

**Proceedings of the
7th Annual Conference of the Asian Studies Association**

Edited by Selina Ching Chan

**Hong Kong Shue Yan University
The Contemporary China Research Center
ISBN 978-988-18445-0-7**

Foreword

The Contemporary China Research Center was first founded in 1996 by Professor Yao-Su Hu, who is the Academic Vice-President at Hong Kong Shue Yan University. In 1998 the Center co-organized a conference on Chinese economic development and social transformation with the Institute of Sociology at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, which was attended by over a hundred scholars from Taiwan, China, and Hong Kong. Over the years, the Center has continued to advance academic research through organizing a variety of seminars, workshops and conferences, as well as publishing research reports. On 2-3 March 2012, the Contemporary China Research Center was honoured to be appointed as a co-organiser of the 7th Annual Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Hong Kong, together with the Asian Studies Association of Hong Kong. More than 200 scholars from 10 countries (China, UK, Japan, Russia, Thailand, Malaysia, France, Australia, Singapore, Indonesia) attended the conference. This conference has provided opportunities for scholars of varying levels of experience to exchange ideas on a wide range of issues relevant to China and Asian Studies. It has also enhanced interdisciplinary investigations of issues pertinent to Asia, China, and Hong Kong. Scholars from the fields of Business studies, Economics, Philosophy, Literature, History, Sociology, Anthropology, Political Science, and Psychology have addressed vital political, cultural and economic issues in Asian Studies at this conference. The conference has also successfully promoted academic exchanges and cooperation between scholars and institution in Hong Kong and colleagues in other parts of the world. Lastly, the Conference Proceedings have provided a record of the conference papers in electronic form and demonstrate the richness of the topics covered.

The publication of the Conference Proceedings would not have been possible without the support of different institutions and individuals. In particular, I would like to take this opportunity to thank all members at the Organizing Committee, Dr. Chi Kin Au, Dr. Yin-Wah Chu, Dr. Lubanski Chi-Fai Lam, Dr. Pui Tak Lee, Dr. Shu Kum Lee, Dr. Lan Sze Pang, Dr. Reuben Mondejar, Dr. Yinni Peng, Dr. Pak Nung Wong, and Dr. Thomas Wai-Kee Yuen, council members at the Asian Studies Association of Hong Kong, Dr. Tai-Yuen Hon, as well as voluntary student helpers for making this Conference a success. I would also like to take the opportunity to thank colleagues and the heads from the departments of Economics and Finance, History, Business Administration, Counselling and Psychology, as well as Sociology, for their support to the Contemporary China Research Center in organizing this conference.

Selina China Chan, The Editor

August 2012

Table of Contents

Keynote Speech

- What have civilisation (wenming) and culture (wenhua) done to Chinese civilisation (hua)?
Stephan Feuchtwang P.10
-

State and Economic Development

- Challenges and Opportunities of Credit Union Movement in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan
Che-Cheong Poon P.11
- Guanxi in the Eyes of China's Foreign Banks
Adolphus, Yee-Yin Wan and Ken, Tsz-Lun Ng P.31
- China's Response to the World Economic Crises and Her Rise
Dragana Mitrovic P.5
- Reassessing Enterprise Risk Management in China
Benjamin Fung P.78
- Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems and Government Regulation
Alexander Katkov P.108
- GCC Economies and Air Pollution: A Qualitative Analysis to a Carbon Dioxide Emissions Issue
Ahmed Saddam and Fatimah Kari P.127
- Follow the Money: Agricultural Productivity and the Commodity Chain of Smallholding Coffee Production on the Bolaven Plateau, Lao PDR
Claudio O. Delang P.150
- Adjusting the Economic Lens on Sustainable Welfare: The GPI of Hong Kong
Yi Hang Yu P.176
-

Marketing Practices, Consumer Behavior and Organizational Management

- Industrial Pollution Problems in Pearl-River-Delta and Mechanism Design for an Inter-regional Management Regime
David W.K. Yeung and Yingxuan Zhang P.201

A Literature Review: How Useful is Agency Theory – Top Executive Compensation <i>Chan Kien Ngai</i>	P.232
The Impacts of Demographics on Mature Consumers' Online Usage and Shopping Intention <i>Monica Law and Mark Ng</i>	P.274
Can Green Marketing Work? Key Determinants of Consumers' Attitude toward Green Products in Hong Kong <i>Mark Ng and Monica Law</i>	P.286
Generational Influences on Hotel Industry <i>Lai-Kuen Law</i>	P.298
Marketing of The Boat Tourism within Chachengsao Province <i>Lamson Lertkulprayad</i>	P.310
A Comparative Analysis of The Marketing of Private Banking Services: Europe vs. Asia <i>Ronald K Chung and Alice M Chung</i>	P.319
人力資源管理以改善公立醫院醫生短缺問題 <i>楊鈺芬</i>	P.325

Real Estate and Stock Markets

Hodrick-Prescott Filter Analysis on Residential Market and Macro Economy in Hong Kong <i>Rita Yi Man Li</i>	P.338
Entrepreneurship and Institutional Change in Real Estate Brokerage Market in Taiwan: The Case of Sinyi Real Estate <i>Simon Chien Yuan Chen and Fu-Lai Tony Yu</i>	P.354
Ownership Housing Demand in Shanghai: A Study with Stated Preference Panel Data <i>Yuan Cheng, John K. Dagsvik and Xuehui Han</i>	P.382
Managing Financial Risk by Using Derivatives: A Study of Hong Kong Listed Companies <i>Tai-Yuen Hon</i>	P.421

The Viewpoint/Safety First (V/SF) Theory as a Rival Theory to Myopic Loss Aversion to Explain the Equity Premium Puzzle
Tang Luk Wing, Jimmy
P.446

The Impact of Liquidity in Explaining the Differences in Returns for Direct and Indirect Property Investment in Hong Kong
Lam Chun-Mo
P.496

Regime-Switching Volatility: Evidence from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange
Yihua Xu, Yingxuan Zhang and Xiao Chen
P.512

The Consideration of On-going Socio-economic Needs of Citizens
Bhzad Sidawi
P.519

Social Transformations in Contemporary China

Chinese Central Government Policy Priorities During Power Transitions
Tristan McLinnis
P.534

Vigilante Activities for Residential Community: An Empirical Study in Liuzhou, China
Lena Y. Zhong and Holly Heng He
P.544

Politics of Space and the Formation of Village Landscape in Northeastern Guangdong
Vesper Y. Chen
P.567

The Three Gorges Dam: Getting a Sense of the Magnitude and Scope of the Project and its Moral Implications
Dan Zhou and Ronald S. Laura
P.585

Religious Revival and De-ethnicisation in China: Reshapping Boundaries
Francis Khek Gee Lim
P.596

Who Supported the Church in Canton? -- A Story on 'Nanjuan' by Jiu Gun-Hoi--
Doi Ayumu
P.620

The Super Girl Voice Phenomenon, Cultural Hegemony and Cultural Dynamics in Contemporary China
Huang Yu
P.639

Cooperation and Confrontation: A Macro Analysis of the MediaSport Institution in Contemporary China

Ping Wu

P.660

新時期後中國的海洋經略－從黃水向藍水的發展（1980-現在）

林皓賢

P.683

中國大陸改革開放三十年來的民生改變

羅永生

P.716

Family and Quality of Life

Happiness and Work-Family Balance in Chinese Society

Wai Kee Yuen, Wan Ling Chu and Han Yu Hou

P.722

Work-Family/Family-Work Conflict on Affective Commitment: Moderating Role of Gender

Millissa F. Y. Cheung and Chi-Sum Wong

P.739

Factors Affecting Family Resilience: A Research on Validating FAAR Model

P.Y. Lui, L.Y. Lo, M.T. Leung, Y.K. Wong, H.Y. Mak, K.C. So and L.P. Lee

P.764

Belief in a Just World and Quality of Life among People Living with HIV in Malaysia

Siah Poh-Chua, Tan Jiunn-Han and Sivan Koran

P.779

Self, Language, Politics, and Education

Changes of Education to Overseas Chinese (1980 – 2000): An Example of Yokohama Yamate Chinese School

Wai Shing Lee

P.789

Wayang as an Alternative Learning Method to Solve Indonesian Problem in Education and Culture

Astri Setiamurti, Nur Hannah Muthohharoh and Moh. Miftachur Rizqi

P.804

Market, Religion and State: Religious Education and Secular Education in a Muslim Village of Northwest China

Hong Yanbi

P.814

Effects of Gender Differences on Communication Strategy Use among ESL Learners

Rushita Ismail, Suzana Ab. Rahim and Farina Nozakiah Takjizan

P.832

- Bad Words Hurt Us Quicker: An Investigation on the Processing of Emotional Words in Bilingual Speakers
Yuen-Lai Chan and Lap-Yan Lo P.848
- The Language Attitudes of Nepalese Adolescents in a Hong Kong Secondary School
Eden S.H. Li, Michael C.M. Ng and Kathryn N.K. Wong P.865
- The Changing Language Attitudes toward English of Chinese Secondary Students in Hong Kong
Eden S.H. Li and Gladys N.Y. Luk P.887
- Contacting and Enacting “Self for being Ethical”: A Model for Psychotherapy Practiced in Taiwan
Wei-Lun Lee P.906
- The Coverage of Madam President: The News Coverage of Megawati Soekarnoputri in the 2009 Presidential Election
Lily Yulianti P.922

Memory, Heritage, and Hong Kong Society

- Body and Social Memory in Hong Kong School Trips for National Identity
Chan Wing-Hoi P.957
- 我們的地方？我們的時間？香港文化保育和都市發展再探
楊健文 P.970
- The Politics of Festival in Postcolonial Hong Kong: Resettlement Plan and the Temple of Identities in Ngautaukok, East Kowloon
Vito Yu P.981
- Why the (Freudian) Unconscious was not Discovered in China? Other and Desire in Hong Kong
Diego Busiol P.1005

Film and Social Change

- Documentary Film and Political Changes in Indonesia (1900-2011)
Ade Suryani P.1026

- State Policy and Its Implementation for Imported Buyout Films in Mainland China
Bingting Liu
P.1041
- Representations of Sexuality in Winds of September
Wang Changsong
P.1060
- Love Story between Teacher and Student as Metaphor: A Textual Analysis of July Rhapsody, Thirteen Princess Trees and Cape No. 7
Huo Shengxia
P.1073
- 從金錢的構形閱讀都市——以《新舊上海》電影為例
楊妍
P.1087
-

Cross-Cultural Interactions

- Gender and Environment in an Ethnic Quarter: A Case Study of Local Community Activities in Yokohama Chinatown
Elim Yee Lam Wong and Tai Wei Lim
P.1097
- Sojourn as an Intercultural Experience: Study on Indonesian Migrant Workers in Malaysia
Melly Ridaryanthi
P.1112
- Re-Integration of Cultural and Religious Identities in Central Asian Societies, the Challenges and the Promising Prospects for Regional Cooperation and Good Neighborhood (including China)
Sunatullo Jonboboev
P.1124
- Comparative Analysis of the Image of the Stranger in Chinese and Russian Discourse
Anna Romanova and Olesia Yakushenkova
P.1158
- European Entertainment Culture in the Concessions of Late Qing Dynasty
Christine Howald
P.1167
-

Intellectuals and the Politics of Modernization

- 胡適與《文星雜誌》
黃克武
P.1178

- 淺論 1950 年代美國在香港的反共宣傳手法：以《四海》為探討對象
羅玉芬 P.1189
- 香港成為國、共以外倡導「自由」聲音的地方——以五十年代《自由陣綫》群體批評國民黨及反共言論為例
區志堅 P.1200
- 從《自由陣線》到《自由鐘》：檢視五六十年代流亡知識份子的命運
容啟聰 P.1214
- 陳寶琛與清季福建新政——以漳廈鐵路為例
黃嘉康 P.1218
- Women Missionaries in the Whirlpool of China's Anti-Foreignness, 1860-1900
Yan Shi P.1225

Renditions and Narratives in Chinese Culture

- Social Meanings of Architecture in Pre-modern China: Hall (Tang) and Pavilion (Ting)
Jing Xie P.1237
- 晚明滑稽仿作新視野——王思任《弈律》初探
胡梓穎 P.1251
- 「奇書文體」的影響：論陳忱《水滸後傳》的敘事結構
林成川 P.1264
- 〈官定後戲贈〉與杜甫的離職詩
黃白鴻 P.1281
- 分析《酒徒》中的五個代碼
杜子臻 P.1287
- 論「仁」的英文翻譯
On the English Renditions of the Confucian Concept ren 仁
張宇傑 P.1296

Keynote Speech

Professor Stephan Feuchtwang,

Emeritus Professor, Department of Anthropology, London School of Economics

Stephan Feuchtwang is Emeritus Professor in the Department of Anthropology, London School of Economics. His main area of research has been China. But recently he extended it to the comparative study of the transmission of great events of state violence, in China, Taiwan and Germany. This research was published in 2011 in *After the Event*, Berghahn Books 2011. Other recent publications include *The Anthropology of Religion, Charisma and Ghosts*, De Gruyter 2010; and as editor and contributor, *Making Place: State projects, globalisation and local responses in China*, UCL Press 2004; and (with Wang Mingming) *Grassroots Charisma: Four local leaders in China*, Routledge 2001. He has been working with Michael Rowlands for the past ten years on a book, now nearing completion, on civilisation, re-introducing the long term in a comparative approach to civilisations defined as spreads and mixtures with many centres, not as cultures that clash.

Keynote Speech:

What have civilisation (wenming) and culture (wenhua) done to Chinese civilisation (hua)?

Abstract

My topic is the formation, externally and internally of moral persons in the conditions under which a civilisation is turned into a self-conscious nationality. Nation-formation is pursued by intellectual and artistic elites particularly, but also contentiously, once they have at their disposal a powerful state. I stress the pedagogical mobilisation of versions of what are supposed, in the new narratives of nationality, always to have been the abiding character of the people of that nation. These pedagogies of moral personality are learned through their own aspirations by subjects who also have at their disposal other transmissions from the past of Chinese civilisation. I ask whether continuity of these traditions of self-cultivation are compatible with the pedagogy of continuity. I stress the multiplication of inconsistent formations and cultivations of personhood in China. I develop a conception of a regime of self-conscious visibility, contrasted with the dynastic regime of imperial invisibility. The new regime of visibility is characterised by spectacular displays of sentiment and by responses of implicit irony. The one continuity that I think may be peculiar to China is the habit of moral pedagogy as a civilising mission.

See [video](http://www.hksyu.edu/ccrc/Seminars.html) on the website at Hong Kong Shue Yan University
<http://www.hksyu.edu/ccrc/Seminars.html>

Challenges and Opportunities of the Credit Union Movements in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan

Che-Cheong Poon
Hong Kong Shue Yan University
Email: ccpoon@hksyu.edu

1 INTRODUCTION

Ever since the emergence of the money economy, a great variety of financing methods have been devised to enable money to flow from savers to dis-savers in order to enhance their economic benefits. In the Chinese community, there are three types of financing methods. The first is self-financing that refers to the use of current income and accumulated savings to meet some periodic consumption expenditure or to acquire working capital for small businesses. Then there is internal financing which refers to borrowing from relatives and friends to finance consumption over spells of economic difficulties or to capture good investment opportunities. Finally, there is external financing which some people use when they wish to raise large amounts of money to finance huge business projects. In such cases people may borrow from commercial banks, or issue stock certificates or bonds on the market. Low-income people must use up all of their current income and, have no margin of savings to improve their methods of production, so self-financing is not an option for them, and external financing is also not available to them since they cannot get access to the financial markets. They could obtain credit from external suppliers, such as pawnshops and money lenders, but such sources are not included in this analysis because they are not financial intermediaries.

Turvey, Kong & Huo (2010) pointed out that informal lending among friends and relatives was a popular financing method in China's agricultural communities. A comprehensive survey of the credit needs of villages in China conducted by Zhao (2011, pp 83-87) shows that a large number of informal loans were arranged to finance personal consumption. These were mostly derived from relatives and friends, were interest-free, did not require collateral interest and had open-ended repayment arrangements. However, when a

larger sum of money is needed, it is difficult to borrow from one individual and to repay the loan in a short time. Thus various types of loan societies, which are groups of people organised for collective saving and lending, were formed to meet these needs, in a mutually supportive way.

According to Fei (1939, pp267-274) and Mok & Wu (1972), Yao Hui (or Yi Hui)¹ was a traditional Chinese money-lending society. Its modern variants have been named variously as Piao Hui (in Singapore), Chin Hui or Chit Fund (in Hong Kong), and He Hui or mutual help society (in Taiwan). Such a society (Hui) is organised on the initiative of the person who needs financial help in cases such as unexpected expenditures for a funeral, a wedding or family sickness. The members meet several times a year. At these meetings, each participant subscribes a share. The total subscriptions by the members are collected by one of the members who can use the money to finance the activities for which the finance is required. The members take it in turn to collect the sum. The first collector is the organiser, and from the very beginning, he is a debtor to the society. He repays his loan bit by bit during the whole course of the loan period, plus a certain amount of interest. The last collector is only a depositor. At the end of the loan period he collects the sum of his deposit and the interest it has earned. The members switch from being depositors to debtors as their turn comes to collect the sum. The order of collection is determined either by contract, by lot or by auction. Over time, the Hui evolved, so that most of the members in the Hui were perfect strangers who joined in mainly to earn interest or to borrow money rather than to help relatives and friends. The Hui was very popular in China (before the establishment of the PRC in 1949), Taiwan, Hong Kong and Southeast Asia in the last century. For instance, there were thousands of members in a single Hui in 1970 in Hong Kong.

As the membership and loan amounts increased, there was a tendency for more and more Hui members to use the borrowed funds to finance risky ventures or financial speculation, and this resulted in an increasing number of cases of loan delinquency and default. Since the Hui had become too commercial and were no longer simply a platform for providing loans to poor people who needed the money to meet some urgent expense, and also

¹ Hui means club or society. In this paper it refers to money-loan society.

because the frequency of Hui insolvency had increased tremendously, Hong Kong and Taiwan introduced some restrictions on the expansion of Hui in 1972 (Chit-Fund Businesses ((Prohibition)) Ordinance, 1972) and 2000 (Civil Law of ROC 2000) respectively to protect the Hui members. As a result, the Hui business has been declining since then.

However, the decline in the Chinese money-loan societies (Hui) provided an opportunity for the development of credit unions since the late 1960s in Hong Kong and Taiwan, and eventually the credit union movement extended to China in the 1980s. Croteau (1963, p.164) pointed out that the individual household faces a monopolistic or imperfect financial market. It has little or no bargaining power, and it receives only the going interest rate for its savings. The market for instalment loans is still disorganised and characterised by high interest charges that are often concealed and unclear. Thus there is a strong incentive for households to unite in a credit union. Jack Dublin in his book (1971, p.9), *Credit Unions: theory and practice*, gave the following definition: A credit union is a cooperative, designed to provide its members with an efficient, inexpensive saving-and-loan service. This definition has provided a clear description of the essence of credit unions. More specifically, credit unions differ from the traditional commercial banks in four ways. (1) A different purpose: The primary purpose of credit unions is to meet the common needs of their members, whereas that of banks is to maximise shareholders' profit; (2) A different control structure: Credit unions use the one-member-one-vote system, not the one-vote-per-share system used by banks. This helps the credit union to serve the common need rather than the individual need, and is a way to ensure that people, not capital, control the organisation; (3) A different allocation of profit: Credit unions share any profits among their member-owners on the basis of how much they use the credit union services, and not on how many shares they hold as is the case in banks. Credit unions also tend to invest their profits in improving their service to members and promoting the well-being of their communities; and (4) A different remuneration system: Unlike the directors of banks who are entitled to director's fees, interest and remuneration, credit union directors are not allowed by law to receive any remuneration from the credit union. Although many different names for and forms of credit union are used in different parts of the world, credit unions do share the common principle of people helping people.

Beginning in Germany with Schulze-Delitzsch and Raiffeisen in the mid-nineteenth century, the credit union movement then spread to other parts of Europe, to Canada in 1901, to the United States in 1908, and then to Australia in 1946. Following World War II, credit unions were developed in many parts of the world. The credit union idea had spread to Asia already in 1938. It started first in the Philippines and then gradually spread to other Asian countries, including Hong Kong and Taiwan. Led by the Catholic Jesuit Society, the credit union movement in Hong Kong and Taiwan started to develop after the conference hosted by the Committee for the Development of Socio-economic Life in Asia (SELA) which was held in Bangkok in May 1963. Since then, the credit union concept has been quickly accepted among the middle and lower income groups. Forty-six years after the establishment of the first credit union in Hong Kong (the St. Francis Credit Union) and Taiwan (the Sacred Heart Credit Union) in 1964, there were 44 credit unions with 74,086 members in Hong Kong and 336 credit unions (in 15 Chapters²) with 203,767 members in Taiwan in 2010.

Recently microfinance has become one of the most important mechanisms for providing financial services to low income households, and credit unions have been considered to be the major microfinance institutions in many developed as well as developing economies. In this paper, efforts are made to identify and explain the characteristics of the credit union industry in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Since the credit union movement in China is in its nascent stage, the first step will be to look at the current situation of the launching and introduction of credit unions there. The succeeding sections will discuss the credit union industry in Hong Kong and Taiwan focusing on a discussion of the supply and demand for microcredit during different phases of the business cycle in order to identify the common and particular features of the credit union industry in these two economies after the Asian financial crisis³. Recommendations will then be presented on ways to develop a comprehensive microfinance system suitable for Chinese people in the hope of contributing to the reduction of poverty and the promotion of employment.

² Chapter is a Credit Union jargon referring to a group of credit unions in a specific geographical area.

³ The East Asian Financial Crisis (or Currency Turmoil) started in Thailand with the collapse of the Thai baht in July 1997 and quickly spread to the rest of the region in 1998.

2 THE CREDIT UNION MOVEMENT IN CHINA

In 1923 a new credit institution, the rural credit co-operative (RCC), appeared in north China, and by 1933 there were 952 co-operatives in Hopei with 23,753 members. These loaned around 90,000 yuan to their members to buy capital goods and repair homes (Myers 1970, p245). This cooperative credit system was not an organisation run by the villagers themselves but a means for them to borrow money from the national bank at low interest rates (Fei 1939, pp 280). Although it was a well-intentioned measure by the government to stabilise rural finance through a cooperative credit system, it failed to yield the expected results because the government was unable to afford the credit required, and because of the mal-administration of the system. Shortly after the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, rural credit co-operatives (RCCs) were introduced in 1951 and developed very quickly (Zhao 2011, p.11), According to the China Statistical Information and Consultancy Centre (1990), by 1955 rural credit co-operatives had been set up in almost all townships in China , with a total number of more than 150,000 throughout the country, and RMB160 million in paid-up shares, RMB200 million in savings deposits and RMB190 million in loans. Thus, in addition to combating usury in the countryside and promoting financial stability, rural credit co-operatives have been the core of the rural financial system since then except for the episode of the people's commune movement in 1958 during which rural credit unions were merged with the township-level branches of the Agricultural Bank and were placed under the jurisdiction of the commune. The rural credit unions underwent a major reform 38 years later, in 1996, to separate them from the Agricultural Bank, and to restore their status as independent cooperative financial institutions.

On the other hand, the urban credit co-operatives were started later than their rural counterparts. After the establishment of the first urban credit co-operatives in Zhumadian City of Henan Province in 1979, urban credit unions developed as a new form of financial institution and experienced fast growth in the 1980s and early 1990s. In contrast to the 1996 rural credit unions reform, which aimed at restoring the cooperative nature of the rural credit unions, the 1995 restructuring of the urban credit unions was intended to reform them as

commercial banks. In 2000, according to Zuo (2001), the People's Bank of China ordered all urban credit unions to choose between three alternatives: to be acquired by the city's commercial banks, to be acquired by joint equity commercial banks, or to merge with rural credit unions. In effect, this would leave no room for the existence of cooperative financial institutions in urban areas. Table 1 shows clearly the effect of the replacement of urban credit co-operatives by city commercial banks and the low profitability of rural credit co-operatives compared to other financial institutions in China.

Table 1. Total assets and profitability of selected financial institutions in China

	Financial institution	2007	2010
Total assets (RMB100million)	All Banking Institutions ⁴	531,160	953,053
	City Commercial Banks	33,405	78,526
	Urban Credit Co-operatives	1,312	22
	Rural Credit Co-operatives	43,434	63,911
Profit after tax (A) (RMB100million)	All Banking Institutions	4,467.3	8990.9
	City Commercial Banks	248.1	769.8
	Urban Credit Co-operatives	7.7	0.1
	Rural Credit Co-operatives	193.4	232.9
Total owners' equity (B) (RMB100million)	All Banking Institutions	30,396	58,322
	City Commercial Banks	1,883	4,822
	Urban Credit Co-operatives	64	2
	Rural Credit Co-operatives	1,867	2,793
Profitability = (A/B)×100%	All Banking Institutions	14.7%	15.4%
	City Commercial Banks	13.2%	16.0%
	Urban Credit Co-operatives	12.0%	5%
	Rural Credit Co-operatives	10.4%	8.3%

Sources: Calculated from China Banking Regulatory Commission Annual Report 2010 PP152, 154, and 156.

In addition to the traditional credit co-operatives, the government in 2007 with the hope of promoting micro-financial services in the rural sector established a new system called rural mutual co-operatives (RMC). "The Interim Provisions on the Administration of Rural Mutual Co-operatives " which was enacted in January 2007 defines a rural mutual co-operative as a

⁴ Banking institutions included Policy banks & the CDB, large commercial banks, joint-stock commercial banks, city commercial banks, rural commercial banks, rural co-operative banks, urban credit co-operatives, rural credit cooperatives, non-bank financial institutions, foreign banks, and new-type rural financial institutions & postal savings banks.

community-based mutual banking financial institution which is jointly funded by the farmers of a township (town), administrative village, and small rural enterprises. It was also stipulated that a rural mutual co-operative must be managed in a democratic manner by its members, with the aim of providing services to them and help in areas of common interest to them. According to the “Notice on the Implementation of the General Working Plan for New-Type Rural Financial Institutions (2009-2011)”, issued on July 23, 2009, the China Banking Regulatory Commission CBRC planned to establish 161 rural mutual cooperatives within 3 years. However, only 37 rural mutual co-operatives were in place by the end of 2010, and it would seem to be very difficult to achieve the target of 161. The unsatisfactory outcome of this initiative may be mainly due to the deviation from the co-operative philosophy of “not for profit, not for charity, but for service” and a shortage of trained personnel. Although rural credit co-operatives, urban credit co-operatives, and the rural mutual co-operatives have all been providing credit services to those who did not have a bank account, they are not genuine credit unions. It was not until the late 1980s that the China Association for NGO Co-operation⁵, with help from the Credit Union League of Hong Kong, established China’s first genuine credit union in a village of Linyi in the southeast of Shandong province.

The World Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU) started a special project that launched the credit union movement of China in 1983. The National Credit Union Federation of Korea, the Credit Union League of the Republic of China, the Credit Union League of Hong Kong and the Singapore Credit Co-operative League have borne the weight of promoting the credit union movement in China. Because of the proximity of these promoters, credit unions have made the most progress in some North Eastern Provinces, such as Heilongjiang, Shandong, Lijiang, Fujian and Hainan. According to Edmonson (1995), China at that time had been the most difficult country for the WOCCU to start credit unions in. The main obstacles encountered were language, culture, geography, government opposition and shortage of money. Because the central government had not endorsed credit unions, the promotional work was done at the local level. In spite of these difficulties, however, the promotion has gradually

⁵ The China Association for NGO Co-operation (CANGO) is a non-profit membership organization operating nationwide. CANGO was founded in 1992 and registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs in 1993.

been extended to other Provinces such as Guizhou, Yunan , Shanxi and. Guangdong.

Among the various issues related to the sannong problems⁶, rural finance is vitally important. Since the late 1990s, the policy environment for the development of rural microfinancing has become more and more relaxed, and the Chinese government's promotion of the new-types of rural financial institutions, including village or township banks, lending companies and rural mutual co-operatives, are laying down good foundations for the development of credit unions. Numerous efforts have been made over the past two decades by WOCCU and the Association of Asian Confederations of Credit Unions (ACCU) in this respect, and eventually the Chinese government established a legal framework to allow for the existence of credit unions at the end of 2006. In addition, the launch and introduction of the Credit Union Microfinance Innovation (CUMI) Training Manual was organised by the Center for International Business Ethics, the ACCU, and the China Credit Research Center of Peking University on July 21, 2010 to promote the credit union purposes and values (So, 2011), and this made a significant contribution to the credit union movement in China. Judging from the strong desire of the Chinese government to establish a self-help microfinance system, including rejuvenating the credit co-operatives, to address the poverty alleviation issue on the one hand, and the desire of the WOCCU and ACCU to include China in their lists of member countries on the other, we have good reasons to expect a substantial development of credit unions in China.

3 DEVELOPMENT OF THE CREDIT UNION INDUSTRY IN HONG KONG AND TAIWAN


As mentioned earlier in Section 1, the Catholic Jesuit Society introduced the credit union movement to Hong Kong and Taiwan in 1963. In Hong Kong, the first credit union, the St Francis Credit Union, was established in 1964. The Credit Unions Ordinance of 1968 was passed on 6 November, but did not come into effect until 22 February 1970 with the

⁶ The sannong problems or the three agricultural problems refer to the problems of peasantry, rural areas and agriculture in China.

appointment of the first Registrar of Credit Unions. In practice, the Registrar has been the Director of the Agriculture and Fisheries Department who also supervised many other co-operative societies. As stated in the Registrar General's annual report (1985-86) that it was government policy to consolidate the present development of cooperative and credit union movements as instruments to improve the economic and social condition of the community.

Figure 1a tracks the credit union movement in Hong Kong since 1964. The pilot period from 1964, when the first credit union was formed, to the end of 1968 when the credit union law was introduced can be considered the first stage of the movement. The second stage was the take-off period from 1969 to 1973, due mainly to the enactment of the Credit Union Ordinance and the realisation of the need for thrift and credit services among the middle and lower income groups. The period from 1974 onwards was the third stage, characterised by a significant drop in the number of credit unions because some of them were wound up or merged.

Figure 1 Time plot of the number of credit unions and credit union members in Hong Kong: 1964-2010




Sources: 1964-1970 data were extracted from Hong Kong Annual Report 1968-70 and unpublished records held in the CULHK; 1971-1987 data were extracted from Hong Kong Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department Annual Reports; 1987-2010 data were extracted from the CULHK Annual Reports.

Over the last 40 years since the Credit Union Ordinance was enacted in 1970, with the advocacy of credit union leaders and full support from credit union members in Hong Kong, the total membership of the 41 credit unions climbed from 5,486 at the end of March 1971, with a penetration rate of 0.34 per cent and total savings of HK\$863,550, to a total

membership of 65,024 in the 44 credit unions at the end of 2010, with total savings of HK\$6,726,372,575, which represents an average annual rate of change of 25.83 per cent.

In Taiwan, the first credit union, the Sacred Heart Credit Union, was also established in 1964. At that time there were only 63 members with total savings of NT\$24,005. In 2010, the credit union industry had 15 Chapters⁷ and 336 credit unions, and had total savings of NT\$19,197,228,853, which represents an average annual rate of change of 34 per cent over the past 46 years. From Figure 2a, it can be seen that the number of credit unions experienced a rapid growth period from 1964 to 1975. This represents the pilot and take-off periods of the credit union movement. The period of 1976 to 1997 was the legislative and institutional period, the main feature of which was the strengthening of the structure of the credit union system. Although there were a number of credit unions that merged or were wound up, the total number of credit unions showed a steady growth in this period. However, since 1997 there has been a gradual decline in the number of credit unions.

Figure 2 Time plot of the number of credit unions and credit union members in Taiwan: 1964-2010



Sources: Plotted from statistics extracted from the CULROC Annual Reports, various years.

Savings in credit unions are called “shares” (each of which is HK\$5 in Hong Kong and

⁷ Chapter is a local union which is composed by primary credit unions located in the same area as the bridge between the league and primary credit unions. There are 15 Chapters located in 15 counties of 4 areas (north, south, east and middle) to assist conducting varies social activities and training programs for members and leaders as well as promoting the new credit unions establishment and businesses run by league.

NT\$100 in Taiwan), and in practice a “share” may be withdrawn on demand (see Credit Union Act, 2000 and Credit Union Ordinance, 2002). To encourage thrift through savings, and thus to provide loans and other services, a fair rate of interest is paid on savings, within the capability of the credit union. “Dividends” on credit union shares are treated as ordinary interest income, and the calculation of the dividend is based on the 12-month share balance of the member during each financial year of the individual credit unions. The Board of Directors recommends a rate of dividend and once the members have accepted this at the Annual General Meeting, the dividend will be paid directly into the account of each member. The Hong Kong Credit Unions Ordinance specifies that the rate of dividend should not exceed 6 per cent per annum, but there is no such restriction in Taiwan.

In addition to its aim of promoting thrift among its members and to receiving their savings, another object of a credit union is to make loans to the members for provident or productive purposes. A credit union loans have some very special features: they are insured at no direct cost to the eligible member, repayment protection insurance is available as an optional extra, there are no hidden fees or transaction charges, repayments are calculated on the reducing balance of the loan (this means smaller interest repayments as a loan is repaid), repayment terms are arranged to suit a member’s particular circumstances and members incur no penalty or additional charges if they repay the loan earlier than planned or make larger repayments than agreed.

Most of the credit union loans were requested for provident purposes, including house renovation, education, vacations abroad, emergency medical treatment, funeral costs and purchases of durable consumer goods. In addition, some big credit unions do provide loans for specific purposes (usually larger loan amounts and interest rate concessions), such as for tax payments, purchase of an apartment or new vehicle, decoration of a newly purchased apartment, repayment of other loans and funeral expenses for close relatives of the member. According to the Hong Kong Credit Union Ordinance, the interest rate on any loan made by a credit union to a member cannot exceed 1 per cent per month on the total of the unpaid balance of any such loan plus charges (if any) made by the credit union for making the loan; but there is no such requirement in Taiwan.

It is interesting to note that the time path of the number of credit union members in both Taiwan and Hong Kong follow the pattern of a total product curve showing diminishing marginal returns (that is, like the left side of a normal curve). As can be seen from Figures 1b and 2b, it is clear that the growth of credit unions in these two economies is approaching a stagnant state in recent years. According to WOCCU (2011), the penetration rate⁸ of Taiwan and Hong Kong in 2010 was 1.4 per cent and 1.2 per cent respectively, compared with 15.7 per cent in Korea, 6.2 per cent in Singapore (not to mention 43.9 per cent in the United States and 70.7 per cent in Ireland). So Hong Kong and Taiwan still have plenty of room to increase the popularity of credit unions among people at the grassroots.

4 THE CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE OF CREDIT UNION SAVINGS AND LOANS IN HONG KONG AND TAIWAN

As shown in Tables 2 and 3, the amount of credit union savings and loans in Hong Kong have increased from HK\$182.25 million and HK\$79.42 million in 1987 to HK\$6726.37 million and HK\$575.63 million in 2010 respectively. However, the volatility of credit union savings and loans as measured by their coefficient of variation⁹ (97 per cent and 48 per cent respectively) were ranked highest among the listed variables. These observations provide good evidence that the credit union industry in Hong Kong has to face the problem of an external drain of funds occasionally, and thus Hong Kong credit unions have to keep a higher reserve-to-deposit ratio than do licensed banks in order to achieve a sound liquidity position. In Taiwan, the amount of credit union savings and loans increased from NT\$2931.55 million and NT\$2788.21 million in 1987 to NT\$21,803.59 million and NT\$13,031 million in 2010 respectively. To compare its 59.77 per cent loan-to-savings ratio compared with Hong Kong's 8.56 per cent loan-to-savings ratio in 2010, we can conclude that the financial situation of the Taiwan credit union industry was much healthier than the credit union industry in Hong Kong.

⁸ According to WOCCU, penetration rate is calculated by dividing the total number of reported credit union members by the economically active population age 15-64 years old.

⁹ Coefficient of variation $CV = \frac{SD}{\bar{X}} \times 100\%$

The calculated mean annual rates of changes (MRs) suggest at least four important points: first, the mean annual rates of changes in all of the listed variables dropped drastically after the financial crisis; second, an extraordinarily high mean annual rates of change in Hong Kong credit union savings before and after the Asian financial crisis (16.02 per cent to 18.06 per cent); third, while bank loans could manage 3-5 per cent mean annual rates of change after the Asian financial crisis (MR₁₉₉₉₋₂₀₁₀), credit union loans in Taiwan and Hong Kong recorded a very low or even a negative mean annual rate of change (0.17 per cent and -3.51 per cent respectively); and the final point is that, in Taiwan the MR of credit union savings was always greater than the MR of credit union loans no matter whether there was an upturn or downturn in the economy, but in Hong Kong, the MR of credit union loans was greater than the MR of credit union savings in the period 1987-1998 (25.18 per cent and 18.6 per cent respectively) , but in 1999-2010, the situation was reverted (-3.51 per cent and 16.2 per cent respectively) .

If we transform the figures listed in Tables 2 and 3 into annual rates of change, we will discover the annual rates of change in credit union loans in Hong Kong (HKCUL) are significantly correlated with the annual rates of change in consumer prices (HKCPI), total bank loans (HKBL), total bank deposits (HKBD), and bank lending interest rates (HKBLR). These significant correlation may be explain by two economic decisions made by credit union members: firstly, they tend to borrow more from the credit union when inflation is high because the negative real interest rate¹⁰ is beneficial to them; secondly, they tend to borrow more from the credit union when the bank lending rate is high because they can obtain their loans at lower cost. The same observations are also true in Taiwan. Although there were some relationship between the annual rates of change in credit union savings in both Hong Kong and Taiwan (HKCUS and TWCLS) with all other macroeconomic variables listed in Tables 2 and 3 before the Asian financial crisis, they did not have a significant relationship with them after the Asian financial crisis. This may be explained by the precautionary nature of credit union savings and the result of the practice of regular saving.

¹⁰ Since the maximum annual lending rate is fixed at 1 per cent per month, a higher inflation rate implies a lower real interest rate.

Table 2. Credit Union Savings, outstanding Loan Balances and Major Macroeconomic Variables in Hong Kong: 1987 – 2010

Year	HKGDP	HKBD	HKBL	HKCUS	HKCUL	HKBDR	HKBLR	HKCPI
1987	393,541	278,494	267,607	182.25	79.42	4.74	6.60	43.7
1988	465,245	313,969	358,716	108.12	102.94	5.40	7.91	47.2
1989	536,268	358,130	474,343	174.67	148.16	8.04	10.54	52.0
1990	598,650	421,560	542,902	212.58	178.83	8.17	10.46	57.3
1991	690,324	540,193	644,149	246.01	209.14	6.96	9.41	63.8
1992	805,082	602,773	719,741	343.82	276.90	4.57	7.32	69.9
1993	927,996	770,865	859,198	475.71	352.64	3.75	6.50	76.0
1994	1,047,470	896,330	1,006,569	569.36	439.11	5.18	7.26	82.7
1995	1,115,739	1,103,010	1,105,785	811.68	595.60	2.26	8.96	90.2
1996	1,229,481	1,346,774	1,302,327	980.82	677.61	5.19	8.52	95.9
1997	1,365,024	1,479,644	1,556,853	1,116.33	866.62	6.39	8.83	101.5
1998	1,292,764	1,602,123	1,521,714	1,131.80	939.18	8.31	9.94	104.4
1999	1,266,668	1,734,675	1,455,650	1,311.43	853.07	5.76	8.49	100.2
2000	1,317,650	1,834,354	1,502,489	1,421.52	882.95	5.40	9.22	96.5
2001	1,299,218	1,835,557	1,507,355	1,861.98	789.70	2.53	7.00	94.9
2002	1,277,314	1,803,988	1,490,679	2,667.00	725.76	0.74	5.11	92.0
2003	1,234,761	1,914,413	1,464,532	2,280.88	652.57	0.12	5.00	89.7
2004	1,291,923	2,005,942	1,581,493	4,101.27	569.44	0.27	5.02	89.3
2005	1,382,590	2,115,436	1,749,925	4,441.74	546.85	1.75	6.12	90.1
2006	1,475,357	2,550,758	1,870,410	4,597.70	592.63	3.02	7.90	92.0
2007	1,615,574	3,055,928	2,127,306	4,690.70	583.00	2.79	7.59	93.8
2008	1,677,011	3,012,983	2,293,348	5,010.90	658.00	0.97	5.39	97.8
2009	1,622,203	3,357,238	2,351,944	6,050.10	671.50	0.30	5.00	98.4
2010	1,748,090	3,607,063	2,784,510	6,726.37	575.63	0.16	5.00	100.7
MR 1987-2010	6.70%	11.78%	10.72%	16.99	8.99	n.a.	n.a.	3.70%
MR 1987-1998	11.42%	17.24%	17.12%	18.06	25.18	n.a.	n.a.	8.24%
MR 1999-2010	2.97	6.88	6.07	16.02	-3.51	n.a.	n.a.	0.05%

Notes:

HKGDP = GDP at current market prices in HK\$M

HKBLR = Best lending rate (period average)

HKBD = Total deposit from customers with licensed banks of which in HKD (HK\$M)

HKSDR = Bank Savings deposit interest rate (period average)

HKBL = Total loans and advances with licensed banks of which in HKD (HK\$M)

HkCUS = Credit Union Savings /Share Balances (HK\$M)

HKCPI = Composite Consumer Price Index (October 2009 - September 2010 = 100)

HKCUL = Credit Union Outstanding Loan Balances (HK\$M)

$$MR_{t-t+n} = \text{Mean annual rate of change} = \left(\sqrt[n]{\frac{X_{t+n}}{X_t}} - 1 \right) \times 100\%$$

Sources:

2010 Gross Domestic Product, Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, 2011.

Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics, Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, various editions.

Hong Kong Monetary Authority Website at: <http://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/market-data-and-statistics/>

Annual Report, Credit Union League of Hong Kong, various editions.

Table 3. Credit Union Savings, outstanding Loan Balances and Major Macroeconomic Variables in Taiwan: 1987 – 2010

Year	TWGD ^P	TWBD	TWBL	TWCUS	TWCUL	TWBDR	TWBLR	TWCPI
1987	3,291,857	3,964,400	2,304,800	2,931.55	2,788.21	5.00	6.75	68.84
1988	3,488,550	4,881,200	3,198,800	3,651.04	3,673.92	5.25	7.00	69.60
1989	4,003,227	5,865,800	4,155,100	4,401.25	4,753.76	9.50	10.38	71.78
1990	4,430,055	6,471,500	4,649,400	5,183.42	5,644.20	9.50	10.00	75.06
1991	4,958,220	7,576,500	5,694,900	6,080.07	6,621.17	8.26	8.65	77.97
1992	5,534,544	9,073,700	7,276,100	7,364.21	8,061.46	7.79	8.30	80.63
1993	6,110,101	10,454,400	8,439,000	8,794.76	9,888.25	7.59	8.03	84.36
1994	6,685,505	12,031,400	9,904,400	10,332.48	11,802.08	7.29	7.94	86.60
1995	7,277,545	13,130,900	10,802,800	11,642.20	13,350.20	6.73	7.67	90.56
1996	7,906,075	14,260,900	11,205,200	12,564.68	13,455.55	6.02	7.38	92.85
1997	8,574,784	15,421,300	12,510,200	13,994.43	13,493.05	6.03	7.50	93.09
1998	9,204,174	16,696,900	13,177,300	14,688.44	13,735.12	5.44	7.70	95.06
1999	9,649,049	18,064,200	13,760,100	15,152.39	12,787.47	5.03	7.67	95.20
2000	10,187,394	19,308,700	14,428,900	15,744.17	13,060.88	5.00	7.71	96.77
2001	9,930,387	20,160,700	14,036,600	15,985.87	12,574.77	2.41	7.38	95.14
2002	10,411,639	20,609,800	13,731,400	16,516.16	12,217.26	1.86	7.10	95.86
2003	10,696,257	21,746,900	14,332,900	17,079.88	11,503.61	1.40	3.43	95.81
2004	11,365,292	23,256,500	15,867,800	17,658.63	11,059.14	1.52	3.52	97.36
2005	11,740,279	24,709,500	17,158,300	18,192.84	10,919.04	1.99	3.85	99.51
2006	12,243,471	25,942,000	17,598,900	18,401.68	11,047.39	2.20	4.12	100.18
2007	12,910,511	26,208,800	18,021,700	18,490.38	11,090.93	2.62	4.31	103.52
2008	12,620,150	27,977,900	18,470,100	18,626.86	11,023.21	1.42	4.21	104.83
2009	12,477,182	29,555,900	18,607,500	18,856.19	10,411.28	0.89	2.56	104.57
2010	14,011,667	30,475,236	20,390,702	21,803.59	13,031.00	1.13	2.93	108.19
MR 1987-2010	6.50%	9.27%	9.94%	9.12%	6.93%	n.a.	n.a.	1.99%
MR 1987-1998	9.80%	13.96%	17.18%	15.78%	15.60%	n.a.	n.a.	2.98%
MR 1999-2010	3.45%	4.87%	3.64%	3.36%	0.17%	n.a.	n.a.	1.17%

Notes:

TWGD^P = GDP at current market prices (NT\$M)

TWBLR = Prime lending rate (period average)

TWBD = Total deposits from Individuals and Business units of which in NTD (NT\$M)

TWSDR = Bank 1 year deposit interest rate (period average)

TWBL = Total loans and advances with major financial institutions of which in NTD (NT\$M)

TWCUS = Credit Union Savings /Share Balances (NT\$M)

TWCPI = CPI = Consumer Price Index (2006 = 100)

TWCUL = Credit Union Outstanding Loan Balances (NT\$M)

Sources:

National Statistics, R.O.C. (Taiwan) Website at:

<http://www.stat.gov.tw/public/data/dgbas03/bs3/inquire/cpispl.xls>

Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan) Website at:

<http://www.cbc.gov.tw/public/Attachment/0112516294971.XLS>


<http://www.cbc.gov.tw/public/data/economic/statistics/key/deposit-y.xls>

<http://www.cbc.gov.tw/public/data/economic/statistics/key/loan-y.xls>

Annual Report, Credit Union League of PRC, various editions.

Regarding outstanding loan balances, it is interesting to note that the credit union loans in Hong Kong registered a higher growth rate than did bank loans in the period of economic prosperity from 1987 to 1998. However, during the period 1999-2010 when the economy of Hong Kong was in recession as a result of the Asian Financial Crisis, the performance of credit union loans was actually worse than that in the banking sector. Although the situation in Taiwan has not been as significant as that recorded in Hong Kong, similar characteristics can also be observed. This is because most of the credit unions have fixed their maximum lending rate at 1 per cent per month. However, when the level of bank lending rates had to be adjusted upward during economic upturns, this made the cost of borrowing from credit unions lower than the cost of borrowing from banks. When a lower level of bank rates prevailed in times of recession, the effects were reversed.

Figure 3 Time Plots of the Loan-to-Savings Ratio (%) for Credit Unions and Banks: 1987-2010



Sources: see Tables 2 and 3

Figures 3a and 3b show downward trends in the credit union and banking industry's loan-to-savings curves, these trends were appeared earlier in Hong Kong than in Taiwan. It is clear that the banks' loan-to-saving deposits ratio (HKBL/S) was always much higher than that of the credit unions (HKCUL/S) because the Banking Law allows banks to search for sources of funds other than deposits through the inter-bank market and the debt market. We

can also note that the discrepancy between HKBL/S and HKCUL/S has become larger and larger since 1998 after the Asian financial crisis. In Taiwan, however, the credit unions' loan-to-saving deposits ratio (TWCUL/S) was greater than the banks' loan-to-saving deposits ratio (TWCUL/S) in 1987-2003, and from 2003 onwards, TWBL/S has been greater than TWCUL/S. These changes may be due to the Taiwan banking industry was too late to recognize the importance of introducing microcredit services to the low-income groups.

In addition, the fact that people found no profitable investment opportunities in the financial markets during the recession and preferred to hold their speculative balance in the form of deposits with banks, created a force that pulled down the loan-to-savings ratio further. Judging from the fact that the time series of the loan-to-savings ratio of banks and credit unions were highly correlated ($r=0.86$ in Hong Kong and $r=0.65$ in Taiwan), it can be concluded that both credit unions and banks were facing the problem of how to transform their savings (deposits) liability to earning assets (loans) in times of recession. Because loans are the most profitable and least risky earning asset for both banks and credit unions, bankers and credit union directors have to pay more attention to promoting the loan market.

5 CONCLUDING REMARKS

On the demand side, according to the principle of diminishing marginal returns to capital, the poorer borrowers should be willing to pay higher interest rates than richer borrowers; on the supply side, the credit suppliers need to consider the credit risk especially the adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Armendariz and Morduch, (2010, pp19-24) argue that the problems of market failure that exist in financial markets stemming from poor information, high transactions costs, and difficulties enforcing contracts can be solved by microfinance. Unlike other microfinance institutions that rely on outside capital, credit unions emphasize the mobilisation of member savings as their primary source of financing, and thus their members can really practice the self-help and mutual aid model of poverty alleviation.

Although China, Hong Kong and Taiwan are three economies at different stages of development, they need a more efficient and equitable mechanism to allocate funds among

different classes of people. Because credit unions do not resort to exploitation between savers and borrowers, it can be expected that the market mechanism of the money loan market will function much more efficiently in the credit union industry than in the banking industry provided that the interest rate is determined by genuine market forces.

We believe credit union is the best way for poverty alleviation, but it is not a panacea. We understand that what credit unions can do is to mobilize the human resources of a country by giving individuals a method of solving their own problems. We foresee the credit union movements in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan will be further developed as long as the credit union recruit a team of volunteers who agree to dedicate their time and resources in service of their fellow members with zeal through the credit union ideas which basically are self-help, mutual aid, member-own and member control.

REFERENCES

- Armendariz, B. and Morduch J., 2010. *The Economics of Microfinance*, 2nd Edition, The MIT Press, USA.
- Census and Statistics Department, 2010. 2009 Gross Domestic Product. Hong Kong: Government Printer, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
- Chit-Fund Businesses (Prohibition) Ordinance, Chapter 262, *Laws of Hong Kong*, The Hong Kong Ordinance (1972).
- Civil Law of ROC, Chapter 2-2, Section 19-1. Republic of China (Taiwan) Government (2000)
- Credit Union Act, 2000 Republic of China. (Amended Date 2002.02.06) [online] Available at: <<http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=D0050128>>
- Credit Union League of Hong Kong (CULHK). Annual Reports. Various years.
- Credit Union League of the Republic of China (CULROC). *Annual Reports*. Various years.
- Credit Union Ordinance, 2002. Chapter 119, *Laws of Hong Kong*, The Hong Kong Government Printer.
- Croteau, J.T., 1963. *The Economics of the Credit Union*. Wayne State University Press.
- China Banking Regulatory Commission, 2011. *Annual Report 2010*. CBRC, China, Beijing.
- China Statistical Information and Consultancy Centre, 1990. *China Report (1949-1989)*, Influxfunds Co. Ltd, and Zie Yongder Co. Ltd, Hong Kong
- Dublin, J., 1971. *Credit Unions: Theory and Practice*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.
- Edmonson, R.G., 1995. Credit union movement making slow progress in People's Republic of China. *Credit Union News*, New York, USA.
- Fei, H.T., 1939. *Peasant Life in China: A Field Study of Country Life in the Yantze Valley*, Kegan Paul, Trench, Teubner & Co., Ltd. London.
- Fisher, I., 1930. *The Theory of Interest*. Macmillan, New York.
- Mok, V. and Wu, J., 1972. Yi Hui and Yin Hui : An Introductory Analysis. *Chung Chi Journal*, 11(2).
- Myers, R.H., 1970. *The Chinese Peasant Economy: Agricultural development in Hopei and*

- Shantung, 1890-1949*. Harvard University Press.
- Poon, C.C. and Ma, H.T., 2008. *Challenges and Opportunity of the Hong Kong Credit Union Movement*, Credit Union League of Hong Kong.
- So, A., 2011. The Inspiring Stories of ACCU: Illustrating and dramatizing the heritage of credit unions in Asian, The ACCU 40th Anniversary 1971-2011 Memoir (PP 79-97), ACCU, Bangkok (Thailand).
- Turvey, C.G., Kong, R. and Huo, X., 2010. Borrowing amongst friends: the economics of informal credit in rural China. *China Agricultural Economic Review*. 2(2), pp.133-147.
- World Council of Credit Union (WOCCU), 2011. *2010 Statistical Report*. [online] Available at: <<http://www.woccu.org/publications/statreport>>.
- Xie, P., Xu, Z., Cheng, E.J. and Shen, M.G., 2005. *Establishing a Framework for Sustainable Rural Finance: Demand and Supply Analysis in Guizhou Province of the People's Republic of China*. Asian Development Bank.
- Zhao, Y.P., 2011. *China's Rural Financial System: Households' demand for credit and recent reforms*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Zuo, X.J., 2001. The Development of Credit Unions In China, Financial Sector Reform in China, Conference Paper. September 11-13, 2001, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. [online] Available at: <http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/Conferences/financial_sector/PastFailuresoftheCreditUnion.pdf>.

***Guanxi* in the Eyes of China's Foreign Banks**

Adolphus, Yee-Yin Wan
Hong Kong Shue Yan University
Email: adfwan@hotmail.com

Ken, Tsz-Lun Ng
Hong Kong Shue Yan University

INTRODUCTION

Guanxi is defined by two Chinese characters, *guan* and *xi*, meaning “gate” and “connection” respectively and “one must pass the gate to get connected to networks” (Cheng, 2007, p. 81). *Guanxi* also refers to relationships and social connections based on mutual interests and benefits (Yang, 1994). It is commonly practised in China. It is different from the Western concept of RM in terms of the order in which transactions and relationships take place, and the short-term versus long-term nature of business transactions (Geddie et al., 2002 and 2005; Sin, 2002). The CFBs tend to practising more on the Western RM which is quite different from the domestic Chinese banks (“DCBs”) which are more focused on practising the *guanxi* concept. The application of these two marketing concepts by the two banking groups is believed to have resulted in different business performances and the CFBs need to review their RM activities in the light of *guanxi*.

China has commenced its reforms in finance and banking since 1978. These reforms have accelerated the improvement of its banking sector in terms of infrastructure, technology and methods to develop business. The performance of the DCBs has been outstanding during these years in both domestic and global markets. Big names such as the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Bank of China, China Construction Bank, and the Agricultural Bank of China do pose threats to the CFBs. These DCBs owe their outstanding business performance to many factors, such as implicit support from the Chinese Government in respect of capital injections and business policies. *Guanxi* is considered important. In these circumstances, this research will also study whether *guanxi* is a critical success factor for the

DCBs to outperform the CFBs in terms of business performance.

LITERATURE REVIEW

CFBs in China's Financial and Banking Reforms

China's financial and banking reforms have enhanced the important role of the CFBs as international trade portals between China and the outside world (He, 2004) in the mid-19th century and then as advisors to foreign firms in China through their representative offices. This status of representative offices of the CFBs was further upgraded to branches in some selected cities to engage in foreign currency business in 1985 and to undertake domestic currency business in 1996 for financing their home customers. In the late 1990s, China allowed foreign investors to buy minority share holdings in the domestic commercial banks (Anderson, 2005), up to 20% for a single foreign owner and 25% for combined foreign owners (Laurenceson and Qin, 2008). Since then, foreign investments in the DCBs have grown very rapidly. Five years after China's entry into the WTO, foreign banks received treatment identical to that of the DCBs. In December 2006, they were able to provide a full range of RMB business to Chinese firms and individuals (Leung and Chan, 2006). Most of the CFBs have headquarters in Shanghai. The growth of the CFBs as a result of China's reforms has created many challenges to the DCBs to improve their business performance.

***Guanxi* and Its Role in Business**

Guanxi was defined in the "Introduction" section. Hark (1999) concluded a comprehensive review providing 26 definitions of *guanxi* which reached almost 50 during the 20th century (Dann and Dann, 2001). Despite numerous definitions, there is no universally agreed one due to its "intricate and pervasive nature" (Chen and Layton, 2003, p. 1218). The concept of *guanxi* is not yet clearly defined. Different approaches to the concept of *guanxi* are held in different academic fields. No specific English words can be used to define *guanxi*

(Hackley and Dong, 2001). Egan (2004) even concluded that “no definition will ever be perfect”.

The role of *guanxi* is ambiguous. It exists between two persons or families because of blood ties or business acquaintances (Fernandez and Underwood, 2006). For business, *guanxi* is referred to “a Chinese system of doing business on the basis of personal relationship, which is representative of the way that business is done throughout much of the non-western world” (Lam and Lin, 2003, p. 1437). It is operationalized through the procurement of sources of information and resources; transaction-smoothing; gaining business and enhancing the chance of success; facilitating future transactions; simplifying business process and improving negotiations; increasing business introductions; securing relationships; and eliminating the competition (Davies et al., 1995; Xin and Pearce, 1996; Fock and Woo, 1998; Tsang, 1998; and Fan, 2002).

Recently, *guanxi's* role in Chinese business has been dramatically affected by international business trends because of China's rapidly increasing foreign investment (Dunfee and Warren, 2001). At the same time, China is undergoing changes influenced by Western legal procedures and concepts, and *guanxi's* role is diminishing. Ultimately, it is not *guanxi* but the Western marketing concepts such as branding, high quality products and good marketing strategy which can make businesses successful in the China market (Fan, 2002). This trend is accelerated when information technology, the Internet in particular, is used to develop a more open and transparent market system. Thus, reliance on *guanxi* as a “middleman” is reduced. However, given the long history of China, *guanxi's* important role still prevails especially when *guanxi* is linked to cultural awareness to emphasize the concept of *guanxi* as a fundamental importance for understanding cultural interactions in China (Buckley et al., 2006).

The CFBs must be aware of the role of *guanxi* and use it to establish better institutional connections with local stakeholders, including customers, employees, local partners and government officials. They should also acknowledge that it is essential to understand and practise *guanxi* if non-Chinese people or organizations want to enter the market and be successful in China (Yang, 1986; Brunner and Koh, 1988; Ambler, 1995; Luo, 1997a; Wong,

1998a; Wall, 1990; Leung et al., 1996; Tung and Worm, 1997; Tsang, 1998). There are people who live entirely on their *guanxi* (Butterfield, 1982, cited in Tsang, 1998, p.65) and claim that in China, *guanxi* is everything (Fox, 1987, cited in Su and Littlefield, 2001, p.208).

Chinese Concept of *Guanxi* Versus Western RM

Guanxi is viewed as a form of RM in China (Bjorkman and Kock, 1995; Wong, 1998b, 1998c, cited in Leung and Wong, 2001). It originated from the orthodox doctrine of Confucianism – the foundation of Chinese cultural values of “*Wu Lun*” (i.e. five relationship hierarchy in the traditional Chinese society: ruler-subject, father-son, husband-wife, brother-brother and friend-friend (Su et al., 2003)), emphasizing personal relationships, loyalty, harmony, order and authority (Zhang and Zhang, 2006), and assuming that “people exist in a web of harmonious and orderly relationships” (Huang, 2000; Hwang, 1987; Luo, 1997b, cited in Zhang and Zhang, 2006, p.378). It mirrored Yin-Yang theory – a Taoist philosophy with dualism, unity and harmony as a doctrine. Managers tend to cultivate, build and develop relationship by establishing flexibility, harmony and commitment via two “polar” sides of the Yin-Yang principle (Wong et al., 2007, p. 883). However, the modern practice of *guanxi* treats *guanxi* as a strategic tool to accomplish business objectives (Leung and Wong, 2001). On the other hand, RM is a concept with its earliest definition sourced from Berry (1983, p.25) as “attracting, maintaining and ... enhancing customer relationship” and “... when necessary also to terminate relationship with customers and other stakeholders, at a profit ...” (Gronroos, 1994, cited in Hark, 1999, p. 16). Many theories and schools of thought of RM emerged during the 20th century (Dann and Dann, 2001, cited in Egan, 2004).

Western Theories of RM to Echo *Guanxi* in This Research

To study *guanxi* in the light of the Western theories is a complicated issue, given the different culture of the East and the West, and the different practices of *guanxi* and RM in their business context. The *transactional marketing* (“*TM*”) and *RM concepts* are two

concepts linking with *guanxi* in this research. Thomas (2000, p.531, cited in Egan, 2004, p.234) differentiated TM and RM in terms of long-term (RM) versus short-term (TM) orientation. A large volume of literature has placed importance on RM due to its long-term nature. *Guanxi* mirrors this concept in a way that long-term relationships with customers are to be maintained.

Guanxi is also linked to the concept of **transaction-cost economics** (Williamson, 1979) in that *guanxi* facilitates economic transaction and avoids substantial bureaucratic costs in countries such as China; and thus “*guanxi* acts as a substitute for spending time and money on lawyers and legal contacts” (Davies, 1995, cited in Fock and Woo, 1998, p.5). Zhang and Zhang (2006) also concluded that cost efficiencies from *guanxi* have three aspects: (a) *guanxi* reduces transaction costs relating to environmental uncertainties, such as coordinating, negotiating, communicating and exchanging; (b) *guanxi* facilitates the search for partners and minimizes contract negotiations, thus reducing associated costs; and (c) *guanxi* reduces costs of searching for information and subsequent authentication. *Guanxi* is cost-effective for the RM activities of the Relationship Managers in respect of customer referrals and customer relationship management.

Network theory aims at “obtaining the necessary information and knowledge to optimize organizational performance” (Chaston, 1998, p. 276, cited in Egan, 2004, p. 189) and provides a framework for the understanding of resources, knowledge and data collection/management (Nohria, 1992, cited in Zontanos and Anderson, 2004). Networks form an important ingredient of the *guanxi*-based business practice (Standifird, 2006). For business, network theory suggests better interpersonal relationships (i.e. *guanxi*) between managers. These interpersonal relationships are positively associated with improved performance (Hoskisson et al., 2000). On the other hand, *guanxi* is a form of **social network theory** that “defines one’s place in the social structure and provides security, trust and a prescribed role” (Hammond and Glenn, 2004, p.24). *Guanxi* is also a form of **social exchange theory** pertaining to the relationship between unspecified obligations and expectations of returns in the future as a result of the contributions made (Blau, 1964).

In respect of the **resource-based theory**, discussions of the relationship of *guanxi* with it or *guanxi* as a resource are found in a large volume of literature, for example, Butterfield (1983), Su et al. (2003), and (Tsang, 1998). Some studies drew upon resource-based theory by associating *guanxi* with an organizational resource and the capability to improve a firm's performance and competitive advantage (Xin and Pearce, 1996; Luo, 1997a; Tsang, 1998). Braendle et al. (2005) also claimed that *guanxi* can add distinct competitive advantages to firms by providing opportunities for individuals and firms to acquire valuable resources, both soft and hard resources (Zhang and Zhang, 2006). Therefore, *guanxi* can be classified as a resource (Tsang, 1998) and even a "chief asset" (The Economist, 1996, cited in Liu and Roos, 2006, p.434).

Resources also relate to **social capital theory** which states that resources are accessible through social connections (Lin, 2001, cited in Song and Werbel, 2007). Social capital theory has a close association with *guanxi* in a way that *guanxi* is also related to social relations (Bain, 1997; Dunfee and Warren, 2001; Hwang, 1987; Park and Luo, 2001; Tsui and Farh, 1997; Xin and Pearce, 1996) that "establish certain privileges, including access to resources and opportunities" (Warren et al., 2004, p. 356). *Guanxi* can be considered as "a type of social capital that is developed between two persons via a process of reciprocal exchange" (Fan, 2002, cited in Standifird, 2006, p.171).


Finally, the "**stakeholder theory**" (Tzokas and Saren, 2000, p.6, cited in Egan, 2004, p.125), **full-time versus part-time marketers** (Arias, 1998, p.148), and **internal versus external partnerships** (Egan, 2004) are the theories to address the relationships between an organization and its customers, suppliers, investors, employees and other stakeholders. Customer long-term relationship and satisfaction are achieved through the joint effort of all people and departments of an organization and one function alone cannot deliver customer value and satisfaction (Tzokas and Saren (2004). This is what is originated from the field of "service marketing" (Gummesson et al., 1997) in relation to the **theory of Nordic School Services** of the neo-relationship marketing. *Guanxi* is echoed by subject theories in terms of its promotion of "service marketing" via a long-term relationship building between the company and its customers.

In conclusion, the above theories do arouse the attention of the CFBs to formulate RM strategies around the *guanxi* concept. The adoption of *guanxi* practices by the CFBs is consistent with the premises of these theories.

Theme *Guanxi*-RM Model Governing This Research

Various *guanxi* models are discussed in the literature, for instance, the integrative *guanxi* model (Wong and Tam, 2000), the insider-outsider perspectives of *guanxi* (Lee and Ellis, 2000) and the three-stage approach of initiating, building and using *guanxi* (Chen and Chen, 2004). This research uses the model of Geddie et al. (2002 and 2005), together with some RM-related theories as discussed the previous section as guidelines for the Relationship Managers to practice *guanxi* in their RM activities.

Figure 1 Comparison of CRM and *Guanxi* Approach



Source: Adapted from Geddie et al. (2002 and 2005).

Geddie et al. (2002 and 2005) presented both systems in a cyclical way in that RM deals with transactions first and relationship later. In RM, the company sees its customer as more of a subset than a merged partner (as practised by *guanxi*) and the short-term customer relationship is implied. *Guanxi* suggests a reverse of order for transaction and relationship. The company and its customer are built on a long-term partnership perspective. The differences between RM and *guanxi* have thus affected the way Chinese managers and Western managers handle their RM activities.

***Guanxi* in the Practice of Relationship Marketing**

Guanxi is practised via personal relationships, as opposed to the Western practice of RM which focuses on specification and enforcement of contracts (Davies et al., 1995). Gronroos (1996, cited in Arias, 1998) viewed *guanxi* essentially as a Chinese cultural construct, but RM as a service or management of the service delivery process for doing business. *Guanxi* in the practice of RM is echoed in its close relationship with RM in a way that “a good *guanxi* reinforces relationship marketing and ensures its success whereas a bad *guanxi* spoils relationship marketing and in turn terminates the transaction” (Wong, 2007, p. 263). *Guanxi* differs from the practice of RM in three areas: (a) RM focuses on a purposefully-built relationship but *guanxi* emphasizes family ties; (b) principles of Confucianism or one’s family and social roles are found in *guanxi*; and (c) *guanxi* favours personal bonds and RM facilitates inter-group or inter-organization relationships (Alston, 1989, cited in Fock and Woo, 1998). These differences affect the practice of *guanxi* in RM by managers, for example, the formation of pricing strategies, and the process of relationship building and business negotiations (Gilbert and Tsao, 2000). Other examples of practising *guanxi* in the RM activities are the *guanxi* initiator to (1) show honesty, introspection and reliability; (2) give gift; (3) keep contacts with *guanxi* members, (4) spend time on social activities such as dining and drinking; (5) frequently provide help and offer free favours to the parties in the network; and (6) pay favours back as a means of keeping the *guanxi* network running (Ai, 2006). Time and patience are considered as two successful elements to build, maintain and enhance *guanxi*

because Chinese executives do not attempt to develop close personal relationships with outsiders, that is, the foreign firms (Fock and Woo, 1998). The operationalization of *guanxi* is very difficult because *guanxi* is very complex and goes beyond the economic context (Arias, 1998).

Customer Relationship Management (“CRM”)

The term “CRM” emerged in the mid-1990s in the information technology vendor community and practitioner community. CRM is often used to describe technology-based customer solutions. The terms RM and CRM are often used interchangeably (Parvatiyar and Sheth, 2001). However, CRM is more commonly used in the technology area as “information-enabled relationship marketing” (Ryals and Payne, 2001, p.3, cited in Payne and Frow, 2005, p.167). Couldwell (1998, cited in Ryals and Knox, 2001, p.3) well defined CRM as “a combination of business process and technology that seeks to understand a company’s customers from the perspective of who they are, what they do, and what they are like”. Today, many businesses such as banks and insurance companies realize the importance of CRM as a means to acquire new customers, retain customer relationship and maximize customers’ lifetime values.

***Guanxi* as Strategies and Tactics**

In this research, the concept of internal and external partnerships is adopted as long-term strategies and tactics are short-term tools for the implementation of the strategies via a CRM system. *Guanxi* elements are to be incorporated into the CRM system and redefinition of the business and operational strategies is necessary for the purpose of integrating the *guanxi* concepts into the RM activities of the CFBs in a *guanxi*-RM conceptual framework to be worked out as the second phase of this research in future.

Guanxi and Business Performance

Business performance is measured in terms of the following four items: sales growth, customer retention, return of investment and market share (Sin et al., 2002; Tse et al., 2004). In respect of the relationship between *guanxi* and business performance, Zhang and Zhang (2006) provided a detailed explanation that there is no one consensus on the positive effect of *guanxi* in relation to business performance. Dunfee and Warren (2001, p. 197) stated that the impact of *guanxi* on economic performance is not known with any degree of precision. Fan (2002) maintained that the benefits of *guanxi* to economic and organizational efficiency may be exaggerated. Other investigators claimed that *guanxi* has no effect, or may even have a negative effect, on a firm and its performance (Braendle et al., 2005; Li and Athuahene-Gima, 2001).

The positive view of the relationship between *guanxi* and business performance is reflected in an article of Luo and Chen (1997, p.4), claiming that “a firm could enhance its performance by benefiting from the *guanxi* network it has established” and “this network constitutes a firm’s core competency and distinctive competitive advantage that can lead to high performance”. This reinforces the claims of Su et al. (2003) that high-*guanxi* firms have outperformed low-*guanxi* firms in terms of business efficiency (Lovett et al., 1999), sustainability of competitive advantage (Tsang, 1998), accessibility to scarce resources (Davies et al., 1995; Luo, 1997a) and enhancement of long-term survival and growth (Pearce and Robinson, 2000; Yeung and Tung, 1996).

For banks, their success in business performance is facilitated by bank operations (e.g. technologies and systems) and marketing (e.g. customer relationship and satisfaction, network and communications, staff-customer relationship, etc.). Other non-financial factors such as relationship quality, staff commitments and loyalty, reward and staff motivation, and business ethics, etc. are also critical success factors affecting the profitability and business of the banks.

RESEARCH PROBLEM, PROPOSITIONS/RESEARCH ISSUES AND CONTRIBUTIONS

Research Problem

The purpose of this research is to study *guanxi* in terms of its importance and applicability to the CFBs. The literature review indicates a substantial volume of literature on Western RM theories and *guanxi* in general but no prior studies have investigated *guanxi* in China's banking industry, particularly the CFBs. Also, there are no surveys on how useful for *guanxi* in the RM activities of the Relationship Managers of the CFBs and discussions of the relationship between *guanxi* and bank performance through the implementation of a CRM system with *guanxi* elements. Therefore, the problem of this research is addressed as:

How useful for the guanxi practice in the RM activities of the Relationship Managers of the CFBs in China's banking industry are the Chinese concepts of guanxi?

To study the research problem and determine solutions for it, the following research questions and propositions were developed through literature review, pilot interviews with the experienced bank marketing executives, and the bank marketing experience of the researchers:

RQ1: What are guanxi and its role in the CFBs?

RQ2: How does guanxi affect the marketing activities and operations of the CFBs?

RQ3: How does guanxi-based RM affect the strategies and tactics of the CFBs?

RQ4: Does guanxi affect business performance of the CFBs?

Propositions/Research Issues

The following research propositions were developed to answer the research questions:

- P1: China's financial and banking reforms over the past two decades have not eroded the important role of *guanxi* in China's banking sector.
- P2a: Different views of *guanxi* in association with RM affect the marketing activities and operations of the CFBs.
- P2b: Whether *guanxi* can be efficiently practised and operationalized to affect the RM activities and operations of the CFBs.
- P3: *Guanxi*-based RM can affect the long-term business strategies and short-term operational tactics of the CFBs.
- P4: The DCBs with high *guanxi* outperform the CFBs with low *guanxi* and the lack of *guanxi* is a reason that undermines the business performance of the CFBs.

Contributions

The answers to the research issues and questions have resulted in the findings presented in Table 1, which suggests theoretical and practical contributions from this research. In terms of the theoretical contributions, the research results confirm the propositions developed through Western theories as discussed in the section on literature review. This suggests a wider utilization of Chinese concepts/theories, for instance, *guanxi*, by some organizations where Western culture is prevailing, e.g. the CFBs.

For the practical value of this research, firstly, *guanxi* is a very complicated topic of research in the banking industry due to the highly sensitive nature of *guanxi*, particularly with regard to corruption and bribery which are forbidden in banking. The research suggests the incorporation of *guanxi* into the RM activities of Relationship Managers in CFBs. It is a pioneer attempt in the banking industry and no previous research into *guanxi* in China's banking sector has been undertaken in this area. Secondly, given that *guanxi* is a typical Chinese culture, this research can only be practically applied in countries where *guanxi*

prevails. However, it has provided some insight into foreign countries which apply RM in business. Thirdly, the findings provide bank management with improved marketing strategies and tactics, and Relationship Managers with a practical marketing guideline.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN

The first part of this research focuses on the researchers' gathering of preliminary information and literature to work out a pre-planned interview guide to lead the interviews of ten Relationship Managers in the CFBs in Shanghai. Semi-structured, open-end, individual in-depth and face-to-face interviews were conducted. *Guanxi* is a complex issue involving social, behavioural and human elements. Therefore, "interviews are good ways of eliciting opinions on complex and sensitive issues" (Hannabuss, 1996, p. 23) for this research on *guanxi*. Semi-structured interview can bridge the gap between the unstructured interview and structure interview to avoid either too loose or too rigid in the research design. By using this method, the researchers may understand each participant's opinions and beliefs in *guanxi*.

Face-to-face interviewing guarantees a higher response and completion rate with the best and highest-quality data (Janes, 2001) and individual in-depth interview on a one-to-one basis helps elicit how the interviewee feels about the role of *guanxi* and its practice in his or her working environment. Finally, the open-ended questions suit the research on *guanxi* which cannot be answered with a simple "yes" or "no" response.

Note-taking rather than voice-recording was used as the recording instrument due to the need for confidentiality. Cross-sectional rather than longitudinal data was obtained due to time and location constraints.

The non-probability and purposive sampling design fitted the exploratory purpose of this research, namely, to obtain information from specific target groups - experienced Relationship Managers. Bank samples were selected from "*China Financial Services Directory 2007*" and "*Bankers' Almanac*", which are both in the public domain. The selected banks should have more than ten years' experience and strong business commitment in China with worldwide banking reputation. The ten interviewees (i.e. Relationship Managers) are the

marketing executives in their capacities of relationship managers/officers or heads of marketing departments and have direct and face-to-face contact with the customers in their daily marketing activities. This sampling is confined to such specific people who can provide the desired information on *guanxi*/RM because they are the only ones who possess, and are in the best position to provide, such information because they know the subject area well. Therefore, their professional opinions, views and knowledge constitute a rich data source and provide greatest insight into the research questions. Sample size was considered sufficient for the nature of purposive sampling in this qualitative research. Shanghai was chosen due to its importance in China's economy and finance and because it contained the China head offices of the majority of foreign banks.

Data was collected by using a qualitative method because *guanxi* exists within the complex and fast-changing environment of China's banking sector and it is a service that cannot be addressed through any quantitative measure. Data was analysed mainly through qualitative approaches such as secondary data analysis, content analysis, inductive data analysis, categorization, interpretation, quotations and narrative forms to see if the research questions were supported or the research objectives were substantiated. In terms of the measurement of validity, the researchers could not use scientific and quantitative methods to measure *guanxi*. However, trustworthiness in terms of credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability was considered a practical approach to measure the validity and reliability of this research.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The findings of this research are consistent with the mainstream of previous studies of the general concepts of *guanxi* in the China context. Table 1 and Table 2 summarize findings against research questions and propositions by addressing the research problem.

Table 1 Summary of Findings against Each Research Issue/Question

Research issue/question	Findings
RQ1: What are <i>guanxi</i> and its role in the CFBs?	Ambiguities in the role were found but the findings helped to study the role of <i>guanxi</i> in China's financial and banking reforms over the past two decades.
RQ2: How does <i>guanxi</i> affect the marketing activities and operations of the CFBs?	How <i>guanxi</i> affects the marketing and operations of the CFBs depends on the understanding by the Relationship Managers of: (1) the views of <i>guanxi</i> in association with RM; and (2) whether <i>guanxi</i> can be efficiently practised and operationalized in the RM and operations of the CFBs.
RQ3: How does <i>guanxi</i> -based RM affect the strategies and tactics of the CFBs?	<i>Guanxi</i> -based RM affects business and operational strategies in terms of the internal and external partnerships/stakeholder theory and tactics in terms of the technology-facilitated systems (e.g. CRM system). The findings indicated the necessity of the CFBs to re-define these two core stakeholders of internal and external partnerships with <i>guanxi</i> elements as a whole process and a <i>guanxi</i> -based conceptual framework should be formulated to facilitate the RM of the CFBs.
RQ4: Does <i>guanxi</i> affect business performance of the CFBs?	The findings made it difficult to draw consensus of opinion on the allegations by some authors that <i>guanxi</i> does or does not affect the business performance of the CFBs but the CFBs should enhance their competitive capabilities and advantages in China market through the development of a <i>guanxi</i> -based Customer Relationship Management (CRM) system in order to improve their business performance in China. Future research in this aspect is required.

Source: Self-developed for this research.

Proposition P1 to P4 are intended to answer the four questions as described in Table 1.

Cross references in each area are made where necessary.

Table 2 Results of Findings for Each Research Proposition

Description of Research Issues/Propositions	Results of Findings
P1: China's financial and banking reforms over the past two decades have not eroded the important role of <i>guanxi</i> in China's banking sector	Partially confirmed
P2a: Different views of <i>guanxi</i> in association with RM will affect the marketing activities and operations of the banks in China, particularly CFBs	Confirmed
P2b: Whether <i>guanxi</i> can be efficiently practiced and operationalized will affect the RM activities and operations of the CFBs	Confirmed
P3: Business and operational strategies and tactics of the CFBs require re-definition of RM in terms of <i>guanxi</i> with the constituencies of internal and external partnerships	Confirmed
P4: The DCBs with high <i>guanxi</i> outperform the CFBs with low <i>guanxi</i> and the lack of <i>guanxi</i> is a reason that undermines the business performance of CFBs	Partially confirmed

Source: Self-developed for this research.

The below conclusions help to achieve an understanding of these research objectives in

relation to the study of *guanxi*'s importance and applicability to the CFBs in order to assist the CFBs to improve their business performance. Also, the findings provide a foundation/platform for further investigations in new areas identified in this research.

***Guanxi* and Its Role in the CFBs**

The findings showed ambiguities in the definition/interpretation of *guanxi* and its role in the banks in China, implicitly confirming the comment of Chen and Layton (2003, p.1218) that there is no universally agreed definition of *guanxi* due to its "intricate and pervasive nature". In defining *guanxi*, Relationship Managers tended to look at *guanxi* from a more practical point of view, as information sourcing, problem solving and business referrals from one party to another. It was also indicated that Relationship Managers were not concerned about the differences between RM and *guanxi* as long as they could use either of them to build up long-term customer/bank relationships. This also confirmed the view of Arias (1998) that it is misleading to identify *guanxi* with RM.

A second issue relating to *guanxi*'s role is the impact of China's financial and banking reforms over the past two decades. The findings demonstrate the difficulties in confirming the impact of these reforms but a high percentage of Relationship Managers supporting the continuing importance of *guanxi* in today's business environment in China, thus implicitly suggesting the role of *guanxi* still exists after China's reforms. In the circumstances, Proposition P1 that China's reforms have not eroded the role of *guanxi* is partially confirmed. RQ1 cannot be provided with a definite answer.

However, the findings have achieved one important point regarding the emphasis of the Relationship Managers on the growing importance in enhancing and sustaining their competitive capabilities and their banks' competitive advantages in order to withstand strong competition as engendered by China's reforms. This may be achieved through the introduction of innovative and high quality products and services required by customers. The sole reliance on *guanxi* for survival by the banks in China is no longer viable. To further investigate the conclusions about the role of *guanxi*, a review of bank practices in the CFBs

with *guanxi* is required.

***Guanxi* in the Practices of the CFBs**

Relationships between *guanxi* and the activities of the Relationship Managers in the CFBs are established through the confirmation of P2a and P2b. The findings conclude that the Relationship Managers' understanding of the following issues can assist in answering RQ2 on how *guanxi* affects the marketing activities and operations of the CFBs: (a) different views of *guanxi* in association with the RM of the CFBs; and (b) practices and operationalization of *guanxi* in the RM of the CFBs.

First, the findings confirm that *guanxi* should be practised by the CFBs regardless of the Western RM concepts held by the Relationship Managers. However, there are difficulties in transplanting RM concepts from Western countries (Palmer, 1995) to banking practices in China, and in integrating Chinese *guanxi* concepts into the RM activities of the CFBs due to different national cultures and business practices. Further, the findings demonstrate that *guanxi* bears a strong relationship with marketing and the operation of banks in China, e.g. customer relationships, products and services, pricing strategies, networking and communications, staff-customer relationships, accounts management and ethical issues. The CFBs are not exceptional. These findings establish the importance of “*guanxi* practices” as a new area for future research in CFBs.

Research findings also throw light on the *guanxi*-based RM which would affect CFBs' business and operational strategies when implementing some Western concepts, e.g. internal and external partnerships and stakeholder theory, in their RM activities – a new research area to integrate *guanxi* into the Western RM under a conceptual framework to be researched and practiced by the CFBs. On the other hand, findings focus on *guanxi* in terms of tactics. Tactics is a tool to implement strategy (Arias, 1998). The findings focus *guanxi* at a tactical level relating to the establishment of customer databases and customer-oriented service systems in order to achieve direct contact with customers and other stakeholders (Gronroos, 1996b, cited in Arias, 1998). The findings also focus on the importance of how CFBs coordinate with their

head offices in the design of customer-oriented service systems (e.g. CRM system) with integrated *guanxi* elements for use by the CFBs in the China market. CRM is viewed by many Relationship Managers of the CFBs as a marketing process to foster customer relationships through a so-called CRM system, by delivering superior customer value and satisfaction. Finally, findings indicate that P3 is confirmed to answer RQ3.

In respect of the relationship between *guanxi* and business performance for the banks, particularly the CFBs in China, findings indicate that *guanxi* has influence on the return on sales. Relationship Managers considered profitability and business performance as the ultimate objectives of good *guanxi* for banks and enterprises in China. This confirms the claims of Davies et al., (1995), Leung et al., (1996), Lovett et al., (1999), Millington et al., (2005) and Yang (1994 and 2002) of *guanxi*'s major role in China and East Asia. However, *guanxi* itself cannot guarantee good business performance. This finding confirms the comments of Braendle et al., (2005) and Li and Athuahene-Gima (2001) that *guanxi* has no effect or even a negative effect on a firm and its performance. The findings also confirm the claim of Zhang and Zhang (2006) that there is no one consensus on the positive effect of *guanxi* in relation to business performance. The most important factor for the success of banks in China is the competitive capabilities of the Relationship Managers and the competitive advantages of the banks. Therefore, the findings emphasize the provision of diversified and quality products and services, offers of attractive pricing and tailor-made services to customers as success factors rather than sole reliance on *guanxi*. The findings have led to the conclusion regarding Proposition P4 that the DCBs with high *guanxi* outperform the CFBs with low *guanxi* is only partially confirmed, and the same applies to the proposition that the lack of *guanxi* is a reason for undermining the business performance of the CFBs. Neither affirmative nor negative answer to RQ4 is therefore provided.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH

This research provides two types of implications: (1) theoretical implication, and (2) practical implication. For *theoretical implication*, firstly, there is close relationship of *guanxi*

with some Western theories such as RM and those discussed in the “Literature Review” section, thus implying the feasibility of practising *guanxi* in the Western marketing management and RM in the CFBs. Secondly, there is a need for the future development of *guanxi*-bank related theories, as the findings indicate a lack of such literature, for example: (a) integration of *guanxi* with RM for the CFBs; and (b) relationships of *guanxi* and marketing/operations of the CFBs. The findings also reveal a lack of *guanxi* models for the banks in China, particularly the CFBs. It is difficult to link *guanxi* to bank marketing practices in China in the absence of sufficient theories and literature related to *guanxi*. In terms of *practical implication*, the general application of *guanxi* practice in conjunction with the RM activities of the CFBs, and the formulation of a *guanxi*-RM conceptual framework for the use of the CFBs are two practical implications and new areas for future research.

LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH

There are a number of limitations in the research that were beyond the researcher’s control during the progress of the research. They are (1) the limitations of research methodology, and (2) the limitations of conducting research in China. While such limitations are acknowledged, they do not detract from the significance of the findings. Instead, they have provided platforms for future research.

For the limitations of research Methodology, firstly, the selection of the location in Shanghai for the research posed time and cost constraints. Secondly, “one-shot” interviews utilized in this research are not sufficient to produce full and rich descriptions for the findings (Polkinghorne, 2005). Thirdly, the time spent in each interview (approximately two hours) is considered too long and the interviewees found the interviews tedious and restless.

With respect to the limitations of conducting research in China, data collection activities in this research were influenced by a number of practical considerations including the lack of up-to-date, comparable and complete information from industrial directories in China, and a strong disinclination of Mainland China people to reveal information about their views on *guanxi* to outsiders. The latter is a sensitive issue for bankers, as far as their view of *guanxi* is

concerned.

RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The first issue identified for further research is the relationship of *guanxi* with the business performance of the banks in China. Some elements of the literature indicated “no one consensus” in the relationship. The second issue relating to the impact of *guanxi* on the CFBs had not been surveyed, and it is still unknown whether the DCBs with high *guanxi* outperform the CFBs with low *guanxi*, or whether a lack of *guanxi* undermines the business performance of the CFBs. The third issue is the relationship between *guanxi* and the Western theories/concept. Research on their interrelationships/interactions is very limited and there has been no study on such relationships impacting on the CFBs. The fourth issue is the worldwide application of *guanxi* in different industries, not only banking. Finally, further phases of this research are subject of future surveys covering *guanxi* in the CFBs in the areas of (a) *guanxi* and RM integration; (b) redefinition of the role of *guanxi* in the RM activities of the CFBs; and (c) redefinition of RM in terms of *guanxi* related to some other Western theories.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

This research aimed at studying *guanxi* in the RM activities of the CFBs. It is mainly of an exploratory nature, and determines a more complicated finding of *guanxi* in the marketing and operation of the CFBs. So far as the findings are concerned, there is no one consensus on the important implications of *guanxi* in China’s banking sector but, without *guanxi*, Relationship Managers would find it difficult to solicit business and maintain rapport with customers. There are still many unanswered questions in respect of the application of *guanxi* to the RM activities of the CFBs, for example, the formulation of a *guanxi*-RM conceptual framework for the CFBs; the effect of *guanxi* practice on the business and operations of the CFBs; and the relationship between *guanxi* and business performance of the CFBs, all of which are more complex than indicated in the literature, thus setting a foundation for further

research.

REFERENCE

- Ai, J., 2006. Guanxi Networks in China: Its Importance and Future Trends. *China & World Economy*, 14(5), pp.105-118.
- Alston, J. P., 1989. Wa, Guanxi, and Inhwa: Managerial Principles in Japan, China, and Korea. *Business Horizon* (March), pp.26-31.
- Ambler, T., 1995. The Derivation of Guanxi. *Marketing Management*, 4, pp.27-28.
- Anderson, J., 2005. The Great Chinese Bank Sale. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 168(8), pp.7-12.
- Arias, J.T.G., 1998. A relationship marketing approach to guanxi. *European Journal of Marketing*, 32(1/2), pp.145-156.
- Bain, Y., 1997. Bringing Strong Ties Back In: Indirect Ties, Network Bridges, and Job Searches in China. *American Sociological Review*, 62, pp.366-385.
- Berry, L.L., 1983. *Relationship Marketing*, in Berry, L.L., Shostack, G.L. and Upsay, G.D. (eds), *Emerging Perspectives on Service Marketing*. Chicago, IL: American Marketing Association, pp.25-28.
- Bjorkman, I. and Kock, S., 1995. Social relationships and business networks: the case of western companies in China. *International Business Review*, 4(4), pp.519-535.
- Blau, P.M., 1964. *Exchange and power in social life*. New York, J. Wiley.
- Braendle, U.C., Gasser, T. and Null, J., 2005. Corporate Governance in China – Is Economic Growth Potential Hindered by Guanxi? *Business and Society Review*, 110(4), pp.389-405.
- Brunner, J. and Koh, A.C., 1988. Negotiations in the People's Republic of China: An Empirical Survey of American and Chinese Negotiators' Perceptions and Practices. *Journal of Global Marketing*, 2(1), pp.33-56.
- Buckley, P.J., Clegg, J. and Tan, H., 2006. Cultural awareness in knowledge transfer to China – The role of *guanxi* and *mianzi*. *Journal of World Business*, 41, pp.275-288.

