Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11861/6455
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dc.contributor.authorProf. YEUNG Wing Kay, Daviden_US
dc.date.accessioned2021-02-26T06:26:16Z-
dc.date.available2021-02-26T06:26:16Z-
dc.date.issued2000-
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2000, vol. 106, pp. 657-675.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0022-3239-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11861/6455-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we consider a class of differential games in which the game ends when a subset of its state variables reaches a certain target at the terminal time. A special feature of the game is that its horizon is not fixed at the outset, but is determined endogenously by the actions of the players; conditions characterizing a feedback Nash equilibrium (FNE) solution of the game are derived for the first time. Extensions and illustrations of the derivation of FNE solutions of the game are provided.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Optimization Theory and Applicationsen_US
dc.titleFeedback solution of a class of differential games with endogenous horizonsen_US
dc.typePeer Reviewed Journal Articleen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1023/A:1004665614745-
crisitem.author.deptDepartment of Economics and Finance-
item.fulltextNo Fulltext-
Appears in Collections:Economics and Finance - Publication
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