Prof. YEUNG Wing Kay, DavidDavidProf. YEUNG Wing KayPetrosyan, Leon A.Leon A.Petrosyan2021-02-232021-02-232013Mathematical and Computer Modelling, Feb. 2013, vol. 57(3/4), pp. 976-991.0895-7177http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11861/6417In the analysis of cooperative stochastic dynamic games a stringent condition–subgame consistency–is required for a dynamically stable solution. A cooperative solution is subgame consistent if an extension of the solution policy to a subgame starting at a later time with a feasible state brought about by prior optimal behavior would remain optimal. This paper considers subgame consistent cooperative solutions in randomly furcating stochastic discrete-time dynamic games. Analytically tractable payoff distribution procedures contingent upon specific random realizations of the state and payoff structures are derived. In computer modeling and operations research discrete-time analysis often proved to be more applicable and compatible with actual data than continuous-time analysis. This is the first time that a subgame consistent solution for randomly-furcating stochastic dynamic games has been obtained. It widens the application of cooperative dynamic game theory to discrete-time problems where the evolution of the state and future payoff structures are not known with certainty.enSubgame-consistent cooperative solutions in randomly furcating stochastic dynamic gamesPeer Reviewed Journal Article10.1016/j.mcm.2012.10.009