- Butterfield, F., 1982. *China: Alive in the bitter sea*. New York: Times Books.
- Butterfield, F., 1983. *China: Alive in Bitter Sea*. Coronet Books, NY.
- Chaston, I., 1998. Evolving 'new marketing' philosophies by merging existing concepts: application of process within small high-technology firms. *Journal of Marketing Management*, 14, pp.273-291.
- Chen, S. and Layton, R., 2003. Market orientation and guanxi in Chinese business enterprises – substitutes or complements? ANZMAC 2003 Conference Proceedings Adelaide, 1-3 December 2003, Market Orientation and Relationship Marketing Track, pp.1217-1224.
- Chen, X.P. and Chen, C.C., 2004. On the Intricacies of the Chinese Guanxi. *Asia Pacific Journal of Management*, 21(3), pp.305-324.
- Cheng, L.W., 2007. Guanxi vs. relationship marketing: Exploring underlying differences. *Industrial Marketing Management*, 36, pp.81-86.
- Couldwell, C., 1998. A data day battle. *computing*, May 21, pp.64-66.
- Dann, S.J. and Dann, S.M., 2001. *Strategic Internet Marketing*. Milton, Queensland: John Wiley and Sons.
- Davies, H., 1995. *Interpreting Guanxi: the Role of Personal Connections in a High Context Transitional Economy*, in Davies, H. ed., *China Business: Context & Issues*. Hong Kong: Longman.
- Davies, H., Leung, T.K.P., Luk, S.T.K. and Wong, Y.H., 1995. The Benefits of Guanxi: The Value of Relationships in Developing the Chinese Market. *Industrial Marketing Management*, 24(3), pp.207-412.
- Dunfee, T.W. and Warren, D.E., 2001. Is Guanxi Ethical? A Normative Analysis of Doing Business in China. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 32, pp.191-204.
- Egan, J., 2004. *Relationship Marketing: Exploring Relational Strategies in Marketing*, 2nd Ed. Prentice Hall.
- Fan, Y., 2002. Questioning guanxi: definition, classification and implications. *International Business Review*, 11, pp.543-561.

- Fernandez, J.A. and Underwood, L., 2006. *China CEO: Voices of Experience From 20 International Business Leaders*. John Wiley & Sons.
- Fock, H.K.Y. and Woo, K.S., 1998. The China Market: Strategic Implications of Guanxi. *Business Strategy Review*, 9(3), pp.33-43.
- Fox, M., 1987. Marketing/Advertising Research: In China, “Guanxi” is Everything. *Advertising Age*, 58(47), pp.12-14.
- Geddie, M.W., DeFranco, A.L. and Geddie, M.F., 2005. A comparison of relationship marketing and Guanxi: Its implications for the hospitality industry. *International Journal of Contemporary Hospitality Management*, 17(7), pp.614-632.
- Geddie, M.W., DeFranco, A.L. and Geddie, M.F., 2002. From Guanxi to customer relationship marketing: how the constructs of Guanxi can strengthen CRM in the hospitality industry. *Journal of Hospitality and Tourism Marketing*, 13(3), pp.19-33.
- Gilbert, D. and Tsao, J., 2000. Exploring Chinese cultural influences and hospitality marketing relationships. *International Journal of Contemporary Hospitality Management*, 12(1), pp.45-53.
- Gronroos, C., 1994. From marketing mix to relationship marketing: towards a paradigm shift in marketing. *Management Decision*, 32(2), pp.4-20.
- Gronroos, C., 1996. Relationship marketing: strategic and tactical implications. *Management Decision*, 34(3), pp.5-14.
- Gummesson, E., Lehtinen, U. and Gronroos, C., 1997. Comment on Nordic perspective of relationship marketing. *European Journal of Marketing*, 31(1), pp.10-16.
- Hackley, C.A. and Dong, Q., 2001. American public relations networking encounters China’s guanxi. *Public Relations Quarterly*, 46(2), pp.16-19.
- Hammond, S.C. and Glenn, L.M., 2004. The ancient practice of Chinese social networking: Guanxi and social network theory. *E:CO Special Double Issue*, 6(1-2), pp.24-31.
- Hannabuss, S., 1996. Research Interviews. *New Library World*, 97, 1129, pp.22-30.
- Hark, M.J., 1999. Relationship marketing defined? An examination of current relationship marketing definitions. *Marketing Intelligence & Planning*, 17(1), pp.13-20.

- He, L., 2004. Foreign Banks in China: What Impact Would They Bring about? *China & World Economy*, 12(1), pp.50-61.
- Hoskisson, R.E., Eden, L., Lan, C.M. and Wright, M., 2000. Strategy in Emerging Economies. *Academy of Management Journal*, 43(3), pp.249-267.
- Huang, Y.H., 2000. The Personal Influence Model and Gao Guanxi in Taiwan Chinese Public Relations. *Public Relations Review*, 26(2), pp.219-236.
- Hwang, K., 1987. Face and Favor: The Chinese Power Game. *American Journal of Sociology*, 92(4), pp.944-974.
- Janes, J., 2001. Survey research design. *Library Hi Tech.*, 19(4), pp.419-421.
- Lam, D. and Lin, X., 2003. Guanxi and Word-of-Mouth. *ANZMAC 2003 Conference Proceedings Adelaide 1-3 December 2003, Marketing in International and Cross-Cultural Environments Track*.
- Laurenceson, J. and Qin, F., 2008. Has Minority Foreign Investment in China's Banks Improved Their Cost Efficiency? *China & World Economy*, 16(3), pp.57-74.
- Lee, M.Y. and Ellis, P., 2000. Insider-Outsider Perspectives of *Guanxi*. *Business Horizons*, Jan-Feb, pp.25-30.
- Leung, M.K. and Chan, Ricky Y.K., 2006. Are foreign banks sure winners in post-WTO China? *Business Horizons*, 49, pp.221-234.
- Leung, T.K.P. and Wong, Y.H., 2001. The Ethics and Positioning of *Guanxi* in China. *Marketing Intelligence & Planning*, 19(1), pp.55-64.
- Leung, T.K.P., Wong, Y.H. and Wong, S., 1996. A Study of Hong Kong Businessmen's Perceptions of the Role "Guanxi" in the People's Republic of China. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 15, pp.749-758.
- Li, H. and Athuahene-Gima, K., 2001. Product Innovation Strategy and the Performance of New Technology Ventures in China. *Academy of Management Journal*, 44(6), pp.1123-1134.
- Lin, N., 2001. *Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

- Liu, H. and Roos, L.U., 2006. Managing strategic planning paradigms in China. *Marketing Intelligence & Planning*, 24(5), pp.432-445.
- Lovett, S., Simmons, L.C. and Kali, R., 1999. *Guanxi* versus the Market: Ethics and Efficiency. *Journal of International Business Studies*, 30(2), pp.231-248.
- Luo, Y., 1997a. *Guanxi* and performance of foreign-invested enterprises in China: An empirical inquiry. *Management International Review*, January, pp.163-170.
- Luo, Y., 1997b. *Guanxi*: Principles, Philosophies, and Implications. *Human System Management*, 16(1), pp.43-51.
- Luo, Y. and Chen, M., 1997. Does *guanxi* influence firm performance? *Asia Pacific Journal of Management*, 14, pp.1-16.
- Millington, A., Eberhardt, M. and Wilkinson, B., 2005. Gift Giving, *Guanxi* and Illicit Payments in Buyer-Supplier Relationships in China: Analysing the Experience of UK Companies. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 57(3), pp.255-268.
- Nohria, N., 1992. *Is a network perspective a useful way of studying organization?* in Nohria, N. and Eccles, R.G. (Eds), *Networks and Organizations: Structure Form and Action*. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
- Palmer, A., 1995. Relationship Marketing: Local Implementation of a Universal Concept. *International Business Review*, 4(4), pp.471-481.
- Park, S.H. and Luo, Y., 2001. *Guanxi* and Organizational Dynamic: Organizational Networking in Chinese Firms. *Strategic Management Journal*, 22, pp.455-477.
- Parvatiyar, A. and Sheth, J.N., 2001. *Conceptual Framework of Customer Relationship Management*, in *Customer Relationship Management – Emerging Concepts, Tools and Applications*, Jagdish N. Sheth, Atul Parvatiyar, and G. Shainesh, eds. New Delhi, India, Tata/McGraw-Hill, pp.3-25.
- Payne, A. and Frow, P., 2005. A Strategic Framework for Customer Relationship Management. *Journal of Marketing*, 69, pp.167-176.
- Pearce, J.A. and Robinson, R.B., 2000. Cultivating *Guanxi* as a Foreign Investor Strategy. *Business Horizons*, January-February, pp.31-18.

- Polkinghorne, D.E., 2005. Language and Meaning: Data Collection in Qualitative Research. *Journal of Counseling Psychology*, 52(2), pp.137-145.
- Ryals, L. and Knox, S., 2001. Cross-functional issues in the implementation of relationship marketing through customer relationship management (CRM). *Cranfield School of Management*, pp.1-20.
- Ryals, L. and Payne, A.F.T., 2001. Customer Relationship Management in Financial Services: Towards Information-Enabled Relationship Marketing. *Journal of Strategic Marketing*, 9(March), pp.1-25.
- Sin, L.Y.M., 2002. *China Marketing*. Hong Kong: Chung Hua Book Store.
- Sin, L.Y.M., Tse, A.C.B., Yau, O.H.M., Lee, J.S.Y. and Chow, R., 2002. The effect of relationship marketing orientation on business performance in a service-oriented economy. *Journal of Services Marketing*, 16(7), pp.656-676.
- Song, L.J. and Werbel, J.D., 2007. *Guanxi* as impetus? Career exploration in China and the United States. *Career Development International*, 12(1), pp.51-67.
- Standifird, S.S., 2006. Using *Guanxi* to Establish Corporate Reputation in China. *Corporate Reputation Review*, 9(3), pp.171-178.
- Su, C. and Littlefield, E., 2001. Entering *Guanxi*: A Business Ethical Dilemma in Mainland China. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 33(3), pp.199-210.
- Su, C., Sirgy, M.J. and Littlefield, J.E., 2003. Is *Guanxi* Orientation Bad, Ethically Speaking? A Study of Chinese Enterprises. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 44, pp.303-312.
- The Economist, 1996. The overseas Chinese: inheriting the bamboo network. *The Economist*, 23 December 1995-January 1996, p. 79.
- Thomas, M.J., 2000. Commentary: princely thoughts on Machiavelli, marketing and management. *European Journal of Marketing*, 34(5/6), pp.524-537.
- Tsang, W.K., 1998. Can *guanxi* be a source of sustained competitive advantages for doing business in China? *The Academy of Management Executive*, 12(2), pp.64-73.
- Tse, A.C.B., Sin, L.Y.M., Yau, O.H.M., Lee, J.S.Y. and Chow, R., 2004. A firm's role in the marketplace and the relative importance of market orientation and relationship marketing. *European Journal of Marketing*, 38(9/10), pp.1158-1172.

- Tsui, A.S. and Farh, J.L., 1997. Where Guanxi Matters: Relational Demography and Guanxi in the Chinese Context. *Work and Occupations*, 24, pp.56-79.
- Tung, R.L. and Worm, V., 1997. The Importance of Networks (Guanxi) for European Companies in China. *Paper presented at the Academy of Management Conference*.
- Tzokas, N. and Saren, M., 2000. Knowledge and relationship marketing: where, what and how? 2nd WWW Conference on Relationship Marketing 15/11/99-15/2/00 Paper 4, www.mcb.co.uk/services/conferen/nov99/m/
- Tzokas, N. and Saren, M., 2004. Competitive advantage, knowledge and relationship marketing: where, what and how? *Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing*, 19(2), pp.124-135.
- Wall, J.A., 1990. Managers in the People's Republic of China. *Academy of Management Executive*, 4(2), pp.19-32.
- Warren, D.E., Dunfee, T.W. and Li, N., 2004. Social Exchange in China: The Double-Edged Sword of Guanxi. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 55, pp.355-372.
- Williamson, O.E., 1979. Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations. *Journal of Law and Economics*, 22(2), pp.233-261.
- Wong, M.L., 2007. Guanxi and its role in business. *Chinese Management Studies*, 1(4), pp.257-276.
- Wong, Y.H., 1998a. Relationship Marketing in China: The Magic and Myth of Guanxi. *Journal of International Marketing & Marketing Research*, 23(1), pp.3-14.
- Wong, Y.H., 1998b. An integrated relationship (*guanxi*) marketing model in China. *Journal of Professional Services Marketing*, 18(1), pp.25-48.
- Wong, Y.H., 1998c. Key to key account management: relationship (*guanxi*) model. *International Marketing Review*, 15(3), pp.215-31.
- Wong, Y.H. and Tam, J.L.M., 2000. Mapping relationships in China *guanxi* dynamic approach. *Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing*, 15(1), pp.57-70.
- Wong, Y.H., Leung, T.K.P., Hung, H. and Ngai, E.W.T., 2007. A Model of Guanxi Development: Flexibility, Commitment and Capital Exchange. *Total Quality Management*, 18(8), pp.875-887.

- Xin, K.R. and Pearce, J.L., 1996. Guanxi: Connections as substitutes for formal institutional support. *Academy of Management Journal*, 39(6), pp.1641-1658.
- Yang, M., 1986. *The Art of Social Relationships and Exchange in China*. Berkeley, CA: University of California.
- Yang, M.M., 1994. *Gift, Favors and Banquets: The Art of Social Relationships in China*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Yang, M.M., 2002. The Resilience of Guanxi and its New Developments: A Critique of some new Guanxi Scholarship. *The China Quarterly*, 170, pp.459-476.
- Yeung, I.Y.M. and Tung, R.L., 1996. Achieving Business Success in Confucian Societies: The Importance of Guanxi. *Organizational Dynamics*, 25(2), pp.54-65.
- Zhang, Y. and Zhang, Z., 2006. Guanxi and organizational dynamics in China: a link between individual and organizational levels. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 67, pp.375-392.
- Zontanos, G. and Anderson, A.R., 2004. Relationships, marketing and small business: an exploration of links in theory and practice. *Qualitative Market Research: An International Journal*, 7(3), pp.228-236.

China's Response to the World Economic Crises and Her Rise

Dragana Mitrovic

University of Belgrade

Email: dragana.mitrovic@fpn.bg.ac.rs

Collapse of the American investment financial market has crippled its financial system and consequently its economy, that is the biggest and the most important world economy. That is why it immediately spread its malign impact on the international financial and monetary system, its main institutions, global investment, production and trade, global employment. At the same time, this crisis also questioned the type of capitalist system that we have known for the last thirty years. One of the non-avoidable questions at the beginning of the crises was – how would Chinese economy do during it? Would the second biggest world economy, the second biggest global trade power, at the time the second biggest financier of the US dollar and economy, world-wide investor in energy sector, the engine of the Asian economy, manage to skip the dire straits of the global economic crises? Many analysts asked how actually big was the vitality of her economy and her real growth potential if the foreign investment would end or got reduced or her access to foreign markets would be forced to follow this path. How big and with what kind of consequences the recession and wider crises that suppresses the USA, EU and Japan – important sources of technology, investments and markets important for the robust Chinese export, but also the destination of the Chinese FDI and other investments – would have on her, as we know that some 60% of Chinese economy depends on foreign markets as shown in Xinhua analyses from November 19 2011? We learnt that already in the first nine months of the 2008 the part of the export in her GDP was year on year reduced by 8.9%. At that moment many asked if the soft slowing of her economy's growth actually was a sign of the end of the Chinese economic miracle, and what sort of consequences that would have for Asia and the whole world, and what for China? China that through 30 years of the reforms and opening up has not only changed every segment of her economy and many aspects of her society, but also her position in Asia and the world, by becoming one of the pillars of the global economic growth, cooperation and multi-polarity.

Up-today's reforms - very complex and demanding ones, gradual, but also brave - have shown that Chinese leadership has had an exquisite capacity and vision to manage these processes, internally and in the international environment, regardless the change of that environment: from extremely favourable to the very unfavourable one. Still, the international environment has since the beginning of the reforms and the opening up not been so harsh, while China needs to uphold the high growth rate for the purpose of creating the working places and realization of the adopted goals of the economic and general social development. Chinese leaders were, soon after the crises broken out, invited to take part at the conference of G-20, and that immediately put the question – how much and by which means they were ready to work on resolving the problems that were created by the others, but which resolvment they needed pretty much. China has kept her pro-active and respectable position within the G-20 and strongly enforced reformist measures within the Bretton Woods institutions, especially voting rights within the IMF - which, on the other hand, she financially generously supported, as well as India and Brazil did as numerous reports (Xinhua 2009, 2010). Anyway, from the very beginning of the G-20 activities, China has had firm position, starting with strong suggestion that the G20 should "play a core role in promoting international economic cooperation and global economic governance", strengthen coordination of macroeconomic policies among them and support countries hit by the sovereign debt crisis in overcoming the current difficulties. It urged the establishment of a new international financial order that is "fair, equitable, inclusive and well-managed," and an international financial system "that is good for the growth of the real economy." China kept insisting on "building of an open and free global trading regime" in which developed countries should promote international trade "with greater openness." Also, her leaders showed seriousness and devotion to G-20 mission of China when saying that it would be a long and complex process to achieve strong, sustainable and balanced growth of the world economy.

The slowing down of the world economy and the acute financial market happened simultaneously with the outbreak of the existing or latent problems of the Chinese reforms, creating thusly additional burdening circumstances for the realization of the adopted guiding

measures. China found herself in an unpleasant position as she had to quickly adjust her production model to remain competitive and because it has been highly integrated in the global market she needed to smoothly do the shifting for one growth engine (export) to the two others (investment and domestic demand). Slowing down of the economies that absorbs most of the Chinese exports, credit crunch and rising prices of the available liquid funds, increase of the prices on the world food and energy markets, rise of the prices of raw materials and transportation in China, due to the highest rate of inflation in the last fourteen years, rise of the local wages, with the appreciation of RMB Yuan in the period of 2005-2008 (especially against depreciating US dollar at the beginning of the crises), as tight credit and monetary policy targeting the threat of inflation at the beginning of 2008, have led to the significant reduction of export - an important economy's growth engine - for 2.4% compared with the previous year. As shown at numerous publishing of the official data (Xinhua News Agency 2009), the total foreign trade contributed to only 1.2% to the 9.9% growth of the GDP in 2008, compared with the 2.4% the previous year. But what pushed the alarm button for those who have suspected the real potential and capability of the Chinese economy, was the simultaneous slowing down of her economic growth that has been the highest continuous one in modern economic history: with 9.8% average trough thirty years. So China was quickly trying to change the pattern of her economy and there was a risk of a dangerous gap between international and domestic demand, as yet domestic demand was not ready to replace the international market's role.

Foreign demand shrinkage, (like the reduction of the previously contracted Christmas orders for approximately 20% already in 2008) hit for the worst The Pearl River Delta, the world manufacturer that produces some 60% of the Chinese export, specialized strongly in the production of toys, foot wear and furniture. Significant number of the small and medium size enterprises has stopped the production for an in-definitive period or shut down some plants, as their work totally depended on the previously contracted production for foreign buyers. Hundreds of small factories have already bankrupted only a year or even the less, after the outbreak of the world economic crises, and hundreds of thousands of the migrant workers moved forward in a search for new working places. It was reasonable to believe that they

would not go back to their native villages where, most probably, were no chances for employment due to the low competitiveness of the Chinese agriculture and reduction of the fertile soil caused by its massive misuse for real-estates construction. On the other hand, their families, living in the countryside, expect remittances from the migrant working member or the family that makes their survival easier or possible. That is why it was of the crucial importance to provide any new employment for them and preserve social stability. As for the illustration of this claim – some 1.3 million migrant workers originated from in 2008 earthquake hit Sichuan, work in one of the most developed, export oriented industrial cities, Shenzhen, with a formal status of the SEZ (Special Economic Zone), and beyond government investment to Sichuan, their salaries, sent home, are that factor that makes possible the recovery and rebuilding of their native province and survival of their families at the same time. From one of the four Chinese cities under central authority – Chongqing – over three millions migrant workers send home, to their families, situated all around mainland China, sums worth millions of dollar per year. This source of survival, savings, investments and growth is at danger with the closing down of their working places. In 2010, number of floating migrant workers population reached a record of 211 million people, and was going to grow up in years to come, being joined by 6 million new workers each year (Hays 2008).

Most of the exporting factories used to make their profits due to the combination of the cheap labour and low-cost raw materials, huge wholesale and underestimated RMB exchange rate as an additional helping tool for pumping export. Such production also meant negligence towards the environmental and energy saving standards. Nevertheless, in the newly emerged circumstances of the simultaneous rising costs of raw materials, energy and labour, as well as the unstable foreign demand, Chinese export needed new solutions, of which most were not easy to be realised: moving upward the chain of the product complexity towards those with the bigger newly added value, introduction of the more applied knowledge, automatization in production and productivity increase, better management, finding the new markets and preparing new - more efficient, innovative and skillful work force. How it works shows the next example. Only in the first five months of the 2008, export of the foot ware products made by the Pearl River Delta producers has slumped for 15.5% compared with the previous

year, but the value of it increased, in spite of the bankruptcy of more than 2.000 local producers in the same period. Obviously, only those with the highest vitality and the accommodating capability and credit potentials bigger than those of their competing partners will survive. By February 2009, more than 20 million migrant workers lost their jobs as a consequence of a tide of factory closures at the start of the financial crisis, according to numerous analyses and reports from 2009 and according to data provided by the Ministry of Agriculture. China's exports started to decline fast at the end of 2008. In the first half of 2009, exports dropped a massive 21.8 percent year on year, according to data provided by the General Administration of Customs of China. It was not until December 2009 that monthly exports returned to growth after 14 months of decline. Statistics show that China's exports in the first five months 2010 rose 33.2 percent to 567.7 billion U.S. dollars. However, a low comparison base made the growth look stronger than it actually was. Additionally, as the world sank into recession that proved stubborn, crisis has led to increasing trade frictions and trade barriers globally. Notorious for its huge trade surplus, China has become the first target of trade protectionists and probably the biggest casualty of trade frictions¹. As a result, the Chinese trade surplus shrank by 15 percent to \$160 billion in 2011, from \$183 billion in 2010, as her imports kept growing and demand for Chinese goods in Europe and in the USA decreased and it was China's lowest surplus in three years². Even the outlook for exports in 2012 is not better Chinese trade officials believe that her foreign trade will be "more balanced" with measures to boost imports. The trade surplus has been shrinking since the global financial crisis erupted in 2008: in 2009 the surplus decreased by 30 percent to \$196 billion, and dropped again by 6.4 percent year-on-year to \$183 billion in 2010.

In contrast, China has robustly started to introduce policies of energy savings and environmentally concerned ones and those that protect fertile soil from other, more profitable usage (usually associated with low or no compensation to the peasants). Low efficiency of

¹ One of the biggest victims was China's steel products export that in 2009 declined 58.5 percent year on year, according to Chinese customs. China's long products export decline 5% m-o-m in January, (*MetalBiz*), 2010-03-02, [online], Available at: <http://www.chinamining.org/News/2010-03-02/1267498321d34233.html>. [Accessed on December 2009].

² According to the China's Ministry of Commerce.

such labour-intensive economy, that has put into the second place many other aspects of the macroeconomic stability on the account of export as a growth engine, has also established unhealthy economy structure – too much dependent on foreign demand and underestimated currency, which, together with the record high trade balance surplus additionally made inflationary pressure. Beyond that, such course of development has worsened an old problem – discrepancy between the levels of development between the export oriented south-eastern coastal part of the country and the continental parts of the country.

Shrinkage of foreign demand has caused slowing of growth path of the domestic industrial production, which at the same time meant reduction of the demand for raw materials, semi-products, energy, but also for labour. This was also caused by hike of the domestic prices, double growth of average salary during the last few years and the reduction of the corporate profits. Actually, much bigger problem has represented the shrinkage of the domestic consumption – the second of the three growth engines of the Chinese economy during the last thirty two years - that jointly with the decrease of demand for the Chinese goods led to the slowing down of the economy, quarter after quarter subsequently, from the 11.3% in 2007, to 10.6%, 10.1% and finally to the level of 9% in the last quarter of 2008. However, this slower path of the GDP growth was still for 0.3% higher than the average one during the last 32 years, and slightly above the projected 8% for 2009³. But, influenced by the fears of world recession and the acute world economic crises, it is often forgotten that the target of the State Council was the slowing down of the excessive growth and hampering the inflation, as well as that production of some dirty industries was stopped during the Olympic Games. Furthermore, since 2005, it was the goal set by the Chinese government to reassign the economy from the overheated one to the economy with high, but controlled growth, that still could absorb more than 15 millions of the working force per year (new migrant workers, graduated from universities and high and technical schools, as well as reemployed ones). What problematized this was a risk and uncertainty of whether the slowing down will stop at the needed level or it would, under the unfavourable pressure from the outside, fall under the

³ China's 2009 GDP growth revised up to 8.2%, according to the Xinhua released data, [online], Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-09/22/content_12095301.htm. [Accessed on 2009-09-22].

desired rate of 9%. Realistic prognoses claimed that the economy growth would in 2009 decline from the 2008 11.9% to around 10%, while some others claimed it to be at modestly 8%. The Chinese economy eventually grew by 8.7 % in 2009 and was rapidly warming up as the 2009 October-December quarterly GDP soared by 10.7 percent. Since the start of 2010, the economy has maintained steady and relatively fast growth and in the first quarter, grew by 11.9 % to 8.06 trillion yuan (1.19 trillion U.S. dollars), which is the growth rate of 5.7% points higher than the same period last year. During the 2010 and 2011 it showed steady and still very high growth of 10.4 and 9.2 percent respectively. Despite the drop in GDP, the numbers were still higher than the government's 8% growth target (China Digital Times, 2011).

Less available financial recourses and more expensive credits world-wide would certainly mean (as it was already proved to the some extent), less FDI pouring into the Chinese economy. But, at the same time many investors would decide to invest there as see it as the most secure destination for the scarce investment recourses, having in mind the broadness of its market and numerous options that China has to overcome and, by its specific manner, skip the dire straits of the globally spread uncertainty and problems. That stands especially when having in mind the huge potential of the domestic investments that is based on the high domestic savings rate. Chinese stock markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen, which have experienced the spectacular growth during 2006 and 2007, obviously as part of the bubble of artificially created expectations, Government's support and strong foreign inflow, has almost completely blown out during the summer of 2009. However, obviously taken for casino for a numerous small investors and because of the rigid control unsuitable for major crackdowns, which could jeopardize stability of the young and still largely closed domestic financial market, they didn't nor couldn't have noticeable or latent negative effects (Reuters, 2009). On the contrary, it has been on a healthy and sustainable level, at it has had foreign inflow into stocks of those companies which future is trustable – like those in the field of real estates, building industry, banking sector, aluminium production and other industry. This inflow was also encouraged by the modest level of those stock's prices, due to the echo of the crises that has been shaking the world biggest stock markets. According to the regulations

issued in April 2010 by the State Council, China will continue to support Chinese A-share listed companies in further introducing strategic investors from home and abroad, and standardize foreign companies' investment in domestic securities and corporate merger and acquisition moves. It was also announced that a national security examination mechanism will be built as soon as possible for foreign-funded companies' merger and acquisition operation in China. Additionally, qualified foreign-funded companies are allowed to go public, issue corporate bonds or medium-term bills in China. On the other hand, these regulations introduced that China still welcomes foreign investment in high-tech industries, services sectors, energy-saving and environmental protection, but polluting and energy-wasting or projects in industries running at overcapacity, are not wanted anymore (Li, 2009).

Answering the question: could the unfavorable external circumstances, that for the first time has substantially influenced the aggregate statistics of the Chinese economy which in the periods of reforms and opening up has gone through many turbulent phases – let's mention just: three inflation crises and one period of deflation, disagreement among the leadership about the deepness of the reforms and social and ideological price to be paid for the changes, serious and regular natural catastrophes, international sanctions, huge problems (among which we emphasize lagging behind the countryside and wealth discrepancy between urban and rural areas, Eastern and other parts of the country, income gap between rich and the poor in the cities, underdevelopment of the social and health security networks, floating population of some 211 million season workers, exceptionally intense urbanization process, energy security, shortage of water and arable soil, non-typical security threats as bird-flu, SARS etc., numerous controversies and problems (Mitrovic, 2007) – so, answering the question: could those external circumstances jeopardize vitality of the Chinese economy and high goals of its' economic and social development – we give the negative answer. Causes that so far made that positive effects outdo the negative ones remain, and basic factors that has caused trend of high growth and stability of the Chinese economy, are not going to change. On the contrary, the process of rebalancing the strength of the three engines of the economy's growth and their tuning with the wider social trends and processes is underway. This has been handling with the careful weighting of their realization's price and with insisting on the continuous search

for social consensus about it. In the core of this consensus is that most of the Chinese citizens see themselves as the genuine winners in this process, and Government, e.g., the CPC, as the guarantee of that particular social contract.

Actually, it was the strong leadership that has differed China from most other countries in recent decades. Carefully chosen, highly educated, carved through working on lower positions of management, Chinese leaders of the fourth generation continue and deepen the visionary ideas of the founding-fathers of the reformatory conception, as well as of the following carriers of this policy. President Hu Jintao and prime minister Wen Jiabao have all the important characteristics of their famous predecessors, very strong support from the widest circle of the leaders, but also the public support, as their way of ruling is specific for their public friendly orientation, too. From the very first sign of the world crises, a long range of leaders – starting with prime minister, State Council ministers, PBOC governor and vice-governor, experts, researchers - have almost on a daily bases addressed the public with explaining the crises, its' eventual consequences on Chinese economy, emphasizing the liability of the domestic economy towards the unfavorable outside's developments, internal difficulties, but also expressing full confidence in the adopted course and viability of its' realization.

One of the first measures announced immediately after the financial crises outbreak, that illustrates our point, and at the same time shows the way how one growth engine take the job of the slowing others: in this case, investment instead of the export and domestic spending, giving them the time to regroup for the new start. So, the Ministry of Transportation announced the adoption of the plan for investing first the 730 billion US\$ into projects of construction of road and port infrastructure during the coming three or five years. Such measure, that shows assurance into effectiveness of the sovereign actions, was aimed to result with almost instant revival of the domestic demand, employment and consumption of the households. Some parts of these funds were already planned by the 11th and 12th State Council's guiding measures (previously five year plans), as to 95% of all municipalities and 80% of all the villages should be connected by the national highway network up to the 2020, as reported in details in numerous domestic media (China Briefing, 2008). Investments have

had up to now created about 40% of the Chinese GDP, and what makes them healthy on a long run are size and unevenness of the Chinese regional development levels, that offers big possibilities for the further economic growth in the relatively long period in the future, through the industrialization of the backward areas and further urbanization. Capacity of the growing spending of the enlarging middle class also gives a big potential for the health growth of the economy. The very special position in this process has a generation born after 1978, with nurtured habits of spending and investing into numerous aspects of the life quality. In the same sense almost unlimited opportunities and, at the same time serious political must, lie with the investment into the countryside – from the infrastructure building, modernization and restructuring the agricultural production towards its further commercialization, giving opportunities to the peasants to rent a land under the market conditions, up to the living standard of the about 800 million of the peasants, whose income level is three to ten times smaller that of the urban dwellers. Rising the level of the *per-capita* income of the peasants to over the 1,200 US\$ until 2020 (that is the decision of the October 2008 CC CPC⁴), gives enormous opportunities to the growth of spending, savings, investments, new working places, and so on, many times around. Within these measures new set price for grain should be seen.

While balancing between providing growth in difficult times and inflation control, State Council decided at first to ease the strains of the credit and monetary policy as to give the commercial banks and additional space for upholding the small and medium enterprises, e.g. to help those enterprises survive the tough situation on the foreign markets, but also to encourage the domestic firms investments into their own technological and management upgrading. (At the begging of the 2010, though, Central government decided to end this policy and limit the liquidity of the commercial banks due to the rising inflation and to some extensive growth level at the last quarter of 2009). Additionally, state has increased the export rebates to the exporters of the labor-intensive products, such as garments and textile, electric appliances and machinery, with the increased level of the added value, with the aim to burst

⁴ In details analyzed in the following article, as well: CPC closes plenum with decision on rural reform, (*Xinhua Net*), Updated: 2008-10-12, [online], Available at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-10/12/content_7097786.htm.

their export in harshening environment. This is part of the new reform wave and attempt to create knowledge-based high-tech and new product export (such as wind turbines and solar cells). In addition, State Council has approved the scrapping of export tax rebates on 406 products including some steel and non-ferrous metals, fertilizers, as well as some plastic, rubber and glass products, effective July 15 2010 most probably to reduce trade frictions but also to eliminate environmentally unfriendly (ETCN, 2010) and low value added production. This is just an additional list of the products which producers have been domestically penalized for being slow in following the upcoming export requirements trends. On the macroeconomic level, government measures seek to also fasten industrial restructuring, give fiscal encouragement to investment into innovations and development of those parts of the economy that lag behind, but have huge growth potentials. Additionally, Government started to strengthen the investment into Wuhan earthquake hit region, railway network, including the world's longest high-speed train between Beijing and Shanghai (in operation late in 2011, with more lines under pavement to link nearly all the provincial capitals), subway lines in the cities, IT industry, infrastructure for telecommunications, renewable energy infrastructure and saving energy infrastructure, R&D, environment protection projects. Important part of the domestic consumption invigorating measures is continuing social welfare expansion to make place to additional home consumption.

When the economy started to rapidly warm up again, in the last quarter of the 2009, urban property prices surged to a historical high in cities including Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen (The Financial Times, 2012). Government economists and officials become very worried about rising inflationary pressure, It was a signal to end a period of the very loose financial policy, which allowed a massive 9.59 trillion RMB yuan of bank lending in 2009, as the chief cause of the current asset bubbles, but was necessary to propel domestic investment and demand. Inflation rate, a volatile element in a society where poor families spend up to half their incomes on food, that was last under 4 percent in September 2010, edged down in December 2011 to 4.1 percent after hitting a 37-month high of 6.5 percent in July 2011⁵. China's inflation could ease to below 4 percent for the first time in 17 months in February

⁵ *China's Statistics Bureau Data.*

2012 and the full-year rate is seen as a “clear deceleration” from 2011 (Zheng, 2012).

Another ingredient amplifying money supply and acerbating liquidity is that the proceeds from foreign trade surplus, (FDI) foreign direct investment and varied forms of hot money flowing into China are often converted to RMB. Now, economists have recommended a policy return to currency appreciation would help increase imports and balance trade. There are increasing signals that policy-makers will soon return to a course they had followed after the July 2005 RMB revaluation. During those three years, China carefully kept an approximately annual 5 percent appreciation of its currency, without dealing a blow to the economy. Recently, it become obvious that any exit from the proactive fiscal and monetary policy, enforced in late 2008, would include the RMB value. The central bank has decreed to extend the yuan's usage beyond the borders. Starting from June 2010, Chinese businesses are allowed to settle trade and investment with their foreign partners with the RMB, if both parties agreed. Also, the central bank restarted the yuan's exchange rate flexibility reform, after a *de-facto* 20-month pegging to the U.S. dollar amid a hope to mitigate the impact of the global financial crisis. After adjusting for inflation, the renminbi appreciated 12 percent against the US dollar in the last 18 months, the Treasury Department said. Some analysts predict that China will allow the renminbi to appreciate by another 3 percent against the dollar in 2012. The yuan value will continue to follow volatilities of a basket of currencies on the market, and, is expected to go up or down on a daily basis against the dollar, the euro, the pound, the yen and the won. The above two measures will make the currency more market-driven, and at the same time, enable the regulators to test the environment for any eventual full convertibility of the yuan in later years, according to the verbs spoken by the head of the PBOC echoed by medium (Gold Alert, 2010). China's trading partners should take positions to facilitate its integration to the global market, as this course could take some time before China feels confident enough with the experiment, and proceeds to full convertibility, especially due to the immaturity of its financial market.

Extremely high level of domestic savings, quite efficient price control, huge foreign currency reserves of 2.4 trillion US\$ at the end of 2009 (even in 2010, marked with world recession, China's foreign exchange reserves rose by more than 280 billion U.S. dollars), the

highest world growth rate, sufficient rate of employment, relatively low salaries, remain the comparative advantages of the Chinese economy, are alongside the mentioned growth spaces, the guaranties of its continuous robust and high growth, as well as the general social development. What is also extremely important, as proof that its long term goal is sustainable growth, China demonstrated by managing to keep budget deficit under 3 percent of the GDP. In spite of the seriousness of the challenges it kept facing since the outbreak of the international financial crisis, China kept its active and supportive pro-stability external behavior as it has provided assistance to developing countries through multiple means, including direct budget support credits to Pakistan, Sri Lanka, several African countries, etc. It also kept strong support for numerous sub-Asian integrations and cooperation processes and activities, proving its responsible and constructive regional role. All these also benefits to the solidity of its position and future performance of its economy.

China's economy growth, followed by other emerging Asian and global powers, contributed its part to regional and global economic recovery (UB, 2009). India's⁶ and ASEAN's growth (OECD, 2012), as well as Japan's early recovery (jeopardised by the weakening US\$ and record yen rate) contributed to the intraregional Asian trade and more independent Asian positive trend (Asia Briefing, 2011). The six major ASEAN countries, followed by the others, have fully recovered from the impacts of the global economic crisis, with medium-term growth prospects returning to the previous - pre-crisis levels. According to the different analyses, economic recovery is underway across the region, as GDP growth will average 6% annually over the period of the next five years. Stronger regional integration and determent sovereign efforts are widely seen as capable to deliver more balanced and long term sustainable growth in the whole region. China's contribution to those trends has been marked as remarkable.

Continuous rise of China's power is one of the most impressive phenomenon of the world at the period between two centuries and two millenniums. The domain of this phenomenon is wide – from production and trade, financial, cultural, ecological, to those in

⁶ India's growth rate averaged around 7% since 1997 as it was able to keep its economy growing at a high rate even during the 2007-2009 recessions, managing a 9.7 % growth rate in 2010.

energy sector, security, military and geopolitics. By becoming one of or the most important participants of the existing structures, agreements and relations on the regional and global level, but also initiator and sponsor, restaurateur or constructor of many new ones – that are built on a very different principles than those that dominant our world – PR China has made enormous impact on its close and wider environment, as well as on the global one. That impact is unprecedented one for a country that undoubtedly has only features of the regional power and that lacks the main characteristic of the global power: military might and through doctrine defined determination to use it to impose certain ideological and interest-based discourse of the political, economic and security reality.

While realizing its „reform and opening up policy“ China – by achieving the longest and highest continuous economic growth in the modern economic history - changed from the autarchic and command economy first into global manufacture, than the biggest industrial manufacturer (People’s Daily 2008), the biggest exporter and the second biggest global importer, state with the major currency and gold reserves⁷, but also one which language has been studied by the most numerous people around the globe⁸, one of the biggest recipient of the FDI, third country that sent crew into space (Hays, 2008) and which created its own satellite navigation system (Wang, 2010). China achieved all of these during a relatively short period of time, starting from the very low point and while possessing relatively limited sovereign resources. Also, it managed to accomplish the mentioned in the global ambient of the absolute domination of the USA, the super-power that comes from a different value and identity discourse – and these made its achievements even more outstanding. On the other side, numerous and serious challenges to the sustainability of such growth, development and “peaceful rise of China”, its social prize, even its ultimate goal – are topics of the numerous analyses and different interpretations, that go from seeing it as a chance for all to an alleged threat to near neighbourhood or global ecological, energy or production balance.

Beyond vigorous development of the economic co-operation (from trade to investments)

⁷ According to the official sources, they were worth 2.6 trillion US\$ in 2010.

⁸ Part of the obvious Chinese influence was obvious in getting the organization of the Olympic Games (2008), Asian games (2009) and World Expo (2010), what China performed superbly, showing the world the achievements of its reformist attempt.

with almost all the countries around the globe, China at the same time has practiced principle, but flexible and pragmatic, peaceful foreign policy, presenting itself as a benevolent and constructive actor in international relations, that contributes to peace building, development and stability – in the neighbourhood, in Asia-Pacific, with the other developing countries, especially rising powers within the BRICS, with great powers, as well as through the OUN system. Through this process China has strengthen its international position and its “soft power” to the level that many analysts see as an unprecedented in its long history or as equal to the one it had had in the XIV century. Our understanding is that unique phenomenon of the Chinese development, and power grown upon it, are primarily focused on the realization of the internal strategic goals of the Chinese “socialist modernization”, and that the outside effects of that project are functionalized to serve the primal aim – rising the quality of life of one billion and three hundred million Chinese citizens.

China within the BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, East Asian Summit, ASEAN+1, ASEAN+3, G-20, even G-2 and its regional and, in some aspects, global empowering will tend to form the block to reform and eventually alter the current financial, monetary (new currency), trade and general global order, without an aspiration to lead it. Considering itself as developing country and the Third World country, and at the same time having some major economic power’s features, China seems to see itself rather realistically, and does not like to be seen as an exclusive USA partner in solving the global issues, but preferably as part of the rising economies’ block that wants redistribution of the global wealth and power, in accordance with the new reality – sizes of their economies, population, etc. By financing American deficit and USA dollar China showed its’ constructive and realistic stand that in the nearest future preserving the existing system would be the cheapest solution, while in the middle and the long term future the new reserve currency or currencies should be introduced (Sule, 2011). Meanwhile, the key international economic organizations should be transformed towards the bigger representation and capacity to serve the world majority – the Third World countries and their citizens. China, together with the BRICS will strongly engage in their transformation within.

REFERENCES

- Asia Briefing, 2011. *Report: Emerging Asia Well Placed to Handle Volatile Global Economy*. [online] November 23. Available at: <<http://www.2point6billion.com/news/2011/11/23/report-emerging-asia-can-largely-withstand-external-shock-10449.html>> [Accessed on 26 November 2011].
- Bloomberg, 2009. *A Tough New Year for China's Migrant Workers*. [online] February 4. Available at: <http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/feb2009/gb2009024_357998.htm> [Accessed on 26 December 2009].
- CGD, 2012. *Aid to Pakistan by the Numbers*. [online] Available at: <http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/pakistan/numbers> [Accessed on 3 June 2012].
- China Law Blog, 2009. *The Latest On Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) In China*. [online] Available at: <http://www.chinalawblog.com/2009/01/the_latest_on_foreign_direct_i.html> [Accessed on 15 April 2009].
- ETCN, 2010. *State Council of China Calls for Eliminating Backward Production Capacity*. [online] Available at: <http://www.e-to-china.com/tariff_changes/Policy_Focus/2010/0420/77366.html> [Accessed on 22 April 2010].
- Finfacts, 2009. *China's export volume decreased 17.5% year-on-year in January; Imports plunged 43% - Chinese Lunar New Year holidays had impact but trend remains grim*. [online] Available at: <http://www.finfacts.ie/irishfinancenews/article_1015915.shtml> [Accessed on 24 April 2009].
- Gold Alert, 2012. *China PBOC Yi: Avoid Single Currency Peg; Keep Policy Flexible*. [online] 8 October 2010. Available at: <<http://www.goldalert.com/2010/10/pboc-head-defends-the-yuan/>> [Accessed on 10 October 2010].

- Hays, J., 2008. *Migrant workers in China*. [online] Available at: <<http://factsanddetails.com/china.php?itemid=150&catid=11&subcatid=72>> [Accessed on 26 March 2009].
- Hays, J., 2012. *Chinese Space Program*. [online] April 2012. Available at: <<http://factsanddetails.com/china.php?itemid=385&catid=10&subcatid=67>> [Accessed on April 2012].
- Li, X., 2009. *Innovation, key for "Made in China" to out of crisis*. [online] Available at: <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-09/24/content_12106202.htm> [Accessed on 24 April 2009].
- Mitrović, D., 1995. *Chinese Reform and the World*. Belgrade: IEF.
- Mitrović, D., 2007. *Reforms of the Social Security System Network in Modern China*. In: D. Vukovic and A. Cekerevac, ed. *Social policy and social reforms*. PSF, Belgrade: PSF, pp. 203-224.
- Mitrović, D., 2008. *China's Economic Miracle – First Decade*. IPS, Belgrade: IPS.
- Morrison, M. W. and Labonte, M., 2010. *China's Currency: An Analysis of the Economic Issues*. [online] Available at: <<http://eastern-asia.blogspot.com/2010/11/chinas-currency-analysis-of-economic.html>> [Accessed on 27 December 2010].
- Mu, X., 2009. *China allocates 270 bln yuan for infrastructure investment so far in 2009*. [online] Available at: <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-05/26/content_11440052.htm> [Accessed on 20 October 2010].
- OECD Development Centre, 2012. *ASEAN countries returning to pre-crisis growth, 2011/12*. [online] Available at: <http://www.oecd.org/document/2/0,3746,en_2649_33731_46367966_1_1_1_1,00.html> [Accessed on January 2012].
- People's Daily, 2008. *China promising to be No.1 manufacturing country*. [online], August 12, 2008. Available at: <<http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90884/6473390.html>> [Accessed on 22

October2008].

Singh, 2010. *IMF reforms: Increased voting rights*. [online] Available at:
<<http://www.merineews.com/article/imf-reforms-increased-voting-rights/15805456.shtml>
> [Accessed on 28 April 2010].

State Council 2010. *China's State Council Issues New Policies to Boost Foreign Investment in China*. [online] Available at:
<<http://www.ub-co.com/newsletter/news/35/2010-04-06/chinas-state-council-issues-new-policies-to-boost-foreign-investment-in-china/>> [Accessed on 6 April 2010].

Sule, A., 2011. *BRICS can build common currency*. [online] Available at:
<http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011-04/08/content_12292017.htm> [Accessed on 11 April 2011].

The Economic Times, 2010. *China revamps FDI rules, curbs non-eco-friendly projects*.
[online] Available at:
<<http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international-business/China-revamps-FDI-rules-curbs-non-eco-friendly-projects/articleshow/5804474.cms>> [Accessed 15 April 2010].

The Financial Times, 2012. *China real estate policy grip tightens*. [online] Available at:
<<http://www.ftchinaconfidential.com/Industries/Property/Features/CapitalIntensiveChina/article/20100422/82df35c8-4c59-11df-b462-00144f2af8e8/China-real-estate-policy-grip-tightens>> [Accessed on 22 Apr 2010].

UB and CO, 2010. *China's State Council Issues New Policies to Boost Foreign Investment in China*. [online] Available at:
<<http://www.ub-co.com/newsletter/news/35/2010-04-06/chinas-state-council-issues-new-policies-to-boost-foreign-investment-in-china/>> [Accessed on 6 April 2010].

Xinhua News Agency, 2008. *CPC closes plenum with decision on rural reform*. [online] 12 October 2008. Available at:
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-10/12/content_7097786.htm> [Accessed on 3 March 2008].

Xinhua News Agency, 2009. *China's 2009 GDP growth revised up to 8.2%*. [online] 22

- September 2009. Available at:
 <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-09/22/content_12095301.htm> [Accessed on 22 September 2009].
- Xinhua News Agency, 2009. *China's imports, exports drop 10.1% in September*. [online] 14 October 2009. Available at:
 <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-10/14/content_12228511.htm> [Accessed on 14 October 2009].
- Xinhua News Agency, 2009. *China urges quicker reform by IMF, WB*. [online] 6 October 2009. Available at: <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-10/06/content_8765828.htm> [Accessed on 6 October 2009].
- Xinhua News Agency, 2010. *Report warns of China's export dependency*. [online] 19 November 2010. Available at:
 <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2010-11/19/content_11576503.htm> [Accessed 19 November 2010].
- Wang, G., 2010. *Chinese GPS moves closer*. [online] 4 June 2010. Available at:
 <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-06/04/c_13332853.htm> [Accessed on 27 December 2010].
- Yiwu Market Daily, 2010. *Currency Exchange Rate Only Has Limited Negative Impacts On Chinese Exports*. [online] 17 September 2010. Available at:
 <<http://www.yiwu-market-guide.com/currency-exchange-rate-only-has-limited-negative-impacts-on-chinese-exports.html>> [Accessed on 20 October 2010].
- Zheng, L., 2012. *Bloomberg News*. [online] 14 February 2012. Available at:
 <<http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-02-14/china-2012-inflation-to-see-clear-deceleration-planner-says.html>> [Accessed on 15 February 2012].

Reassessing Enterprise Risk Management in China

Benjamin Fung
Caritas Institute of Higher Education
Email: bfung@cihe.edu.hk

I. INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of the major accounting scandals and breakdowns in corporate controls, the need for proactive enterprise risk management (ERM) has increased dramatically. ERM calls for a change in the way risk is perceived and managed. It poses challenges to the corporations for their inherent risk management. A strong and effective ERM program can exploit the opportunities and minimize the threats inherent with risk. Issues on ERM in China have received close attention in the recent years. Whether a company can operate orderly and effectively or not depends largely on the effectiveness of its ERM.

The importance of corporate governance has been highlighted by the current and past global crises. Shortcomings of corporate governance mechanisms have been contributing to the largest happening of the crises. Corporate governance has been seen at the forefront of establishing standards of corporate ethics aimed at reducing unscrupulous corporate practices while preserving a fair business environment. Corporate governance is also increasingly being considered an important part of ERM and the logic is: poor corporate governance is viewed as risky, whereas creditors and investors view good corporate governance (GCG) as a sign of strength in a corporation. Thus, creditors and investors are demanding better financial reporting and greater transparency and also demanding more GCG practices.

II. ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT

ERM can be described as a risk-based approach to managing an organization, integrating concepts of strategic planning, operations management, and internal control. Risks are inherent in all business transactions. Thus, it would be very dangerous to do business

without good understanding and proper management of the risk embedded in the enterprise. Wrong approach in taking those risks could create a severe financial impact to the organizations. ERM has appeared as a new inspiration for managing the collection of risks that face an organization. Identifying, measuring, and managing risk are the key procedures in ERM. On the other hand, ERM is evolving to address the needs of various stakeholders, who want to understand the broad spectrum of risks facing complex organizations to ensure they are properly managed. Regulators and debt rating agencies have increased their scrutiny on the risk management processes of companies. More importantly, a company's credit rating is vital to its borrowing capacity, companies must now demonstrate their creditworthiness more than ever before in order to gain financing.

Current literatures have paid increasing attention to ERM (Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003). Furthermore, Pagach and Warr (2008) postulated that ERM is a holistic method of managing both operational and strategic risks across an organization. In addition, ERM provides a process by which a company integrates all of its risk management functions (Pagach and Warr, 2007). As a result, those companies which adopted ERM experience a reduction in stock price volatility, increased asset opacity, a decreased market to book ratio and decreased earnings volatility besides increased the boards and senior management's ability to oversee the portfolio of risks facing an organization (Beasley *et al.*, 2006 and Pagach and Warr, 2008).

Risk management is aimed to provide an efficient control system in order to improve performance in corporations. Egbuji (1999) argues that the success of risk management is dependent upon the stage at which it is introduced. Much of the ethics behind risk management is the identification of risks before they materialize, followed by the implementation of mitigation strategies and contingency plans so that if and when they do materialize, their potential impact is reduced. Risk management is more explicit about handling changes and corporations which manage risk in the most effective ways can become the survivors and winners. Multinational corporations that are operating in a rapidly changing global environment, risk management is not only about protecting their business, but also about making it better performance. Thus, management must have a clear understanding of risks and can address the problems before they occur. The risk issues need to be answered

within the context of a comprehensive and coherent risk management framework.

III. CURRENT RISK MANAGEMENT IN CHINA

There has been an increasing consciousness that a more holistic approach to managing risks would enrich the effectiveness of risk management practices in China. However, ERM programs are still lacking and have yet to be fully implemented in most enterprises and the reasons may include organizational structure that are not conducive to ERM; individuals do not want to assume their specific responsibilities; a lack of understanding regarding how to effectively implement ERM; and difficulties in measuring risks in an organization. The current level of ERM adopted by Chinese enterprises is analyzed as follows:

State-owned Enterprises

Risk management is one of indispensable problems in the course of operating and developing contemporary organizations, including state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China. SOEs have been major economic organization and the backbone of the national economy (meaning that they still dominate the national economy, controlling natural resources, utilities, and many other vital sectors). As for the classification of SOEs, the term refers to business entities established by central and local governments, and whose supervisory officials are from the government. According to a broader definition, there are three kinds of central SOEs:

1. business entities managed by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC);
2. state-owned financial institutions, and their supervisory authorities are in the China Banking Regulatory Commission, China Insurance Regulatory Commission, and China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC); and
3. SOEs whose supervisory authorities are in individual central government ministries, except for SASAC, such as the Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Science and Technology.

In recent years, local SOEs have continued to expand their scale and develop rapidly; meanwhile, they have a lot of risk exposures. Due to the present fiscal decentralization system, many of SOEs have become the financing platform and tools for local governments. With the support and active intervention of local governments, they can even violate operating regulations and pile up huge debts. Such debt risks, combined with their internal management risks, potentially pose great dangers to SOEs. Moreover, more and more of China's companies have been "going out" to establish branches in foreign countries, acquire local companies, or invest in financial derivatives, thus generating many amassing huge overseas assets. Most of these companies are centrally-managed financial institutions, central SOEs, local SOEs and large private enterprises. In terms of risk, these huge overseas assets are influenced by external environmental factors such as exchange rate, the local macro-economic situation and the political situation. Despite these unknown factors, their risk management tends to be ignored.

Realizing gaps in risk management, the Chinese government has been striving to strengthen measures to preserve and protect those state assets that are managed and operated through SOEs. The supervisory body for SOEs is the powerful SASAC which is directly under the control of the State Council. SASAC has urged centrally-administered SOEs to reinforce their overall risk management in the mid of global financial crises. With SASAC mandating the need for SOEs to establish and maintain ERM processes and systems, China is now at the forefront of driving best practice for the post financial crisis period.

Likewise, there have been active marketization of SOEs in which the allocation of resources previously conducted by means of government administration is now mainly determined by the market, and part of SOEs are transformed into non-SOEs. The purpose of marketization is to turn SOEs into independent legal persons and entities in market competition that have autonomy in business operation and are responsible for their own losses, bearing their own risks and self disciplined. Large SOEs that remain in SASAC portfolios should each implement an appropriate risk management program.

Listed Chinese Companies

With China's entry into World Trade Organization, the Chinese large enterprises have to compete with other competitors on the global level playing field. Corporate governance becomes an even more pressing issue to enhance the Chinese enterprises' competitive advantages and eliminate unacceptable practices. The Chinese government uses overseas listings as a means to force SOEs to conform to international standards as compliance with listing rules in overseas jurisdiction has also helped SOEs achieve better resource allocation, improve enterprise efficiency and competitiveness. Overseas listings may help improve the corporate governance of Chinese companies.

China has a government-led regulatory system with a very hand-on approach to monitoring and improving listed companies' governance practices. CSRC and the stock exchanges regularly launch special projects to examine companies' standards of corporate governance, business operations and compliance structures. Corporate governance practices at China's biggest listed companies are improving, but weak internal controls remain a pervasive issue. For most Chinese listed companies, introducing the kind of enterprise-level internal controls and risk management systems needed to underpin good governance is still at its nascent stage. A study by Violet Xing published in the 2003 Bond Law Review indicates that the majority of listed companies, which have been restructured from traditional SOEs, lack an adequate corporate governance culture. In many Chinese listed companies, risk management responsibility is not centralized, which could easily cause lack of internal communication, resulting in difficulty with building a corporate culture with comprehensive risk consciousness. Moreover, the success in ERM relies on a well-built risk management culture, which further relies on the strong support from the senior management team.

IV. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA

Corporate governance in China has received much attention (for example, Gao *et al.*, 2008, Zhang *et al.*, 2008, Chen *et al.*, 2007). The corporate governance system adopted by

Chinese listed companies can be best described as a control-based model, in which the controlling shareholders (mostly the state) closely control over the listed companies through concentrated ownership and ‘management friendly boards’ (Liu 2006). The dominance of state shareholders in these listed companies has led to problematic corporate governance practices, significant related-party transactions and, at times, marginalization of individual shareholders’ interests (Chen *et al.*, 2007).

An outstanding feature of the China’s corporate governance system is the dual board structure which separates management and supervision. Under this governance system, there are two boards: board of directors (board) or called management board and supervisory board, which represent owners and other stakeholders’ interests. The function of both boards is to supervise the management of the company. The members of the dual-board system are both appointed by shareholders and report to shareholders, who are perceived as the ultimate source of authority. As in many cases where the state is the largest shareholder of the listed companies, the government officials are often represented in the supervisory board.

In general, the board has only a weak impact upon the decisions of the listed companies. The problem starts at a very basic level, namely from the selection process of directors. According to a study conducted by Tong *et al.* (2009), analyzing the top 100 listed companies in China based on market value, 77 out of 100 were still controlled by their five majority shareholders, most dominated by the government. As shareholders appoint the members of the board, they are directly controlled by the majority shareholders. As part of the government promotion system for state officials, often the general manager and the chairman of the board are appointed by the regional government (Jingu, 2007). With this governance structure, the board is basically serving as the agent of majority shareholders. Supervisory boards are equally ineffective, with an only vaguely defined monitoring role over managers and board. Dahya *et al.* (2003) reported that most shareholders simply do not know the function and role of the supervisory board.

The independent director system has already established and gradually brought into play in China, in accordance with the *Guide Opinion on Establishing Independent Director System by Listed Companies*, issued by CSRC in 2001 requiring the board comprising independent

directors so as to overcome the difficulty of internal personnel control of many listed companies. There are existing problems that affect the effectiveness of the system, for example, the independency of independent directors is influenced by nomination, hiring and remuneration, whereas these factors are still controlled by the majority shareholders of listed companies, thus the independent directors do not have real independency; nearly a half of the independent directors are professors and scholars who are engaged in education and have no prior experience in enterprise management; and owing to limited time and energy, the independent directors do not have access to corporate information, thus their function cannot bring into play.

In recent years, Chinese companies listed in North America have been rocked by a wave of fraud allegations that have led to dozens of suspensions and delistings from NASDAQ, the American Stock Exchange and the New York Stock Exchange while others have been hit hard by the resignation of their auditors. The US Securities and Exchange Commission and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board have launched investigations into some Chinese companies and their US auditors. An official at China's securities regulator said in the watchdog's first public remarks since a series of accounting scandals and fraud allegations that corporate misbehavior, unfamiliarity with the US market and some practices involved in overseas listings had all contributed to recent investor distrust of Chinese listed companies.

V. ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

China ERM

Ever since 'the Enterprise Risk Management Guideline for State Owned Enterprises' (China ERM) was issued by SASAC in 2006, ERM has become a critical aspect for a company's strategic approach to risk management. An ERM framework can identify the components that need to be addressed in order that risk management procedures are fully embedded into operations. By combining these components, a company will have the framework to directly link its risk management practices to its goals and strategies. Chinese

companies that embrace ERM framework and that can clearly articulate their approach to risk will quickly distinguish themselves on the global stage.

The purpose of China ERM is to

- protect value of state-owned properties;
- upgrade management capability;
- improve market competitiveness; and
- ensure enterprise's continuous development

COSO ERM Framework

The US Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission COSO (1992, 2004) had issued two key reports laying down guidelines on the design of internal control systems. In 2004, COSO expanded on internal control, providing a more robust and extensive focus on the broader subject of ERM and developed *Enterprise Risk Management – Integrated Framework* (the ERM framework). While it is not intended to and does not replace the internal control framework (*Internal Control – Integrated Framework* issued by COSO in 1992), but rather incorporates the internal control framework within it, companies may decide to look to this ERM framework both to satisfy their internal control needs and to move toward a fuller risk management process (*COSO Enterprise Risk Management – Integrated Framework*, Foreword, September 2004).

COSO (2004) defines enterprise risk management as “a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management, and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of entity objectives”.

Like COSO framework, the ERM framework primarily reiterates the same three basic managerial objectives identified previously: *operations* (effective and efficient use of resources), *reporting* (reliability and broadened to encompass nonfinancial and internal reporting), and *compliance* (comply with applicable laws and regulations). In addition, COSO

has identified a fourth category, *strategic objectives*, that it describes as being a “higher level objective” with which the other three objectives need to be aligned.

Comparison of China ERM and COSO ERM

China ERM Guidelines consisting of 10 chapters and their comparison with COSO ERM framework are shown in Appendix 1.

In short, China ERM expands and elaborates on elements of internal control as set out in COSO framework. Moreover, China ERM includes objective setting as a separate component and objectives are a “prerequisite” for internal control. China ERM roles and responsibilities fall on management, the board of directors, and risk officers. Internal auditors play an important role in monitoring ERM, but do not have primary responsibility for its implementation or maintenance. A COSO 2009 ERM release stresses the specific importance of the board to ERM and the need for the board to understand and shape the organization’s risk appetite, risk philosophy and risk portfolio and to assure that risk management mechanisms are aligned and effective.

China ERM mandates board responsibility for the risk management framework, formation of risk management committees reporting to the board and requires a dedicated risk management function all with prescribed functions and responsibilities. Although specific risk responsibilities are allocated to various departments, the ultimate responsibility must be taken by the board. External auditors will be required to express an audit opinion on the effectiveness of internal control that their strategy is aligned with their desired risk profile.

VI. CHINA SOX

China has been implementing the risk management framework outlined both in the “Central State-owned Enterprises Comprehensive Risk Management Guidance” which has become effective since 6 June 2006 and COSO framework. In June 2008, China issued the Basic Standard for Enterprise Internal Control (China SOX) specifying comprehensive

requirements over a company's internal control framework.

China SOX is a regulation adopted in China designed to improve risk management and prevent AIG, Enron and Worldcom-style disasters in China. As most of the large companies in China are majority owned by the government, the regulations can facilitate the government to look after their own assets and ensure that risk management practices are well adopted in China. The companies that are required to comply with China SOX are the SOEs under SASAC and foreign-listed Chinese companies, whose shares are traded in Hong Kong, London, NYSE, NASDAQ, etc. This is a significant regulatory innovation introduced by China that aims to facilitate the enhancement of an enterprise's overall risk management capabilities, and further improve the reliability of information disclosed in the financial statement. All non-listed enterprises are encouraged to adopt China SOX as well.

China SOX is similar in its elements to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 from the US. Section 404 of SOX required US publicly-traded corporations to utilize a control framework in their internal control assessments. Many opted for the COSO framework, which includes a risk assessment element. China SOX sets out general principles of establishing and maintaining an effective internal control framework based on the five components of internal control specified in the COSO framework, emphasizing that evaluation of internal control should focus on *internal environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and communication, and internal monitoring*.

ERM has received growing attention following the SOX of 2002 and the changed NYSE Corporate Governance Rules (Beasley *et al*, 2005) and has also been considered critical in the emerging markets. In China, ERM supports and builds on SOX compliance efforts. SOX's Section 404 compliance requires the implementation of an ongoing process to address financial reporting risk. Because most companies are using the COSO framework as criteria for complying with Section 404, many elements of the compliance process also apply to the implementation of ERM. Section 404 provides a foundation for implementation of ERM. Therefore, SOX has had widespread influence throughout the world (Bierstaker and Wright, 2004).

China SOX was intended to impose stricter corporate governance, risk management and control standards on those listed companies. These are big, well-run companies which are already compliant with stricter regulations (like SOX). Since these companies already have the people, processes and systems required by these external markets, it would be easier for them to deal with China SOX's requirements.

In accordance with China SOX, Chinese companies must:

1. include the five control elements in internal controls (Chapter 1 Article 5) when establishing and implementing effective internal control. This means that they must study and implement COSO and similar frameworks and use them as the foundation for their ongoing risk management.
2. establish and implement internal control policies (Chapter 1 Article 6). This requires a long process of documenting existing internal controls, evaluating them, and making the changes. Here, Chinese enterprises would do well to learn from the experiences of public companies in the US who implemented Section 404 of SOX.
3. establish a suitable business IT system with embedded controls (Chapter 1 Article 7). IT will automate many of the internal control processes in all areas of the business (for example, supply chain, customer service or financial reporting). This means that enterprises who comply with China SOX will be buying new ERP systems, email tools, databases, training systems, HR systems and lots more.
4. set clear policies on the rewards and disciplines relating to the proper implementation of internal controls. Effective internal control implementation should be treated as a key element of performance appraisals for departmental and staff levels (Chapter 1 Article 8). This means managers will be personally accountable for the success or failure of their internal controls.
5. perform self-assessment of the effectiveness of internal controls on a periodic basis and issue control self-assessment reports (Chapter 6 Article 46). An enterprise must conduct its own evaluation of the control framework, and share its findings with qualified external auditors. The auditors then propose changes and vouch for the validity of the internal controls in an annual report.

With the implementation of China SOX, Chinese listed companies have started to establish internal control systems. Revisions to the Company Law and Securities Law in 2006 have strengthened minority shareholder rights and disclosure requirements for listed companies. Given a large number of SOEs listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, improvements in China's corporate governance culture are possible only if corporate governance in SOEs is improved.

VII. IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES

In April 2010, the Ministry of Finance together with the China Securities Regulatory Commission, the National Audit Office, the China Banking Regulatory Commission and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission jointly released the Implementation Guidelines for Enterprise Internal Control (the "Implementation Guidelines") which comprise

1. Application Guidelines for Enterprise Internal Control ("Application Guidelines") (cover 18 areas) guide enterprises in establishing a holistic internal control framework and provide references for enterprises to assess, and accounting firms to audit, internal controls. They also set out general objectives, definitions of subject issues, relevant risk profiles, workflow standardization and requirements for key control points.
2. Guidelines for Assessment of Enterprise Internal Control ("Assessment Guidelines") guide enterprises in assessing their internal control system's design and operation to include the five control elements and also determine their design and operation deficiencies. An enterprise shall form working papers to document in details its assessment process and submit the internal control assessment report to the board for approval before outward disclosure.
3. Guidelines for Audit of Enterprise Internal Control ("Audit Guidelines") refer to guidelines on carrying out an effective audit of an enterprise's internal control by a firm of accountants.

Following the issuance of China SOX in 2008, the issue of the Implementation Guidelines represents another milestone in the establishment of an enterprise internal control

framework in China. The Chinese enterprise internal control framework, with China SOX as the foundation and the Implementation Guidelines as the implementation tools, takes account of the special nature of Chinese enterprises and leading international practices.

Targets and effective dates of the Implementation Guidelines are shown in Table 1 and brief comparison between the Implementation Guidelines and internal control regulatory requirements in US and Hong Kong in Table 2.

TABLE 1
Implementation Guidelines and their effective implementation dates

Targeted Enterprises	Effective Dates	First Year of Compliance Reporting
Mainland-based companies listed domestically and abroad	1 January 2011	Annual reports for the year ending 31 December 2011
Companies listed on the main board of the Shanghai Stock Exchange and/or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange	1 January 2012	Annual reports for the year ending 31 December 2012
Companies listed on the Small and Medium Enterprise Board and the ChiNext Board	If and when appropriate	Enterprises disclose annual self-assessment reports
Non-listed mainland-based large and medium-sized enterprises	Early adoption recommended	Accounting firms issue audit reports on internal controls

Source: KPMG Implementation Guidelines for Enterprise Internal Control, Feb 2011 Risk and Compliance

The above timelines for mainland-based companies listed domestically and abroad to comply with China SOX are from 1 January 2011. Other companies may plan and perform compliance over an extended period for doing so.

There are also Application Guidelines which guide enterprises in establishing internal controls and provide references for enterprises to assess internal controls (KPMG, 2011). According to KPMG's points to note in implementing the Application Guidelines, the Guidelines cover the common core businesses of manufacturing entities and fail to address some activities of specific entities. In this respect, enterprises may not rely on only the Application Guidelines for establishing internal control systems. They also need to streamline

their operations, as well as fully address risk exposures, under the general principles of China SOX and the Application Guidelines, as well as actual risk circumstances.

TABLE 2

Brief comparison between the Implementation Guidelines and internal control regulatory requirements in US and Hong Kong

Matters in comparison	Requirements of the Implementation Guidelines in China SOX	US Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404	Provision C2.1 in Hong Kong Code on Corporate Governance Practices
Major implementation requirements	An enterprise shall: ● perform self-assessment of the effectiveness of internal controls and issue annual reports thereon ● engage accounting firms to form an audit opinion on whether internal controls over financial reports are effective	● An enterprise's management shall affirm its responsibility of establishing and maintaining proper structures and procedures for internal controls over financial reporting and submit annual assessment reports on the effectiveness of internal controls ● Auditors shall test and assess management compliance and issue assessment reports	● Directors shall, at least once a year, review whether listed entities' and their subsidiaries' internal control systems are effective, and submit corporate governance reports on completed reviews to shareholders. The review shall cover all key internal controls such as financial controls, operational controls, and compliance controls, as well as risk management functions ● No specific requirements of internal control audits

Any assessment guidelines?	● Guidelines for Assessment of Enterprise Internal Control	● SEC issued non-mandatory guidelines on management assessments, which is an acceptable approach for compliance	● No specific assessment guidelines are issued, except for general principles for review procedures set out in the <i>Internal Control and Risk Management - A Basic Framework</i> published by the Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Who should be responsible for the assessment?	● Board of directors (or similar authority)	● Management	● Directors
Criteria for assessment conclusions	● Criteria for concluding the effectiveness of internal control have not been specified	● The internal control is concluded to be ineffective if one or more material weakness have been identified	● No requirements of conclusions for internal control assessments

Source: KPMG Implementation Guidelines for Enterprise Internal Control, Feb 2011 Risk and Compliance

Currently, various Chinese and foreign regulatory requirements on internal control, including the requirements on internal control evaluation and audit of listed companies in financial markets such as the US, Japan and Hong Kong, as well as the internal control requirements for companies listed on the Chinese stock exchanges, are mostly based on the COSO framework, and require internal control evaluation to cover internal environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and communication, and internal monitoring. As a result, enterprises will experience increased cost-efficiency through performing an internal control evaluation that addresses most of the internal control requirements of various regulatory regimes.

VIII. PERSPECTIVES AND CHALLENGES

In China, ERM practices may have initially been driven by compliance needs, but continuous development should serve as an internal control function for better corporate governance. Since the Enron collapse in mid-2002, increasing the disclosure transparency, and protecting the legal rights of social public investors have already become the focus questions of corporate governance improvement.

Corporate Governance in China is characterized by a number of unique features, among them being the diversity of approaches to board of director organization and leadership. From boards of listed companies in Hong Kong, which tend to be comprised of many independent directors, to the boards of SOEs in Mainland China, with large numbers of government representatives, China presents a variety of solutions to corporate oversight.

COSO 2004 ERM framework improved and expanded internal control framework system, marking the normative system of internal control risks of enterprises from internal control to manage the transition. SASAC using China ERM framework to formulate and release the light of the “Central Enterprise-wide Risk Management Guidelines” has enriched the nation’s internal control system and the contents of the specification indicate a breakthrough in the building of China's internal control practices.

Risk management in China has gone through a demanding period since the implementation of China SOX and ERM guidelines. Now it is time to assess whether the requisite guidelines could help the Chinese enterprises enhance their ability to meet growing stringent internal risk management requirements. Amid the growing international regulatory and governance compliances, how do the Chinese regulatory requirements add substantive value to the Chinese enterprises to act more quickly and with intelligence and confidence to mitigate risks and meet their business goals?

According to the online international survey¹ conducted by International Federation of Accountants of the US from June to August 2010, the respondents from more than 80

¹ Global Survey on Risk Management and Internal Control, *Results, Analysis and Proposed Next Steps*, published by the Professional Accountants in Business Committee in Feb 2011.

countries and jurisdictions across the globe indicated the main weaknesses of the current risk management and/or internal control system(s) in their organization including *the control environment; add-on instead of built-in* (risk management and internal control are viewed as external exercise, separate from normal business activities); *objective setting; event identification; risk assessment; risk response; controlled activities; information and communication; and monitoring*. These weaknesses are a more complete reference of the framework established by the COSO internal control within the five elements and five elements of the same, that is, including the control environment, risk identification and assessment, control activities and measures, information, communication and feedback, monitoring and evaluation.

Deloitte launched the “Internal Control Survey of Chinese listed companies” in 2011. The survey shows the following three points:

1. The effectiveness of internal control is gradually emerging;
2. Internal audit in the role of monitoring and evaluating of internal control should be strengthened; and
3. The cost-effectiveness of internal control implementation is different.

The survey also revealed problems that listed companies experienced in the process of internal control system building and evaluation, for example, insufficient attention of top management, lacking of professionals, insufficient information system support, etc.

IX. CONCLUSION

Internal control has been integrated with risk management and as a part of contemporary corporate governance. Current research and practice show the prevalence of risk management and internal control as parts of corporate governance in the multinational companies in the world. Although corporate governance in China has improved substantially over the last few years, many problems still remain including, among others, weak board systems, inadequate incentive mechanisms for management, insufficient checks and balances, inefficient information disclosure and a weak external governance structure.

It is noteworthy that instances of the corporation's financial scandals often rooted in the lack of effective financial supervision and the dysfunctional risk management. It is imperative to bring up the importance of strengthening the effectiveness of corporate governance and internal control in managing enterprise risk in China.

APPENDIX 1

Comparison between China ERM Guidelines and COSO ERM Framework

Chapter	China ERM Guidelines	Does China ERM conform to COSO ERM Framework?
1	General Principles ● Deploy comprehensive risk management work ● Increase enterprise's competitiveness ● Boost investment return ● Enhance enterprise's sustainability, healthy and stable development ● Define major risk boundary ● Comply with China's legal requirements and rules ● Integration of ERM into management system Risk management integration process comprises 3 levels of Risk Management Control: 1. Functional and business unit 2. Risk Management Committee formed under the functional units and the Board of Directors (Board) 3. Audit Committee formed under the internal audit units and the Board	COSO ERM framework defines essential components, suggests a common language and provides clear direction and guidance for enterprise risk management Requires an entity to take a portfolio of risk ● Management considers how individual risks interrelate ● Management develops a portfolio view from two perspectives: 1) business unit level; and 2) entity level Defines risk appetite and risk tolerant level; and reacts to the risk by approaches such as <i>treat, transfer, tolerate, terminate, etc.</i> China ERM 1. adopts similar approach in defining risk response 2. is not a one-sided view – risk is always negative 3. also reminds enterprise not to hinder development just because of avoiding risk
2	Initial Information of Risk Management Should collect information in respect of 5 risks aspects:	

	1. Strategic risk - Domestic and international enterprises' chaotic strategic risk cases that led to suffering losses; and relevant important information regarding the enterprises 2. Financial risk - Domestic and international enterprises' chaotic financial risk cases that led to suffering losses; liabilities; cash flow; production costs; auditing costs; accounting policies; and industry index 3. Market risk - Domestic and international enterprises' cases of marketing risk oversight and lack of response remedies that led to suffering losses; product pricing and supply change; creditability of main suppliers and customers; and potential and real competitors and their products 4. Operation risk - Relevant information about product structure; new product and market development; marketing strategy; effective organizational structure; current ERM; and capability 5. Legal risk - Domestic and international enterprises' cases of legal risk oversight and lack of response remedies that led to suffering losses; political and legal environment; new law and policy that affect the entity; and significant legal dispute cases	
3	Risk Assessment ● Should include three processes: 1) risk identification; 2) risk analysis; and 3) risk evaluation ● Risk identification - whether there are any risks from business units and respective business activities; and if yes, what are their risks? ● Risk analysis clearly defines and	COSO ERM Risk assessment ● allows an entity to understand the extent to which potential events might impact objectives ● assesses risks from two perspectives: 1) likelihood; and 2) impact

	describes the identified risk; and risk likelihood and conditions ● Risk evaluation - the extent to which potential events may have impact on achievement of enterprise's objectives ● Regularly and irregularly implement risk identification, analysis and evaluation so as to cope with new risk and reassess the existing risk change	● is used to assess risks and is also normally used to measure the related objectives ● employs a combination of both qualitative and quantitative risk assessment methodologies ● relates time horizons to objective horizons ● assesses risk on both an inherent and a residual basis CHINA ERM Risks are also assessed by a combination of both qualitative and quantitative risk methods
4	Risk Management Strategy ● Enterprises should base on own internal condition and external environment to define own strategy to tackle risks ● Such strategy should well define the enterprise's risk appetite, risk tolerance and effective standard of risk management ● Risk response can be chosen by method: 1) <i>accept</i>; 2) <i>avoid</i>; 3) <i>transfer</i>; 4) <i>hedge</i>; 5) <i>compensate</i>; and 6) <i>treat</i> ● Should well balance risk and profit ● Avoid overlooking risk and also not hinder development due to avoiding risk ● Should properly prioritize, budget and organize resources to manage risk ● Should review and analyze the established risk management strategy regularly and integrate the continuous amendments and perfections	COSO ERM Risk response ● identifies and evaluates possible responses to risk ● evaluates options in relation to entity's risk appetite, cost vs. benefit of potential risk responses, and degree to which a response will reduce impact and/or likelihood ● selects and executes response based on evaluation of the portfolio of risks and responses
5	Risk Management Resolution ● Target of risk solutions ● Required structure and leadership	COSO ERM recommends control tools such as segregation of duties, key

	● Management and business process involved ● Required conditions, means and other resources ● Measurement before, during and after risk event ● Adopted mechanism and risk management tools	risk indicator, proper authorization and authentication approval process for resolving risk China ERM also adopts similar control tools 1. On top of that, it states clearly on the requirement of internal control system and even demands business units to link remuneration with the risk management result 2. it also recommends employing external risk consultant, if needed, to do assessment in order to identify gaps and improvements
6	Risk Monitoring and Enhancement ● Enterprise should place emphasis on major risk, major incident as well as important management and business process ● Monitor the execution of initial information collection, risk assessment, risk management strategy and key control activities and risk resolution ● Adopt stress testing, revert testing, diagonal testing and self-control assessment when needed ● Improve when situation changes or defects arising ● Ensure the information related to risk that are properly reported and communicated vertically and horizontally; inter and intra departments; between function and business units ● Ensure the information must be timely, accurate, and complete ● Respective departments and business	COSO ERM emphasizes on ongoing monitoring activities and also separate evaluation (or a combination of two) China ERM also covers ongoing monitoring and separate evaluation 1. Comparatively, it stresses more on separate evaluation 2. It explicitly demands Risk Management Department to assess all departments regularly, and Internal Audit to audit at least annually all departments even including Risk Management Department

	units must regularly self-assess and detect risk management work ● Internal Audit Department must conduct at least annual audit of all departments, including risk management functional department, and submit supervising assessment report to Risk Management Committee and Audit Committee under the Board	
7	Organization of Risk Management ● Enterprise should establish an integrated risk management organization system mainly consisting of corporate governance structure, risk management functional departments, Internal Audit Department, Legal Affairs Department and any other functional and business units ● The Board should be responsible for: ■ reviewing and submitting comprehensive risk management report to annual shareholders' meeting ■ determining overall risk management objectives, risk appetite, risk tolerant level, and approving risk management strategy and major risk solutions ■ understanding and controlling current respective major risks faced by the enterprise and making decision on the risk control strategy ■ approving risk assessment report of major decision ■ approving audit report of Internal Audit Department on risk management supervision and assessment ■ approving the positions of risk management organization structure and their responsibilities	COSO ERM emphasizes everyone has responsibility of ERM and CEO is the ultimate responsible person It also mentions that risk management department, internal audit, unit head, financial officer and even board directors have key responsibility China ERM adopts similar approach by requesting all units to be responsible for risk management. However, it demands more accountability from the Board which is to be responsible for shareholders by involving in major risk event and decision, and also submitting risk management report To ensure Risk Management Department is performing its duties, it also demands Internal Audit Department to carry out annual audit

8	Risk Management Information System ● Enterprise should apply the information system in collecting, storing, processing, analyzing, testing, transmitting, reporting and disclosing risk related information ● Enterprise should ensure the accuracy, consistency, timeliness, usability and completeness of data input into the information system ● The information system should be able to conduct quantitative analysis and testing; and have key risk indicator with threshold alert function ● The information system should be able to make information available to all departments ● Enterprise should ensure the stability and safety of the system and also need continuously to improve, enhance or regenerate	COSO ERM Information and Communication Management identifies, captures and communicates pertinent information in a form and timeframe that enables employees to carry out their responsibilities Requests accurate and timely information, and also properly communicates across the organization China ERM achieves these objectives by explicitly demanding an information system to handle risk data and disseminate them accordingly
9	Risk Management Culture ● Enterprise should focus on the establishment of a risk awareness culture, and combine the development of risk management culture with:- 1) the process of setting up enterprise culture, educate and promote staff awareness on risk management; 2) the remuneration policy and HR policy, in order to strengthen the risk awareness of the management and prevent any oversight of risk due to over expansion of business ● Integrate the risk management culture with the whole organization, build up an atmosphere of risk management culture in all departments, throughout different staff levels	COSO ERM stated “Everyone in an entity has some responsibility for ERM.” ● It listed the roles and responsibilities of different staff, i.e.) “The CEO is ultimately responsible and should assume ownership. Other managers support the entity’s risk management philosophy... A risk officer, financial officer, internal auditor, and others usually have key support responsibilities. Other entity personnel are responsible for executing

	● The Board should highly focus on the cultivation of risk management culture, and the General Managers are responsible for the activities of risk management cultural development ● Strengthen quality legal education and establish moral and integrity standards for the employees, and take serious disciplinary action against any violation of the nation and corporation rules	ERM in accordance with established directives and protocols..... The Board provides important oversight to ERM and concurs with the entity's risk appetite ” ● It emphasizes the importance of senior management behavior that sets good example and its tone. ● It encourages whistleblower hotline China ERM is more conceptualwise that only emphasizes on the building up of risk management culture within the company ● Except for CEO and GMs, China ERM does not specify the roles and responsibilities of other staff ● China ERM has different attitudes towards the violation of integrity ● China ERM emphasizes severe penalty for any violation of laws, business conducts, integrity, etc.
10	Supplementary ● The state-owned enterprise, which operates without a Board, will take up the Board's roles and responsibilities as mentioned in the China ERM ● The China ERM will provide separate guidelines on risks in relation to	Conclusion COSO ERM is a framework that provides key concepts and fundamental structure for supporting enterprises to manage risk

	enterprise's investment; financial reporting and derivatives products trading including as Appendix for introduction of Risk Management Techniques and Terminologies	1. COSO ERM is more an academic model to tell how to build a risk control mechanism in an enterprise 2. COSO ERM elaborates more on methodologies and theories, with less emphasis on working requirements China ERM is a comprehensive guideline, provides step by step guidance on risk management and spells out what is required on execution level ● It possibly assumed that the readers have already got knowledge in ERM. Therefore, it does not go into the details of the theories behind, but more emphasis on the execution requirement, application and implementation

Source: English translation of 中央企業全面風險管理指引

REFERENCES

- Austin, R., Ford, H, and Ramsay, I., 2005. Company Directors, Principles of Law and Corporate Governance. Chatswood: LexisNexis Butterworths.
- Beasley, M., Clune, R., and Hermanson, D., 2005. Enterpriserisk Management: An empirical analysis of factors associated with the extent of implementation. *Journal of Accounting and Public Policy*, 24, pp.521-531.
- Beasley, M., Clune, R. and Hermanson, D., 2006. The Impact of Enterprise Risk Management on the Internal Audit Function. *Strategic Finance*, pp.1-26.
- Bierstaker, J. and Wright, A., 2004. Does the adoption of a business risk audit approach change internal control documentation and testing practices?. *International Journal of Auditing*, 8 (1), pp.67-78.
- Chen, J., Ke, Q. and Isaac, D., 2007. Board characteristics as corporate governance mechanism. In: Chen, J. and Yao, S., eds. *Globalization, Competition, and Growth in China*. London: Routledge, pp.15-40.
- COSO News Release, 2010. COSO Announces Projects to Modernize Internal Control - Integrated Framework.
- COSO News Release, 2010. COSO Releases Results of Two Surveys on Current State of Enterprise Risk Management and Board Risk Oversight.
- Dahya, J, Karbhari, Y, Xiao, J. and Yang, M., 2003. Corporate Governance: An International Review. *The Usefulness of the Supervisory Board Report in China*, 11(4), p.308.
- Daud, W. and Yazid, A., 2009. A Conceptual Framework For The Adoption of Enterprise Risk Management in Government-Linked Companies. *International Review of Business Research Papers*, 5(5), pp. 229-238.
- Egbuji, A., 1999. Risk management of Organizational Records. *Records Management Journal*, 9 (2), pp.93-116
- Enterprise Risk Management during the Global Financial Crisis: Sharing Global Experience, The 2nd Annual Thought Leadership Conference Booklet, 2009.
- Fraser, J. and Simkns, B., 2010. *Enterprise Risk Management*. Hoboken, New Jersey: John

Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Gao, S., Gao, G. and Zhang, T., 2008. Corporate Governance Reform and Firm Performance: Evidence from China. *Research in Accounting and Emerging Economies*, 8, pp.189-209.

Gauthier, S., 2005. *From Internal Control to Enterprise Risk Management*. [online] Available at: < <http://www.entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/article/131788474.html>>.

Grant Thornton. 2009, Enterprise Risk Management: Creating value in a volatile economy, Addressing the concerns of the Corporate Governance Community.

Holton, G., 1996. Enterprise Risk Management. *Contingency Analysis*, pp.1-14.

International Federation of Accountants. 2011. Global Survey on Risk Management and Internal Control. *Results, Analysis, and Proposed Next Steps*, Information Paper.

Jingu, T., 2007. Corporate Governance for listed Companies in China – Recent Moves to Improve the Quality of Listed Companies. *Namura Capital Market Review*,10(2).

KPMG. 2011. Implementation Guidelines for Enterprise Internal Control, Risk and Compliance.

KPMG. 2011. *China Boardroom Update*, Issue 1.

Lipton, M., Neff, D., Brownstein, A., Rosenblum, S., Emmerich, A., Nikes, S. and Walker, B., 2010. Risk Management and the Board of Directors. *The Corporate Governance Adviser*, Mar/Apr, Vol. 18/2, Aspen Publishers

Liu, Q., 2006), Corporate governance in China: current practices, economic effects and institutional determinants. *Economic Studies*, 52(2), pp.415-453.

Mako, W. and Zhang, C., 2003. Management of China's State-Owned Enterprises Portfolio: Lessons from International Experience.

MAZARS, 2011. Optimize the internal control of your mainland China Company, Internal Control and Risk Management .

McKinsey Quarterly, 2011. Spurring Performance in China's State-Owned Enterprises.

National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2007. *China Statistical Yearbook*.

Nocco, B. and Stulz, R., 2006. Enterprise Risk Management: Theory and Practice. *Journal of Applied Corporate Finance*,18(4), pp.8- 20.

OECD Working Group on Privatization and Corporate Governance of State Owned Assets.

2009. Occasional Paper: State Owned Enterprises in China: Reviewing The Evidence
- Pagach, D. and Warr, R., 2007. An Empirical Investigation of the Characteristics of Firms Adopting Enterprise Risk Management. North Carolina State University, Working Paper.
- Pagach, D. and Warr, R., 2008. *The Effects of Enterprise Risk Management on Firm Performance*.
- Protiviti. 2010. *A Brief Introduction to the China Enterprise Internal Control Supplemental Guidelines*.
- Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), 2003-2011. *Role of PCAOB*. [online] Available at: < <http://pcaobus.org/Pages/default.aspx>>.
- Securities Exchange Commission, 2011. *What We Do?* [online] Available at:< <http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml>>.
- Simkins, B. and Fraser, J., 2010. *Enterprise Risk Management: Today's Leading Research and Best Practices for Tomorrow's Executives*, Wiley.
- State-owned enterprises internal control: problems, causes and countermeasures. [online] Available at: <<http://chinawestproducts.com/08/10/state-owned-enterprises-internal-control-problems-causes-and-countermeasures/>>.
- The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, 2004. *Enterprise Risk Management - Integrated Framework, Executive Summary*.
- The Institute of Internal Auditors, 2004. *Applying COSO's Enterprise Risk Management - Integrated Framework*.
- Tong L, Zhong J, Kong J, Chang R., 2009. *Corporate governance assessment - summary report on the top 100 Chinese listed companies for 2009*. China, Centre for Corporate Governance at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the Centre for Research on Assessment of Leaders at the China National School of Administration, and Protivi.
- Woetzel, J., 2008. Reassessing China's stated-owned enterprises. *The McKinsey Quarterly*, pp.1- 6.

Zhang, J., Zhang, T. and Zhang, X., 2008. Corporate governance, performance and management turnover: An empirical analysis of Chinese listed companies. *International Review of Business Review Papers*, 4(4), pp.190-198.

Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems and Government

Regulation

Alexander Katkov
Johnson & Wales University
Email: akatkov@jwu.edu

INTRODUCTION

The classification of economic systems dividing them into three main forms: pure market, pure command and mixed economies, is very correct from the historical perspectives but is very outdated from the point of view of the economic analysis of modern economies. Except, probably, North Korea all other countries in the world today are mixed economies. The mixed economy is combining features of both market and command economies. All countries have different forms of property ownership: private, public, government, collective, personal. In all countries the market mechanism of coordination of the decision making processes of producers and consumers is complemented by governmental involvement into economic activities with the help of fiscal and monetary policies. Quite often the government became not only the umpire of economic disputes but the participant of these disputes because today the government is very often the largest consumer and in the case of state monopolies is the largest producer of products and services.

In some countries, like Japan, Germany, France the government is not only the “big brother” who is watching, but also is the “big sister” who can take care about peoples’ problems: a health care, an infrastructure, a security, an education. In these countries the government is expected to be involved into economic processes and the big government is welcomed.

In other countries, like the USA, a big government is desirable for people whose income is low and who by the different reasons are looking for the government as for the last resort. More capable, more dynamic and more productive people with higher incomes perceive the government as the obstacle, as the unneeded controller, and as the disposable income cutter

because of the tax collection. They tend to compare the government with the sea monster Leviathan. This tradition that has been introduced by the British political philosopher Thomas Hobbs in XVII century is quite alive 360 years later. For example, the American social scientist Robert Higgs in his book “Crisis and Leviathan. Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government” discussing the expansion of the government’s authority over economic decision making in the USA made the following statement: “Given capitalist color by the form of private property rights, the system has denied the substance of any such rights whenever governmental authorities have found it expedient to do so”(1987, p.236). The division of thoughts about the government’s role in economic matters and expectations what government could and should do for people broadly presented by contenders from the Republican Party who want to contest President Obama later this year.

It looks that everybody agrees that the government should play some role in the regulation of the modern economy. But how big or small this role should be, and how to measure the level of the regulation?

This article is addressing the issue of the possible ways to measure the level of the government regulation.

METHOD’S DESCRIPTION

Most economists will agree that the pure market and pure command economies are absolutely opposite to each other in terms of their structures and the processes of functioning. But they have the same mission: to satisfy unlimited human needs and wants using the set of limited economic resources. Each of them is pursuing the same list of four major economic goals: economic efficiency, economic growth, economic stability and economic equality. But why they are so different? One of the reasons, why they are different, is the difference in the priority and ranking of goals from the same list of these four major economic goals. This ranking is different for every system. As the result, each system has used the different strategy for the functioning and the development and has the different economic structure. I can say

even more; in the case of pure market and pure command economies these rankings are exactly opposite as I will show there.

Because the mixed economy is the synthesis of both above mentioned economies the real combination of the market and regulation, freedom of choice and commanding pressure can be different in different countries because of the resources endowments, historical, religious and cultural specifics, and political traditions. So, in some countries there is more market economy, in other countries there is more command economy. Can these differences be measured? Let try to do that using the idea of ranking correlation developed by the British mathematician Maurice Kendall to measure these differences as differences between economic goals ranking orders. The hypothesis used in this case is very simple: than closer Kendall ranks correlation coefficient value to the market economy's economic goals ranking order than more market and freedom of choice options left for the private sector. But if the correlation coefficient value is closer to the command economy's economic goals ranking order than this economy has a very substantial government's involvement into economic matters.

According to Herve Abdi's article in the "Encyclopedia of Measurement and Statistics" (2007) when we are comparing two ordered sets we should look at the number of different pairs between two sets which allow us to get something which is called the "symmetric difference distance" between two sets.

$$\tau = 1 - \frac{2 \times [d_{\Delta} (\mathcal{P}_1, \mathcal{P}_2)]}{N(N-1)}$$

Where the symmetric difference distance between two sets of ordered pairs $\mathcal{P}_1$ and $\mathcal{P}_2$ is presented as $d_{\Delta} (\mathcal{P}_1, \mathcal{P}_2)$. N is number of ranked objects (goals), in our case $N = 4$. Kendall coefficient can have values between -1 and +1: $-1 \leq \tau \leq +1$ where -1 is the largest possible distance and +1 is the smallest one.

The Kendall coefficient τ can be interpreted as the difference between the probability to have goals in the same order and the probability that they are in the different order:

$$\tau = P(\text{same}) - P(\text{different}).$$

Let us use the Kendal coefficient between two ordered sets for selected leading economies: USA, China, Germany, Japan and Russia. But before we will do it let us assign after some analysis economic goals ranking orders for the pure market and pure command economies. In this part I will refer to the analysis of three economic systems that I have offered in my article published last year: “Government Regulation: Comparative Analysis” (2011).

PURE MARKET ECONOMY

For the “pure” capitalism as traditionally pure market economy has been called the leading economic goal is the “efficiency”. Efficiency in this case is not only the productivity but also the correct allocation of resources accordingly to the existing combinations of needs and wants. Why efficiency is the leading goal of the market economic system? The brief historical excursion will help to find the answer to that question.

The classical capitalism of XVIII – XIX century is the simple enough economy consisting of many small producers who own, at least in the boundaries of the same geographical region, about the same economic resources: natural, technological and labor. So, to survive in the very intense and cruel competition with others the producer should develop two important abilities:

1) the ability of quick adaptation to demand changes, and 2) the ability to control the cost/price ratio. In the case of the “pure” competition the producer has no power to dictate to the consumer. The producer should react to demand changes that are results of permanent changes in sets of consumer needs and wants initiated by the process of the social and technological evolution of the society. The producer who did not possess those two abilities was doomed to the failure going bankrupt or being acquired by the more successful competitor.

As the result of that the need and the ability to grow became the consequences of efficient operations and the company should pursue the economic growth to survive in the future.

When the loser is leaving the market the winner can get not only the loser's market share but the loser's business also. Because of that the increase in the volume of produced goods and services became closely related to the economic efficiency the goal of economic growth logically possesses the second rank among four major economic goals.

The economic stability cannot be the leading goal of the pure market economy because the pure competition are not establishing any factors that are blocking or braking attempts of individual producers to pursue their individual business interests. So, inevitable mistakes in the consumer demand's assessment and the underestimation or the lack of the knowledge of the competitors' abilities became the reasons of the overproduction with the following contractions of economic activities. A contraction that can grow into a recession or even a depression automatically will increase unemployment and will decrease the consumption which is the effect of the decline in the disposable income. Business would react to the demand decrease by the reduction of the production. This reduction of the output's production will create the contradiction between the goal of economic stability and the goal of economic growth.

Another phase of the business cycle – a “prosperity” phase, also will create the factor that would negatively affect the consumer demand and as the result will slow down the level of production. This factor is inflation. Increase in the consumer demand during the “prosperity” phase will increase the price level. So, as the result according to the Law of Demand the quantities of goods and services demanded would decline. As the result inflation as the unemployment would negatively affect the economic growth.

Unemployment and inflation are natural features of the free, non- regulated pure market economy. The control of unemployment and inflation only can be possessed by the sector of the national economy which is independent of the business sector, in other words by the government. So, the “economic stability” can be declared as the desirable goal of the national economy but only the government as the independent coordinator and the umpire of the big game called the “pure market competition” can provide resources and create policies that would help to keep economic development more stable. In this big game, where every “player” is representing interests of either businesses or households and playing/competing against and sometime in the coalition with others trying to maximize its win, the government-umpire by

issuing right decision in support of producers or consumers can diminish the negative consequences of unemployment and inflation. Or, in some cases, it can intensify them when decisions are wrong. Practically the goal of economic stability can be achieved by the pure market economy only randomly and partially.

The accessibility of products and services to the population in the pure market economy is determined by the level of the disposable income. Because in the capitalist economy the disposable income is the function of the economic resources involved into the process of production, people who do not own natural and technological resources (land and capital) and own the labor resource that have no demand (wrong skills, no skills, or low level of specific skills) do not have the access to products and services. They are doomed to the suffering and the death. The person who has no income is the only potential consumer. The larger number of people with no or low income the less demand for goods and services and lower the potential of the economic growth.

So, the structure of the pure market economy has the naturally built-in contradiction: the efficiency and the growth of the system became dependent of the lack of stability and of the high level of the income inequality. Those two factors are negatively affecting the economic growth. The entrance of the government onto the economic arena as the controller and the regulator became sooner or later the inevitable necessity. The government can and should try to moderate the effect of this contradiction via tools of the fiscal and monetary policies to improve economic stability and to redistribute incomes to soften their negative effects on the future economic growth.

The pure market economy needs the government regulation in the long run and its transformation into the mixed economy is inevitable.

The ranking order of four major economic goals in the Pure Market Economy is the following: 1. Efficiency. 2. Growth. 3. Stability. 4. Equality.

THE COMMAND ECONOMY

In the command or centrally planned economy the order of ranking of the above mentioned four major economic goals is absolutely opposite to the order of their ranking in the pure market economy. In the command economy the function of the property ownership is not playing the leading structure forming role as it is playing in the pure market economy. In the pure market economy the boundaries separating one enterprise from another are often determined by the physical borders between pieces and units of land and capital resources. Stone walls separating one farm from another farm in New England is the good example of structure forming role of the property ownership function. In the command economy, where according to the law all production units are co-owners of land and capital resources, one business unit cannot be differentiated from another by the ownership boundaries. As the result the leading role of the structure forming function is transferred from the property ownership to the property management function.

Declared co-ownership of the national wealth for every citizen of the country will move goals of economy equality and economic stability into first two positions among the most important economic goals. The achievement of the goal of economic equality is guaranteeing everybody at least the access to goods and services satisfying the most basic needs and wants. The achievement of the goal of economic stability is guaranteeing everybody an employment and at least a minimal income earned or not earned to become a consumer. To pursue and achieve both of those goals the economy will need the governmental regulation. So, if those two goals have the highest priority for the economic system the government regulation and the control of the economy through the utilization of the management function of property became objectively inevitable. The main question in this situation what is the level and boundaries of that control.

It looks that there are two main choices. The first one is the “soft” version when the government became involved into the process of the regulation of the national economy taking the initiative in the control of some leading economic functions:

- the function of the determination of the general strategy of the national economy development in the given country depending of the the socio-economic priorities;
- the function of the control and the maintenance of the harmony between the major needs of the society and the economy's abilities to satisfy them;
- the function of the income redistribution through the established system of the taxation and transfer payments to support needy members of the society;
- the function of the maintenance of the stability of the economic development through the application of tools of the fiscal and monetary policies;
- the function of the redistribution of economic resources to support socially and economically important projects and to limit projects that have negative effects on the recent and future development of the national economy and the society.

The second possible choice is the command economy. In this case the government is not just regulating the economy but is performing the absolute control of the economic activities and decisions made by managers of economy's sectors and even individual economic business units. This option can be realized in the case of the nationalization of the economic resources at the maximum scale. Even the labor resource in the command economy practically became nationalized either through the "soft" form of the control when the ideological brain washing mechanism would name workers the "leading force" of the new society building process to make them enthusiastic about future changes and not demanding about the living standards. Or the nationalization can be realized through the "hard" form of the control when the large part of the population is converted into the "slaves" placed into the special labor camps.

The first choice of the government regulation has been used in the mixed economic system of Western Europe and later in the USA where there are different forms of the property are co-existing and are playing the different structure forming functions: the private property is realizing the function of the ownership, and the common property is realizing the function of the management. The second choice of the government regulation that has been used in the USSR, China, countries of the Eastern Europe, North Korea, Vietnam and Cuba was the choice of the dictate and the control known as the command economy.

Why the difference between structures' organizing/forming functions of the ownership and the management so important? The structure organizing function of the property is defining the boundaries between business elements of the economic system and is prescribing the degree of the accepted governmental control of business elements activities. The higher degree of the nationalization then it is higher the degree of the governmental control. Because it is easy to control from one center the simple economic system then the complex system the higher the degree of the control traditionally used to manage naturally simple or artificially simplified systems. Because of that the chief managers of the command economies have developed the special standards of peoples' behavior limiting the freedom of choices. In the extreme form such standardization of the people's behavior has been practiced in China during the Cultural Revolution. The most recognized image of that standardization was the crowd of thousands people wearing the same uniformed clothes regardless of gender, waving the identical red books with quotations from Chairman Mao speeches, and shouting standard slogans.

It is obvious that there were also good features of the centrally planned system. For example the priority goals such system can realize often better than the pure market economy. But those priority goals: the access to the products and services to majority members of society and the economic stability, are getting into the contradiction with two others: economic efficiency and economic growth. Those two can be achieved if business units would have the maximum of the freedom of choice outside the government control.

The goal of guaranteed access to products and services for all working people has been secured by the constitutional right to have a job and by the developed system of the social security. As the result, workers have received the guaranteed salary according to the specially developed salaries scales, and orphans, handicapped and retirees have received their disposable income from the government as co-owners of the national natural and technological resources. Their incomes were lower but they were guaranteed.

The economic stability has been achieved by the strict control of the frictional unemployment with the practice of the forceful employment of people who tried to find the reason not to work at all. The control of the inflation the government has performed through the state mechanism of the price setting and through subsidies of the products and services important for the satisfaction of the basic needs: food, housing, transportation, healthcare and education.

It would be incorrect to say that goals of economic efficiency and economic growth have been ignored by leaders of countries with command economics. Oppositely these goals would be declared as leading goals from the stages of party congresses. But as the history shows high growth rates have been achieved as the result of the high exploitation of the countries labor and natural resources. The exploitation of the labor resources, as it was mentioned earlier, has been fulfilled through the ideological “brain wash” and/or by forming the fear for the freedom or even the fear for life among prisoners of labor camps. Neither of these two motives: enthusiasm and fear can guarantee the high level of productivity in the long run. In addition, the labor force of the Soviet Union substantially declined as the result of wars and few waves of emigration. After the system of labor camps has been closed down and the fear as the motive to work hard was illuminated the lack of the material motivation to work and the shortage of the new labor because of the bad demographic situation became two main factors of the decreasing productivity and the very low rates of the economic growth.

Of course, the history of the Soviet Union is unique. The XXth century brought very many challenges and hardships to citizens of the Soviet Union, so the poor results of the grandiose social and economic experiment that had the goal of the creation of the new economic system. May be the choice of the command economy was determined by the

historical specifics of the process of the country's development interrupted and affected by revolutions and wars. Revolutions and wars need the strong command style of management based on the strict hierarchy and the dictate of the supreme leadership – commanders. People who lead the October revolt and the Civil war in Russia after war became the economy's chief administrators without the knowledge of the economic laws and very often with very basic or very primitive education. If the mistakes of managers of individual business units in case of non-hierarchical market economy can provoke the recession but not the stagnation of the entire system and the possible economic collapse (the Great Depression as the very specific case should be considered as the exemption from the rule), the mistakes of the leadership of the command economy would be multiplied by managers of lower levels of hierarchy and would stimulate the crisis of the whole command system. This crisis can be resolved only through the transformation of the entire economic system and through the liquidation of the centralized dictate of the government.

Even the general analysis of the planning mechanism is showing the less flexibility of the planned economy compare with the market economy. In the command economy there is the transfer of decision making freedom from the level of the individual producers who are interested in the satisfaction of needs and wants of their direct consumers to be able to stay in the business (Adam Smith “invisible hand”) to the level of the centralized bureaucracy. This bureaucracy is interested not in peoples' needs and wants satisfaction but wants to ensure the quantitative balance between available set of economic resources and the planned set of produced products and services assigned for the set of the abstract consumers. The substitution of the needs' satisfaction as the major aim of the economy by the aim of the provision of the inputs-outputs balance has liquidated the possibility of the satisfactory realization of the principle of allocative efficiency. Allocative efficiency is measuring the existing level of utility derived from of the output produced when the structure and the volume of the produced goods and services are reflecting the structure and the volume of the population's needs and wants.

The complex system cannot be successfully managed from the single center without the center's attempt to simplify this system. According to the law of cybernetics the level of the complexity of the management (administrative) system should be higher or at least of the equal

level of complexity of the managing (guided) system. So, to deal with are emerging complexity of the national economy the State Central Planning Board has been forced to diminish the complexity of the economy growth by decreasing the number of producers in every industry. This strategy gave birth to oligopolies and even monopolies in some sectors of the soviet economy especially in the machine building industry. The inefficiency and possible dictate of monopolies have been widely recognized as the negative characteristics hindering the economic growth.

Monopolies are less economically efficient than competitive industries. Monopolies produced less, their prices are higher, and the quality of products and services are lower than products and services produced by competitive producers. They are playing the negative role in the process of the realization of goals of economic efficiency and economic growth. So, we can conclude that the command economy build in the Soviet Union has generated the system of state monopolies. As the result, there was the emergence of the inevitable contradiction between goals of equality and stability from one side and efficiency and growth from another. When the function of management/administration became the leading structure forming function of the economy the growth of the centralized control is inevitable because the state is taking and performing the role of the “protector” of the common interest of all co-owners of the common wealth of the country against possible threats to the system from outside and possible mistakes and confusions emerged inside of the system.

The state using mechanisms of the centralized control and administration is capable to manage simple tasks of the income redistribution and the maintenance of the some desirable level of the economic stability. But the state cannot ensure the economic efficiency because the freedom of choice and the economic initiative are limited to the minimum by the government directives. This discussed above conflict between economic goals probably never can be resolved. We only can hope to find more or less acceptable alternatives of its resolution by decreasing the centralized government control of the national economy and by diminishing the chaos the contraction phase of the pure market economy’s business cycle through finding the acceptable complementation between functions of ownership and administration. In other words we should welcome the mixed economy.

The ranking order of four major economic goals in the Command Economy is the following: 1. Equality. 2. Stability. 3. Growth. 4. Efficiency.

THE MIXED ECONOMY

The mixed economy is more flexible than command economy and more stable and just than market economy because it includes features of both and operates as the synthesis of the market and regulation. Almost all countries of the world today have one or another form of mixed economy. I want to comment on some specifics of the U.S. mixed economy where the market co-exists with the government regulation almost 80 years. I would not discuss the processes of the government regulation in the USA in all details but I would try to offer very general analysis of the most important tools of the government regulation: fiscal and monetary policies.

The economic role of the government is broadly discussed by philosophers, economists and politicians for the almost 400 years period since Thomas Hobbes and John Locke published in XVI and XVII centuries their works analyzing the processes of interactions between individuals and the state. Most of them agree that two most important functions that people want the government to perform are: 1) the function of the protection of individuals and their property from possible encroachment of others, and 2) the function of the provision to the society goods and services that private sector are not able to offer, for example, big infrastructural projects and policies regulating market and compensating market imperfections. These good and services are known as public goods and services. When this function is realized efficiently the processes of manufacturing and exchange are stable.

The controlling and regulating function of the government is realized through two market regulating policies:

- 1) the fiscal policy which is affecting the level of consumption through the mechanism of taxation and transfer payments redistributing incomes in favor of

low income earners, and which determining the level and boundaries of the government expenditures;

2) the monetary policy which is controlling the money supply.

The fiscal policy can be defined as the mechanism that use taxation and government spending to support the economy's attempt to reach the level of full employment and low inflation, in other words, to reach the highest of possible levels of stability and at the same time to stimulate the economic growth. The Roosevelt's "New Deal" was the first attempt to use the fiscal policy mechanism at the macro level to help economy to get out the depression. If aggregate expenditures of households, businesses, the government and the foreign sectors are less than the value of the gross national product produced by the full employed economy the production in the future will decline, the unemployment will increase and the market powers would not be able to return the economy back to the full employment level of the potential gross national/domestic product. The economy will face the contraction. It is the moment when the government can help by increasing the government spending for example financing the new infrastructural projects. The rise of the government spending can increase the government borrowing needs. As the result, the government will sell bonds. But the emerging deficit of the federal budget would become the lesser of two evils and should be accepted.

In reality the deficit growth became the self-feeding monster because the guaranteed interests' payments often can be obtained only from the next borrowing efforts. In addition to this problem there are some others that are affecting the debt growth. The changes in the demographic structure of the population are increasing the government obligations to the growing group of elderly citizens in the form of social security payments and Medicare. Plus the military-industrial complex is constantly lobbying its interests forcing the government to increase the military expenditures.

The Keynesian economic model of the government regulation based upon the idea that the aggregate demand should be stimulated to achieve the economic growth. To stimulate consumption of households, which is by far the largest component of the formula of GDP, taxes

should be decreased. But lower taxes means less government receipts. So, to keep government spending high to support their growth during the recessions the government must increase the borrowing. As the result, to pursue the goal of economic growth and at the same time to make the access to goods and services more equal through the income redistribution strategies and the creation of new jobs (mostly in the public sector), the government should accept the growth of the national debt and the perspectives of the future inflation. That means that again all economic goals cannot be achieved simultaneously. Even the mixed economy has its own weaknesses, and the goals' prioritization should become the important issue of the government economic strategy.

Let create ranking orders of four major economic goals that are common for all economic systems and respectfully for all countries. Choice of countries: USA, Japan, Germany, China and Russia. To get the economic goals ranking orders for each country me should collect experts' opinions and build these orders on the basis of the generalizations of those opinions. Because in our case we are discussing not the perfection of the ranking orders design but the method of the application of the ranking method in the analysis of the mixed economies I will build rankings based upon my own understanding of economic situation in each selected country.

USA: Growth, Stability, Efficiency, Equality.

Japan: Stability, Efficiency, Equality, Growth.

Germany: Stability, Equality, Efficiency, Growth.

China: Growth, Stability, Efficiency, Equality.

Russia: Stability, Efficiency, Growth, Equality.

Let find the Kendall rank correlation coefficients for each country using initially the pure market economy economic goals ranking order as the standard, and later we will do the same using the command economy economic goals ranking order as the standard.

The economic goals order the pure market economy: [Efficiency, Growth, Stability, Equality] with the following ranking: $\mathcal{R}_1 = [1, 2, 3, 4]$.

USA: [Growth, Stability, Efficiency, Equality] with the ranking: $\mathcal{R}_2 = [2, 3, 1, 4]$.

As we discussed it in the beginning of this article when we are comparing two ordered sets we should look at the number of different pairs between two sets which allow us to get something which is called the “symmetric difference distance” between two sets.

$$\tau = 1 - \frac{2 \times [\mathbf{d}_\Delta (\mathcal{P}_1, \mathcal{P}_2)]}{N(N-1)}$$

Where the symmetric difference distance between two sets of ordered pairs $\mathcal{P}_1$ and $\mathcal{P}_2$ is presented as $\mathbf{d}_\Delta (\mathcal{P}_1, \mathcal{P}_2)$. N is number of ranked objects (goals), in our case $N = 4$. Kendall coefficient can have values between -1 and +1: $-1 \leq \tau \leq +1$ where -1 is the largest possible distance and +1 is the smallest one.

The Kendall coefficient of correlation of economic goals ranking for the U.S. economy and the Pure Market Economy is 0.33:

$$\mathcal{P}_1 = \{[1, 2], [1, 3], [1, 4], [2, 3], [2, 4], [3, 4]\}.$$

$$\mathcal{P}_2 = \{[2, 3], [2, 1], [2, 4], [3, 1], [3, 4], [1, 4]\}.$$

The set of pairs which are in only one set of ordered pairs is $\{[1, 2], [2, 1], [1, 3], [3, 1]\}$. So, the value of $\mathbf{d}_\Delta (\mathcal{P}_1, \mathcal{P}_2) = 4$. That means that the value of the Kendall rank correlation coefficient between two orders of economic goals is:

$$\tau = 1 - \frac{2 \times 4}{4 \times 3} = 1 - \frac{2}{3} = \frac{1}{3} = 0.33$$

Japan: [Stability, Efficiency, Equality, Growth] with the ranking: $\mathcal{R}_3 = [3, 1, 4, 2]$.

$$\mathcal{P}_1 = \{[1, 2], [1, 3], [1, 4], [2, 3], [2, 4], [3, 4]\}.$$

$$\mathcal{P}_3 = \{[3, 1], [3, 4], [3, 2], [1, 4], [1, 2], [4, 2]\}.$$

The set of pairs which are in only one set of ordered pairs is $\{[1, 3], [3, 1], [2, 3], [3, 2], [2, 4], [4, 2]\}$. So, the value of $\mathbf{d}_\Delta(\mathcal{P}_1, \mathcal{P}_2) = 6$. That means that the value of the Kendall rank correlation coefficient between two orders of economic goals is:

$$\tau = 1 - \frac{2 \times 6}{4 \times 3} = 1 - \frac{12}{12} = 0$$

Germany: [Stability, Equality, Efficiency, Growth] with the ranking: $\mathcal{R}_4 = [3, 4, 1, 2]$.

$$\mathcal{P}_1 = \{[1, 2], [1, 3], [1, 4], [2, 3], [2, 4], [3, 4]\}.$$

$$\mathcal{P}_4 = \{[3, 4], [3, 1], [3, 2], [4, 1], [4, 2], [1, 2]\}.$$

The set of pairs which are in only one set of ordered pairs is $\{[1, 3], [3, 1], [1, 4], [4, 1], [2, 3], [3, 2], [2, 4], [4, 2]\}$. So, the value of $\mathbf{d}_\Delta(\mathcal{P}_1, \mathcal{P}_2) = 8$. That means that the value of the Kendall rank correlation coefficient between two orders of economic goals is:

$$\tau = 1 - \frac{2 \times 8}{4 \times 3} = 1 - \frac{16}{12} = -\frac{1}{3} = -0.33$$

China: [Growth, Efficiency, Stability, Equality] with the ranking: $\mathcal{R}_5 = [2, 1, 3, 4]$.

$$\mathcal{P}_1 = \{[1, 2], [1, 3], [1, 4], [2, 3], [2, 4], [3, 4]\}.$$

$$\mathcal{P}_5 = \{[2, 1], [2, 3], [2, 4], [1, 3], [1, 4], [3, 4]\}.$$

The set of pairs which are in only one set of ordered pairs is $\{[1, 2], [2, 1]\}$. So, the value of $\mathbf{d}_\Delta(\mathcal{P}_1, \mathcal{P}_2) = 2$. That means that the value of the Kendall rank correlation coefficient between two orders of economic goals is:

$$\tau = 1 - \frac{2 \times 2}{4 \times 3} = 1 - \frac{4}{12} = \frac{2}{3} = 0.67$$

Russia: [Stability, Efficiency, Growth, Equality] with the ranking: $\mathcal{R}_6 = [3, 1, 2, 4]$.

$$\mathcal{P}_1 = \{[1, 2], [1, 3], [1, 4], [2, 3], [2, 4], [3, 4]\}.$$

$$\mathcal{P}_6 = \{[3, 1], [3, 2], [3, 4], [1, 2], [1, 4], [2, 4]\}.$$

The set of pairs which are in only one set of ordered pairs is $\{[1, 3], [3, 1], [2, 3], [3, 2]\}$. So, the value of $\mathbf{d}_\Delta(\mathcal{P}_1, \mathcal{P}_2) = 4$. That means that the value of the Kendall rank correlation coefficient between two orders of economic goals is:

$$\tau = 1 - \frac{2 \times 4}{4 \times 3} = 1 - \frac{8}{12} = \frac{1}{3} = 0.33$$

Because the economic goals ranking order of the pure command economy is extremely opposite to the goals ranking order for the pure market economy the Kendall rank correlation coefficient between them is $\tau = -1$. Respectfully for discussed above countries the Kendall rank correlation coefficients with the pure command economy economic goals order would be: -0.33 for the USA and Russia; -0.67 for China, +0.33 for Germany and 0 for Japan.

We can conclude that among chosen countries China's mixed economy is the closest to the pure market economy goals setting priority and Germany is the farthest from the pure market economy among them.

From my point of view presented method has the perspectives of the practical applications because the Kendall rank correlation coefficient can make the comparative analysis of the trends in the government regulation more informative and illustrative. Its further development is one of my goals.

REFERENCES

- Abdi, H., 2007. The Kendall Rank Correlation Coefficient. In: N. Salkind, ed. *Encyclopedia of Measurement and Statistics*, 2. Thousand Oaks (CA): Sage, pp.508-510.
- Higgs, R., Crisis and Leviathan, 1987. *Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government*. Oxford Press. New York.
- Katkov A., 2011. Government Regulation: Comparative Analysis. *Conference Proceedings Papers. Knowledge Globalization Conference, Boston, Massachusetts*, 5(1), pp.285- 293.

GCC Economies and Air pollution:

A Qualitative Analysis to a Carbon Dioxide Emissions Issue

Ahmed Saddam
University of Malaya
Email: ahmed_saddam@live.com

Fatimah Kari
University of Malaya

1. INTRODUCTION

The GCC countries fall in among the top 25 countries that contribute in increasing carbon dioxide emissions more than the world average. In this study, the FDI inflows will be analyzed as external reason of pollution in GCC countries, and to find out whether these foreign investments have affected the environment or not, where FDI inflows will represent the effect of foreign activities on GCC economies. Moreover, we will address the major commodity imports as a reason for imported pollution which reflects the effect of trade on environment, as well as it will focus on major commodity sectors that induce polluting the environment in general, namely mining, quarrying and fuel sector and manufacturing industries.

Analyzing of the said three factors is to extrapolate the reality of environmental policy that implemented in GCC countries over the period 1998-2008, where these countries are main contributor in climate change because of their huge reserves of oil, which account for 40% of the world's proven reserves, and 23% of world reserves of gas (Reiche, D.2010). These significant percentages emphasize the importance comparative advantage of GCC countries in investing the oil sector, as well as in sectors that related to oil industries which could generate an adverse impact on the environment. Therefore we can extrapolate whether there were strict environmental policies or not through analyzing the effect of FDI on carbon dioxide emissions over the period 1998-2008, and by analyzing per capita carbon dioxide emissions. Moreover, tackles the relation between commodity imports and air pollution.

1.1 Review of Literature

David I. Stern, et al (1996) found that there is an inverse relationship between environmental degradation and per capita national income, where economic growth reduces the environmental impact resulting from various economic activities. Also the trade has a neutral impact on environmental degradation. This study used a cross sectional regression for the per capita environmental impacts on per capita income, which can show different patterns of effects.

Kathleen M., & R. Quentin, (2002) confirms that the level of environmental degradation, declining with increasing per capita incomes, where the positive relationship between per capita income and some indicators of a declining measures of environmental degradation. This study was conducted in Canada using official data with four criteria for measuring environmental degradation.

Besides, it found a key result which stresses that the environmental degradation does not affect the low level of per capita income, as well as it illustrate that the high level of per capita income will improve the level of eco-efficiency in the long term in Canada. On this basis, this study suggested that the economic policy in Canada should be follow the comprehensive steps to reduce pollution intensity per unit of productive sectors of the economy to move from the production that have high pollution rate towards low level, in order to mitigate the environmental degradation which associate with the total consumption, and economic activities.

Awudu Abdulai, et.al (2009) examined the linkage between economic growth, foreign trade, and environmental degradation. This study based on the theoretical and empirical approaches over the period 1990-2003. The results indicated that the trade may influence the EKC relationship both positively and negatively.

The study confirms that GDP has a high positive significant impact on environment, while the trade coefficient is not statistically significant. Moreover, the income variable indicates that there is an EKC implication. The study concluded that solving environmental problems does not necessary negatively affect economic growth, as well as the study reports

when a country has not institutional capacities to set up proper environmental policies and protecting some sectors, in this case the environmental problem will still affect that country even though raising of level of income. Moreover, environmental issue is need international cooperative actions to unify their policies for achieving suitable economic growth with less level of pollution.

S.M de Bruyn, et.al, (1998) reached in their study that the environmental pollution linked to direct relationship with economic growth. This study indicated that the best way to reduce the effect of environmental pollution is to increase the level of investment in high technology to achieve rapid economic growth and increase the level of value added. It leads to the fast economic growth and reduce the effect of environmental pollution resulting from the increased production.

The study showed that the economic growth has a direct positive impact on the levels of pollution in spite the increase of level of pollution resulting from economic growth. This pollution could be declined over the time though economic progresses that occur in the level of advanced technology. In other words, in the long-term, the continued economic growth will lead to accumulate advanced technologies, which placed instead of the old technologies, and this progress could be induced reducing level of pollution level. Moreover, the study has distinguished the relationship between economic growth and environment during the long and short term.

Nickerson (2004) examined the effect of pollution by relating national per capita emissions to per capita GDP. His study based on combination of two environmental theories, which are; the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) and the porter hypothesis.

The study reached to three main conclusions. The first, is rising of manufacturing export has reduced emissions by increasing competition between firms which force them to be highly efficient. The second, the study confirms that regulations variables are significant in the result of the model. Meaning that, there is an importance role for promoting environmental regulations by the government, where it a good motivation to reduce the Air pollutions. Third, It found that the level of carbon dioxide emissions has increased with a high

level of income, whereas this conclusion is opposite of EKC theory. The study explains that because of economic growth is not supported by the advanced technology.

Soumyanada Dinda, (2005) found that the economic growth was directly linked to the level of commodity stocks of goods, as well as a direct relationship between economic growth and the environment. This study suggests that achieving sustainable economic growth could be through protection of natural resources and optimal exploitation, which effect in reducing impact of climate change. Also, this study found a significant relationship between economic growth and the environment. It confirms impact an impact of economic growth on the economy and the environment, and found also . ‘ that the growth rate of out put is negatively related to its initial level, and positively related with the environment. Furthermore, the study examined several variables, mainly the cumulated per capita Co2 emission, and per capita protected forest area within the country. The study result showed that the cumulated per capita carbon dioxide emissions (Co2), and per capita area of protected forests linked to positive economic growth rate. In other words, rising of level of economic growth lead for more pollution, where increasing per capita carbon dioxide emissions, and degradation level of forest area.

Mohammed Redha Qader (2009) reports in his study, that CO₂, NO₂, and CH₄ are the three most widespread green house gases (GHGs), where the Electricity consumption and the related CO₂ emissions resulting from oil and gas combustion in GCC countries has a big role of Air pollution.

The study found that GCC countries contribute significantly to the global CO₂ emissions, and that the majority of their emissions are concentrated in the energy extraction and manufacturing sectors. Moreover, it refers that the current rates of electricity consumptions and related CO₂ emissions in GCC countries are higher than other developed countries of similar population. The study recommended encouraging using of renewable and cleaner sources of power generation.

Ekins, (1999) found that the relationship between economic growth and the environment could be positive and hence economic growth, where the government pay more concern towards the environment by engaging this growth and subjects it to the consideration

that maintain the environment. Moreover, Ekins sees that the population growth combined with increase level of economic activities which induce damaging the environment as a result of the high level of production and consumption which represent a big challenge. As well as, he reports that the human welfare is also associated with the positive relation between economic growth and environmental degradation.

Sonia Ben Kheder, (2010) showed in her study empirical analysis to explain the relationship between foreign direct investment, environmental regulation and pollution, in order to shed a new light on the environmental impact of pollution. The study is based on using data of French FDI out flows in a mix of developing, transition, emerging and developed countries over the period 1999-2003. The study has estimated three simultaneous equations to model the determination of FDI. It confirms a negative impact of environmental regulation on FDI, as well as French manufacturing FDI have led to increase level of pollution emissions in host countries.

Taylor, (2003) reached when GDP increases, the greater scale of production leads directly to more pollution, but at a higher level of income per capita, the demand for health and environmental quality rises with income which can translate into environmental regulation.

Wen Chen (2007) tested the availability of the environmental Kuznets curve in China by using provincial panel data. The study analysing the relationship between GDP per capita and the emissions of five kinds of industrial pollutants, solid wastes, waste water, So₂, Soot, and smoke. It found that the relationship varies on the types of pollutants and regions.

Jeffery A. Frankel, et.al (2002) discussed determinants of foreign trade and their effect on environment by using a gravity model. This study found that the trade have a beneficial effect on some measures of environmental quality, where it supports the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC).

The study is target to examine effect of trade and economic growth on Air pollution, measured by So₂ and No₂. The new contribution of study is to address endogeneity of trade drown from the gravity model.

Moreover, the study found no evidence for pollution hypothesis, where this study confirms that trade helps promotion economic growth which in turn is an indirect channel of effect on environment.

Hyun-Hoon Lee, et.al, (2005) examined the impact of income on the environment. The examination results showed that the income has a positive impact on pollution, where it has specific effects on the most of the criteria of environmental efficiency.

The study also found that the low level of population density and the political freedom is great importance in influencing the level of environmental sustainability, but the signal coefficients are estimated will be positive in all cases, and this situation to be clear on the issue of civil liberty and political, as researchers stressed that civil liberty and political do not support the sustainability of the environment automatically in all cases.

1.2 Gap statement

Many environmental studies, which based on assumptions of Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC), have addressed the environment in countries that follow a strict environmental policy. This study it will be based on Pollution Haven Theory (PHH), as well as factor endowment hypothesis (FEH). However, it is a further attempt to determine the impact of the most important factors of the increase of carbon dioxide emissions in GCC countries. And for continuing with the literature of the study, our study try to link the three key factors, imports, FDI and growth, as major reasons of emissions for these countries.

1.3 Methodology

This study is based on a qualitative approach. It is an attempt to find out whether GCC countries have achieved sustained growth or not. Therefore we will analyse data of carbon dioxide emissions, relative importance of the main commodity sectors, per capita GDP, per capita carbon dioxide emissions. As well as foreign direct investment and imports for the

period 1998-2008. Our analysis will be enhanced by figures and tables to give a clear picture for this paper.

2. CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS IN GCC COUNTRIES

GCC countries are the more countries that have high rate of carbon dioxide emissions as a result of depending of these economies on fossil fuels, where these countries emit about 45% -50% of the total emissions in Arab countries (Mohammad, 2009).

Besides, the rate of carbon dioxide emissions in GCC countries have exceeded the global rate, where in 2003 the emissions rate in UAE, Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait were about 13, 8, 9, and 7 times respectively more than the world's average, where GCC's emissions rate amounted by 254 million metric tons (Farid B. 2008) which confirms that these countries are significant contributor in environmental pollution and climate change.

The study period, 1998-2008 have witnessed a high increase of crude oil revenues in GCC countries, especially the years 2002-2008, where the contribution of oil sector in GDP raised from 30.8% in 2002 to 40% in 2006, as well as these revenues constitute 77.4% as a ratio of public revenues in 2002 and reached to 86% in 2006 (Saif, 2009). In contrast, we note increasing of carbon dioxide emissions over the said period, where the pollution level have increased in the UAE from 83.6% million metric tons in 2002 to 128.5 million metric ton in 2008, also in Saudi Arabia from 323.4 million metric tons reaching 393 million metric tons at the same period. The rest of GCC countries, also have witnessed rising of carbon dioxide emissions, as shown in the following table:


Table (1): Carbon Dioxide emissions in GCC countries 1998-2008 (Thousand metric tons)

Year	UAE	Bahrain	Saudi Arabia	Oman	Qatar	Kuwait
1998	98892	18405	207288	16667	32402	36421
1999	89038	18020	227229	20818	31408	66002
2000	126754	19758	297749	22057	34730	71107
2001	113783	15082	295843	20444	28001	67465
2002	83659	16824	323459	25544	28012	63982
2003	106365	17580	323697	31943	30564	73263
2004	112878	18056	346047	30971	40286	81338
2005	115628	19684	367067	34176	56820	89878
2006	121462	21294	384386	39717	49541	86343
2007	135540	22464	402450	37319	63054	86145
2008	128501	21879	393418	38518	56297	86244
98-2008	112045.5	19004.18	324421.18	28924.91	41010.45	73471.64

Source: SESRIC, The database of Statistical economic and social research and training centre for Islamic countries, Ankara –Turkey. <http://www.sesric.org/index.php>

The table above can be graphically represented, as in the following figure:

Figure (1): Carbon Dioxide emissions in GCC countries 1998-2008 (Thousand metric tons)



Source : Based on table (1).

The figure above shows that both of Saudi Arabia and the UAE represent significant contribution, where their emissions average amounted to be 324421.18, 112045.5 thousand metric tons, respectively, on average of the period 1998-2008. Kuwait has come in the third level (73471.64) thousand metric tons, followed by Qatar which its carbon emissions rose from 32402 thousand metric tons in 1998 to 56297 thousand metric tons in 2008 due its high productions level of natural gas. where it lead for more pollution during the study period.

In Oman, the carbon dioxide emissions have jumped from 16667 thousand metric tons in 1998 to 38518 thousand metric tons in 2008, and in Bahrain from 98892 to 128501 thousand metric tons during the period of study.


Accordingly, we can say that there is a significant increase in level of carbon dioxide emissions in GCC countries in general, accompanied with grows level of GDP of GCC countries during the period 1998-2008. In other words, we note that there is a positive relation between economic growth that represented by GDP, and increasing level of carbon dioxide emissions over the period 1998-2008. However, if we go to figure (4) we will confirm this fact, where we will note that there is an increase in the level of per capita GDP especially the years 2003-2008. In contrast, we see also that the level of carbon dioxide emissions have increased over the said period. This means that the environmental consideration have not found more attention in the economic policy of GCC countries. In other meaning, GCC countries have not adopted strict environmental policies over the period of study.

However, there is no doubt, that the most pollutant sectors in GCC countries are mining, quarrying and fuel sectors, as well as manufacturing sectors which their contribution to GDP are rounded between 25% in Oman, and 58% in Qatar on average. Moreover, the electricity and gas sector which consume a high level of oil, also is consider as a third sector that emitted carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.

The following figure shows share of main commodity sectors in GCC countries over the period of study.

Figure (2): Share of main commodity sectors to GDP in GCC countries- Average 1998-2008

(Percentages)



Source: Based on data of Arab Monetary Fund, AMF, Kuwait; www.amf.org.ae

Figure (2) illustrates that the mining, quarrying and fuel sectors represent a significant share of total commodity sectors of GDP over the period 1998-2008, which implies their high importance in the GCC economies especially in Qatar and Kuwait. This fact confirms that these two countries depend too much on extractive industries which contribute about 58.1% and 50.8%, respectively, on average of total GDP over the study period (AMF, 2010)^(*).

Manufacturing industries are the second main sector especially in Bahrain and the UAE, where it represents a big relative importance of the total GDP, where this sector contributes by 12.9% and 12.8% of GDP of the mentioned countries, respectively, during the period 1998-2008 (Ibid).

Besides, we can say that the extractive and manufacturing industries are major causes, that induced increasing level of carbon dioxide emission in GCC countries, where it exceeded the world emissions rate. In other meaning, the economic activities in GCC countries consider as polluted activities compared with other sectors that can achieve a significant value added with less pollution such as agricultural and constructions sectors where represent very modest

^(*) The ratios calculated based on statistics data of Arab monetary fund (AMF), <http://www.amf.org.ae>

percentages^(**) compared with the main sectors of GCC economies. For showing the real impact of carbon dioxide emissions and to obtain more accurate analyses, we will analyse the per capita carbon dioxide emissions in GCC countries over the period 1998-2008, as shown in the following table:

Table (2): Per capita carbon dioxide emission in GCC countries 1998-2008 (metric ton)

Year	UAE	Bahrain	KSA	Oman	Qatar	Kuwait
1998	34.16	29.62	10.52	7.19	57.03	31.29
1999	29.05	28.35	11.25	8.82	53.27	31.33
2000	39.15	30.4	14.42	9.18	56.31	32.47
2001	33.33	22.68	14.02	8.37	43.19	29.65
2002	23.3	24.73	15.01	10.28	40.92	27.4
2003	28.25	25.26	14.69	12.65	41.78	30.57
2004	28.7	25.37	15.36	12.05	50.54	33.07
2005	28.28	27.05	15.88	13.06	64.17	35.45
2006	28.7	28.64	16.23	14.87	49.51	33.22
2007	31.06	29.58	16.66	13.69	55.43	32.35
2008	29.88	29.11	16.44	14.28	52.47	32.78

Source: SESRIC, The database of Statistical economic and social research and training centre for Islamic countries, Ankara –Turkey. <http://www.sesric.org/index.php>


Also, the table can be represented graphically as the following figure:

^(**) For example the average share of Agriculture sector to GDP in GCC countries over the period 1998-2008 was as the following: UAE (0.01), Bahrain (0.003), Saudi Arabia (0.02), Oman (0.01), Qatar (0.000) and Kuwait (0.001).

Average share of construction sector to GDP as following: UAE (0.08), Bahrain (0.04), Saudi Arabia (0.04), Oman (0.05), Qatar (0.05), and Kuwait (0.01)

Source: Calculated by the researcher based on statistical bulletin of Arab countries,(2010), Arab monetary fund (AMF), Kuwait, pp 37-58.

Figure (3): Per capita carbon dioxide emissions in GCC countries -1998-2008



Source: By the researcher based on table (2).

Figure (3) above shows that Qatar has a highest share in terms of per capita carbon dioxide emissions over the period 1998-2008, where the average of these emissions amounted to be 51.33 metric ton. This result reflects a high reliance on fossil fuel and other polluted industries especially oil and gas industries. Kuwait comes in the second level (31.78) metric ton, followed by UAE which falls in the third level (30.39) metric tons on average.

Moreover, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Oman have constituted less share compared with the rest of GCC countries, they represent 27.34, 14.58 and 11.31 metric ton respectively.

By the figure (3), we noted also that the share of per capita carbon dioxide emissions have witnessed evident fluctuations during the period 1998-2002 especially in Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE, these changes attributed to volatility of economic activities that generated these emissions in that period. On the years from 2002 to 2005 we note a significant increase of per capita carbon dioxide emissions, and Qatar has had a highest rising in comparison with the rest of GCC countries. Hence, the researcher sees that the main reason of rising of per capita carbon dioxide emissions is due to increasing level of economic activities that mainly depend on crude oil and gas that yielded from increased global demand. This case leads to stimulate the oil and gas sectors and increase the production level, as well as the other related sectors such as petrochemicals.

In the last two years of study, 2007-2008, the per capita carbon dioxide emissions have insignificant decline in all of Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, where we can


justify that decline due to several initiatives^(*) which were taken by GCC countries in an attempt to reduce pollution level as a part of their commitments towards the global community, where GCC countries consider as major contributor of carbon dioxide emissions globally.

In Oman and Kuwait, we note rising of per capita carbon dioxide emissions which reflect failure of effort of these countries in adopting successful policies to reduce carbon emissions. However, the most important issue that we should focus on it, that the increasing of per capita GDP in GCC countries were more than increasing of per capita carbon dioxide emissions especially the period 2002-2008. However, GCC countries witnessed a significant oil boom at the period of study, which could be a good motivation for supporting programs^(**) that maintain the environment and diminish level of emissions problem, where the availability of funding will allows to the GCC's governments to initiate efficient programme for reducing the emissions of carbon dioxide. This target can be achieved by bringing advanced technologies to be used in various production processes, or by using energy alternatives such as solar energy in some productions branches. The following figure shows the per capita GDP in GCC countries over the period 1998-2008.

(*) For example, the UAE started since 1999 encouraging projects that maintain the environment such as projects of solar energy that used for multiple purpose. Moreover, UAE also banned using of leaded fuel since 2003 in attempting reducing level of carbon emissions of transport sector. (Mohamed, 2008) (Farid, 2008).

(**) The GCC countries have joined to the United Nations framework convention on climate change. In 1994-1996; Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. UAE and Bahrain ratified the Kyoto protocol in 2005-2006 respectively. As well as, GCC countries held some bilateral programs with developed countries, where Saudi Arabia is the most experienced in this respect, and one important programme was " Solar energy research American (Danyel 2010).

Figure (4) : Per capita GDP in GCC countries -1998-2008 (US Dollar)



Source: AMF, Arab Monetary Fund, Abu Dhabi, different tables. (www.amf.org.ae)

SESRIC (2007) Statistical year book, statistical, economics and social research and training centre for OIC countries, Turkey- Ankara.

Figure (4) confirms an obvious rising of per capita GDP in Qatar, the UAE, and Kuwait compared with per capita carbon dioxide emissions, where this case is consider a good indicator. Therefore, we can say that these countries have good motivations towards reinforcement the environment because the growth levels are better than it in Saudi Arabia, Oman and Bahrain. In other words, achieving a high level of economic growth rate can lead to initiate many processes to follow a strict environmental regulation towards the local producers, consumers and foreign investors alike, especially in the fields that causes more pollution, namely the extracting and manufacturing industries.

3 COMMODITY IMPORTS AND CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS

The economic literatures refers that liberalization of commodity trade could be led to pollute the environment when the traded goods lead to more pollution, but this issue remains subjects to the role of economic policy towards the environment in an attempt to reduce

pollution that may yielded from these commodity imports. For example, in early eighties the united state of America tried to reduce importing of Japanese cars, as a result of that. However, the demand of American cars has been increased and led for more pollution, because of the American cars have emitted more carbon gas compared to Japanese cars (Thomas, 2004), Hence, we note in this example that the adopted policy in this regard has led for more pollution. In other words, it has preferred growing the local demand with out paying more attention to Air pollution. Therefore, and with out doubt, the economic policy has a significant role in caring of environment and achieve a balance between the economic growth and environmental considerations, especially Air pollution.


By the same way, freedom of trade could be lead to protect the environment through liberalization importing capital goods that have advanced technology and friendly towards the environment. In this case we see the economic policy has contributed in maintaining the environment by encouraging importing capital goods that setting instead of old capital goods which have disadvantage technology, where this policy contributed in bringing new technologies rather than old polluted technologies.

According to the above, we can not say definitely that the foreign trade will lead to environmental pollution, where this issue is linked to the economic policy and its attempts in reducing Air pollution level with maximizing economic growth and per capita GDP as a result of that. In other words, activating the economic sectors and paying fully care about the environment to achieve sustainable economic growth, where in this case emerges role of government to follow suitable economic policy which permit importing advanced capital goods to reduce the pollution that occur by importing (imported pollution). This target could be achieved by providing incentives to the importers for encouraging importing goods that have advanced technology, especially which use in production.

In GCC countries, the commodity imports like machinery and transportation equipments have had big relative importance in the total commodity imports over the period 1998-2008, where these imports represent about 34.8% on average of total commodity imports of GCC countries, while the manufactured goods fall in the second level, which constitute 21.6% of the total commodity imports. These percentages are not modest in

comparison with importing of food and beverage at the same period, where it amounted by 16.1% of the total commodity imports. The following figure shows the main commodity imports in GCC countries over the period 1998-2008.

Figure (5): The main commodity imports to GCC countries- Average 1998-2008 (percentages)



Source: Arab Monetary Fund (AMF), Kuwait, different tables. (www.amf.org.ae).

The figure above explains that Saudi Arabia represents the main ratio which dominate on 49% of the total commodity imports in this country during the study period 1998-2008. Oman and Kuwait fall in the second and third level (41%), (40%) respectively, while Bahrain and the UAE represent low relative contribution (28%) and (23%) respectively.

By the figure (5) also, we see the manufactured goods come in the second rank in terms of its relative importance, where the UAE dominate on the main share which amounted to be 31% on average of the total commodity imports, followed by Qatar and Oman 24% for both of them. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait show ratios 20%, 15%, and 13% respectively.

The effect of commodity imports towards the environment is depend on the size and type of these imports with out doubt, as well as, the environmental consideration that taken by the governments of these countries. In this respect and according to figure (5) we sees that the polluted commodity imports have significant relative importance, where it dominate on the major contribution of total commodity imports, and this issue is so clear when we compare it

with food and beverage of imports over the same period. Therefore, the commodity imports could be contributed increasingly to pollute the environment. Moreover, and in this context, one study indicates that the transportation sector in Bahrain consider as a main reason for increasing air pollution (Sami, 2006), where this study has conducted in 5 cities in Bahrain, and it found that there is a high increased level of Air pollution which yielded from raising numbers of personal cars during the period 1994-2005. In addition, another study (Farid B. Op cit) reports that the Air pollution in Saudi Arabia is attributed mainly to a high reliance on extractive sector, and other sectors that used crude oil as a raw material such as petrochemical industries, as well as other activities that emitted high quantity of carbon dioxide.

Through the above, we can report that the increasing of import of machinery and transportation equipments refer in another way to rising of energy consumption that consumed by these machineries which lead ultimately to increasing of carbon dioxide emissions as a main source of Air pollution in GCC countries, especially in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait, where these countries have high energy consumption level (Mohammed, 2009).

4. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS IN GCC COUNTRIES

The FDI is consider one of the most important way for enhancing economic reformation, where many developing countries try to attract foreign companies and attempt to increasing their production level. As well as achieving economic growth. In contrast, these foreign investments could be led for increasing environmental pollution, where the size and type of FDI will determine whether it has negative or positive impact on the environment in the host economies. Moreover, the economic policy towards the environment is a key factor to regulate type of investment.

Accordingly, the role of FDI and its impact on growth and then on environment will be related to the adopted policy of the host country and the sectors that invested by foreign companies. However, we can also add that the relation between foreign direct investment and

environment is linked with the situation of environmental legislations in the GCC countries, where the strict environmental legislations could be effect negatively in attracting the foreign investors (Sonia, 2010) and according of this opinion, GCC countries would be adversely affected in case of applying strict environmental legislations towards the foreign companies. In other words, the negative impact of foreign direct investment on the environment in GCC countries will mean that foreign companies have exploited the feature of lax environmental laws as a great incentive that driver to invest in sectors that have comparative advantage such as oil and gas sectors.

In addition, GCC countries have become more attractive to international industries that distinguished in intensive using of energy because of the low prices of these resources, as well as availability of cheap foreign labour, which encourage many foreign companies to invest in industries that lead for more environmental pollution such as petrochemical, aluminium and steel, where these investments contributed in increasing level of pollution in GCC countries.

Besides, increasing level of consumption of electricity has contributed significantly in rising level of energy consumption in GCC countries which reflects its negative impact on the pollution, where the rate of electricity consumption in GCC countries amount by 10% while the global rate is about 3%, which confirms that the high consumption of energy is a key factor that contribute to increase level of Air pollution in GCC countries over the period 1998-2008.

Furthermore, the most of foreign direct investments inflows in GCC countries have concentrated in oil and gas sectors except UAE and Bahrain, where in UAE the major share of FDI was in construction and financial intermediation which their contribution reached 34.3% and 35.4% of total FDI inflows to the UAE in 2006 (DSC,2007).

In Bahrain, banking sector was the most attractive to the foreign investor, where its contribution amounted about 69.6% of the total foreign investment of Bahrain in 2002, as well as the real state sector represents a second relative importance in Bahrain (15.9%), followed by manufactured sector (9.1%) of the total FDI inflows at the same year (ESCWA, 2007).


In Saudi Arabia, FDI's have concentrated in manufacturing industries and dominate on a

significant ratio (64.33%) of the total FDI inflows in 2005, while the FDI inflows to Oman have directed to oil and gas sectors and manufacturing industries which amounted about 47.64%, 32.2%, respectively, as ratio of total FDI in 2002, and relative contribution of industrial sector in Qatar and Kuwait amounted about 72.2%, and 78.5% respectively (Ibid).

Accordingly, we note that the availability of energy resources and low prices in the GCC countries have contributed significantly in attracting foreign companies towards oil and other related sectors which consider a direct reason of increased emissions of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Therefore we can conclude that the GCC countries have adopted lax environmental policy towards the foreign investors, where these countries have achieved high levels of economic growth with continued increased carbon dioxide emissions despite of initiate several environmental legislations, where that were not enough for reducing Air pollution in GCC countries over the period 1998-2008.

The FDI's inflows to GCC countries have been continuously, where Saudi Arabia and the UAE are the main recipient of these investment which their average amounted about USD (8571.54) million, and USD 6101.51 million, respectively, as shown in the following figure:

Figure (6): Average of FDI inflows to GCC countries 1998-2008 (Million USD)



Source: UNCTAD, data base of FDI.

AIECGC (2010), statistic of Arab Investment and Export Credit Guarantee Corporation.

SESRIC, data base of statistical economics and social research and training, Turkey- Ankara.

Figure (6) clearly shows that Kuwait has a low level of FDI inflows compared with the rest of GCC countries over the period 1998-2008. The important issue in this regard is that the impact of FDI on pollution may not be limited in size of foreign investments inflows, but also in the sectors that invest in it, and according of that we can say that the FDI inflows to oil sector have more negative impact on environment in comparison with the foreign investment in construction sector. As well as, we see that the level of environmental regulation and the type of these investments are more important factors that determine the level of carbon dioxide emissions. In the UAE, we previously discussed that its foreign investments have concentrated in the construction sector, where this type of investment does not significantly affect the environment compared to the impact of FDI inflows in oil sectors, as we noted in Qatar, Kuwait and Oman which their investment have focused in polluting sectors. However, the impact of FDI inflows towards the environment also will be linked to the level of environmental regulations in GCC countries, where the effect of FDI on environment is a specific case to the country.

5. FINDINGS

We have reached to the following findings:

- a.** There is a positive relation between the growth of per capita GDP and per capita carbon dioxide emissions in GCC countries over the period 1998-2008, particularly in Bahrain and Oman which confirm that have not strict environment policy in these countries.
- b.** The increased emissions of carbon dioxide emphasize that there is no efficient strategy towards using renewable energy, as well as it confirms the continued reliance on extractive sectors.
- c.** There is a clear positive relation between the size of GDP in GCC countries and the level of carbon dioxide emissions which reflect situation of unsustainable growth that yielded from a high reliance on oil and gas sectors.
- d.** There is a slight decrease in per capita carbon dioxide emissions with significant increase in per capita GDP in both Qatar and UAE over the last two years of study, 2007-2008.
- e.** Machinery and transportation equipments are one of pollution reason because of their high relative importance in total commodity imports over the period 1998-2008 especially in Saudi Arabia, Oman and Kuwait.
- f.** The availability of energy resources and cheap foreign labour have contributed in attracting the FDI to extractive sectors in all of GCC countries except Bahrain and UAE which their foreign investment concentrated in Banking and construction sectors respectively.

REFERENCES

- Abdulai, A., and Ramcke, L., 2009. *The impact of trade and economic growth on the environment: revisiting the cross-country evidence*. Working paper, No. 1491, Kiel institute for the world economy, Germany.
- AIECGC, 2010. Statistic of Arab Investment and Export Credit Guarantee Corporation.
- Arab Monetary Fund (AMF), Kuwait, different tables. [online] Available at: <www.amf.org.ae>.
- Chaaban, F.B., 2008. *Report of Arab forum for environment and development*. Dubai. p47.
- Chen, W., 2007. *Economic growth and the environment in China: an empirical test of the environmental Kuznets curve using provincial panel data*. Annual conference on developing and change in Capi town.
- De Bruyn, S.M., Van den Bergh, J.C. and Opschoor, J.B., 1998. Economic Growth and Emissions: reconsidering the empirical bases of Environmental Kuznets Curves. *Ecological Economics*, 25(2), p.161-175.
- Dinda, S., 2005. Does environment link to economic growth?. S.R. An International Workshop, Oslo, 21–23 June 2005.
- Dubai statistics centre (DSC), 2007. *Foreign direct investment in UAE*. Dubai: FDI bulletin, p.3.
- Ekins, P., 1999. *Economic Growth and environmental sustainability- The Prospects for Green Growth*. London.
- ESCWA, 2007. *The environment in the transboundary context in the ESCWA region: situation and recommendation*. United Nations economics and social commission for western Asia.
- Frankel, J.A. and Rose, A.K., 2002. Is trade good or bad for the environment? Sorting out the causality. [online] Available at: <http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/fs/jfrankel>.
- He, J., 2005. *Pollution haven hypothesis and environmental impact of foreign direct investment; The case of industrial emissions of Sulfur dioxide (SO₂) in Chinese provinces*. CERDI, University of Auvergne.

- Kathleen, M. and Quentin, R., 2002. Growth and the environmental impact in Canada: An Empirical Analysis. University of Ottawa.
- Kheder, S.B., 2010. *French FDI and pollution emissions: an empirical investigation*. University of Paris.
- Lee, H.-H., Chang, R.K. and Koo, C.M., 2005. *On the relationship between economic growth and environmental sustainability*. 5th Ministerial conference on environment and development in Asia and Pacific, 26, March, Seoul, Korea.
- Nickerson, B.A., 2004. *Modeling carbon dioxide emissions: Applying empirical and economic analysis to a global environmental issue*. Ohio state university
- Pugel, T.A., 2004. *International Economics*, 12th ed. New York: Mc Graw Hill.
- Qader, M.R., 2009. Electricity Consumption and GHG Emissions in GCC Countries. *Energies*, 2, pp.1201-1213.
- Raouf, M.A., 2008. Climate change threats: opportunities, and the GCC countries, the Middle East institute. *Policy Brief*, 12, p.14.
- Reiche, D., 2010. Energy policies of gulf cooperation council (GCC) countries- possibilities and limitations of ecological modernization in rentier states. *Energy Policy*, 38(5), pp.2395-2403.
- Saif, I., 2009. *The oil boom in GCC countries, 2002-2008*. CARNEGIE papers. P.13
- Sami, S. and Khorji, T., 2006. *Traffic blamed for Air pollution in Bahrain*. [online] Available at: <<http://www.arabenvironment.net/archive/2006/10/106334.html>>.
- SESRIC, data base of statistical economics and social research and training, Turkey- Ankara.
- SESRIC, 2007. *Statistical year book, statistical, economics and social research and training centre for OIC countries, Turkey- Ankara*.
- Stern, D.I., Michael, S. and Barbier, E.B., 1996. Economic Growth and environmental degradation: the Environmental Kuznets Curve and Sustainable Development. *World Development*, 24(7), pp.1151-1160.
- Taylor, M.S. and Copeland, B.R., 2003. Trade, Growth and the environment. NBER Working Paper, 9823, p.4.
- UNCTAD, of data base FDI.

Follow the Money: Agricultural Productivity and the Commodity Chain of Smallholding Coffee Production on the Bolaven Plateau, Lao PDR

Claudio O. Delang¹
Hong Kong Baptist University
E-mail: cdelang@hkbu.edu.hk

INTRODUCTION

There is a consensus among economists and agronomists that the agricultural sector in developing countries functions at a relatively low level of productivity. In many areas, this low level of productivity is due to traditional methods of cultivation, inadequate infrastructure, and poor irrigation, among others. In order to improve productivity, developing countries must increase the use of such inputs as new seed varieties, irrigation facilities, machinery, and chemical fertilisers. The introduction of these new inputs necessitates cash investments, which is often insufficient. Credit is an important component of small-scale agricultural production, and inadequate access to credit by farmers can become a major bottleneck to development. The importance of credit stems from three characteristics of the agricultural sector.

First, smallholders rarely generate incomes in excess to their consumption requirements, which severely constraints their ability to invest in improving the productivity of their smallholdings. This traps them in a vicious cycle of poverty. Credit alleviates capital constraints, and “significantly improve the ability of households to procure needed agricultural inputs, [reducing] the opportunity costs of capital-intensive assets, encouraging labour-intensive technology and raising labour productivity” (Barslund and Tarp, 2008: 485).

Second, the access to credit increases the willingness of farmers to take risks, altering

¹ The work described in this paper was fully supported by a grant from the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (Project No. CUHK442707). I would like to thank all those who kindly and patiently answered our questions, specially the smallholding peasants whose future is so uncertain. The fieldwork for this paper was carried out by Soukdavanh Bouadaphom and Matthew Toro.

their risk-coping strategies. Households able to access credit outlets may be more willing to pursue more rewarding but risky schemes and technologies, and avoid risk-reducing but little rewarding livelihood strategies (Barslund and Tarp, 2008).

Third, there is an important lag between the time investments are made (for the purchase of seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and labour) and the time the crop can be harvested and sold. During these months, no other economic activity can be carried out, because the farmers are busy on their fields, while daily expenses continue. For marginal farmers these months – specially the period closer to the harvest – are often critical in terms of cash needs. Thus credit markets are necessary to support the farmers during cash-strapped periods before the harvest (Cho and Zoebisch, 2003).

In the absence of government-operated or government-sponsored financial institutions, farmers in developing countries rely on moneylenders. Moneylenders have been present in rural areas of developing countries for a long time. Their advantage lies in their flexibility, as British colonial officer Sir Malcom Darling (1925) already points out in the early 20th century:

“He is always accessible, even at night; dispenses with troublesome formalities, asks no inconvenient questions, advances promptly, and if interest is paid, does not press for repayment of principal. He keeps in close personal touch with his clients, and in many villages shares their occasions of weal or woe. With his intimate knowledge of those around him he is able, without serious risk, to finance those who would otherwise get no loan at all.”

However, moneylenders ask for interest rates that are too high for long-term investments to improve the productivity of the farms (Basu, 1984), and can only be used to address problems generated by the third of the three characteristics of the agricultural sector mentioned above.

To avoid credit shortages, and facilitate the development of the agricultural sector, many developing countries have established government-operated or government-sponsored financial institutions, which supply credit at concessional rates. Examples include the Zarai

Taraqati Bank Limited (ZTBL) in Pakistan in 1957, the Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) in Thailand in 1966, the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) in India in 1982, and the Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (VBA) in 1988, and the Agricultural Promotion Bank (APB) in Laos in 1993. The rationale for using concession rates is that these would provide farmers relatively easy access to agricultural inputs, and therefore help them increase productivity.

Government-supported banks are supposed to replace moneylenders, but there is little evidence that this has worked in practice. Often, bureaucratic hurdles, inefficiencies and lack of funds have prevented government-sponsored financial institutions from fulfilling their full potential (Meyer and Nagarajan, 1999). The result is that in most rural areas in developing countries, formal and informal credit markets coexist side-by-side. As noted in Hoff and Stiglitz (1993: 33):

There is typically a dual rural credit market in developing countries. In the formal credit market, institutions provide intermediation between depositors (or the government) and lenders and charge relatively low rates of interest that usually are government subsidised. In informal credit markets, money is lent by private individuals-professional moneylenders, traders, commission agents, landlords, friends, and relatives-generally out of their own equity.'

The aim of this paper is to assess the role that banks and moneylenders have been playing in improving the quality of the agricultural produce and the productivity of the farms – the first two of the three reasons for credit to be important in the agricultural sector – among coffee farmers in the Bolaven Plateau in Southern Lao PDR (hereafter Laos). As will be discussed, these two sources of credit have largely failed in improving quality and productivity: Lao coffee commands a 10% lower price than the world price of coffee, because of its perceived low quality, and Lao coffee is one of the least productive in the world, in terms of output for hectare. The paper will argue that the APB has failed to improve the quality and output of the smallholding Lao coffee producers because when it started extending

loans the world prices of coffee started dropping, which led to high rates of non-performance, while moneylenders gain from the low productivity of the coffee farms, so do not attempt to improve it.

Fieldwork for this paper was carried out in fifteen coffee-growing communities in the Bolaven Plateau in Southern Laos, the main coffee production area of Laos, from February to April 2009. During this period, quantitative information of all the loans made by the members of the communities were collected, together with information on the reasons for soliciting loans from different sources, and the process of obtaining these loans, through open-ended interviews. The end result was a dataset of 514 loans made by 193 smallholding families, from 1995 to 2008. This dataset – supplemented by the qualitative information obtained during interviews – will be used in the following pages.

The article is structured as follows. First, I introduce the Bolaven Plateau as a coffee-producing area. Second, I look at the establishment of the APB, and the goals of the APB loans to the Bolaven coffee farmers. Third, I discuss at the attitudes of the coffee farmers towards the APB, and the reason why moneylenders have become more popular than the APB. Fourth, I discuss the symbiotic relationship between moneylenders and the members of the Lao Coffee Exporting Association (LCEA). Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the constraints that prevent the coffee industry to become more productive and the smallholding coffee farmers to improve their standard of living.

LAO PDR AND THE BOLAVEN PLATEAU

Laos is a small, landlocked country in Southeast Asia, bordering Vietnam, China, Burma, Thailand and Cambodia (Figure 1). It is one of the poorest countries in the world. With a population of 6.2 million people, in 2008 it had a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of only US\$5.43 billion, or US\$876 per capita (World Bank, 2009). The Bolaven Plateau is a highland region in southern Laos, located between the Annamite Mountain Range to the east and the Mekong River to the west. The areal extent of the plateau is approximately 3,750 sq km, and the average elevation ranges approximately from 1,000 to 1,350 metres ASL. Annual

temperatures average about 19°C, and average annual rainfall is about 1,800 mm. As early as 10,000 years ago, a system of volcanoes dominated the area and deposited rich basaltic soils that now make the region exceptionally fertile. According to *A Romance with Cafe Lao* (2004) the combination of climatic (temperature, solar radiation, humidity) and geomorphic (elevation, soil quality, land cover) variables, combined with the historical trajectory of land use in the area, makes the Bolaven Plateau the most ideal place for growing coffee in all of peninsular Southeast Asia.

Figure 1: Laos and the Bolaven Plateau



Laos was incorporated into French Indochina in 1893. The French started growing coffee in the Bolaven Plateau in the early 1900s, and during the first half of the 20th century coffee production expanded. However, World War II severely disrupted its production and trade, and around 1955, production had dropped to about 1,500 metric tons (MT) (Duris, Bonnal, and Pilecki, 2002).

Lao PDR gained full independence from France in 1954, but it soon became engulfed in the regional instability and the war in neighboring Vietnam. In 1975, shortly after the end of the US-Vietnam war, the nationalist Pathet Lao movement swept to power. During the second half of the 1970s, the Lao government put in place a centralized and isolationist economic system: factories were nationalized, private trade was outlawed, and much of agriculture was collectivized. From the mid-1970s to 1986 Laos trading partners were mainly COMECON countries, to whom it also exported most of its coffee. However, coffee was characterised by two important features: its low quality and its low productivity.

1. Low quality of the coffee. The export price to COMECON countries was negotiated rather than resulting from supply and demand. For this reason, Laos attempted to increase total output rather than quality.

2. Low productivity. Laos attempted to increase total output by encouraging lowland farmers to migrate up the Bolaven plateau to clear forestland and plant coffee (Andersson, 2007).² Thus, the total amount of land under cultivation increased steadily. However, insufficient investment was made to increase the productivity (i.e. the output per hectare) resulting in one of the lowest productivities in the world (see below).

In November 1986, Laos adopted the New Economic Mechanism (NEM), and engaged in widespread economic reforms, taking major steps to transform the centrally planned economy into a market economy. With the NEM, the Lao government encouraged the development of a private sector, gradually deregulating controls over price and production, granting managerial and financial autonomy to state-owned enterprises, and opening its

² To facilitate the production and trade of coffee, the government set up agricultural cooperatives (*Sahakone Kaset*, see Bourdet, 1993; Khouangvichit, 2010). However, production was still done by independent households, and these cooperatives acted more as collectors of coffee rather than as grower's cooperatives. Many *Sahakone Kaset* did not actually last more than three years.

national border to foreign capital and trade (World Bank, 2006). It also started shifting its emphasis from trading with the COMECON countries, to trading with the world market. The Lao coffee sector was one of Laos' most valuable agricultural exports, and much effort was expended to improve the quality of coffee, through grants from the Agricultural Promotion Bank (APB).


Lao coffee is produced by what resembles an upside down pyramid with more than 20,000 smallholder farmers growing 1 to 3 ha of coffee, a much smaller number of farmers growing between 4 and 10 ha, and the emergence of a very small number of large domestic and foreign owned plantations cultivating 100-plus ha (Southichack, 2009). The APB loans went to these small farmers, as well as farmers who rely mainly on other crops, but grow coffee to supplement their incomes. Coffee is also important for thousands of hired farm workers, for whom seasonal work on coffee plantations secures the cash needed to supplement the meagre incomes earned – and insufficient rice produced – on their own fields. Finally, coffee production provides jobs to thousands of people working in commerce, finance, transportation, and other services throughout the supply chain. Altogether, according to government sources, the coffee sector generates about 210,000 jobs (GDS, 2005: 37). The Bolaven Plateau (and its coffee) is thus very important for the national economy of Laos.

THE AGRICULTURAL PROMOTION BANK

In the early 1990s, the World Bank, in collaboration with the Asian Development Bank (ADB), issued a large loan to the Government of Laos (GoL) for the purpose of investing in agricultural intensification schemes, so as to modernize, and increase the productivity of, the agricultural sector. The Central Bank of Laos was responsible for channelling that money to the government-operated APB, which issued loans to farmers. The APB was established in 1993 as a state-owned policy bank, and various APB branches were opened throughout the provinces. The coffee farmers of the Bolaven Plateau were served by the APB's Pakxong district branch (Champasack Province), which was established in 1995. According to Thawaensimphet et al. (2003) the APB of Pakxong District Branch lent 11 billion kip between 1998 and 1999 (though the loans were in the form of rice, money, fertilizers, and equipment)

equivalent to approximately US\$2,115,000. The loans that the APB gave to the farmers were the initial impetus behind the modernization of the coffee industry after the introduction of the NEM, and the farmers took up the loans rather enthusiastically. Figure 2 shows that the APB was the most common source of loans from 1995 to 2001.

Figure 2: Number of loans by source (1987-2008)



Source: Fieldwork


Through this scheme, low-income farmers could loan bags of rice at discounted prices, or obtain money, fertilizer, and basic farming equipment like barb wire for building fences. During this period, rice was the primary currency of the loans, followed by money, fertilizers, and equipment. No collateral was necessary to take the loans (also because people did not have the legal rights to their land). Instead, contracts were signed between the head of the village where the borrowers lived, and the bank. The village head would serve as the representative of a group of borrowers, typically consisting of between 5 and 10 villagers, and would be responsible for ensuring the bank that the people he was representing were trustworthy and able to repay.

The APB loans had four different objectives:

1. Increasing the area under cultivation

The APB loans allowed the farmers to increase the area under cultivation quite considerably (Figure 3). While the area under cultivation had remained stable from 1964 to 1982, from 1983 to 2009 (from the mid 1990s with the financial support of the APB), the area under cultivation with coffee increased at a rate of over 7% a year.

Figure 3: Area cultivated and production, 1961-2009



Source: FAOSTAT, FAO


2. Increasing the output

Similarly to the area under cultivation, the output remained stable from 1963 to 1978. From 1978 to 1994 output increased by 7.18% a year, and from 1995 to 2001 (when the APB was distributing loans) output increased by 20.15% a year (Figure 3). In 2002, as the price of the coffee was very low (discussed below), total output started to decrease, to recover only from 2006.

3. Increasing yield per hectare

The success of the APB in increasing the productivity (i.e. the output per area) of the coffee farms is more questionable. The yield per hectare (Figure 4) increased considerably from 1990 to 2002, tripling in 12 years, when it was presumably grown on increasingly marginal land. However, in 2002 this was still comparable to the productivity in 1976, and well below the world average. When the price of coffee dropped, people took less care of the coffee plants, and after 2002 the productivity of Lao farms dropped again, to recover only when the price of the coffee raised again. Only in 2009 the yield returned to the level of 2002.

Figure 4: coffee yield per hectare, 1961-2009



Source: IMF (2010)

Table 1 compares the productivity of the Lao coffee farms to that of the neighbouring countries. In Laos, the yield is approximately half of that in Thailand and Vietnam (though larger than that of Burma). In Laos, yield rates per tree average between 1.4 and 1.6 Kgs, while in places like Kenya prime Arabica yields between 6 and 9 Kgs per tree (World Bank, 2005). The low productivity in Laos can partly be explained by the very high tree density and the relatively poor plant maintenance skills, including the lack of pruning.

Table 1. Greater Mekong coffee comparison (compiled in 2005 with latest data available)

	Laos	Thailand	Vietnam	Burma
Production area (ha)	37,576	66,400	500,000	5,000
Yield (kg/ha)*	612	1,301	1,400	366
Production volume (tons)	23,000	86,400	700,000	1,830

Source: World Bank (2005)

* Calculated by the author

4. Increasing the quality of the coffee

Together with the low productivity of the Lao coffee plants, there is also the problem of the low quality of the coffee. Lao coffee is said to be of lower quality, and commands a price discount of 10% over the world price of coffee. This further reduces the income to the farmers, and their ability to improve in the productivity of their farm. The low quality of the coffee seems to be an endemic problem of the Lao coffee industry, which was not successfully addressed by the APB's loans.

In the next section, I discuss the reason for the Lao coffee to remain of low quality, and I will argue that it is partly due to the disappointment of people with the APB, and partly to the very structure of the Lao coffee industry, in particular the role of the moneylenders.


THE FALL OF THE PRICE OF COFFEE AND THE DISILLUSIONMENT WITH THE APB

It can be said that the APB did manage to increase the total output produced by the smallholder coffee farmers on the Bolaven Plateau. With these loans farmers were able to considerably increase the area under cultivation (Figure 2), thus their incomes. However, by focusing insufficiently on productivity and quality, the limitations of the approach pursued became evident as the price of the coffee dropped.

In spite of the initial success of the APB, the long-term consequences of the APB loans has been less fortunate. The promotion of credit among coffee farmers took place at the

beginning of a four-year long decline in coffee prices, an unfortunate timing (Figure 5). In the Bolaven Plateau, over 80% of the coffee grown is Robusta, which commands a lower price than Arabica (only 12% of the coffee grown is Arabica), and whose price started to fall earlier. In September 1994, shortly after the APB had been established, Robusta was at its highest price, at US\$0.83/kg. It then fell, almost uninterruptedly, to reach less than US\$0.1 in October 2001, a drop of more than 80% over a six-year period.

Figure 5: Monthly rice of Arabica and Robusta coffee (US\$ per Kg), Jan. 1980 to Oct. 2010



Source: IMF (2010)

Encouraged by the APB, the farmers were still borrowing as the prices were falling, expanding their fields and increasing the productivity of their land (Figures 3, 4). However, eventually the price was too low and the farmers stopped borrowing and taking care of the coffee plants. Some people outrooted the plant to farm other crops, while other people simply stopped harvesting, which means that the productivity dropped sharply.

The fall in the world price of coffee had very detrimental effect on the livelihood of the coffee farmers. The price crash resulted in significant falls in the revenue per hectare, making it impossible for the farmers to repay their debts. On average, when the price of coffee was

high, the 600 kgs of coffee produced on one hectare could be exchanged for 2,400 to 3,000 kgs of rice, more than sufficient for a family of six. When the price of coffee plunged, the same amount of coffee could only be traded for 600 to 800 kgs of rice, which could barely cover five to six months. Seasonal, part-time labour for the coffee plantations was affected as well.

The APB ended up with more than 90% of non-performance for the loans it had issued to coffee farmers (Southichack, 2009). Many farmers blame the APB for their debts. For instance, one farmer interviewed complained that he had been cajoled by an APB official to take a loan with the bank. He claimed that, while he did need the money, he was initially very reluctant to borrow because he feared he would be unable to pay the interests. However, upon listening to the exhortations of a bank official, who insisted that the price of coffee – which at the time was relatively high – would either remain at the same level or increase, he felt more comfortable to borrow from the bank. He explains:


The way the bank works is not fair. When I took out the loan, the price of coffee was much higher, but now the price of coffee has dropped and it is more difficult to repay the loan. I thought they [the APB officials] knew more than me; I trusted them.

During this period the APB seems to have been lax in requesting farmers to return their debts. Because the vast majority, if not all, of these early loans were made without any agreement of collateral, the bank had no real enforcement mechanism or bargaining power to ensure that people repaid their loans. The APB claims that as a consequence it sustained serious financial losses as people failed to repay and the number of defaulted loans began to grow. According to the manager of the APB in Pakxong, the APB has recently modified its collection policy in compliance with mandates from the Central Bank of Laos. The Central Bank of Laos instructed the governors of Champasak province and Pakxong district to convene a meeting with the APB officials to retrospectively collect the defaulted loans issued several years ago. Hence, beginning around 2007 and 2008, in accordance with the instruction of the Central Bank and the provincial and district governors, the Pakxong branch of the APB began to recoup its losses by threatening the farmers to confiscate the title of their properties (most households have now obtained titles to their land) if they failed to repay their debts. The

strategy has been relatively successful. The Pakxong branch of the APB claims that the shift toward a more assertive collection policy has motivated the borrowers of defaulted loans to finally begin to pay, or finish paying off, their debts. The manager of the Pakxong branch APB affirmed that “About 70 percent of the old [defaulted] loans have now been collected because of the new policy”. This claim seems to be supported by those on the other end of the new collection policy, but not in the same positive way.

The new collection policies of the APB have contributed to make it the least favoured source of loans, in spite of the low interest rates it charges (Figure 6). In fact, since 2002, moneylenders have replaced the APB as the favourite source of credit (Figure 2). Moneylenders are popular in many rural areas in developing countries. However, it may be somehow surprising that in 2009 people borrow eight times more from moneylenders than from banks (Figure 2), even though moneylenders charge three to four times higher interest rates (Figure 6). The reason why moneylenders are so popular can be summarised in four points. After discussing them, I will consider how the dependency upon moneylenders prevents the quality of the coffee from improving.

Figure 6: monthly interest rates by source



Source: fieldwork

First, the ease with which people can borrow money from moneylenders. Moneylenders are usually located in the village where the farmers live, instead of a distant district capital. This avoids expensive, time consuming trips, which reduces transaction costs and make it possible to access the money very rapidly (Burgess and Pande, 2005). According to the manager of APB Pakxong district, the entire process is rather fast and straightforward, with farmers getting approved for their loans within two weeks. However, the process of application for loans involves meetings and waiting time (which may conclude with an embarrassing refusal) that makes it less appealing than borrowing from a trader, who typically lives within the village and who can provide the desired loan almost instantly. Most farmers, even those less critical of the APB as a public institution, complain that the process of applying, being reviewed for, and finally receiving a loan from the APB is far too convoluted and time-consuming. One farmer voiced this commonly-held sentiment by declaring: “In the past, they [the APB and its officials] wanted to help the people; but now they make it difficult to get loans.” When another farmer who had borrowed from the APB on two separate occasions in the past (in 1995 and 1998) was asked if he would like to borrow from the APB again, he quickly responded: “No. Of course I don’t want a new loan [with the APB]. It used to be very easy to get a loan; now it is too complicated”.

Second, moneylenders usually do not expect to have the principal reimbursed (this is a common characteristic of moneylenders, see for example Braveman and Guasch, 1986), while the APB is now pushing for reimbursements. One farmer who borrowed from the APB in 1995, failed to repay, and was consequently subject to the new, more stringent collection policies grumbles:

When I first borrowed [from the APB], it was easy; they made it easy. But now they’ve made it so difficult because they come and put pressure on us by taking land titles. Now, in 2009, they take land titles for loans from 1995! . . . If they [the APB and its officials] really want to help people, they should not take such high collateral from us.

Third, banks do not usually give money for short-term loans, necessary to subsist until the next harvest, and unrelated to increasing the productivity of the farmland (Riedinger, 1994). This is also the case of the APB.

Fourth, and perhaps more importantly in the case of the coffee growers of the Bolaven Plateau, coffee farmers are disillusioned by the APB, and feel betrayed. They accuse the bank officers of encouraging the people to borrow more money than they initially intended to, in the second half of the 1990s. Also, a few of the villagers interviewed claim that some APB officials deliberately failed to deduct payments from their total outstanding balances. One farmer, for instance, declared:

I don't want to borrow from the APB because it's so difficult to repay. Maybe sometimes we [the villagers] give money to them [the collection officers] but when they come around the next time, they still have not applied our payment. Or maybe sometimes they change the staff and new collectors come around – they don't know that I already paid but they still come to take from me!

Another woman took out a Kip 1,600,000 rice loan from the APB at an interest rate of 22 percent per year, a far better rate than what is offered by moneylenders. However, she claimed that when she would make her monthly payments to gradually pay down her debt, the bank officer would keep the money for himself and deliberately fail to deduct the payment from her total balance. "I would always pay the money, but my debt never went down", the woman charged during a February 2009 interview. When asked to elaborate, she explained:

The man from the bank would come to collect money from many people, but when he came to get the money from me, he wouldn't mark the payment on my account or delete the money. He would use the money to have drinks and play and have fun. And the next time the people from the bank came, they said I owed the same amount as last time, and this man had already been fired.

When asked about whether she ever received any receipts for the allegedly stolen payments, she insisted: “The man [who she claims pocketed her payments] never gave me any receipts. . . . And the bank didn’t cut the money that he took from me. It [the loan balance] was still the same because they said I didn’t have a receipt so they would not delete the money I paid from my account, so I lost my money.” At the time of the interview, eight years after initially borrowing from the APB, the woman said she still owed Kip 900,000 (or about 56 percent) of the balance from the original loan with the bank, and the prospect of ever returning to the APB for an additional loan was very remote.

MONEYLENDERS AND THE COFFEE EXPORTERS ASSOCIATION

Since 2002, when the price of coffee was at its lowest, and loans from the APB virtually disappeared (Figure 2) moneylenders have replaced the APB as the most common source of loans. From the coffee farmers’ perspective, the most obvious reason for borrowing from traders is that the traders will eventually buy the harvest. Borrowing from traders reduces one cash transaction. Borrowing from traders also increases the security to the farmers, because they know someone will buy the harvest. Thus, the farmer’s interest in building a strong relationship with moneylenders is also due to the need of having a reliable outlet through which to sell the coffee. However, in the following pages I will argue that the importance of the traders in the commodity chain leads to the little investment expended in increasing the productivity of the Lao coffee farms.

There is no uniform pattern or regularity in the loan schemes offered by moneylenders. Most loans are in the form of cash, but some are in the form of rice (10 percent of the total), or a combination of goods (rice, money, fertilizers, barbed wire, etc.). Most loans are bridge loans to buy rice for three to four months prior to harvest time. Other times it may be larger loans for medical emergency, or for holding important social functions, such as weddings.

Loans from moneylenders usually incur a monthly interest rate of 8 to 12 percent, while APB loans usually come with interest rates of about 2% a month (Figure 6). Often, the poorer or more desperate the farmer, the higher the interest rates. No doubt, it is expensive to be poor, as has also been observed elsewhere (Dasgupta, 1989; Swaminathan, 1991; Gill and Singh,

1997).

Typically no contract is signed and no collateral is given. However, loans from moneylenders are typically the ones that are most consistently paid back on a timely basis. In almost all cases, the moneylender is also the trader who will buy the coffee harvest, and the incentives to build good rapports and establish good informal credit, as well as the high interest rates, help explain this repayment pattern. There are two main types of agreement when repayment is to be made in coffee.

In the first type of agreement, the farmer consents to sell his coffee at the current market price, minus a discount. As the price of coffee is highly volatile, this arrangement could also work to the farmer's advantage. However, an underlying problem that pervades the Lao coffee sector is farmers' lack of adequate market information. Traders are often the only source of market information available to the farmers, who have little understanding of the way international commodity prices affect the domestic price for their coffee, not to mention the technicalities of price penalties (which Lao-origin coffees suffer due to their poor international reputations), or quality issues. Thus, such arrangements are much of a gamble for farmers, a gamble in a game whose rules are not well understood.

In the second type of agreement, the farmer agrees with the trader to repay the loan for a determined amount of coffee. Close to 50 percent of the farmers engage in this agreement, which according to almost all farmers is the least preferred method of repayment. This option almost always works to the farmer's disadvantage, as the actual market value of the coffee repaid is essentially always much greater than the loan. By repaying the loan this way, the farmer's lack of market information and dependence on the trader is deepened.

Moneylenders are in a symbiotic relationship with the coffee exporters, both of whom may eventually benefit from the low productivity of the coffee farms – and resulting poverty of the coffee farmers.

Moneylenders obtain the funds they lend to the farmers from the members of the Lao Coffee Exporters Association (LCEA), to whom in turn they sell most of their coffee. The Lao Trade Ministry established the LCEA to control, regulate and promote the export of Lao coffee. Only members of the LCEA can obtain an export licence, and since 80% to 85% of the

Lao coffee is exported, the ten members of the LCEA have a tight control over the coffee produced in Laos.

Moneylenders work in close collaboration with the members of the LCEA, and there is a very close symbiotic relationship between traders and moneylenders:

On the one hand, coffee exporters need moneylenders to secure coffee. Coffee production is carried out in rather isolated villages in remote areas, where many roads are unpaved and sometimes inaccessible during the rainy season. According to Andersson et al. (2007), the minimum export order is usually of 18 tons (equivalent to 1 TEU, a 20-foot-long container), which involves buying coffee from a large number of farmers. The low standard of the local roads makes the coffee collection a time-consuming task, and exporters would only be able to purchase sufficiently large quantities of coffee at considerable expense. Moneylenders are able to use their detailed knowledge of the areas in which they live to purchase and transport the coffee at lower costs than the exporters would be able to. Also, lending money to the farmers – which is also a way for traders and exporters to reserve the farmers' output – requires a detailed knowledge of the villages and farmers' financial conditions. Exporters, by being located in distant villages or the district capitals, are not able to obtain that knowledge. Ultimately that credit cannot be guaranteed by a court of law, but only by informal pressures exercised in the farmers' community. It is unlikely that a distant exporter would be able to exercise such pressures.

On the other hand, moneylenders need exporters, since they obtain from exporters the funds they lend to the farmers, and with which they tie the farmers to themselves. Of course moneylender also depend on exporters to purchase the coffee they buy from the farmers.

