Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11861/8672
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dc.contributor.authorPetrosyan, Leon Aganesovichen_US
dc.contributor.authorProf. YEUNG Wing Kay, Daviden_US
dc.date.accessioned2023-11-20T06:48:35Z-
dc.date.available2023-11-20T06:48:35Z-
dc.date.issued2019-
dc.identifier.citationTrudy Instituta Matematiki i Mekhaniki UrO RAN, 2019, Vol. 25(1), pp. 166-173.en_US
dc.identifier.issn01344889-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11861/8672-
dc.description.abstractA two-level game is considered. At the first level, the set of players N is partitioned into coalitions Si ⊂ N, i = 1, . . ., m, such that Si ∩ Sj = ∅ for i 6= j and each coalition plays against other coalitions a non-zero-sum cooperative differential game with prescribed duration and nontransferable payoffs. At the second level, within each coalition, the players are engaged in a cooperative differential game with prescribed duration and transferrable payoffs. The concept of solution is proposed for this type of two-level games. The properties of a solution, namely, its time consistency or dynamic stability, are studied. © 2019 Krasovskii Institute of Mathematics and Mechanics. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofTrudy Instituta Matematiki i Mekhaniki UrO RANen_US
dc.titleTwo-level cooperation in a class of non-zero-sum differential gamesen_US
dc.typePeer Reviewed Journal Articleen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.21538/0134-4889-2019-25-1-166-173-
item.fulltextNo Fulltext-
crisitem.author.deptDepartment of Economics and Finance-
Appears in Collections:Economics and Finance - Publication
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