Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11861/6453
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dc.contributor.authorProf. YEUNG Wing Kay, Daviden_US
dc.contributor.authorPetrosyan, Leon A.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2021-02-26T02:57:45Z-
dc.date.available2021-02-26T02:57:45Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2004, vol. 120, pp. 651-666.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0022-3239-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11861/6453-
dc.description.abstractSubgame consistency is a fundamental element in the solution of cooperative stochastic differential games. In particular, it ensures that: (i) the extension of the solution policy to a later starting time and to any possible state brought about by the prior optimal behavior of the players would remain optimal; (ii) all players do not have incentive to deviate from the initial plan. In this paper, we develop a mechanism for the derivation of the payoff distribution procedures of subgame consistent solutions in stochastic differential games with transferable payoffs. The payoff distribution procedure of the subgame consistent solution can be identified analytically under different optimality principles. Demonstration of the use of the technique for specific optimality principles is shown with an explicitly solvable game. For the first time, analytically tractable solutions of cooperative stochastic differential games with subgame consistency are derived.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Optimization Theory and Applicationsen_US
dc.titleSubgame consistent cooperative solutions in stochastic differential gamesen_US
dc.typePeer Reviewed Journal Articleen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1023/B:JOTA.0000025714.04164.e4-
crisitem.author.deptDepartment of Economics and Finance-
item.fulltextNo Fulltext-
Appears in Collections:Economics and Finance - Publication
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