This symbiosis relationship between moneylenders and exporters in turn prevents the productivity of the coffee industry, the quality of the coffee, and the incomes of the farmers, from improving. Whether the coffee farmers pay the moneylender in coffee, or whether they sell the coffee to the moneylender for cash, they are paid for the amount of coffee they sell, rather than the quality of that coffee. As a consequence, the farmers try to produce as much coffee as possible, disregarding the quality of that coffee. This in turns leads to the discount price of 10% to the world market, which contributes to prolonging farmers' poverty. Their

poverty in turn perpetrates their relationship of dependency from moneylenders, and the control that moneylenders have over their agricultural output.

On the other hand, moneylenders have a similar relationship of dependency from the exporters as the farmers have from the moneylenders, although at a higher level in the supply chain, which guarantees their higher profits.

It seems that there is a vicious cycle, which is difficult to break, and which leads to the poverty of the coffee farmers and the low quality of the coffee output. The APB could attempt to break this cycle through the issuance of long-term loans to improve the productivity of the farms – and the quality of the coffee – but the people do not trust the APB. Also, the investments would need to be large: the reduced quality is also blamed on coffee plants being too densely planted. In many areas improving the quality would involve outrooting the densely planted coffee plants, and planting new seedlings more sparsely, though farmers would need to wait for about five years for the first harvest.

Moneylenders and exporters could attempt to break this cycle by paying more for higher quality coffee. However, it is very likely that a sizeable proportion of the profits of the moneylenders (and perhaps also the exporters) make come from the loans they make to impoverished farmers, rather than the trade of coffee. The moneylenders would then be the last people who would want the Lao coffee farmers to improve the productivity of their farms, and go out of debt. Thus, those most able to improve the quality of the coffee and productivity of the farms are also those who are least interested in doing so.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

This paper discussed the dependency of farmers from moneylenders, the role of money lending in the Lao coffee industry, and the relationship between money lending and the low quality of the Lao coffee. The farmers are forced to borrow from moneylenders, because of the low incomes they receive for their coffee. They then have to sell their coffee to the same moneylenders, at prices well below the world market price. Because of the high interest rates charged for these loans, and the low price paid by moneylenders for the coffee, farmers are unable to use these loans to increase the long-term productivity of their farms. This keeps the

farmers dependent on moneylenders, from whom they have to keep borrowing money. At the same time, since moneylenders do not pay more for better quality coffee, farmers try to maximise the quantity, rather than the quality, of their coffee. This in turn keeps the prices low (10% below the world market price), which reduces the incomes of the farmers and forces them to borrow from moneylenders.

Ultimately both exporters and moneylenders may benefit from the low quality of the coffee, because that low quality lowers the prices and forces the farmers to borrow more money, for which they can charge high interest rates. Thus, both exporters and moneylenders seem to have little interest in increasing the productivity of the farms and the quality of the coffee. Since they are the only ones able to do so, it is unlikely that this will happen any time soon. It is difficult to see how the coffee industry will improve, without structural changes.

Ironically, this relationship between farmers, moneylenders, and exporters is at least partly the result of the APB's efforts to improve the productivity and the quality of the coffee in the 1990s. The loans expended by the APB resulted in the high indebtedness of farmers because it coincided with a drop in the world price of coffee. It also let the farmers to dislike the APB, because they felt that the APB had encouraged them to borrow more than they could afford to repay. As a result, the farmers no longer want to borrow from the APB, and prefer to borrow from traders.

While the APB has been rather successful in increasing the amount of land under cultivation, as well (perhaps) as the productivity of the coffee farms, it has not been successful in increasing the quality of the Lao coffee (though it is generally accepted that the quality of the coffee is now better than it was in the 1990s). What are, then, the steps forward towards an improvement of the quality of the coffee? Four scenarios seem possible, and ironically, the role of the APB seems to be peripheral.

The first scenario is an improvement of the Lao coffee within the Fair Trade or Bio Coffee movement. Organic and Fair Trade coffee certification is being backed by the government, the UNDP, and the FAO. Organic certification usually results in lower output per hectare and high unit costs of production relative to the mass-market coffee, though it also commands higher prices (Lewin, Giovannucci and Varangis, 2004). However, it is


questionable what proportion of the roughly 20,000 smallholder producers, and how many of the 210,000 jobs that the coffee sector generates, will eventually be able to benefit from fair trade. Involving a large number of smallholder producers would be a challenge.

The second scenario is that of agricultural extension work and creating quality standards. A plethora of activities by different Government organisations and NGOs exist. Among them is the Lao government-run Application Point in the Bolaven (PAB), which aims at the collective wet-processing of coffee (Tulet, 2009). The programme offers producer groups “to build collective processing centres for coffee and to conduct in these centres all operations up until the drying stage, with no individual ownership of coffee and strict operating rules as well as frequent quality control” (Tulet, 2009: 27). The objective of this new approach is to have farmers do the post-harvest transformation of the coffee, instead of selling the coffee to moneylenders by the cherry. This process would result in better quality coffee, which would command a higher price.

The third scenario is the establishment of quality standards, which is still lacking. Farmers are becoming more aware of the relationship between the quality of the beans and the prices (also because of foreign-invested firms directly involvement in production and processing). However, quality standards and grading systems have not been established, and there is no incentive for the farmers to improve the quality of their coffee. Traders who can spot better quality coffee are able to pay the farmer the same price as lower quality coffee, and then resell it to exporters for a higher price.

The fourth scenario is for the APB to break the power of the moneylenders, through the provision of short-term loans to sustain the household for three to five months before the harvest. However, this is rather unlikely to ever happen: people are disillusioned with the APB, the process of obtaining funds is too convoluted for the farmers to bother approaching the APB for small loans (Figure 7), and the APB, as a bank, pushes for the reimbursement of the principal, which some farmers are unable to do, and many traders do not expect. Also, as a formal, large, institution, it is more expensive for a bank to administer small loans.

Figure 7: Amount borrowed per loan (average of all loans made each year)



Source: fieldwork

If these scenarios fail, and the likelihood that they would reach all the 20,000 smallholders who grow coffee on the Bolaven Plateau is weak, what is likely to happen to the Lao coffee industry? Probably coffee production will be concentrated in the hands of fewer, larger exploitations. A few large domestically and foreign invested plantations, cultivating more than 100 hectares, are already emerging, and they might represent the beginning of a gradual shift in the coffee industry, from a high-output, low-quality one, to one in which the growing, picking, and roasting are internalised, and the coffee marketed as a high-quality one. Incidentally, the low profits that smallholders can make at present benefits the emergence of these large operators, since the lower profits lowers the price of the land, and the operators are able to buy the land cheaply. If the companies that belong to the LCEA move from export to direct production by buying large plantations (some already have), they will have further profited from the situation that they helped creating.

REFERENCES

- A Romance with Cafe Lao, 2004. *Tea & Coffee Asia*. [online] Available at: <<http://www.teacoffeeasia.com/news.asp?id=505>> [Accessed 10 February 2011].
- Andersson, M., Engvall, A. and Kokko, A., 2007. *Regional development in Lao PDR: growth patterns and market integration*. Stockholm School of Economics, Working Paper, 234.
- Barslund, M. and Tarp, F., 2008. Formal and informal rural credit in four provinces of Vietnam. *Journal of Development Studies*, 44(4), pp.485-503.
- Basu, K., 1984. Implicit interest rates, usury and isolation in backward agriculture. *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 8, pp.145-159.
- Bourdet, Y., 1993. *Rural Reforms and Agricultural Growth in Laos*. Lund: University of Lund.
- Braveman, A. and Huasch, J.L., 1986. Rural Credit markets and institutions in developing countries: lessons for policy analysis from practice and modern theory. *World Development*, 14(10/11), pp.1253-1267.
- Burgess, R. and Pande, R., 2005. Do Rural Banks Matter? Evidence from the Indian Social Banking Experiment. *The American Economic Review*, 95(3), pp.780-795.
- Cho, K.M. and Zoebisch, M.A., 2003. Land-use changes in the Upper Lam Phra Phloeng Watershed, northeastern Thailand: Characteristics and driving forces. *Journal of Agriculture and Rural Development in the Tropics and Subtropics*, 104(1), pp.15-29.
- Darling, M.L., 1925. *The Punjab peasant in prosperity and debt*. London: Humphrey Milford Oxford university press.
- Dasgupta, A., 1989. *Reports on informal credit markets in India: summary*. New Delhi: National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.
- Duris, D., Philippe, B. and Pilecki, A., 2002. The coffee commodity chain in Laos, and farmer strategies. In: D. Berry, ed. *Plantations, recherche, développement: Recherche et caféiculture*. Paris: Quae. Ch. 3.
- GDS, 2005. *Integrated Value Chain Analysis of Selected Strategic Sectors in Lao People's Democratic Republic*. Global Development Solutions. Prepared for The World Bank

- Gill, A. and Singh, U.C., 1997. Financial sector reforms, rate of interest and the rural credit markets: the role of information lenders in Punjab. *Indian Journal of Applied Economics*, 6(4), pp.37-65.
- Hoff, K. and Stiglitz, J.E., 1993. Imperfect Information and Rural Credit Markets: Puzzles and Policy Perspectives. In K. Hoff, A. Braverman and J.E. Stiglitz, eds. *The Economics of Rural Organisation: Theory Practice and Policy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.33-52
- IMF, 2010. *IMF Primary Commodity Prices*. [online] Available at: <<http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/index.asp>> [Accessed 10 February 2011].
- Khouangvichit, D., 2010. Socio-Economic Transformation and Gender Relations in Lao PDR. *GERUM – Kulturgeografi*, p.1.
- Lewin, B., Giovannucci, D. and Varangis, P., 2004. *Coffee Markets New Paradigms in Global Supply and Demand*. Agricultural and Rural Development Discussion Paper 3. Washington: World Bank.
- Meyer, R.L. and Nagarajan, G., 1999. Development of rural financial markets in Asia. In *Agricultural credit in Asia and the Pacific*. Report of the APO Symposium on Agricultural Credit held in Tokyo, Japan, 8-14 September 1999. [online] Available at <<http://aede.osu.edu/programs/ruralfinance/PDF%20Docs/Publications%20List/Papers/01P01.pdf>> [Accessed 10 February 2011].
- Riedinger, J.M. 1994. Innovation in rural finance: Indonesia's Badan Kredit Kecamatan Program. *World Development*, 22(3), pp.301-313.
- Southichack, M., 2009. *The Lao Coffee Economy: A New Growth Path on the Horizon?* Vientiane: Intergro Inc.
- Swaminathan, M., 1991. Segmentation, collateral undervaluation, and the rate of interest in Agrarian credit markets: some evidence from two villages in South India. *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 15, pp.161-178.
- Thawaensimphet, I., Vongphasuk, P., Sidavong, S. and Naphaivanh, B.m 2003. *A Study on Local Trading Systems and Their Effects on Coffee Prices in the Bolaven Plateau-Lao People's Democratic Republic*. Vientiane: National Agricultural and Forestry Research

Institute.

Tulet, J.C., 2009. *Development Trends Analysis on the Boloven Plateau*. Vientiane: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Programme of Capitalisation in Support of Rural Development Policy (PCADR), Boloven Application Point (PAB).

World Bank, 2005. *Integrated Value Chain Analysis of Selected Strategic Sectors in Lao People's Democratic Republic*. Washington DC: World Bank, Prepared by Global Development Solutions, LLC.

World Bank, 2006. *Building Export Competitiveness in Laos, Background Report*. Washington: The World Bank. [online] Available at: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/Internal-Training/Laos_Tourism_Cluster_Case_Study.pdf> [Accessed 10 February 2011].

World Bank, 2009. *Development Data & Statistics*. [online] Available at: <<http://www.worldbank.org/>> [Accessed 10 February 2011].

Adjusting the Economic Lens on Sustainable Welfare: The GPI of Hong Kong

Yi Hang Yu
Hong Kong Baptist University
Email: yihangyu@gmail.com

INTRODUCTION

The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has been developed in the 1930s to measure the economic output of a country, but is also wrongly seen as a measurement of its citizen's level of welfare or well-being (e.g. Lawn & Clarke, 2008). As such, politicians and news outlets put much emphasis on country's yearly (or quarterly) changes in the level of GDP (Anielski, 2001; Stiglitz *et al.*, 2009). Specific problems of the GDP include:

1. It accounts for all forms of goods and services produced domestically as positive consumption. If it measured welfare, then only economic activities which increase people's welfare would be included. Unfortunately, since it simply measures economic output, activities such as accidents and pollution, which result in people's losses to welfare, add to the GDP (Costanza, 1997; Lawn, 2004; Lawn & Clarke, 2010).
2. GDP does not account for the depreciation of durable goods and infrastructures that wear over time (some studies indicate that the stock would endure for 10 year period; for example, Lawn (2008)); as well as for the value these durable goods produce, which are yielded over a long period of time.
3. A portion of GDP must also be directed to defensive or rehabilitative purposes to maintain the productivity of human beings; for example, on health care services and insurance policies
4. Free services, such as volunteerism and household labour, are not accounted for in GDP because these services are not traded in markets. However, since they have a critical role in improving the welfare of a nation and its citizens they should be included also (even) in

indices of economic well-being (Lawn & Clarke, 2008b).

5. The loss of goods and services provided by natural capital in a country are usually ignored.

For example, the depletion of forestland beyond its regeneration rate is not reflected in GDP as a cost but instead as positive consumption.

Since the 1980s, there has been an increasing interest in the lack of relationship between economic growth and people's welfare. It was observed that while GDP steadily increased, some social, environmental, and economic characteristics were worsening. It is clear that the GDP not only provides an incomplete picture of the overall economic health of a country, but is also unable to reflect the level of well-being of a country's population, because it ignores certain benefits and costs. Among the social traits that in many countries have worsened over the last decades are suicides, divorces, and crime, among the environmental features are increasing deforestation, and air, water, and soil pollution, and among the economic traits are increasing inequality and the increasing impoverishment of a sizeable proportion of the population.

It was felt that new indicators, which include not only economic, but also social and environmental variables, should be created. The Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) was born out of a desire precisely to account for the different elements that affect human welfare, not only the economic, as is the case for the GDP, but also the social and the environmental (some studies also add political and spiritual dimensions, see Clarke & Shaw, 2008). Hence, the GPI includes a large number of variables. Table 1 is a list of the items typically found in the calculation of the GPI (different scholars may add additional items to the calculation: the GPI, unlike the GDP, is not yet a standardized measure). The sign after the variables in Table 1 indicate whether this item will be added or subtracted to the GPI value. For example, the cost of crime is subtracted (the larger the cost of crime, the lower the GPI value), unlike for the GDP where high costs of crime add to the GDP.

Table 1: Items typically found in the calculation of GPI
(including in brackets whether it adds or reduces welfare)

Economic	Social	Environment
Personal consumption expenditure (+/-)	Value of non-paid household labour (+)	Cost of non-renewable resource depletion (-)
Defensive expenditures (-)	Value of volunteer labour (+)	Cost of lost farmland (-)
Expenditure on consumer durables (-)	Cost of crime (-)	Cost of ozone depletion (-)
Services from consumer durables (+)	Cost of unemployment and underemployment (-)	Cost of air pollution (-)
Income distribution index (+/-)	Cost of overwork/lost leisure time (-)	Cost of water pollution (-)
Net capital investment (+)	Cost of vehicle accidents (-)	Cost of climate change (-)/ Cost of long-term environmental damage (-)
Services yielded by publicly provided man-made capital (+)	Cost of family breakup (-)	Cost of lost wetland (-)
Net foreign lending/borrowing (+/-)		Cost of lost old-growth forest (-)


THE GPI OF OTHER COUNTRIES

Researchers have studied the GPI of different countries and cities ranging from European countries, USA, Australia, and several Asian countries; for example Jackson and Stymme (1996) extensively estimated the GPI of several European countries from 1950 to 1994; Lawn (2008) estimated the GPI of Australia from 1967 to 2006; Makino (2008) estimated the GPI of Japan from 1970 to 2003; Wen *et al.* (2008) estimated the GPI of China from 1970 to 2005; and more.

Studies of the GPI of several European countries between 1950 and 1992 have shown that most countries have had a falling GPI since the mid-1970s or 80s, while the GDP has continued to grow (Figure 1). Only the Netherlands had a GPI value that kept increasing after the 1970s. All of such studies indicate that GPI stops growing or grows at a much slower rate when GDP reaches a threshold level. The threshold hypothesis has been pointed out to describe this trend, which indicates that when macroeconomic systems expand beyond a certain size, the additional benefits of growth are exceeded by the accompanying costs. Some

of the following examples indicate this trend.

Figure 1 – Comparison of GDP and GPI for the Germany, UK, Austria, the Netherlands, Sweden, and USA.



Source: Lawn & Clarke (2008)


European countries

Figure 1 illustrates several comparisons between GDP and GPI of different European countries. All of the countries studied reflect a similar contrasting trend between GDP and GPI, where the former continuously rises and the latter eventually drops at a certain moment. Figure 1 illustrates that generally the growth rate of the GPI of European countries slow down during the 60s and 70s. An explanation for this was because where industrialization occurred earlier for some European countries, the increased production of goods and services would usually be accompanied with rising costs associated with such economic activity.

China

The Chinese example illustrates GDP starting from a very low level and subsequently an increase in GDP has corresponded to an improvement in the standard of living of the people for longer than it has in Europe (refer to Figure 2). During the 1980s and 1990s, China's economy boomed and GDP and GPI increased due to rising consumption expenditures and development of publicly-provided infrastructure. However, we can see from Figure 2 that from 1998 onward, the GDP per capita has increased by some 70% while the GPI per capita has remained constant. Some of the reason for the stagnation in GPI while GDP increased is related to increasing environmental costs, including the costs of land degradation, urban waste, water pollution, air pollution, and long-term environmental damage, which may increase GDP, but would decrease GPI (Wen *et al.*, 2008). During this period, crime, family breakdown and inequality also increased sharply (Wen *et al.*, 2008).

Figure 2 – The per capita GPI versus per capita GDP of China from 1970 to 2005.




Note: Valued in Chinese yuan at 2005 prices.

Source: (Wen *et al.*, 2008)

Australia


The Australian example illustrates a great example of costs exceeding the benefits (refer to Figure 3). This period of decline was due to a decline in consumption expenditure that was very much due to a decline in demand for Australian mineral exports following the first oil price shock of 1973 (Lawn, 2008). This period also saw increase in unemployment and high inflation rates (Lawn, 2008). Subsequent years saw GPI grow at a slower pace because of growing consumption expenditure, although this was hampered by rising environmental and social costs. Social costs contributed much between 1974 and 1987 when cost of crime and unemployment were high. Despite rising social costs, environmental costs were higher than social costs throughout the study period due to rising costs of pollution, vegetation clearance, and increasing depletion of non-renewable resources.

Figure 3 – Per capita GDP and per capita GPI of Australia and GPI index values.



Note: Valued at 2004/2005 prices.

Figure 5.1 Per capita GPI versus per capita GDP: Australia, 1967–2006



Note: 1967 = 100.

Figure 5.2 Index values of per capita GPI and per capita GDP: Australia, 1967–2006

Source: Lawn (2008).

Japan


In terms of the GPI of Japan, the situation is yet again quite different. The positive growth rates of GPI and GDP were nearly identical (refer to Figure 4). This was due to the continuous rise in unpaid labour, and declining costs of air and water pollution, albeit increasing costs of unemployment, underemployment and overwork.

This trend is quite different from Australia's results, as Japan's GPI has not seen signs of falling while Australia's GPI has already seen it fall in 1974. Makino (2008) and Lawn and Clarke (2008c) indicates that this was due to Australia's earlier industrialization during the conclusion of the Second World War when Japan was in "reconstruction mode". Therefore, Japan would take a longer period of time to "catch up" to Australia's level of industrialization and, thus, took longer to reach the threshold level of per capita GDP (Makino, 2008; Lawn and Clarke, 2008c). Secondly, Japan imports a lot of its raw materials from other countries due to its relative lack of natural resources, and in turn is financed by exporting large quantities of manufactured products and services. This would mean that many environmental costs associated with imports are "offloaded" onto other countries, which is evident in its drastic decline of environmental costs from 1980 to 2003 (Makino, 2008; Lawn and Clarke, 2008c). Therefore, this has resulted with an inflated value of sustainable welfare and ultimately extended its threshold level (Makino, 2008; Lawn and Clarke, 2008c).

Figure 4 – Per capita GDP and per capita GPI of Japan and the components involved in its GPI.


Genuine progress in Japan and an open economy GPI

181



Note: Valued in thousands of yen at 2000 prices.

Figure 7.1 Per capita GPI and per capita GDP: Japan, 1970–2003



Note: Valued in billions of yen at 2000 prices.

Figure 7.2 Positive components of Japan's GPI, 1970–2003

Source: Makino (2008).

THE CASE OF HONG KONG

While the GPI has been estimated for many countries, there has been no study done for HK. This research, therefore, aims at fulfilling this gap by looking at the change of HK's GPI from 1968 to 2010. This has been both presented in its entirety and broken down by the social, economic, and environmental factors in this research.

METHODOLOGY

Table 2 lists the set of items used in the calculation of HK's GPI. The data were compiled mostly from Hong Kong statistics year books by the Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, whereas other sources include Social Welfare Department and World Data Bank. Certain indicators from Table 1 were not included into HK's calculation due to either the lack of available data or its relevance to HK's context. For example, the cost of lost old-growth forest on Table 1 were not included on Table 2 because of the absence of available data on HK's old-growth forest; although this was mitigated by replacing this cost with value of carbon sequestration based on previous studies. Other indicators, such as the direct disamenity of waste-water pollution, are new additions to the calculation. This is to provide a rather more complete picture of the factors that would affect HK's sustainable welfare. For example, direct disamenity of waste-water pollution was included to reflect the vulnerability of HK as a harbour city from deteriorating water quality caused by ships and urban waste, and the negative effects waste-water pollution has on reduced aesthetic and irritation caused to residents and tourists.

Table 2 – Items used for the calculation of HK's GPI

Economic	Social	Environment
Personal and public consumption expenditure (+/-)	Value of non-paid household labour (+)	Cost of non-renewable resource depletion (-)
Defensive expenditures (-)	Value of volunteer labour (+)	Cost of lost agricultural land (-)
Services from consumer durables (+)	Cost of crime (-)	Cost of fisheries depletion (-)
Income distribution index (+/-)	Cost of unemployment and underemployment (-)	Cost of air pollution (-)
Services yielded from publicly provided man-made capital (+)	Cost of overwork/lost leisure time (-)	Cost of waste-water pollution (-)
Net capital investment (+)	Cost of family breakdown (-)	Cost of noise pollution (-)
Change in net foreign assets (+/-)	Direct disamenity of waste-water pollution (-)	Cost of solid waste (-)
	Direct disamenity of air pollution (-)	Cost of climate change (-)
		Cost of lost wetland (-)
		Value of carbon sequestration (+)

THE GPI OF HONG KONG

The results of HK are shown in Figure 5 and 6, where Figure 5 shows per capita GDP and per capita GPI in 2009 HK Dollar value, and Figure 6 shows the index value of per capita GDP and per capita GPI. As can be seen, the results of HK shows several periods of growth and recessions over the period of 1968 to 2010 (refer to Figure 5 and 6). The first period of growth saw per capita GDP grow at an average rate of 21.6% per annum, and per capita GPI grow at a relatively steady average rate of 3.3% per annum from 1968 to 1976 in 2009 HKD value. This phase could be described as the phase where manufacturing industries, mainly from the textile industry, have matured and revenue from this were mainly from exports. Despite, this phase also represents the period when GDP growth exceeds GPI. Analysis reveals that this was due to the drop in value yielded from non-paid household labour. This period also reflects very low consumption expenditure that could be due to increasing political unrest; for example the 1967 riot caused by extreme leftists during the period of Cultural Revolution in China, and increasing social and environmental costs; for example,

increasing overwork hours and growing crime rates.

Figure 5 – Per capita GPI and per capita GDP in 2009 HKD value: HK, 1968-2010.





Figure 6 – Index values of per capita GPI and per capita GDP: HK, 1968-2010 (1968=100).



The next period saw per capita GDP grow at an average rate of 23.5% per annum and it also saw GPI grow at a quick, albeit slower, average rate of 21.4% per annum between 1977 and 1997. This marked the period of an increase in consumption expenditure and increase in services yielded from infrastructural services. This period saw the transition from

manufacturing industries to a commercial-based industry as well as the tourism industry, because of the “Open door policy” of China in 1978 after the end of a lengthy period of unrest in China. During that period, the HK government also extended its subsidization of education and saw the designation of HK’s country park system. This period also saw increases in salary, higher life expectancy, and literacy rate. Private developments of residential estates brought about an influx in private housing estates, marking also the increase in demand and growth in spending power and consumption expenditure. However, the 80s and 90s were also filled with uncertainty as to the handover of HK from British sovereignty to Chinese sovereignty in 1997. Subsequently after this period, HK saw its recession in GDP.

Between 1998 and 2000, GDP dropped at an average rate of 4.4% per annum; however, this period saw GPI grow at an average rate of 2% per annum. The recession of GDP from mid-1997 to 1998 saw the collapse in share prices and property market. This was largely cushioned by the pegging of HK Dollar with the US Dollar that prevented extended devaluing. Despite the lowering of consumption expenditure, the well-being of HK was not faltered because of the exponential growth in infrastructural services during that period, as well as a very high net foreign asset value.

The subsequent periods saw continued drop of GDP from 2001 to 2003 and also continued drops from 2001 to 2005. The political climate was again unstable despite adjustments to people’s lives after the handover. Within a short time, the political climate heated up and the Chief Executive position would be challenged culturally, politically, and managerially. This was further exasperated in 2003 when the SARS outbreak and the subsequent Bird Flu Pandemic caused further regressions in GDP and GPI.

GDP saw its rebound in 2004, which is 2 years earlier than the rebound of GPI in 2006. The average rate of growth of GDP from 2004 to 2010 was at 6.4% per annum, whereas the average rate of growth of GPI from 2006 to 2010 was at 3.5% per annum. Both GDP and GPI saw drops in 2009 due to 2008 Global Financial Crisis, which saw decline in consumption expenditure and net foreign assets.

The results in its components


Economic factors

The GPI results of HK indicate that GDP has been growing at an average rate of 15.8% per annum from 1968 to 2010, whereas, GPI has been growing at an average rate of 11.4% per annum when estimated in 2009 HK Dollar value (refer to Figure 7). Weighted adjusted consumption expenditure has also been growing at a slower average rate of 14.1% per annum throughout the study period. It is important to understand that HK's increase in inequality is causing consumption expenditure to drop, as rising inequality is measured as an index and weighted against consumption expenditure; i.e. rising inequality would weight down consumption expenditure. This is to prevent overstating the welfare of its residents and to address the issue of a widening poor to wealth gap. The Gini coefficient of HK reflects this as an increase of 8 index points from 45 in 1981 to 53 in 2006, where 100 indicates maximum inequality.

Importance of infrastructural services and net foreign assets

As mentioned above, the exponential growth of services yielded from infrastructures and net positive foreign assets were the reasons for the delayed decline in GPI when GDP declined from 1998 to 2000. It is interesting to note that the value of services from infrastructures has surpassed social costs in 1979 and has subsequently surpassed environmental costs (reflected as LNCS or Lost Natural Capital Services in Figure 7) in 1994 (refer to Figure 7), and its value has remained above the two costs thereafter. The benefits yielded throughout the years from developments during previous periods have proven to be important towards the welfare, as wealth is turned into fixed assets.

Figure 7 – Per capita GPI and its major component categories: HK, 1968-2010.



Environmental factors

Damaging environmental costs

Perhaps most interestingly would be the cost of lost natural capital services, which saw one of the quickest growth rates of 14.6% per annum on average throughout the study period. This rate is growing at a rate that is higher than the rate of certain beneficial components – consumption expenditure (11.4% per annum on average); the value of non-paid labour (6% per annum on average); and changes in net foreign assets (12% per annum on average); while it is lower than the rate of growth of services yielded from infrastructural services (23% per annum on average). This increase in environmental costs was largely due to the cumulative impact of the cost of climate change which grew at an average rate of 14.9% per annum and has contributed 90% of the total environmental costs for most of the study period (refer to Figure 8). Figure 9 illustrates more clearly the influence of other components when cost of climate change is excluded. The cumulative impact of the cost of lost wetland grew with the quickest rate of 19% per annum on average. Whereas, the cost of air pollution, cost of water pollution, cost of noise pollution, and cost of solid waste grew at an average rate of 15% per annum. Lastly, the cost of lost agricultural land, cost of non-renewable depletion, and cost of

fisheries depletion grew at a slower rate of 12.7% per annum on average, 11% per annum on average, and 9.5% per annum on average, respectively.

Figure 8 – Components included in per capita environmental costs (LNCS or Lost Natural Capital Services).






Figure 9 – Components included in per capita environmental costs excluding cost of climate change.



The value of carbon sequestration

The value of carbon sequestration (refer to Figure 10), although relatively low, could be an area for further understanding to further emphasize the importance of preserving the integrity of forest lands in HK, of which large portions are contained in its country parks. Country parks cover 46% of total land area in HK, and such areas are protected and development is very limited; therefore, most old-growth forests that exist in HK are contained in such areas and as a result a large portion of the carbon are stored there. However, it must be noted that estimates in this study only reflect carbon sequestered in terrestrial plants and soil but does not include those stored in water bodies; therefore, the true value would be higher than that observed here.

Figure 10 – The value of carbon sequestration of Hong Kong




Social factors

Rising social costs

The growth of social costs was at 13.2% per annum on average, where the biggest contributor was from the cost of overwork or lost leisure time, which continues to grow at an average rate of 13.9% per annum (refer to Figure 11). The second largest contributor would be the cost of unemployment and underemployment, and crime with a growth rate of 14.3% per annum on average and 10.2% per annum on average, respectively.

Figure 11 – Components included in per capita social costs.



Declining of non-paid labour

On the other hand, the benefits yielded from non-paid labour grew slowly at an average growth rate of 6% per annum. This was indicative of declining rate of growth in the number of “willing¹” housewives and househusbands throughout the study period perhaps due largely to an increasing number of females in the labour force as well as increasing overwork hours have resulted with a preference to hire foreign domestic helpers to handle household chores. Whereas, even though the value of volunteer labour was relatively low and grew at an average growth rate of 4.4% per annum, the recent growth of volunteerism from 1999 onwards reflects encouraging signs that the value from this item could have an increase in impact.

DISCUSSION

HK’s results have indicated that its rapid economic development has reached a threshold

¹ This is to reflect the changing attitude of HK housewives and househusbands towards doing household chores, as Wong (1996) and Ho (2007) found that there is a decline in willingness of both men and women in working at home.

point that suggests that the current rate of economic development does not contribute to the well-being of its residents. The associated costs with economic development have resulted with a GPI that is growing at a much slower rate relative to the growth rate of GDP. This was the result of increasing environmental and social costs throughout the study period. HK's GPI is largely mirrored in European countries, as mentioned above when industrialization occurred earlier than other countries. In HK this was when an influx of manufacturing industries relocated to HK from mainland China from the 40s to the 70s. However, interestingly HK's GPI has yet to drop (as can be seen in Figure 1) and this could possibly be due to the uniqueness of its locale when a majority of the manufacturing industries that settled in HK relocated back to mainland China in 1978 during the Open Door Policy; therefore, also relocating the costs that are associated with manufacturing industries – similar to the offloading of cost found in Japan.

In terms of environmental costs, this was mostly contributed by the exponential growth in the cost of climate change (which consisted, on average, 90% of other environmental cost components throughout the study period) as measured by the amount of greenhouse gas emitted. Secondly, the irreversible cumulative impact of lost wetland due to urban development could have an increasing influence towards the drop in GPI. Lastly, increasing severity of HK's pollution levels has led to the increase in expenditures on its abatement measures when the same amount of money could have been spent on improving our welfare instead of maintaining the current state of well-being.

On the other hand, the majority of social costs came from the cost of overwork or lost leisure time and the cost of unemployment and underemployment. Even though exact data were not available regarding the total number of overwork hours, the large cost was based on studies conducted by HK University (HKU, 2008) that indicated that the amount of overwork hours were in fact quite high. This was not surprising due to the overwork culture that exists in HK's working environment. Secondly, the cost of unemployment and underemployment reflects the under-utilization of its local labour force, and in turn reduces overall consumption expenditure.

The positive components of the GPI have had important contributions during certain periods of the study. Firstly, the value of non-paid household labour during the first 4 years of

the study has contributed greatly on the growth of GPI but this subsequently declined when social values differed and the option of foreign domestic helpers were increasingly available. Secondly, the value of volunteer labour, as calculated by officially registered volunteer hours, has rapidly increased in the last 10 years of the study, albeit its relative insignificance in the total value of non-paid labour. Thirdly, service from infrastructures proved to be important in placing wealth in fixed assets, as infrastructures do not fluctuate according to the highs and lows of the market economy; therefore, services yielded from infrastructures eventually can increase the level of well-being during periods of economic downfall. Lastly, maintaining a net positive in foreign assets proved crucial as well.

These results suggest that policies should put more emphasis on improving the quality of our standard of living instead of just continuously spoon-feeding large amounts of money into programmes that raise competitiveness and economic growth. Some of the more pressing issues are the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, to conserve critical natural habitats, and to implement stringent environmental standards and the likes of polluter-pays economic measures. Further, it is imperative to implement policies that encourage the balance of work and life; such an example could include implementing the maximum working hours policy and ensure paid overwork hours as appropriate. Also, it is imperative to maximize employment opportunities, and it is suggested that more accessible education and vocational programmes be developed, as well as to create a more diverse industry to cater a diverse labour force. Further, it is suggested that residents should learn the benefits of volunteerism, especially to youth and retirees as it has been found that volunteering would provide psychological benefits (Chou *et al.*, 2003; Mjelde-Mossey *et al.*, 2002). Lastly, the importance of services yielded from infrastructures do not necessarily warrant the construction of new infrastructures since additional capital could eventually come at the expense of the sustainable welfare of other capitals; improving the quality of infrastructures would also provide added benefits over the period of time the stock endures.

CONCLUSIONS

The GDP of Hong Kong has been growing during the past 4 decades at a very high rate compared to that of most of the world, and Hong Kong now has a GDP per capita (at purchasing power parity) that is higher than Switzerland and the Netherlands. The results indicate that HK has reached its threshold level in 1974 and has subsequently grown at a much slower rate. This was much due to increasing environmental costs, especially in the cost of climate change, cost of lost wetland, and cost on pollution abatement measures. Also, rising social costs indicate that the cost of overwork and cost of unemployment and underemployment were the two main causes for this rise. It is suggested that the HK government should prioritize policies that aim to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to implement more green measures, such as tax on pollution, to reduce environmental costs; whereas, policies on maximum working hours should be implemented, and improvements should be made on increasing employment opportunities through better education and on continued studies, as well as creating a more diverse industry.

Further, it would be interesting to explore what-ifs and reflect on possible scenarios of how the GPI would have looked like if, for example, the Asian economic crisis did not occur or if HK did not return to Chinese sovereignty in 1997.

As mentioned above, one of the main indicators used to evaluate the performance of governments is GDP growth. This is because GDP is known by most people, is easy to measure, is easy for the press to report, and is a number easy to understand. However, if an indicator that aims at measuring people's well-being can have the same advantages as the GDP (easy to measure, to report, and to understand), then governments may be willing to shift from trying to increase GDP to trying to increase GPI, promoting well-being rather than economic growth. Beyond countries, the idea of GPI addresses the question of world economic growth, and whether the world economy should aim at producing more output (given that the economic output is already excessive, in terms of the capacity of the natural environment to produce the raw materials we transform, and recycle the waste we generate), or at better output, that increases human welfare rather than the consumption of traded goods.

The GPI can be a step towards improving human welfare rather than increasing economic output.

REFERENCES

- Anielski, M., 2001. *Measuring the Sustainability of Nations: The Genuine Progress Indicator system of Sustainable Well-being Accounts*. The Fourth Biennial Conference of the Canadian Society for Ecological Economics: Ecological Sustainability of the Global Market Place, Montreal.
- Berik, G. and Gaddis, E., 2011. *The Utah Genuine Progress Indicator, 1990 to 2007: A Report to the People of Utah*. [online] Available at: <www.utahpop.org/gpi.html>.
- Chou, K.L., Chow, N.W.S. and Chi, I., 2003. Volunteering aspirations of Hong Kong Chinese soon-to-be-old adults. *Adaptation and Ageing*, 27(3-4), pp.79-96.
- Clarke, M. and Shaw, J., 2008. Genuine progress in Thailand: a systems-analysis approach. In: P. Lawn, and M. Clarke, eds. *Sustainable Welfare in the Asia-Pacific: Studies using the Genuine Progress Indicator*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, pp.260-298.
- Costanza, R. et al., 2004. Estimates of the Genuine Progress Indicator for Vermont Chittenden County and Burlington, from 1950 to 2000. *Ecological Economics*, 51, pp.139-155.
- Fisher, I., 1906. *Nature of Capital and Income*. New York: A.M. Kelly.
- HKU, 2008. *Work life balance in Hong Kong survey results*. [online] Available at: <http://www.hku.hk/press/news_detail_5755.html> [Accessed 1 December 2011].
- Ho, P.S.Y., 2007. Eternal mothers or flexible housewives? Middle-aged Chinese married women in Hong Kong. *Sex roles*, 57, pp.249-265.
- Jackson, T. and Styme, S., 1996. *Sustainable Economic Welfare in Sweden: A pilot index 1950-1992*. Stockholm: Stockholm Environment Institute.
- Lawn, P., 2003. A theoretical foundation to support the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare, Genuine Progress Indicator, and other related indexes. *Ecological Economics*, 44, pp.105-118.
- Lawn, P., 2004. To operate sustainably or not to operate sustainability? – That is the long-run

- question. *Futures*, 36, pp.1-22.
- Lawn, P., 2005. An assessment of the valuation methods used to calculate the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW), Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI), and Sustainable Net Benefit Index (SNBI). *Environment, Development and Sustainability*, 7, pp.185-208.
- Lawn, P., 2008. Genuine progress in Australia: time to rethink the growth objective. In: P. Lawn and M. Clarke, eds. *Sustainable Welfare in the Asia-Pacific: Studies using the Genuine Progress Indicator*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., pp.91-125.
- Lawn, P. and Clarke, M., 2008. An Introduction to the Asia-Pacific region. In: P. Lawn and M. Clarke, eds. *Sustainable Welfare in the Asia-Pacific: Studies using the Genuine Progress Indicator*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., pp.3-34.
- Lawn, P. and Clarke, M., 2008b. Why is Gross Domestic Product an inadequate indicator of sustainable welfare. In: P. Lawn and M. Clarke, eds. *Sustainable Welfare in the Asia-Pacific: Studies using the Genuine Progress Indicator*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., pp.35-46.
- Lawn, P. and Clarke, M., 2008c. Genuine progress across the Asia-Pacific region: comparisons, trends, and policy implications. In: P. Lawn and M. Clarke, eds. *Sustainable Welfare in the Asia-Pacific: Studies using the Genuine Progress Indicator*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., pp.333-361.
- Lawn, P. and Clarke, M., 2010. The end of economic growth? A contracting threshold hypothesis. *Ecological Economics*, 69, pp.2213-2223.
- Makino, M., 2008. Genuine progress in Japan and the need for an open economy GPI. In: P. Lawn and M. Clarke, eds. *Sustainable Welfare in the Asia-Pacific: Studies using the Genuine Progress Indicator*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., pp.153-190.
- Mjelde-Mossey, L.A., Chi, I. and Chow, N., 2002. Volunteering in the Social Services: Preferences, Expectations, Barriers, and Motivation of Aging Chinese Professionals in Hong Kong. *Hallym International Journal of Aging*, 4(1), pp.31-44.
- Stiglitz, J.E., Sen, A. and Fitoussi, J., 2009. *Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress*. [online] Available at:

<http://www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr/documents/rapport_anglais.pdf> [Accessed 17 November 2011].

Wong, D., 1996. Housewife role and women's psychological well-being: The case of Tuen Mun. *Hong Kong Journal of Social Work*, 30(1), pp.48-56.

Wen, Z., Yang, Y, and Lawn, P., 2008. From GDP to the GPI: quantifying thirty-five years of development in China. In: P. Lawn and M. Clarke, eds. *Sustainable Welfare in the Asia-Pacific: Studies using the Genuine Progress Indicator*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., pp.228-259.

Industrial Pollution Problems in Pearl-River-Delta and Mechanism Design for an Inter-regional Management Regime

David W.K. Yeung
Hong Kong Shue Yan University
Email: dwkyeung@hksyu.edu

Yingxuan Zhang
Hong Kong Shue Yan University
Email: zhangyingxuan@hotmail.com

1. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION

Although in a time of increasing global competition and rising urban entrepreneurialism, regional cooperation provides opportunities to overcome the negative effects of political fragmentation in regional and mega-city development, regions in China have contextually specific governance problems and socio-political conflicts (Yeh and Xu, 2011; Yeh and Xu, 2008). A mega-city region-- Pearl River Delta (PRD) Region-- has attracted plenty of studies. The PRD Region is comprised of Pearl River Delta Economic Zone (PRDEZ), the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) and Macao Special Administrative Region (Macao SAR). The PRDEZ is a sub-region of Guangdong Province. In addition to Guangzhou, the provincial capital, it harbors two special economic zones of Shenzhen and Zhuhai, six leading cities, sixteen county-level cities, and three rural counties, each with its precisely nuanced level of autonomy (Friedmann, 2005).

After being declared as an open economic area in the early 1980s, the PRDEZ boosted industrialization in transitional economy (Yeh, 2001; Yeh and Xu, 2011; Yeh and Wu, 1999; Yeh et al, 2002; Lin, 2001; Liao and Chan, 2010; Campanella et al, 2002). Industrialization in The PRD region associated with booming economic growth and environmental issues, among them deterioration of environmental quality (Wang, 2002; Lee, 2002a; Ma and Tao, 2010; Chow, 2002; Hopkinson and Stern, 2003; Zhang et al, 2008; ARUP, 2009).

Due to the geographical diffusion of pollutants, unilateral response on the part of one

city is often ineffective. Cooperation in environmental control holds out the best promise of effective action. So far, major international cooperation in environmental management includes the Bali Action Plan, Copenhagen Summit, Kyoto Protocol, Vienna Convention and Geneva Protocol. In China, officials in both HKSAR and Guangdong province had realized that neither of them can solve the pollution alone. Pre-1997, a Hong Kong-Guangdong Environmental Protection Liaison Group has been established to coordinate joint efforts to tackle regional pollution. Post-1997, a joint study by the HKSAR Government and the Guangdong Government had also started to identify air pollution problems in the PRD Region and to project air quality trend (Chow, 2002). The studies of regional environment can be found in Lee (2001, 2002a and 2002b), Chan et al. (2002), Salkeld (2002) and Ma (2002) and so on. Regional cooperative plan in environmental management include PRD Environmental Protection Planning Outline, Outline Plan- Reform and Development of the Pearl River Delta (2008–2020), the PRD Regional Air Quality Management Plan, PRD Regional Water Quality Management Cooperation 15-year Plan, and Regional Cooperation Plan on Building a Quality Living Area.

However, existing international and regional joint initiatives could hardly be expected to offer a long-term solution because there is no guarantee that the original cooperative agreement would be effective throughout the duration of collaboration. In particular, there is no assurance that the participants will always be better off as economic conditions change over time. To construct a cooperative solution that every party would commit to from beginning to the end, the proposed arrangement must guarantee that every participant will be better-off and the originally agreed upon arrangement remain effective at any time within the cooperative period for any feasible state brought about by prior optimal behavior. This paper presents a mechanism design for an inter-regional pollution management scheme for the PRD region which would solve this problem. In Section 2, environmental conditions in the PRD region will be given. In Section 3, existing collaborative schemes in The PRD region are presented. Section 4 examines the problems facing regional environmental cooperation. Section 5 develops the mechanism design of institutional arrangement in environmental collaboration among cities in the PRD region. Policy implementation and consistent

compensation are provided in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.

2. ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITION IN PRD REGION

2.1 Air Environmental Condition in PRD Region

Air pollution is a transboundary issue. According to Environmental Protection Department (EPD) of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) Government, HKSAR is facing two air pollution problems: one is the street level pollution; and another is regional air quality pollution. In the Pearl River Delta (PRD) Region in the past three decades, the air quality problem deteriorates while this region undergoes unprecedented economic growth and urbanization. Air pollutant at certain concentrations can threaten public health. This section will focus on pollutants that have an impact on a regional scale and for which standards have been established for protection of public health. The pollutants of concern in this section include Sulphur dioxide (SO₂), Nitrogen Oxides (NO_x) or Nitrogen Dioxide (NO₂), Ozone (O₃) and Total Suspended Particulates (TSP) or Respirable Suspended Particulates (RSP) (also known as PM₁₀).

To understand the air quality in PRDEZ, data for annual average of pollutants concentrations from 1991 to 2010 are collected. Figure 1 presents the annual averages of SO₂ concentrations of nine cities. For the last 20 years, most of the annual averages do not exceed the Mainland Class 2 NAAQS with some exceptions.




Figure 1 1991 to 2010 Annual Average of SO₂ Concentration for PRDEZ

Source: Data from Study of Air Quality in the Pearl River Delta Region, by Environmental Protection Department, HKSAR Government (2002); Pearl River Delta Regional Air Quality Monitoring Network - A Report of Monitoring Results in 2006-2009; Guangzhou Environmental Bulletin; Shenzhen Environmental Bulletin; Zhuhai Environmental Bulletin; Foshan Environmental Bulletin; Jiangmen Environmental Bulletin; Zhaoqing Environmental Bulletin; Huizhou Environmental Bulletin; Dongguan Environmental Bulletin; Zhongshan Environmental Bulletin.

Note: the data in 2010 is preliminary.

Figure 2 demonstrates the annual averages of NO_x concentrations (1991-2000) and NO₂ concentrations (2001-2010). Since Mainland China changed one of its measured air pollutant from NO_x to NO₂ in air pollution report from 2001 and no data for NO_x concentrations are available after 2001, the study has to split the discussion of Air Quality into two time slots. From 1991 to 2000, most of the measured annual averages of NO_x of do not exceed the Mainland Class 1 & 2 NAAQS. However, Guangzhou's TSP pollution was severe: the curve is all above the Mainland Class 3 NAAQS and reaches its peak in 1996 with the figure of 151µg/m³. From 2001 to 2010, the trend of RSP concentration for Guangzhou is downward: not only all the data measured are below the Mainland Class 3 NAAQS, but also a declining trend of about 25% is recorded. Otherwise, Dongguan records a sharp increase of NO₂ concentration in 2002, close to the limit of the Mainland Class 3 NAAQS. Shenzhen has a similar situation and records a sharp increase in 2004. Zhaoqing, although the NO_x

concentrations in this city are below the Mainland Class 1 NAAQS, has recorded an increase of NO₂ concentrations since 2002. Zhaoqing's NO₂ concentrations increase by about 152% in 2010 and obviously exceed the Mainland Class 2 NAAQS. For Foshan, the curve of NO₂ concentrations is upward indicating that NO₂ concentrations increase year by year.




Figure 2 1991 to 2000 Annual Average of NO_x Concentration for PRDEZ & 2001 to 2010 Annual Average of NO₂ Concentration for PRDEZ

Source: Data from Study of Air Quality in the Pearl River Delta Region, by Environmental Protection Department, HKSAR Government (2002); Pearl River Delta Regional Air Quality Monitoring Network - A Report of Monitoring Results in 2006-2009; Guangzhou Environmental Bulletin; Shenzhen Environmental Bulletin; Zhuhai Environmental Bulletin; Foshan Environmental Bulletin; Jiangmen Environmental Bulletin; Zhaoqing Environmental Bulletin; Huizhou Environmental Bulletin; Dongguan Environmental Bulletin; Zhongshan Environmental Bulletin.

Note: the data in 2010 is preliminary.

Figure 3 illustrates the annual averages of TSP concentrations (1991-2000) and RSP concentrations (2001-2010). Similar to the situation of air pollutants NO_x and NO₂, Mainland China changed one of its measured air pollutant from TSP to RSP in air pollution report from 2001 and no data for TSP concentrations are available after 2001, the study has to split the

discussion of Air Quality into two time slots. TSP concentrations in Zhaoqing and Foshan exceeded Mainland Class 3 NAAQS several times in early 1990s. However, the situation improved after 1995. From 2001 to 2010, most cities' (to the exclusion of Foshan) annual averages of RSP concentrations exceed the Mainland Class 1 NAAQS, though do not exceed the Mainland Class 2 NAAQS. Foshan, again, records a sharp increase of RSP concentration in 2006 and the concentrations in both 2006 and 2007 far exceed the Mainland Class 2 NAAQS. RSP concentration decreases in 2008 but still close to the Class 2 limit.




Figure 3 1991 to 2000 Annual Average of TSP Concentration for PRDEZ & 2001 to

2010 Annual Average of RSP Concentration for PRDEZ

Source: Data from Study of Air Quality in the Pearl River Delta Region, by Environmental Protection Department, HKSAR Government (2002); Pearl River Delta Regional Air Quality Monitoring Network - A Report of Monitoring Results in 2006-2009; Guangzhou Environmental Bulletin; Shenzhen Environmental Bulletin; Zhuhai Environmental Bulletin; Foshan Environmental Bulletin; Jiangmen Environmental Bulletin; Zhaoqing Environmental Bulletin; Huizhou Environmental Bulletin; Dongguan Environmental Bulletin; Zhongshan Environmental Bulletin.

Note: the data in 2010 is preliminary.

The trend of annual O₃ concentrations for the last 5 years is presented in Figure 4. O₃ levels in Zhaoqing, Huizhou and Dongguan show a declining trend of about 15%, 3% and 2%, respectively. However, for Shenzhen, Zhu Hai, Guangzhou, Jiangmen and Zhongshan O₃ levels have increased sharply by approximately 33%, 31%, 25%, 22%, and 11%, respectively.




Figure 4 2006 to 2010 Annual Average of O₃ Concentration for PRDEZ

Source: Data from Pearl River Delta Regional Air Quality Monitoring Network: A Report of Monitoring Results in 2010, by Guangdong Provincial Environmental Monitoring Centre and Environmental Protection Department, HKSAR (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010);
Note: the data in 2010 is preliminary.

To understand the existing air quality in HKSAR, all routinely monitored data for the period 1991 through 2010 are used. Figure 5 presents the trends in annual SO₂, NO₂, and O₃ concentrations for the period from 1990-2010, annual TSP concentration for the period from 1998-2010, and annual RSP concentration for the period from 1993-2010. O₃ levels have increased sharply by approximately 152%. The NO₂ concentrations have shown a moderate upward trend since 1990. SO₂, TSP and RSP, on the other hand, show a declining trend of about 50%, 9% and 10% over the study period, respectively. According to Wang (2002), in HKSAR, O₃ pollution is more serious in the western and northwestern parts of the territory,

which is due in part to the land and sea breezes and terrain-induced winds unique to western Hong Kong.




Figure 5: 1990 to 2010 Annual Average of Pollutants Concentration for HKSAR

Source: Data from the Environmental Protection Department, HKSAR.

Note: the data in 2010 is preliminary.

Generally, both RSP and NO₂ concentrations have a regional component and a local component. 1-hour peak O₃ concentrations are highly correlated at sites in HKSAR, Foshan and Shenzhen.

2.2 Water Environment in PRD Region

The PRD region covers the lower part of the Xijiang, Beijiang and Dongjiang deltas and the Pearl Estuary Region. The river network has a total river length of over 1600km and a coastline extending over 450km from east to west.

River water in PRDEZ are suffered from different degrees of pollution and showed a significant spatial variation (Fan et al, 2010). Zhou et al (2011)'s study showed that Class II and Class III were the main water quality types in the PRD Region. The main pollutants constitute total phosphorus, ammonia nitrogen, coliform bacteria, anionic detergent, the COD,

and the BOD. Water pollution in the PRD Region is becoming more and more serious, while pollution in the wet season found to be more pronounced than in the dry season.

There are four important marine Water Quality Objectives (WQOs), namely Dissolved Oxygen (DO), Total Inorganic Nitrogen (TIN), Unionised Ammonia (NH₃) and E. coli bacteria. The overall WQO compliance rate is based on the combined individual compliance rates of all stations for these four marine WQOs. The overall WQO compliance rate of the whole territory from 1990 to 2010 is presented in Figure 6. The overall WQO compliance rate for 2010 was 80%, lower than that in 2009 (87%) but similar to that in 2007 (80%) and 2008 (81%).




Figure 6: Overall compliance with the marine Water Quality Objectives in HKSAR, 1990-2010

Source: Data from HKSAR EPD (2009b and 2010).

2.3. Acid Rain

Acidic wet deposition in form of rain, mist, fog and snow is always due to the presence of un-neutralized anions from natural gases (Lau, 2001). In nature, the presence of atmospheric CO₂ gives wet deposition a theoretical equilibrium pH of 5.6. Anthropogenic emissions of CO₂, SO₂ and NO_x which react with the water molecules in the atmosphere to produce acids will lead to acid rain. Therefore, in mainland China, the pH of 5.6 is considered as a background level for unpolluted air. Figures in Figure 7 and Figure 8 indicate the situation of acid rain in The PRD region. Almost all of the annual average of rain pH value of cities in The

PRD region is below pH 5.6. HKSAR suffers from heavy acid rain as well as cities in PRDEZ. In most of the year (1999-2010), acid rain accounts for more than 50% of the total rainfall in most of the cities. Some even accounts for more than 80%.




Figure 7: Annual Average of Rain pH Value in PRD Region (1999-2010)

Source: Data from Guangzhou Environmental Bulletin; Shenzhen Environmental Bulletin; Zhuhai Environmental Bulletin; Foshan Environmental Bulletin; Jiangmen Environmental Bulletin; Zhaoqing Environmental Bulletin; Huizhou Environmental Bulletin; Dongguan Environmental Bulletin; Zhongshan Environmental Bulletin; Guangzhou Yearbook; Shenzhen Yearbook; Zhuhai Yearbook; Foshan Yearbook; Jiangmen Yearbook; Zhaoqing Yearbook; Huizhou Yearbook; Dongguan Yearbook; Zhongshan Yearbook.; Air Quality in Hong Kong (1999-2010)




Figure 8: Frequency of Acid Rain in PRD Region (1999-2010)

Source: Data from Guangzhou Environmental Bulletin; Shenzhen Environmental Bulletin; Zhuhai Environmental Bulletin; Foshan Environmental Bulletin; Jiangmen Environmental Bulletin; Zhaoqing

Environmental Bulletin; Huizhou Environmental Bulletin; Dongguan Environmental Bulletin; Zhongshan Environmental Bulletin; Guangzhou Yearbook; Shenzhen Yearbook; Zhuhai Yearbook; Foshan Yearbook; Jiangmen Yearbook; Zhaoqing Yearbook; Huizhou Yearbook; Dongguan Yearbook; Zhongshan Yearbook.

3. EXISTING COLLABORATION SCHEMES IN PRD REGION

Over the last twenty to thirty years HKSAR and the PRDEZ have been engaged in the most spectacular piece of cooperation (Salkeld, 2002). Air pollution is the most visible and urgent environmental problems confronting the PRD Region, and one that most clearly requires regional cooperation, coordination, and response (Campanella et al., 2002). Officials in both HKSAR and Guangdong province had realized that neither of them can solve the pollution alone. Pre-1997, a Hong Kong-Guangdong Environmental Protection Liaison Group has been established to coordinate joint efforts to tackle regional pollution. Post-1997, a joint study by the HKSAR Government and the Guangdong Government had also started to identify air pollution problems in the PRD Region and to project air quality trend (Chow, 2002). The studies of regional environment can be found in Wang (2002), Lee (2002a), Chan et al. (2002) and Ma (2002) and so forth. This section will review trans-boundary environmental management systems in the PRD Region.

3.1 The Earlier Cooperation on Cross-boundary Environmental Issues

As far back as the early 1980s, there was little dialogue and cooperation between Hong Kong and Guangdong on environmental issues. However, the Hong Kong government admitted the need to get contact with Guangdong Government to handle cross-boundary environmental issues. Then, in 1990, the Hong Kong-Guangdong Environmental Protection Liaison Group (the Liaison Group) was set up to enhance cooperation and coordination on environmental management and pollution control. This was the sole point of contact on the environmental issues at that time. Since its formation, the Liaison Group has served as the focal point for several cross-border environmental cooperation projects including Joint Study on Air Quality in the PRD Region (Chow, 2002; Lee, 2002a and 2002b; Hopkinson and Stern, 2003).

The Hong Kong–Mainland Cross Boundary Major Infrastructure Coordinating Committee (ICC) was formed in October 1997. The ICC is responsible for implementing major cross-boundary projects such as the Western Corridor (Shenzhen–Hong Kong transport link) and the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge; and also responsible for issues related to environmental regulation, provision of non-staple foods, water supply, social welfare, business investment, and the flow of passengers, traffic and freight (Ma and Tao, 2010).

The Hong Kong Guangdong Co-operation Joint Conference (CJC) was initiated in March 1998. Meetings are held twice a year in Hong Kong and Guangzhou alternately. The CJC's original objectives were to keep each other informed of developments, and coordinating policies related to the areas: trade and economic co-operation; exchanges in education, technology and professionals; and checkpoint establishment. The agenda of CJC was later expanded, including cross-border infrastructure projects; environmental protection schemes (e.g. the reduction of water pollution in shared water bodies and the possible unification of diesel fuel standards) (Ma and Tao, 2010).

In 1999, the Liaison Group was replaced by the Hong Kong-Guangdong Joint Working Group on Sustainable Development and Environmental Protection (the Joint Working Group). However, the Hong Kong government was criticized by environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and government advisors for not taking bolder steps to discuss and implement cross-boundary cooperation projects with Guangdong (Chow, 2002; Lee, 2002a and 2002b; Hopkinson and Stern, 2003). Under the Joint Working Group, there have been a number of special panels set up for coordination in various specific areas including the PRD Region Air Quality Special Panel. A Joint Study, which released by the Joint Working Group, showed that The PRD region air quality was deteriorating due to smog caused by complex chemical reactions among O₃, NO_x, SO₂ and volatile organic compounds (VOC) (CH2M Hill, 2002).

In addition to the Liaison Group and the Joint Working Group, there are four other cross-boundary coordinating committees that indirectly help coordinate and resolve cross-border environmental issues: Sino-British Joint Liaison Group; the Sino-British Infrastructure Coordination Committee; the Hong Kong-Mainland Cross Boundary Major

Infrastructure Coordinating Committee; and the Hong Kong-Guangdong Cooperation Joint Conference (Lee, 2002a).

3.2 Outline Plans of the PRD Region

The Guangdong Provincial Government published the “PRD Environmental Protection Planning Outline (2004 – 2020)” in 2005. The plan outlines the environmental strategies and emission targets to be achieved by 2020. For SO₂, NO_X and RSP, their emission targets stated in this Outline are 358,000, 395,000 and 270,000 tonnes respectively by 2020 (HKSAR EPD, 2009).

Another Outline Plan, “Reform and Development of the Pearl River Delta (2008–2020)”, was issued by The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) of the Chinese government in December 2008. The aim of the Outline Plan was to reform and transform the PRD Region into an economy based on low energy consumption and low pollution. This Outline Plan would focus on seven major aspects of the key planning areas, including: 1) building a modern industrial system; 2) strengthening innovation capabilities; 3) promoting infrastructure modernization; 4) coordinating urban and rural development; 5) promoting coordinated regional development; 6) enhancing resource conservation and environmental protection; and 7) expedition of the development of social undertakings. In addition to reform of the industrial structure and development pattern, there was also emphasis on coordinating the allocation and sharing of public resources in the region in the interests of sustainable development and building an environmentally friendly society (Ma and Tao, 2010).

3.3 Pearl River Delta Regional Air Quality Management Plan

To improve the regional air quality, in April 2002, the HKSAR Government and the Guangdong Provincial Government reached a consensus to reduce on a best endeavour basis the anthropogenic emissions of a number of pollutants. These included SO₂, NO_x, RSP and

VOC by 40%, 20%, 55% and 55% respectively in the PRD Region (i.e. covering the PRDEZ in Guangdong and the HKSAR) before the year 2010 , using 1997 as the base year (CH2M Hill, 2002; HKSAR EPD, 2009). Achieving these targets will enable HKSAR to meet its current AQOs, significantly improve the air quality of the PRD region and relieve the regional smog problem. Table 1 shows the Regional distribution of pollutants of The PRD region in 1997, while Table 2 indicates the PRD Region emission reduction target in 2010.

Table 1: Regional Distribution of Pollutants in 1997 (Unit: Thousand Tonnes)

Region	SO ₂	NO _x	RSP	VOC
HKSAR	65.9 (8%)	123.3 (16%)	11.4 (2%)	68.9 (15%)
PRDEZ	732.5 (92%)	632.9 (84%)	519.5 (98%)	400.9 (85%)
PRD Region	798.3	756.2	530.9	469.7

Source: Report on the Mid-term Review of the Pearl River Delta Regional Air Quality Management Plan, 2007

Table 2: PRD Region 2010 Emission Reduction Target (Unit: Thousand Tonnes)

Region	SO ₂	NO _x	RSP	VOC
HKSAR	30.2	92.8	4.7	31.0
PRDEZ	431.3	503.6	207.5	178.2
PRD Region	461.6	596.5	212.2	209.2
2010 Emission Reduction Target	-40%	-20%	-55%	-55%

Source: Report on the Mid-term Review of the Pearl River Delta Regional Air Quality Management Plan, 2007

In December 2003, the two governments jointly drew up the “PRD Regional Air Quality Management Plan (the ‘Management Plan’)” with a view to meeting the above emission reduction targets. The PRD Air Quality Management and Monitoring Special Panel was set up under the Hong Kong/Guangdong Joint Working Group on Sustainable Development and Environmental Protection (JWG) to follow up on the tasks under the Management Plan. At the technical level, the PRD Regional Air Quality Monitoring Network established under the Management has put up a 16-station continuous monitoring network for air quality in the PRD Region (CH2M Hill, 2002).

However, historical data in Table 3 indicate that it is difficult for cities to meet the basic commitments of compliance and the emission reduction targets would have problem to achieve (up to this study, data for 2010 is not yet available).

Table 3: The Trend of Regional Distribution of Emissions
(Unit: Thousand Tonnes)

Pollutant: SO₂

Region	1997	2003	2006	2007	Target for 2010
HKSAR	65.9	91.7	/	68.1	30.2
PRDEZ	732.5	745.2	/	/	431.3
PRD Region	798.3	836.9	713.0	/	461.6

Pollutant: NO_x

Region	1997	2003	2006	2007	Target for 2010
HKSAR	123.3	110.9	/	97.2	92.8
PRDEZ	632.9	647.9	/	/	503.6
PRD Region	756.2	758.8	903.8	/	596.5

Pollutant: RSP

Region	1997	2003	2006	2007	Target for 2010
HKSAR	11.4	7.1	/	5.64	4.7
PRDEZ	519.5	525.6	/	/	207.5
PRD Region	530.9	532.7	424.9	/	212.2

Pollutant: VOC

Region	1997	2003	2006	2007	Target for 2010
HKSAR	68.9	44.2	/	39.7	31.0
PRDEZ	400.9	473.1	/	/	178.2
PRD Region	469.7	517.3	1175.4	/	209.2

Source: HKSAR EPD, 2009; Zheng et al, 2009; Report on the Mid-term Review of the Pearl River Delta Regional Air Quality Management Plan, 2007

As one of the methods to achieve the emission reduction targets, an Emission Trading Pilot Scheme for Thermal Power Plants in the PRD Region was released jointly by the HKSAR Government and the Guangdong Provincial Government in 2007 (HKSAR EPD, 2007). The Scheme aimed to provide a framework whereby eligible power plants in The PRD region would participate in emission trading. Conversely, even though the efforts by the HKSAR Government and the Guangdong Provincial Government, there were no transaction recorded for this Scheme up to this study.

3.4 Development of a Pearl River Delta Water Quality Model

A PRD Water Quality Protection Special Panel under the Joint Working Group was jointly established by the HKSAR and Guangdong Provincial Governments in August 2000. The objective of the Special Panel is to promote exchange and cooperation on the protection of water environment in the Pearl River Estuary region. A joint project (2003-2007) called “Development of a Pearl River Delta Water Quality Model” was developed in the framework of co-operation between HKSAR EPD and Department of Environmental Protection of Guangdong Province.

This numerical water quality model for the Pearl River Estuary region aims to simulate the complicated flow dynamics and water quality processes in both the river network and the coastal region. The model provides the two governments an analytical tool to support collaboration on regional water quality management and pollution control plans (HKSAR EPD, 2008).

3.5 Pearl River Delta Regional Water Quality Management Cooperation

Through the Joint Working Group, both of HKSAR and Guangdong Provincial Governments agreed in 2000 on a 15-year plan to clean up Deep Bay and to reduce pollution from existing sources and control future pollution. According to EPD of HKSAR, a review of the plan was completed at the end of 2007 and a new set of water pollution reduction targets

were agreed on. Regional water quality control strategy for Mirs Bay was initiated at the end of 2008.

3.6 Regional Cooperation Plan on Building a Quality Living Area

The first regional plan jointly compiled by the three sides- HKSAR, Guangdong and Macao SAR governments- is the “Regional Cooperation Plan on Building a Quality Living Area”. The three-month public consultation on the initial proposals was launched on September 1, 2011. The overall objective of the Plan is to transform the PRD Region into an exemplar cluster of green cities for quality living through the compilation of a long-term co-operation blueprint for the three sides. Low-carbon, high-technology and low-pollution are the key words of the Plan. The Plan will be compiled based on the consensus reached by the three sides, and will suggest cooperation initiatives in the areas of environment and ecology, low-carbon development, culture and social living, spatial planning, and transportation systems (Guangdong Province Government et al, 2011).

4. PROBLEMS IN REGIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION

Setboonsarng (2005) addressed the need for regional cooperation in trade and investment. Linn and Pidufala (2009) surveyed the experience with regional organizations in developing countries and drawn lessons which can help in regional cooperation. Shi (2009)’s study shown that some factors, such as the complexity of state forms, complicated historical problem and real economic basis and politics, restrict the regional cooperation. Wynne (2008) examined the potential benefits of regional agreements and attempted to account for past failures of such arrangements. Researches on Asian have been conducted as well. Kelegama (2001) investigated impediments to regional economic cooperation in South Asia. Kawai (2004) addressed the lessons learned from regional economic integration and cooperation in East Asia. Cui and Zhang (2008) analyzed the problems and strategy of Dalian regional economic development in Northeast Asia and raised some strategies of enhancing cooperation:

Strengthening the construction of the port market; Enhancing the industry structure; Improving the cooperation with other cities; Strengthening cooperation in ports; Enlarging cooperation with Northeast Asia nations; Exploring the possibility of building free trade port. Ur-Rahman (2008) identified that political nature and disparity in economic structures were the two types of problems impacting regional cooperation.

Based on the analyses presented above, some factors, such as the complexity of state forms, complicated historical problem, political nature, and disparity in economic structures were the several types of problems impacting regional cooperation. Some key issues that could enhance regional cooperation in environmental management in The PRD region are identified:

- 1) Achieving higher degree of trust in regional relations. Regional relations among the member cities should be based on the principles of mutual trust, equality and non-interference into each other's affairs. Expanding environmental cooperation is essentially a political decision. And such decisions cannot be implemented in an environment of mistrust and lack of confidence. Without a higher level of trust environmental cooperation cannot be realized, although there can be some exceptional cases in a bilateral context. Strong regional cooperation will never be effective unless both people and their government can comprehend the mutual benefits of coming together. Unless the comparative advantage of inter-regional environmental management relations are realized and until the cost of non-cooperation is calculated by the decision makers, substantive initiatives related to cooperation cannot be undertaken. Therefore, the level of trust among member cities would determine the level of cooperation.
- 2) Political will to cooperate needs to be further strengthened. The political will of the regions to come together despite differences in size, level of development and differing perceptions has to be further enhanced. It would be an invaluable asset for regional cooperation. Despite differences on many counts, the political will to cooperate could result in successful regional cooperative frameworks.

- 3) Expand the role of private sector. The private sector usually is more proactive and innovative in terms of choice energy-saving technology than the public sector enterprises. The market forces have their own dynamics to engage in mutually beneficial ventures.
- 4) Informed decision making on environmental cooperation and efficient and effective use of information technology. There is a need to carryout in-depth research and analysis of the potential areas for cooperation within region. Identification of areas of cooperation where complementarities exist would generate interest in the potential partners. It would also reduce the factors of uncertainty and give confidence to the prospective technology spillover. Additionally, information sharing has enormous potential for creating conducive environment for regionally environmental management cooperation. Creation of web-based technology links would facilitate the flow of technology information and help establishing relevant connections. Information networks play a crucial role in accessing information and establishing contacts in the private sector.
- 5) Environmental management policy coordination for sustainable environmental management cooperation. Environmental management competition has to be channeled to create a win-win situation for all member cities in the region. Accommodation of small and weak economies in the environmental cooperation framework would ensure long-term common prosperity of the entire region. A coordinated region-based growth strategy will enable the member cities to deal effectively with future challenges, especially in view of globalization. A coordinated environmental management-policy-approach is important for long-term regional integration.
- 6) Workable Cooperation Issues. Air pollution, water pollution, ecosystem degradation constitute a very large and diverse group of environmental problems. Therefore, while following the regional environmental management framework, bilateral, trilateral and quadrilateral cooperation based on each city's capacity for handling certain projects should be undertaken for successful implementation of projects. Regional air pollution is a big challenge and has immense stakes for rapidly developing economies like the PRD Region. Approach to focus regional air pollution related projects is a needed and

practicable area to deal with. Therefore, the PRD Regional environmental management framework provides an opportunity to have greater cooperation in regional air pollution.

- 7) Expanding communication infrastructure. The other emerging area of cooperation is the infrastructure development projects. An extensive communication infrastructure linking all member cities is a prerequisite for cooperation. In this regard all cities in the region are in agreement to develop a multilateral agreement on facilitating environmental management. Moreover, the development of domestic communication infrastructure is equally important and due attention should be paid to this issue, especially in the cities where it is inadequate.

5. MECHANISM DESIGN OF INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENT IN ENVIRONMENTAL COLLABORATION AMONG CITIES IN THE PRD REGION

The failure of the market to provide an effective mechanism for optimal resource use will arise if there exist imperfect market structure, externalities, imperfect information or public goods. These phenomena are prevalent in economic production and management of the resultant pollutions. Economic analysis no longer treats the economic system as given since the appearance of Leonid Hurwicz's (1973) pioneering work on mechanism design. The term "design" stresses that the structure of the system is to be regarded as an unknown and subject to novel construction.

In dynamic cooperation, an important condition on cooperation and agreement is required: in the solution, the agreed upon optimality principle must remain optimal throughout the cooperation period. This condition is known as dynamic stability or time consistency. In other words, dynamic stability of solutions to any cooperative scheme involved the property that, as cooperation proceeds the same optimality principle is maintained at each stage, and hence the participants do not possess incentives to deviate from the previously adopted optimal behavior (Yeung and Petrosyan, 2006a and 2006b; Yeung, 2008). In particular, it ensures that: (i) the continuation of the agreed-upon policy to a later stage would remain optimal; (ii) all participants have no incentive to deviate from the initial

plan.

Given the complex nature of environmental problems facing the PRD Region, and the numerous measures that need to be implemented to provide for better environmental quality, there needs to be an institutional arrangement in environmental collaboration.

Figure 9 proposes an institutional arrangement for the region that would arrive at appropriate targets of environmental pollution control.




Figure 9: Institutional Arrangement in Environmental Collaboration among PRD Region

A proposed prototype inter-regional pollution management model modified from the Yeung (2011) model is as follows:

Table 4: Mechanism Design of Operations in Collaborative Environmental Management**Noncooperative Status Quo Estimation**

Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 4
Review current GDP and Project the annual GDP of the PRD cities in the planning 5 years	Review current environmental costs and Project the annual costs of the PRD cities in the planning 5 years	Review current pollution tax and projected rates; Project the planning 5 years	Review current abatement spending and Project the planning 5 years

Collaborative Environmental Management Scope

Design of Collaborative Policies			
Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 4
New pollution tax capturing pollution spill-over	Joint pollution abatement actions	choice of green technology, maximize the PRD Region GDP	Sharing mechanism and compensation scheme to maintain dynamic stability

Optimal Actions and Forecast of Outcomes under Cooperation

Derivation of Optimal Environment-Preserving Technology Choice Among The 11 Cities			
Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 4
Estimation of annual GDP of the PRD cities in the planning 5 years under cooperation	Estimation of environmental costs of the PRD cities in the planning 5 years	Compute optimal pollution tax rates for the 9 cities in the planning 5 years	Design joint abatement actions in the planning 5 years

Compensations

Step 1	Step 2	Step 3
With maximized joint GDP from the PRD Region a compensation plan is designed to compute transfer payments among the involved cities so that the agreed-upon payoffs will be realized by each city.	To ensure stability in cooperation over time, the specific agreed-upon optimality principle must be maintained at all stages of the cooperation duration. This condition is known as <i>dynamic consistency</i> (see Yeung and Petrosyan 2006b).	Design of dynamically consistent* compensation for all the eleven cities in the PRD Region will be computed.

* The notion of dynamic consistency is illustrated in Section 6 below.

6. POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND DYNAMICALLY CONSISTENT COMPENSATION

Using the above analysis as a policy guide, a coalition of cities in The PRD region should be formed to pursue a comprehensive cooperative scheme of air pollution abatement. Policy instruments include environmental taxes and charges, adoption of environment-friendly production technology, subsidy to the replacement of polluting techniques, joint research and development in clean technology, etc.

To offer a long-term solution for cooperation, first there has to guarantee that the participating cities will always be better off within the entire duration of the agreement. To create a cooperative solution that every city would commit to from beginning to the end, the proposed arrangement must remain optimal throughout the cooperation period. This is the ‘classic’ game-theoretic problem of dynamical (or subgame) consistency. In this study, in order to maximize the joint outcome of environmental cooperation in The PRD region, a dynamically consistent compensation plan will be designed. Transfer payments among the involved cities will be computed to ensure stability in cooperation over time. A compensation scheme leading to dynamic consistency will be developed using the pioneering techniques of Yeung and Petrosyan (2006b) and Yeung (2011). Policy recommendations and analysis will be developed. In particular a dynamically consistent compensation formula has to obtained so that

$$\frac{\sum_{\zeta=t}^5 G_{\zeta}^i}{\sum_{\zeta=t}^5 netGDP_{\zeta}^i} = \frac{\sum_{\zeta=t}^5 G_{\zeta}^j}{\sum_{\zeta=t}^5 netGDP_{\zeta}^j},$$

for $i, j \in N$ and $t \in \{1, 2, \dots, 5\}$,

where G_k^t is the income net of pollution damage received by city k in year t under the collaborative scheme,

$netGDP_k^t$ is the GDP net of pollution damage of city k in year t if each city acts on its own.

$$\text{Moreover } \sum_{k=1}^{10} \sum_{\zeta=t}^5 G_{\zeta}^k = Y_t$$

where Y_t is the cumulative total net GDP of the eleven cities under cooperation from the t^{th} year to the last fifth year.

Having

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\sum_{\zeta=t}^5 G_{\zeta}^{DG}}{\sum_{\zeta=t}^5 netGDP_{\zeta}^{DG}} &= \frac{\sum_{\zeta=t}^5 G_{\zeta}^{FS}}{\sum_{\zeta=t}^5 netGDP_{\zeta}^{FS}} = \frac{\sum_{\zeta=t}^5 G_{\zeta}^{GZ}}{\sum_{\zeta=t}^5 netGDP_{\zeta}^{GZ}} = \frac{\sum_{\zeta=t}^5 G_{\zeta}^{HK}}{\sum_{\zeta=t}^5 netGDP_{\zeta}^{HK}} \\ &= \frac{\sum_{\zeta=t}^5 G_{\zeta}^{HZ}}{\sum_{\zeta=t}^5 netGDP_{\zeta}^{HZ}} = \frac{\sum_{\zeta=t}^5 G_{\zeta}^{JM}}{\sum_{\zeta=t}^5 netGDP_{\zeta}^{JM}} = \frac{\sum_{\zeta=t}^5 G_{\zeta}^{MC}}{\sum_{\zeta=t}^5 netGDP_{\zeta}^{MC}} = \frac{\sum_{\zeta=t}^5 G_{\zeta}^{SZ}}{\sum_{\zeta=t}^5 netGDP_{\zeta}^{SZ}} \\ &= \frac{\sum_{\zeta=t}^5 G_{\zeta}^{ZQ}}{\sum_{\zeta=t}^5 netGDP_{\zeta}^{ZQ}} = \frac{\sum_{\zeta=t}^5 G_{\zeta}^{ZS}}{\sum_{\zeta=t}^5 netGDP_{\zeta}^{ZS}} = \frac{\sum_{\zeta=t}^5 G_{\zeta}^{ZH}}{\sum_{\zeta=t}^5 netGDP_{\zeta}^{ZH}} \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

implies that the cooperative payoff for each city is always maintained to be proportional to the relative size of their noncooperative GDP net of environmental cost throughout the cooperation period. With (1) holding, each city will obtain an addition payoff (proportional to their noncooperative status) in each of the collaborating years and hence would have no incentive to leave the plan.

7. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The paper develops a model for collaborative environmental management for the PRD cities -- Dongguan, Foshan, Guangzhou, Hong Kong, Huizhou, Jiangmen, Macao, Shenzhen,

Zhaoqing, Zhongshan, and Zhuhai. Using empirical methods to estimate the parameters relevant to GDP, pollution medical costs, taxes and abatement spending, an operational model for identifying the participating cities' environmental control strategies and inter-regional compensation will be formulated. The model is expected to provide practical policy choices for a PRD environmental collaboration scheme (if it indeed becomes a reality). It will facilitate the exploration of hitherto intractable problems in consistent environmental cooperation and establish solution plans. The research is expected to yield notable academic contributions to the study in mechanism design.

REFERENCES

- Angell, L.C. and Klassen, R.D., 1999. Integrating Environmental Issues into The Mainstream: An Agenda for Research in Operations Management. *Journal of Operations Management*, 17, pp.575–598.
- ARUP, 2009. Review of Air Quality Objectives and Development of a Long Term Air Quality Strategy for Hong Kong - Feasibility Study (Final Report). *Report for the Environmental Protection Department, Hong Kong SAR Government, 2009, July.*
- Bielli, M. and Reverberi, P., 1996. New Operations Research and Artificial Intelligence Approaches To Traffic Engineering Problems. *European Journal of Operational Research*, 92, pp.550-572.
- Box, G.E.P., 2007. *Response Surfaces, Mixtures, And Ridge Analyse*. 2nd ed. Norman R. Draper. Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley-Interscience.
- Campanella, T.J., Zhang, M., Lee, T. and Sze, N.D., 2002. The Pearl River Delta: An Evolving Region. In A.G.O. Yeh et al., eds., *Building A Competitive Pearl River Delta Region: Cooperation, Coordination, and Planning*. Hong Kong: Centre for Urban Planning and Environmental Management, Hong Kong University, pp. 9-26.
- Campbell, J.F. and Langevin, A., 1995. Operations Management for Urban Snow Removal and Disposal. *Transportation Research Part A: Policy And Practice*, 29A(5), pp.359-370.

- Chakrabarty, B.K., 2007. Computer-Aided Design in Urban Development and Management—A Software for Integrated Planning and Design by Optimization. *Building and Environment*, 42, pp.473–494.
- Chan, J.C.L., Cheng, A.Y.S., Liu, H.P. and Walton, A., 2002. Air Pollution Considerations in Town Planning in Hong Kong. In A.G.O. Yeh et al., eds., *Building a Competitive Pearl River Delta Region: Cooperation, Coordination, and Planning*. Hong Kong: Centre for Urban Planning and Environmental Management, Hong Kong University, pp. 165-182.
- Chow, T., 2002. Fighting Air Pollution in Hong Kong. In A.G.O. Yeh et al., eds., *Building A Competitive Pearl River Delta Region: Cooperation, Coordination, And Planning*. Hong Kong: Centre for Urban Planning and Environmental Management, Hong Kong University, pp.153-158.
- Crainic, Teodor G., Gendreau, M. and Potvin, J.-Y., 2009. Intelligent Freight-Transportation Systems: Assessment and The Contribution Of Operations Research. *Transportation Research Part C*, 17, pp.541–557.
- Cui, Y. and Zhang, F., 2008. Positive Analysis on Problems and Strategy of Dalian Regional Economic Development in Northeast Asia. *Proceedings of 2008 Conference on Regional Economy And Sustainable Development*.
- Daniel, S.E., Diakoulaki, D.C. and Pappis, C.P., 1997. Operations Research and Environmental Planning. *European Journal Of Operational Research*, 102, pp.248-263.
- Fan, X., Cui, B., Zhao, H., Zhang, Z., and Zhang, H., 2010. Assessment Of River Water Quality In Pearl River Delta Using Multivariate Statistical Techniques. *Procedia Environmental Sciences*, 2, pp.1220–1234.
- Friedmann, J., 2005. *China's Urban Transition*. Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota Press.
- Golden, Bruce L. and Wasil, Edward A., 1994. Managing Fish, Forests, Wildlife, and Water: Applications of Management Science and Operations Research to Natural Resource Decision Problems. In S.M. M. Pollock, Allison D. Barnett, M. H. Rothkopf (eds) *Handbooks In Operations Research And Management Science: Operations Research And The Public Sector*, 6, pp.289-363.
- Gruber, M.H.J., 1990. *Regression Estimators: A Comparative Study*. Boston: Academic Press.

- Hopkinson, L. and Stern, R., 2003. One Country, Two Systems, One Smog Cross-Boundary Air Pollution Policy Challenges for Hong Kong and Guangdong. *China Environment Series*, 6, pp. 19-36.
- Huang, R., Jiang, Y., Liu, Z., Yang, Y., and Jiang W., 2010. Algorithm and Implementation of Urban Rail Transit Network Based on Joint Operation. *Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology*, 10(2), pp.130-135.
- Hurwicz, L., 1973. The Design of Mechanisms for Resource Allocation. *American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings*, 63, pp.1-30.
- Kawai, M., 2004. Regional Economic Integration and Cooperation in East Asia. Experts' Seminar On The "Impact And Coherence Of OECD Country Policies On Asian Developing Economies," Paris, June 10-11, 2004.
- Kelegama, S., 2001. Impediments to Regional Economic Cooperation In South Asia. *Friederich-Ebert-Stiftung Publication No.49*.
- Larson, R.C. and Odoni, A.R., 1981. *Urban Operations Research: Logistical And Transportation Planning Methods*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
- Larson, R.C. and Odoni, A.R., 2007. *Urban Operations Research*. 2nd ed. Dynamic Ideas, Belmont: Massachusetts.
- Lau, P.S., 2001. Study of Acid Rain in Hong Kong. *Final Report Submitted For The Provision Of Service To The Environmental Protection Department, HKSAR (Tender Ref AS 99-417). IESD Publication 01-02*.
- Lee, F.Y.S., 2001. Environmental Issues Arising from Rapid Industrialization and Decentralized Urbanization in the Pearl River Delta. *China Environment Report: Ecological Lessons of the Pearl River Delta, Hong Kong: Greenpeace China*, pp. 23-35.
- Lee, F.Y.S., 2002a. Towards Effective Regional Environmental Governance For The Hong Kong - Pearl River Delta Border Zone: The Relevance of Some International Experiences. In A.G.O Yeh et al., eds., *Building A Competitive Pearl River Delta Region: Cooperation, Coordination, And Planning*. Hong Kong: Centre For Urban Planning And Environmental Management, Hong Kong University, pp. 205-236.
- Lee, F.Y.S., 2002b. Tackling Cross-Border Environmental Problems in Hong Kong: Initial

- Responses And Institutional Constraints. *The China Quarterly*, 172 (December), pp.150-173.
- Liao, H.F. and Chan, R.C.K., 2010. Industrial Relocation of Hong Kong Manufacturing Firms: Towards an Expanding Industrial Space Beyond The Pearl River Delta. *Geojournal*, DOI 10.1007/S10708-009-9316-3.
- Lin, G.C.S., 2001. Metropolitan Development in A Transitional Socialist Economy: Spatial Restructuring In The Pearl River Delta, China. *Urban Studies*, 38(3), pp.383-406. London, UK: Carfax.
- Linn, J.F. and Pidufala, O., 2009. Experience with Regional Economic Cooperation. *CAREC Notes, February 2009 Issue No. 3*.
- Ma, X.L., 2002. Guangdong - Hong Kong Environmental Cooperation: Problem, Solution and Urgency. In A.G.O. Yeh et al., eds., *Building A Competitive Pearl River Delta Region: Cooperation, Coordination, And Planning*. Hong Kong: Centre For Urban Planning And Environmental Management, Hong Kong University, pp. 193-204.
- Ma, X.L. and Tao, J.L., 2010. Cross-Border Environmental Governance in The Greater Pearl River Delta (GPRD). *International Journal of Environmental Studies*, 67(2), pp.127–136.
- Marchau, V., Walker, W. and Duin, R., 2008. An Adaptive Approach To Implementing Innovative Urban Transport Solutions. *Transport Policy*, 15, pp. 405–412.
- Odoni, A.R., Rousseau, J.-M. and Wilson, N.H.M., 1994. Models In Urban and Air Transportation. In S.M. M. Pollock, Allison D. Barnett, M. H. Rothkopf (eds) *Handbooks In Operations Research and Management Science: Operations Research and The Public Sector*, 6, pp.107-150.
- Revelle, C. and Ellis, J.H., 1994. Models For Water and Air Quality Management. In S.M.M. Pollock, Allison D. Barnett, M.H. Rothkopf (eds) *Handbooks In Operations Research and Management Science: Operations Research and The Public Sector*, 6, pp.365-401.
- Salkeld, K.A., 2002. Thoughts On The Environment and Sustainable Development For The Pearl River Delta Region. In A.G.O. Yeh Et Al., eds., *Building A Competitive Pearl River Delta Region: Cooperation, Coordination, and Planning*. Hong Kong: Centre For

- Urban Planning and Environmental Management, Hong Kong University, pp. 189-192.
- Setboonsarng, S., 2005. Regional Economic Cooperation In Trade and Investment For The Rehabilitation Of Tsunami-Affected Countries: A Private Sector Approach. *Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review*, 1(1).
- Shi, C., 2009. The Present Regional Economic Cooperation In Northeast Asia and The Prospect. *Asian Social Science*, 5(2), pp.15-18.
- Ur-Rahman, F., 2008. SCO: Problems of Enhancing Economic Cooperation. *Eurasia Critic*, April, 2008
- Wang, T., 2002. Photochemical Smog: An Air-Pollution Problem Requiring Regional Solutions. In A.G.O. Yeh et al., eds., *Building A Competitive Pearl River Delta Region: Cooperation, Coordination, and Planning*. Hong Kong: Centre for Urban Planning and Environmental Management, Hong Kong University, pp. 159-164.
- Wey, W.M., 2005. An Integrated Expert System/Operations Research Approach For The Optimization Of Waste Incinerator Siting Problems. *Knowledge-Based Systems*, 18, pp.267–278.
- Wynne, L., 2008. An Arab Union: Is Regional Economic Cooperation The Way Forward For The Oil States Of The Middle East? *Cross Sections*, IV, pp.151-162.
- Xu, J. and Yeh A.G.O., 2011. Coordinating The Fragmented Mega-City Regions In China: State Reconstruction and Regional Strategic Planning. In J. Xu and A.G.O. Yeh, eds., *Governance and Planning Of Mega-City Regions: An International Comparative Perspective*. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, pp. 213-235.
- Yeh, A.G.O, 2001. Hong Kong and The Pearl River Delta: Competition Or Cooperation? *Built Environment*, 27(2), pp.129-145.
- Yeh, A.G.O, 2002. Further Cooperation Between Hong Kong and The Pearl River Delta In Creating A More Competitive Region. In A.G.O Yeh et al., eds., *Building A Competitive Pearl River Delta Region: Cooperation, Coordination, and Planning*. Hong Kong: Centre for Urban Planning and Environmental Management, Hong Kong University, pp. 319-346.
- Yeh, A.G.O and Xu, J., 2008. Regional Cooperation In The Pan-Pearl River Delta: A

- Formulaic Aspiration Or A New Imagination? *Built Environment*, 34(4), pp.408-426.
- Yeh, A.G.O, and Xu, J., 2011. Regional Cooperation in China's Transitional Economy. In Anthony G.O. Yeh and Jiang Xu (eds), *China's Pan-Pearl River Delta: Regional Cooperation and Development*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
- Yeh, A.G.O, Lee, F.Y.S, Lee, T, Dak, S.N., eds., 2002. *Building A Competitive Pearl River Delta Region: Cooperation, Coordination, and Planning*. Hong Kong: Centre for Urban Planning and Environmental Management, Hong Kong University.
- Yeh, A.G.O. and Wu, F.L., 1999 The Transformation of The Urban Planning System In China From A Centrally-Planned To Transitional Economy. *Progress In Planning*, 51(3), pp.167-252.
- Yeung, D.W.K., 2007. Dynamically Consistent Cooperative Solution in A Differential Game Of Transboundary Industrial Pollution. *Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications*, 134, pp.143-160.
- Yeung, D.W.K., 2008. Dynamically Consistent Solution For A Pollution Management Game In Collaborative Abatement With Uncertain Future Payoffs, In D.W.K. Yeung and L.A. Petrosyan (Guest eds) *Special Issue On Frontiers In Game Theory: In Honour Of John F. Nash*, *International Game Theory Review*, 10(4), pp.517-538.
- Yeung, D.W.K., 2012. Dynamically Consistent Collaborative Environmental Management with Production Technique Choices. *Annals of Operations Research*, Forthcoming in 2012. DOI: 10.1007/S10479-011-0844-0.
- Yeung, D.W.K. and Petrosyan, L.A., 2006a Dynamically Stable Corporate Joint Ventures. *Automatica*, 42, pp.365–370.
- Yeung, D.W.K. and Petrosyan, L.A., 2006b. *Cooperative Stochastic Differential Games*. New York, NY: Springer-Verlag.
- Yeung, D.W.K. and Petrosyan, L.A., 2008a. A Cooperative Stochastic Differential Game of Transboundary Industrial Pollution. *Automatica*. 44 (6), pp.1532-1544.
- Yeung, D.W.K. and Petrosyan, L.A., 2008b. Managing Catastrophe-Bound Industrial Pollution With Game-Theoretic Algorithm: The St Petersburg Initiative. In L.A. Petrosyan and N.A. Zenkevich (eds), *Contributions To Game Theory and Management*.

