Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11861/6508
Title: The tragedy of the commons revisited
Authors: Hartwick, John M. 
Prof. YEUNG Wing Kay, David 
Issue Date: 1997
Source: Pacific Economic Review, Feb. 1997, vol. 2(1), pp. 45-62.
Journal: Pacific Economic Review 
Abstract: The Malthus–Hardin tragedy of the commons is formulated as a dynamic game between “clans”. At each date a member of a clan desires more newborns of her/his type and more current consumption, harvested from the commons. Equilibrium in the dynamic game yields a steady state level of per capita consumption and a steady population level for each clan (births equal deaths). Four outcomes are obtained, depending on the assumptions about the discount rates of members of a clan and about the mode of competition for “large populations” for each clan. Lack of property rights for agricultural land in the commons leads to equilibrium with excessive populations and low per capita consumption.
Type: Peer Reviewed Journal Article Cover
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11861/6508
ISSN: 1468-0106
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0106.t01-1-00022
Appears in Collections:Economics and Finance - Publication

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