Prof. YEUNG Wing Kay, DavidDavidProf. YEUNG Wing Kay2021-03-062021-03-061998European Journal of Operational Research, Jun. 1998, vol. 107(3), pp. 737-754.0377-2217http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11861/6506This paper presents a class of differential games which admits a feedback Nash equilibrium solution with linear value functions. An interesting feature is that not only may the equilibrium strategies be highly nonlinear, they may even assume a general structure instead of an explicit specification. A number of existing games are shown to be games belonging to this class of games. Two new applications — one in political support scrambling and one in common pool non-renewable resources extraction — are provided.enA class of differential games which admits a feedback solution with linear value functionsPeer Reviewed Journal Article10.1016/S0377-2217(97)00093-3