Subgame-consistent cooperative equilibria of multi-objective dynamic games

Abstract

This paper develops subgame consistent cooperative equilibria of multi-objective dynamic games. The presence of multiple objectives in decision-making is prevalent and inherent. Given that the set of objectives of each player will be affected by the actions of other players, non-coordinated maximization by individual players could lead to the case where some prominent objectives may reach an undesirably level. Cooperation is the best way to alleviate the problem and enhance the participants’ payoffs. This paper presents the techniques for solving subgame consistent cooperative equilibria of multi-objective dynamic games with utility-based players. In such an equilibrium, individual rationality, group efficiency, and subgame consistency are realized. An application of collaboration between Australia and New Zealand is provided. This is the first time that subgame consistent cooperative equilibria are applied in multi-objective dynamic games with utility-based players, ample applications in various fields are expected.