St Petersburg State University, pp 524-538.

- Zhang, Y.H., Hu, M., Zhong, L.J., Wiedensohler, A., Liu, S.C., Andreae, M.O., Wang, W. and Fan, S.J., 2008. Regional Integrated Experiments on Air Quality over Pearl River Delta 2004 (PRIDE-PRD2004): Overview. *Atmospheric Environment*, 42, pp.6157–6173.
- Zheng, J., Zhang, L., Che, W., Zheng, Z. and Yin, S., 2009. A Highly Resolved Temporal and Spatial Air Pollutant Emission Inventory for The Pearl River Delta Region, China and Its Uncertainty Assessment. *Atmospheric Environment*, 43, pp.5112–5122.
- Zhou, N., Westrich, B., Jiang, S. and Wang, Y., 2011. A Coupling Simulation Based On A Hydrodynamics and Water Quality Model Of The Pearl River Delta, China. *Journal of Hydrology*, 396, pp.267–276.

A Literature Review: How Useful is Agency Theory – Top Executive Compensation

Chan Kien Ngai
Hong Kong Shue Yan University
Email: chankien@hotmail.com.hk

1. INTRODUCTION

The issue of how top executives of publicly listed companies are paid has been intensively debated in the US since the 1920s (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997; Taussig & Barker, 1925). In Hong Kong, this issue has also been fuelled by public debates regarding the massive pay-outs to the top executives of publicly listed companies, despite poor financial performance and sharp falls in stock prices. For example, it was reported that Pacific Century CyberWorks (PCCW), a major listed company in Hong Kong, paid HK\$768 million to twelve of their top executives in year 2000 (50 times more than in 1999) despite the company having lost HK\$6.9 billion and its share price having dropped 72 percent (*SCMP*, 2002).

Rosen (1992) studied the compensation-performance relationships of the listed companies in the US, and found that top executives whose work produced annual rates of return of 20 percent were paid only 1 percent more than top executives whose work produced annual rates of return of 10 percent. In perhaps the largest empirical study of top executive compensation, Jensen and Murphy (1990) studied the compensation-performance history of several thousand top executives in the US. Using an agency framework, they were surprised to find that top executives received only US\$3.25 for every US\$1,000 increase in shareholders' wealth and concluded that, "The compensation of top executives is virtually independent of performance...on average, companies pay their top executives like bureaucrats" (p.138).

Overall, the literature using company performance as a predictor variable to explain the compensation of top executives has reported mixed and largely inconclusive results (Finkelstein, 1992; Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Main, 1991; Murphy, 1985; Tosi et al., 2000).

Gomez-Mejia (1994) therefore concludes that, “The literature on executive pay is rather extensive...when taken as a whole, results are conflicting and disappointing” (p.199).

The weak evidence is an important issue for both academics and practitioners. For academics, the weak evidence suggests that agency theory has poor predictive power (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Perrow, 1986). For practitioners, it raises the question whether the assets in public companies have been managed efficiently (Hall & Liebman, 1998). The weak evidence also raises fundamental concerns about the ethics of board practices since shareholders expect boards to protect their interests (Walters et al., 1995).

The weak evidence is particularly important for Hong Kong because the reform of top executive compensation policies and practices has followed the assumptions of agency theory and thus the Anglo-American system (Ho, 2003), despite important differences between family-dominated companies in Hong Kong and more broadly owned companies in the US; and also despite the corporate culture in Hong Kong being characterized as “collectivist” (Hofstede, 1991, 1980), and thus perhaps different from the US culture, which is characterized as “individualist” (Hofstede, 1991, 1980).

The key questions to be asked are:

1. Which factors are seen as responsible for the weak evidence of a relationship between top executive compensation and company performance?
2. How useful is agency theory as an explanation of top executive compensation?

This paper reviews the empirical and theoretical literature relating to top executive compensation in an attempt to answer these two questions.

2. THEORY AND EVIDENCE

The literature that has examined top executive compensation (Bloom & Milkovich, 1998; Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama, 1980; Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Kosnik & Shapiro, 1997) has overwhelmingly been based on agency theory. Agency

theory focuses on the need for monitoring and control arising from conflicts of interest between top executives and shareholders as the result of the separation of ownership and control.

Agency theory assumes that agents are risk-averse, self-serving, and “economics driven” (Walsh & Seward, 1990). Agency problems (agency conflicts) arise because agents have different goals from the principals and thus have the potential to pursue a self-serving agenda at the expense of the shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983 a,b; Kroll et al., 1993). The difference in the goals between agents and principals is that agents want to minimize risks and principals want to maximize profits. Agency problems adversely affect company performance, and ultimately reduce shareholders’ wealth (Fama & Jensen, 1983a,b; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).

Thus, the challenge for shareholders is to find ways through which they can monitor, control or induce these agents to act in their best interests (Eisenhardt, 1989; Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992; Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997; Hoskisson et al., 2000). Agency theory suggests that an agency contract is an effective mechanism because the contract is “self-monitored” on the part of the top executives. An efficient agency contract is a contract that links the compensation of top executives with measurable company performance (Bloom & Milkovich, 1998; Conlon & Parks, 1990; Tosi et al., 1997; Welbourne et al., 1995). Bloom and Milkovich (1998) claim that effective agency contracts “solve the agency problem” (p.284).

However, findings from studies of top executive compensation as an effective mechanism have been inconsistent and inconclusive. Finkelstein and Boyd (1998) report correlations of .13 and -.03 between return on equity (ROE) with cash compensation and stock options. Johnson (1982) reports a correlation of .003 between ROE and total compensation of top executives (salary, bonuses and stock options). Belliveau et al. (1996), however, report a stronger correlation of .41 between ROE and total compensation of top executives (salary, bonuses and stock options). In a meta-analysis of 105 studies of top executive compensation, Tosi et al. (2000) report a correlation of .05 between company

performance and the compensation of top executives, using various measures of company performance and various definitions of compensation of top executives.

Because of the weak evidence, Barkema et al. (1998) suggest that to arrive at a better understanding of what determines the compensation paid to top executives, future studies should “enhance understanding of the relative importance of firm performance and other criteria...and how the definitions, measurement, and relative importance of these criteria depend on a firm’s governance structure and on contingencies” (p.142).

The following sections will explore factors that researchers have thought might have contributed to the failure to find a consistent and strong relationship between top executive compensation and company performance.

The next section will discuss two methodological issues that researchers have thought might have contributed to the weak evidence for a relationship between top executive compensation and company performance found in their studies. The two issues are the different ways in which “compensation” is defined in the literature, and the different ways in which “performance” is measured in the literature.

3. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

A review of the literature revealed that the term “compensation” has been defined as salary, bonuses, stock options or a combination of these (Belkoui & Picur, 1993; Boyd, 1994; David et al., 1998; Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998; Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987; Kerr & Kren, 1992). A review of the literature also revealed that as many as thirty different measures have been used to measure “company performance” (Boyd, 1994; Douglas & Santerre, 1990; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1995; Tosi et al., 2000; Werner & Tosi, 1995).

Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997), Barkema et al. (1998) and Tosi et al. (2000) suggested that different definitions of compensation and different measurements of company performance might have contributed to the weak evidence for any relationship between top executive compensation and company performance reported in the literature. Because of these differences, some of the findings reported in the literature may not be comparable.

Gomez-Mejia (1994) said, “Firms and researchers use different formulas to report executive compensation...and it is not always clear how comparable those data are” (p.175). Tosi et al. (2000) also said, “A problem that we faced is the large number of different independent variables used as performance measures” (p.307).

The next sub-section will discuss the different definitions used in the literature for the term “compensation”, which researchers have thought may have contributed to the weak evidence reported in the literature for a relationship between top executive compensation and company performance.

3.1 How has compensation been defined?

The term “compensation” has been defined as salary, bonuses, stock options or a combination of these. For instance, O’Reilly et al. (1988) and Kerr and Kren (1992) defined compensation as salary, Belkauoi and Picur (1993) and Boyd (1994) as salary and bonuses, Finkelstein and Boyd (1998) as salary and stock options, Bilimoria (1997) as stock options, and Gomez-Mejia et al. (1987), Douglas and Santerre (1990), Gray and Cannella (1997) and David et al. (1998) as salary, bonuses and stock options. It is possible that the different definitions of compensation may have contributed to the weak evidence for a performance-compensation relationship reported in the literature because the literature cited may not be comparable. As Gomez-Mejia (1994) said, “Firms and researchers use different formulas to report executive compensation...and it is not always clear how comparable those data are” (p.175).

Researchers seem not to have had a problem with including short-term incentives (salary and bonuses) in the definition of compensation (Agarwal, 1981; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989; Kerr & Bettis, 1987; Lewellen & Huntsman, 1970). In fact, Meeks and Whittington (1975), Coffee (1988), Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992), Kroll et al. (1993), David et al. (1998) and Shevlin (2003) favoured including stock options in the definition of compensation, because stock options form an essential part of the compensation of top executives, particularly in the US; Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992) found that over 60 percent of compensation of the chief executives in the US was in the form of stock options.

However, including long-term incentives (stock options) in the definition of compensation has been controversial. Lewellen and Huntsman (1970), Ciscel and Carroll (1980), Kerr and Bettis (1987) and Lambert and Larcker (1993) argued that the term “long-term incentives” is misleading and that the valuation of these long-term incentives is “beset with a number of methodological and practical problems” (Lambert & Larcker, 1993, p.80). The argument is that long-term incentives do not necessarily refer to rewards that are linked to performance goals far into the future or beyond the tenure of top executives, which is normally five years (Ciscel & Carroll, 1980; Gomez-Mejia, 1994; Kerr & Bettis, 1987; Lambert & Larcker, 1993).

Second, long-term incentives such as stock options are intended to focus the attention of top executives on long-term performance goals, but in reality it does not work this way. Lewellen and Huntsman (1970), Kerr and Bettis (1987) and Gomez-Mejia (1994) suggested that top executives may benefit from a general upward trend in the stock market, receive stocks at a discount (i.e. below the market price) or receive company stocks through a predetermined formula based on different measures of performance. However, these long-term incentives do not have a mechanism to penalise these top executives for poor performance.

The methodological problem lies in the calculation of the “present value” of stock options that top executives hold but have not yet cashed in. Different approaches have been developed to estimate the “present value” of stock options, and the most commonly used is the method developed by Black and Scholes (1973) (Kerr & Bettis, 1987; Lewellen & Huntsman, 1970). Yet, Lewellen and Huntsman (1970), Kerr and Bettis (1987), O’Reilly et al. (1988) and Belliveau et al. (1996) have argued that all these methods require crude estimates, such as a company’s future stock prices, future interest rates and opportunity cost of holding these stock options. The calculations of the “present value” can vary widely and thus affect the figures for compensation used in the literature.

The practical problem is the fact that top executives can choose when to convert these stock options into cash. Thus, it is very difficult to specify when the income generated by such stock options should be credited to the executives’ compensation package. Kerr and

Bettis (1987), Lambert and Larcker (1993) and Gomez-Mejia (1994) argued that the compensation of top executives could fluctuate widely if all the gains were attributed to a particular year when top executives exercised the option to convert these stock options into cash.

Another practical problem is the problem of comparability. Agarwal (1981) points out that, “Defining compensation as salary and bonus also has the advantage of providing comparability...as the largest percentage of prior studies have defined compensation to include only direct cash payments (salary and bonuses)” (p.39).

As a result of these methodological and practical problems, Lewellen and Huntsman (1970), Kerr and Bettis (1987) and Lambert and Larcker (1993) suggested that the definition of compensation should include only salary and bonuses and exclude stock options, because excluding stock options in the definition would not adversely affect the results of research. The argument is that stock options are highly correlated with salary and bonuses. In a frequently cited article, Lewellen and Huntsman (1970) examined the relationship between company performance and top executive compensation by using two definitions of compensation. One definition included salary and bonuses, and the other included salary and bonuses as well as stock options. It was found that there were no significant differences between the results on the basis of each of the two definitions. Lewellen and Huntsman (1970) argued that the two definitions are highly correlated, “These two measures are perhaps differentiated only by a scale factor” (p.718). Lewellen and Huntsman (1970) therefore suggested that to avoid both practical and methodological problems, future research could exclude stock options in the definition of compensation. Tosi et al. (2000) agreed, “If total pay was not available, total cash pay (salary and bonus) was used...this should not be a problem...they are highly correlated. It has been demonstrated that simple measures of cash compensation are an excellent proxy for total pay for CEO” (p.307). Agarwal (1981), Kerr and Bettis (1987), Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996, 1989) and Finkelstein and Boyd (1998) also found that the two definitions were highly correlated and thus suggested excluding stock options from the definition of compensation.

Kerr and Bettis (1987) pointed out that such long-term incentives were so complex that the calculation of a CEO's financial income was often "intractable or misleading", and that value became "the selection of the day on which the option [was] to be valued" (p.653). Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) claimed that there were no theoretically and empirically appropriate methods of establishing the value of stock options, and suggested that until such methods emerged, stock options should not be included in the definition of compensation.

In summary, many different definitions have been used for compensation in the literature. Except for salary and bonuses, the actual dollar amount received by top executives is often not clearly understood and subject to interpretation. Lewellen and Huntsman (1970) reported that cash compensation (salary and bonuses) was so strongly correlated with total compensation (salary, bonuses and stock options) that future research might use cash compensation as the definition for compensation. Yet, Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992) and other researchers suggested that excluding stock options might be a problem because a large percentage of the top executives' compensation may be in the form of stock options, particularly of top executives in the US.

The next sub-section will examine different measurement used in the literature for company performance, and thus the performance of top executives. Researchers have thought that the different measurement used in the literature might have contributed to the weak evidence for the performance-compensation relationship reported in the literature.

3.2 How has performance been measured?

A fundamental issue in the accounting literature concerns the validity of accounting information, that is, the extent to which accounting information reflects the underlying financial health of a company. Accounting standards require numerous estimates, and many legitimate choices of procedures are available. Thus accounting policies used by top executives may lead to differences in reported earnings (Bushman & Indjejikian, 1980). These choices, in turn, may be used as the measure for rewarding top executives (Bushman & Injejikian, 1980; Lambert & Larcker, 1993; Sloan, 1994). This means that the profitability of

a company at a given point of time may not be a hard number, but rather an estimate derived from top executives' calculations using accounting conventions (Gomez-Mejia, 1994). Top executives enjoy high discretion in selecting the type of data and methodology to use in assessing the financial health of their company (Bushman & Indjejikian, 1980; Gomez-Mejia, 1994; Rappaport, 1978).

The meta-analysis conducted by Tosi et al. (2000) revealed that as many as thirty different measures have been used to assess the performance of companies, which in turn have been used to measure the performance of the top executives. The different measures used in the literature raise the question whether the performance of companies and the associated performance of top executives have been measured accurately and consistently. It also raises the question whether the literature is comparable (Gomez-Mejia, 1994; Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003; Tosi et al., 2000).

The many different performance measures can be categorised into measures of profitability, stock performance and stockholders' equity (Belkoui & Picur, 1993; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989; Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998; Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987; Kerr & Kren, 1992; Kroll et al., 1993). Of the three measures, the use of profitability and stock performance as a measure of company performance has been controversial.

The first measure of company performance is profitability. Profitability is measured as earning per share or return on investment (Kroll et al., 1993; Tosi et al., 2000). However, Lewellen and Huntsman (1970) and Kerr and Bettis (1987) have argued that this measure of profitability may not reflect a company's true underlying value of performance, because to make them look good, top executives can manipulate the profitability indicators. They have revealed that the techniques commonly used by top executives to manipulate profitability indicators include: (1) manipulating depreciation policy, accelerated versus straight-line; (2) changing inventory valuation procedures, FIFO (first in, first out) versus LIFO (last in, first out); (3) using short-term, non-capitalized leases to obtain production equipments; and (4) using window dressing techniques, such as holding borrowed money as cash until the end of a year, so that a balance sheet looks good. Gomez-Mejia (1994) concludes that all these practices create problems when interpreting accounting data.

The second measure of company performance is stock performance (i.e. change in stock prices) (Kroll et al., 1993; Tosi et al., 2000). However, it has been argued that there are problems in using stock performance. Lewellen and Huntsman (1970), Kerr and Bettis (1987) and Gomez-Mejia (1994) have found that stock prices move with the market and this may have little to do with how well a company is being managed by the top executives. Rappaport (1978), Poster (1985) and Rosen (1992) have found that stock prices tend to move up if more cash dividends are paid out, but this decreases funds available for reinvestment and R&D, lowers growth rate and depresses stock price in the long run.

The third measure of company performance is return of stockholders' equity (ROE), which has received fewer criticisms. Mangel and Singh (1993) said, "If CEO compensation is directly tied to the most immediate performance, this measure would be most relevant". Studies using this measure include those of Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989), Sloan (1994) and Madura et al. (1996).

In their meta-analysis Tosi et al. (2000) found that the "adjusted, composite and true" (p.229) correlation coefficient between top executive compensation and company performance was .203. This indicated that company performance accounted for about 4.5 percent of the variance in top executive compensation. Tosi et al. (2000) concluded that the result was consistent with Jensen and Murphy's (1990) conclusion that "incentive alignment as an explanatory agency construct for CEO pay is weakly supported at best" (p.229).

The result indicates that even taking methodological issues into consideration, company performance explained only 4.5 percent of the variance in top executive compensation. The question is, "What other factors might be used to explain the remaining 95.5 percent variance?"

In summary, methodological issues may have contributed at least partially to the weak evidence for a performance-compensation relationship found in many studies. However, even taking these methodological issues into consideration, it is found that company performance explains only about 4.5 percent of the variance in top executive compensation. This indicates that 95.5 percent of the variance has not been accounted for.

Another factor that researchers have thought might affect top executive compensation is company size.

4. COMPANY SIZE

An issue that emerged in the meta-analysis conducted by Tosi et al. (2000) was the influence of company size on top executive compensation.

Tosi et al. (2000) found that company size accounted for 40 percent of the variance in top executive compensation. That is, company size explained 8.8 times the amount of variance in top executive compensation explained by company performance. The result is consistent with the studies of Balkin and Gomez-Mejia (1990), Kroll et al. (1993), Mangel and Singh (1993), Barkema et al. (1998) and Finkelstein and Boyd (1998). Clearly company size is an important factor affecting top executive compensation.

Such a finding seems to be consistent with the predictions of agency theory, for the underlying premise of agency theory is that the “separation” of ownership from control produces a condition where the interests of shareholders and top executives may, and often do diverge (Berle & Means, 1932; Jensen, 1993; Westphal, 1999). Because of the divergence, unencumbered by external constraints (i.e. board of directors), presumably self-serving top executives are more interested in increasing company size (i.e. through mergers and acquisitions) than maximising profits (Aoki, 1984; Herman 1981; Jensen, 1986).

Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) contended that more than 30 percent of all mergers and acquisitions made in the 1960's and the 1970's were later divested. Kaplan and Weisbach (1990) concluded that 44 percent of mergers and acquisitions made in the 1970's and the 1980's were divested by the latter 1980's. Shleifer and Vishny (1991) and Bowman and Singh (1993) and argued that such divestitures have been made because of the poor performance of the acquired businesses. The question is, if mergers and acquisitions do not enhance shareholder wealth, why are they undertaken?

Three reasons are given. First, Posner (1987), Shleifer and Vishny (1991), Bowman and Singh (1993), and Dalton et al. (2003, 1998) argued that it is easier for the top executives to

exert influence over company size than company performance, and therefore top executives prefer to increase company size (i.e. by way of mergers and acquisitions), and use this as the basis for their compensation. Second, Dyl (1988) and Kroll et al. (1990) argued that top executives are risk-averse, and that mergers and acquisitions present an opportunity for top executives to link their compensation to a more stable factor such as company size and de-link their compensation from company performance, which may often be unstable. Third, Allen (1981) and Kosnik (1990) argued that bigger size means greater organizational complexity, and that more “human capital” (top executive effort) is required to run the business. If this is the case, top executives may be justified in asking for higher compensation.

But how can top executives de-link their compensation from company performance and link it to the scale of operations? The reason given by Fierman (1990) and Crystal (1991) is that, because shareholders are too dispersed to be able to get involved in the affairs of any particular company, the board of directors usually decides how much money top executives are paid. But the board’s role often involves conflicts of interest. Board members often benefit by aligning themselves with the top executives, because they are usually friends of these top executives. Another reason given by Gomez-Mejia (1994) and Finkelstein and Boyd (1998) is that business organizations are so complex that it is difficult to evaluate the performance of the top executives, and so it is easier to tie compensation packages to the scale of operation than to company performance.

The meta-analysis conducted by Tosi et al. (2000) revealed that company size has explained 40 percent of the variance in top executive compensation. This indicates that, even including the 4.5 variance explained by company performance, the remaining 55.5 percent of the variance in top executive compensation has not been accounted for. Although there seems to be a number of candidates that might be used to explain the 55.5 percent unexplained variance, Tosi et al. (2000) suggested that, the “best first candidate is ownership structure” (p.229).

In summary, without external constraints, top executives are likely to be interested more in increasing company size than increasing company performance, which is consistent with

the prediction of agency theory. The literature indicates that company size is a stronger predictor of top executive compensation than company performance.

Another factor that researchers have thought might affect top executive compensation is ownership structure.

5. **OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE**

Researchers suggested that interest alignment between top executives and shareholders is likely to be a problem in a company where ownership is dispersed (Tosi et al., 2000; Westphal & Zajac, 1994). This is because according to agency theory the separation of ownership and control facilitates a condition that allows top executives to take advantage of their privileged position to pursue their interest at the expense of shareholders (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983 a,b; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Tosi et al., 2000; Westphal & Zajac, 1994). Agency theory predicts that monitoring and incentive alignment mechanisms (i.e. compensation contracts) are effective mechanisms in curtailing self-serving tendencies of top executives. However, according to Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Boyd (1994), Gomez-Mejia (1994) and Tosi et al. (2000), these mechanisms seem to be particularly weak in a company where ownership is dispersed, which is where they are needed the most. It seems likely that shareholders in a company where ownership is dispersed may be less involved in monitoring, because shareholders have less at stake in the company on an individual basis, and also because it is more difficult for the individual shareholders to coordinate their actions in curtailing self-serving behaviours of top executives.

Researchers have also suggested that interest alignment between top executives and shareholders is less of a problem in a company where ownership is concentrated (Boyd, 1995; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1995). Boyd (1995), Goldberg and Idson (1995) and Hambrick and Finkelstein (1995) have defined ownership concentration as an individual or an institution owning 5 percent or more of a company's total stock. They found that ownership concentration is associated with curtailing top executives' self-serving behaviours. Specifically, Allen (1981), Gomez-Mejia et al. (1987), Dyl (1988), Kerr and Kren (1992),

Boyd (1994) and Hambrick and Finkelstein (1995) found that greater ownership concentration was associated with a closer linkage between top executive compensation and company performance. They suggested that companies with concentrated ownership, with shareholders who have a larger stake in the company, should have enough incentive and power to monitor top executives. Studies have therefore often used concentration of ownership as a proxy for the intensity of monitoring.

However, Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1989) examined top executive compensation, using two separate samples (171 and 186) of the largest companies in the US in 1986 and 1988 respectively. They found that while the “intensity of monitoring” was indeed higher among companies with high ownership concentration, the higher intensity of monitoring did not produce better company performance in these companies. Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1989) explained that this occurred because the relationship between level of monitoring and company performance might not be a linear one. At a very high level of monitoring, top executives may be so cautious in their strategic decisions that attractive business opportunities are likely to be missed. Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1989) therefore concluded, “Higher levels of monitoring may actually reduce alignment of managerial and shareholder interests, leading to diminishing return from monitoring” (p.1014). Hoskisson and Hitt (1988) and Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) also found that the relationship between monitoring and top executive compensation was non-linear.

In the period 1992-1994, David et al. (1998) used a sample of 200 of the largest US companies to examine institutional investors – a particular class of ownership concentration. They found that institutional investors had a major influence on top executive compensation. Specifically, institutional investors were associated with lowering the level of compensation of the top executives and increasing the proportion of long-term incentives in the compensation mix. These findings seem to be consistent with the empirical evidence produced by Dyl (1988) and Hambrick and Finkelstein (1995) showing that ownership concentration reduces top executive compensation. Extending this argument, both Jensen (1993) and David et al. (1998) expected that other non-institutional block-holders, including

family owners, might have an influence on top executive compensation similar to that of institutional investors (David et al., 1998, p.206).

Krikorian (1991), David and Kochhar (1996) and Useem (1996) have argued that institutional investors have the incentive to monitor top executives and to influence top executive compensation for three reasons. First, institutional investors have legal and fiduciary responsibilities to monitor top executives. Second, the substantial ownership that institutional investors have in a particular company makes it difficult for them to sell off their shares in response to poor company performance, because doing so may adversely affect the stock price and loss may be incurred. Third, it may be difficult for the institutional investors to find alternative investments, considering that they may “already own significant stakes in most companies in the economy” (David et al., 1998, p.201).

However, studies have found that the presence of institutional investors is not “automatically” associated with increasing monitoring. Heard and Sherman (1987), Finkelstein (1992), Jensen (1993), David and Kochhar (1996) and David et al. (1998) revealed that institutional investors (i.e. banks, mutual funds, pension funds) often have business relationships with the companies in which they invest. David and Kochhar (1996) and David et al. (1998) found that the power of monitoring was likely to be reduced if the institutional investors depended for their business on the companies they invested in. This is because top executives of the companies in which they invest might threaten to withdraw business from these institutional investors.

In summary, the literature has shown that higher ownership concentration is generally linked with a higher level of monitoring and lowering top executive compensation. This is consistent with the prediction of agency theory that ownership concentration reduces agency conflicts by a closer monitoring of the top executives. However, excessive monitoring may have an adverse effect on company performance, and thus may not be in the best interest of the shareholders. Also, the monitoring ability of institutional investors is likely to depend on whether their business depends on the companies in which they invest.

Another factor that closely relates to ownership structure is board directorship. Board directorship is a factor researchers have thought might affect top executive compensation.

6. BOARD DIRECTORSHIP

A board of directors is the primary governance mechanism responsible for setting the compensation of top executives and monitoring top executives (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Jensen, 1993; Tosi et al., 1997; Westphal, 1999; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) claim that, “Boards have long been considered to play an important role in the establishment of executive pay” (p.248). Boards also represent company shareholders and serve as their first line of defence against the presumably self-serving top executives (Jensen, 1993).

The argument is that companies with independent boards are more likely to reduce agency problems arising from the separation of ownership and control by lowering the compensation of top executives (Hoskisson et al., 1994). Studies such as those of Kosnik (1990), Boyd (1994) and Zajac and Westphal (1994) have typically evaluated board independency and the effectiveness of board monitoring through the use of proxy variables, such as the proportion of outside directors on the board (outsider-dominated boards) and board size.

Writers such as Main et al. (1993), Boyd (1994), Westphal and Zajac (1994) and Dalton et al. (1998) have suggested that boards dominated by outside directors may monitor top executives more closely and prevent top executives from asking for higher compensation. Fama and Jensen (1983a,b) have suggested that outside directors often have expertise relevant to monitoring top executives and are often experts in organisational control. Fama and Jensen (1983a,b) and Zajac and Westphal (1994) have suggested that outside directors are likely to be motivated to monitor top executives because their reputation is at stake.

However, there have also been arguments suggesting that outsider-dominated boards are unlikely to be effective in monitoring and exercising vigilance (Zajac & Westphal, 1994). Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) argued that outside directors have low financial stakes and low equity holdings in the companies and this may reduce board vigilance and monitoring capability. However, Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) and Westphal (1999) argued that the independence of outside directors may be challenged because they were often appointed by

the chief executive, and thus are likely to be demographically similar to the chief executive, or if they were formerly members of the management team, they may not be “truly independent” (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990, p.79).

Empirical evidence documenting an inverse relationship between outsider-dominated boards and the compensation of top executives has been mixed. Using a sample of the top 100 companies in the UK over the period 1991-1994, Conyon and Peck (1998) failed to find evidence to support the argument that outsider-dominated boards lead to a lowering of the compensation of top executives. Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) and Lambert and Larcker (1993) also found no evidence of an inverse relationship between the proportion of outside directors on the board and the compensation of top executives. Main (1991) even found that the proportion of outside directors on the board had a positive rather than a negative effect on the compensation paid to top executives.

Another proxy variable used to measure board independency and effectiveness of board monitoring is board size (Dalton et al., 1998). It is suggested that a larger board is likely to be associated with lowering the compensation of top executives (Dalton et al., 1998).

However, empirical evidence to document that a larger board is associated with better monitoring and lowering the compensation of top executives has been described as “vexing” (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996), “contradictory” and “inconsistent” (Zahra & Pearce, 1989).

Mintzberg (1983) suggested that board members’ assessments of top executives are likely to be manipulated when boards are large and diverse. Using a sample of 1,534 community hospitals in the US over the period 1980-1988, Alexander et al. (1993) found that larger boards gave the opportunity for top executives to gain advantage through tactics such as “coalition building, selective channelling of information, and dividing and conquering” (p.79). However, using a sample of the 120 largest industrial companies in the US over the period 1960-1990, Ocasio (1994) found that, “The stability and cohesiveness of the governing coalition under the CEO can best be contested when the number of directors on the board is large...A large board also limits the possibility of the CEO exerting social influence to maintain his power” (p.291). Zahra and Pearce (1989) also found that “larger boards are not as susceptible to managerial domination as their smaller counterparts” (p.309).

In addition, Mintzberg (1983), Alexander et al. (1993) and Goodstein et al. (1994) provided evidence that, because of their diversity, larger boards were able to secure external linkage and critical resources such as external funding to improve company performance. According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), “The greater the need for effective external linkage, the larger the board should be” (p.172). Zahra and Pearce (1989) also found that larger boards were more likely to provide top executives with expertise and advice that they could not obtain from other company staff.

However, Goodstein et al. (1994) found that larger boards were less participative, less cohesive, and less able to reach consensus. Judge and Zeithaml (1992) reported that larger boards were less likely to become involved in strategic decision-making. Daily and Dalton (1994) reported that larger boards had a tendency to react slowly, especially in crisis, which might jeopardize the very existence of a company.

In summary, the literature seems to provide no consensus whether a higher proportion of outside directors on the board or a larger board size lead to lower or higher compensation of the top executives, and is thus inconclusive about the predictions of agency theory. The literature also seems to indicate that monitoring may not be the only role that a board of directors may engage in. A board of directors may also provide top executives with valuable advice and external resources.

Other factors researchers have thought may affect top executive compensation are non-financial factors, which boards may use to evaluate the performance of top executives.

7. NON-FINANCIAL MEASURES

Gomez-Mejia and Palich (1997), Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997) and Tosi et al. (2000) have suggested that weak evidence for the relationship between performance and compensation may be attributable to the fact that financial measures may represent only part of the measures the board of directors use to evaluate the performance of top executives. As Tosi et al. (2000) says, “The board of directors might turn to measures of performance that

include...judgmental, clinical, and subjective assessments...such criteria are more likely to represent a holistic, multidimensional assessment of executive performance” (p.331).

Barkema et al. (1998) say that the vast literature on this issue, “leads researchers into a blind alley”. They suggest that future work should

“Enhance understanding of the relative importance of other criteria, such as market, peer compensation and behaviour, and how the definition, measurement, and relative importance of these criteria depend on a firm’s governance structure and on contingencies and national culture. These may lead to a better understanding of factors determining executive pay” (p.143).

In recent years, Gomez-Mejia (1994) and Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997) have drawn on this advice and examined non-financial measures that may play an important part in determining the compensation of top executives. These non-financial measures have been categorized as: market measures, peer and individual measures, and behavioural measures.

Tosi et al. (2000), Gomez-Mejia and Palich (1997) and Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997) have argued that using non-financial measures is beneficial because top executives may not be penalised for poor performance of the company, if poor performance is the result of factors that are beyond their control. However, White and Fife (1993), Gomez-Mejia (1994) and Gomez-Mejia et al. (2003) have argued that non-financial measures are subjective in nature, relying on the judgments of board directors as to how well top executives have been performing, and thus these judgments may be subject to influence by top executives. As Gomez-Mejia (1994) says,

“Subjective criteria rely on beliefs about what constitutes good performance...this raises the possibility that the executive’s pay may be decoupled from performance if the executives can exert undue influence on the board of directors” (p.172).

The literature has indicated that in addition to financial measures (quantitative measures), performance evaluators (i.e. boards of directors) might have used non-financial (qualitative) measures to judge the performance of top executives. The following sub-sections will discuss several non-financial measures, with the next sub-section discussing market measures that researchers have thought may affect executive compensation.

7.1 Market measures

Market measures have been based on the framework of marginal productivity theory (Roberts, 1959). This theory argues that market forces of demand and supply determine compensation of top executives. According to this theory, the services to the company of top executives should be treated as any other input of production. The price of that input (i.e. the compensation of top executives) is determined by the intersection of demand and supply in the market for that input (labour market for top executives) (Gomez-Mejia, 1994; Gomez-Mejia & Palich, 1997; White & Fife, 1993).

Agency theory also acknowledges that market forces may explain the compensation of top executives, but argues that competition in the market place dictates how much compensation top executives can get. Fama (1980), Fama and Jensen (1983a,b), Gomez-Mejia (1994) and Gomez-Mejia et al. (2001) argued that top executives who abuse their position of power by acquiring extravagant perks and compensation, and top executives who consistently make poor decisions not only risk their source of income (income of the shareholders), but also risk undermining their reputations and careers. Fama and Jensen (1985) further argued that the market place could efficiently evaluate the performance of top executives so that compensation cannot deviate too much from what the market considers appropriate.

In reality, however, writers such as White and Fife (1993), Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997) and Barkema et al. (1998) have had difficulty defining what the “market” actually is.

Fife (1993), White and Gomez-Mejia (1994), and Barkema et al. (1998) suggested that the “market” of top executives is actually the market of “comparison with others”. That is, when a company decides to compensate its top executives at the “market rate”, it must first find what other top executives are being paid. In other words, price of any service is a social-behavioural process rather than a quantitative one.

Agarwal and Walking (1994) and Linden et al. (1995) however, have attempted to demonstrate that the market forces of demand and supply determine the compensation of top executives. In one of those attempts, Agarwal and Walking (1994) found that attempted acquisitions occur more frequently in companies where chief executives are excessively compensated. The chief executives of the to-be-acquired companies are more likely to be replaced when a bid succeeds than when it fails. Those chief executives who lose their jobs in the takeover generally fail to find another senior post within three years after the bid. Agarwal and Walking (1994) argued that this indicates takeover bids generate additional information, which can be used by the “market” to reduce the compensation of excessively paid top executives to the point where demand meets with supply.

This sub-section indicates that companies could have great discretion in justifying a particular top executive’s compensation. Although an investigation of market influences may be useful to understand what determines top executive compensation, how researchers measure “the market” may be a problem. One suggestion is that researchers may interview performance evaluators to get first hand information about how they choose a particular data point to be the point of “the market”.

Other factors that researchers have thought might affect top executive compensation are peer measures and individual measures.

7.2 Peer measures and individual measures

Social comparison theory (O'Reilly et al., 1988) provides another way of explaining the compensation of top executives. This theory proposes that the compensation of selected peers may play an important role in determining the compensation of top executives. It argues that directors of the boards are often chief executives of other companies, and these directors tend to use their own compensation as a benchmark for compensating top executives (O'Reilly et al., 1989, 1988). O'Reilly et al. (1988) found that, on average, a chief executive would receive US\$51,000 more when the average salary of outside directors increased by US\$100,000 per year, indicating there is a certain relationship between top executive compensation and the compensation of outside directors.

It has also been claimed that this “social comparison” process occurs only if the chief executives have sufficient power to influence the boards. O'Reilly et al. (1988) and Daily et al. (1998) provided empirical evidence to support their argument that those directors who lacked independence from the top executives tended to be more generous in compensating the top executives. Westphal and Zajac (1994) in an examination of 570 top US executives also found that powerful top executives could influence boards to approve longer and larger compensation packages.

Social comparison theory indicates that performance evaluators (i.e. boards of directors) may use their own compensation as a referent for judging top executive compensation. It is suggested that the use of a social referent is an associated industry risk (Miller & Gomez-Mejia, 1996). It is suggested that in an industry where industry risk (high uncertainty) is high, performance evaluators are more likely to use a social referent for compensating top executives as they may realise that under such circumstances company performance may be an unreliable indicator of the top executives' contributions.

Other measures that may influence the compensation of top executives are individual measures. These are based on the theoretical framework of human capital theory (Agarwal, 1981). This theory argues that the knowledge, experience, tenure, education and skills of top executives determine their compensation level. Agarwal (1981) summarizes the argument as,

“The amount of human capital a worker possesses influences his productivity, which, in turn influences his earnings. The same general reason should hold for executives as well. Other things being equal, an executive with a greater amount of human capital would be better able to perform his job, and thus be paid more” (p.39).

Empirical studies of the level of human capital (i.e. knowledge, experience, skill, tenure, education) are generally supportive of explanations of the compensation of top executives given by human capital theory. The studies include those of Agarwal (1981), Hill and Snell (1988), Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1989), Gerhart and Milkovich (1991), Hill and Phan (1991) and Sanders and Carpenter (1998).

While it seems easy to link measures of human capital with the compensation of top executives, Gomez-Mejia (1994) has argued that the observed results cannot be easily interpreted unless one can show how human capital predicts something of value to the organization, that is, whether it can be shown that a higher level of human capital leads to “value”, which may include better performance ratings by peers, better business decisions made, higher profitability and so forth. However, there is little empirical evidence to support a link between the value of human-capital and compensation.

Other factors that researchers have thought might affect top executive compensation are behavioural ones.

7.3 Behavioural measures

Behavioural measures refer to the actions and processes top executives engage in when performing their duties (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Hoskisson et al., 1992; Ouchi & Maguire, 1975; Ouchi, 1980). Behavioural measures include the effort top executives expend in uncovering opportunities and exposing threats to the organization, and the choices they make in selecting strategic initiatives (Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998; Gomez-Mejia, 1994; Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997). However, as with other non-financial measures discussed

above, behavioural measures are subjective assessments of top executives' behaviour, because what top executives do on a daily basis involves numerous tasks, which may not be directly linked to specific outcomes (i.e. financial performance), and thus are difficult to quantify (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Mintzberg, 1975).

However, it has been argued that although behavioural measures are subjective in nature, the decisions top executives make can be more objectively evaluated if the evaluators (i.e. boards of directors) are knowledgeable about both the decisions and the setting of those decisions. In particular, Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990), Gomez-Mejia (1994) and Hoskisson et al. (1994) have argued that inside directors (i.e. executive directors) have the knowledge and experience to assess objectively and accurately the decisions made by the chief executive.

However, it is not clear what types of decisions made by top executives should be judged to be of "value" to a company and justify compensation being paid (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1995; Nevis et al., 1995). Also, it is not clear whether the board of directors should focus on "hard" behaviours, such as capital investment and R&D expenditure, or whether they should consider "softer" issues, such as the top executive building a core management team, which may be important to the company in the future.

In summary, it may be reasonable to suggest that studies that have used only financial indicators to measure the performance of companies, and in turn the performance of top executives, may be deficient because these measures may tap only a small portion of the top executives' work. Knowing this, performance evaluators such as directors may use measures of performance that include objective as well as subjective evaluation processes to assess the top executives' contributions. If this is the case, it is not surprising that the evidence for a relationship between top executive compensation and company performance is weak. Also, if this is the case, as Jensen and Murphy (1990) have argued, it seems to indicate that there is limited support for the notion of an "agency contract" to align interests.

Other factors that researchers have thought may affect top executive compensation are contingency factors.

8. CONTINGENCY FACTORS

Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997) point out that, “Compensation does not occur within a vacuum” (p.350). Yet little is known about the impact of contingency factors (e.g. competition, product differentiation, internationalisation, capital intensity) on top executive compensation. This section discusses two related contingency factors and uses these to show that contingency factors may affect top executive compensation. The two contingency factors are regulations and investment opportunities.

The first contingency factor is regulation. Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987), Rajagopalan and Finkelstein (1992) and Hubbard and Palia (1995) suggest that top executives who work for a highly regulated company (e.g. a public utilities company) are likely to face less uncertainty, but this may also lessen the options top executives have to influence company performance. Hence, they suggest that top executives who work in a highly regulated company are likely to receive less compensation than top executives who work in a less regulated company (e.g. an information technology company). The argument is that top executives in a less regulated company assume more risks and have more influence on company performance, and thus the company needs to pay higher compensation to attract capable top executives.

Empirical evidence has been consistent with this perspective. Using a sample of 1,000 companies in the US over the period 1970-1990, Joskow et al. (1993) found that top executives in highly regulated companies earned substantially less than top executives in deregulated companies, because they had “less effect on performance outcome” (Joskow et al., 1993, p.6) than top executives in deregulated companies. On the contrary, Rajagopalan and Finkelstein (1992) found that companies paid more to top executives in deregulated companies “to compensate for the added outcome uncertainty and risk managers face in a deregulated environment” (p.131). Carroll and Ciscel (1982) have found similar results.

The findings indicate that the greater the potential impact of actions taken by the top executives on the company, and hence on the ability to directly influence its performance, the greater the compensation of top executives is expected to be.

The second contingency factor is investment opportunities. Smith and Watts (1992) and Gaven and Gaven (1995) suggest that investment opportunities not only require more of top executives by way of effectively managing those opportunities, but that they also create added risks for top executives. Thus they argue that top executives who work in a company with large investment opportunities should earn substantially more than top executives who work in a company with fewer investment opportunities. Hubbard and Palia (1995) agree, saying, “Firms with greater investment opportunities employ more skilled executives who have to be given ... a higher level of pay” (p.107).

Empirical evidence relating to investment opportunity and top executive compensation has supported this perspective. Using a sample of 321 companies in the US in 1992, Gaven and Gaven (1995) found that top executives in high-growth companies, where there are greater investment opportunities, received more compensation than their counterparts in lower-growth companies. Gaven and Gaven (1995) linked this result to the argument made by Smith and Watts (1992) and noted that, “Managers of growth firms are paid more because the selection of investment projects commands a higher wage than the supervision of assets in place” (p.27). Collins et al. (1995) also found similar results for the “greater responsibilities and risks borne” by top executives with expanded investment opportunities.

In summary, contingency factors may affect top executive compensation. The literature indicates that top executives are paid more if they assume more risks, and have more influence on company performance. Such a finding seems to be consistent with the predictions of agency theory.

9. CONCLUSION

According to agency theory, an agency contract is an effective internal mechanism to align the divergent interests of top executives and shareholders. However, for decades researchers using different data sets, different measurements of variables and different statistical techniques have typically found only weak evidence of a relationship between top executive compensation and company performance. The failure to find strong evidence has

led researchers “into a blind alley” (Barkema et al., 1998, p.135). Researchers have continued to be puzzled by the question why only weak evidence has been found for the compensation-performance relationship, and thus whether agency theory is in fact useful in explaining top executive compensation.

This paper has argued that only weak evidence has been found for the compensation-performance relationship because company performance is not a sufficient explanation of top executive compensation. Company performance seems to be only one of many factors that affect top executive compensation. For example, performance evaluators (i.e. boards of directors) may also use non-financial and subjective measures to evaluate the performance of top executives, and compensate top executives according to these measures. Other factors, such as company size, ownership structure, board directorship and contingencies may influence top executive compensation as well.

This paper also indicates that agency theory, which assumes that top executives are self-serving and which focuses on objective financial measures to explain the compensation paid to top executives, may provide only an inadequate explanation. Other theories, such as social comparison theory and human capital theory may be useful in explaining the compensation paid to top executives.

This paper also reveals that studies of top executive compensation have overwhelmingly used data from American companies. However, as Barkema et al. (1998) have said, “Data on other countries represent a rich, virtually untapped, source of increased understanding of what determines executive pay” (p.143).

The researcher believes that Hong Kong is a setting worth investigating, because despite the high level of ownership concentration in Hong Kong companies and a corporate culture characterized by a high level of collectivism (Hofstede, 1991, 1980), the reform of top executive compensation has largely followed the assumptions of agency theory and the Anglo-American system. It may be reasonable to question whether the assumptions of agency theory and the Anglo-American system fit Hong Kong’s institutional and cultural contexts.

REFERENCES

- Agarwal, A. and Walking, R.A., 1994. Executive careers and compensation surrounding takeover bids. *The Journal of Finance*, XLIX (3), pp.985-1014.
- Agarwal, N.,1981. Determinants of executive compensation. *Industrial Relations*, 20(1), pp.36-45.
- Alderfer, C.P., 1986. The invisible director on corporate boards. *Harvard Business Review*, 64, pp.38-52.
- Alexander, J.A., Fennell, M.L. and Halpern, M.T.,1993. Leadership instability in hospitals: The influence of board-CEO relations and organization growth and decline. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 38, pp.74-99.
- Allen, M.P., 1981. Power and privilege in large corporations: corporate control and managerial compensation. *American Journal of Sociology*, 86(5), pp.1112-1123.
- Angel, P.O. and Fuma, V.S.,1997. The compensation of Spanish executives: A test of a managerial talent allocation model. *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, 15, pp.551-531.
- Balkin, D.B. and Gomez-Mejia, L.R., 1990. Matching compensation and organizational Strategies. *Strategic Management Journal*, 11, pp.153-169.
- Barkema, H.G., Geroski, P. and Schalbach, J., 1997. Managerial compensation strategy and firm performance. *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, 15, pp.413-417.
- Barkema, H.G., Gomez-Mejia, L.R. and Luis, R., 1998. Managerial compensation and firm performance: A general research framework. *Academy of Management Journal*, 4(12), pp.135-145.
- Baysinger, B.D. and Hoskisson, R.E., 1990. The composition of the board of directors and strategic control: Effects of corporate strategy. *Academy of Management Review*, 15, pp.72-87.
- Baysinger, B.D., Kosnik, R.D. and Turk, T.A., 1991. Effects of board and ownership structure on corporate R & D strategy. *Academy of Management Journal*, 1, pp.205-214.

- Belkhoui, A. and Picur, R., 1993. An analysis of the use of accounting and market measures of performance, CEO experience and nature of deviation from analyst forecasts. *Managerial Finance*, 19(2), pp.20-32.
- Belliveau, M.A., O'Reilly, C.A. and Wade, J.B., 1996. Social capital at the top: Effects of social similarity and status on CEO compensation. *Academy of Management Journal*, 39, pp.1568-1593.
- Bilimoria, D., 1997. Perspective on corporate control: Implications for CEO compensation. *Human Relations*, 50, pp.829-858.
- Black, F. and Scholes, M., 1993. Pricing of options and corporate liabilities. *Journal of Political Economy*, 81, pp.637-654.
- Bloom, M. and Milkovich, G.T., 1998. Relationships among risk, incentive pay, and organizational performance. *Academy of Management Journal*, 41(3), pp.283-297.
- Bowman, E.H. and Singh, H., 1993. *Corporate restructuring, organizational change and market reactions*. Working paper, Reginald, H. Jones centre, Philadelphia.
- Boyd, B.K., 1994. Board control and CEO compensation. *Strategic Management Journal*, 15(5), pp.335-385.
- Boyd, B.K., 1995. CEO duality and firm performance: A contingency model. *Strategic Management Journal*, 16(4), pp.301-312.
- Brickley, J.A., Coles, J.L. and Jarrell, G., 1997. Leadership structure: Separating the CEO and chairman of the board. *Journal of Corporate Finance*, 3, pp.189-220.
- Brickley, J.A., Lease, R.C. and Smith, C.W., 1988. Ownership structure and voting on anti-takeover amendments. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 20, pp.267-291.
- Bushman, R. and Indjejikian, R.J., 1980. Accounting income, stock price, and managerial compensation. *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, 1, pp.31-41.
- Ciscel, D.H. and Carroll, T.M., 1980. The determinants of executive salaries: An econometric survey. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 61, pp.7-13.
- Carroll, T.M. and Ciscel, D.H., 1982. The effects of regulation on executive compensation. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 64, pp.505-509.

- Claessens, S., Djankov, S. and Lang, L., 2000. The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 58(1), pp.81-112.
- Claessens, S., Djankov, S. and Lang, L., 1999. *Who controls East Asian corporations?* Unpublished manuscript, World Bank and the University of Chicago.
- Coffee, J.C., 1988. Shareholder versus manager: The strain in the corporate web. In J. C. Coffee, Lowenstein, L. and Acherman, S. R. (Eds.), *Knights, Raiders, Target* (pp. 40-62). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Collins, M.C., Blackwell, D.W. and Sinkey, J.F., Jr., 1995. The relationship between corporate compensation policies and investment opportunities: Empirical evidence for large bank holding companies. *Financial Management*, 24(3), pp.40-553.
- Conlon, E.J. and Parks, J.M., 1990. Effects of monitoring and traditions on compensation arrangements: An experiment with principal-agent dyads. *Academy of Management Journal*, 33, pp.603-622.
- Conyon, M.J. and Leech, D., 1994. Top pay, company performance and corporate governance. *Oxford Bulletin of Economic and Statistics*, 56, pp.229-247.
- Conyon, M.J. and Peck, S.I., 1998. Board control, remuneration committees, and top management compensation. *Academy of Management Journal*, 4(2), pp.146-157.
- Crystal, G.S., 1991. Why CEO compensation is so high? *California Management Review*, 34, pp.9-29.
- Daily, C.M. and Dalton, D.R., 1994. Bankruptcy and corporate governance: The impact of board composition and structure. *Academy of Management Journal*, 37, pp.1603-1617.
- Daily, C.M. and Dalton, D.R., 1997. CEO and board chair roles held jointly or separately: Much ado about nothing? *Academy of Management Executive*, 11(3), pp.11-20.
- Daily, C., Johnson, J.L., Ellstrand, A. E. and Dalton, D. R., 1996. *Board governance as a determinant of CEO compensation*. Unpublished manuscript, Texas A & M University.
- Daily, C.M., Johnson, J.L., Ellstrand, A.E. and Dalton, D.R., 1998. Compensation committee composition as a determinant of CEO compensation. *Academy of Management Journal*, 1, pp.209-220.

- Dalton, D.R., Daily, C.M., Certo, S.T. and Roengpitya, R., 2003. Meta-analysis of financial performance and equity: Fusion or confusion? *Academy of Management Journal*, 46, pp.13-26.
- Dalton, D.R., Daily, C.M., Ellstrand, A.E. and Johnson, J.L., 1998. Meta-analytic reviews of board composition, leadership structure, and financial performance. *Strategic Management Journal*, 19(3), pp.269-290.
- David, P. and Kochhar, R., 1996. Barriers to effective governance by institutional investors: Implications for theory and practice. *European Management Journal*, 14, pp.457-466.
- David, P., Kochhar, R. and Levitas, E. (1998). The Effects of institutional investors on the level and mix of CEO compensation. *Academy of Management Journal*, 41(2), pp.200-208.
- Davis, J.H., Schoorman, F.D. and Donaldson, L. (1997). Toward a stewardship theory of management. *Academy of Management Review*, 22(1), pp.20-47.
- Davis, J. and Donaldson, L., 1998. *The theory of stewardship*, Working paper, University of Notre Dame.
- DeAngelo, H. and DeAngelo, L., 1985. Managerial ownership of voting rights: A study of public corporations with dual classes of common stocks. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 14, pp.33-69.
- Dobrzynski, J.H, 1993, March 15. Relationship investing: A new shareholder is emerging. *Business Week*, pp.68-74.
- Dogan, E. and Smyth, R., 2002. Board remuneration, company performance, and ownership concentration. *ASEAN Economic Bulletin*, 19(3), pp.319-345.
- Donaldson, L., 1990. The ethereal hand: organisation economics and management theory. *Academy of Management Review*, 15, pp.369-281.
- Donaldson, L. and Davis, J., 1991. Stewardship theory or agency theory: CEO governance and shareholder return. *Australian Journal of Management*, 16(1), pp.49-64.
- Douglas, E.J. and Santerre, R., 1990. Incentive contracts and stockholder monitoring: Substitute sources of executive compliance. *Quarterly Review of Economics and Business*, 30(2), pp.24-31.

- Dyl, E.A., 1989. Agency, corporate control and accounting methods: The LIFO-FIFO choice. *Managerial and Decision Economics*, 10(3), pp.137-141.
- Dyl, E.A., 1988. Corporate control and management compensation-evidence on the problem. *Managerial and Decision Economics*, 9(1), pp.21-25.
- Eisenhardt, K.M., 1989. Agency theory: An assessment and review. *Academy of Management Review*, 15(3), pp.369-381.
- Fama, E.F., 1980. Agency problems and the theory of the firm. *Journal of Political Economy*, 88, pp.288-307.
- Fama, E.F. and Jensen, M.C., 1983a. Agency problems and residual claims. *Journal of Law and Economics*, 26(2), pp.327-349.
- Fama, E.F. and Jensen, M.C., 1983b. Separation of ownership and control. *Journal of Law and Economics*, 26, pp.301-325.
- Fama, E. and Jensen, M.C., 1985. Organizational forms and investment decisions. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 14, pp.101-119.
- Fierman, J., 1990, March 12. *The people who set the CEO's pay*. *Fortune*, 12, pp. 58-66.
- Finkelstein, S., 1992. Power in top management teams: dimensions, measurement, and validation. *Academy of Management Journal*, 35, pp.503-553.
- Finkelstein, S. and Boyd, B., 1998. How much does the CEO matter? The role of managerial discretion in the setting of CEO compensation. *Academy of Management Journal*, 41(2), pp.179-199.
- Finkelstein, S. and Hambrick, D.C., 1989. Chief executive compensation: A study of the intersection of markets and political processes. *Strategic Management Journal*, 10, pp.12-34.
- Finkelstein, S. and Hambrick, D.C., 1996. *Strategic leadership: Top executives and their effects on organizations*. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing.
- Fraser, D.R., Lee, S.D., Reising, J.J. and Wallace, W.A., 1996. *A pin in the ear or a pin in the eye?* Unpublished manuscript, Texas A & M University.
- Gaven, J.J. and Gaven, K.M., 1995. Compensation policy and the investment opportunity set. *Financial Management*, 24(1), pp.19-32.

- Gerhart, B. and Milkovich, G.T., 1991. Organizational differences in managerial compensation and financial performance. *Academy of Management Journal*, 39, pp.1692-1917.
- Ghoshal, S. and Bartlett, C.A., 1995. Changing role of top management: Beyond structure to process. *Harvard Business Review*, 73, pp.86-89.
- Goldberg, L.G. and Idson, T.L., 1995. Executive compensation and agency effects. *The Financial Review*, 30(2), pp.313-335.
- Gomez-Mejia L.R., 1994. Executive compensation: A reassessment and a future research agenda. *Research in Personnel and Human Resources Management*, 12, pp.161-222.
- Gomez-Mejia, L.R. and Balkin, D.B., 1992. *Compensation, organizational strategy, and firm performance*. Cincinnati, OH: Southwestern.
- Gomez-Mejia, L.R. and Palich, L.E., 1997. Cultural diversity and the performance of multinational firms. *Journal of International Business*, 1, pp.1-22.
- Gomez-Mejia, L.R. and Wiseman, R.M., 1997. Reframing executive compensation: An assessment and outlook. *Industrial & Labour Relations Review*, 43, pp.31-51.
- Gomez-Mejia, L.R., Larraza-Kintana, M. and Makri, M., 2003. The determinants of executive compensation in family-controlled public corporations. *Academy of Management Journal*, 3, pp.226-228.
- Gomez-Mejia, L.R., Nunez-Nickel, M. and Gutierrez, I., 2001. The role of family ties in agency contracts. *Academy of Management Journal*, 44, pp.81-96.
- Gomez-Mejia, L.R., Tosi, H. and Hinkin, T., 1987. Managerial control, performance, and executive compensation. *Academy of Management Journal*, 30(1), pp.51-70.
- Goodstein, J., Gautam, K. and Boeker, W., 1994. The effects of board size and diversity on strategic change. *Strategic Management Journal*, 15, pp.241-250.
- Gray, S.R. and Cannella, A.A., Jr., 1997. The role of risk in executive compensation. *Journal of Management*, 23, pp.517-540.
- Hall, B.J. and Liebman, J.B., 1998. Are CEO really paid like bureaucrats? *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, pp.653-673.

- Hambrick, D.C. and Finkelstein, S., 1987. Managerial discretion: A bridge between polar views of organizations. In L.L. Cummings & B.M. Staw (Eds.), *Research in Organisational Behaviour*, 9, 369-406. Greenwich, CT: JAL Press.
- Hambrick, D.C. and Finkelstein, S., 1995. The effects of ownership structure on conditions at the top: The case of CEO pay raise. *Strategic Management Journal*, 16, 175-193.
- Heard, J.E. and Sherman, H.D., 1987. *Conflicts of interests in the proxy voting system*. Washington, DC: Investor Responsibility Research Centre.
- Hill, C.A. and Snell, S.A., 1988. Effects of ownership structure and corporate productivity. *Academy of Management Journal*, 32, pp.25-46.
- Hill, C.W. and Phan, P., 1991. CEO tenure as a determinant of CEO pay. *Academy of Management Journal*, 34(3), pp.712-717.
- Ho, S.S.M., 2003. *Corporate governance in Hong Kong: Key problems and prospects*. Centre for Accounting Disclosure and Corporate Governance, School of Accountancy, The Chinese University of Hong Kong.
- Hofstede, G., 1980. *Culture's consequences: International differences in work-related values*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Hofstede, G., 1991. *Cultures and organizations: Software of the mind*. London: McGraw-Hill.
- Holmstrom, B., 1979. Moral hazard and observability. *Bell Journal of Economics*, 10(1), pp.74-91.
- Hoskisson, R.E. and Hitt, M.A., 1988. Strategic control systems and relative R & D investment in large multi-product firms. *Strategic Management Journal*, 9, pp.606-621.
- Hoskisson, R.E., Eden, L., Lau, C.M. and Wright, M., 2000. Strategy in emerging economies. *Academy of Management Journal*, 43(3), pp.249-267.
- Hoskisson, R.E., Hitt, M.A. and Hill, C.W.L., 1992. Managerial incentive and investment in R & D in large multi product firms. *Organizational Science*, 3(4), pp.1-17.
- Hoskisson, R.E., Johnson, R.A. and Moesel, D.D., 1994. Corporate divestiture intensity in restructuring firms: Effects of governance, strategy, and performance. *Academy of Management Journal*, 37(5), pp.1207-1251.

- Hubbard, R.G. and Palia, D., 1995. Executive pay and performance: Evidence from the U.S. banking industry. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 39, pp.105-130.
- Jensen, M.C., 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. *Journal of Finance*, 48(3), pp.831-880.
- Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W.H., 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behaviour, agency costs, and ownership structure. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 3, pp.305-350.
- Jensen, M.C. and Murphy, K.J., 1990. CEO incentive: It's not how much you pay, but how. *Harvard Business Review*, 68(3), pp.138-154.
- Johnson, B., 1982. *Executive compensation, size, profit and cost in the electric utility industry*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Florida State University.
- Johnson, S., Boone, P., Breach, A. and Friedman, E., 2000. Corporate governance in the Asian financial crisis. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 58, pp.287-322.
- Joskow, P., Rose, N. and Shepard, A., 1993. *Regulatory constraints on CEO compensation*. Washington, DC: National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Judge, W.Q., Jr. and Zeithaml, C.P., 1992. Institutional and strategic choice perspective on board involvement in the strategic decision process. *Academy of Management Journal*, 35, pp.766-794.
- Kaplan, S.N. and Weisbach, M.S., 1990. *The success of acquisitions: Evidence from divestitures*. Working paper no. 3484, National bureau of Economic Research (NBER).
- Kerr, J. and Kren, L., 1992. Effects of relative decision monitoring on chief executive compensation. *Academy of Management Journal*, 33(2), pp.370-397.
- Kerr, J.L. and Bettis, R.A., 1987. Board of directors, top management compensation and shareholder returns. *Academy of Management Journal*, 35(2), pp.645-664.
- Kesner, I.F., 1987. Directors' stock ownership and organizational performance: An investigation of Fortune 500 companies. *Journal of Management*, 13, pp.499-508.
- Kets de Vries, M.F.R., 1993. The dynamics of family controlled firms: The good and the bad news. *Organizational Dynamics*, 21(3), pp.59-71.
- Kosnik, R.D., 1990. Effects of board demography and directors incentives on corporate greenmail decisions. *Academy of Management Journal*, 33, pp.129-150.

- Kosnik, R.D., 1987. Greenmail: A study of board performance in corporate Governance. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 32, pp.163-185.
- Kosnik, R.D. and Shapiro, D.L., 1997. Agency conflicts between investment banks and corporate clients in merger and acquisition transactions: Causes and remedies. *Academy of Management Executive*, 11(1), pp.7-20.
- Krikorian, B.L., 1991. Fiduciary standard: Loyalty, prudence, voting proxies, and corporate governance. In Sametz, A.W. and Bicksler, J.L. (Eds.), *Institutional investing: Challenges and responsibility of the 21st century*: 257-277. Homewood, IL: Business One Irwin.
- Kroll, M., Simmons, S.A. and Wright, P., 1993. Determinants of chief executive officer compensation following major acquisitions. *Journal of Business Research*, 20, pp.349-366.
- La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A., 1999. Corporate ownership around the world. *Journal of Finance*, 54, pp.471-517.
- Lambert, R.A. and Larcker, D.F., 1993. The use of accounting and security price measures of performance in managerial compensation contracts. *Journal of Accounting and Economics Research*, 23, pp.85-125.
- Lane, P.J., Cannella, A.A. Jr. and Lubatkin, M.H., 1998. Agency problems as antecedents to unrelated mergers and diversification: Amihud and Lev reconsidered. *Strategic Management Journal*, 19, pp.555-578.
- Lewellen, W.G. and Huntsman, B., 1970. Managerial pay and corporate performance. *American Economic Review*, 60, pp.710-720.
- Linden, D.W., Linzner, R. and Walfe, F., 1995. The Cosseted Directors. *Forbes*, pp.68-171.
- Lobingier, P.G., 2000. Do performance plan adoptions improve firm performance? An analysis of nine industries. *Journal of Managerial Issues*, 12(3), pp.288-305.
- Lublin, J.S., 1992. Effects of board demography and directors incentives on corporate greenmail decision. *Academy of Management Journal*, 33, pp.129-150.
- Lublin, J.S., 1996, April 12. Report on executive pay: Raking it in. *Wall Street Journal*, R 1-3.

- Lunati, M.T., 1997. *Ethical issues in economics: From altruism to cooperation to equity*. London: Macmillan.
- Madura, J., Martin, A.D. and Jessel, K.A., 1996. Determinants of CEO compensation in small publicly traded businesses. *American Business Review*, 14, pp.80-88.
- Main, B.G.M., O'Reilly, C.A. III. and Wade, J., 1993. Top executive pay: Tournament or teamwork? *Journal of Labour Economics*, 11(4), pp.606-628.
- Main, B.G.M., 1991. Top executive pay and performance. *Managerial and Decision Economy*, 12, pp.219-229.
- Mangel, R. and Singh, H., 1993. Ownership structure, board relationships and CEO compensation in large U.S. corporations. *Accounting and Business Research*, 23(91A), pp.339-350.
- Meeks, G. and Whittington, G., 1975. Directors' pay, growth, and profitability. *The Journal of Industrial Economics*, 24, pp.1-14.
- Melcher, R.A. and Oster, P., 1993, March 24. Yankee-style activists strike boardroom terror road. *Business Week*, pp.1-14.
- Miller, J.S. and Gomez-Mejia, L.R., 1996. *Decoupling of executive pay and firm performance: A behavioural perspective*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Academy of Management, Cincinnati, OH.
- Milkovich, G.T., Gerhart, B. and Hannon, J., 1991. The effects of research and development intensity on managerial compensation in large organizations. *Journal of High technology Management Research*, 2(1), pp.133-150.
- Mintzberg, H., 1975. The manager's job: Folklore and fact. *Harvard Business Review*, 54(4), pp.49-61.
- Mintzberg, H., 1983. *Power in and around organizations*. Eaglewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Murphy, K.J., 1985. Corporate performance, pay, and managerial remuneration: An empirical analysis. *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, 7, pp.11-42.
- Murphy, K.J., 2000. Performance standards in incentive contracts. *Journal of Accounting and Finance*, 30, pp.245-278.

- Muth, M.M. and Donaldson, L., 1998. Stewardship theory and board structure: A contingency approach. *Corporate Governance*, 6(1), pp.5-28.
- Nevis, E.C., DiBella, A.J. and Gould, J.M., 1995. Understanding organizations as learning systems. *Sloan Management Review*, pp.73-85.
- Ocasio, W., 1994. Political dynamics and the circulation of power: CEO succession in U.S. industrial corporations, 1960-1990. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 39, pp.285-312.
- O'Reilly, C.A., Main, B.G. and Crystal, G.S., 1988. CEO compensation as tournament and social comparison: A tale of two theories. *Administration Science Quarterly*, 33, pp.257-274.
- O'Reilly, C., Caldwell, D. and Barnett, W., 1989. Work group demography, social integration and turnover. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 34, pp.21-37.
- Ouchi, W.G., 1980. Markets, bureaucracies, and clans. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 25, pp.129-141.
- Ouchi, W.G. and Maguire, M.A., 1975. Organizational control: Two functions. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 20, pp.559-569.
- Pearce, J.A. and Zahra, S.A., 1991. The relative power of CEOs and boards of directors: Associations with corporate performance. *Strategic Management Journal*, 12, pp.135-153.
- Perrow, C. (1986). *Complex organizations: A critical essay*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Pfeffer, J. and Salancik, G.R., 1978. *The external control of organizations: A resource dependence perspective*. Harper & Row, New York.
- Poster, C.Z., 1985. Executive compensation: Taking long-term incentives out of the corporate tower. *Compensation Review*, 17(2), pp.30-32.
- Rajagopalan, N. and Finkelstein, S., 1992. Effects of strategic orientation and environmental change on senior management reward systems. *Strategic Management Journal*, 13, pp.127-142.
- Rajagopalan, N., 1997. Strategic orientations, incentive plan adoptions and firm performance: Evidence from electric utility firms. *Strategic Management Journal*, 1, pp.1-20.

- Ramaswamy, K., Veliyath, R. and Gomes, L., 2000. A study of the determinants of CEO compensation in India. *Management International Review*, 40(2), pp.167-191.
- Rappaport, A., 1978. Executive incentives versus corporate. *Harvard Business Review*, 56(4), pp.81-88.
- Ravenscraft, D. and Scherer, F.M., 1987. *Mergers, sell-offs, and economic efficiency*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute.
- Rechner, P.L. and Dalton, D.R., 1991. CEO duality and organizational performance: A longitudinal analysis. *Strategic Management Journal*, 12, pp.155-160.
- Roberts, D.R., 1959. A general theory of executive compensation based on statistically tested propositions. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 70, pp.270-294.
- Rosen, S., 1992. *Contracts and the market for executives*. In *Contract Economics*, edited by Weirn, L. and Wijkander, H., 181-217. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Sanders, W.G. and Carpenter, M.A., 1998. Internationalisation and firm governance: The roles of CEO compensation, top team composition, and board structure. *Academy of Management Journal*, 4, pp.158-178.
- Schulze, W.S., Lubatkin, M.H. and Dino, R., 2002. Toward a theory of agency and altruism in family firms. *Journal of Business Venturing*, 1, pp.1-20.
- Schulze, W.S., Lubatkin, M.H., Dino, R. and Buchholtz, A. K., 2001. Agency relationships in family firms: Theory and evidence. *Organizational Science*, 12, pp.99-116.
- Shevlin, T., 2003. *Stock options boost company earnings, research indicates*. News Online, The University of Washington Business School.
- Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W., 1997. A survey of corporate governance. *Journal of Finance*, 52, pp.737-783.
- Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W., 1986. Large shareholders and corporate control. *Journal of Political Economics*, 94, pp.461-488.
- Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W., 1991. Takeovers in the '60s and the '80s: Evidence and implications. *Strategic Management Journal*, 12, pp.51-59.
- Sloan, R., 1994. Accounting earnings and top executive compensation. *Journal of Accounting*, 1, pp.22-42.

- South China Morning Post (SCMP), 2000, September 20. *Family control and the Asian crisis*. p. A11.
- South China Morning Post (SCMP), 2002, January 4. *PCCW directors' pay dwarfs rivals*. p. A12.
- Smith, C.W. and Watts, R.L., 1992. The investment opportunity set and accounting procedure choice: Preliminary evidence. *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, 15, pp.407-445.
- Stulz, R.M., 1988. On takeover resistance, managerial discretion, and shareholder Wealth. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 20, pp.25-54.
- Tam, O.K., 1999. *The development of corporate governance in China*. Northampton, MA: Edward Edgar.
- Taussig, F.W. and Barker, W.S., 1925. American corporations and their executives: A statistical inquiry. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 3, pp.1-51.
- Tian, J.J. and Lau, C.M., 2001. Board composition, leadership structure and performance in Chinese shareholding companies. *Asia Pacific Journal of Management*, 18(2), pp.245-256.
- Tosi, H.L. and Gomez-Mejia, L.R., 1989. The decoupling of CEO pay and performance: An agency perspective. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 34, pp.169-189.
- Tosi, H.L., Katz, J.P. and Gomez-Mejia, L.R., 1997. Disaggregating the agency contracts: The effects of monitoring, incentive alignment, and term in office on agency decision-making. *Academy of Management Journal*, 40, pp.584-602.
- Tosi, H.L., Werner, S., Katz, J.P. and Gomez-Mejia, L.R., 2000. How much does performance matter? A meta-analysis of CEO-pay studies. *Journal of Management*, 26, pp.301-339.
- Useem, M.A., 1996. *Investor capitalism: How many managers are changing the face of corporate America*. New York: Basic Books.
- Veliyath, R. and Bishop, J.W., 1995. Relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance: Empirical evidence of labour market norm. *The International Journal of Organizational Analysis*, 3, pp.268-283.

- Veliyath, R., Ferris, S.P. and Ramaswamy, K., 1994. Business strategy and top management compensation: The mediating effects of employment risk, firm performance and size. *Journal of Business Research*, 30, pp.293-311.
- Walsh, J.P. and Seward, J.K., 1990. On the efficiency of internal and external corporate control mechanisms. *Academy of Management Review*, 15, pp.421-458.
- Walters, B., Hardin, T. and Schick, J., 1995. Top executive compensation: Equity or excess? Implications for regaining American competitiveness. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 14, pp.227-234.
- Welbourne, T.M., Balkin, D.B. and Gomez-Mejia, L.R., 1995. Gainsharing and mutual monitoring: A combined agency-organizational justice interpretation. *Academy of Management Journal*, 38, pp.881-899.
- Werner, S. and Tosi, H.L., 1995. Other people's money: Effects of ownership on compensation strategy and managerial pay. *Academy of Management Journal*, 38, pp.1672-1691.
- Westphal, J.D., 1999. Collaboration in the boardroom: Behavioural and performance consequences of CEO-board social ties. *Academy of Management Journal*, 42(1), pp.7-24.
- Westphal, J.D. and Zajac, E.J., 1994. Substance and symbolism in CEO's long-term incentive plan. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 39, pp.367-390.
- White, W. M. and Fife, R. W., 1993. New challenges for executive compensation in the 1990s. *Compensation and Benefits Review*, 25(1), pp.27-36.
- Wright, P., Ferris, S.P., Sarin, A. and Awasthi, V., 1996. Impact of corporate insider, block-holder, and institutional equity ownership on firm risk taking. *Academy of Management Journal*, 39(3), pp.451-463.
- Wright, P., Kroll, M. and Elenkov, D., 2002. Acquisition returns, increase in firm size, and chief executive compensation: The moderating role of monitoring. *Academy of Management Journal*, 45(3), pp.599-608.
- Young, M.N., Peng, M.W., Ahlstrom, D. and Bruton, G.D., 2003. Principal-principal agency conflicts in corporate governance. *Academy of Management Review*, 3, pp.1-20.

- Zahra, S.A. and Pearce, J.A., 1989. Board of directors and corporate financial performance: A review and integrative model. *Journal of Management*, 15, pp.291-334.
- Zajac, E.J. and Westphal, J.D., 1994. The costs and benefits of managerial incentives and monitoring in large US corporations: When is more not better? *Strategic Management Journal*, 15, pp.121-142.

The Impacts of Demographics on Mature Consumers’ Online Usage and Shopping Intention

Monica Law
Hong Kong Shue Yan University
Email: cclaw@hksyu.edu

Mark Ng
Hong Kong Shue Yan University

INTRODUCTION

The Internet and mobile devices are the most prominent tools of business, communication and entertainment today. The number of the worldwide Internet users has reached more than 2 billion in 2011; amongst those users, 44% of them were in Asia (Internet World Stats, 2011). Goldman Sachs predicted the world e-commerce sales may record around US\$963 billion by 2013 (Davis, 2011). In China, the annual increase of online shopping amount recorded with 50% of the rapid annual increase (China Internet Network Information Center, 2011). The virtual marketplace grows quickly due to the speedy developments of various online technologies, telecommunication devices and applications, such as Wi-Fi connectivity, blogs, communication tools, tablets, 3G/4G mobiles and mobile apps. All of these further enhance the online usage and penetration dramatically.

Traditionally, the online marketplace has been dominated by youngsters and marketers have mainly targeted those users aged between 18 to 34 years old (Kwon and Noh, 2010). However, some researchers highlight that mature online users form a rapidly growing and lucrative market segment, which requires marketers to pay specific attention (Burnett, 1991; Eastman and Iyer, 2004). The main reason is related to the increasing size of this segment. The United Nation (2007) estimated that, in the developed countries such as the U.S., the proportion of people aged 60 years or above may increase from 21 percent in 2005 to 28 percent in 2025 and other developed countries, such as Japan and some European countries, may expect to age rapidly in the foreseeable future. To the situation in China, about one in five Chinese will be older than 65 by 2035 (China Statistical Yearbook, 2010). Hence, the

middle-aged and older people are the dominate consumption segment in most of the countries.

In order to assist online marketers to capture the rapid growth of this mature segment, the exploration of key determinants to their online usage and shopping intention is a critical area of examination. But there are still not enough studies in investigating of the generational differences towards online behaviors in an Asia context. This study aims to examine whether the mature segment has lesser online experience and purchase intention than the young adults with regard to demographic factors. The findings may assist online marketers formulate various marketing strategies.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

Numerous studies have illustrated that demographic factors associate with behaviors and cognitive decisions. Amongst those attributes, age, gender and education are the most investigated traits. For example, Liebermann and Stashevsky (2002) supported these three factors related to online usage and perceived online risk. With more understanding to those factors, consumers' online usage patterns and purchase motivation may be predicted.

In fact, each of those attributes has exerted particular impacts. First of all, consumer's age affects the process of technological adoption and the related virtual behavioral patterns. For instance, youngsters have higher abilities and acceptance in using technological devices (e.g., Schiffman and Kanuk, 2003). To the mature consumers, they enjoy traditional shopping patterns and have lesser online purchase intention as well as experience (May and Greyser 1989; Trocchia and Janda, 2000). Bigne, Ruiz and Sanz (2005) remarked the generational change is a kind of determinants to interactive shopping. But some researchers find different results. For instance, Miller and Wood (2002) showed age is without effect on online usage and shopping.

In tradition, women concern more about social relations than men. This means women prefer traditional shopping more as this may regard as a kind of social gathering (Sim and Koi, 2002). Men's behaviors mostly are based on benefit and utilitarian motivation (Steenkamp et al., 1999; Citrin et al., 2003). The researchers then conclude men have more online usage

and higher purchase motivation than women (e.g., Huang and Yang, 2010). On the other hand, some scholars illustrate gender does not have any specific impacts and Internet practices of men and women are not with great differences (e.g., Bhatnagar et al., 2000; Alreck and Settle, 2002).

To education, most of the researchers have more similar findings that higher educated consumers may deal with computers and mobile devices more, thus surfing Internet more and having higher motivations to purchase online (e.g., Swinyard and Smith, 2003; Doolin et al., 2005). Education is important as consumers may have more knowledge and confidence in visiting and searching webs.

Age, gender and education are the three controversial factors in affecting online behavior and decision as they have different influences in various segment groups and countries. In this study, the main hypotheses are to assist marketers understand them more and illustrate the significant effects of those demographic variables on online usage and purchase intention in a Chinese context.

METHODOLOGY

Sampling and Procedure

The sample for this study was composed of the adults aged 21 to 70 in Hong Kong with a convenience sampling method. Research interviewers were employed and their major duties were to invite respondents, read questions and mark answers. Further, a cover letter was attached to each questionnaire for explaining the purposes of the survey and providing assurance of the anonymity. To the questionnaire, the researchers prepared both Chinese and English versions with back-translation process (Brislin 1980). The major purpose was to assure the equivalence of Chinese and English versions. At the end, 715 questionnaires were taken for this study. The demographic details are shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Demographic Profiles of the Respondents

	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Age		
- <40	158	22%
- 40-50	380	53%
- >50	177	25%
Gender		
- Male	372	52%
- Female	343	48%
Education		
- Secondary or below	432	60%
- Post-secondary or diploma	170	24%
- Tertiary/ university or above	113	16%

Measures

Online usage. Four items were adopted and they were taken from the study of Mathwick and Rigdon (2004). The statements were for indicating whether the respondents treated surfing the Internet as their daily life practices or not. They were: “Surfing the Internet is a part of my life”; “I spend most of my spare time on the Internet”; “I am a heavy Internet user”; and “In a typical week, I visit dozens of Web sites”. All measures adopted a five-point Likert scale, described by “Strongly agree” (= 5) and “Strongly disagree” (= 1). The scale was with high Cronbach’s alpha coefficient (.94) in this study.

Online purchase intention. Three items were taken from the study of Chiu, Lin and Tang (2005), which were prepared by Taylor and Todd (1995a, b). Some of the wordings were amended. For example, the original statement was – “I intend to use the Internet to buy CCP” and finally it was changed to be “I intend to purchase online”, in order to suit the purpose of this research. The other two items were: “I plan to use the Internet to purchase product(s) within the next three months”, and “Overall, I would use the Internet for online purchase”. The measures were with five-point Likert scale and the high reliability (.85).

Demographic variables. Age, gender and education were taken as the major demographic variables. The details are shown in Table 1.

DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

All statistical analyses were processed with SPSS 16.0. Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations among the variables in the study are provided in Table 2. Online usage was with significant negative correlations with age and gender, but with significant positive correlation with education. Online purchase intention had a significant negative correlation with age, but had a significant positive correlation with education and no correlation with gender. This means that age and education correlated with online usage and online purchase intention differently whereas gender correlated with online usage but did not have any correlation with online purchase intention.

Table 2: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations among Measures

<i>Variables</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>
1. Age	2.03	.68	1			
2. Gender	1.48	.50	.05	1		
3. Education	1.55	.75	-.13**	-.10**	1	
4. Online usage	2.90	.88	-.22**	-.13**	.28**	1
5. Online purchase intention	2.41	1.05	-.14**	-.05	.30**	.49**

** $p < .01$


In order to investigate the effects of demographic variables on online usage further, two-way ANOVA and post hoc comparisons were adopted. As shown in Table 3, there were significant main effects of age on online usage corrected with gender, $F(2, 712) = 24.12$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .06$, and corrected with education, $F(2, 712) = 12.48$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .03$. With regard to the post hoc comparisons, the group aged 50 or above had significantly different mean of online usage with the other two age groups (i.e., <40 and 41-50). To education, the group with secondary or below had significantly different mean of online usage with the ones with post-secondary/diploma, and tertiary/ university or above.

Table 3: Effect of Demographic Variables on Online Usage by Age

	<i>df</i>	Sum of Squares	Mean of Squares	<i>F</i>	η^2	<i>p</i>	Post Hoc Comparisons
Online usage	5	49.15	9.83	13.71	.09	.00	>50 $\neq$ 41-50; >50 $\neq$ <40
Age	2	34.58	17.29	24.12	.06	.00	
Gender	1	6.59	6.59	9.19	.01	.00	
Age and gender group	2	6.01	3.01	4.20	.01	.02	
Error	706	506.10	.72				
Total	712	6561.75					
Online usage	8	71.82	8.98	13.06	.13	.00	Sec or below $\neq$ post-sec/dip; Sec or below $\neq$ tert./u or above
Age	2	17.17	8.58	12.48	.03	.00	
Education	2	27.62	13.81	20.08	.05	.00	
Age and education group	4	1.70	.42	.62	.00	.65	
Error	703	483.44	.69				
Total	712	6561.75					

Moreover, there was a significant interaction effect of age with gender on online usage. In order to understand further, the comparison of their simple effects was performed and shown in Figure 1. Female's online usage decreased from the young adult to the eldest groups. To male, the highest frequencies of online usage recorded in the group aged 41-50. But there was no interaction effect of age with education.

Figure 1: Interaction Effect of Age with Gender on Online Usage




To online purchase intention, there were significant main effects of age on online usage corrected with gender, $F(2, 706) = 12.81$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .04$, and corrected with education, $F(2, 706) = 9.28$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .03$. With regard to the post hoc comparisons, the group aged 50 or above had significantly different mean of online purchase intention with the other two age groups (i.e., <40 and 41-50). To education, the group with secondary or below had significantly different mean of online purchase intention with the ones with post-secondary/diploma, and tertiary/university or above.

Table 4: Effect of Demographic Variables on Online Purchase Intention by Age

	df	Sum of Squares	Mean of Squares	<i>F</i>	η^2	<i>p</i>	Post Hoc Comparisons
Online purchase intention	5	38.51	7.70	7.28	.05	.00	>50 ≠41-50; >50 ≠ <40
Age	2	27.11	12.81	12.81	.04	.00	
Gender	1	.44	.42	.42	.00	.52	
Age and gender group	2	7.39	3.49	3.49	.01	.03	
Error	700	740.83					
Total	706	4888.89					
Online purchase intention	8	95.61	11.95	12.18	.12	.00	Sec or below ≠post-sec/dip; Sec or below ≠tert./u or above
Age	2	18.21	9.10	9.28	.03	.00	
Education	2	42.12	21.06	21.47	.06	.00	
Age and education group	4	4.49	1.12	1.14	.01	.34	
Error	697	683.73					
Total	706	4888.89					

In addition, there was a significant interaction effect of age with gender on online purchase intention. The comparison of their simple effects was illustrated in Figure 2. Female's online purchase intention decreased from the young adult to the eldest groups whereas the highest frequencies of online purchase intention were in the male group aged 41-50. But there was no interaction effect of age with education.

Figure 2: Interaction Effect of Age with Gender on Online Purchase Intention



DISCUSSION

This study examines how the personal factors affect middle-aged and elderly users' online usage and purchase intention. The survey results illustrate that the demographics are with certain effects. There were three main findings: (1) Age is a key factor. Indeed, the ones aged 50 or above had particular hesitation in surfing Internet and shopping in virtual stores; (2) The frequencies of online usage and the intention of online shopping dropped dramatically starting in the group of women aged 40. The men group aged 41 to 50 used online the most and had higher intention of online shopping; and (3) Education also has certain effect. Those with the lower education background (i.e., secondary or below) were performed differently with the higher educated ones.

Most of the online retailers want to attract more customers online and motivate them to make more purchases. The findings of the study assist the online marketers to target particular group of middle-aged segments. For instance, the most attractive mature consumers may be the high educated males aged 41-50. Hence, this study supports the view that providers should not treat all the mature consumers alike.

Furthermore, marketers should try to enhance mature users' online experience. For

example, they may add more interesting platforms and make them more user-friendly. After they have gained more positive online experience, they may develop positive attitude towards particular webs/providers and may continue in future (Goldsmith 2002), thereby taking marketers' online shopping services. Then, they form positive and comfortable shopping experience each time (Keen, Wetzels, Ruyter, and Feinberg 2002). This positive experience can further enhance their perceived belief, positive attitude, usage of Internet and online shopping services further.

LIMITATIONS

Several major limitations concerning this study need to be acknowledged. First of all, it should be noted that the samples might not be representative of the general mature online users in China. Future research needs to determine if these results can be replicated with a national random sample.

Furthermore, this research design was cross-sectional and the whole Internet adoption process has not examined in-depth. In fact, there may have various stages in enhancing online experience. Especially, this investigation is important to the mature market because they may face more difficulties than the youngster group. With such research findings, Internet service providers may then formulate more effective strategies in assisting them. Thus, more longitudinal research studies towards attitude formulation are highly recommended.

CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, we believe that attitude is the key for attracting more middle-aged and elderly online users, and enhancing their online usage as well as online shopping purchases. Online marketers may have more in-depth understanding of their practices. When they understand their users more, the chances to build up closer business relationships with them are higher.

REFERENCES

- Alreck, P., and Settle, R.B., 2002. Gender effects on Internet, catalogue and store shopping. *Journal of Database Marketing*, 9(2), pp.150-162.
- Bhatnagar, A., Misra, S., and Rao, H.R., 2000. On risk, convenience, and Internet shopping behavior. *Communications of the ACM*, 43(11), pp.98-105.
- Bigne, E., Ruiz, C., and Sanz, S., 2005. The impact of Internet user shopping patterns and demographics on consumer mobile buying behavior. *Journal of Electronic Commerce Research*, 6(3), pp.193-209.
- Brislin, R.W., 1980. Translation and content analysis of oral and written material. In: H.C. Triandis and J.W. Berry, eds. *Handbook of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, Volume 2. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., pp. 389-444.
- Burnett, J.J., 1991. Examining the media habits of the affluent elderly. *Journal of Advertising Research*, 31, pp.33-41.
- China Statistical Yearbook, 2011. Beijing: National Bureau of Statistics of China.
- China Internet Network Information Center, 2011. *Statistical report on Internet development in China* [pdf] Available at: <<http://www1.cnnic.cn/uploadfiles/pdf/2011/2/28/153752.pdf>> [Accessed 15 December 2011].
- Chiu, Y.B., Lin, C.P., and Tang, L.L., 2005. Gender differs: Assessing a model of online purchase intentions in e-tail service. *International Journal of Service Industry Management*, 16(5), pp.416-35.
- Citrin, A.V., Sprott, D.E., Silverman, S.N., and Stem, D.E., 2000. Adoption of Internet shopping: The role of consumer innovativeness. *Industrial Management and Data Systems*, 100, pp.294-99.
- Davis, D., 2011. Worldwide web sales will reach \$963 billion by 2013. *Internet Retailer*. Available at: <<http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:1hcDEG1a9xQJ:www.internetretailer.com/2011/01/04/global-e-commerce-sales-head-1-trillion-mark+goldman+sachs+2011+annual+report+internet&cd=5&hl=zh-TW&ct=clnk&gl=hk>> [Accessed 15 December 2011].
- Doolin, B., Dillon, S., Thompson, F., and Corner, J.L., 2005. Perceived risk, the Internet shopping experience and online purchasing behavior: A New Zealand perspective. *Journal of Global Information Management*, 13(2), pp.66-88.
- Eastman, J.K., and Iyer, R., 2004. The elderly's uses and attitudes towards the Internet. *The*

- Journal of Consumer Marketing*, 21, pp.208-220.
- Goldsmith, R.E., 2002. Explaining and predicting consumer intention to purchase over the Internet: An exploratory study. *Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice*, 10, pp.22-28.
- Huang, J.H., and Yang, Y.C., 2010. Gender differences in adolescents' online shopping motivations. *African Journal of Business Management*, 4(6), pp.849-857.
- Keen, C., Wetzels, M., Ruyter, K., and Feinberg, R., 2002. e-tailers versus retailers: Which factors determine consumer preferences? *Journal of Business Research*, 57, pp.685-95.
- Kwon, W.S., and Noh, M., 2010. The influence of prior experience and age on mature consumers' perceptions and intentions of internet apparel shopping. *Journal of Fashion Marketing and Management*, 14(3), pp.335-349.
- Internet World Stats., 2011. Internet usage statistics and Internet users in the world distribution by world region. Available at:<<http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm>> [Accessed 15 December 2011].
- Mathwick, C., and Rigdon, E., 2004. Play, flow and the online search experience. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 31, pp.324-32.
- May, E., and Greyser, S., 1989. From-home Shopping: Where is It Leading? In L. Pellegrini, and S.K. Reddy, eds. *Retail and Marketing Channels-Economic and Marketing Perspectives on Producer-Distributor Relationships*. London: Routledge, pp.216-233.
- Miller, R.A., and Wood, J.T., 2002. Perceptions about Internet commerce: A student survey. *Journal of Internet Commerce*, 1(2), pp.37-48.
- Schiffman, L., and Kanuk, L., 2003. *Consumer Behavior* (8th ed). New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Sim, L., and Koi, S. (2002). Singapore's Internet shoppers and their impact on traditional shopping patterns. *Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services*, 9(2), pp.115-124.
- Steenkamp, J.F., Hofstede, F., and Wedel, M, 1999. A cross-national investigation into the individual and national antecedents of consumer innovativeness. *Journal of Marketing*, 63, pp.55-69.
- Swinyard, W.R., and Smith, S.M., 2003. Why people (don't) shop online: A lifestyle study of the Internet consumer. *Psychology and Marketing*, 20(7), pp.567-597.
- Taylor, S., and Todd, P.A., 1995a. Understanding information technology usage: A test of competing models. *Information Systems Research*, 6, pp.144-77.
- Taylor, S., and Todd, P.A., 1995b. Decomposition of cross effects in the theory of planned behavior: A study of consumer adoption intentions. *International Journal of Research in Marketing*, 12, pp.137-55.
- Trocchia, P. and Janda, S., 2000. A phenomenological investigation of Internet usage among

older individuals. *Journal of Consumer Marketing*, 17(7), pp.605-616.

