Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11861/6486
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dc.contributor.authorProf. YEUNG Wing Kay, Daviden_US
dc.date.accessioned2021-03-06T05:47:30Z-
dc.date.available2021-03-06T05:47:30Z-
dc.date.issued1990-
dc.identifier.citationIn Hamalainen, R. P., & Ehtamo, H. K. (eds.) (1990). Dynamic games in economic analysis (pp. 29-38). New York: Springer.en_US
dc.identifier.isbn9783540537854-
dc.identifier.isbn9783540470960-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11861/6486-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, private investment and public investment are modelled in a differential game framework. A feedback Nash equilibrium solution is obtained. The private saving rate and the government's income tax rate are derived as functions of time, private capital stock, and public capital stock. Their relationship with model parameters — like the discount rate, the depreciation rate, terminal valuation of capital stock, marginal product of capital and the planning horizon — are examined. Various extensions of the basic model are made.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherNew York: Springeren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesLecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences;157-
dc.titleA game theoretical approach to public investment versus private investmenten_US
dc.typeBook Chapteren_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/BFb0006225-
item.fulltextNo Fulltext-
crisitem.author.deptDepartment of Economics and Finance-
Appears in Collections:Economics and Finance - Publication
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