Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11861/6428
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dc.contributor.authorProf. YEUNG Wing Kay, Daviden_US
dc.contributor.authorDr. ZHANG Yingxuan, Cynthiaen_US
dc.contributor.authorYeung, Patricia M.en_US
dc.contributor.authorMak, Demien_US
dc.date.accessioned2021-02-24T07:49:22Z-
dc.date.available2021-02-24T07:49:22Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.citationInternational Game Theory Review, 2010, vol. 12(4), pp. 471-481.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0219-1989-
dc.identifier.issn1793-6675-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11861/6428-
dc.description.abstractThis article provides an extension of the Fend-Feichtinger-Tragler dynamic game of offending and law enforcement to a stochastic framework. This allows the analysis to reflect actual crime statistics which displays randomness in its distribution. Stochastic paths of crimes are derived. The asymptotic stationary distribution of crime records is also obtained.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Game Theory Reviewen_US
dc.titleDynamic game of offending and law enforcement: A stochastic extensionen_US
dc.typePeer Reviewed Journal Articleen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1142/S0219198910002787-
crisitem.author.deptDepartment of Economics and Finance-
item.fulltextNo Fulltext-
Appears in Collections:Economics and Finance - Publication
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