United Nation, 2007. *World economic and social survey*. Available at:
<<http://www.un.org/esa/policy/wess/wess2007files/wess2007.pdf>> [Accessed 15
December 2011].

Can Green Marketing Work?

Key Determinants of Consumers' Attitude toward Green Products in Hong Kong

Mark Ng
Hong Kong Shue Yan University

Monica Law
Hong Kong Shue Yan University

In recent decade, with environmental threats recognized by both the government and citizens, green marketing re-emerge as a main theme in the Western markets (Ottman, Staford, & Hartman, 2006). With the increasingly concerns in environmental threats, people in Asian market also started to concern about the environmental issues of consumption (Harris, 2006). Being a metropolitan suffers from high levels of pollution in different areas such as air pollution, water pollution, noise pollution, and high levels of garbage disposal; the government and residents of Hong Kong have started to realize the seriousness of the situations. This change in attitude can be reflected by the introduction of plastic bag levy in July 2007. It is expected that the use of green marketing appeal would become a trend in Hong Kong.

Green marketing refers to an organization's efforts at designing, promoting, pricing and distributing products that will not harm the environment. It also refers to the marketing of products that are more environmental safety, and contain reusable materials or are made of recyclable materials. Generally speaking, as the production costs of green products are higher than that of non-green products, green marketers must ensure their price setting strategies balanced both consumers' sensitivity to the price and their willingness-to-pay more for environmental safety (Chase, 1991).

Previous research into consumer attitudes toward green advertising was very comprehensive and addressed many different concepts such as motivations for a firm to produce green advertising (Davis, 1992), consumers' responses to green advertising (Frankel, 1992), and their willingness to pay higher prices (Phillips, 1999). However, earlier research in

green marketing developed in the 1970s and 1980s contained mixed and inconclusive results (Schwepker & Cornwell, 1991).

In the late 1980s, the idea of green marketing reemerged. Some survey reports in the UK identified that there was an increase in consumers' interest in green products, and their willingness to pay for green products (Intel, 1991; Worcester, 1993). Many corporations started their research in green marketing. Vandermerwe and Oliff (1990) found that 92 per cent of European multinationals claimed to adapt their products in response to green concerns. Ottman (1993) also observed that the number of green products introduced to the US doubled in 1990 and number of green print ads grew by four times.

Although there are a large number of research studies among green buying behaviors in western countries, marketers knew very little about their green buying behaviors (Lee, 2009). Some green marketers find difficulties in segmenting the market as there were limited research studies conducted in Asian countries (Keegan & Green, 2000). This paper attempts to supplement existing western-based studies by examining the key determinants in green buying behaviors among consumers in Hong Kong.

In the current research, we examine how consumers' environmental attitudes relate to their attitudes toward green products. We examine the relationships between consumers' attitude toward environmental protection, their environmental concern, perceived environmental responsibility, perceived effectiveness of environmental behavior, and attitude toward green products. The purpose of this research is to provide some ideas on developing effective green marketing strategies in Hong Kong.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND FRAMEWORK

According to Schultz, Shriver, Tabanico, and Khazian (2004), environmental attitude refers to "a collection of beliefs, affect, and behavioral intentions a person holds regarding environmentally related activities or issues" (p.31). Those people having higher environmental attitude tend to perceive that they are responsible to take environmental protection measures. Many studies have summarized a strong correlation between

environmental attitude and ecological behavior intentions (for examples, Dunlap & Van Liere, 1978; Roth, 1991).

Environmental concern (EC) refers to an individual's awareness of environmental problems and his or her attempts to contribute to solve these problems (Dunlap & Jones, 2002). Many empirical studies have found that the direct empirical relationships between EC and environmental protection behavior were low to moderate (Bamberg, 2003). In contrast, many studies have also showed consumers who are concerned about environmental issues, are more willing to pay higher prices for renewable energy (Bang, Ellinger, Hadjimarcou, & Traichal, 2000), purchase environmental friendly products (Kim & Choi, 2005), and other environmental protection behaviors (Bamberg, 2003). These studies reflected that people concerned about the environmental problems tend to take up more responsibilities in environmental protection. Consequently, two hypotheses are set as follows:

Hypothesis 1: One's environmental attitude is positively related to his/her perceived environmental responsibility.

Hypothesis 2: One's environmental concern is positively related to his/her perceived environmental responsibility.

Blake (1999) classified three levels of factors determining the gap between an individual's environmental values and actions: individual, situational, and institutional. Individual factors are related to an individual's attitudes. Their inaction to environmental protection could be attributed to their laziness, non-acceptance of responsibility, or simply lack of interest. Situational factors refer to judgment of efficacy and personal responsibility. Finally, institutional factors are concerned with practicality of action such as availability of resources. Thus, individuals' perception on their responsibilities plays a key role in determining their practice of ecological behaviors. People do not perceive or accept their responsibilities toward environment would reduce their intention to make green purchase.

According to Bandura (1977), self-efficacy refers to one's beliefs in his or her ability to

accomplish a specific task. An individual's self-efficacy plays a major role in shaping his or her approaches to goals, tasks and challenges. People are more inclined to do environmental friendly behaviors if they believe these behaviors are effective. In other words, consumers' attitudes toward green advertising vary according to their perceived effectiveness of environmental protection behaviors. Consumers with proactive attitudes toward environmental behaviors have better attitudes toward green marketing activities (Haytko & Matulich, 2009). Thus, two more hypotheses are set as follows:

Hypothesis 3: One's perceived environmental responsibility is positively related to his/her attitude toward buying green products.

Hypothesis 4: One's perceived effectiveness of environmental protection is positively related to his/her attitude toward buying green products.

RESEARCH DESIGN

This study was designed to answer the following research question: How perceptions of customers toward environmental protection related to their attitudes of green products? The independent variables were consumers' attitudes toward environmental protection, environmental concern, their perceived responsibility in environmental protection, and perceived effectiveness of environmental protection. The dependent variable was their attitudes toward green product, and hence, their buying intention of the green products.

Participants and Procedure

A self-administrative questionnaire survey method was chosen. Research fieldworkers were employed for this study and they had attended a briefing session before conducting the survey. Their major duties included inviting respondents and collecting answered questionnaires. The survey was conducted through Internet. Each respondent were filled in

the questionnaire and sent back to our email account.

The sample included people from different backgrounds and selected through snowball sampling method. A total of 687 respondents participated in this study for the questionnaire survey. 56 per cent of participants were female and 44 percent of them were male. Most of them were university students and graduates (46%), followed by participants with secondary school or below educational level (37.8%) and tertiary education level (12.5%). They were evenly distributed across three age groups: below 25 (34.2%), 25 to 40 (32.9%) and above 40 (32.9%).

Instruments

The questionnaire consisted of three sections. The first part was intended to collect participants' attitudes and perceptions toward environmental protection. The second section consisted of scales measuring their attitudes and purchase intention toward green products. The last one was about the participants' personal backgrounds. The questionnaire was prepared in both in Chinese and in English. Back translation procedure was adopted to ensure equivalence of Chinese and English versions.

The perceived environmental responsibility and perceived effectiveness of environmental protection were hypothesized to contribute to attitude toward green product, and purchase intention of green product. Seven-point Likert's scales were used in all measures ranged from "*strongly disagree*" (=1) to "*strongly agree*" (=7).

Attitude toward environmental protection was measured with the seven-item scale developed by Lee (2009). The reliability of this scale was 0.889. Sample items included: "It is essential to promote green living in HK", "I strongly agree that more environmental protection works are needed in HK", and "It is very important to raise environmental awareness among HK people". Items four to seven of this scale were reverse-coded.

To measure the participants' degree of *environmental concern*, the four-item scale developed by Lee (2009) was adopted in this study. Reliability of this scale was 0.825. Sample items included: "I am worried about the worsening of the quality of HK's

environment”, and “Hong Kong’s environment is my major concern”.

Perceived environmental responsibility was measured with the three-item Likert’s scale adapted from Lee (2009). The reliability of this scale was 0.887. Sample items included: “I should be responsible for protecting our environment”, “Environmental protection starts with me”, and “Environmental protection is the responsibility of the HK Government, not me”.

Perceived effectiveness of environmental behavior was measured with the four-item scale adapted from (Lee, 2008). The reliability of this scale was 0.723. Sample items included: “I think if I carry out some pro-environmental behaviours in my everyday life”, and “I would contribute a lot to our environment”.

Attitude toward buying green product was measured by the three-item scale adapted from Pickett-Baker and Ozaki (2008). The reliability of this scale was 0.625. The examples of scale items were: “I feel good about buying brands which are less damaging to the environment”, and “It is easy for me to identify these products”.

Purchase intention of green product was measured by the three-item scale adapted from Pickett-Baker and Ozaki (2008). The reliability of this scale was 0.704. The examples of scale items were: “I buy green products even if they are more expensive than the non-green ones” and “I choose to buy products that are environmentally-friendly”.

DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations among the variables in the study are provided in Table 1. The attitude toward environmental protection, environmental concern, perceived environmental responsibility, perceived effectiveness of environmental protection, were all significantly and positively related to their attitudes toward green products and buying intention toward green products.

Table 1: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations among Measures

Variables	M	SD	EA	EC	PER	PEE	AGP
Attitude toward environmental protection	5.89	.87					
Environmental concern	5.57	.92	.568**				
Perceived environmental responsibility	5.57	.94	.656**	.565**			
Perceived effectiveness of environmental protection	4.88	.97	.438**	.339**	.518**		
Attitudes toward green product	4.83	.95	.380**	.338**	.442**	.339**	
Buying intention of green product	4.85	.96	.422**	.398**	.511**	.410**	.581**

** $P < .01$

To determine the meaningfulness of the relationship between them, structural equation modeling was conducted. Follow a two-step procedure, structural equation modeling was used to test the measurement model, the path model and the hypotheses.

In the first step, the principle component with eigenvalues over 1 was used to extract the factors used in the study. Ultimately, all the items were retained after the detection of variables with more than one factor, or removal of low factor loadings. In line with recommendations by Mishra et al. (1998), the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) was used to determine whether the items used in this study share a common core. The result (.902) was higher than the acceptable exploratory standard (.50) suggested by Nunnally (1978). The data then were rotated by the varimax method and reliabilities of the extracted factors were assessed using Cronbach's alpha coefficient (Mishra et al., 1998). Most scales had reliabilities over .75, which fulfilled the minimum acceptable level suggested by Nunnally (1978).

Next, the measurement model comprised of all the items, was tested with the global fit indexes ($\chi^2/df = 3.52$; goodness-of-fit index [GFI] = .98, comparative fit index [CFI] = .97, normed fit index [NFI] = .96, incremental fit index [IFI] = .97, and root mean square error of approximation [RMSEA] = .061) with LISREL software (version 8.80). The result revealed that the hypothesized factor structure fitted the data well, indicating the model was acceptable.


After the validation of the measurement models, another step was to test the hypotheses. A structural model was suggested with the six constructs – attitudes toward environmental

protection, environmental concern, perceived responsibility of environmental protection, perceived effectiveness of environmental protection, attitudes toward green products, and buying intention toward green products.

All the global fit indexes ($\chi^2/df = 2.91$; goodness-of-fit index [GFI] = .98, comparative fit index [CFI] = .98, normed fit index [NFI] = .96, incremental fit index [IFI] = .98, and root mean square error of approximation [RMSEA] = .054) were reached the acceptable levels. The hypothesized factor structure fitted the data well and the model was acceptable.

Besides the global fit indexes, the relationships between each constructs were significant. Six hypotheses were supported based on the parameter estimates and t-values for the hypothesized relationships. The links between attitude toward environmental protection and perceived responsibility to environmental protection (H1: $t = 7.68$), environmental concern and perceived responsibility to environmental protection (H2: $t = 5.76$), were supported. Both perceived responsibility to environmental protection and perceived effectiveness of environmental protection were also positively and significantly related to their attitudes toward green product (H3: $t = 5.65$ and H4: $t = 4.46$, respectively). The estimated path coefficients of the hypothesized model are shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Proposed Model of Study



DISCUSSION

Several implications can be drawn from this study. The findings of current study have enriched the existing green marketing literature by clarifying the relationship between environmental concern, environmental attitude, perceived responsibility of environmental protection, perceived effectiveness of environmental protection, and attitudes toward green products.

Consumers' attitude toward green purchase is affected by their perceived responsibility to and perceived effectiveness of environmental protection behaviors. The findings are largely consistent with literature of green marketing, which postulates that users' attitudes toward green purchase are affected by their attitudes towards environmental protection.

Consumers' environmental attitudes and environmental concern had significant impacts on their perceived responsibility to environmental protection. People with high levels of environmental attitudes and concerns tend to perceive environmental protection as their own responsibility. Those people with higher perceived responsibilities to environmental protection and perceived effectiveness of environmental behaviors also hold more favorable attitudes toward green products. These results are consistent with findings in previous studies.

Applying the results to marketing planning, green marketers are advised to consider the following points: Firstly, green marketing should use more emotional appeal rather than rational appeal. Green marketers may make use of marketing communication campaign with strong emphasis in environmental problems and the urgency of environmental protection to raise people's environmental concern, which may lead to increase in perceived responsibility of environmental protection.

Secondly, people who accepted their responsibility to environment have more favorable attitudes toward green purchase; thus, to promote green products in Hong Kong, it is necessary for consumers to realize their individual responsibilities in environmental protection. For example, green marketer may convey the message that "each of us is responsible to save our earth" in their marketing communication campaign.

Finally, the results also suggest that consumers are concerned about the effectiveness

and usefulness of their environmental behaviors. They are less motivated to buy green products if they do not believe in the beneficial outcomes of the purchase for themselves and the environment. It also implies that green advertising works best to attract those consumers who are already practicing green behaviors and believe that these behaviors are effective to environmental protection. To develop an effective marketing campaign, green marketers may describe how their purchases can contribute to save the earth and support environmental protection effectively.

LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

In conclusion, this study extends previous research on green marketing, by showing how different environmental attitudes and perceptions are related to each other. Our findings highlight the importance of perceived responsibility and effectiveness of environmental behavior in affecting their attitudes toward green products.

Several major limitations concerning this study need to be acknowledged. First of all, future research needs to determine if these results can be replicated with a national random sample. Secondly, there is an important limitation concerns the validity of self-report measures of behavior. The respondents may have over reported “socially-desirable” environmental attitudes, concerns, and environmentally friendly friends. Another issue is the consistency of behavior over time. A longitudinal research follows the consumer’s green behavior over time in respect to their willingness of green purchase would be able to draw conclusion on whether relationships accounted for here are consistent over time.

Also, the present study measures consumers’ attitudes toward green products but not their actual purchase behaviors. Future research may address this limitation by linking the attitudes with the behavior. Further research may also look into how corporations can build effective marketing campaigns that convey the green messages to their audiences. Finally, some researchers have argued that contextual factors such as external drivers and barriers would also affect the environmental behaviors of respondents. Inclusion of these factors in further research may improve the explanatory power of the model.

REFERENCES

- Bamberg, S., 2003. How does environmental concern influence specific environmentally related behaviors? a new answer to an old question. *Journal of Environmental Psychology*, 23, pp.21-32.
- Bandura, A., 1977. Self-efficacy: toward a unifying theory of behavioural change. *Psychological Review*, 84, pp.191-215.
- Bang, H., Ellinger, A.E., Hadjimarcou, J. and Traichal, P.A., 2000. Consumer concern, knowledge, belief, and attitude toward renewable energy: an application of the reasoned action theory. *Psychology and Marketing*, 17(1), pp. 6-26.
- Blake, J., 1999. Overcoming the 'value-action gap' in environmental policy: Tensions between national policy and local experience. *Local Environment*, 4(3), pp.257-278.
- Davis, J.J., 1992. Ethics and environmental marketing. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 11, pp.81-87.
- Dunlap, R.E. and Jones, R.E., 2002. Environmental concern: Conceptual and measurement issues. In R. E. Dunlap and W. Michelson, eds. *Handbook of environmental sociology*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp.482-524.
- Dunlap, R.E., and Van Liere, K.D., 1978. The new environmental paradigm. *Journal of Environmental Education*, 9, pp.10-19.
- Frankel, C., 1992. Blueprint for Green Marketing. *American Demographics*, 14, pp.34-38.
- Harris, P.G., 2006. Environmental perspectives and behavior in China: Synopsis and bibliography. *Environment and Behavior*, 38(1), pp.5-21.
- Haytko, D.L. and Matulich, E., 2009. Green advertising and environmentally responsible consumer behaviors: Linkages examined. *Journal of Management and Marketing Research*, 1, pp.2-11.
- Keegan, W.J. and Green, M.C., 2000. *Global Marketing*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Kim, Y. and Choi, S.M., 2005. Antecedents of green purchase behavior: an examination of collectivism, environmental concern, and perceived consumer effectiveness. *Advances*

- in *Consumer Research*, 32, pp.592-599.
- Lee, K., 2008. Opportunities for green marketing: Young consumers. *Marketing Intelligence & Planning*, 26(6), pp.573-586.
- Lee, K., 2009. Gender differences in Hong Kong adolescent consumers' green purchasing behavior. *Journal of Consumer Marketing*, 26(2), pp.87-96.
- Mintel, 1991. *The Green Consumer Report*. London: Mintel.
- Ottman, J.A., 1993. *Green Marketing: Challenges & Opportunities*. Chicago, IL: NTC Business Books.
- Ottman, J.A., Stafford, E.R. and Hartman, C.L., 2006. Avoiding green marketing myopia: Ways to improve consumer appeal for environmentally preferable products. *Environment*, 48(5), pp.22-36.
- Pickett-Baker, J. and Ozaki, R, 2008. Pro-environmental products: marketing influence on consumer purchase decision. *Journal of Consumer Marketing*, 25(5), pp.281-293.
- Schultz, P.W., Shriver, C., Tabanico, J.J. and Khazian, A.M., 2004. Implicit connections with nature. *Journal of Environmental Psychology*, 24, pp.31-42.
- Schweper, C. and Cornwell, T., 1991. An examination of ecologically concerned consumers and their intention to purchase ecologically packaged products. *Journal of Public Policy and Marketing*, 10, pp.77-101.
- Vandermerwe, S. and Oliff, M., 1990. Customer drive corporations green. *Long Range Planning*, 23(6), pp.10-16.
- Worcester, R., 1993. *Public and Elite Attitudes to Environmental Issues*. London: MORI.

Generational Influences on Hotel Industry

Lai-Kuen Law

Hong Kong Shue Yan University

Email: lklaw@hksyu.edu

INTRODUCTION

Branding is traditionally an important issue in hotel industry. As it is different from the tangible products, people can only loyal to the hotel based on its previous experience which in terms of the intangible service.

However, with the societal, technologies and lifestyles changes, hotel is facing the challenges with attracting and retaining the new generation – Generation Y (Gen Y) guests who claimed the least loyal to branding than its generational predecessors, but to be the future key purchasing group for hospitality industry. Understanding what appeals to be the generations as consumers is critical for organizations. Generational difference may influence their values and preferences. Thus, it is necessary for the hotel to consider on this issue, and to understanding these different perceptions will enable improved communications and persuading for the consumers.

Targeting specific generations for their preferences and reaching them through media that is suitable to their style is an important marketing trend. Gen Y enter into a primary business and leisure traveller group in the U.S, even it accumulates to 28% of Hong Kong population (Census and Statistics Department, 2011). However, very little academic literature provides a solid process for uncovering the true needs of the specific Gen Y segment in hotel operations in Hong Kong.

Therefore, to fill this gap, the primary purpose of this study is to empirically examine Gen Y's expectation and perception towards hotel selection, and to identify hotel attributes they prefer. More specifically, it identifies the underlying factors of Gen Y hotel guests who are willing to pay more for the hotels they prefer. This contributes to provide important insights into the development of consumer-based hotel marketing strategies, especially to

address the effect of Gen Y on the purchasing process and help hotel marketers better understand Gen Y. Appropriate solutions for further improvements on meeting the demands of Gen Y are recommended.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Service Branding

Brands are at the heart of marketing and business strategy. It is a topic of great significant in the service companies, especially in the hotel industry. Since intangible service is different from tangible product with its unique characteristics including intangibility, inseparability of production and consumption, heterogeneity of quality and perishability (Kayaman and Arasli, 2007; Baltescu, 2009). Only with strong brands in hotel service and guests memories of their hospitality experience will increase consumers' trust of the invisible, enabling them to better visualise and understand the intangible service and reduce consumers' perceived financial, social or safety risk (Berry, 1986; Kayaman and Arasli, 2007).

Several research have indicated that guest satisfaction and branding are in close relationship. A brand name provides the guest important information about the service sight unseen (Jacoby, *et al.*, 1977; Briucks, *et al.*, 2000). By creating a strong brand, which represents the hotel services and appears to consumer's tangible characteristics of an actual product. Successful brands create wealth by attracting and retaining consumers and provide added value to both guests and hotel companies. The hotel industry has regarded the value of brandings as an essential component of its marketing strategy. Thus successful branded hotels take brand as their potential source of strategic advantage and apply their resources to reinforce their brand advantages over their competitors (Damonte, *et al.*, 1997).

In addition, satisfied consumers tend to buy more and to be less price conscious, and most importantly, it generates positive word-of-mouth; thus contributing to the wealth and success of the hotel (Anderson and Mittal, 2000). However, questions remain regarding how the brand creates guest loyalty, especially with the notion of generational cohorts which

provides a major research aspect for considering the implications of social and demographic change for hotel industry.

Generations of Consumers - Generation Y


Different generational cohort can reflect what formative events or social conditions define on that generation (Corvi *et al.*, 2007). Meanwhile, generations can be defined as “proposed groups of individuals who are born during the same time period and who experienced similar external events during their formative or coming of-age years” (Kupperschmidt, 2000, p.66; Noble and Schewe, 2003, p.979). Several studies had indicated that people who have experienced similar environmental conditions, such as political events, economic situations and technological changes, will shape specific preferences, beliefs, behaviours, values tendencies (Smith and Clurman, 1997; Lyons *et al.*, 2005). As such, generational attitudes have a strong significant influence on the perceptions of consumers. Hence, it is an important marketing trend to target and reach the specific generations for their preferences. Understanding the attitudes of different generations and what appeals to the generations as consumers is critical for the success of organizations in the future (Marconi, 2001; Alas, 2005).

In recent decade, more research have tended to focus on Generation Y (Gen Y), as it is segmented to become the largest consumer group in the history, a sizable portion and represents the future market for most consumer brands. However, they always review as having different behaviours and attitudes from those of other generations (Jayson, 2006; Twenge and Campbell, 2008).

Gen Y does not have a standardized definition. Some consider Gen Y as people born between 1977 and 1994, or 25 percent of the total population in the U.S. alone (Donnison, 2007). Others consider them to be born in 1980s and sometime as late as 2001 (Alcatel-Lucent, 2010). Variations among age ranges by authors, but the general consensus is as the demographic cohort from the late 1970s to the late 1990s. They are the offspring of “Baby Boomers” or “Generation X”.

Gen Y was born into a period of rapidly economic, technological and social changes (Lyons, 2004; Rawlins, *et al.*, 2008). They grew up with technology, the internet and wireless communications network, which have provided them a hyper-connected lifestyle and easy access to global-wide sources of information (Rawlins, *et al.*, 2008; Taylor, 2008; Alcatel-Lucent, 2010). They are as tech-driven; they have increased their use and familiarity with communications, media, and digital technologies.

Gen Y enters into a primary business and leisure traveller group. They also value overseas travel more than other generations (Zemke *et al.*, 2000). However, unlike the generations that have gone before them, Gen Y are always claimed as the ‘least loyal and least satisfied’ hotel guests. For example, the study by Barsky and Nash (2011) based on the Market Metrix Hospitality Index, a quarterly report of consumer satisfaction with hotel in 2006 based on 35,000 in-depth consumer interviews conducted each period. Gen Y travellers are the least loyal to hotel brands compared to all other generational group.



Graph 1: Consumer Loyalty by Generation

Source: Barsky and Nash (2011): The Market Metrix Hospitality Index (2006 Q3)

Research from Hua and Qu (2009) conducts a gap analysis on Gen Y consumer's expectation and perception towards lifestyle hotels. The findings indicate that Gen Y is overall satisfied with lifestyle hotels and view lifestyle hotels have relatively high performance in general than the traditional hotel. Furthermore, several research had identified the key character of Gen Y in terms of their hotel preference in the West. For example, multi-use lobbies, WiFi chairs, and allow staff and consumer interaction are being designed in hotels to attract this group (Nicholas, 2009).

Even though Gen Y are always claimed as the ‘least loyal and least satisfied’ hotel guests, some research had contrast findings. For example, they associate brands with companies that stand behind their products and it gives them important peer recognition (Generational-Targeted Marketing, 2007). The influence of the technological and social environment as well as socialization agents such as peers and mass media provide common life experiences that create common values and attitudes among people growing up in this period. Since this segment is becoming the mainstream of purchasing group in the hotel market, hotel that wants to capture with this generation must design properties with them in mind to future-proof their businesses.

METHOD

Study Population and Sampling

Since the primary purpose of this study is to empirically examine the Gen Y consumer’s expectation and perception towards hotel selection. Data were collected by means of a questionnaire survey conducted in Hong Kong in May 2010, using convenience sampling method. A total of 1,444 questionnaires were collected and coded into SPSS statistics for analysis.

Study Instrument and Data Analysis

The questionnaire consisted of three main parts. The first part of the questionnaire collects information about hotel facilities and attributes that the respondent’s preference to have towards hotel selection. The second part used to collect data on the choice of media that influence respondents in selecting hotel. The last part of the questionnaire collects demographic information such as the age, gender, education level, income level and marital status of the respondents. Apart from the generational difference, gender variable has been explored in many hospitality literatures (Kindlon, 2006). In addition, another question was

used to understand whether Gen Y will be willing to pay more for “suitable” hotel or not. Since the majority of the population of Hong Kong is Chinese, the original questionnaires were written in Chinese. To ascertain the respondent’s hotel experiences and usages, frequency and descriptive analyses were conducted.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Socio-Demographic Profile

Frequency and descriptive analyses were used to provide an overview of the Gen Y’s socio-demographic profiles and their hotel use preference.

From the output shown, there are 665 males (46.1 per cent) and 779 females (53.9 per cent) in the sample, giving a total of 1,444 respondents.

Nearly half of the respondents (48.8%) were born between 1988 and 1992 (18 to 22 years old), followed by those born between 1983 and 1987 (23 to 27 years old). And the rest are age within the ranged defined as Gen Y.

Importance of Hotel Facilities and Attributes during Hotel Selection

Firstly, in respect of hotel selection, five criteria had obtained very high scores by the respondents as an important issue to consider during hotel selection were listed on Table 1. The majority of respondents (86.1%) agreed with easy access on transportation is the key important consideration on their selection. Additionally, the other criteria also had high importance on hotel selection, such as the safety district and environment for the hotel located (83.0%); staff courteous manner (81.5%), hotel’s positive reputation (79.0%) and the location of hotel which close to the city centre and shopping mall (70.8%).

With the improvement in the society, economy and technology, Gen Y would refer the hotel to have easy access on transportation instead of the focusing on hotel’s decoration as usual.

TABLE 1: Importance of Hotel Facilities and Attributes during Hotel Selection

	Not Important	Neutral	Important
1. Easy access on transportation	2.2%	11.7%	86.1%
2. Safety district and environment	2.5%	14.5%	83.0%
3. Staff courteous manner	2.4%	16.1%	81.5%
4. Good reputation	3.5%	17.5%	79.0%
5. Closely located to the city centre and shopping mall	7.0%	22.2%	70.8%
⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮
Hotel branding	13.7%	39.8%	46.5%

However, among the criteria for selection, less than half of respondents (46.5%) claimed that hotel branding was important in their consideration on hotel selection. This is different from traditional view that brands are at the heart of hotel industry.

Another point to note is that, more than half of respondents (51.4%) agree to pay more if the hotel have the above facilities they prefer (mean = 3.43, SD = .896). To ascertain this outcome, another question was asked about the ranking on hotel facilities and attributes, and payment. From questionnaire results, findings showed the percentage of respondents who agree (37.2%) to put hotel facilities and attributes in prior to payment during hotel selection is higher than those who disagree (24.0%) with this statement. It is consist with Gen Y's character that they would consider more preferable on their perception and value and lifestyle instead of payment. Positively influential predictors associated with the willingness to pay more.

Influencers Towards Hotel Selection

Furthermore, influence from the media identified as affecting respondents' in hotel selection. As showed on Table 2, more than three quarters of respondents (79.5%) indicated that they would consider peer recommendation as the great influence on their hotel selection.

Similarly, a large portion of respondents also claimed that their previous experience (70.3%) in staying in the hotel or its alliance hotels will affect their hotel selection. Additionally, nearly half of respondents (48.5%) reported that Internet forum had played an important role in influencing their selection among hotel choices. The use of internet forum was vitally important to them.

TABLE 2: Source that Influence Respondents on Hotel Selection

	Not much Influence	Neutral	Great Influence
1. Peer recommendation	3.8%	16.7%	79.5%
2. Previous experience	9.8%	19.9%	70.3%
3. Internet forum	17.4%	34.1%	48.5%
⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮
Magazine advertisement	23.1%	37.9%	39.0%
TV advertisement	25.3%	38.7%	36.0%

However, as revealed in previous literature, traditional media mechanisms may be less helpful to influence respondents in hotel selection as previously. Questionnaire findings showed less than 40% of respondents expressed the view that advertisement on traditional media as the great influencer towards their hotel selection (39.0% and 36.0% for magazine advertisement and TV advertisement, respectively). This was in contrast to the high influence from peer recommendation and previous experience as listed above.

In sum, reviewing research findings above revealed that a rigid attitude to the traditional perception and media mechanism that influence the respondents on hotel selection had been changed.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The research findings about Gen Y is inconsistent with branding literature, which suggests that consumers are willing to pay more for a “suitable” and/or a preferred brand

(Aaker, 1996). Alternatively, Gen Y tends to be more willing to pay more not for the brand, but for the facilities, attributes and lifestyle of the hotel which “suitable” to them.

Marketing actions to remedy these changes of generational difference is important. As a marketer, it is necessary to match Gen Y’s communications to each stage. Successful Gen Y brands should be perceived as the flexible and convenience, and best consumer service providers understand what “service” means to them.

Furthermore, hotel strategy is shown to be more complex than posited by the traditional branding perspective. It is not only influenced by traditional factor but peer influence and wireless communication which have an impact on Gen Y’s experience on hotel selection.

As revealed from aforementioned literature, peer recognition is important to Gen Y. This can also explain why peer recommendation had an extraordinary high influence to the respondents on their hotel selection. Furthermore, new technology has made life easier for respondents, especially Gen Y, they are primarily like to have wireless communication; it is not surprising to see the result of internet forum as an important influencer in their hotel selection.

As such, even though findings showed that respondents seemed not to obviously view advertisements as the high influence. Traditional advertisement on magazine and TV is no longer the sole factor affecting Gen Y, its impact still cannot be ignored. Online advertisement or post on social networking service, such as Facebook or Twitter which are widely used worldwide for social links. By mean of posting an advertisement on this channel as an alternatively marketing strategy, it is believe that more Gen Y in the targeted segment can be captured.

In the nutshell, the results of this research had illustrated Gen Y’s dimensions and benefits sought toward hotel facilities and attributes and help hotel marketers better understand Gen Y.

Like all such studies, this study can be improved, especially in terms of its generalisation. Enlarging the sample size and randomly sampling are suggested to apply in future study. Additionally, future research can also examine potential moderating variables influencing the hotel selection by gender differences consumer’s different life-cycle stages.

Finally, this study can further be used as a foundation and stepping-stone to provide insights into future cross-cultural research in order to compare Gen Y in hotel selection between the East and West. In particular, meaningful and challenging tourism experiences focused on cultural exchange seem likely to be popular with Gen Y.

REFERENCES

- Aaker, D., 1996. *Building strong brands*. New York: Free Press.
- Alas, R., 2005. Job related attitudes and ethics in countries with different histories. *Cultural Management*, 12(2), pp.69-84.
- Alcatel-Lucent, 2010. White Paper: Unlocking the Gen Y Potential, [online]. Available at: <<http://hma.hotelworldasia.com/content/white-paper-unlocking-gen-y-potential>> [Accessed December 2011].
- Anderson, E. and Mittal, V., 2000. Strengthening the satisfaction-profit chain. *Journal of Service Research*, 3, pp.107-120.
- Baltescu, C.A., 2009. Challenges and opportunities facing brand management in the lodging industry. *Bulletin of the Transilvania University of Brasov*, 2(51), pp.67-74.
- Barsky, J. and Nash, L., 2011. Generation Y: More emotional, less loyal, *Market Metrix*, [online]. Available at: <<http://www.marketmetrix.com/en/default.aspx?p=research3&s=research>> [Accessed December 2011].
- Berry, L.L., 1986. Big ideas in service marketing. *Journal of Consumer Marketing*, 3, pp.47-51.
- Briucks, M., Zeithaml, V., and Naylor, G., 2000. Prince and brand name as indicators of quality dimensions for consumer durables. *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science*, 28(3), pp.359-374.
- Census and Statistics Department, 2011. Hong Kong Statistics, *The government of Hong Kong Special Administration Region*. [online]. Available at: <http://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hong_kong_statistics/statistical_tables/index.jsp?charsetID>

- =1&tableID=002&subjectID=1> [Accessed December 2010].
- Corvi, E., Bigi, A. and Ng, G., 2007. The European millennial versus the US millennial: similarities and differences. In: International Business Research Conference. Sydney, 3-6 December 2007. Australia.
- Damonte, T., Rompf, P., Bahl, R., and Domke, D., 1997. Brand affiliation and property size effects on measures of performance in lodging properties. *Journal of Hospitality Research*, 20(3), pp.1-16.
- Donnison, S., 2007. Unpacking the millennial: a cautionary tale for teacher education. *Australian Journal of Teacher Education*, 32(3), pp.1-13.
- Generational-Targeted Marketing Group, 2007. [online]. Available at: <<http://www.investopedia.com/articles/financialcareers/08/generational-marketing.asp>> [Accessed November 2007].
- Hua, W. and Qu, H., 2009. A gap analysis on Generation Y customer expectations and perceptions towards lifestyle hotels. [online]. Available at: <<http://scholarworks.umass.edu>> [Accessed December 2011].
- Jacoby, J., Szybillo, G., and Busato-Schach, J., 1977. Information acquisition behavior in brand choice situations. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 3, pp.209-215.
- Jayson, S., 2006. Generation Y gets involved, *USA Today*, [online]. Available at: <http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-10-23-gen-next-cover_x.htm> [Accessed December 2011].
- Kayaman, R. and Arasli, H., 2007. Customer based brand equity: evidence from the hotel industry. *Managing Service Quality*, 17(1), pp.92-109.
- Kindlon, D., 2006. *Alpha Girls: Understanding the New American Girl and How She Is Changing the World*. New York: Rodale.
- Kupperschmidt, B., 2000. Multi-generation employees: Strategies for effective management. *Health Care Manager*, 19(1), pp.65-75.
- Lyons, S., 2004. An exploration of generational values in life and at work. *Dissertation Abstracts International*, 3462A (UMI No. AATNQ94206).
- Lyons, S., Duxbury, L. and Higgins, C., 2005. An empirical assessment of generational

- difference in work-related values. *Human Resources Management*, 26, pp.62-71.
- Marconi, J., 2001. *Future marketing: Targeting seniors, boomers, and generations X and Y*. Chicago, IL: NTC Contemporary Publishing Group Inc.
- Nicholas, A.J., 2009. Generational Perceptions: Workers and Consumers. *Journal of Business & Economics Research*, 7(10), pp.47-52.
- Noble, S. and Schewe, C., 2003. Cohort segmentation: an exploration of its validity. *Journal of Business Research*, 56(12), pp.979-987.
- Rawlins, C., Indvik, J. and Johnson, P.R., 2008. Understanding the new generation what the millennial cohort absolutely, positively must have at work. *Journal of Organizational Culture, Communications and Conflict*, 12(2), pp.1-8.
- Smith, J. W. and Clurman, A., 1997. *Rocking the ages: The Yankelovich report on generational marketing*. New York: HarperCollins Publishers Inc.
- Taylor, M., 2008. Generation Y with Chinese characteristics. [online]. Available at: <<http://www.timeo-performance.com/employment-market-in-china/gen-y>> [Accessed December 2011].
- Twenge, J. M. and Campbell, S. M., 2008. Generational differences in psychological traits and their impact on the workplace. *Journal of Managerial Psychology*, 23(8), pp.862-877.
- Zemke, R., Raines, C. and Filipczak, B., 2000. *Generations at work: Managing the clash of veterans, babyboomers, xers, and nexters in you workplace*. New York: American Management Association.

Marketing of The Boat Tourism within Chachengsao Province

Lamson Lertkulprayad
Srinakharinwirot University
Email: llertkulprayad@gmail.com

BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE

Thailand was formerly known as the Venice of East since the people have normal living through the river transport. Many canals were used as the main routes. Though boats were not as fast as the cars used in the present, they could travel at low cost, and saved environment due to no mechanic. Along the river, established constructions were a long-term prosperity such as market, houses and “Wat”, place of worship on.

Even today the country has changed by rising of modern buildings. Traces of traditional Thai history still have been found along the river regularly like Chachoengsao Province. Situated close to Bangkok, just 82 miles, the province has total 11 districts that consist of Amphur Muang, Amphur Bangkhla, Amphur Bangpakong, Amphur Ban Pho, Amphur Bangnampreaw, Amphur Panomsarakham, Amphur Snamchaiekt, Amphur Prangyao, Amphur Ratchasan, Amphur Ta Takeab, Amphur Klong Kueng (Chachoengsao Provincial Administration Organization, 2008)

Chachengsao province is the area that Bangpakong River runs through, and creates prosperity in green fields, crops and Thai culture such as Temple Sothon Worawihan and Talat Ban Mai, the local community has revived its 100 year-old riverside market on the eastern end of Chachoengsao province. Although there are many tourist attractions alongside the river, the number of tourists' visiting was still very little compared with the other popular cities like Pattaya. In our opinion, this town is only the place to tour for a while and most tourists pass themselves to more famous tourism cities. Spiritual tourism at Temple Sothon Worawihan is the only one that is the most attractive.

At the current situation, we are interested to do a research studying how interested the tourist places alongside Bangpakong River are and what marketing strategies can be

recommended to match with its tourists' behavior.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

1. To compare between the present tourism behavior of Thai travelers and demographic factors i.e. gender, age, occupation, education, monthly salary, as well as life style in travelling.
2. To study the suitable sailing routes in Bangpakong River serviced for tourists.
3. To study marketing demands for boat tourism in Chachengsao Province classified by demographic factors i.e. gender, age, occupation, education, monthly salary, as well as life style in travelling.
4. To collect information in customers' desires to promote marketing plan for boat tourism in Chachengsao Province.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH

1. Estimate possibility to build another sailing port promoting boat tourism at the river.
2. Add more variety of tourist attractions in the province.
3. Create more values for existing heritage places by the process of marketing.
4. Understand the linkage of all stakeholders concerning with domestic tourism within the province.

LITERATURE REVIEWS

Boonlert Jittungwattana (2005) explained about sustainable marketing concept similar to Koller, Keller & Simon Nelson Pattern Fund (2009) that the significance of tourism product and its positioning was essential to be first priority. Concerning about it and selection of tourists' target market, the strategic development of marketing mix ought to be followed and conglomerated with tourism production and positioning. Furthermore; marketing plan obviously looked into long term benefits not leaving tremendous wastes and

pollution in the local communities. In terms of creating tourism objectives, there were six criteria in choosing the suitable tourist target market and how to be a good organization of community as the following:

1. The local must response immediately to the tourists' demand for their satisfaction.
2. The local must have interesting profits from providing tourist activities.
3. The local must raise better standard of living for the people in community equally.
4. The local must maintain surrounding environments in good condition for tour businesses.
5. The local must consume overall natural resources worthily for tourism.
6. The local must allow all participating with tour businesses and enjoys satisfied.

Palmer and Cole (1995) gave the suggestion that production and marketing in service business was done together, and service activities could not be tried before. Therefore, word of mouth or viral marketing was essential. Jay Kandampurly (2006) emphasized the efficiency of services occurred when the customers received more benefit than what they have paid. And, then they were proud to be permanent customers and willing to ask the others to follow. For tourism industry, it was the excellent strategy and significant to help lower costs of marketing operation.

Victor T. C. Middleton (2001) illustrated to ingredients of tourism products in terms of sustainable tourism marketing as follows:

1. The design of tour program offered to tourists
2. The selection of tour physical evidences matched with their tour pricing and their brand image
3. The conclusive services provided to tourists and the appropriate amount of employees with good full training and service attitude
4. Valuable goodwill of tour attractions communicated to visitors

The good tour attractions ought to maintain high service quality and standard pricing. Berry & Yodav (1996) commended that the successful determination of pricing in a tour program was up to the worth values the visitors received comparing with the paid expenses.

For the rest 2 P's: Place & Promotion, their overall functions were to create product awareness and desire as well as purchasing the goods through appropriate distribution channel. In the part of promotion, it stimulated wants inside tourists' mind through mass media communication like radio and television or the new booming one was social media such as twitter and face book.

More than 4 Ps used in marketing plan, nowadays many researchers applied the new marketing mixes by conversing 4 Ps into 4 Cs: Customer Value, Cost to Customer, Convenience, and Communication to find customers' attitude toward their needs and wants (Kotler, 2000). It was the concept invented to link the customers' demands as a centre and responded to their expectation perfectly.

History and Tour Attractions in Chachengsao Province


Chachengsao province is located at the east part of Thailand covering approximate 5,351 square kilometers or 2,344,375 Rai (Thai measurement system). Far from Bangkok capital city about 82 kilometers, the travelers can visit here through the main street no. 34 (Bangna-Trad). The provincial area is connected with the others:-

North - Prachinburi and Nakhonnayok Provinces

South - Chonburi and Chanthaburi Provinces and the Gulf of Thailand


East - Prachinburi and Sakaeo Provinces

West - Samutprakan, Pathumtanee Provinces and Bangkok, Capital City of Thailand
(TAT Central Region Office: Region No. 8, 2007)



Picture No. 1 Chachengsao Map from Tourism Authority of Thailand

From information of Chachoengsao Provincial Administration Organization, the name of Chachengsao was dedicated from Khmer or Cambodia language, “Sa Thong Trang” or “Sa Thong Sao”. Its meaning was the deep canal. Maybe because of its geographical location that have a deep and big river i.e. Bangpakong River, the ancient people called it like that. As the time went by, the local changed its name to become “Sangsao” or Chachengsao at present. With the prosperity in the river, the city had another name as “Padriew”. In the past, people here had very good skills in fisheries especially making a dry snakehead fish. Its size was so huge that could be cut into eight notches. Therefore; it became the history of the city name. Furthermore; the ancient records have written that the city used to be the assembly point for all soldiers before making war in the period of King Naresuan and King Taksin.



Picture No. 2: King



Picture No. 3: King Narasuan

For tour attractions alongside Bangpakong River at inner town, there are plenty of temples here, but the outstanding one that all people give the most respect is “Wat Sothorn Wararam Worrawiharn Temple”, or someone calls “Wat Hong”. It has been built in the late Ayutthaya period in the area believed as the land of dragon. Inside the temple, there is a Buddha image, "Luang Pho Sothon" regarded as one of the most revered Buddha images in Thailand and it is the most important holy thing of Chachengsao province settled here since the early period of Thonburi Kingdom (1667-1822). Another attraction in town is Talad Ban Mai Riverside Market. The Thai traditional market that has been survived for at least 100 years old alongside the river still keeps conservation of Thai old lifestyle. Here there are so many local shops and restaurants. The travelers are likely to have lunch or even buy traditional snacks, toys and fascinating souvenirs. Next to another town at Ban Klar district, it is the beautiful area full of natural resources such as Koh Lad. The local still makes daily living life and has activities here alongside the river such as showering or fabricating palm hats. For the famous temple in the nearby area, it is Wat Pho Bang Klar. The uniqueness in this temple is many Ma Kai bats on trees during the day. They fly out to find for food during the night. Even though fruits are their favorites, these bats never eat fruits grown by Bang Khla people.



Picture No. 4: Boat at Bang Klar

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

From the plan of research, the sampling group came from the 300 visitors used to travel in Chachengsao Province and included 8 stakeholders working in tourism in this area. We divided the research method into two parts i.e. questionnaire surveys and depth interviews. To accomplish the first part, we collected the sample by accidental sampling and did the purposive interviews with involving stakeholders. Most of them are the government officers, sailors, and owners of tour business alongside the Bangpakong River. The research processes started from searching literature reviews about tourism marketing and Chachengsao areas. Then, collecting questionnaire and interviews, the outcomes were analysed by using SPSS program. The descriptive results from average, T-test, and one-way ANOVA showed us the figures to understand the visitors' behavior and their attitude about marketing demands including personal information used to promote boat tourism in this province.

RESEARCH OUTCOMES

From the collected data, most travelers were female aged between 21-30 years old. Their education background was bachelor and income between 5,001-15,000 Baht (approximate \$160 - \$500 per month). The tour lifestyle was shopping and eating good foods. They were interested in tasting local foods and had no needs for entertainment activities on board. However; the trip price should be suitable and worth for travelling within one hour. Any entrance fees to enter the local shops or temples were not necessary in their thought. Two routes of boat trips they felt interesting were 1) the city town- Wat Sothorn Wararam Worrawiharn Temple- Ban Mai Riverside Market- (Bangpakong Dam) 2) Bang Klar district – Koh Lad, a island at Bang Klar – Wat Pho Bang Klar Temple. These

routes had already opened for tour services.



Picture No. 5: Wat Pho Bang Klar



Picture No. 6: Wat Sothorn Wararam
Worrawiharn Temple

RESEARCH SUGGESTION

We recommend setting up tourism activities within 1 hour of sailing, such as local food eating on boats, shopping at a modern mall along Bangpakong River, light and sound show at night, watching the firefly at night, lighting decoration at heritage places and fun activities on the boats. Moreover; establishment of a standard port as well as parking lot near a major tourist attraction along the river was the need of tourists. Nevertheless, all attractions should be clean and decorated with clear beautiful signs. Publicity through the networking website and Facebook was recommended as well as the tour program, “Overnight in the River”. And facilities to the tourists by selling boat tours at tourism festival in Bangkok were considered an appropriate marketing. However; all stakeholders should not forget to include the training of conservation, and the right ways to provide tourism and hospitality services to tourists in order to create sustainable tourism for the community and local resources.

REFERENCES

- Berry, L. L. and Yadav, M. S., 1996. Capture and communicate value in the pricing of services. *Aloan Management Review*, Summer, pp.40-50.
- Boonlert Jittungwattana, 2005. *Sustainable Tourism Development*, Bangkok: Press & Design Co., Ltd.
- Chachoengsao Provincial Administration Organization, 2008. *Handbook for travelling at Chachengsao Province*, Chachengsao: Ham Compute Offset Limited Partnership.
- Kandampully, J., 2006. *Services Management*. Upper Saddle River, N.J.:Prentice Hall .
- Kotler, P., 2000. *Marketing Management*. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall.
- Kotler, P., Keller, K. L. and Simon Nelson Patten Fund. eds, 2009. *Marketing management*. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson Prentice Hall.
- Middleton, V. T. C., 2001. *Marketing in Trave and Tourism*. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann.
- Palmer, A. and Cole, C., 1995. *Service Marketing: Principles and practice*. New Jercey: Prentice Hall.
- Tat Central Region Office: Region No. 8, 2007. Chachengsao. In: THAILAND, T. A. O. (ed.).

A Comparative Analysis of The Marketing of Private Banking Services: Europe vs. Asia

Ronald K Chung
EQuity Consulting Co., Ltd.

Alice M Chung
Hong Kong Shue Yan University
Email: achung@hkysu.edu

INTRODUCTION

The practice of private banking dates back at least as far as the seventeenth century with some British private banks (Maude et. el., 1996) in Europe.

Traditionally, private banks are not incorporated companies, but are partnership based organization to provide financial and related services to high net worth individuals (HNWI.) These services include retail banking products as well as a wide range of up-market investment and finance related services, such as intergenerational wealth management.

With “a long history of authoritarian regimes, political persecutions and concomitant weak property rights, as well as confiscatory tax regimes..., wealthy individuals... keep a portion of their savings in a few neighboring jurisdictions that offer a high degree of confidentiality and freedom...” (Dufey, 2009, p. 3.) Due to the desire for privacy and confidentiality by these individuals, most of the business is conducted on a private and personal basis. Marketing of private banks at this stage is primarily through word-of-mouth.

Private banking in Asia experienced tremendous growth since the 1960s “... when the colonial period had ended, local wars began to die down , and countries started to migrate from a restrictive and highly political socialist model of development to an economically-driven growth-path based on private ownership and free enterprise,...” (Dufey, 2009, p. 4)

Clearly, the practice of private banking in Europe, evolving over 4 – 5 centuries were designed to cater to the “old money,” which Asian clients with the bulk of the current wealth

created in recent 4 – 5 decades were “new money.” As such, client expectations can be quite different and the traditional marketing through word-of-mouth may not work for private banks in the Asian markets.

This paper reviews the existing limited research on private banking. Based on our analysis of prior research, we identify the distinct characteristics of private banking clients in Asia and suggests how banks can better market their financial services and products to these clients in Asia.

A FIRST LOOK AT THE MARKET

Given the fact that the focus of private banking products are designed for HNWIs. A definition of HNWI is, therefore, necessary.

Who are the HNWI?

Different service providers has different definitions for HNWIs. Typically, in today’s market, an individual will need at least 3 million USD of investable assets to be considered as HNW clients by a private banking service provider. However, according to Datamonitor (2002,) with the increasingly intense competition in the market place, up to 50% of private clients falls below normally accepted minimum investment thresholds.

As a result, HNWIs are now generally defined over 4 levels based on investable assets (In USD): Level 1 – Mass Affluent (300K – 500K,) Level 2 – High Net Worth Individuals (500K – 5M,) Level 3 – Very HNWI (5M – 50M,) and Level 4 – Ultra HNWI (> 50M.)

Where are the HNWI?

As statistics of the exact number of the different categories of clients are difficult to obtain, statistics of the highest level – billionaires – are collected by Forbes on an annual basis. According to Forbes (2011,) there are 1,210 billionaires (USD) in 2010 worldwide. Within

this group, the US has most billionaires, with 413. In Europe, Britain has 33 billionaires and Germany has 52 billionaires. In Asia, China has most billionaires with 115. There are 36 billionaires in Hong Kong and 26 billionaires in Japan.

TRADITIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF HNWIS

Maude (2006) identified traditional European clients tend to have characteristics that include:

1. Inherited income
2. Prefer confidentiality
3. Use discretionary asset management approach that rely on the banker
4. A high degree of risk aversion
5. Focus on wealth preservation

CHARACTERISTICS OF HNWIS: EAST VS. WEST

Two recent surveys portraits the differences between HNWIs from the traditional West and the contemporary East in private banking.

Dufey (2009) found that

1. HNWIs in the East are still in the Wealth-building phase (vs. Wealth preserving in the West).
2. As a result, they are more willing to take risks
3. Their portfolios are more bifurcated with overweighting in deposits and equities, and underweighting bonds and fixed income securities.
4. They also tend to have a preference towards real estates.
5. They are not shy from exotic instruments such as hedge funds, private equity and commodities
6. They tend to be more home country driven (what they know) with their investment

7. They tend to look for the private banker to provide them access to credit to support growth of business operations
8. They tend to use multinational service providers, and finally,
9. They tend to treasure long term relationship

In addition to Dufey (2009), the research survey by Lye (2011) identified the following key differences between Asian and Western HNWIs.

1. Asian HNWIs are more aggressive with the desire for wealth building
2. They request to see their bankers more and like to hear updates from their bankers
3. They tend to retain more control and display an aversion to mandates
4. Some HNWIs in Asia are interested in Intergenerational legacy, few are geared towards Social legacy
5. Most HNWIs in the East are not used to the idea of paying fees for wealth management services.
6. Growing interest in the loan market

Based on the above, an analysis of mapping can lead to the identification of factors that gives a clear picture of the characteristics of Asian HNWIs.

1. Their background as 1st and 2nd generation wealth creators lead Asian HNWIs to be more return oriented with a lower focus on risks.
2. As they are mostly still involved with their business venture, they tend to be more direct involvement with their investment and, hence, have a tendency to be interested in a credit relationship.
3. In addition, this also led them to be less reliant on structured mandates.
4. The direct involvement may also lead them to be more domestically driven with their investment – focusing on what they know and are comfortable controlling.

5. However, possibly due to their domestic focus with their investment, they tend to prefer multinational providers with cross-boarder experience and expertise as partners in their investments.

IMPLICATIONS TO MARKETING OF PRIVATE BANKING SERVICES IN ASIA

Given the differences between the traditional European private banking clients (Maude, 2006) and the ones in Asia as identified in this analysis, it is clear that provision and marketing of private banking services need to use a approach that is different from the traditional one.

1. To cater to the needs of the wealth builders in Asia, private bank should market their services from more of a “invest with” the client approach, rather than the traditional “invest for” clients.
2. While traditional clients may want confidentiality, Asian clients are more brand conscious – looking at the banks as investment partners. Hence, banks should not just rely on word of mouth, but rather building a brand with mass appeal. For instance, UBS sponsors major sports events such as HK Open Golf in Hong Kong as well as F1 globally to build name recognition. This is far from the confidentiality approach used in the early days of private banking.
3. In addition to the brand, client-banker relationships also tend to be more important in Asia as Asian clients tend to be more hands-on. Hence, guidance and advise are more important in contrast to the discretionary approach used in Europe.
4. Finally, as Asian clients are still wealth builders, possibly seeking credit to help build their wealth, credit may be used as part of a market program in the Asian market.

REFERENCES

Datamonitor, 2002. *Customer acquisition in wealth management survey*, September, 2002.

Dufey, G., 2009. *Private Banking in Asia - A Survey*. Nanyang Technological University (NTU) - Centre for Research in Financial Services (CREFS).

Forbes, March 10, 2011.

Lye, J.X., 2011. The Practice of Private Wealth Management in Singapore. University of Pennsylvania Scholarly Commons, Wharton Research Scholars Journal.

Maude, D. J., 2006. *Global Private Banking and Wealth Management*, John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, NJ.

Maude, D. J. and Molyneux, P., 1996. *Private Banking*. Euromoney Books.

Molyneux, P. and Omarini, A., 2005. Private Banking in Europe. Getting clients and keeping Them. In: *Annual Conference of the European Association of University Teachers of Banking and Finance*. London, September, 2005.

UBS Wealth Management Investor Day 2011, November 17, 2011.

人力資源管理以改善公立醫院醫生短缺問題

楊鈺芬

香港樹仁大學

電郵: fyoung@pacific.net.hk

醫院管理局

根據《醫院管理局條例》，醫院管理局（醫管局）是一個法定機構，並於1990年成立。

自1991年12月起，醫管局負責管理全港公立醫院，以及相關的醫療服務，透過食物及衛生局局長向香港特別行政區政府負責；食物及衛生局則負責制定醫療政策和監察醫管局的工作。

醫管局需要就公眾對公立醫院服務的需求及所需資源，向政府提供意見、管理及發展公立醫院系統、向食物及衛生局局長建議恰當的公立醫院服務收費政策、設立公立醫院、管理及規管公立醫院，以及促進、協助和參與培育工作，造就醫院或有關服務的人才。

現時醫管局共有僱員約56,000人，管轄41間公立醫院和醫療機構、48間專科門診及74間普通科門診。各醫院及門診按其所屬區域，劃分為七個醫院聯網，確保病人在同一個地區內，獲取優質的持續治療。

每個聯網的醫院運作都會予以理順補足，令聯網內的醫院能合力為區內社群提供全面和互相配搭的服務。此外，聯網之間再有管理架構，統籌聯網內和聯網之間的事務，以及監察服務的表現。

（一）職務分析

職務分析是人力資源管理學的第一步，提供工作方面的各種資訊，包含：對工作內容和崗位需求、對崗位、部門和組織結構，以及對員工的分析。

公立醫生兼顧行政工作

本港公立醫院醫生若任職專科駐院醫生，必須處理行政工作，當職位越來越高，負責的行政工作亦越來越繁重，包括：制訂策略規劃及領導分科服務發展、管理人事和財政等，從而增加醫生的工作量。

根據醫管局招聘網站，本港公立醫生的職位描述如下：

專科駐院醫生	副顧問醫生	顧問醫生
• 提供專科服務 • 指導駐院醫生的專科訓練 • 處理行政工作 • 接受持續的醫學教育和專業發展	• 提供專科及分科服務 • 指導駐院醫生的專科 / 分科訓練 • 處理行政工作 • 接受持續的醫學教育和專業發展 • 管理團隊運作及發展 • 獨立提供全面普通臨床服務 • 進行對醫療發展影響的臨床研究	• 提供專科及分科服務 • 指導駐院醫生的專科 / 分科訓練 • 處理行政工作 • 接受持續的醫學教育和專業發展 • 制訂策略規劃及領導分科服務發展 • 管理人事和財政 • 監管不同部門之間的問題應變計劃 • 獨立為不同領域及複雜的臨床服務提供指導與及領導臨床研究以帶出成效

以美國作為參考例子，當地的內科醫生亦需要處理行政工作。根據美國權威職業字典 O*Net，當地醫生需要兼顧輸入數據，處理及核實文件等行政工作。O*Net 更詳細列出內科醫生的職責，並以重要性作排序；相反，醫管局對職位要求，只謹列出一項主要責任、入職要求及優先考慮的個人特質，詳情請參考附頁 1¹。

在本港有不少報章，曾引述前線醫護人員，對需要處理過多行政工作，表示不滿。立法會醫學界議員梁家騷醫生批評，一些前線醫生兼顧輸入數據或醫院認證等行政工作，大大加重他們負擔²。

亦有曾擔任公立醫院心臟科醫生透露，在公立醫院需要負責不少的行政及文字工作，「我用一個小時做手術，可能亦要用一個小時寫報告。」最後，他離開公院，轉投私營醫院。他更指，醫生對於過多行政工作，一直感到不滿，認為把這些時間，用作救治病人，會更有意義³。

不過，醫管局在《醫管局 2009 至 2012 年度的策略服務計劃》⁴ 中，提出「管理 101」計劃，確保前線醫護人員，具備有效履行管理職責所需的知識及技能，並由純醫療人員轉型至醫療管理人員。當局期望，在未來三年，至少有 300 名人員參與此計劃，配合現今及未來，對管理人員的需求。

醫管局對公立醫院醫生的職務分析含糊，工作範疇定位不明確，醫護人員除了要應付一般的醫療工作，亦要兼顧繁多的行政工作。由於，醫管局對公立醫院醫生的職位描述不恰當，不但增加他們的工作量，更導致醫護人員大量流失。

¹ 附頁 1

² 《太陽報》18/4/2011 公院醫生谷爆 煲茶海報倒周一嶽

³ 《星島日報》20/6/2007 行政工作少醫生寧轉戰私營

⁴ 醫管局《2009 至 2012 年度的策略服務計劃》


(二) 人力資源預測

人力資源預測是根據相關工作的特色及需求，規劃如何進行招募、培訓，來填補空缺職位。

醫護人手不足 流失率高企

根據醫務委員會數字統計，撇除海外執業的香港註冊醫生，現時全港一共有 11,733 名正式註冊西醫。假設以本港大約 709 萬人口計算，現時每千人口醫生的比例是 1.65，即每名醫生需要照顧 606 香港人。

根據世界衛生組織數據顯示，在 2009 年，世界人口醫生比例中，英國每千人口的醫生比例是 2.74，當中奧地利更高達 4.75。另外，經濟合作發展組織的數據指出，組織在歐洲 31 個成員國之中，在 2008 年，平均每千人口的醫生比例是 3.3，比率是本港現時的雙倍。而美國及加拿大分別是 3.1 和 2.2；新加坡的比例較低，只有 1.83。在內地，國家衛生部公布數字指，在 2010 年每千人口醫生比例是 1.79，亦較本港的為高。



圖表 1.1 世界人口醫生比例



圖表 1.2 世界人口醫生比例

利用以上的數據計算，除了香港以外，其他國家平均每千人口的醫生比例是 $(2.2+2.3+3.1+2.2+3.3)/5$ ，即大約 2.62。相對其他國家，香港缺少的平均每千人口醫生比例是 $2.62 - 1.65$ ，即相等於 0.97。


假設以香港現時大約 709 萬人口計算，本港需要額外多大約 $0.97 \times 7,090,000/1000$ ，即 6877 名醫生，才能追上世界的平均水平。

同時，在《醫管局 2009 至 2012 年度的策略服務計劃》指出，未來人口老化問題將會日益加劇，而長者的住院及求診人數都比一般成年人多，反映長者對醫療服務需求亦會大幅上升，若按現時醫生人數不變，未來醫生的需要照顧比例只會不斷增加。



圖表 2 按年齡劃分的香港人口及醫管局病人日數分布

另外，《立法會衛生事務委員會－有關醫院管理局醫護人員問題的跟進》報告指出，由 2008 年到 2026 年，醫管局各專科人手的需求將會增加百分之 35，達到 1750 人。直至 2014 / 2015 年度，醫管局醫生將累積短缺大約 310 人⁵。



圖表 3 醫管局各專科的醫生人手需求

⁵ 《立法會衛生事務委員會－有關醫院管理局醫護人員問題的跟進》
<http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr10-11/chinese/panels/hs/papers/hs0711cb2-2298-2-c.pdf>

本港醫護人手不足，流失率高企，達到百分之 5.3，即每年流失 280 至 320 名醫護人員。即使每年有大約 250 至 320 名醫科畢業生投身社會，亦未能有效填補每年的流失數字⁶。

回歸後，醫學界曾經出現醫生人手過剩的問題，醫管局於是在 2002 至 2003 年迫使兩間大學醫學院削減醫科生學額，由每年的 320 個至 250 個。不過，數年前，本港又出現醫生人手不足的問題，結果當局再次增加學額至 320 個⁷。此外，在 2002 年，當局為紓緩財赤，推出自願提早退休計畫，流失多名年資超過十年，具資歷的醫護人員，導致近年醫護人員青黃不接⁸。有學者指，培訓醫生是長期投資，絕不能今天少了數個醫生，就多培訓幾個，明天多出幾個，又把他們踢走。

由此可見，醫管局未能就香港醫療系統對醫生的長遠人力需求，作出前瞻性規劃。這不但導致本港醫護人手長期不足，更直接影響醫療服務質素。

（三） 績效評核

績效評核是對員工能力和質素所進行的綜合考核，目的是了解員工的特點，善用及發揮其特長，創造更有利的工作條件。

晉升機制欠缺透明度

根據公共醫療醫生協會，公立醫院醫生意見調查顯示，超過八成的公立醫院醫生不滿晉升機會。

公立醫院醫生意見調查	
項目	支持率
整體待遇（福利及薪金）屬不合理水平	70.60%
不滿晉升機會	81.60%
對工作環境及安排的意見無獲合理回應	71.40%
對醫管局失去歸屬感	79.90%
得不到適當培訓與支援	49.40%
工作時間和工作量不能得到生活平衡	71.40%
私營醫療市場有相近工作會考慮離職	52.30%
私營醫療市場即時有相近工作機會會立即離職	40.30%
註：共 419 名醫生受訪	
資料來源：公共醫療醫生協會	

圖表 4 公立醫院醫生意見調查

由於，公立醫院醫生不滿晉升機會，從而對醫管局失去歸屬感，導致大量公立醫院醫生離開公立醫院，甚至轉投其他私營醫院，追求較佳的生活質素。

醫管局欠缺具透明度及符合員工期望的晉升機制，醫管局行政經理程偉權指出，

⁶ 《經濟日報》23/06/2011 本地醫生缺 長遠須增人手

⁷ 《新報》公院人手不足料將惡化 醫專贊成聘海外醫生

⁸ 《星島日報》25/10/2002 醫管局推肥雞餐減人手

公立醫院醫生的晉升速度緩慢，不少已獲得專業資格，及具豐富經驗的醫生亦未必能夠晉升，當中以內科醫生的晉升速度最為緩慢，引致人才流失速度甚高⁹。

為挽留公立醫院人才，今年三月，醫管局計劃訂下內科醫生「逢五晉升」的階梯，讓取得專科資格五年或以上、表現優異的醫生晉升為副顧問醫生。不過，公共醫療醫生協會會長蘇潔瑩不滿計劃，她表示，在婦產科、放射科等專科，醫生取得專科資格即可晉升，要求醫管局即時晉升，已取得專科資格的醫生¹⁰。

同時，公立醫院醫生認為，公立醫院的整體待遇不合理，包括：福利津貼、薪金等。醫管局與醫生工會一直就待遇及工時等問題，進行討論，不過雙方仍未能達成共識¹¹。這一直都是公立醫院醫生大量流失的主要原因之一。

聯網醫院部門化

除了，無法循公平公開的晉升機制往上爬，即使公立醫院醫生希望調職到其他聯網醫院，尋求更好發展，也是十分困難。公立醫院之間存在「山頭主義」，每一間聯網醫院只會培訓旗下的醫護人員，不輕易接受從其他聯網醫院調職過來的同伴，使聯網醫院之間的人手調配更為天方夜譚。

部份公立醫院醫生每天需要照顧較多病人，有些則較為輕鬆。理論上，醫管局應因應不同醫院的使用量而進行人手調配，但「山頭主義」使醫院出現人手分配不合理的情況，也令部份醫院的醫生處理龐大工作。

「山頭主義」更導致聯網醫院**資源分配不均**。醫管局一般以醫院上年度的財政預算作為基線，求每間醫院制訂周年工作計劃，列明來年的主要服務範疇、工作量，以及服務表現和質素的指標。然後，當局便會參照醫院的工作計劃，決定該醫院的撥款額，包括是否給予新資源以開設或增強服務，確保資源能得到充分善用。

今年，醫管局的開支預算高達 360 億元，運作透明度低，立法會醫學界議員梁家驪直斥，「醫管局每年拎咁多公帑，啲錢點用？人手分配係咪適當？根本無人知！」他表示，現時九龍東聯網人口達 98 萬，但上年度只獲撥款 31 億元；九龍中聯網人口只有 50 萬，資源卻多達約 42 億元，撥款存有差距¹²。

由此可見，醫管局的晉升機制不完善，使部分公立醫院醫生失去工作動力，轉投私營醫院。另外，聯網醫院部門化，令醫管局在資源及人手分配上，存有差距，未能有效地、全面地運作。

建議

針對醫管局在人力資源管理中，職務分析、人力資源預測及績效評核，三個範疇中所出現的管理問題，我們作出以下建議：

（一）創造及培訓醫護人員

在職務分析中，醫管局對公立醫生的工作定位不明確，兼顧行政工作，加醫生工作負擔；在人力資源預測中，醫管局未能妥善規劃醫護人員的需求，導致本港醫護人手長期處於不足水平，流失率高企，直接影響醫療服務質素。

⁹ 香港公共醫療醫生協

<http://pub28.bravenet.com/forum/static/show.php?usernum=2397288658&frmid=18&msgid=740990>

¹⁰ 《東方日報》09/03/2011 醫生逢五晉升 工會不接受

¹¹ 有線寬頻 19/03/2011 醫管局與醫生工會未就待遇及工時問題達共識

¹² 《東方日報》08/03/2011 梁家驪動議改革醫管局

就缺乏管理人才方面，醫管局應創造新職位，聘請人手協助醫生處理行政事務，而非由醫生轉型擔任，可參由考美國權威職業字典 O *Net¹³，設立的助理職位，當中包括：醫生助理及醫療助理。

Physician Assistant

醫生助理

- Provide healthcare services typically performed by a physician, under the supervision of a physician.
- Conduct complete physicals, provide treatment, and counsel patients.
- May, in some cases, prescribe medication.
- Must graduate from an accredited educational program for physician assistants.

Medical Assistant

醫療助理

- Perform administrative and certain clinical duties under the direction of a physician. Administrative duties may include scheduling appointments, maintaining medical records, billing, and coding information for insurance purposes.
- Clinical duties may include taking and recording vital signs and medical histories, preparing patients for examination, drawing blood, and administering medications as directed by physician.

圖表 5 美國醫療助理職位

醫生助理¹³具備醫療學歷及經驗，能協助處理醫學報告，減輕醫生行政上的負擔；醫療助理¹⁴性質像診所助理，協助輸入數據，能減輕醫生處理非必要的行政工作。另外，醫管局亦可聘請及增開醫護人員助理，分擔醫生輸入電腦資料，以及查詢醫療設備等工作，讓醫生可以有更多時間來診治病人。

不過，一般大專院校提供的醫護課程及護理學高級文憑課程，並不包括醫護管理方面的內容，只集中在護理常識上。因此，醫管局可與本港不同的大專院校，合辦醫護人員管理課程，確保培訓出一眾熟識護理知識和行政管理的畢業醫科生，一方面減低醫護人員兼顧行政工作的沉重負擔，亦視作培訓醫護人員的基石，舒緩人手不足的問題。

增加醫科學位或助理課程

為解決人手不足的問題，政府需要增設更多醫科學額，以應付未來醫護人員需求。今年施政報告¹⁵指出，政府計劃撥款 2 億元，增加醫科生學位，第一年的醫科學士及護士學額，分別增加 1 00 個和 4 0 個學額。

同時，政府亦會開辦醫科助理課程，培訓助理人手，包括：增加專職醫療人員學額 1 46 個。另外，自資專上院校，亦會增加護士培訓學額，長遠舒緩醫護人手不足的問題。

好處	壞處
- 紓解醫護人員不足問題	- 醫科畢業生要培訓需時 - 增加學額杯水車薪 - 少數學生選讀部分專科

¹³ O*Net <http://www.onetonline.org/link/summary/29-1071.00#WorkActivities>

¹⁴ O*Net <http://www.onetonline.org/link/summary/31-9092.00>

¹⁵ 二零一一至一二年施政報告《繼往開來》

聘請兼職醫生

醫管局可聘請兼職醫生，招聘私家執業醫生到公立醫院兼職，或吸納即將離職或退休的公立醫院醫生，減輕醫護人員的工作量。為了填補醫護人員流失，醫管局曾在英文報章，刊登招聘廣告，又到醫學會及專科學會，例如：眼科學會，宣傳兼職醫生空缺。

截至今年七月，當局一共聘請 167 名兼職醫生，一星期工作兩至三天。不過，若兼職醫生毋須輪夜當值，其薪酬將以同級全職醫生薪酬七成計算¹⁶。

好處	壞處
- 紓緩公院醫護人手 - 兼職私家醫生年資達十年或以上多年專科經驗，有利病人服務	- 兼職醫生時薪以工作量而定 - 一星期只兼職兩至三天

聘請海外醫生

醫管局就聘請海外醫生，在今年 5 月開展招聘程序，預計整體招聘逾 500 名醫生，期間以有限度註冊形式來港工作，並豁免考取本港的執業試。當局至今收到逾 160 個申請，但僅有 29 人合資格。

當局所招聘的海外醫生，主要是在英澳讀醫的香港人，並在外國考獲跟本港醫學專科學院中期試，相符或以上的資格。根據海外醫生合約制，海外醫生在港從事專科設有限制，不能涉及所有科目，他們大部分時間不會獨立面對病人，主要跟隨醫院團隊工作，每個團隊都有負責上司和顧問醫生監察¹⁷。

好處	壞處
- 解決公立醫院人手不足問題 - 供競爭機會	- 無法填補醫生逾百分之五的流失率 - 措施屬短暫性 - 免試外援，破壞香港社會「公平」核心價值

進修

醫科學生在大學醫學院經過五年的訓練後，還需要接受一年的臨床實習訓練，才能正式成為醫生。若要成為專科醫生，道路就更加漫長，要求也更為嚴謹，醫生必須要通過香港醫學專科學院的考試，才能成為認可的專科醫生，一般需要六年至八年時間不等。

醫管局於 2007 年成立了專職醫療深造學院，為其下專職醫療人員作出有系統和長遠的培訓規劃，推出專科、跨專業及個人發展課程，包括為新入職的人員提供為期三年的在職培訓課程。同時，當局計劃於來年資助 37 名專職醫療員工往海外進修或實習，資助約 100 名專職醫療員工進修碩士課程¹⁸。

好處	壞處
- 培訓醫護人員	- 做法治標不治本 - 可會造成斷層

¹⁶ now 新聞台 醫管局兼職醫生薪酬按工作而 <http://news.now.com/home/local/player?newsId=16388>

¹⁷ 《經濟日報》 1/11/2011 醫局聘 10 海外醫生 杯水車薪

¹⁸ 《立法會二十題：專職醫療人員人力需求》

（二）改善薪酬制度

公立醫院醫生認為，其整體待遇不合理，對醫管局失去歸屬感，最後選擇離開公立醫院，導致醫護人手不足。

現時，公立醫院醫生平均每小時需見十名病人，花在每名病人身上的時間就只有五分鐘，使醫生感到極大壓力之餘，也無能為力為病人提供更詳盡的服務。醫管局可為醫生設立「多勞多得」的評估機制，以量化方式，量度醫生每天的工作量，例如：以醫生每天處理病人的數量，作為其中一個決定醫生薪酬的因素。假若，醫管局能劃一每小時醫生診治病人數目，舉例以每小時診治五名病人為基礎。其後，醫生每診治多一名病人，則額外給予薪酬，提供經濟誘因。此外，假若該醫生所屬的聯網醫院，處於非繁忙時段，該醫生可申請調往其他較繁忙的聯網醫院當值，協助紓緩其他較繁忙的同事，解決人手分配不均的問題。

與此同時，醫管局可向轄下聯網醫院醫生，作出意見調查，了解他們對公立醫院系統的意見，從而作出針對性的改善。根據公共醫療醫生協會，有關公立醫院醫生意見調查顯示，有超過七成的醫護人員指，工作時間長和工作量多，難以平衡生活。醫管局應積極與醫生工會進行磋商，改善醫護人員的工作環境，包括：工時長、工資低的問題，讓他們對工作環境及安排的意見，獲得合理回覆，從而加強他們對公立醫療團隊的信心，減少流失率。

（三）改善晉升機制

醫管局的晉升機制不完善，使部分公立醫院醫生失去工作動力，轉投私營醫院，令公立醫護人手流失。

面對以上情況，醫管局應盡快設立更具透明度的醫生晉升機制，使擁有專科資格，以及具豐富經驗的醫生得到相應回報，一方面加強他們對工作環境的歸屬感，一方面避免他們流向私人市場。

針對聯網醫院部門化，醫管局可設立一個跨越資源的機制，效地評估聯網醫院的資源分配，確保地區護理及保健服務。另一方面，聯網醫院可將平日閒置的資源，與其他聯網醫院交換更有需要的資源，以達更完善的管理。

其他參考建議

（一）人口老化加劇 日倡增醫科學額

日本的人口老化嚴重程度高居世界第一，有超過百分之二十五的人口，年齡超過65歲。由於，迅速老齡化加速，醫生與人口比例偏低，導致社會對醫生的需求不斷上升，醫療費用亦跟隨急升。有學者認為，問題是歸究於日本政府限制醫科學生的數目，又指日本醫學協會為了不希望競爭加劇，試圖保持低數量的醫生。學者建議，從社區和醫療學校增加醫科學生，長遠增加醫生的人數¹⁹。因此，醫管局為應付長遠的醫護人員需求，增聘及培訓醫護人員是不可缺少的一環。

¹⁹ 《More doctors needed before boosting clinical research in Japan - The Lancet》

(二) 醫療轉診制度與公私營醫療系統合作

有經濟學者提出「轉診制度」，可避免大醫院診治小病，而引起的浪費，以及造成醫院大型化，對其他診所構成的不公平競爭²⁰。此外，現時有大量公立醫院醫生轉投私營，公私營醫療系統合作，亦是另類可探索的方案，雙方醫療系統共同合作，發展另一套全面的醫護協調及監管機制²¹。

總結

總括而言，醫管局在人力資源管理學的職務分析、人力資源預測及績效評核中，均管理不善，出現前線醫生兼顧行政工作、醫護人手不足、**醫生待遇欠佳**、晉升機制欠缺透明度，以及聯網醫院部門化等問題，減低公立醫院醫生的歸屬感，導致流失率經常處於高企，影響醫療服務質素。

就此，我們作出針對性的建議，包括：創造及培訓醫護人員、改善薪酬制度及晉升機制，一方面讓醫管局能有效地、長遠地解決管理上的問題，另一方面，確保市民得到適當的醫療服務，達至雙贏局面。

²⁰ 社會福利資訊網《香港應成立中央醫療保險制度》

²¹ 香港工商專業聯會

附頁 1

相對美國權威網站 O*Net，醫管局的職位描述草率，對職位要求，只列出一項主要責任、入職要求及優先考慮的個人特質。相反，O*Net 詳細列出美國內科醫生的職責，並以重要性作排序，清晰列出重要的個人特質等。可見，醫管局對公立醫療醫生的職位描述並不清晰，沒有列明醫生的所有職責及其重要性。

美國內科醫生職務分析
美國權威職業字典 O*Net

Job Identification

Job Title: Resident Specialist (Medical Doctor)

Department: Medicine

Reports to: Associate Consultant

Major responsibilities and duties

<i>Making Decisions and Solving Problems</i> Analyzing information and evaluating results to choose the best solution and solve problems.
<i>Assisting and Caring for Others</i> Providing personal assistance, medical attention, emotional support, or other personal care to others such as coworkers, customers, or patients.
<i>Getting Information</i> Observing, receiving, and otherwise obtaining information from all relevant sources.
<i>Updating and Using Relevant Knowledge</i> Keeping up-to-date technically and applying new knowledge to your job.
<i>Analyzing Data or Information</i> Identifying the underlying principles, reasons, or facts of information by breaking down information or data into separate parts.
<i>Processing Information</i> Compiling, coding, categorizing, calculating, tabulating, auditing, or verifying information or data.
<i>Documenting/Recording Information</i> Entering, transcribing, recording, storing, or maintaining information in written or electronic/magnetic form.
<i>Monitor Processes, Materials, or Surroundings</i> Monitoring and reviewing information from materials, events, or the environment, to detect or assess problems.

資料來源： O*Net <http://www.onetonline.org/link/summary/29-1063.00>

聯合醫院內科及老人科醫生職務分析
醫管局

Service Resident (Medical & Geriatric)

Ref: KEC/U214/11

Post Date: 9 Dec 11

Office: Medical and Geriatric Department, United Christian Hospital

Pay: HK\$51,969 to HK\$108,759 per month (including Monthly Allowance) [HGPS Pt 30 - 44B]

Key Responsibilities

Provide clinical and related services in the specialties.

Entry Requirements

A qualification registrable in Hong Kong under the Medical Registration Ordinance.

Preferred Attributes / Exposure

Staff members in the rank are expected to meet the 4 core competencies set for the Resident post. They are:

1. Functional competency.
2. Personal competency.
3. People and team competency.
4. Organization effectiveness.

Remarks

For Serving HA Staff

The offer of salary and allowance (Cash allowance, Fixed-flexi allowance or Monthly allowance) upon transfer will be made in accordance with prevailing policies.

For External Applicants

Incremental credits in recognition of relevant experience may be granted.

For All Applicants

1. The selected candidate will be offered contract terms for up to 1 year and subsequent extension may be available subject to operational needs and satisfactory performance.
2. May be required to work shifts and irregular hours as well as to perform on-call duties.
3. May be required to wear N95 mask and Personal Protective Equipment upon discharge of duties

資料來源： 醫管局

https://hkha.dimension.jobsonline.com/career/Default.asp?PID=3&AC=HKHA&EC=HA_Adm&GC=HAADM&JobID=8996&LID=1&GID=103&HKB118075197935104

參考書目

- Chee, N., Setoya, Y., Koyama, A. and Takeshima, T., 2010. The ongoing development of community mental health services in Japan: utilizing strengths and opportunities. *Australasian Psychiatry*, 18(1), pp. 57-62.
- Ebihara, S., 2007. More doctors needed before boosting clinical research in Japan. *The Lancet*, 369(9579), p.2076.
- Gupta, N., Castillo-Laborde, C. and Landry, M.D., 2011. Health-related rehabilitation services: assessing the global supply of and need for human resources. *BMC Health Services Research*, 11 (1), p. 276.
- Khatri, N., Wells, J., McKune, J. and Brewer, M., 2006. Strategic human resource management issues in hospitals: a study of a university and a community hospital. *Hospital Topics*, 84(4) pp. 9-20.
- Kwak, N.K., McCarthy, K.J. and Parker, G.E., 1997. A Human Resource Planning Model for Hospital/Medical Technologists: An Analytic Hierarchy Process Approach. *Journal of Medical Systems*, 21(3), pp.173-187.
- Reamy, J., 1997. Inquiry. *Excellus Health Plan*, 34(3), pp.266-267.
- Takeuchi, M., Tsubokura, M., Yuji, K., Matsumura, T., Kodama, Y., et al., 2010. Japan's health policy. *The Lancet*, 376 (9756), p.1900.
- Utsugi-ozaki, M., Bito, S., Matsumura, S., Hayashino, Y., Fukuhara, S., et al., 2009. Physician Job Satisfaction and Quality of Care Among Hospital Employed Physicians in Japan. *Journal of General Internal Medicine*, 24 (3) pp. 387-392.
- Wagner, R., Hlavacka, S., Bacharova, L., 2000. Hospital human resource planning in Slovakia. *Journal of Health Organization and Management*, 14 (5/6), pp.383-405.

Hodrick-Prescott Filter Analysis on Residential Market and Macro Economy in Hong Kong

Rita Yi Man Li
Hong Kong Shue Yan University
Email: ritarec1@yahoo.com.hk

1. INTRODUCTION

Economic change is a law of life. We usually associate economic instability with business recessions and booms and we are accustomed to speaking of the expansion, downturn, contraction and upturn in economic fortune as the "business cycle." Nevertheless, economic instability has been experienced by all men whether he has made his living by cultivating crops, by hunting and fishing or by practicing the arts of commerce, finance and industry. Economic history records the endless change in economic conditions. Some years are prosperous, others are dull and depressed. (Burns 1969). Common cycle analysis is important to real estate market as interactions exist between property, economic and financial sectors in one way or another (Wang 2003). For example, real estate investment accounts for over 50% of total private investment and real estate assets represent just slightly less than 60% of the US's wealth (almost 70% of US real estate is residential). In Korea, housing assets make up more than 60% of total net worth held by all households (Zhang 2011). Aspachs-Bracons and Rabanal (2010) report that there is a significant relationship between economic downturns and housing price declines in a sample of 18 industrialized countries. During the subprime financial crisis in 2007-2009, the question of correlation between housing cycle and business cycle gained importance. Many agree that the housing price downturn result in the defaults in mortgage market in the United States and finally triggered a complex chain reaction which caused the global financial market and economy stumble (Aspachs-Bracons and Rabanal 2010; Igan et al. 2011). Some of the previous research, however, argues that while some components of the construction industry stimulate economic growth, others are just results of economic growth. Likewise, Burinskienė et. al. (2011)

comment that real estate cycles do not fully coincident with the general economic cycles. The drops of the real estate market starts and ends earlier than the economic decline. Moreover, real estate prices tend to rise steadily in the long run. In the US, it is even suggested that misallocation of large amount of financial resources on housing investment instead of equipment and plant result in a concomitant drag in GDP (Chen et al. 2011). In view of these, policy-makers are often puzzled whether they should formulate their policies to motivate housing investment to promote economic growth (Chen et al. 2011).

2. PROPERTY AND BUSINESS CYCLE

Events, economics and political systems move via cycles which is similar to the natural life-cycles' (Reed and Wu 2010). A cycle is different from a trend as it repeats itself and hence facilitates investors to forecast the future prices based on historical records (Li et al. 2011). The terms which are used to describe business cycles are rich in diversity. Nevertheless, there is a tendency towards standardized. Inside the business cycles, "trough" marks the end of contraction so as the beginning of expansion whilst the "peak" of a business cycle marks the end of "expansion" and the beginning of "contraction" (Burns 1969). Business cycles manifest themselves in under or over-utilization of productive resources of an economy (Graff and Sturmy 2012). This sequence of changes is recurrent and the duration of business cycles vary from more than one year to ten or twelve years. As the phenomenon of economic expansion, contraction and construction in business cycle can only be found in a market economy but not planned economy, business cycles analysis is more or less equivalent to the analysis of economic process in capitalist market (Reed and Wu 2010). Besides, there are a couple of factors which lead to the occur of business cycle. Recent years witnessed the role played by nominal price rigidity in shaping the American business cycle (Ireland 2001). Cyclical patterns in different countries' real estate market are fairly similar, the differences arise mainly from country-specific disturbances arising from social, cultural or political institutions (Li et al. 2011).

Apart from business cycle in economics, what often draws people's attentions is

property cycle. Property cycle is defined as repeated oscillations of a market which continually overshoots and then undershoots its own steady state. They reflect some degree of instability in the market where a single economic shock leads the market to oscillate around its steady state (Reed and Wu 2010). In Hong Kong, housing market experienced a boom when the economy rose sharply in 1978-1981. Nevertheless, it bust because of oversupply and excessive speculation from 1982 through 1984 and revived during the economic expansion in late 1980s. The negative real interest rates extended the boom to the early 1990s which caused fluctuations in house prices. Later, the housing market continued to boom in spite of the restrictions in mortgage lending announced by the government and the banks in 1992. The speculative activities entered to new heights even though the government announced a task force to dampen speculation on property prices and land supply, the market picked up again in late 1996. In Singapore, the housing market boom between 1980 and 1984 during rapid economic growth, followed by the liberalization of Central Provident Fund (CPF) which allowed CPF savings to be used for private housing mortgages. Housing prices rose by more than 100% between 1979 and 1983 and then dropped with the bust in 1985 which coincided with Singapore's first general recession since independence. The fast growing public housing construction led to the overheating of the economy in the early 1980s and the subsequent deceleration occurred as it coincided with the bad economy later on. The housing market recovered in 1987 and reached a peak in the 1996. This was a period of strong economic recovery along side with the liberalization in the regulations governing the purchase and financing of HDB resale flats (Chen et al. 2004).

