Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11861/9092
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Prof. YEUNG Wing Kay, David | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Dr. ZHANG Yingxuan, Cynthia | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-03-19T05:46:22Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2024-03-19T05:46:22Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2022 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2022, vol. 15. | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 2310-2608 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11861/9092 | - |
dc.description.abstract | An empirically meaningful theory of dynamic games has to incorporate real-life phenomena. Durable strategies, which effects last for a period of time, are prevalent in real-life situations. Revenue generating investments, toxic waste disposal and purchase of durable goods are common examples of durable strategies. This paper first provides a review on durable-strategies dynamic game theory. A practically relevant advancement - random horizon durable-strategies dynamic games - yielding novel results in durable-strategies dynamic games theory is then presented. Dynamic optimization theorem, game formulations and HJB equations are derived. An illustrative example is provided. The theory and solution mechanism of durable-strategies cooperative dynamic games are also discussed. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartof | Contributions to Game Theory and Management | en_US |
dc.title | On durable-strategies dynamic game theory | en_US |
dc.type | Peer Reviewed Journal Article | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.23 | - |
crisitem.author.dept | Department of Business Administration | - |
item.fulltext | No Fulltext | - |
Appears in Collections: | Business Administration - Publication |
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