Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11861/6441
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Prof. YEUNG Wing Kay, David | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-02-26T01:30:34Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-02-26T01:30:34Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2006 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | International Game Theory Review, 2006, vol. 8(4), pp. 739-744. | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 0219-1989 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11861/6441 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Under dynamic cooperation a player may use 'irrational' acts to extort additional gains if later circumstances allow. In this article we present a condition under which even if irrational behaviors appear later in the game the concerned player would still be performing better under the cooperative scheme. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartof | International Game Theory Review | en_US |
dc.title | Technical note: "An irrational-behavior-proof condition in cooperative differential games" | en_US |
dc.type | Peer Reviewed Journal Article | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1142/S0219198906001223 | - |
item.fulltext | No Fulltext | - |
crisitem.author.dept | Department of Economics and Finance | - |
Appears in Collections: | Economics and Finance - Publication |
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