Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11861/8754
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorProf. YEUNG Wing Kay, Daviden_US
dc.contributor.authorPetrosyan, Leon A.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2023-12-01T05:37:31Z-
dc.date.available2023-12-01T05:37:31Z-
dc.date.issued2014-
dc.identifier.citationIn Haunschmied, Josef, Veliov, Vladimir M. & Wrzaczek (Eds.). (2014). Dynamic games in economics (pp. 289-315). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.en_US
dc.identifier.isbn9783642542473-
dc.identifier.isbn9783642542480-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11861/8754-
dc.description.abstractThe provision of public goods constitutes a classic case of market failure which calls for cooperative optimization. However, cooperation cannot be sustainable unless there is guarantee that the agreed-upon optimality principle can be maintained throughout the planning duration. This paper derives subgame consistent cooperative solutions for public goods provision by asymmetric agents in a discrete-time dynamic game framework with uncertainties in stock accumulation dynamics and future payoff structures. In particular, subgame consistency ensures that as the game proceeds agents are guided by the same optimality principle and hence they do not possess incentives to deviate from the previously adopted optimal behavior. A “payoff distribution procedure” leading to subgame-consistent solutions is derived and an illustration is presented. This is the first time that subgame consistent cooperative provision of public goods with uncertainties in stock dynamics and future payoffs is analyzed.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSpringer, Berlin, Heidelbergen_US
dc.titleSubgame consistent cooperative provision of public goods under accumulation and payoff uncertaintiesen_US
dc.typeBook Chapteren_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/978-3-642-54248-0_13-
crisitem.author.deptDepartment of Economics and Finance-
item.fulltextNo Fulltext-
Appears in Collections:Economics and Finance - Publication
Show simple item record

SCOPUSTM   
Citations

2
checked on Dec 22, 2024

Page view(s)

27
Last Week
0
Last month
checked on Dec 20, 2024

Google ScholarTM

Impact Indices

Altmetric

PlumX

Metrics


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.