Are Asset Impairment and Earnings Management for Tunneling? Evidence from Connected Transactions in Hong Kong
Principal Investigator
Department
Grant Awarding Body
Research Grants Council
Grant Type
Faculty Development Scheme
Project Code
UGC/FDS15/B02/16
Amount awarded
$553,250
Funding Year
2017/18
Duration of the Project
24 months
Status
Completed
Abstract
Prior research has documented that controlling shareholders may expropriate wealth through tunneling-like connected transactions. This project explores how firms with forthcoming transfer of assets to related parties justify the transaction price prior to the tunneling transactions without attracting investors' attention or regulatory intervention, and how firms respond to the economic consequences of these trading strategies. Specifically, the questions of interest are whether suspected tunneled firms use asset impairment before asset-transfer connected transactions to reduce the transaction price, and as a consequence, whether these firms manage contemporaneous earnings to avoid decreases in reported earnings? Our analyses will provide insight into the policy implications of the mandatory disclosure of connected parties (related parties) and connected transactions (related party transactions).