Similar to business cycles, different countries have different length of property cycles. For example, Property cycles in Melbourne over the last half century show a regular repetitive pattern of 15 years apart (Robinson 1998). Between 1879 and 1932, there was 10 business cycles in Germany, 11 in Great Britain and France (Burns 1969). Among the housing cycles in European countries, Belgium's upswing was the longest as that last for nearly 2 decades. Other countries also experienced prolonged growth, e.g. 11 years in Denmark (Ball 2008). Previous research also shows that the time for expansion and contraction phase are not steady within one country. Dalsgaard et al. (2001) find that business cycle in OECD countries has

changed over the past 30 to 40 years. A number of developments changed the structure of OECD economies, spurred by technology advances and structural reform. Many countries in these years shift towards a service-based economy, combined with an improvement in inventory management reduce the destabilizing effect from stock building in the business cycle. Increase openness to trade, a surge in intra-firm and intra-industry trade also contribute to the change in the cycle. In the US, information and communication technology contribute to a rise in trend growth. For example, between 1854 and 1961 the average length of business cycles in the US was 49 months (about 4 years), with an average expansion and contraction last for 30 and 19 months respectively. During the ten business cycles from 1919 to 1961, the contractions last for 15 months and the expansions averaged 35 months. While the declines ranged from seven to 66% and averaged 26%, the increases of industrial production ranged from 18 to 93% and averaged at 38%. (Burns 1969).

Some previous research shows that property cycle occur because of the building lags in relation to demand changes for space which are driven by the fluctuations of business activity. Developed on the modern market system, the conceptual model links the macro economy and the sub-markets of space. Changes in economic activities affect the households, firms and other types of entities, which in turn affect the space demand. This provides a good sign to developers to supply more new space. Unfortunately and finally, the lengthy space development process often creates delay or mismatch with the fast changing market demand. The lag between building demand and supply has become one of the most popular explanations for property cycles (Reed and Wu 2010). Another theory which explains the existence of property cycle due to the changes in macro economy lies on the credit cycles. Whilst low interest rate can potentially cause expansion and high interest rate can potentially cause expansion and high interest rate lead to contraction in our economies. Property and credit cycles are strongly linked with one another (Davis and Zhu 2011). Bank lending affects property prices via liquidity effects. Changes in lending attitudes and credit availability have considerable impact on the investment decisions on new construction and demand for real estate, which in turn lead to changes in property prices. It has been widely documented that floods of money seeking investment opportunities and the competition among financial

institutions after financial deregulation which stimulate the building frenzy phenomenon in some countries during the 1980s and 1990s. Alternatively, the story between economic cycles and property cycles can be viewed by the credit and property cycles can be driven by common economic factors, both of them are largely determined by economic conditions and prospects (Davis and Zhu 2011). Others concur that causes or factors which affects the property cycles varies in different cities and countries (Robinson 1998) so as the reasons for the linkage between property and business cycles, for example, post war property cycles in Melbourne are identified and associated with the fundamentals of demand and supply (Robinson 1998). Previous research also demonstrates the close relationship between different types of housing cycles. In Malaysia, cycles in condominium prices appear the most exogenous and lead the house price cycles in the terrace, semi-detached and detached housing categories by one to two quarters (Chung 2011). Farrelly & Sanderson (2005) find that real estate actors behave differently at various points of the business cycle.

3. DATA

According to the Rating and Valuation Department (2012), not all the residential transactions are included in the data set. It excludes the housing transaction from public sector developments, including all units built under the Home Ownership, domestic units built under the Private Sector Participation Scheme for subsidised sale, Mortgage Subsidy, Buy or Rent Option, Urban Improvement and Flat-for-Sale Schemes, Sandwich Class Housing, are not included, Government owned quarters, Tenants Purchase Scheme. The figure 1 shows the property prices of various types of residential prices from 1982 quarter 1 to 2011 quarter 3. Abbreviations of the figures can be found in Table 1:

The residential prices include in this study are defined as independent dwellings with separate bathroom (and/or lavatory) and cooking facilities. They are further divided according to floor area:

Class A - saleable area less than 40 m²

Class B - saleable area of 40 m² to 69.9 m²

Class C - saleable area of 70 m² to 99.9 m²

Class D - saleable area of 100 m² to 159.9 m²


Class E - saleable area of 160 m² or above

(Rating and Valuation Department 2012).


Table 1 Abbreviations of different types of housing used in this research

Abbreviations	Types of housing
AHK	A grade housing in Hong Kong Island
BHK	B grade housing in Hong Kong Island
CHK	C grade housing in Hong Kong Island
DHK	D grade housing in Hong Kong Island
EHK	E grade housing in Hong Kong Island
AK	A grade housing in Kowloon
BK	B grade housing in Kowloon
CK	C grade housing in Kowloon
DK	D grade housing in Kowloon
EK	E grade housing in Kowloon
ANT	A grade housing in New Territories
BNT	B grade housing in New Territories
CNT	C grade housing in New Territories
DNT	D grade housing in New Territories
ENT	E grade housing in New Territories
HKGDP	Hong Kong Gross Domestic Product


Figure 1 A through E grade housing prices and GDP record from 1982 to 2011




AHK




AK




A_NT




BHK




BK




BNT




CHK




CK




CNT




DHK




DK




DNT




EHK



EK



ENT



HKGDP

4. RESEARCH METHOD

Any observed economic time series can be decomposed into trend and cycle. The empirical analysis of the business cycle regularities involves the process of detrending (García-Ferrer and Ríó 2001). The present study filters the time series real estate transaction and GDP data using the Hodrick-Prescott technique. It is one of the most common methodologies that business cycle researchers adopt (McGough and Tsolacos 1995) to remove the trend components in the business cycle (Ravn and Uhlig 2002). Previous research papers adopt this method in locating the business cycles in Japan (Artis and Okuboy 2011) and the US (Partridge and Rickmany 2005). The HP filter estimate the trend in an unobserved components model that has trend and noise components, with the signal-to-noise ratio “ q ” set to an arbitrary value. The parameter “ q ” which is equivalent to the ratio of the variances in the model is detrended with the associated filter and it is suggested that we should fix q at 1/1600 for quarterly data. The procedure for which we apply the HP filter is just the same as smoothing a series using a cubic spline (the spline literature focuses on methods for choosing a fixed value for the smoothing parameter) (Trimbur 2006). The Hodrick Prescott filter (HP filter) is used to remove the trend component in Grade A, B, C, all Grades office and GDP values. The time series regression is used to identify the factors which possibly affect the rent of the office. Given that a times series of observations Y_t ($t=1,2,\dots,T$), HP filter can be considered as an additive decomposition $Y_t = Y_t^{\bar{}} + Y_t^c$, where $Y_t^{\bar{}}$ is a trend component and Y_t^c is a cyclical component. HP estimates the trend component via constrained minimization (Razzak 1997). According to (Gallego and Johnson 2005):

$$\frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T (\ln y_t - \ln y_t^*)^2 - \frac{\partial}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T [(\ln y_{t+1} - \ln y_t^*) - (\ln y_t - \ln y_{t-1}^*)]^2 \quad (1)$$

where y_t^* is the HP filtered time series generated from the actual y_t and its counterpart matrix can be written as

$$y^* = (1_T + \partial(P'P))^{-1}y \quad (2)$$

Where P is the $T \times T$ matrix represented by a series of concatenated identity and zero matrices, y and y^* are column vectors with dimensions $(Y \times 1)$:

$$P = [1_T | O_{(T-2) \times 2}] - 2[O_{(T-2) \times 1} | I_{(T-2)} | O_{(T-2) \times 1}] + [O_{(T-2) \times 2} | I_{(T-2)}] \quad (3)$$

After we obtain stationary cyclical components of the series by using HP filter, we conduct the correlation analysis which is similar to the research study conducted by Sayan & Tekin-Koru (2012). This research adopted Pearson's correlation to study the correlation between various residential cycles and GDP cycles. The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient is an index without dimension and is invariant to linear transformations of either variable. It was a mathematical formula developed in 1895 (Rodgers and Nicewander 1988). According to (Bolboaca and Jantschi 2006), Pearson's correlation is a measure on the direction and strength of the linear relationship between two variables to where one variable is linearly correlated to another. It is assumed that both variable variables Y and X are ratio or interval variable, their joint distribution is bivariate normal which follow a normal distribution.


$$r_{Prs} = \frac{\sum (X_i - X_m)(Y_i - Y_m)}{[\sum_{i=1}^n [(X_i - X_m)^2 ((Y_i - Y_m)^2)]^{1/2}} \quad (4)$$


The Pearson's correlation coefficient varies from -1 to +1.

- 1) +1 show that the variables exhibit a perfect linear relation with an increasing relationship;
- 2) -1 show that the variables exhibit a perfect linear relation with an decreasing relationship;
- 3) 0 show that the variables are not linearly related by one another.


On top of that, it is suffice to say there is a strong correlation if the correlation coefficient exceeds 0.8 and a weak correlation displayed if the correlation coefficient is less than 0.5.

Figure 2 HP filter results of various housing cycles and business cycles







Hp_DHK




Hp_DK




Hp_DNT




Hp_EHK



Hp_EK



Hp_ENT



Hp_GDP

5. RESULTS

Among the various types of HP housing cycles in Table 2, there is stronger relationship between class A, B, C housing units (smaller size units) than D and E (larger size housing units). Majority of correlation values between Class A through E exceed 0.7 at 99% significant level. In terms of relationship between GDP and housing cycles, all of them displays a positive significant relationship at 99% level except class A (New Territories), Class B (Kowloon and New Territories), Class C (Hong Kong Island), Class E (New Territories) display a significant positive value at 95% level. Besides, property cycles of class A, B, C between GDP are of stronger correlation than grade D and E. Yet, all of these record a value less than 0.5 which means only weak correlation exist between them. This research

results echo various previous research such as Burinskienė et. al. (2011). The author speculates that lead lag relationship exists between property cycles and business cycles as suggested by Reed and Wu (2010). Moreover, larger size flats are luxury goods where the home purchasers buy more when they have more money in hand. Therefore a stronger correlation exists between larger size flats and GDP. The strong correlation between various classes of residential cycles are expected as the factors which affect the housing prices such as construction costs, land price changes in the same direction no matter whether they are used to build large or small size housing units.

6. CONCLUSION

The booms and busts of business cycles repeat in many countries in different periods of time. Hong Kong is of no exception. The rises and falls of housing cycles exhibit a weak positive and significant relationship with business cycles. There is, however, a stronger correlation between various classes of residential cycles as they share similar factors which lead to the rises and falls in housing prices.

Table 2 HP filter results for five classes housing and GDP

HP_AHK	1	.970(**)	.927(**)	.973(**)	.907(**)	.912(**)	.953(**)	.886(**)	.896(**)	.922(**)	.841(**)	.875(**)	.826(**)	.715(**)	.843(**)	.244(**)
HP_AK	.970(**)	1	.965(**)	.962(**)	.935(**)	.957(**)	.950(**)	.900(**)	.945(**)	.917(**)	.843(**)	.909(**)	.824(**)	.726(**)	.821(**)	.247(**)
HP_ANT	.927(**)	.965(**)	1	.934(**)	.898(**)	.990(**)	.914(**)	.855(**)	.971(**)	.871(**)	.800(**)	.909(**)	.766(**)	.696(**)	.771(**)	.200(*)
HP_BHK	.973(**)	.962(**)	.934(**)	1	.940(**)	.935(**)	.983(**)	.909(**)	.918(**)	.964(**)	.837(**)	.923(**)	.868(**)	.715(**)	.878(**)	.254(**)
HP_BK	.907(**)	.935(**)	.898(**)	.940(**)	1	.905(**)	.939(**)	.945(**)	.881(**)	.912(**)	.834(**)	.897(**)	.838(**)	.653(**)	.859(**)	.200(*)
HP_BNT	.912(**)	.957(**)	.990(**)	.935(**)	.905(**)	1	.918(**)	.850(**)	.973(**)	.879(**)	.799(**)	.922(**)	.773(**)	.706(**)	.780(**)	.220(*)
HP_CHK	.953(**)	.950(**)	.914(**)	.983(**)	.939(**)	.918(**)	1	.901(**)	.907(**)	.961(**)	.820(**)	.921(**)	.880(**)	.715(**)	.889(**)	.224(*)
HP_CK	.886(**)	.900(**)	.855(**)	.909(**)	.945(**)	.850(**)	.901(**)	1	.840(**)	.891(**)	.829(**)	.857(**)	.816(**)	.646(**)	.866(**)	.247(**)
HP_CNT	.896(**)	.945(**)	.971(**)	.918(**)	.881(**)	.973(**)	.907(**)	.840(**)	1	.877(**)	.791(**)	.925(**)	.783(**)	.710(**)	.778(**)	.250(**)
HP_DHK	.922(**)	.917(**)	.871(**)	.964(**)	.912(**)	.879(**)	.961(**)	.891(**)	.877(**)	1	.805(**)	.896(**)	.881(**)	.713(**)	.873(**)	.304(**)
HP_DK	.841(**)	.843(**)	.800(**)	.837(**)	.834(**)	.799(**)	.820(**)	.829(**)	.791(**)	.805(**)	1	.742(**)	.693(**)	.787(**)	.722(**)	.277(**)
HP_DNT	.875(**)	.909(**)	.909(**)	.923(**)	.897(**)	.922(**)	.921(**)	.857(**)	.925(**)	.896(**)	.742(**)	1	.830(**)	.618(**)	.858(**)	.250(**)
HP_EHK	.826(**)	.824(**)	.766(**)	.868(**)	.838(**)	.773(**)	.880(**)	.816(**)	.783(**)	.881(**)	.693(**)	.830(**)	1	.589(**)	.845(**)	.269(**)
HP_EK	.715(**)	.726(**)	.696(**)	.715(**)	.653(**)	.706(**)	.715(**)	.646(**)	.710(**)	.713(**)	.787(**)	.618(**)	.589(**)	1	.598(**)	.396(**)
HP_ENT	.843(**)	.821(**)	.771(**)	.878(**)	.859(**)	.780(**)	.889(**)	.866(**)	.778(**)	.873(**)	.722(**)	.858(**)	.845(**)	.598(**)	1	.220(*)
hp_GDP_HKM	.244(**)	.247(**)	.200(*)	.254(**)	.200(*)	.220(*)	.224(*)	.247(**)	.250(**)	.304(**)	.277(**)	.250(**)	.269(**)	.396(**)	.220(*)	1

REFERENCES

- Burns, A.F. 1969. The Business Cycle in a Changing World. In: AF Burns, ed. *The Nature and Causes of Business Cycles*. United States: National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Wang, P., 2003. A Frequency Domain Analysis of Common Cycles in Property and Related Sectors. *Journal of Real Estate Research*, 25(3), pp.325-346.
- Zhang, W.-B., 2011. Economic Growth with Space and Fiscal Policies with Housing and Public Goods. *Journal of Economic Studies*, 38(4): 452-482.
- Aspachs-Bracons, O. and Rabanal, P., 2010. The Drivers of Housing Cycles in Spain. *SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association*, 1(1/2), pp.101-130.
- Igan, D., Kabundi, A., De Simone, F.N., Pinheiro, M. and Tamirisa, N., 2011. Housing, credit, and real activity cycles: Characteristics and comovement. *Journal of Housing Economics*, 20(3), pp. 210-231.
- Burinskienė, M., Rudzkienė, V. and Venckauskaitė, J., 2011. Effects of Quality of Life on the Price of Real Estate in Vilnius City. *International Journal of Strategic Property Management*, 15(3), pp.295-231.
- Chen, J., Guo, F. and Zhu, A., 2011. The Housing-led Growth Hypothesis Revisited : Evidence from the Chinese Provincial Panel Data. *Urban Studies*, 48(10), pp.2049-2067.
- Reed, R. and Wu, H., 2010. Understanding Property Cycles in a Residential Market. *Property Management*, 28(1), pp.33-46.
- Li, J., Chiang, Y.H. and Choy, L., 2011. Centralelocal Conflict and Property Cycle: A Chinese Style. *Habitat International*, 35(1), pp.126-132.
- Graff, M. and Sturmy, J.-E., 2012. The Information Content of Capacity Utilization Rates for Output Gap Estimates. *CESifo Economic Studies*, 58(1), pp.220-251.
- Ireland, P.N., 2001. Sticky-Price Models of the Business Cycle: Specification and Stability. *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 47, p.3-18.
- Chen, M.C, Kawaguchi, Y. and Patel, K., 2004. An Analysis of the Trends and Cyclical Behaviours of House Prices in the Asian Markets. *Journal of Property Investment &*

- Finance*, 22(1), pp.55-75.
- Robinson, J., 1998. *An Investigation of the Fundamentals in Property Cycles*. United Kingdom: RICS.
- Ball, M., 2008. *House Price Cycles: Evidence from Recent European Experience 2008*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Dalsgaard, T., Elmeskov, J. and Park, C.Y., 2001. Ongoing Changes in Business Cycle - Evidence and Causes. In: *23rd SUERF Colloquium (Societe Universitaire Europeenne de Recherches Financieres)*. Brussels.
- Davis, E.P. and Zhu, H., 2011. Bank Lending and Commercial Property Cycles: Some Cross-Country Evidence. *Journal of International Money and Finance*, 30(1), pp.1-21.
- Chung, H.H., 2011. Cycles in landed and non-landed housing sub-markets in Malaysia. International. *Journal of Housing Markets and Analysis*, 4(2), pp.144-154.
- Farrelly, K. and Sanderson, B., 2005. Modelling Regime Shifts in the City of London Office Rental Cycle. *Journal of Property Research*, 22(4) pp.325-344.
- Rating and Valuation Department, 2012. Property Market Statistics. [online] Available at: <<http://www.rvd.gov.hk/en/publications/pro-review.htm>> [accessed 19 February 2012].
- García-Ferrer, A. and Ríó, Ad., 2001. A Cyclical Characterization of Economic Activity in the United States, 1887-1940. *Journal of Economic Studies*, 28(2), pp 74-92.
- McGough, T. and Tsoacos, S., 1995. Property cycles in the UK: an empirical investigation of the stylized facts. *Journal of Property Finance*, 6(4), pp.45-62.
- Ravn, M.O. and Uhlig, H., 2002. On Adjusting the Hodrick-Prescott Filter for the Frequency of Observations. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 84(2), pp371-380.
- Artis, M. and Okuboy, T., 2011. The Intranational Business Cycle in Japan. *Oxford Economic Papers*, 63(1), pp.111-133.
- Partridge, M.D. and Rickmany, D.S., 2005. Regional Cyclical Asymmetries in An Optimal Currency Area: an Analysis Using US State Data. *Oxford Economic Papers*, 57(3), pp.373-397.
- Trimbur, T.M., 2006. Detrending Economic Time Series: A Bayesian Generalization of the Hodrick–Prescott Filter. *Journal of Forecasting*, 25(4), pp.247-273.

- Razzak, W., 1997. The Hodrick-Prescott technique: A smoother versus a filter An application to New Zealand GDP. *Economics Letters*, 57, pp.163–168.
- Gallego, F.A. and Johnson, C.A., 2005. Building confidence intervals for band-pass and Hodrick–Prescott filters: an application using bootstrapping. *Applied Economics* ,37(7), pp.741-749.
- Sayan, S, and Tekin-Koru, A., 2012. Remittances, Business Cycles and Poverty: The Recent Turkish Experience. *International Migration*, 50(S1). pp.e151-e176.
- Rodgers, J.L. and Nicewander, W.A., 1988. Thirteen Ways to Look at the Correlation Coefficient. *The American Statistician*, 42(1), pp.59-66.
- Bolboaca, S.-D. and Jantschi, L., 2006. Pearson versus Spearman, Kendall's Tau Correlation Analysis on Structure-Activity Relationships of Biologic Active Compounds. Leonardo. *Journal of Sciences*, 9(2), pp.179-200.

Entrepreneurship and Institutional Change in Real Estate Brokerage Market in Taiwan: The Case of Sinyi Real Estate

Simon Chien Yuan Chen¹
Feng Chia University
Email: cyuan@mail.fcu.edu.tw

Fu-Lai Tony Yu
Hong Kong Shue Yan University
Email: flyu@hksyu.edu

1. INTRODUCTION

There is a long debate about the real power of economic growth and how East Asia economic miracle was formed. However, the myth of economic growth and economic miracle in Asia are no longer mysterious. Nowadays, most scholars agree that entrepreneurship and institution are two most crucial factors contributing a nation's growth of wealth (Sandler, 2001). The entrepreneurship theory pioneered by Schumpeter (1961), interpreted clearly why entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial innovation are the key resources to economic growth. Now the entrepreneurship theory has developed very quickly and provides many insights on how entrepreneur behave and innovate new ideas. For example, entrepreneurs play roles such as innovator, arbitrageurs, coordinators and charismatic leaders, which are all necessary sources for economy to grow and to adapt new change (Wennekers and Thurik, 1999).

As to the role of institution, as earliest as Olson (1982) pointed out that over-active interested groups' lobbying in western democratic countries would decline these nations' development momentum. In the same vein, Powell (2005) argued that the economic miracle of Tiger economy could be also partly contributed by the time when World War II was just over and interested groups still not yet firmly organised in the countries such as Taiwan and Korea. The recent rapid development of new institutional economics furthering provided us

¹ We thank Diana Kwan for her proof reading in this paper. However, she bears no responsibility for errors that remain.

many insights for understanding the economic functions of institution and also soundly answered the question, how institution does matter with a nation's economic growth (North, 1999). This is because the institutional setting shapes property rights structure, amount of transaction cost and individual's incentive structure, which dramatically influence individual's incentive, behaviours and then final economic outcomes. The contrasting economic development between Taiwan versus mainland China and North versus South Korea has always been cited as good examples on how different institutional settings do relate to economic growth.

However, these two paradigms are not separated. Nelson (2002) stressed that institutional and technical innovation are all important to the economic growth. In the emerging market development such as the nations of Brazil, Russia, India and China, more and more researches focus on the roles of institution setting and entrepreneurship (Aidis et al, 2008). So, it is the crucial topic of clarifying the relationship between entrepreneur and institution in Asia where most countries are developing economies. Moreover the new type of entrepreneur, the institutional entrepreneur especially needs to be discussed in developing countries. The institution entrepreneurs are those who possess good skills in creating market institution, removing institutional barriers and therefore need good ability to coordinate with government official (Li, et al, 2006). These successful institution innovations not only benefit entrepreneurs' companies but also bring positive externalities to whole industry as well as the nation. The importance of institutional theory and entrepreneurship also attracted one of important journals in entrepreneurship research, the *Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice* (ETP) that published a special issue in 2010 to discuss the relationship between institution and entrepreneurship theories. One reviewing paper in the ETP concluded that there are three main research streams discussing institutional theory and entrepreneurship. One stream focuses on the relationship between the institutional setting and entrepreneurship, which seeks to answer the question of what kinds of institution settings are suitable for entrepreneur to develop. The second stream is to discuss the entrepreneurship and legitimacy, which tries to explain how and why entrepreneurs seek to legitimate their new ventures. The third stream is to interpret the features and behaviours of institutional entrepreneurs, which focus on how

entrepreneur build up the market institution and win market and government recognition.

These three streams all need further investigations. But, this paper aims to go further to discuss the third research stream. Because there are not too many references to discuss the features of institutional entrepreneur and how these institutional innovations are created, modified and successfully approved by market and government. This paper try to a establish the theoretical model of institutional innovation processes based on new institutional economics and entrepreneurship theory, which is arranged in section two, three and four. The model is general but we use the real estate as an example to discuss. In section five, we use the Sinyi Real Estate in Taiwan as a case to demonstrate how real institutional entrepreneur behave. Because Sinyi Real Estate is the leading company in Taiwan's secondary housing brokerage and it has innovated many new transaction rules and restore many orders in the real estate brokerage market. The historical development of Sinyi Real Estate is just as a typical case of institutional entrepreneur, which would provide many valuable lessons to other Asian countries.


2. THE ECONOMIC FUNCTION OF INSTITUTION AND TYPES OF TRANSACTION COSTS: INCENTIVE VERSUS COORDINATION PARADIGM

2.1 The static institutional analysis: only the incentive matters?

In the perspective of new institutional economics, owing to the reality of individuals' bounded rationality and imperfect information, self-interested people may behave opportunistically and take advantage of others. Therefore, without constraints, the 'self-seeking with guile' in individual behaviour will increase uncertainty and incur very high costs because it is very costly to distinguish opportunistic from nonopportunistic actors *ex ante* (Williamson, 1975). Society as a whole can become very chaotic and unproductive because many resources are used to prevent opportunistic behaviour and less is used in creation and production. Therefore, institutions emerge to provide information to constrain people's behaviours so that it becomes more predictable and less uncertain. According to

North (1990a, p. 3), ‘The institution reduces uncertainty by providing a structure to everyday life’. Institutions are founded on informal and formal rules. The former like customs, norms and cultures are shaped spontaneously by long-term human experience. Most of the rules that matter to our daily lives develop within society in an evolutionary process of gradual feedback and adjustment.

Figure 1 Economics of institutions



Source: Williamson, 1998, p. 26

An institution is indeed very important to delineate, protect, arrange, and process property rights. Williamson (2000) described more details about the economic functions of institution as he referred to which there are four levels of rules constituting a social institution (see Figure 1).

The top level in figure 1 is the social embeddedness. This level of rules includes norms, customs, mores, traditions, religious doctrines, etc. Such rules emerge spontaneously through an infinite number of interactions between individuals in society and changes in them are very slow, particularly in the core of religious doctrines and ideologies. Level 2 rules are those shaping the formal, predominantly state-organised institutional environment. These rules are the product of politics and provide the rules of the game within which economic activity is organised. The polity, judiciary, and bureaucracy of government are all located here. Williamson (2000) called level 2 rules first-order economising, since they are vitally important to the economic productivity of an economy.

Level 2 rules explain why we need government. Governments emerge to provide an institutional environment to define and secure property rights (Barzel, 1997, 2002; Umbeck, 1981). However, a perfectly functioning legal system of government is impossible to achieve. As Barzel (1997) indicates, to delineate every attribute of property is prohibitively costly. Using government to delineate some kinds of rights may be too costly. Therefore, some rights are left in the public domain from the point of view of government statutes and another level of regulations emerge to delineate these rights, more cheaply than can be done by government. Contracts, broadly defined, are the third level of rules and further order the rights left unordered at level 2.

This is the level current transaction cost economic mainly addresses and are the focus of Coase's (1937) firm theory. Taking the rules of the game at level 2 as given parameters, level 3 deals with the play of the game. Alternative modes of organisation are described as syndromes of attributes that differ in discrete structural ways. Second-order economising applies: efficiency gains from allocating transactions into feasible governance- market, hybrids, firms, bureaux and so on to match.

Hence, levels 2 and 3 provide the framework to shape the incentive structure at level 4

and affect the final allocation of resources in society. Conversely, the allocation result at level 4 will feedback to changes in rules at level 3 to reassign the incentive alignment; regulate competitive behaviours; and to reduce transaction costs. Finally it may also affect changes in rules at level 2. Thus, higher level rules impose constraints on lower levels (illustrated by solid arrows in Figure 1). By contrast, changes in institutions starts at the lower levels as feedback begins to drive change in higher levels of rules (depicted by the dashed arrow).

So, there are four layers of rules defining our property rights, shaping individual's incentives and influencing our daily routines. However, there are two problems in Williamson's approach of institutional analysis. One is the time factor missing in Williamson's model of institutional comparison. Williamson suggested that the cost and benefit analysis can be applied to arrange transactions properly within its feasible governance. However, in reality the feasible governance seems very difficult to be found immediately after the analysis of institutional comparison is completed. Because transaction cost is ubiquitous and the amount of transaction cost always changes. If anyone wants to correctly measure and calculate transaction cost and properly design rules for reducing transaction cost, they cannot get the right answer without spending time to learn and experiencing a trial and error process. In sum, Williamson's transaction cost analysis only address the incentive problems on human being and did not consider human's problem of bounded rationality (Hodgson, 1989; De Soto, 2008).

Another problem is the interaction between different levels of institution. It can be seen in figure 1 that new rules emerge and feedback from lower level of rules to higher one. However, as we know that the replacements of old routines and rules are never easy. The "institutional dependency" is just the term to describe why some inferior rules exist for a long time even everyone knows (North, 1990). So some successfully institution changes and replacements must lead by 'someone' with entrepreneurship as suggested by North (1990). However, the details of how entrepreneur find good rules and successfully replace old ones still yet to be clearly described. The next section will go to address the dynamic dimension of transaction cost.

2.2 From static to dynamic institutional analysis: the coordination problems

From above, we can see that Williamson's transaction cost approach is static and only focuses on the incentive problem and ignores people's bounded rationality. Scholars claimed that maintaining good quality of coordination is another important dimension of transaction cost, which dramatically influences an organization or institution to sustain. As Langlois and Foss (1999) stressed, the importance of the *quality of coordination* is an important value that firm can exist and survive. However, to create and maintain the quality of coordination is not automatic. People have to spend time to learn and maintain the quality of coordination. Langlois (1988) calls this is the dynamic transaction costs. Dynamic transaction costs are "the costs that arise in real time in the process of acquiring and coordinating productive knowledge ... and which are different in nature from the transaction costs that are caused by problems of aligning incentives" (Langlois and Foss 1997, p.18). In other words, dynamic transaction costs are "the costs of not having the capabilities you need when you need them" (Langlois and Foss 1999:18). Therefore, it requires learning to acquire such skills. Hence, dynamic transaction costs are "the costs of persuading, negotiating and coordinating with, and teaching others. They arise in the face of change, notably technological and organizational innovation" (Langlois 1992, p.99).

In post-Coase literature, dynamic transaction costs are different from static transaction costs. Transaction problems are not only a matter of incentive problem within an otherwise well-defined exchange context. Rather, "coordination problems may arise because capabilities exhibit too much 'friction': the knowledge, skills, and traditions embodied in existing governance structures (be they firms, markets, or in between) may be too inflexible, especially in the face of major 'Schumpeterian' change, to seize market and technological opportunities. In such circumstances, other governance structures that can muster the necessary capabilities may arise and prosper" (ibid, p.21).

The dynamic dimension between transaction cost, property rights and rules also can be seen from Barzel's (1997) property rights theory. He views commodities as having multiple attributes. Owing to bounded rationality and information problem, individuals or parties

cannot design a complete contract for the transaction of an asset with multiple attributes. Some property rights are inevitably not well-defined or well-protected and are left in the public domain where they are in danger of appropriation by the others. Rights in the public domain will attract rent-seeking behaviour and increase transaction cost. Regulations are needed to delineate these rights from public domain and will constrain rent-seeking behaviours and reduce transaction cost. However, it is prohibitively costly to delineate every attributes clearly. So, whether the rights will be removed from public domain depends on not only the value of those rights (and the value of the resources they relate to), but also by the transaction costs involved in measuring, delineating and protecting those rights. Moreover, as Foss and Foss (2006) indicated that the value of rights in the public domain and transaction cost involved to delineate them cannot be known immediately due to human's bounded rationality. The optimal regulations to delineate these rights with less transaction cost also cannot be known immediately but have to through a trial and error process to discover. The processes of discovering good regulations to delineate more rights must involve such as learning, trial and error, and coordination.

Based on above discussion, we can summarise a more comprehensive understanding of transaction costs and the economics functions of institutions. Coase and Williamson showed that transaction cost mainly come from imperfect information, which incentive selfish individual to engage rent-seeking behaviour by appropriating rights left in the public domain and therefore, institutions design is important to constrain these rent-seeking behaviours. However, the ways of reducing transaction cost by designing better institutional and governance all take time to learn to get new knowledge, skills and etc. So, to install a new rule successfully, it needs to minimise the static and dynamic transaction cost and let the total transaction cost smaller than the value of rights removed from public domain. Of course, this must be a difficult task and needs someone who has entrepreneurship to succeed the task. Next section, we will use the real estate brokers as a case to discuss the relationship between entrepreneur, transaction cost and institution.

3. INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP, TRANSACTION COSTS AND THE ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS OF REAL ESTATE BROKERS

Real estate is always deemed as a kind of special goods in the perspective of traditional economics due to their peculiar characteristics such as its limited supply and immobility. Moreover, in the lens of neo-classical economics, real estate market has many market failures, which distorts its economic efficiency. The main and obvious problems in the real estate market are the information imperfection and asymmetry, which create a suitable place to foster rent-seeking behaviours. Government is therefore called for providing regulations to constrain people's rent-seeking behaviours (Cowen and Crampton 2002). For example, sellers could conceal some crucial information on housing defects. Real estate developers and brokers also could use their information advantage in land use regulations, market prices and building materials to charge higher price to customers. Therefore, in the view of neo-classical economics, the housing market exhibits market failure. As Jaffe (1996, p427) describes, "housing is deemed to be a special type of goods traded in unusual market, often resulting in relatively high transaction cost".

So, it will be very useful to apply new institutional economics to analyse the real estate market structure and how it affect final economic outcomes. For example, Watkins (2008) suggests that housing property market is not a homogeneous market but consists of different sub-markets, each with its own specific market institutional structure shaped from each sub-market's special supply and demand side context. Some sub-markets may be economically efficient and some may not be. He thought that new institutional economics can assist us to explore more insightful questions in housing market structure and other sub-markets where they are structured and changed as well as how they influence the outcomes. Keogh and D'Arcy (1999) claimed that the economic efficiency of the property market heavily depended on the regulatory design of property exchange processes. They adopted Williamson's idea and suggested that there are three layers of institution shaping property market structure, which are institutional environment, the property market structure and property market organisation. These three layers of real market institution define property

exchange processes, incentive structure and market efficiency.

Keogh and D'Arcy proposed three levels of institutions in property market, which also stressed the importance of interactive relationship between different levels of institutions, but the dynamic processes of institutional change in property market is still not to be discussed further. Nonetheless, the institutional economics still provides many insights for understanding the nature of the real estate transaction. Firstly, institutional economics let us realize that the real estate is an unusual goods because it is composed of many rights. Even there are so many regulations in real estate market such as zoning, building codes, private contracts, some rights are still left in the public domain and more well-designed regulations are needed. Secondly, transaction cost associated with real estate exchange includes very high cost of getting adequate information such as the measuring cost of real estate property, searching cost of suitable sellers and buyers, and matching or negotiating sellers and buyers (Jaffe, 1996; Yavas, 1994). Moreover, one of the important insights from Williamson's transaction cost theory is the assets specificity² which is useful for explaining real estate market institution. Investment in real estate is a typical case of the asset specify. Because homeowners spend a huge amount of money on buying a house, there are high sunk costs and high relocation cost afterwards. This puts buyers in a very high *ex post* transaction risk and they will be very vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour (Deng 2003). Without any institutional design of safeguard, high *ex post* transaction costs prevents the transaction of a real estate being completed. Therefore, real estate exchanges faces high transaction costs including searching costs to match buyer and seller (Yavas 1994), *ex ante* measuring costs of property and *ex post* transaction cost after real estate was exchanged.

Hence, it can be seen easily that there are so many regulations in the real estate industry. Also, there are so many different kinds of argents in the real estate industry such as brokers,

² Asset specificity refers to assets that have limited alternative uses. Because investment in these kinds of assets generates considerable sunk costs, owners incur a very high risk of being exploited by opportunistic behaviour after investment. A specific asset investment generates a 'quasi rent' as a kind of rights in the public domain, which is likely to be appropriated by opportunistic behaviour. Fear of this risk of opportunism leads to non-investment or under-investment. This is conceptualised as the hold-up problem in transaction costs economics (Williamson 2000).

lawyers, bankers, developers and etc, which are all related to transaction cost. These agents may therefore play important roles in the housing market and deserve further economic investigation. In particular, how these agents influence the housing market structure and change the relationship between them and their clients (principle-agent problem) are still not well understood (Evan, 1995).

So, the institutional innovation may play as a more important driving force in the real estate industry than technical one in other industries. A successfully real estate associated agents may own some features of institutional entrepreneurship. In this paper, we focus on real estate brokers. On the one hand, real estate brokers have lots of opportunities to take advantage from property buyers and sellers, which increase transaction cost. On the other hand, they also can behave like a 'good' real estate brokers by reducing transaction cost through providing more information, good suggestions and excellent negotiation skills to trading parties. As the real estate textbook requires that real estate brokers should behave like "one who offers to buy and offers to sell for another for compensation or arranges for the negotiation of contracts of various type" (Cyr and Sobeck 1992). Dasso and Ring (1989) also defined that the key function of the broker is negotiation and brokers have to fulfil the duties by care, instructions, accountability, loyalty and principle.

The requirements of being a good real estate broker defined by textbook, of course demonstrate some features of entrepreneurship. Casson (2003, p.20) describes that entrepreneur, "is someone who specialize in taking judgemental decisions about the coordination of scarce resource". Entrepreneur earns the profit by his or her superior judgement. They act as middlemen through their superior coordination skills to convince trading parties that their goods or services will make all parties better off. Superior coordination ability also implies that entrepreneurs have information advantage. To acquire this information advantage, entrepreneurs have to specialize in collecting, collating and processing information. Moreover, entrepreneurs have to conduct like arbitrator if the negotiation between trading parties breaks down (Casson 1982). Hence, entrepreneurs not only disperse information but also foster coordination between maladjusted behaviours (De Soto, 2008). Further, real estate brokers with entrepreneurship not only have to demonstrate

the loyalty and accountability to buyers and sellers, but also have to have the ability of institutional innovation, which is the core value in entrepreneurship suggested by Schumpeter (1934/1961) and equally important as technical innovation (Nelson 2002).

High transaction costs do prohibit exchange. Unrealised mutual gain, however, is a profit opportunity for entrepreneurs to explore. As Dixit (2004) described that “Every economic problem is an economic opportunity. Someone who can solve the problem, turning the potential gains into actual ones, may be able to charge a fee for this service.” This is the institutional entrepreneur who innovate new or better regulations to complete the exchange that cannot be done in the past. Real estate market always be deemed as a market with many risks and transaction cost, which implies that there exists many opportunities, especially for institutional entrepreneur. But one successful new institutional innovation in real estate exchange must be not easy. Because any new institutional design for reducing transaction cost all have to experience many uncertainties and huge social resistance. In the next section, we will propose the model of institutional innovation processes and discuss how entrepreneurs create new rules and replace old ones.

4. THE PROCESSES OF ENTREPRENEURIAL INNOVATION OF INSTITUTION

Entrepreneurs live in the world of uncertainty. They learn in order to succeed. Hence, there are various types of transaction costs, either static or dynamic, associated in each stage of entrepreneurial innovation. In the management of technology, the innovation process is generally classified into four or five main stages (for example, see Pennings 1987; Robert 1988). Specifically, Pennings (1987: 212) puts forward a model of organisational innovation that delimits a sequence of behaviours that organisations go through in innovating. His five main stages are recognition or awareness, attitude formation, decision making, initial implementation and institutionalisation. Similarly, in his discussion of entrepreneurial management, Robert (1988: 13) also separates the process of innovation into (1) opportunity search, (2) opportunity assessment, (3) opportunity development and (4) opportunity pursuit (note 2). In this paper, we classify the process of entrepreneurial innovation into four stages,

namely *projection of an opportunity, focusing and assessing the opportunity, implementation, and institutionalization*. Moreover, unlike previous studies, our discussion focuses on the entrepreneur and entrepreneurial learning with transaction costs (static and dynamic) in the innovation process.

1. Identification of and Alertness to an opportunity

Innovation is a mental projection, involving entrepreneurial imagination. Imagination is the world-building capability of human agency. The contents of imagination are shaped by entrepreneurs' experiences or stocks of knowledge. Entrepreneurial imagination has something to do with alertness to profit opportunities (Kirzner 1973). According to Kirzner (1973), the role of entrepreneurs lies in their alertness to hitherto unnoticed opportunities. Entrepreneurial alertness refers to "an attitude of receptiveness to available, but hitherto overlooked, opportunities" (Kirzner 1997:72). To exploit the profit opportunities, the entrepreneur "must introduce...his own creative actions, in fact construct the future as he or she wishes it to be" (Kirzner 1982:63). The entrepreneur has an extraordinary sense of 'smelling' opportunities. Alertness is like an "antenna that permits recognition of gaps in the market that give little outward sign" and entrepreneurs always position themselves on the high ground where signals of market opportunities can more easily strike them (Gilad et al. 1988:483). Entrepreneurship is at all times on the lookout for hitherto unnoticed features of the environment (present or future), which might inspire new activity on his part (Kirzner 1997:72). Thus, the essence of entrepreneurship is to keep alert to opportunities even when the enterprise is in a profitable situation and it is this feature that qualifies an actor to be an entrepreneur.

At the projection stage, how does the entrepreneur spot the profit opportunity? Why the entrepreneur is able to identify profit opportunity that is overlooked by others? This has something to do with the entrepreneur's stock of knowledge in his mind. The entrepreneur will pay attention to his or her external world selectively. Given that the stock of knowledge or experience is always related to the future plan, he or she is the first one to know the change

in the market, or more precisely the availabilities of opportunities. When a seemingly opportunity appear in the entrepreneur's mind, he or she will actively seek information about that opportunity. This is called pro-active learning in organizational literature. For example, entrepreneur may learn such a new idea from overseas and try to adopt it in his country. He perceived the opportunity via his experience. To be sure, the opportunity at the beginning is not that clear. It requires the entrepreneur to bake it out. The entrepreneur has the idea in the mind; he will focus on it and collects materials to support his or her instinct. This process is part of the entrepreneurial learning.

2. Focusing of and Assessing an Opportunity

When an opportunity forms in the entrepreneur's mind, the entrepreneur will begin to assess its profitability. For example, a real estate broker will assess if his or her new idea benefit the buyers and sellers, so that he or she can earn a profit. If the new buying and selling arrangement can reduce the transaction costs of both parties, and hence bring about a profit to the agent, then the innovation can pass through the market tests. As we have mentioned that the high *ex post* transaction risk is the main transaction cost in buying a house. If real estate broker can provide a kind of guarantee after the transaction as an institutional safeguard in the market, it will not only reduce buyers' fear in hold-up problem but also will significantly reduce time consuming in property transaction and create more transactions completed that failure previously. The provision of guarantee will benefit for buyers, sellers as well as brokers themselves.

3. Implementing an innovative idea under uncertainty

A major function of the entrepreneur consists in "getting things done" (Schumpeter 1934:93). However, under uncertainty, an innovative idea has to be implemented though learning, experimentation and error elimination. The entrepreneur also needs to teach, inform, persuade and convince customers (both buyers and sellers) to accept the new idea (Michael,

2007).

Learning, experimentation and error elimination

The entrepreneur attempts to "invent the future in a profitable image, an image as agreeable as possible to the future customers" (White 1977, p.71). However, to implement a production plan, entrepreneurs encounter the unknown future. Errors are indispensable. During entrepreneurial process, when an error occurs, it indicates no-through road (Farson and Keyes 2002, p.75). The driver needs a 'U-turn' and finds a way out. Entrepreneurs continue to update their expectations in light of the difference between what was expected in the past and what actually happened. When the expectation differs from the outcome, agents will adjust their actions. Entrepreneurs learn by trial and error. Entrepreneurial learning is an evolutionary process of cumulative growth of problem-solving knowledge. In Hayek's view (1949), the market is an ongoing, open-ended process of error elimination, a process in which potential alternative solutions of various kinds of problems are tried out and selected upon through the choices of market participants. It is a process in which new tentative solutions are continuously explored, and in which problems they are subject to change, as solutions to old problems tend to create new problems. Learning or discovery process involves entrepreneur's own experience of success and failure. Entrepreneurs interpret incoming events according to their own experience. Whenever the expectations resulting from the existing interpretation are disappointed, or when beliefs are disproved by new experience, then re-interpretation occurs. The whole process of entrepreneurial learning is then a process of correction, adjustment and refinement. Under uncertainty, learning to coordinate and meet market expectations is an important form of dynamic transaction costs.

Teaching and convincing home buyers as a form of dynamic transaction costs

Dynamic transaction costs are not fixed and static. They associate with teaching, learning, or persuasion.³ Since a new idea is not fully coherent and clear at the beginning,

³ The role of persuasion in economic life has received attention in recent years. McCloskey (1994:76-79) shows that, in the United States, about a quarter of the labour force or national income in 1988 devoted to persuasion activities.

entrepreneur needs to inform, teach and persuade the customers (both buyers and sellers) to accept the new idea (Michael 2007). This is in this sense that the entrepreneur is a dynamic middleman, rather than a sheer arbitrageur.

Whereas mental activity on knowledge is mainly cognitive (or knowing), persuasion is affective in nature (or feeling) (Rogers 1983). Until a home buyer understands new transaction arrangement, he or she cannot form an attitude toward the asset. In developing an attitude toward the innovation, individuals apply the new idea to their present or anticipated future situations before deciding whether or not to try it. In Rogers' words (1983, p170), "the ability to think hypothetically and counter-factually and to project into the future is an important mental capacity at the persuasion stage where forward planning is involved". The function of the entrepreneur is not only to present buyers with a particular buying opportunity, but to present it to them that they cannot fail to "notice" its availability. In other words, the entrepreneur must get buyers to notice and absorb that information. More importantly, through persuasive promotion, consumers' tastes are changing. Entrepreneurs have to change the knowledge buyers believe and possess concerning the factual state of the world. Human agents often take their experiences for granted and use their stocks of knowledge to solve their everyday life problems (Schutz 1970; Berger and Luckmann 1966). Very often, consumers' perceptions of the external worlds are 'locked in' by their experiences and therefore show no interest in new consumption opportunities even though they may know their existence. The function of persuasion is to unlock pre-occupied knowledge and perception. It is a process of learning.

Informing and persuading home sellers as a form of dynamic transaction costs

In the economy where people interpret external events in a routine manner, it is very difficult for an innovative real estate agent to make the sellers understand a novel and idiosyncratic idea. Accordingly, it is very costly to inform and persuade the contracting parties to invest in specialised assets that involve irreversible investment. In many cases, sellers refuse to comply with the innovator's vision. Consequently, coordination fails. Hence, a successful real estate leader is able to inform and persuade home sellers to accept his or her

novel idea.

4. Market Selection, Imitation and Institutionalization

Entrepreneurial innovation is subject to market test. Profitability governs the market selection through the realization of profit and loss. Through the process of filtering, those whose chosen option happens to lead to profits will be weeded in. Likewise, those whose chosen option happens to lead to losses will be weeded out. Once new ways of doing things are found to be profitable or feasible, they will repeatedly use. In other words, rules are adopted. Successful plans are adopted and imitated in the market. A new rule dominated in the market may become a formal rule endorsed by government. This is just the detail gradual processes of institutional change from lower level rules to higher one leading by an institutional entrepreneur. The institution is the result of selective learning and market selection. It reduces transaction costs and serves as a social coordinator.

In next section, we will use the case of Sinyi Real Estate in Taiwan to interpret the real entrepreneurial learning process of institutional innovation.

5. THE CASE OF TAIWAN'S SINYI REAL ESTATE CO.⁴

5.1 Entrepreneur's alertness of the market opportunity

Sinyi Real Estate (Sinyi afterwards) is the most successful and famous real estate agent in Taiwan. Customers and Taiwanese are impressed with this company as it is named, Sinyi. In Chinese, *Sin* means trustworthiness and *Yi* means righteousness. Mr. Chou, the founder of Sinyi, emphasises the company's spirit is 'righteousness first and profitableness may follow' (Sinyi 1995). The reasons in which Mr. Chou views the trustworthiness as his company's inherent value can trace back to his family background since he grew up in a traditional

⁴ The data of the Sinyi Real Estate was collected through related books, articles, Siinyi's publications. We also interviewed six senior Sinyi's employees to know the details of Sinyi's institutional innovation.

Chinese family and was influenced by Confucian thinking. He believed that morality and profit with gratitude are cornerstones of being business. Moreover, his early working experience in broker industry in Taiwan also strengthened this beliefs. Before 1980, when there was no official real estate broker in Taiwan, selling a property depended on seller's effort in friendship network or circulating posters (Lee, 2001). In 1984, Taiwan government officially permitted the real estate broker to organize a legal company entity, which initiated to develop the real estate broker market. However, the real estate broker market was very chaotic at the beginning with many fraud and deceit. Most real estate agents did not provide basic salary for their brokers. Commission through housing transactions was the income of the brokers (Lee, 2001). Moreover, the market structure at that time was underdeveloped, especially the regulatory framework. The real estate brokers were notorious to take risks and opportunistic behaviours in the market. Mr. Chou experienced that chaotic condition and had bad feedback from the market. He worked in two broker companies but both of them forced him to leave because he refused to take advantage of consumers (Lee 1992). At that moment, he started to think whether he should quit or resume to the industry of real estate brokerage. He concluded his working experience and decided to establish his own company in 1981. He believed that there still had a chance to be successful in the industry of real estate brokerage. He described,

“The industry of real estate brokerage is still doable. But now the mainstream's operation was different with what I think. If we could treat consumers with probity; if the human quality in real estate brokers could be hugely improved, if there is a secure mechanism in real estate transaction, and if broker company not only focus on transaction but also their brokers job security.... This industry still left lot of space waiting for exploring”. (Sinyi 2007, p.29)

From Mr. Chou's reflection, it shows the entrepreneur's alertness and identification of market opportunity as in the case of Taiwan where there were very high transaction costs in real estate brokerage market. He realised that he could benefit from this opportunity by providing

better regulatory design for sellers, purchasers and brokers. However, entrepreneurs always encounter many difficulties in implementing a new institution.

5.2 The institutional innovation of fixed-percentage commission

Generally, there are three types of commission in real estate brokerage, namely a flat fee per household, a percentage of the sale price and sales price minus the price required by the seller (this is known as net listing) (Yavas 1994). As mentioned, in the early stage of Taiwan's real estate brokerage market, net listing gave brokers' incentives to maximise the commission. Buyers pay a higher price and sellers wait to complete the transaction until the sale price reaches brokers' commission target (Yavas 1994). Moreover, brokers made use of information advantage to seek more commission.

Mr. Chou observed that the commission structure was the key reason contributing to the chaotic brokerage market. Three years after Sinyi was formed, he announced fixed-percentage of sale price in his company in 1984. However, he did not know that there was a huge social resistance to change this old routine in the industry. On the one hand, Mr. Chou did not sure what was a proper commission benchmark and led the fixed-percentage commission fluctuated in Sinyi at the beginning. The employees were not confident whether new practice would work. On the other hand, they felt that the practice was inconsistent with current routine in real estate industry and would cut down commission. Mr. Chou remembered "at that time almost my employee quit" (Sinyi 1995). Other brokerage companies also planned to suspend Mr. Chou's membership in Taiwan Brokerage Association due to the adoption of fixed-percentage commission (Lee 2007). Some home sellers also disagreed with Chou's idea because they felt "if brokers can sell the price higher than my targeting price, this is brokers' talent. I don't mind" (from interviewee, 2008/9/9).

Despite huge resistance from his employees and rivals, Mr Chou did not give in his vision. He tried to convince his employees the advantages of fixed-percentage commission and disadvantages of net listing. He indicated to his staffs that new practice may lose some short-term benefits but, in the long term, the company would win the trust from consumers

because they had never taken advantage of the buyers (Lee 1992). Mr Chou learned from Japanese experience and fixed the percentage of commission at four percent in his company. As a result of the employee's resistance, he decided to recruit fresh college graduates and those who have never worked in other real estate brokerage before. In 1986, he refined fixed-percentage commission. Sinyi collected only of seventy per cent of the commission compared to traditional mode that commission was totally charged once the housing contract was signed. Sinyi collected remaining thirty per cent of commission until the property was sold. The refinement of commission collection ensured the service quality of brokers for both sellers and buyers.

Mr. Chou received positive feedback in the market after refining fixed-percentage commission. His brokers were confident on new commission system as the number of clients increased. The rapid development of Sinyi finally influenced other rival companies. Fixed-percentage commission system replaced traditional commission routine in four years. In 1988, Taiwan's Real Estate Brokerage Association accepted fixed-percentage commission system. Less than 5 per cent of the sale price is collected by its members. After 15 years, fixed-percentage commission system finally became an official statutory regulation. In 1999, the "Real Estate Brokerage Management Code" was issued to abolish net listing. The ceiling of the commission was 6 per cent of the sale price. Besides fixed-percentage commission, Mr Chou introduced real estate disclosure statement and after-sale guarantee which will be described in next section.

5.3 The Institutional innovation of real estate disclosure statement and after-sale guarantee

As mentioned, real estate transaction involves high transaction cost and these costs can be identified as two types; before and after the transaction is completed. So, the real estate transaction needs a guarding mechanism to reduce *ex ante* and *ex post* transaction cost. However, both guarding mechanisms were all void in the early stage of Taiwan's real estate brokerage market and caused many conflicts.

Real estate disclosure statement

The real estate disclosure statement is a kind of guarding mechanism to reduce transaction costs in measuring property. It delineates property rights of real estate and is common in many countries such as the USA. Mr. Chou learnt this design when he visited Japan in 1989 and applied it in Taiwan's real estate markets. He said, "when we brought refrigerator or air conditioning, these stuff all accompanied instruments that provide detail information of the machine and guide consumers on how to use the machines. Why there is no such instrument in real estate market" (Sinyi 2007, pp.74-75). Mr. Chou found that such practice was not well developed in Taiwan. He decided to adopt real estate disclosure statement. In 1989, each property on the sale list of Sinyi included a disclosure statement.

Again, resistance quickly emerged when Mr. Chou decided to adopt disclosure statement. His employees argued that it was no guarantee that properties with the disclosure statements would be sold easily. They suggested that buyers might take longer time to make decisions or even reduce their willingness to purchase properties once detail information of the property was disclosed. More time and cost were expected in each real estate transaction. Moreover, home sellers also complained that their properties were not shown in the sale list immediately but had to wait one week to prepare disclosure statement before it is listed. Rival brokers then had more competitive advantages because of a week time-lapse. The innovative practice of Real estate disclosure statement gave much pressure to Sinyi. As Mr. Chou remembered, "On the year that I insisted to implement the institution of real estate disclosure statement in my company. The cost of making these statements finally turned my company from surplus to deficit" (Lee, pp89). Again, despite resistance from employees and clients, and financial burden, Mr Chou did not give up his plan. He continued to communicate with his employees that disclosure statement would let customers feel Sinyi more reliable than other companies. He also persuaded his brokers that the disclosure statement prevented conflicts between home sellers and buyers. Moreover, the real estate statement also protected brokers (Sinyi 1995). The employees and clients were finally convinced. Mr Chou believed that real estate disclosure statement was very useful in real estate brokerage market. He promoted the service to rival companies. In a meeting of Taiwan Brokerage Association, he

said, “Sinyi would like to provide our example of real estate disclosure statement and experience on how to make it without any charge to any one or company who are interested” (Sinyi 1995, pp 272). Real estate disclosure statement eventually became a practice in Taiwan’s real estate industry. It also influences formal statutory system. In 1992, the Real Estate Brokers Management Code stipulates that brokers had to make real estate disclosure statement for each property on the sale list.

After-sale guarantee

Real estate disclosure statement reduces *ex ante* transaction hazards and costs in real estate exchange. Meanwhile, high *ex post* transaction costs and hazards still need an institution to protect transaction parties. Mr. Chou and other Taiwan’s broker companies introduced ESCROW system during the 1990s (Lee and Kuo 1997). The practice was adopted in the USA and its aim was to secure the payment of real estate exchange (Dasso and Ring 1992). Mr. Chou did not satisfy the after-sale guarantee system in payment only. He observed that there were still many risks after the payment was done. Due to the fact that real estate has too many attributes, real estate disclosure statement did not delineate all the rights clearly. So, home buyers would discover many problems in their property once they moved in. For example, the problem of water leaking in a property leads to much disputes and conflicts. Property developers may use radiative polluted steel bar and sea sand in building the house as had been found in many cases in Taiwan. Mr. Chou thought that buying a house was the most important investment for home owners. If people bought a house and found serious defects afterwards, they would be very stressful and hardly have a chance to buy another one (Lee 2007). Chou thought that a real estate agent owns professional knowledge in identifying a house with potential defects. So, he announced that his company would bear the risks of housing defects after sales. In 2007, he made several after-sale guarantees. Buyers can obtain guarantees from Sinyi in securing payment exchange and Sinyi also guaranteed the property without the problems of leaking water and contaminated building materials including radiative polluted steel bar and sea sand. Again, his employees opposed this new practice because more resources were needed to perform such guarantee codes. Moreover, Sinyi would

encounter higher risks because it was sometimes difficult to discover housing defects and identify sellers' opportunistic behaviours. Other rival companies also objected this new system due to higher costs and uncertainties. Nevertheless, Mr. Chou was confident on his foresight and insisted on after-sale guarantee practices (Lee 2009). Rival companies finally forced to adopt Sinyi's after-sale guarantee system due to the pressure of market competition (Lee 2007). Although Taiwan's Real Estate Brokers Management Code only stipulated that brokers secured payment exchange by ESCROW system, Sinyi's four-year after-sale guarantee system provided more safeguards for home buyers in Taiwan.

6. CONCLUSION

Institution and entrepreneurs indeed are two most important sources for economic development. New institutional economics uses the term of transaction cost to explain how different institution settings cause different level of transaction cost and affect the economic growing power afterwards. However, any institutional change and transaction cost reduction all need 'people' and 'time' to find the best design of regulation. The dynamic dimension of transaction cost and the role of entrepreneur cannot be ignored in any institutional change.

This paper successfully combines the theory of entrepreneurship with the concept of dynamic transaction costs and provides a theoretical model to explain the stages of entrepreneurial innovation of institution. We also use the Sinyi Real Estate as a case to describe the difficult learning processes in institutional innovation. Sinyi has been well known in successfully providing a series of innovative transaction packages to buyers and sellers in the secondary housing market. However, buyers and sellers often do not understand new service once it is introduced to the market. It takes the entrepreneur to explain the new contractual arrangements, persuade and convince market participants, including staff members, to accept the new idea. Furthermore, an innovative package has to go through trial and error, entrepreneurial learning and error elimination before it can be widely accepted in the market. Once the innovation is found to be feasible, it is then imitated by other real estate agencies and eventually influences government's real estate policy. As a result, a new institution emerges in

housing market.

Theoretical model and case in this paper also successfully demonstrate a kind of market-oriented regulation production system, which is bottom-up and based on voluntary. This may imply that market institution also can be architected by entrepreneurs rather than government (Blundell and Robinson, 2000). The relationship between government and market can be discussed further. Benson (1998) suggested that once market has problems also means that there is a profit opportunity yet to be developed well. Entrepreneurs have to provide voluntary basis regulations to transaction parties and persuade them to accept. The process of entrepreneurs to provide such voluntary basis regulations as this paper shows is a discovering process. This discovering process involve trial and error, market test and then influence more people to follow this new regulation voluntarily. So, this may imply that government's intervention may cease the entrepreneurial discovering processes of voluntary regulation, which is the cornerstone of maintaining spontaneous order.

Although, this paper successfully presents the important role of entrepreneur and discloses the entrepreneurial learning process in discovering voluntary basis regulation in reducing transaction cost, many researches are still needed to shape this research area firmly. For example, Sinyi's development in China faces many difficulties. Sinyi's successful experience in Taiwan and its spirit of customer-centered are hugely challenged in China (Yang and et al, 2010). This implies that the research of institution and entrepreneurship may need case studies more than one single country and the culture environment also needs to be considered (Bruton and et al, 2010). The relationship between institution and entrepreneur does need to further investigation to find the real power and function underneath the economic growth and redefine the boundary between government, public policy, market and entrepreneur.

REFERENCES

- Barzel, Y., 1997. *Economic Analysis of Property Rights*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Benson, B.L., 1998. Economic freedom and the evolution of law. *Cato Journal*, 18(2), pp.209-31.
- Casson, M. C., 1982. *The Entrepreneur: An Economic Theory*. Oxford: Martin Robertson.
- _____, 2003. *The Entrepreneur*. New York: Edward Elgar.
- Coase, R., 1937. The Nature of the Firms. *Economica*, 4(16), pp.386-405.
- _____, 1960. The Problem of Social Cost. *Journal of Law and Economics*, 3(1), pp.1-64.
- Cowen, T. and Crampton, E., 2002. *Market failure or success-the new debate*. Cheltenham: The independent institute.
- Cyr, J.E. and Sobeck, J.M., 1992. *Real Estate Brokerage*. 3rd ed. Chicago: Real Estate Education Company.
- Dahlman, C.J., 1979. The Problem of Externality. *Journal of Law and Economics*, 21(2), pp.14-162.
- Dasso, J. and Ring, A.A., 1989. *Real Estate: principle and Practices*. 11th ed New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Demsetz, H., 1964. The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights. *Journal of Law and Economics*, 7, pp.11-26.
- _____, 1973. The Property Right Paradigm. *Journal of Economic per History*, 33, pp.16-27.
- Deng, F.F., 2003. Collective goods and the political hold-up problem. *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, 159, pp.414-434.
- De soto, J.H., 2008. *The Austrian School-market order and entrepreneurial creativity*. Cheltenham: Institution of Economic Affairs.
- Evans, A.W., 1995. The property market: ninety per cent efficient?. *Urban Studies*, 32, pp.5-29.

- Gilad, B., Kaish, S. and Ronen, J., 1988. The Entrepreneurial Way with Information. In S. Maital, ed. *Applied Behavioural Economics*, Vol. II. Somerset: Wheatsheaf, pp.481-503.
- Harvey, J. and Jowsey, E., 2004. *Urban Land Economics*. 6th ed. New York: Palgrave.
- Hodgson, G.M., 1989. Institutional Economic theory: the old versus new. *Review of Political Economy*, 1(3), pp.249-269.
- Jaffe, A.J., 1996. On the role of transaction costs and property rights in housing markets. *Housing Studies*, 11(3), pp.425-435.
- Keogh, G. and D'Arcy, 1999. Property Market efficiency: An Institutional Economics Perspectives. *Urban studies*, 36(3), pp.2401-2414.
- Kirzner, I.M., 1973. *Competition and Entrepreneurship*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- _____, 1982. Uncertainty, Discovery and Human Action: A Study of the Entrepreneurial Profile in the Misesian System. In I.M. Kirzner, ed. *Method, Process and Austrian Economics*. Canada: D.C. Heath.
- _____, 1997. Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Process: An Austrian Approach. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 35, pp.60-85.
- Klosterman, R., 1985. Arguments for and against planning. *Town Planning Review*, 56, pp.5-20.
- Langlois, R.N., 1988. Transaction costs, production costs and the passage of Time. In: S.G. Medema, ed. *Coasean Economics*. Massachusetts: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp.1-21.
- _____, 1992. Transaction-cost Economics in Real Time. *Industrial and Corporate Change*, 1(1): 99-127.
- Langlois, R.N. and Foss, N., 1999. Capability and Governance: Rebirth of Production in the Theory of Economic Organisation. *Kyklos*, 52(2), pp.201-218.
- Langlois, R.N. and Robertson, P.L., 1995. *Firms, Markets and Economic Change: A Dynamic Theory of Business Institutions*. London: Routledge.
- Lee, B.J., 2009. *Trust brings happiness: a story of Sinyi*. Taipei: Common Wealth.
- Lee, J.C., 1992. *I see a light in the distant place*. Taipei: Chinese production center.
- Lee, Y.J. and Kuo, E.M., 1997. The usage of middleman in securing ownership. *Your rights*

- and the law*, April Issue, pp.91-98.
- McCloskey, D.N., 1994. *Knowledge and Persuasion in Economics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Michael, S.C., 2007. Transaction cost entrepreneurship. *Journal of Business Venturing*, 22(3), pp.412-26.
- Nelson, R.R., 2002. B Langlois, R.N., (1988). Transaction costs, production costs and the passage of Time. In S.G. Medema, ed. *Coasean Economics*, Massachusetts: Kluwer Academic Publishers: 1-21ringing institutions into evolutionary growth theory. *Journal of Evolutionary Economics*, 12, pp.17-28.
- North, D., 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pennington, M., 2000. *Planning and the Political Market*. London: The Athlone Press.
- Pigou, A.C., 1920. *The Economics of Welfare*. London: Macmillan.
- Rogers, E.M., 1983. *Diffusion of Innovations*. 3rd. ed. New York: The Free Press.
- Samuelson, P., 1954. The pure theory of public expenditures. *Review of Economics and Statistic*, 36, pp.387-389.
- Schumpeter, J.A., 1934/1961. *The Theory of Economic Development*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Schutz, A., 1970. *On Phenomenology and Social Relations*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Simon, H.A., 1957. *Administrative Behaviour*. New York: Free Press.
- Sinyi Realty, 1995. *To plant one more tree-the Sinyi's culture*. Taipei: Sinyi Realty.
- Stigler, G.T., 1972. The law and economics of public policy: A plea to the scholars. *Journal of legal studies*, 1, pp. 1-12.
- Walker, B., 1980. Urban planning and social welfare. *Environment and Planning A*, 12, pp.217-225.
- Watkins, C., 2008. Microeconomic Perspectives on the Structure and operation of Local Housing. *Housing Studies*, 23(2), pp.163-177.
- Webster, C.J. and Lai, L.W.C., 2003. *Property rights, Planning and Market*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- White, L.H., 1977. *Uncertainty and Entrepreneurial Expectation in Economic Theory*.

Unpublished Senior Honours Thesis, Harvard College, March 31.

Williamson, O.E., 1975. *Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications*.
New York: The Free Press.

_____, 1985. *The Economic Institutions of Capitalism*. New York: The Free Press.

_____, 2000. The new institutional economics: taking stock, looking ahead. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 38, pp. 596-613.

Yavas, A., 1994. Economics of Brokerage: An Overview. *Journal of Real Estate Literature*, 2, pp.169-195.

Ownership Housing Demand in Shanghai:

A Study with Stated Preference Panel Data

Yuan Cheng¹

Fudan University

Email: chengyuan@fudan.edu.cn

John K. Dagsvik

Statistics Norway

Email: john.dagsvik@ssb.no

Xuehui Han

Fudan University

Email: hanxuehui@fudan.edu.cn

1. INTRODUCTION

In this study, we applied a discrete choice modeling approach to analyze rank-ordered stated preference panel data of housing choices. Our aim was to better understand how housing choices are affected by household characteristics, such as income, and by housing alternative attributes, such as size, location and price. Survey respondents were asked to reveal their preferences toward hypothetical alternative housing choices. Different model specifications were estimated and compared. The preferred model was then employed to conduct selected policy simulation experiments and assess willingness-to-pay measures for alternative housing subsets.

Housing represents a major consumption and investment good, and considerable research has been devoted to analyzing housing issues. Among the various academic frameworks, the discrete choice theory has been extensively employed in analyzing housing-related choices. The idea of applying a discrete choice approach to housing demand can be traced back to the pioneering work of McFadden (1978). Early empirical studies were those of Pollakowski (1982), who analyzed the choice of residential locations, and Boehm

¹ We would like to thank Olav Bjerkholt and Erik Biørn for their valuable comments. This research was sponsored by Shanghai Pujiang Program.

(1982), who considered housing choices and found a hierarchical structure of tenure, size, and quality in housing choices using US data from 1968 and 1976. By employing data from the 1977 Annual Housing Survey for Albany-Schenectady-Troy, New York, SMSA, Borsch-Supan and Pitkin (1988) studied a variety of Nested Multinomial Logit models of hierarchical choice and found a strong positive relationship between home ownership and heading a household. Some studies combined the analysis of housing choices and the analysis of associated school and neighborhood quality. For example, Quigley (1985), Nechyba and Strauss (1998), and Barrow (2002) estimated housing preferences and the corresponding school and residential location decisions of households, whereas Bayer et al. (2003, 2004) used the discrete choice framework to analyze residential sorting and preferences for schools and neighborhoods in an equilibrium setting.

The popularity of discrete choice theory dwells in its micro-behavioral nature. To estimate and predict overall aggregated housing demand, it accommodates the heterogeneity in disaggregate behaviors as correctly as possible. However, the existing housing-related choice studies in the framework of discrete choice are mainly based on Revealed Preference (RP) data. Compared to RP housing data, Stated Preference (SP) data, which we employed in this study, allow us to retain full control of variations, particularly in the design of the alternative specific attributes, which is not possible for RP data. A common problem with RP data for housing preferences is that the true choice sets faced by the households usually were not observable to the researcher. For the RP analysis, to accommodate this lack of information, the researchers either use the housing alternatives available for trading on the market as the proxy for the choice set (see, for example, Han 2010), or assume any types of housing alternatives are available for the households (see, for example, Borsch-Supan and Pitkin 1988; Tu and Goldfinch 1996), or employ the whole housing stocks in the neighborhood as the proxy for the choice set (See, for example, Boehm 1982). However, this proxy approach may be somewhat crude; among other things, the applied proxy does not accurately measure the sizes of the individual choice sets. With respect to these questions, SP data can potentially complement RP data because one can design SP experiments and thereby achieve full control of the variations in the choice sets. Furthermore, in contrast to the RP data for housing

attributes, the alternatives in SP surveys can be constructed to represent new features of dwellings that do not yet exist in the market. Therefore, finding a proper methodology to use SP housing data for simulating policy implications has high potential value to policy makers.

Although the use of SP discrete-choice techniques to evaluate the benefits of public programs is well established in transportation, environmental economics and health economics (Hall et al. 2004), this study is, to our knowledge, the first attempt to use rank-ordered SP panel data to analyze housing alternative choice decisions in a discrete choice framework. The fact that we use panel data allows us more flexibility to take into account the unobserved heterogeneity in preferences for latent housing attributes. In addition, the rank-order questionnaire data enable us to obtain additional information by asking the respondents to indicate their second-best choices. Prominent applications of a Logit Model with ranked alternatives include Beggs et al. (1981), Chapman and Staelin (1982), and Hausman and Ruud (1987).

Combined with the specifically designed SP survey toward the target population and the rapid development of computer calculating capacity, our method provides a way for policy makers to understand the aggregated effects of a particular housing-related policy through disaggregated reactions.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the Random Utility Methodology. Under different assumptions of the random error in the utility function, three modeling specifications are discussed: the independent random utility model, the random utility model with a nested structure and the specification with alternative-specific random effects. Section 3 justifies the empirical specification for the deterministic term in the utility function. Section 4 outlines the featured online survey method and data collection approach. Section 5 elaborates the empirical estimation results. In section 6, the Mixed Multinomial Logit (allowing for the alternative-specific random effects) is applied to the simulation of several housing market-related policy implications. Section 7 concludes the discussion.

2. METHODOLOGY

The choice of housing is a typical discrete choice problem for which the random utility model (RUM) has been developed and applied extensively. We started with the utility of housing goods as follows:

$$U_{it}(s) = v_{it}(s) + \varepsilon_{it}(s), \quad (2.1)$$

where $U_{it}(s)$ denotes the utility of housing alternatives (s) in time (t) for household (i) . The deterministic term of utility $v_{it}(s)$ is determined by observable variables such as income and demographic characteristics of households', and the prices, location, and sizes of dwellings. The term $\{\varepsilon_{it}(s)\}$ is random error term, which is assumed to be independently and identically distributed (*i.i.d.*) with extreme value distribution.

The panel data we used in this study allowed us to model housing preferences in different ways; we could frame different preferences by putting different assumptions on the random error term $\{\varepsilon_{it}(s)\}$.

2.1. Independent Random Utility Model

We started with the most basic and popular modeling specification, the independent random utility model. That is, we assumed that the random error term $\varepsilon_{it}(j)$ is *i.i.d.* with extreme value distribution. In our study, respondents were asked to rank order three alternatives in each experiment (t) . We took each experiment as an individual observation. Using well-known results (see McFadden, 1984), we obtain the corresponding rank-ordering choice probabilities as

$$P(U_{it}(n) > U_{it}(r) > U_{it}(s)) = \frac{\exp(v_{it}(n))}{\exp(v_{it}(n)) + \exp(v_{it}(r)) + \exp(v_{it}(s))} \cdot \frac{\exp(v_{it}(r))}{\exp(v_{it}(r)) + \exp(v_{it}(s))}. \quad (2.2)$$

Let $Y_{itr} = 1$ if household (i) ranks alternative (n) on the best and (r) the second best in time (t) and zero otherwise. Let $B(t)$ be the set of alternatives presented in time (t) . The total likelihood function of the entire sample can be expressed as

$$L = \prod_i \prod_t \prod_{n \in B(t)} \prod_{r \in B(t) \setminus \{n\}} P(U_{it}(n) > U_{it}(r) > U_{it}(s))^{Y_{itr}}. \quad (2.3)$$

The maximum-likelihood method was employed for the total likelihood function in (2.3) to estimate the parameters of interest.

2.2. A Random Utility Model with a Nested Structure

In this subsection, we extend the above discussed random utility model by allowing the error terms of housing alternatives in the same location group to be correlated rather than independent. The correlation is motivated by the idea that housing alternatives in the same location group share more similarities other than those in different locations. It also could be understood as, even being presented with the three housing attributes simultaneously, the respondents first deciding which location they prefer and then other attributes by picking a specific housing alternatives in the choice set.

To this end, we introduced a Nested Logit (NL) framework (McFadden, 1984). Therefore, instead of independent random error terms, we now assume that the joint cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of the error terms is given by

$$P\left(\bigcap_{s \in B_k} (\varepsilon_{it}(s) \leq x_{sk})\right) = \exp\left(-\sum_{k=1}^K \left(\sum_{s \in B_k} \exp(-x_{sk} / \alpha)\right)^\alpha\right), \quad (2.4)$$

where (B_k) is the location group (k) to which the housing alternative (s) belongs.

The parameter α ($\alpha \in (0,1]$) measures the degree of similarity between alternatives within each location group. Tiago de Oliveira (1962, 1963) has shown that the correlations between two error terms could be expressed as

$$\text{corr}(\varepsilon_{it}(r), \varepsilon_{it}(s)) = 1 - \alpha^2, \quad (2.5)$$

for $r \in B_k, s \in B_j, j = k$, indicating that the housing alternatives (r) and (s) are in the same location group, and

$$\text{corr}(\varepsilon_{it}(r), \varepsilon_{it}(s)) = 0 \quad (2.6)$$

for $r \in B_k, s \in B_j, j \neq k$, indicating that the housing alternatives (r) and (s) are in different location groups.

When the random components of the error terms are dependent, there are generally no closed-form formulas for the probabilities of the particular rank-ordering of alternatives. Dagsvik and Liu (2006) showed that when the choice set contains only three alternatives, one could obtain simple expressions for the probabilities of rank-ordered data.

Below, we briefly review the approach described by Dagsvik and Liu (2006). When the three alternatives were ranked, the rank revealed the order of the preference/utility of respondents toward the three alternatives. Still, let $U_{it}(s)$ denote the random utility of alternative (s) for household (i) . In each experiment, suppose that the three alternatives n, s , and r are presented. Evidently, we find that

$$\begin{aligned} P(U_i(r) > U_i(s)) = \\ P((U_i(n) > U_i(r) > U_i(s)) \cup (U_i(r) > U_i(n) > U_i(s)) \cup (U_i(r) > U_i(s) > U_i(n))). \end{aligned} \quad (2.7)$$

Together with the relation

$$P((U_i(r) > U_i(n) > U_i(s)) \cup (U_i(r) > U_i(s) > U_i(n))) = P(U_i(r) \geq \max(U_i(n), U_i(s))),$$

equation (2.7) implies that

$$P(U_i(r) > U_i(s)) = P(U_i(n) > U_i(r) > U_i(s)) + P(U_i(r) \geq \max(U_i(n), U_i(s))).$$

Consequently, we obtain the following:

$$P(U_i(n) > U_i(r) > U_i(s)) = P(U_i(r) > U_i(s)) - P(U_i(r) \geq \max(U_i(n), U_i(s))). \quad (2.8)$$

The formula (2.8) shows that one can express the probability of a particular rank order as the probabilities difference between the second and first choice for general random-utility models. Dagsvik and Liu (2006) applied this result to the Nested Trinomial Logit case.

However, in our case, because the three alternatives in each experiment could take any one of the five possible location combinations, we had to deduct the corresponding ranking probabilities for each experiment. In Appendix 1, we display the different ranking probabilities upon different nest structures for the choice sets in each experiment. By judging to which type of nest structure each experiment belongs, we used the corresponding rank-ordered probabilities shown from (A1) to (A15) in Appendix 1 to construct the total likelihood function.

2.3. Specification with Alternative-specific Random Effects

Although the Nested Logit (NL) Model formulation above was able to account for the possible interdependence between housing alternatives, it still assumes that the interdependence only exists for housing alternatives in the same location group. To accommodate more complicated interdependence (for example, allowing interdependence between housing alternatives in the same size group) will bring difficulties for NL to estimate. Therefore, we propose to employ a Multinomial Logit Model for ranking with alternative-specific random effects (also called the Mixed Multinomial Logit Model). As proved by McFadden (1984), the Mixed Multinomial Logit Model can approximate the interdependence between housing alternatives by introducing the random taste-shifters of households towards a housing attribute.

In this setting, the utility function in (2.1) can be decomposed into

$$U_{it}(s) = v_{it}(s) + \varepsilon_{it}(s) = v_{it}(s) + \eta_i(s) + \tilde{\varepsilon}_{it}(s), \quad (2.9)$$

where the deterministic term $v_{it}(s)$ takes the same form as in (2.1). The term of $\tilde{\varepsilon}_{it}(s)$ is *i.i.d.* with extreme value distribution, and $\eta_i(s)$ is the independent randomly distributed variables that are constant over time and independent of $\tilde{\varepsilon}_{it}(s)$. Upon the dwelling attributes and household characteristic variables in the deterministic term of $v_{it}(s)$, we are going to impose more structures to $\eta_i(s)$ in the following empirical specification section.

Again, let $B(t)$ denote the choice set in experiment (t) . We then have, conditional on the vector of all random effects (η_i) , the probability of the ranking alternative (n) as best and the alternative (r) as second-best (in all experiments). $P_{it}(n, r; \eta_i)$ becomes

$$\begin{aligned} P_{it}(n, r; \eta_i) &= P_{it}(U_{it}(n) > U_{it}(r) > U_{it}(s); \eta_i) \\ &= \\ &= \frac{\exp(v_{it}(n) + \eta_i(n))}{\sum_{l \in B(t)} \exp(v_{it}(l) + \eta_i(l))} \cdot \frac{\exp(v_{it}(r) + \eta_i(r))}{\sum_{l \in B(t) \setminus \{n\}} \exp(v_{it}(l) + \eta_i(l))}. \end{aligned} \quad (2.10)$$

The corresponding likelihood function for household (i) , conditional on the random effects, can therefore be expressed as

$$L_i(\eta_i) = \prod_t \prod_{n \in B(t)} \prod_{r \in B(t) \setminus \{n\}} P_{it}(n, r; \eta_i)^{Y_{itnr}}, \quad (2.11)$$

whereas in (2.3), Y_{itrs} is equal to one when the household ranks alternative (n) as best and the alternative (r) as second-best in experiment (t) and zero otherwise.

The total likelihood is therefore given by

$$L = \prod_i EL_i(\eta_i), \quad (2.12)$$

where the expectation is taken with respect to the vector of random effects. We can approximate this expression by

$$L^* = \prod_i \left(\frac{1}{M} \sum_{m=1}^M L_i(\eta_i^m) \right), \quad (2.13)$$

where (η_i^m) is the m^{th} draw of the vector of all random effects in M independent vectors. Equation (2.13) is the total likelihood that we use for estimating the model version with random effects.

3. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION

We start our modeling from a utility function $U_i^*(x, j)$. The $U_i^*(x, j)$ presents the utility for household i of quantities of non-housing consumption goods x and housing alternative j . By maximizing the utility function and applying Taylor's formula, we deduct the specification as in (3.1). The detailed procedure can be found in Appendix 2.

As shown in (3.1), we include dwelling prices, locations, sizes and household incomes as the utility determinants. These factors are commonly believed main determinants for housing choices in the previous literature. One important demographic variable, the age, has not been introduced into the model. It is because we cannot identify the age effect in this modeling framework. The common way to analyze the age effect in this framework is to estimate the specification for different age groups. Therefore, we do not have an age variable in the model.

Some more the-state-of-the-art dwelling attributes in location choices, such as with easier access to public transportation or close to high quality schools as discussed by Quigley (1985), Nechyba and Strauss (1998), Barrow (2002) and Bayer et al. (2003), do not enter our model. It is because from the policy aspects, on the macro-level, the direct attributes that the policy measures affect are the major factors such as dwelling prices, locations and sizes. The public transportation and school quality are more neighborhoods associated, which only are affected by macro-level policy measure indirectly. Therefore, we assume the location proxy all the public service quality. The deterministic term $v_{it}(s)$ takes the following structure:

$$v_{it}(s) = -\theta \frac{w(s)}{y_i} + \mu_z + \beta A_s + \delta A_s^2, \quad (3.1)$$

where $w(s)$ is the price/monthly cost of the housing alternatives (s) . The variable (y_i) is the monthly income of household (i) . We expect that utility decreases along with housing price $w(s)$ and that utility increases along with income (y_i) . Therefore, we expect the coefficient estimate (θ) to be positive.

The term (μ_z) varies with location group (z) of the dwellings. The parameter (μ_z) represents the mean attractiveness to the population of dwellings in location group (z) . We expect that the estimate of (μ) for the inner zone location has the highest value (most attractive) and that the estimate for the outer-zone location has the lowest value.

To investigate the effects of dwelling size (A_s) on an individual's utility, we assume that size enters the utility function as a polynomial structure. The polynomial structure implies that when the dwelling size is relatively small, the marginal utility of size increases along with size. When the dwelling size is large, the marginal utility of size decreases along with size. Therefore, we expect the parameter (β) to be positive and the parameter (δ) to be negative.

The structural form in (2.14) implies that the preferences for location and size in terms of (μ_z) , (A_s) and (A_s^2) are assumed to be separable and additive.

To account for random effects embodied by the term $\eta_i(s)$ in equation (2.9), we first suppose that the parameters in $v_{it}(s)$ follow different distributions. The coefficient for the price-to-income ratio, (θ) , is assumed to be log-normally distributed to accommodate the non-negative property. The parameters for location (μ_z) and size $((\beta)$ and (δ) are assumed to be normally distributed. To this end, the random effects $\eta_i(s)$ can further be decomposed into

$$\eta_i(s) = \tau_1(\theta)\eta_{i1}(\theta) + \tau_2(\mu_z)\eta_{i2}(\mu_z) + \tau_3(\beta)\eta_{i3}(\beta) + \tau_4(\delta)\eta_{i4}(\delta), \quad (3.2)$$

where $\tau_1(\theta)$, $\tau_2(\mu_z)$, $\tau_3(\beta)$ and $\tau_4(\delta)$ are positive estimated parameters. The term $\eta_{i1}(\theta)$ is a standard log-normally distributed variable. The terms $\eta_{i2}(\mu_z)$, $\eta_{i3}(\beta)$ and $\eta_{i4}(\delta)$ are standard normally distributed variables.

In our study, only one household characteristic term –income is included. The other important characteristic - age component of the household is assumed no role to play. As discussed by Han (2010) in a RP setting, the age component of the household can be an important factor in determining the dwelling size preference. In this study, we have tried to formulate the age component effects in a similar fashion as in Han (2010). However, we do not find significant effects of age composition in our study. Therefore, to be precise, we exclude the age component of household from our model.

4. SURVEY AND DATA COLLECTION

We collected data in Shanghai, China. One reason we believe Shanghai is a proper location for our study is that its housing market has developed rapidly in the past decade. Combined with the trends of increasing immigration, growing household incomes, and deregulation of housing-related financial systems, the housing market has become a substantial economic sector. To affect the housing market, several policy measures have been actively employed. Detailed background introductions of the housing market can be found in Han (2010, section 2.1). As a result, the implication of our methodology is highly relevant and interesting to policy makers and housing developers.

In this study, we employed the SP data, consisting of asking households to express their preferences for hypothetical housing alternatives to obtain information about their housing preferences. There are many ways in which one could ask questions to elicit households' preferences. Our purpose was to model consumer preferences among dwellings, so it was important to ask questions in such a way that we could obtain unambiguous responses that are expressed as precise rankings. One way to achieve this goal was to ask each household to

state the preferred alternative in a specified choice set. Alternatively, as was done for this study, households are asked to make a complete ranking of a set of hypothetical housing alternatives, which are characterized by their given attributes.

In the survey, each household (household) was exposed to 20 experiments. In each experiment, the questions were posed as follows: “If there are three housing alternatives, described as follows, please indicate which one would be your preferred choice? Then, if your preferred choice is not available, please indicate which one of the other two alternatives you prefer.”

The first question revealed the respondent’s most preferred alternative, and the second question helped us to obtain a complete ranking of the three alternatives by revealing the second and third choices. By repeating this specific sequence of alternative rankings for all 20 random drawing choice sets, a dataset with rankings of housing choices with specified attributes was obtained for all respondents.

To describe the housing alternatives, we focused on three main attributes – location, size and price. We chose these three dimensions to describe the housing alternatives because we believe that these attributes are the major observable considerations of housing buyers. To construct the housing alternatives for the choice set, we included five unit price groups, six size groups and three locations. We choose the grouping ranges by referring to the real housing market data in Shanghai discussed by Han (2010). The five unit price groups are dwellings with unit prices below 7,000 Yuan per m^2 , 7,000-10,000 Yuan per m^2 , 10,000-15,000 Yuan per m^2 , 15,000-20,000 Yuan per m^2 , and 20,000 Yuan per m^2 and above. The six size groups are dwellings with size below 60 m^2 , 60-90 m^2 , 90-120 m^2 , 120-150 m^2 , 150-200 m^2 and 200 m^2 and above. The three locations are the inner, intermediate, and outer zones of the city. We have two methods to frame the housing price: one way is to use total price, and the other is to use unit price. Since the dwelling size was employed to describe the housing alternatives explicitly in the survey, the unit price is easy to get by dividing the total price with the size. In addition, we believe total price has more affordability implication to the respondents than the unit price. Therefore, in the survey, we chose to use the total price. We described the housing alternatives by the total price (unit price * size), size, and location.

Altogether, there were 90 combinations (5 unit price groups * 6 size groups * 3 location groups) in the sample choice set; see Appendix 3 and Table A1. The merit of this combination was that we assumed that the attributes were independently drawn to avoid possible correlation. That is, if we used market housing information, there would usually be a correlation between location and unit price, which would bias our estimation. For the case of Shanghai, see Han (2010). The three housing alternatives in each experiment, which the respondents were asked to rank, were drawn randomly from the 90 alternatives without replacement.

In addition, background information such as household income, household age composition, and the respondents' estimates of affordability were asked in the survey. Household information survey questions are listed in Appendix 3.

The survey was conducted online. A specific website was used to host this survey, and all questions were organized and presented by a web-based program. The online approach enabled us to randomly draw housing alternatives in each experiment for each respondent, allowing maximum representativeness of the choice set. That is, even though the maximum number of alternatives in each respondent's choice set could not exceed 60, there was a fairly high probability that each alternative would show up in the experiment choice set at least once in the entire survey. The survey could be performed in a similar way using a paper-based approach. However, it would be costly to print a specific questionnaire for each respondent and digitize the corresponding answers. Another advantage of an online survey is its trendiness style. Respondents might have more fun and be more patient when completing the survey online. Finally, we can collect the answers more efficiently from a web-based program than would be possible for a paper-based survey.

A total of 60 individuals responded to the survey, which was advertised on the Internet. This approach might have generated selection bias because people with no access to an Internet connection would be excluded. If housing preferences are somewhat correlated to Internet access our estimations from the survey data would only represent the housing demand of households with Internet access. With respect to this concern, we assumed that housing preference is not correlated with Internet preference. A total of seven respondents did

not complete the 20 experiments, and another respondent's information about age composition was unreasonable. All 8 were removed from the sample, resulting in a dataset comprising 52 people with 1,040 first- and second-choice observations; in total, there were 2080 choice observations in the dataset. The basic descriptive survey statistics are listed in Tables 1-4 below.

Table 1. Household Yearly Income of Sampled Respondents (in 1,000 Yuan)

Income	20	22	25	30	40	45	50	60
Frequency	2	1	1	3	1	1	2	5
Income	66	80	84	86	100	120	130	150
Frequency	1	5	1	1	8	3	3	3
Income	200	250	300	400	500	777	1000	2000
Frequency	6	1	5	1	3	1	1	1

Table 2. Comparisons of housing alternatives by location and choice rank

	Inner Zone	Intermediate Zone	Outer Zone
Best Choice	512	370	274
Second Choice	369	374	413
Last Choice	272	392	492

Table 3. Statistics Summary for Total Price (in 10,000 Yuan)

	Mean/S.E.	25% Quartile	50% Quartile	75% Quartile
Best Choice	154.9/111.3	77.5	129.6	180.0
Second Choice	176.9/129.8	77.5	132.0	230.4
Last Choice	216.3/167.2	83.8	159.6	323.0

Table 4. Statistics Summary for Size (in m²)

	Mean/S.E.	25% Quartile	50% Quartile	75% Quartile
Best Choice	133/61	83	124	165
Second Choice	126/62	80	110	165
Last Choice	132/69	76	124	178

Tables 2, 3, and 4 show the marginal distributions of total price, size and location for housing alternatives ranked as the best choice, second choice and last choice in all experiments. In general, the inner-located alternatives were ranked as the best choice more frequently than those located elsewhere. Compared to alternatives with lower prices, the alternatives with higher total prices tended to be listed as less preferable choices. The size effects showed no clear trend between the ranks. The corresponding distribution figures are found in Appendix 4 and Figures A1, A2, and A3.

All calculations and estimations were programmed by the software R². The random-drawing method suggested by Train (2003) was employed to estimate the random-effect model.

5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS

The three model specifications discussed in section 2 have been estimated separately. The empirical results are presented in Table 5. Each column corresponds to one model specification.

Table 5. Empirical Estimation Results for Different Model Specifications

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	Multinomial Logit Model	Nested Logit Model	Mixed Logit Model
Coefficient of Price to Income Ratio (θ)	0.204 (0.033)	0.484 (0.048)	
Log-mean of (θ)			0.018 (2e-3)
Standard Error of log-distributed (θ)			1.217 (3e-3)
Similarity in Location Group (α)		1.004 (0.058)	
Coefficient of Size (β)	1.241 (0.208)	1.345 (0.220)	

² R is a language and environment for statistical computing and graphics. It is a GNU project which is similar to the S language and environment which was developed at Bell Laboratories (formerly AT&T, now Lucent Technologies) by John Chambers and colleagues. The data set used in this study and corresponding program is available upon requests.

Mean of normally distributed (β)	2.038	
	(1e-3)	
Standard Error of (β)	0.730	
	(1e-3)	
Coefficient of Size ² (δ)	-0.281	-0.327
	(0.067)	(0.070)
Mean of normally distributed (δ)	-0.370	
	(7e-3)	
Standard Error of (δ)	0.114	
	(1e-3)	
Attractiveness of Location		
Inner zone (μ_1)	-0.077	0.490
	(0.075)	(0.075)
Mean of normally distributed (μ_1)	0.535	
	(2e-5)	
Standard Error of (μ_1)	0.661	
	(3e-4)	
Intermediate zone (μ_2)	0	0
Mean of normally distributed (μ_2)	0	
	-	

Standard Error of (μ_2)			0.322 (2e-4)
Outer zone (μ_3)	-0.452 (0.075)	-0.271 (0.073)	
Mean of normally distributed (μ_3)			-0.390 (2e-4)
Standard Error of (μ_3)			0.346 (1e-3)
Log likelihood at Maximization	-1777	-1732	-1610
McFadden's ρ^2	0.05	0.07	0.14
Log likelihood in Reference Case		-1863	
Number of Observations		1040	

As shown in Table 5, all parameter estimates were estimated precisely, except for the inner location's attractiveness in the Multinomial Logit Model (Model 1). As McFadden's ρ^2 indicates, the Mixed Logit Model (Model 3) outperforms the other two models in terms of fitness. That is, McFadden's ρ^2 increases to 0.14 (Model 3) from 0.07 (Model 2) and 0.05 (Model 1) by introducing the alternative specific random effects. Therefore, we emphasized the estimation implications of the Mixed Logit Model (Model 3).

First, we observe in Model 3 that coefficient estimations do vary in the population. According to the well-known properties of log-normal distribution, when

$$\log \theta \sim N(\mu, \sigma),$$

$$E\theta = \exp(\mu + 0.5\sigma^2), \quad \text{var}(\theta) = \exp(2\mu + \sigma^2)(\exp(\sigma^2) - 1).$$

We can obtain the mean and standard deviation of the log-normally distributed price-income ratio parameter θ in Table 5 (2.14 and 3.93, respectively). The mean of 2.14 increases dramatically compared to the estimate of 0.484 in the Nested Logit Model (Model 2) and 0.204 in the Multinomial Logit Model (Model 1). The main reason for this difference is that we accommodate the random effects of the price-income ratio in Model 3 rather than assuming a constant effect in Model 1 and Model 2.

In all three model specifications, the coefficient estimation for size (β) is positive, and the coefficient estimation for square size (δ) is negative, which is consistent with our expectations. The utility will increase with size when the size is relatively small and decrease with size when the size is relatively large. Based on Model 3, we can tell that the preferred dwelling size (the one that brings the highest utility to the household) is 275 square meters. That is, if we do not consider affordability or location, the most preferred apartment has a size of 275 square meters. This result reveals important information that the apartments currently on the housing market are far too small, which might imply future demand for larger apartments.

With regard to location attractiveness (μ_z), the general result, that the inner zone is the most attractive and the outer zone is the least attractive, holds for both Model 2 and Model 3. Model 3 yields the largest difference between locations (with a mean of 0.535 for the inner zone and -0.390 for the outer zone).

The way in which Model 3 accommodates taste heterogeneities among people is abstract and difficult to understand. To further reveal the merits of this method, we used location attractiveness as an example. The estimated means and standard deviations for the location coefficient provided information regarding the percentage of the population that places a positive value on location and the percentage that places a negative value on it. As shown in Table 5, the distribution of the coefficient for the inner zone had an estimated mean of 0.535 and an estimated standard deviation of 0.661, such that 79% of the distribution was

above zero, and 21% was below zero. This result implies that housing alternatives in the inner zone is a positive inducement for approximately four-fifths of households and is a negative factor for the other one-fifth of households. By contrast, 13% of the population places a positive value on the outer zone location, whereas 87% of the population places a negative value on this location (with a mean of -0.390 and a standard deviation of 0.346).

Again, because Model 3 (Mixed Logit Model) outperformed the other two models, all of the following calculations and simulations are based on estimations of Model 3.

6. POLICY IMPLICATION SIMULATION

6.1. Policy Implication of Construction Limitations on the Number of Large Apartments

The Shanghai government has employed several types of policy measures to interfere with the housing market. One of these measures was to limit the proportion of housing with sizes greater than 90 m² to a maximum of 30% of the total newly constructed residential housing from June 2006 (GOSCPRC³ Statement No. 37, 2006). Setting aside the justification for this policy, to illustrate the possible implications of this measure, we considered a simple choice setting. Suppose that 1,000 households, each with a monthly income of 9,000 Yuan, decide to buy new apartments. They are particularly interested in apartments that cost 12,500 Yuan per m² and are located in the intermediate zone. Based on the estimation results in Table 5, the choice probability for small (below 90 m²) and large (above 90 m²) apartments are 49.53% and 50.47%, respectively. A “policy-free” market equilibrium would be reached if 495 small apartments and 505 large apartments were built for 1,000 buyers.

However, as regulated by the size limit policy discussed above, large apartments should not exceed 300 dwelling units, yielding a 195-dwelling unit shortage for large apartments and a 195-dwelling unit surplus for small apartments.

One possible outcome that makes this policy measure entirely off-target is that buyers of large apartments remain steadfast in desiring large apartments. In that case, prices for large

³ General Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China.

apartments would skyrocket due to a supply shortage, which is opposite the intended effect of the measure.

The other possible outcome is that buyers of large apartments choose to rent or move to other cities instead of sacrificing their preference to buy large apartments. In this situation, the demand for large apartments will be constrained. However, because the demand for owner-occupied housing has been channeled to the renting market, housing rentals will increase in price. If people choose to move to other cities, the aim of this measure to constrain the increase in housing prices will be accomplished by reducing the fundamental demand.

6.2. Subsidies to Movers

In the past decades, to fulfill the city's public transportation network planning or other municipal projects, thousands of households have been relocated. From 1995 to 2008, there has been an average of 71,265 households involved in "moving" projects each year. An average of 4.62 million square meters of dwellings have been removed annually (Shanghai Statistics Yearbook, 2009).

One major measure used to motivate people to move is the provision of a moving subsidy, which has been co-organized by the government and the housing construction companies. Minimum subsidy standards have been published by the government of Shanghai. From 2001, the subsidy standards have been based on the dwelling location (see Shanghai Government Statement No. 111, 2001)

Our framework provides us a useful tool for obtaining a reference for subsidy standards. To this end, we first introduce the concept of "compensating variation". The "compensation variation" is the money-metric value of housing alternatives' attributes relative to a benchmark alternative with different attributes. It enables us to quantify the relative strength of the preference directed toward the various choices of dwelling type. In other words, this means how much it is necessary to increase or decrease the total housing price paid by a household so that the utility of dwellings in the benchmark group is equal to the utility of dwellings that are chosen to evaluate, conditional on household income and other housing

specific attributes. We refer to the increase or decrease in total price as “compensating variation.” The compensating variation also could be understood as the “willingness to pay.”

To formulate the “compensating variation,” we chose the outer zone location as the benchmark group. Let K denote the willingness to pay. To focus on the compensating variation induced by the pure location attractiveness of the dwellings, we assume the same monthly cost w for all dwellings. Again, the independent random draw between location and unit price of dwellings in our experimental design provides us the opportunity to separate the location effect from the market price.

To keep the utility unaffected by moving from housing j to k , household i must pay or be compensated with K . That is, K is the money-metric measure for the utility difference in each month between the two housing alternatives. To ignore individual-household randomness, we focused on an average household. Thus, K is determined by

$$\begin{aligned} E(U_{ij}) &= E(U_{ik}) \\ \Rightarrow \\ E\left(-\theta \frac{(w_j - K)}{y_i} + \mu_{outer} + \beta A_j + \delta A_j^2\right) &= E\left(-\theta \frac{w_k}{y_i} + \mu_{inner} + \beta A_k + \delta A_k^2\right). \end{aligned} \quad (6.1)$$

Suppose $w_j = w_k, A_j = A_k$. Then, we get

$$K = y_i E\left(\frac{1}{\theta} (\mu_{inner} - \mu_{outer})\right). \quad (6.2)$$

According to equation (6.2) and the estimations of the Mixed Logit model in Table 5, we could simulate the required compensation variations of the household with different household income levels for locations between the inner and outer zones.

Table 6. Compensating Variation of Location from Inner to Outer Zones (unit: 1000 Yuan)

Household Group by Average Income	4.5	5.5	6.5	7.5	9.0	12.5	17.5	20.0

Required Compensation Variation <i>K</i>	1.95	2.38	2.81	3.24	3.89	5.40	7.56	8.64

Note: Housing alternatives are those with the same size.

As shown in Table 6, households with higher incomes tended to have a higher willingness to pay for preferred locations. A household with a monthly income of 17,500 Yuan was willing to sacrifice 7,560 Yuan per month to move from an outer zone to an inner zone location when the other two main housing attributes were unchanged. Meanwhile, a household with a monthly income 5,500 Yuan was only willing to pay 2,380 Yuan to move from an outer zone to an inner zone location.

Using the most common case as an example (moving from an inner-zone to an outer-zone location), the compensating variation for a location, given in Table 6, provides a useful reference for the amount of money to subsidize movers.

Suppose that the movers are asked to move from apartments located in the inner zone to those located in the outer zone. The new apartments have similar sizes and market prices to the old apartments. To move voluntarily, the movers must be compensated by lump-sum payments. For example, a household with a monthly income of 9,000 Yuan would ask for a 3,890 Yuan monthly compensation to move.

Another interesting fact is that the payment amount depends on a household's income level. From Table 6, it can be seen that households with higher incomes require higher subsidies. However, it has been often asserted that as a public policy, the income-dependent subsidy is unfair. The movers with lower incomes would claim discrimination based on the "income-dependent" subsidy. In practice, a uniform subsidy will be announced that applies to all moving households. In this case, the compensating variation for a household with an average income is still a useful reference.

Based on our framework, we can also simulate how the institution of a moving subsidy can be affected by the random effect. Suppose that there are two households those have the same characteristics (income) and dwell in the same kind of apartment (same location, size, and price). All of their differences come from random heterogeneity and taste shifters. To simulate the effect, we randomly draw two such households with monthly incomes of 9,000

Yuan that are dwelling in 120 square-meter apartments located in the inner zone with prices of 960,00 Yuan. The simulated moving subsidy is 17,406 Yuan for one household, which is very different from the simulated subsidy of 3,890 Yuan for the other household. This exercise implies that there might be a huge difference between the household-specific required moving subsidy and the average required subsidy caused by randomness in household behaviors (which is true for the real world), which can hinder the effectiveness of the practice of subsidized moving.

6.3. Heavy Taxation and Increasing Interest Rate

The Shanghai government has actively adjusted the taxation of housing trading and interest rates of mortgage loans with the intent of constraining demand. In 2005, the “transaction tax” for previously-owned dwellings was introduced to replace “capital gains tax.” The transaction tax equals five percent of the total sale price of a dwelling (whereas the previous capital gains tax only applied to a net gain over the original purchase price) (GOSCPRC, 2005). The annual interest rate for mortgage loans with durations of more than 5 years was adjusted from an average of 5.76% in 2002 to 7.83% in 2007 (The People’s Bank of China, 2002-2007).

When demand is strong, the full transaction tax and successive increases in mortgage loan interest rates are mainly channeled to the total price of the traded housing, which affects household choices.

Following the same trend of large apartment construction that was discussed in section 6.2, there are two possible scenarios for increasing total prices: the first is that potential buyers abandon the idea of buying and choose to rent if they must find a dwelling to settle or invest their money in other markets if they are investors; the second is that they retain the idea of buying and buy housing that they can afford or believe is profitable.

Because, in our SP data, respondents were only asked to rank their preferences for the three alternatives presented in each experiment, it was impossible for us to use the estimated model to simulate the change in choice probabilities as a result of the first scenario. However,

for the second scenario, the prediction can be simulated. To this end, we assumed that sellers charge the full transaction tax to buyers and that the total prices of housing increases by 5%. Suppose that households could choose from the housing alternatives listed in Table A1 and Appendix 3. Table 7 compares the choice probabilities “after full transaction tax” and “before full transaction tax.”

Table 7. Comparison between Choice Probabilities with and without a Full Transaction Tax on Housing, based on a owner household monthly income of 9000 Yuan

Total Price Group (in 10,000 Yuan)	<65	65-120	120-160	160-270	>270
Choice Probability Before Full Transaction Tax	26.14%	27.62%	26.47%	16.06%	3.71%
Choice Probability After Full Transaction Tax	28.33%	28.48%	25.89%	14.41%	2.89%

We can see from Table 7 that if the increasing tax has not made households change their buying decisions, the demand for housing alternatives with lower prices increases, whereas the demand for housing with higher prices decreases. This result is consistent with our expectations. For example, when 10,000 households are considering buying, the number of households that demand housing with a total price of less than 650,000 Yuan is 2,833 with the full transaction tax and 2,614 households otherwise.

Therefore, when heavy transaction tax and increasing mortgage loan rate measures are used, the policy implications on the housing market depend on whether they make potential buyers change their minds and choose not to buy. If not, the raising price driven by full transaction tax switches some large-apartment buyers to choose smaller apartments. We can extend this effect to an equilibrium setting. The reduced demand for large apartments will force sellers to share the increasing prices proportionally by decreasing prices.

7. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we employed rank-ordered SP panel data to investigate the preferences of various types of dwelling alternatives in Shanghai.

Several model versions were estimated in this paper, and they differ with respect to stochastic specifications on unobserved heterogeneity and unobserved attributes. A significant improvement in fitness was achieved when we accommodated random effects in the model.

In contrast to the RP approach, the SP approach allowed us to design hypothetical choice experiments and thereby retain full control of the variations in choice sets. Using this approach, we could reveal respondents' preferences toward dwelling alternatives with attributes that do not exist in the current market. This approach will help policy makers and real estate construction companies to understand the responses of housing demanders toward the dwellings they plan to provide.

Based on the model estimates and the simulated compensation variations for the attributes of interest, the implications of four recently used policies are discussed. We believe that these discussions help to show the potential usefulness of our modeling framework in assisting policymaking decisions. As revealed in the simulations, after accommodating heterogeneities and taste shifters, the simulated scenario under a specific policy will be very different. It also partially explained the failures and controversies of the latest real estate intervention policies in China. Therefore, these modeling implications for evaluating policy impacts or predicting proposed market strategies has great potential significance.

Our framework shares a common limitation with the other SP analysis. This limitation is that the choice-making process is hypothetical. Respondents do not make real decisions, which might generate bias in our results. We reserve the challenge to find a way to accommodate the effects of “unreal” decision making for future studies.

REFERENCES

- Barrow, L., 2002. School Choice through Relocation: Evidence from Washington D.C. Area. *Journal of Public Economics*, 86, pp.155-189.
- Bayer, P., Ferreira, F. and McMillan, R., 2003. *A United Framework for Measuring Preferences for Schools and Neighborhoods*. Economic Growth Center, Yale University, Working Paper No. 872.
- Bayer, P., McMillan, R. and Rueben. K., 2004. *An Equilibrium Model of Sorting in an Urban Housing Market*. NBER Working Paper No. 10865.
- Beggs, S., Cardell, S. and Hausman, J., 1981. Assessing the Potential Demand for Electric Cars. *Journal of Econometrics*, 16, pp. 1-19.
- Boehm, T.P. 1982. A Hierarchical Model of Housing Choice. *Urban Studies*, 19, pp. 17-31
- Borsch-Supan, A., and Pitkin, J., 1988. On Discrete Choice Models of Housing Demand. *Journal of Urban Economics*, 24, pp.153-172.
- Chapman, R. and Staelin, R., 1982. Exploiting Rank Ordered Choice Set Data within the Stochastic Utility Model. *Journal of Marketing Research*, 14, pp. 288-301.
- Dagsvik, J.K. and Liu, G., 2006. *A Framework for Analyzing Rank Ordered Panel Data with Application to Automobile Demand*. Discussion Paper no. 480, Statistics Norway.
- Hall, J., Viney, R., Haas, M. and Louviere, J., 2004. Using stated preference discrete choice modeling to evaluate health care programs. *Journal of Business Research*, 57, pp.1026-1032.
- Han, X., 2010, Housing Demand in Shanghai: a Discrete Choice Approach. *China Economic Review*, 21, pp.355-376.
- Hausman, J. and Ruud, P., 1987. Specifying and Testing Econometric Models for Rank Ordered Data. *Econometrica*, 46, pp. 931-959.
- McFadden, D., 1978. Modeling the Choice of the Residential Location. In: A. Karlquist et al, eds. *Spatial Interaction Theory and Residential Location*. North Holland, Amsterdam, pp.75-96.
- McFadden, D., 1984. Econometric Analysis of Qualitative Response Models. In: Z. Griliches

- and M. Intriligator, eds. *Handbook of Econometrics*, Vol. II. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp.1396 – 1456.
- Nechyba, T.J., and Strauss, R.P., 1998. Community Choice and Local Public Services: A Discrete Choice Approach. *Regional Science and Urban Economics*, 28, pp.51-73.
- Pollakowski, H.O., 1982. *Urban Housing Markets and Residential Location*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Co.
- Quigley, J., 1985. Consumer Choice of Dwelling, Neighborhood and Public Services. *Regional Science and Urban Economics*, 15, pp.41-63.
- Tiago de Oliveira, J., 1962/63. Structure Theory of Bivariate Extremes; Extensions, *Estudos de Matemática. Estatística e Econometria* , 7, pp.165-195.
- Train, K.E. 2003. *Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Tu, Y. and Goldfinch, J., 1996. A Two-Stage Housing Choice Forecasting Model. *Urban Studies*, 33, pp.517-537.

APPENDIX 1

Proofs for Choice Probability $P(U_{j_{it}} > U_{r_{it}} > U_{s_{it}})$ for Nested Structure in Location

Case 1. Each j_{it} , r_{it} , and s_{it} are in different subsets

This situation is the simplest one. Assume that $j_{it} \in B_u$, $r_{it} \in B_k$, and $s_{it} \in B_h$. As shown below, it takes the form of Multinomial Logit Model. For simplicity, we express the two terms in (2.2) separately. For the first term, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
 P(U_{r_{it}} > U_{s_{it}}) &= \frac{\partial \left(\exp(V_{irt} / \alpha_k)^{\alpha_k} + \exp(V_{ist} / \alpha_h)^{\alpha_h} \right) / \partial V_{irt}}{\left(\exp(V_{irt} / \alpha_k)^{\alpha_k} + \exp(V_{ist} / \alpha_h)^{\alpha_h} \right)} \\
 &= \frac{\partial \left(\exp(V_{iyt}) + \exp(V_{izt}) \right) / \partial V_{iyt}}{\exp(V_{iyt}) + \exp(V_{izt})} \\
 &= \frac{\exp(V_{iyt})}{\exp(V_{iyt}) + \exp(V_{izt})}.
 \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

For the second term, we have

$$P\left(U_{r_{it}} = \max_{v \in \{j_{it}, r_{it}, s_{it}\}} U_v\right) = \frac{\exp(V_{irt})}{\exp(V_{ijt}) + \exp(V_{irt}) + \exp(V_{ist})}. \tag{2}$$

According to (2.2), the rank-ordered probability is

$$P(U_{j_{it}} > U_{r_{it}} > U_{s_{it}}) = \frac{\exp(V_{irt})}{\exp(V_{irt}) + \exp(V_{ist})} - \frac{\exp(V_{irt})}{\exp(V_{ijt}) + \exp(V_{irt}) + \exp(V_{ist})}. \tag{3}$$

Case 2. Only j_{it} and s_{it} are the same subsets

Assume $r_{it} \in B_k, \{j_{it}, s_{it}\} \subset B_u$. Then,

$$P(U_{r_{it}} > U_{s_{it}}) = \frac{\exp(V_{irt})}{\exp(V_{irt}) + \exp(V_{ist})}. \tag{4}$$

$$P\left(U_{r_{it}} = \max_{v \in \{j_{it}, r_{it}, s_{it}\}} U_v\right) = \frac{\exp(V_{irt})}{\exp(V_{irt}) + \left(\exp(V_{ijt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_u}} + \exp(V_{ist})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_u}}\right)^{\alpha_u}}. \quad (5)$$

Combining (4) and (5), the rank-ordered probability is

$$P(U_{j_{it}} > U_{r_{it}} > U_{s_{it}}) = \frac{\exp(V_{irt})}{\exp(V_{irt}) + \exp(V_{ist})} - \frac{\exp(V_{irt})}{\exp(V_{irt}) + \left(\exp(V_{ijt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_u}} + \exp(V_{ist})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_u}}\right)^{\alpha_u}}. \quad (6)$$

Case 3. Only r_{it} and j_{it} are the same subsets

Assume $\{r_{it}, j_{it}\} \subset B_k, s_{it} \in B_h$. Then,

$$P(U_{r_{it}} > U_{s_{it}}) = \frac{\exp(V_{irt})}{\exp(V_{irt}) + \exp(V_{ist})}. \quad (7)$$

$$P\left(U_{r_{it}} = \max_{v \in \{j_{it}, r_{it}, s_{it}\}} U_v\right) = \frac{\left(\exp(V_{irt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} + \exp(V_{ijt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}}\right)^{\alpha_k - 1} \exp(V_{irt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}}}{\exp(V_{ist}) + \left(\exp(V_{irt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} + \exp(V_{ijt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}}\right)^{\alpha_k}}. \quad (8)$$

The rank-ordered probability in this case is

$$P(U_{j_{it}} > U_{r_{it}} > U_{s_{it}}) = \frac{\exp(V_{irt})}{\exp(V_{irt}) + \exp(V_{ist})}$$

$$\frac{\left(\exp(V_{irt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} + \exp(V_{ijt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} \right)^{\alpha_k - 1} \exp(V_{irt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}}}{\exp(V_{ist}) + \left(\exp(V_{irt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} + \exp(V_{ijt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} \right)^{\alpha_k}}. \quad (9)$$

Case 4. Only r_{it} and s_{it} are the same subsets

Assume $\{r_{it}, s_{it}\} \subset B_k, j_{it} \in B_h$. Then,

$$P(U_{r_{it}} > U_{s_{it}}) = \frac{\left(\exp(V_{irt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} + \exp(V_{ist})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} \right)^{\alpha_k - 1} \exp(V_{irt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}}}{\left(\exp(V_{irt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} + \exp(V_{ist})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} \right)^{\alpha_k}}. \quad (10)$$

Symmetric to (8), we get

$$P\left(U_{r_{it}} = \max_{v \in \{j_{it}, r_{it}, s_{it}\}} U_v\right) = \frac{\left(\exp(V_{irt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} + \exp(V_{ist})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} \right)^{\alpha_k - 1} \exp(V_{irt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}}}{\exp(V_{ijt}) + \left(\exp(V_{irt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} + \exp(V_{ist})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} \right)^{\alpha_k}}. \quad (11)$$

The corresponding rank-ordered probability is

$$P(U_{j_{it}} > U_{r_{it}} > U_{s_{it}}) = \frac{\left(\exp(V_{irt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} + \exp(V_{ist})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} \right)^{\alpha_k - 1} \exp(V_{irt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}}}{\left(\exp(V_{irt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} + \exp(V_{ist})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} \right)^{\alpha_k}} \cdot \frac{\left(\exp(V_{irt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} + \exp(V_{ist})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} \right)^{\alpha_k - 1} \exp(V_{irt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}}}{\exp(V_{ijt}) + \left(\exp(V_{irt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} + \exp(V_{ist})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} \right)^{\alpha_k}}. \quad (12)$$

Case 5. All j_{it} , r_{it} , and s_{it} are in the same subsets

Assume $\{j_{it}, r_{it}, s_{it}\} \subset B_k$. Then,

$$P(U_{r_{it}} > U_{s_{it}}) = \frac{\left(\exp(V_{irt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} + \exp(V_{ist})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} \right)^{\alpha_k - 1} \exp(V_{irt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}}}{\left(\exp(V_{irt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} + \exp(V_{ist})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} \right)^{\alpha_k}}, \quad (13)$$

and

$$P\left(U_{r_{it}} = \max_{v \in \{j_{it}, r_{it}, s_{it}\}} U_v\right) = \frac{\left(\exp(V_{ijt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} + \exp(V_{irt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} + \exp(V_{ist})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} \right)^{\alpha_k - 1} \exp(V_{irt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}}}{\left(\exp(V_{ijt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} + \exp(V_{irt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} + \exp(V_{ist})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} \right)^{\alpha_k}}. \quad (14)$$

Therefore, the rank-ordered probability is

$$\begin{aligned}
P(U_{jit} > U_{rit} > U_{sit}) &= \frac{\left(\exp(V_{irt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} + \exp(V_{ist})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} \right)^{\alpha_k - 1} \exp(V_{irt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}}}{\left(\exp(V_{irt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} + \exp(V_{ist})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} \right)^{\alpha_k}} \\
&\quad - \frac{\left(\exp(V_{ijt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} + \exp(V_{irt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} + \exp(V_{ist})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} \right)^{\alpha_k - 1} \exp(V_{irt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}}}{\left(\exp(V_{ijt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} + \exp(V_{irt})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} + \exp(V_{ist})^{\frac{1}{\alpha_k}} \right)^{\alpha_k}}.
\end{aligned} \tag{15}$$

APPENDIX 2

Consider first an economy with two types of commodities – non-housing goods and housing goods. Let x denote a vector of quantities of non-housing goods and j denote housing alternatives. Consider a particular household i , let B_i denote the set of housing alternatives available to household i . The dwelling group B_i includes three dwelling alternatives for each time t .

Let $U_i^*(x, j)$ be the utility for household i of quantities of non-housing consumption goods x and housing alternative j . The budget constraint household i faces takes the form of $px + w_j \leq y_i$ and $j \in B_i$, where p is the vector of prices for non-housing goods, w_j is the price for housing alternative j , and y_i is the monthly income of household i .

The household i makes optimal decisions on consumption of non-housing goods and housing goods simultaneously. Without loss of generality the agent's decision process can be decomposed as taking place in two stages: In the first stage he/she maximizes utility with respect to the non-housing goods consumption, given the housing alternative j is chosen. Let U_{ij} denote the conditional indirect utility, which is defined by

$$\begin{aligned} U_{ij} &= \max_x U_i^*(x, j), j \in B_i, \\ \text{s.t. } &px \leq y_i - w_j. \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A1})$$

Assume this conditional indirect utility can be written as

$$U_{ij} = v(p, y_i - w_j, \mu_j + \varepsilon_{ij}), j \in B_i, \quad (\text{A2})$$

where $v(\cdot)$ is a function that is common to all agents and is convex and decreasing in prices p and increasing in "after housing income" $y_i - w_j$. The term $\mu_j + \varepsilon_{ij}$ is interpreted as an individual indicator of attractiveness of housing alternative j ($j \in B_i$). μ_j is a deterministic term that represents the average attractiveness across households toward housing alternative j in B_i , which can be explained by the observed attributes (such as the dwelling location and size), whereas ε_{ij} is a stochastic component that is supposed to capture unobserved (unobserved to the econometrician) heterogeneity

in preferences across individuals and housing alternatives. We assume the values of μ_j and ε_{ij} are known to household i .

The conditional indirect utility defined in (2) fully represents the preferences over housing alternatives. Thus, the housing choice is determined by maximizing the conditional indirect utility function. However, for the sake of developing an empirical model we need more structure on the utility function.

According to standard utility theory, it follows that $v(\cdot)$ is homogeneous of degree zero in prices of non-housing/housing goods and individual income. By utilizing that property, we can write (A2) as

$$U_{ij} = v\left(\frac{p}{y_i}, 1 - \frac{w_j}{y_i}, \mu_j + \varepsilon_{ij}\right). \quad (\text{A3})$$

By applying Taylor's formula to the function $v(x, y, z)$ around the point (x_{i0}, y_{i0}, z_{i0}) , which does not depend on j , it yields

$$v(x, y, z) = v(x_{i0}, y_{i0}, z_{i0}) + \gamma(x - x_{i0}) + \theta(y - y_{i0}) + \phi(z - z_{i0}), \quad (\text{A4})$$

where γ , θ , and ϕ are values of the relevant first derivatives. When inserted into (A4) with $(x, y, z) = (p/y_i, 1 - w_j/y_i, \mu_j + \varepsilon_{ij})$, it follows that

$$U_{ij} = v(x_{i0}, y_{i0}, z_{i0}) + \gamma\left(\frac{p}{y_i} - x_{i0}\right) + \theta\left(1 - \frac{w_j}{y_i} - y_{i0}\right) + \phi(\mu_j - z_{i0}) + \phi\varepsilon_{ij}. \quad (\text{A5})$$

Since utility is assumed ordinally measurable, we can rescale utility such that $\phi = 1$, and subtract the following term

$$v(x_{i0}, y_{i0}, z_{i0}) + \gamma\left(\frac{p}{y_i} - x_{i0}\right) + \theta(1 - y_{i0}) - z_{i0}, \quad (\text{A6})$$

from both sides in (5).

Consequently, we get that the conditional indirect utility defined in (2) is equivalent to the following structure

$$U_{ij} = -\theta \frac{w_j}{y_i} + \mu_j + \varepsilon_{ij}. \quad (A7)$$

The variable w_j / y_i will subsequently be called as the price-income ratio. It measures the price of dwelling j relative to income. We expect its coefficient θ to be positive. That is, price (the numerator of the ratio) of housing alternatives has negative effects on utilities, whereas the income (the denominator) has positive effects.

Based on the variables of dwelling location and size, we can further specify the term of μ_j in (A7) as

$$\mu_j = u_z + \beta A_j + \delta A_j^2, \quad (A8)$$

where u_z represents location and A_j represents the size of dwelling j .

APPENDIX 3

Table A1. All Possible Alternatives used to Form the Experimental Choice Set

Identifier	Size (in m ²)	Unit Price (Yuan per m ²)	Total Price (in 10,000 Yuan)	Location (in districts)
1	240	6.5	156	XUHUI
2	85	6.9	58.7	XUHUI
3	155	7.0	108.5	LUWAN
4	142	5.9	83.8	HUANGPU
5	98	6.6	64.7	JINGAN
6	55	6.8	37.4	XUHUI
7	68	11.0	74.8	LUWAN
8	135	13.0	175.5	HUANGPU
9	44	10.0	44	JINGAN
10	108	12.0	129.6	XUHUI
11	180	12.8	230.4	LUWAN
12	230	11.5	264.5	HUANGPU
13	80	17.0	136	JINGAN
14	100	18.0	180	XUHUI
15	124	16.0	198.4	LUWAN
16	50	15.5	77.5	HUANGPU
17	170	19.0	323	JINGAN
18	220	16.5	363	XUHUI
19	48	7.9	37.9	LUWAN
20	145	8.8	127.6	HUANGPU
21	117	9.5	111.2	JINGAN
22	165	8.0	132	XUHUI
23	235	9.8	230.3	LUWAN
24	83	7.7	63.9	HUANGPU
25	178	30.0	534	JINGAN
26	133	26.0	345.8	XUHUI
27	280	22.0	616	LUWAN
28	110	25.0	275	HUANGPU
29	76	21.0	159.6	JINGAN
30	54	20.0	108	HUANGPU
31	240	6.5	156	CHANGNING
32	85	6.9	58.7	PUTUO
33	155	7.0	108.5	HONGKOU
34	142	5.9	83.8	CHANGNING
35	98	6.6	64.7	PUTUO
36	55	6.8	37.4	HONGKOU
37	68	11.0	74.8	CHANGNING
38	135	13.0	175.5	PUTUO
39	44	10.0	44	HONGKOU
40	108	12.0	129.6	CHANGNING
41	180	12.8	230.4	PUTUO

42	230	11.5	264.5	HONGKOU
43	80	17.0	136	CHANGNING
44	100	18.0	180	PUTUO
45	124	16.0	198.4	HONGKOU
46	50	15.5	77.5	CHANGNING
47	170	19.0	323	PUTUO
48	220	16.5	363	HONGKOU
49	48	7.9	37.9	CHANGNING
50	145	8.8	127.6	PUTUO
51	117	9.5	111.2	HONGKOU
52	165	8.0	132	CHANGNING
53	235	9.8	230.3	PUTUO
54	83	7.7	63.9	HONGKOU
55	178	30.0	534	CHANGNING
56	133	26.0	345.8	PUTUO
57	280	22.0	616	HONGKOU
58	110	25.0	275	CHANGNING
59	76	21.0	159.6	PUTUO
60	54	20.0	108	HONGKOU
61	240	6.5	156	PUDONG
62	85	6.9	58.7	ZHABEI
63	155	7.0	108.5	YANGPU
64	142	5.9	83.8	MINHANG
65	98	6.6	64.7	BAOSHAN
66	55	6.8	37.4	PUDONG
67	68	11.0	74.8	ZHABEI
68	135	13.0	175.5	YANGPU
69	44	10.0	44	MINHANG
70	108	12.0	129.6	BAOSHAN
71	180	12.8	230.4	PUDONG
72	230	11.5	264.5	ZHABEI
73	80	17.0	136	YANGPU
74	100	18.0	180	MINHANG
75	124	16.0	198.4	BAOSHAN
76	50	15.5	77.5	PUDONG
77	170	19.0	323	ZHABEI
78	220	16.5	363	YANGPU
79	48	7.9	37.9	MINHANG
80	145	8.8	127.6	BAOSHAN
81	117	9.5	111.2	PUDONG
82	165	8.0	132	ZHABEI
83	235	9.8	230.3	YANGPU
84	83	7.7	63.9	MINHANG
85	178	30.0	534	BAOSHAN
86	133	26.0	345.8	PUDONG
87	280	22.0	616	ZHABEI

88	110	25.0	275	YANGPU
89	76	21.0	159.6	MINHANG
90	54	20.0	108	PUDONG

The districts of Xuhui, Huangpu, Jingan and Luwan are categorized as inner zone locations. Hongkou, Changning, and Putuo are categorized as intermediate zone locations. Pudong, Yangpu, Zhabei, Minhang and Baoshan are categorized as outer zone locations.

Household Information Survey Questions

1. Which district do you currently live in? (Current Dwelling Location)
2. What was your household income last year? (Household income in 2006)
3. What was your household income last month? (Household income in July 2007)
4. How many members are in your household? Please specify their ages.
(Number and age composition of household members)
5. Do you own the apartment in which you live? (Owner or Not Owner)
6. If you are a homeowner, please provide the size of your apartment, and please estimate the current market price of your apartment.
(For owners, area and market price of current dwellings)
7. What is the maximum mortgage that you think you could afford?
(Maximum mortgage amount that could be afforded)

APPENDIX 4

Figure A1. Sample Income Distribution




Figure A2. Total Price Distribution Comparisons





Figure A3. Size Distribution Comparisons



Managing Financial Risk by Using Derivatives:

A Study of Hong Kong Listed Companies

Tai-Yuen Hon
Hong Kong Shue Yan University
Email: tyhon@hksyu.edu

INTRODUCTION

Change in the international business environment and the increased volatility of interest rates and foreign exchange rate movements have profound implications on the way in which international companies deal with their financial risks. These risks cannot only affect quarterly profits, but it can determine a company's survival. The management of these risks has become paramount for the survival of companies in today's volatile financial markets.

In the new millennium, the financial markets have become more volatile than before. Even in some advanced economies like Hong Kong, companies face wild fluctuation of interest rates and exchange rates during the past decade. From the firm perspective, financial risk is a crucial threat to its profitability. In particular for Hong Kong firms, foreign exchange risk and interest rate risk need to be properly managed. For that reason, it is common to find local companies to use derivatives, such as forwards, futures, options and swaps, to hedge these risks.

As reported by Bank for International Settlements (BIS), after contracting by 4% in the first half of 2010, total notional amounts outstanding of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives rose by 3% in the second half, reaching US\$601 trillion by the end of 2010. In the largest risk category (i.e., interest rate and foreign exchange derivatives) in the OTC derivatives market by any measure, notional amounts outstanding increased by 3% in the second half of 2010. According to the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) 2009 derivative usage survey report, 94% of the world's largest corporations used derivative instruments to manage and hedge their business and macroeconomic risks. Foreign exchange and interest rate derivatives were the most widely used instruments among large global corporations.

For firms, there are a wide variety of financial risk, including market risk, credit risk, insurance risk, and liquidity risk in their daily business. As discussed above, an obvious trend for firms in various geographic regions and industrial sectors to hedge their financial risk is through the derivatives. In the present study, I attempt to find out, among the major companies in Hong Kong, what derivatives instruments are used and the purposes of using them.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the background of the study. Section 3 review the relevant literature, followed by section 4 that states out the research questions. Section 5 explains the methodology of the present study. Section 6 reports the research findings, and the last section contains the conclusion.

STUDY BACKGROUND

As business becomes more global, more and more companies are finding themselves increasingly exposed to increased risks with exchange rate fluctuations and interest rate fluctuations being just some of the financial risks they face; therefore the management of these risks has become paramount for Hong Kong listed companies. The primary objective of this study is to examine the ways that the Hong Kong listed companies in the Hang Seng Index Constituent Stocks manage their financial risk with derivatives in the year of 2010. Among the various categories of financial risk, there are market risk (i.e., the risk of loss from adverse movements in the value of assets, interest rates, and foreign exchange rates), credit risk (i.e., the failure of third parties to meet their obligations to a company when falling due), insurance risk (i.e., the potential loss resulting from inappropriate underwriting, mispricing, adverse expense, lapse, mortality, and morbidity experiences) and liquidity risk (i.e., the risk of having insufficient cash available to meet the payment obligations to counterparties when they become due).

The market risk arises from the possibility of financial loss caused by changes in financial instruments' fair value or future cash flows due to fluctuations in key variables such as interest rates, foreign exchange rates, equity market prices, and real estate property market

prices. For example, the banks' or insurance companies' exposure to interest rate risk predominantly arises from its duration gap between the liabilities and assets for interest rate sensitive products. Besides, foreign exchange risk arises from the company's operations in multiple jurisdictions in the Asia Pacific region or the rest of the world. Foreign currency risk associated with assets and liabilities denominated in non-functional currencies results in gains and losses being recognized in the consolidated income statement. In view of the recent global financial crisis and its tremendous impacts, the focus of this paper is on interest rate risk and exchange rate risk for the Hong Kong companies.

The Hang Seng Index (HSI) in Hong Kong has four sub-indexes which are finance, utilities, properties, and commerce and industry, and there are 46 constituent stocks in the Index. The commerce and industry sector has 23 constituent stocks, which is half of the HSI. Different from finance (with 12 constituent stocks), utilities (with 4 constituent stocks) and properties (with 7 constituent stocks) sectors, the commerce and industry sector involves various industries that run different businesses, such as energy, materials, industrial goods, consumer goods, services, telecommunication, information technology, and conglomerates.

The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA, 2010) reported that the main derivative instruments in Hong Kong are the outright forwards and the foreign exchange (FX) swaps. From 2007 to 2010, average daily net turnover of outright forwards increased by 117.6% to US\$32 billion, while that of FX swaps increased by 20.5% to US\$147 billion. Around 60% of the total outright forwards transactions lie in the band of seven days and up to one year. In April 2010, the share of FX swap transactions with a maturity up to seven days increased to 77.6% from 73.7% in April 2007. Average daily net turnover of OTC interest-rate derivatives in Hong Kong had increased by \$1.2 billion or 6.8% during the period of 2007-2010. Interest-rate swaps remained the most highly traded product, even though their turnover decreased by 1.0% to \$15.8 billion between 2007 and 2010. In the OTC interest-rate derivatives market, business with non-financial customers increased, rising from 1.7% in 2007 to 2.2% in 2010.

There are various instrument types in the derivative markets. Below we discuss the major types that are widely used.

(1) Forward contracts: Forward contracts represent agreements for delayed delivery of financial instruments or commodities in which the buyer agrees to purchase and the seller agrees to deliver, at a specified future date, a specified instrument or commodity at a specified price or yield. Forward contracts are generally not traded on organized exchanges and their contractual terms are not standardized. The reporting exercise also includes transactions where only the difference between the contracted forward outright rate and the prevailing spot rate is settled at maturity, such as non-deliverable forwards (i.e., forwards which do not require physical delivery of a non-convertible currency) and other contracts for difference.

(2) Swaps: Swaps are transactions in which two parties agree to exchange payment streams based on a specified notional amount for a specified period. Forward exchange swap contracts are reported as swaps.

(3) Options: Option contracts confer either the right or the obligation, depending upon whether the reporting institution is the purchaser or the writer, respectively, to buy or sell a financial instrument or commodity at a specified price up to a specified future date.

(4) Forward rate agreement: This instrument is a forward contract in which the two parties agree to make interest payments to each other at futures dates. One party makes a payment at a rate agreed to in advance. The other party makes a payment at a rate to be determined later.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Effective risk management is a critical success factor for delivering projects in predefined cost, time, and quality. Bartram et.al.(2011) provided strong evidence that the use of financial derivatives reduces both total risk and systematic risk. They used a new, larger data set that includes 6,888 nonfinancial firms headquartered in 47 different countries. The effect of derivatives use on firm value is positive yet sensitive to endogeneity and omitted variables concerned. Choi (2010) stated that every transaction taking place between economic agents of different countries requires an accompanying currency exchanges. However, exchange rates are often fluctuating and seriously volatile in the floats. This brings the currency risk to agents. Currency risk will arise once there are transactions between two

different currencies. Firms which are exposing to this type of risk have to do something to hedge against it in order to avoid suffering losses from the exposure. In analysis of the purposes of using derivatives, Nguyen and Faff (2010) pointed out that despite the public concern about the use of financial derivatives to increase firm risk, the evidence shows that in most cases, financial derivatives are used for hedging purposes. They concluded that the public concern regarding the corporate use of derivatives to expose firms to undue levels of risk appears to be largely unfounded. Mahmood and Kashif (2010) stated that the main factors affecting derivative usage included tread of derivative usage, risk level, awareness with modern finance, correlation between hedging and firm's value, firm's performance and business cycle effect, and correlation between nature of business and financial risk. In their study, they analyzed listed companies in Pakistan and found that the most popular derivatives in the country are financial futures. Ojo (2010) noted that all regulatory strategies should take into consideration of the importance of management responsibilities – both on individual and corporate levels. Meta-risk regulation has assumed such a prominent position in regulation through its application in Basel II, and it is preferred to risk-based regulation – not only because of the element of ambiguity which risk-based regulation introduces into its assessment (i.e., through a consideration of the external environment of the firm), but also because of its impact on the use of external auditors in regulation and supervision.

Rainer (2009) showed different models applied in the valuation of interest rate derivatives, which included direct models for the probability density, short-rate models, and forward market rate models. He pointed out that in practice society with complicated optimization problems and larger portfolios of trades, model calculation can increase performance of calibration as much as possible. As argued by Clark and Judge (2008), hedging instruments depend on the type of exposure. Different instruments have to be used to hedge risks with different natures. For example, a short-term risk should be hedged by a short-term instrument, while a long-term risk has to be hedged with a long-term instrument. Short-term instruments such as foreign currency forwards and/or options are used to hedge short-term exposure generated from export activities, while foreign currency debt and foreign currency swaps into foreign currency (but not into domestic currency) are used to hedge

long-term exposure arising from assets located in foreign locations. Risks can be effectively hedged only when the right hedging instruments are chosen. Lin et.al. (2009) suggested that the information asymmetry index is significantly lower for derivatives users than for non-users. Besides, Reynolds et.al. (2009) argued that using derivatives may be financially constrained, and thus firms may use risk management instruments to smooth out cash flows and ensure internal funds are available for investment.

Yi et.al. (2008) showed that derivative use does not improve bond issuers' credit ratings, nor affect their cost of debt. As stated by Gibson (2007), a commercial bank can use credit derivatives to manage the risk of its loan. Credit derivatives can create counterparty credit risk that itself must be managed. Complex credit derivatives rely on complex models, leading to model risk. Credit rating agencies interpret this complexity for investors, but their ratings can be misunderstood, creating rating agency risk. The settlement of a credit derivative contract following a default can have its own complications, creating settlement risk. Papaioannou (2006) reported that the larger the size of a firm, the more likely it is to use derivative instruments in hedging its exchange rate risk exposure. The primary goal of US firms' exchange rate risk hedging operations is to minimize the variability in firms' cash flow and earning accounts (mainly related to payables, receivables, and repatriations). The choice of foreign exchange derivatives instruments is concentrated in OTC currency forwards (over 50% of all foreign exchange derivatives used), OTC currency options (around 20%), and OTC currency swaps (around 10%).

Judge (2006) found that the size of the firm is positively related to the foreign currency hedging decision, indicating that larger firms are more likely to hedge as compared with smaller firms. This finding is consistent with significant information and transaction cost scale economies of hedging that discourages smaller companies from hedging. According to Sheedy (2006), derivatives are used more extensively in Hong Kong and Singapore than in the US. They are particularly popular for managing foreign exchange risk. However, their use is more speculative in these places than in the US. As showed in the study of Smithson and Mengle (2006), probably the most important issues are the considerable basis risk and the associated prospect of earnings volatility that come with the use of such derivatives to manage

the firm's credit exposures. El-Masry (2006) highlighted that the most important reason for using derivative for hedging purposes is managing the volatility in cash flows, and the market value of the firm is considered to be the second most important reason. Aabo (2006) suggested that more than half of the firms regard the use of foreign debt equally important as, or more important than, the use of currency derivatives in hedging exchange rate exposures.

According to Stulz (2005), 28 percent of firms use derivatives to reduce earnings volatility. The most common derivatives the companies used are foreign exchange derivatives, interest rate derivatives, and commodity derivatives. After using different derivatives, the volatility of the stocks, interest rate exposure, and foreign exchange exposure of the companies has reduced by 5%, 22%, 11%, respectively. Adedeji and Baker (2002) pointed out that the motivation of using interest rate derivatives may be due to the risk of financial distress and economies of scale. However, foreign exchange risk, dividend payout ratio, liquidity, institutional share ownership, expected growth, tax rate, industry classification, and the existence of hybrid securities (e.g., preference shares and convertible loans), do not have any significant influence on the use of the instruments.

In the analysis of the derivatives usage in different countries, Yu et.al. (2001) noted that it is a common practice for the Hong Kong firms using derivatives for risk management to engage in foreign exchange and interest rate derivatives. Moreover, the most widely accepted risk measurement technique for these firms is the value-at-risk model. Scenario analysis is also used by some companies due to its ease of implementation. Lee et.al. (2001) found that a number of inter-regional differences in the organization of risk management, that is, a greater emphasis on decentralized structures in the Asia-Pacific region and less formal board control over risk management in U.S. multinational corporations. In terms of the tools of risk management, there were also regional differences in the concerns in choosing derivatives, driven to some extent by differences in the accounting treatment internationally. DaDalt et.al. (2001) provided evidence that both the use of derivatives and the extent of derivatives usage are associated with lower asymmetric information. Specifically, for firms using derivatives (notably currency derivatives), they found that analysts' earnings forecasts have significantly greater accuracy and lower dispersion. These findings support the conjecture of DeMarzo and

Duffie (1995) and Breeden and Viswanathan (1998) who argued that hedging reduces noise related to exogenous factors, and hence decreases the level of asymmetric information regarding a firm's earnings.

Bodnar and Gebhardt (1998) found that German firms are more likely to use derivatives than US firms, with 78% of German firms using derivatives compared to 57% of US firms. Wysocki (1998) reported that derivatives use is increasing along with the number of lines of business and the number of overseas operation. Derivatives use is found to be decreasing in inside ownership, but is unaffected by the riskiness of CEO compensation, the level of insider wealth vested in equity, or CEO retirement. He further found that derivatives use is increasing in firm size and decreasing in regulation. According to Oldfield and Santomero (1997), many institutions heavily involved in the fixed income market attempt to track interest rate risk closely and more rigorously as compared to those that have little rate risk in their portfolio. They measure and manage the firm's vulnerability to interest rate variation, even though they cannot do so perfectly. Likewise, international investors are aware of foreign exchange risk and try to measure and restrict their exposure to it. Duangploy et.al. (1997) stated that since all the companies are risk averse, they would hedge their potential risk. Some of them are highly averse to risk, who would totally hedge it. Other companies' hedge risk selectively, based on their own view to the future changes in the market. Olson (1997) suggested that measuring the interest rate risk is necessary in order to manage it. For most analysts and bankers, interest-rate-risk measurement includes fair values, duration, net-income forecasts, and rate-shock simulations. Scott and Sharma (1995) contended that swaps occur because the swap market incorporates information about the firm more quickly than the open debt market. Hence, managers of firms whose credit risk has improved may capture the lower default risk premium more quickly in the swap market than they can in the open market. The lower default risk premium benefits the owners and managers of firms, whose compensation depends largely on the value of the firm.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The theories and concepts written on managing risk using derivatives are relatively new. Whether or not they can be applied to the real setting is still controversial. More theoretical development and empirical studies are needed, particularly in Asian setting. I try to fill this research gap. To explain how the Hong Kong companies in the Hang Seng Index Constituent Stocks manage their financial risks with derivatives, I attend to set several research questions based on theories and concepts that discussed in the previous section. The following questions are to be addressed in the present study.

1. Do the Hong Kong listed companies use derivatives to hedge the risks?
2. What are the risks that the derivatives are hedging?
3. What are the types of derivative instruments that the companies are using?
4. What are the objectives of using such kinds of derivatives?

DATA

The markets for OTC instruments and exchange-traded derivative financial instruments (options, futures, forwards, swaps, etc.) on foreign exchange rates and interest rates have exhibited exponential growth over the past 20 years. Along with increased use, regulation for the disclosure of derivative has developed, requiring companies in many countries to include information about their derivatives' positions in their annual reports. For example, the following are recent standards (and effective dates) adopted by so-called G4+1 countries and International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) as part of the movement toward common reported standards: United States, FAS 133 (effective June 15, 1999); United Kingdom, FRS 13 (effective March 23, 1999); Australia, AAS 33 (effective January 1, 2000); Canada, AcSB Handbook Section 3860 (Financial Instruments – Disclosure and Presentation, effective January 1, 1996); New Zealand, FRS-31 (effective December 31, 1993). The resulting availability of data makes the empirical analysis of the use of derivatives by nonfinancial firms in different countries possible.

In this study, I collected and analyzed firm-level data. The data come from different sources. First are annual reports and financial reviews, which are released under the Hong Kong Accounting Standard 32 (HKAS 32), Hong Kong Accounting Standard 39 (HKAS 39), Hong Kong Financial Reporting Standard 7 (HKFRS 7) and Hong Kong (IFRIC) Interpretation 9. Additionally, I also collected data from different website, such as Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), Hang Seng Indexes (HSI) and Global Reports. A group of undergraduate students helped to collect and code the data.

From the recent HSI constituent stocks' annual reports, the information about derivative instruments was searched and extracted. I first counted and found out whether or not the companies use derivatives to hedge their financial risks. I then identified what types of derivative instruments these companies used and what types of risks they hedge. Lastly, I looked for the objectives of these companies in using such kinds of derivatives. The information was then tabulated, so that comparison across sectors can be made. I also used some cases to illustrate.

Companies are classified as users or nonusers of derivatives based on a search of their annual reports and financial reviews for information about these of derivatives. Even careful examination of the annual reports does not always give clear evidence whether a company uses derivatives or not, because some companies make very general statements about their risk management policy or accounting practices without specifically addressing the particular year in question. Given the systematic way of classifying companies and the fact that users appear to be misclassified about as often as nonusers, the results should at worst suffer from some noise with little effect on the results across the sample of companies.

RESULTS

Table 1 displays the derivatives usage of Hong Kong companies in the HSI constituent stocks. To compare the pattern across sectors, I provide the information of derivatives usage in each sector.

**Table 1: Derivatives Usage by Hong Kong companies in Hang Seng Index (HSI)
Constituent Stocks**

HSI	Code	Company Name	User of Derivatives	Nonuser of Derivatives
Finance	5	HSBC Holdings PLC	1	
	11	Hang Seng Bank Ltd	1	
	23	Bank of East Asia Ltd	1	
	388	Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Ltd	1	
	939	China Construction Bank Corp	1	
	1299	AIA Group Ltd	1	
	1389	Industrial & Commercial Bank of China	1	
	2318	Ping An Insurance Group Co	1	
	2388	BOC Hong Kong Holdings	1	
	3988	China Life Insurance Co Ltd	1	
	3328	Bank of Communications Co Ltd	1	
	3988	Bank of China Ltd	1	
		Sub-total (%)	12 (100%)	0 (0%)
Utilities	2	CLP Holdings Ltd	1	
	3	Hong Kong & China Gas Co Ltd	1	
	6	Power Assets Holdings Ltd	1	
	836	China Resources Power Holdings Co Ltd	1	
		Sub-total (%)	4 (100%)	0 (0%)
Properties	1	Cheung Kong Holdings Ltd	1	
	12	Henderson Land Development Co Ltd	1	
	16	Sun Hung Kai Properties Ltd	1	
	83	Sino Land Co Ltd		1
	101	Hang Lung Properties Ltd		1
	688	China Overseas Land & Investment Ltd		1
	1109	China Resources Land Ltd	1	
		Sub-total (%)	4 (57.1%)	3 (42.9%)

HSI	Code	Company Name	User of Derivatives	Nonuser of Derivatives
Commerce & Industry	4	Wharf Holdings Ltd	1	
	13	Hutchison Whampoa Ltd	1	
	17	New World Development Co Ltd	1	
	19	Swire Pacific Ltd	1	
	66	MTR Corporation Ltd	1	
	144	China Merchants Holdings International Co Ltd		1
	267	Citic Pacific Ltd	1	
	291	China Resources Enterprise Ltd	1	
	293	Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd	1	
	330	Esprit Holdings Ltd	1	
	386	China Petroleum & Chemical Corp (Sinopec)	1	
	494	Li & Fung Ltd	1	
	700	Tencent Holdings Ltd	1	
	762	China Unicom Hong Kong Ltd		1
	857	PetroChina Co Ltd	1	
	883	CNOOC Ltd	1	
	941	China Mobile Ltd		1
	1044	Hengan International Group Co Ltd	1	
	1088	China Shenhua Energy Co Ltd	1	
	1199	COSCO Pacific Ltd	1	
	1880	Belle International Holdings Ltd		1
	1898	China Coal Energy Co Ltd		1
	2600	Aluminum Corp of China Ltd	1	
		Sub-total	18 (78.3%)	5 (21.7%)
		Grand total	38 (82.6%)	8 (17.4%)

Of all the 46 companies in the HSI, 38 of them (or 82.6%) reported that they used at least one derivative if and when the need arises. Specifically, in the finance and utilities sectors, 100% of the companies reported that they used derivatives. The figures for the commerce and industry sector and properties sector are 78.3% and 57.1%, respectively. It is interesting to note that 17.4% of the companies did not use any derivatives. In the properties sector, the percentage is the highest (42.9%). Here are some examples.

Case 1: Sino Land Co. Ltd. (Code: 83) mainly relied on monitoring the change of foreign exchange risk to manage the exchange rate risk.

Case 2: Hang Lung Properties Ltd. (Code: 101) maintained a large amount of bank deposit of

US\$189 million, and hence the resulting currency risk is insignificant.

Case 3: China Overseas Land & Investment Ltd.'s (Code: 688) part of the transactions are denominated in foreign currencies, including Hong Kong dollar and US dollar. Because of the link exchange rate system, the currency risk is low.

Moreover, in the commerce and industry sector, 21.7% of the companies reported that they did not use derivatives. Below is an example.

Case 4: China Mobile Ltd. (Code: 941) used Renminbi (RMB) in the major business operations. The company's foreign currency represented 1.3% of the total cash and deposits, thus the company did not expect a high currency risk.

Table 2 shows the results of the companies using derivatives by types of instrument and interest rate risk.

Table 2: Companies use of derivatives by type of instrument and interest rate risks

HSI	Code	Futures	Options	Swaps	FRA*
Finance	5			1	
	11			1	
	23			1	
	388				1
	939			1	1
	1299				
	1398		1	1	1
	2318		1	1	
	2388	1		1	
	2628		1		
	3328		1	1	1
	3988	1	1	1	
Sub-total		2 (16.6%)	5 (41.7%)	9 (75%)	4 (33.3%)
Utilities	2			1	
	3				
	6			1	
	836			1	
Sub-total		0 (0%)	0 (0%)	3 (75%)	0 (0%)
Properties	1			1	
	12			1	
	16			1	
	83				
	101				
	688				
	1109			1	
Sub-total		0 (0%)	0 (0%)	4 (57.1%)	0 (0%)

HSI	Code	Futures	Options	Swaps	FRA*
Commerce & Industry	4			1	
	13			1	1
	17			1	
	19			1	
	66			1	
	144				
	267			1	
	291			1	
	293			1	
	330				
	386				
	494				
	700				
	762				
	857			1	
	883				
	941				
	1044				
	1088			1	
	1199			1	
	1880				
	1898				
	2600	1			
Sub-total		1 (4.3%)	0 (0%)	11 (48%)	1 (4.3%)
Grand total		3 (6.5%)	5 (10.9%)	27 (58.7%)	5 (10.9%)

*FRA denotes Forward Rate Agreement.

Overall, 58.7% of the companies reported that they used interest rate swaps, 10.9% of them used options, 10.9% of them used forward rate agreements (FRA), and 6.5% of them used interest rate futures in hedging the interest rate risk. The percentage of using interest rate swaps is particularly high in finance sector (75%) and in utilities sector (75%). In the properties sector (57.1%), interest rate swaps is the only type of derivatives used by companies. It is also the main type for companies in the commerce and industry sector, with 47.8% companies using it. Here are some examples.

Case 5: China Resources Power Holdings Co. Ltd. (Code: 836) needed tremendous capital for its operation and expansion. Actually, there was a 32.6% increase on loans in 2010 towards 2009. It used interest rate swaps with net quarterly settlement to hedge its exposure against changes in interest rate on bank borrowing, so that its interest risk expenses would be minimized by swapping floating interest rates to fixed interest rates. As at 31 December 2010, loans of HK\$6,619 million which were provided using floating rates were swapped to fixed

interest rates at a range from 2.075% to 4.52% per annum.

Case 6: Henderson Land Development Co. Ltd. (Code: 12) had an outstanding bank loan of HK\$7,100 million on 31 December 2010, which was on a floating rate basis. It then used interest rate swap to convert the floating rate basis loan into fixed rate basis loan, which means to convert the floating interest rate into fixed interest rate. This helps to reduce the interest rate risk arises during the repayment period.

Case 7: Citic Pacific Ltd. (Code: 267) borrowed by using the variable rate which made the company suffer to the interest rate risk. To deal with the issue, the company was using the interest rate swap and borrowed by the fixed rate. During the first half of 2011, the company used about HK\$1.4 billion interest rate swaps to lock the fixed rate to borrow the fund. The fixed rate of the interest rate swap was in the range of 0.60% to 5.24%, and the floating rate was mainly calculated by the HIBOR and LIBOR.

Case 8: COSCO Pacific Ltd. (Code: 1199): As at 30th June 2011, outstanding interest rate swap contracts comprised nominal principal amounting to US\$200 million in total whereby the company agreed to pay the banks interest at floating rates ranging from 105 basis points to 116 basis points above 6-month LIBOR in return for receiving interests from the banks at a fixed interest rate of 5.875% per annum.

Table 3 reveals the companies' use of derivatives by type of instrument and exchange rate risk.

Table 3: Companies use of derivatives by type of instrument and exchange rate risks

HSI	Code	Forwards	Futures	Options	Swaps	NDF*
Finance	5	1				
	11	1				
	23	1				
	388	1				
	939					
	1299	1	1		1	
	1398	1		1	1	
	2318	1			1	
	2388	1		1	1	
	2628		1		1	
	3328	1	1	1	1	
	3988	1		1	1	
Sub-total		10(83.3%)	3 (25%)	4 (33.3%)	7 (58.3%)	0 (0%)
Utilities	2	1			1	
	3	1			1	
	6	1			1	
	836					
Sub-total		3 (75%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	3 (75%)	0 (0%)
Properties	1	1			1	
	12				1	
	16				1	
	83					
	101					
	688					
	1109					
Sub-total		1 (14.3%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	3 (42.8%)	0 (0%)

HSI	Code	Forwards	Futures	Options	Swaps	NDF*
Commerce & Industry	4	1			1	
	13	1			1	
	17					
	19	1			1	
	66	1			1	
	144					
	267	1			1	
	291					
	293	1			1	
	330	1				
	386	1				
	494	1				
	700	1		1		
	762					
	857				1	
	883	1				
	941					
	1044			1		1
	1088					
	1199					
	1880					
	1898					
	2600	1				
Sub-total		12 (52.2%)	0 (0%)	2 (8.7%)	7 (30.4%)	1 (4.3%)
Grand total		26 (56.5%)	3 (6.5%)	6 (13%)	20 (43.5%)	1 (2.2%)

*NDF denotes Non-Deliverable Forward.

All together, among the 46 HSI companies, 56.5% of them used forward contracts, 43.5% used swaps, 13% used options, 6.5% used futures, and 2.2% used non-deliverable forwards (NDF). The following cases are some examples that illustrate how they used derivatives to deal with exchange rate risk.

Case 9: Hong Kong Exchange and Clearing Ltd. (Code: 388) invested in non-HKD securities in an attempt to maximize its return. The company used forward foreign exchange contracts and foreign currency bank deposits to hedge the currency exposure of its non-HKD investments and liabilities arising from fluctuations in exchange rates. At as 31 December 2010, the company hedged cash and cash equivalents of JPY and USD, as well as financial assets of AUD, EUR, GBP, JPY and USD. The amount of money used to hedge cash and cash equivalents of JPY and USD are \$96 million and \$969 million, respectively. For hedging financial assets of AUD, EUR, GBP, JPY, and USD, the company used \$215 million, \$379

million, \$74 million, \$12 million, and \$480 million, respectively. The details of using which instruments to hedge the above foreign currency assets have not been shown in the annual report and financial review. The company only mentioned that forward foreign exchange contracts have been used as economic hedges for the currency exposures of its investments by external fund managers.

Case 10: Bank of East Asia Ltd. (Code: 23) managed currency risk by setting limits for foreign currency position and using forward contract. Its annual report revealed that in 2010 the company used HK\$136,496 million and HK\$156,605 million for forward purchases and forward sales to hedge the currency risk of USD, and HK\$94,932 million and HK\$96,540 million were used for forward purchases and forward sales to hedge the currency risk of CNY. The company also used HK\$ 12,559 million and HK\$ 8,196 million for forward purchases and forward sales to hedge other foreign currencies' risk.

Case 11: Hong Kong & China Gas Company Ltd. (Code: 3) operates in Hong Kong and Mainland China and was exposed to foreign exchange risk arising from various currency exposures, primarily with respect to the United States dollars and Renminbi. To manage the foreign exchange risk, the company used forward contracts. The company had also entered into cross currency swap contracts to manage its exposure to foreign exchange risk from recognized liabilities.

Case 12: Esprit Holdings Ltd. (Code: 330) suffered the exchange rate risks due to its international business and primarily from commercial transactions and recognized assets and liabilities. As the merchandise is mainly produced in Europe, Euro is the currency that mainly causes the risk, which when there is 1% strengthening in Euro towards US Dollars, company's profit attributable to shareholders would decrease by approximately HK\$3 million and total equity would decrease by approximately HK\$ 33 million. This caused the attention of the management to use foreign currency forward contract to hedge the foreign exchange rate risk. In the year of 2010, Esprit's profit attributable to shareholders has decreased by HK\$4 million and the total equity has decreased by HK\$4 million due to the 1% strengthening in Euro towards US Dollars on monetary items.

Case 13: CNOOC Ltd. (Code: 883) used the foreign exchange forward contracts to manage

the foreign exchange rate risk. The foreign exchange forward contracts had been considered as liabilities at fair value of RMB 80,054,000 for the year ended 2010, and RMB 125,000 for the year ended 2009. This showed that the company was consistent in using foreign exchange forward contracts to hedge the foreign exchange risk. The company has made the decision according to the management's assessment that an expectable change in foreign exchange rate of the USD for 5% in 2010. As a result, the company only suffered from the foreign exchange risk from its subsidiaries that was less than 0.77% of the profit and 0.83% of the equity due to the change of USD currency rate.

Table 4: Financial risk management objectives

Types of objective	Number of companies (%)
(A) Foreign exchange objectives	
Management of transaction risk	32 (69.6%)
Management of translation risk	29 (63%)
Management of economic risk	11 (23.9%)
No stated objectives/ do not manage foreign exchange exposure	4 (8.7%)
(B) Interest rate objectives	
Reduce borrowing costs	29 (63%)
Protect group's earnings/ cash flow	28 (60.9%)
Protect key financial ratio	9 (19.6%)
No stated objectives/ do not manage interest exposure	5 (10.9%)

As showed in Table 4, for the foreign exchange objectives, 69.6% of the companies reported that they have managed transaction risk, 63% of the companies reported that they have managed the translation risk, and 23.9% of the companies reported that they have managed economic risk. However, 8.7% reported that they did not manage foreign exchange risk or have any stated objectives.

For interest rate objectives, 63% of the companies reported that they have reduced borrowing costs, particularly for those in the finance sector. 60.9% of the companies reported that they have protected group's earnings or cash flows, particularly for those in utilities sector. That may be the reason why these firms can stably pay dividends to shareholders. Besides, 19.6% of the companies reported that they have protected key financial ratio, and

10.9% reported that they did not manage interest exposure or have any stated objectives. Below are two examples.

Case 14: Hutchison Whampoa Ltd. (Code: 13) aimed at reducing the borrowing cost since the interest payment affected the net income of the company when it involved large amount.

Case 15: HSBC Holdings PLC. (Code: 5) managed the foreign exchange risk to protect the consolidated capital ratios and the capital ratios of individual banking subsidiaries from the effect of changes in exchange rates.

CONCLUSION

The primary objective of this study was to identify the ways the Hong Kong companies in the Hang Seng Index Constituent Stocks manage their financial risks with derivatives. Among the 46 companies that we studied, 38 of them (or 82.6%) reported that they used at least one derivative if and when the need arises. Obviously, it was popular for these Hong Kong large companies to manage their financial risks using derivatives. It is worthy to note the variation in the use of derivatives among different sectors. For example, in the finance and utilities sectors, 100% of the companies reported that they used at least one derivative. The corresponding figures for the commerce and industry sector and properties sector are 78.3% and 57.1% respectively.

In view of the global financial crisis, the Hong Kong companies have been concerning about interest rate risk and foreign exchange risk. To deal with the former, 58.7% of the companies reported that they used interest rate swaps, followed by options (10.9%), forward rate agreements (FRA) (10.9%) and interest rate futures (6.5%). To deal with the latter, 56.5% of the companies used forward contracts, followed by swaps (43.5%), options (13%), futures (6.5%), and non-deliverable forward (NDF) (2.2%). Obviously, the companies preferred using interest rate swaps to hedge interest rate risk and using forward contracts to hedge foreign exchange rate. In general, there is a trend for large firms in Hong Kong to use derivatives for managing the financial risks. Some of them even have written policies on using derivatives. The majority of these companies also have clear objectives, including foreign exchange

objectives and interest rate objectives.

Our study has provided some initial information about the purposes and the use of derivatives among large Hong Kong companies. Some interesting patterns have been revealed. In the future, more research should be conducted to examine the trend by using time-series data or propensity score-matching methods. In addition, comparison can be made between Hong Kong and some financial centers in Asia, such as Singapore and Shanghai. If firm-level data are available, it is desirable to study the financial decisions regarding the use of derivatives and the outcomes of these decisions.

REFERENCES

- Aabo T., 2006. The importance of corporate foreign debt in managing exchange rate exposures in non-financial companies. *European Financial Management*, 12(4), pp.633-649.
- Adedeji, A. and Baker, C.R., 2002. Why firms in the UK use interest rate derivatives. *Managerial Finance*, 28(11), pp.53-74.
- Bartram, S.M., Brown, G.W., and Conrad, J., 2011. The effects of derivatives on firm risk and value. *Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis*, 46(4), pp.967-999.
- Bodnar, G.M. and Gebhardt, G., 1998. Derivatives usage in risk management by U.S. and German non-financial firms: a comparative survey. Working paper, Wharton school, University of Pennsylvania.
- Breeden, D. and Viswanathan, S., 1998. Why do firms hedge? An asymmetric information model. Working paper, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University.
- Choi, M.S., 2010. Currency risks hedging for major and minor currencies: constant hedging versus speculative hedging. *Applied Economics Letters*, 17, pp.305-311.
- Clark, E. and Judge, A., 2008. Foreign currency derivatives versus foreign currency debt and the hedging premium. *European Financial Management*, 15(3), pp.606–642.
- DaDalt, P., Gay, G.D. and Nam, J., 2001. Asymmetric information and corporate derivatives use. Working paper.
- DeMarzo, P.M. and Duffie, D., (1995). Corporate incentives for hedging and hedge accounting. *Review of Financial Studies*, Fall Issue, pp.743-771.
- Duangploy, O., Bakay, V.H. and Belk, P.A., 1997. The management of foreign exchange risk in US multinational enterprises: an empirical investigation. *Managerial Finance*, 23(7), pp.85-99.
- El-Masry, A.A., 2006. Derivatives use and risk management practices by UK non-financial companies. *Managerial Finance*, 32(2), pp.137-159.
- Financial Accounting Standards Board, 1998. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133 Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities. June.

[Online] Available at:

<<http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175820927915&blobheader=application%2Fpdf>> [Accessed 1 February 2012].

Gibson, M.S., 2007. Credit derivatives and risk Management. Finance and Economics Discussion Series. Divisions of Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs. Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C. May. [Online] Available at: <<http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2007/200747/200747pap.pdf>> [Accessed 1 February].

Global reports. [Online] Available at: <<http://www.global-report.com>> [Accessed 1 February].

Hang Seng Bank, Hang Seng Index 2001-2012. [Online] Available at: <<http://www.hsi.com.hk/HSI-Net/>> [Accessed 2 February 2012].

Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 2011. Financial Instruments:

Presentation. [Online] Available at:

<http://app1.hkicpa.org.hk/ebook/HKSA_Members_Handbook_Master/volumeII/hkas32.pdf> [Accessed 3 February 2012].

Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 2010. Financial instruments: recognition and measurement., [Online] Available at:

<http://app1.hkicpa.org.hk/ebook/HKSA_Members_Handbook_Master/volumeII/hkas39.pdf> [Accessed 4 February 2012].

Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 2011. Financial Instruments:

Disclosures. [Online] Available at:

<http://app1.hkicpa.org.hk/ebook/HKSA_Members_Handbook_Master/volumeII/hkfrs7.pdf> [Accessed 4 February 2012].

Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 2010. Reassessment of Embedded Derivatives. [Online] Available at:

<http://app1.hkicpa.org.hk/ebook/HKSA_Members_Handbook_Master/volumeII/hkfrs-int9.pdf> [Accessed 5 February 2012].

Hong Kong Monetary Authority, 2010. The foreign-exchange and derivatives markets in

- Hong Kong. Quarterly Bulletin, by the Banking Policy Department, September. [Online]
Available at: <<http://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/index.shtml>> [Accessed 5 February 2012].
- Mengle, D, Kuprianov, A. and Pachos, J., 2009. ISDA Research Notes. International Swaps and Derivatives Association. No. 2, pp.1-10, Spring. [Online]
Available at: <<http://www.isda.org/researchnotes/pdf/ISDA-Research-Notes2.pdf>> [Accessed 6 February 2012].
- Judge, A., 2006. The determinants of foreign currency hedging by U.K. non-financial firms. *Multinational Finance Journal*, 10(1/2), pp.1-41.
- Kleist, K. and Mallo, C., 2011. OTC derivatives market activity in the second half of 2010. Bank for International Settlements, Monetary and Economic Department.
- Lee, F.M., Marshall, A., Szto, Y.K. and Tang, J., 2001. The practice of financial risk management: an international comparison. *Thunderbird International Business Review*, 43()3, pp.365-378.
- Lin J.B., Pantzalis, C, and Park, J.C., 2009. Derivatives use, information asymmetry, and MNC post-acquisition performance. *Financial Management*, pp.631-661.
- Mahmood, M, and Kashif-ur-Rehman, (2010). Derivative usage in corporate Pakistan: a qualitative research of listed companies. *International Business & Economics Research Journal*. 9(5), pp.151-158.
- Nguyen, H. and Faff, R., 2010. Are firms hedging or speculating? The relationship between financial derivatives and firm risk. *Applied Financial Economics*, 20, pp.827-843.
- Ojo, M., 2010. The growing importance of risk in financial regulation. *The Journal of Risk Finance*, 11(3), pp.249-267.
- Oldfield, G.S. and Santomero, A.M., 1997. The place of risk management in financial institutions. Working paper, The University of Pennsylvania. January. [Online]
Available at: <<http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/95/9505.pdf>> [Accessed 6 February 2012].
- Olson, R. (1997). Measures of interest rate-risk: the case for benchmarks. *Bank Accounting & Finance*, 11(2) , pp.15-24.
- Papaioannou, M.G., 2006. Exchange Rate Risk Measurement and Management: Issues and

- Approaches for Firms. *South-Eastern Europe Journal of Economics*, 2, pp.129-146.
- Rainer, M., 2009. Calibration of stochastic models for interest rate derivatives. *Optimization*, 58(3), pp.373-388.
- Reynolds, M.P., Bhabra, G.S., and Boyle, G.W., 2009. Cash flow, investment and derivative use: an empirical analysis of New Zealand listed companies. *International Research Journal of Finance and Economics*, Issue 32, pp.72-82.
- Scott, J.L. and Sharma, M., 1995. Interest rate swaps: a managerial compensation approach. *Journal of Financial and Strategic Decisions*, 8(1), pp.71-79.
- Sheedy, E., 2006. Corporate risk management in Hong Kong and Singapore. *Managerial Finance*, 32(2), pp.89-100.
- Smithson, C. and Mingle, D., 2006. The promise of credit derivatives in nonfinancial corporations (and why it's failed to materialize). *Journal of Applied Corporate Finance*, 18(4), pp.54-60.
- Stulz, R.M., 2005. Financial Derivatives. *The Milken Institute Review*, pp.20-31, Third Quarter. [Online] Available at:
<http://www.cob.ohio-state.edu/fin/faculty/stulz/publishedpapers/milkeninstitute_pubpaper.pdf> [Accessed 7 February 2012].
- Wysocki, P.D., 1998. Managerial motives and corporate use of derivatives: some evidence. Working paper, University of Michigan Business School.
- Yi, B., Lin, J.B., and Chen, C., 2008. Does derivative use help reduce the cost of debt? *Review of Business Research*, 8(3), pp.196-204.
- Yu, S.H., Chan, H.C., Fu, Y.H., and Lo, C.W., 2001. Managing risk by using derivatives: the case of Hong Kong firms. *Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies*, 4(4), pp.417-425.
- 2010 annual reports and financial reviews of Hang Seng Index Constituent Stocks.

The Viewpoint/Safety First (V/SF) Theory as a Rival Theory to Myopic Loss Aversion to Explain the Equity Premium Puzzle

Tang Luk Wing, Jimmy¹
University of South Australia
Email: jimmytg@netvigator.com

INTRODUCTION

Mehra and Prescott (1985) study the U.S. economy in the period of 1889-1978 and observe that there is a large differential between the return from equity and bonds. In particular, the average real return on the Standard and Poor 500 Index is 7 percent while the average real return on short-term risk-free debt is less than 1 percent. That is, the equity premium is about 6 percent over the 90-year period. They believe that the results are robust and cannot be explained by removing transactions costs, liquidity constraints and other frictions in standard economic models. It is difficult to explain the combination of a high equity premium, a low risk-free rate and smooth consumption with credible levels of investor risk aversion. It is estimated that investors would have to have coefficients of relative risk aversion in excess of 30 to explain the historical equity premium. However, previous estimates and theoretical arguments suggest that the actual figure is close to 1.0. Hence, we need to find the reasons why we have so large an equity premium or why people do not want to hold equities.

One explanation is that the equity premium could be a premium for bearing non-diversifiable risk. With standard constant relative risk aversion preferences, the coefficient of relative risk aversion is the reciprocal of the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution but there is no fundamental economic reason for this restriction. Mehra and Prescott (1985) use isoelastic preferences but this class of preferences implies that the coefficient of risk aversion is strictly linked to the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution.

¹ I wish to express my sincere gratitude to the Hong Kong Shue Yan University for its permission for me to conduct the research. I would also like to give a special thanks to Dr. Lee Shu-Kam for his help.

Epstein and Zin (1991) introduce a class of preferences called “Generalized Expected Utility” which permits independent parameterization for the coefficient of risk aversion and the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution. In the Generalized Expected Utility framework, the asset is priced by its covariance with the growth rate of consumption as well as by its covariance with the return on the wealth portfolio. Epstein and Zin use the market portfolio as a proxy for the wealth portfolio. The modification may resolve the risk-free rate puzzle but it seems that equity premium puzzle still remains. Constantinides (1990) put forward habit formation as another approach to modifying preferences. Habit formation assumes that utility is influenced by both current and past consumption since repeated exposure to a stimulus diminishes the response to it. There are two types of habit, “internal” and “external” and two modeling perspectives, “difference” and “ratio”. Internal habit formation holds the idea that utility is a decreasing function of one’s own past consumption and marginal utility is an increasing function of one’s own past consumption. Models with external habit stress that the operative benchmark is the consumption relative to other agents in the economy. There is an external habit model in which preferences are defined over the ratio of consumption to lagged aggregate consumption and utility of consumption is defined relative to average per capita consumption. This kind of model is sometimes called “Catching up with the Joneses”. The idea is that one’s utility depends on how one is doing relative to others. The consequence is that an individual can become exceedingly sensitive and averse to consumption variation. Hence, equity may have a negative rate of return and becomes undesirable, resulting in personal consumption falling relative to others. Average per capita consumption will rise over time and the induced demand for bonds will help lessen the risk-free rate puzzle. While the Constantinides (1990) model may resolve the risk-free rate puzzle, the equity premium puzzle will remain.

Theoretically, aggregate consumption is meaningful if the market is effectively complete. The existence of a representative household with von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences is assumed in complete markets. Some have suggested the relaxation of the assumption of complete markets. Idiosyncratic income shocks may imply un-insurability, persistence heteroscedasticity and counter cyclical conditional variance but it is believed that

economic agents will dynamically self-insure and thus effectively smooth consumption. Therefore, the difference in the equity premium in incomplete markets and complete markets should be small. Constantinides and Duffie (1996) put forward a model incorporating uninsurable idiosyncratic income shocks. Hence, consumers will require an extra incentive or a larger equity premium to hold equities and other similar investment instruments as their values will be reduced in recessions. In other words, the model provides an explanation of the equity premium puzzle by saying that equities are a poor hedge against the potential loss of employment in recessions. But it is hard to prove empirically. Rietz (1988) proposes a model incorporating a disaster state, that is, a situation in which there is a very small probability of a very large drop in consumption. In this situation, the risk-free rate will be much lower than the return on an equity security. However, the model requires a 1-in-100 chance of a 25% decline in consumption but such a scenario has not been observed in the USA. Moreover, real interest rate did not move as predicted. Brown et al. (1995) try to resolve the puzzle by focusing on survival bias. The main point is that the ex-post returns reflect the premium on a stock market that has survived sudden and unexpected changes such as that in the USA while many other exchanges which have not survived will have low ex-ante equity premium. As we do not know a priori which exchanges would survive, stock and bond markets must be differentially impacted by a financial crisis for this explanation to work. However, in times of financial crisis due to political upheavals or unanticipated inflation, bonds are as likely to lose value as stocks and the assertion that these crises impact differentially on the returns to stocks and bonds is not supported by empirical evidence.

Some have suggested that the equity premium is not a risk premium but is in fact due to other factors, such as borrowing constraints, a liquidity premium or taxes. However, although relaxation of the borrowing constraint will reduce the equity premium by increasing both the returns of equity and bond at the same time, it makes the risk-free rate puzzle re-emerge. Moreover, the explanation of the equity premium puzzle by liquidity premium or taxes is not supported by empirical evidence. Indeed, some believe that there is no equity premium and thus no puzzle at all.

Samuelson (1963) mentions that Samuelson has at one time offered some lunch

colleagues whether they want to accept the following bet: an equal chance to win \$200 and lose \$100. One colleague turns down the bet but expresses that he would like to accept 100 such bets. Samuelson does not promise to let the colleague to make 100 such bets but go back home to prove a theorem showing that the colleague is irrational. The main point is the colleague's rationale for turning down the bet: "I won't bet because I would feel the \$100 loss more than the \$200 gain." Benartzi and Thaler (1995) believe that this attitude is the intuition behind loss aversion and that myopic loss aversion can resolve the equity premium puzzle.

Benartzi and Thaler (1995) try to explain the equity premium puzzle by myopic loss aversion. Myopic loss aversion comprises two behavioral concepts: loss aversion and mental accounting. Loss aversion refers to the fact that people tend to weigh losses greater than gains. This concept plays a central role in Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory which is a descriptive theory of decision-making under uncertainty. Utility in the prospect theory is defined over gains and losses relative to some neutral reference point, such as the status quo, as opposed to wealth in expected utility theory. This utility function has a slope of the loss function steeper than the slope of the gain function with a kink at the origin. The degree of loss aversion depends on the ratio of these slopes at the origin. Mental accounting refers to the way aggregation is done, specifically the framing of decisions and the framing of outcomes of these decisions. It is noted that aggregation rules are not neutral in the presence of loss aversion. In the context of myopic loss aversion, choice bracketing is emphasized. Myopic loss aversion stipulates that loss aversion and a short evaluation period (or a high frequency evaluation) makes risky assets less attractive to investors. It, therefore, predicts that people would buy more risky assets such as equity shares if they evaluate their investments less frequently. Benartzi and Thaler (1995) finds that using simulations, the size of the equity premium at about 6 percent is consistent with the previously estimated parameters of prospect theory, assuming that investors are loss averse and that they evaluate their portfolios annually. Benartzi and Thaler believe that they have resolved the equity premium puzzle.

RATIONALE FOR THIS RESEARCH

Gneezy and Potters (1997) show, in an experiment, that the frequency of evaluation influences investment in risky assets and that risk aversiveness increases with evaluation frequency. The results are consistent with the myopic loss aversion hypothesis which predicts that investors will find risky options more attractive if they evaluate outcomes less frequently. In the experiment, two groups of participants are subjected to the same sequence of choices. The subjects in the high frequency group are supplied with feedback information after each round of the sequence. They can change their choice after each round. The subjects in the low frequency group are supplied with feedback information only after three rounds. They can change their choices only when three rounds are completed. Myopic loss aversion predicts that the low-frequency subjects would make more risky choices because when the subjects evaluate outcomes less frequently, risky options would become more favorable in terms of gains and losses.

Faced with a sequence of three independent but identical lotteries with a probability of $2/3$ to lose \$1 and a probability of $1/3$ to win \$2.50, myopic loss aversion hypothesizes that an individual will weigh losses more heavily than gains and the attractiveness of the lotteries may depend on whether the financial outcomes are evaluated separately or together. If the individual weighs losses relative to gains at a rate of $\lambda > 1$, then the expected utility of a single lottery is $(2/3)\lambda(-1) + (1/3)(2.5)$, which is positive only if $\lambda < 1.25$. However, if the individual evaluates the three lotteries together, then the expected utility is $(1/27)(7.5) + (6/27)(4) + (12/27)(0.5) + (8/27)\lambda(-3)$, which is positive if $\lambda < 1.56$. The reason is that the probability of a loss for a single lottery decreases from 0.67 to 0.30 ($0.67 \times 0.67 \times 0.67$) for three consecutive lotteries. If the financial outcomes of the three lotteries are evaluated together but not evaluated each separately, then the lotteries should become more attractive. Gneezy and Potters try to test this basic prediction of myopic loss aversion by manipulating the evaluation period of the subjects in an experiment. The results exhibit a clear treatment effect since the average bets for treatment L are larger than those for treatment H and it is statistically significant. It may be contended, though, that the subjects are students and that the effect are

lessened for professional traders. However, Haigh and List (2005) using traders recruited from the Chicago Board of Trade find that traders display behavior consistent with the prediction of myopic loss aversion to a greater, not lesser extent than students. With these findings, Haigh and List opine that expected utility theory may not model the behavior of professional traders well and that behavioral economics and finance models which relax inherent assumptions used in standard economics theories may be more credible.

Bellemare, Krause, Kröger and Zhang (2005) attempt, in an experiment, to unravel the entangled effects of information feedback and investment flexibility on the risk taking behavior of investors assumed to be myopically loss averse. They find that, contrary to the results of Langer and Weber (2008), altering information feedback alone is sufficient to make the loss averse investor to behave as predicted by the myopic loss aversion hypothesis. Experiments are commonly designed such that information feedback frequency and investment decision flexibility are altered at the same time. Bellemare, Krause, Kröger and Zhang created Treatment M in which the subjects are provided with low investment flexibility but more frequent information and are forced to experience the gains or losses for each round separately by requiring them to record their results on paper although they have to fix their bets for three rounds beforehand. They find that varying the information condition alone is sufficient to induce myopic loss aversion behavior. However, this result is in stark contradiction with that of Langer and Weber (2008) which show that the average percentage of bet in the corresponding Treatment M is significantly higher than that in Treatment H. Bellemare et al. (2005) suggest that this difference is due to the fact that Langer and Weber (2008) is using the “multiplicative approach” in which investors may reinvest their returns while they are using the “additive approach” consistent with the existing literature. However, Fellner and Sutter (2009) using the “additive approach”, identify the period of commitment as a crucial factor for the level of risky investments. They find that despite frequent information feedback, longer investment horizon alone may induce investors to make a higher level of risky investment. Therefore, it seems that the suggestion of Bellemare et al. (2005) is unlikely. Moreover, the subjects in both Langer and Weber (2008), and Fellner and Sutter (2009) in the corresponding Treatment M invest even more in the risky asset than in

Treatment L but they do not find a joint or cumulative effect of infrequent information feedback and long period of commitment. Instead, Langer and Weber (2008) find a strong and persistent interaction effect between information feedback frequency and period of commitment in which feedback frequency have a reverse effect on the percentage invested in the risky asset for the long period of commitment. This is surprising because frequency of information feedback is usually considered the driving force behind myopic loss aversion. Langer and Weber (2008) point out that limiting information feedback do not help people behave less myopically when decisions are made for a long period of commitment. They explain that when decision makers are bounded by a longer period of commitment, they have to take a more far-sighted view and with frequent information feedback, they would learn over time that occasional losses are more than compensated by larger gains.

Langer and Weber (2005) argue that the relation between myopia and the attractiveness of a lottery sequence is not as general as that suggested in the literature. They extend the concept of myopic loss aversion to myopic prospect theory and predict that, for some risk profiles, myopia will increase rather than decrease the attractiveness of an investment sequence. By incorporating diminishing sensitivity, an important aspect of prospect theory, in the gain and loss domain, Langer and Weber (2005) extend the concept of myopic loss aversion to myopic prospect theory and predict that myopic loss aversion is not unique in direction but depends on the risk profiles of investment options. For some risk profiles, reverse effects may be observed. Their predictions are supported by an experimental study. The experiment shows that myopia increases rather than decreases the willingness to invest for risk profiles having a 10% chance to lose the investment. They also notice that subjects seem to pay more attention to the probabilities of gaining and losing than the respective sizes of gains and losses, which is not compatible with prospect theory but agree with other literature (Lopes (1996) and Langer and Weber (2001)). It is demonstrated that the relation between information feedback frequency and risk taking behavior strongly depends on the risk profiles of lotteries.

Langer and Weber think that myopic loss aversion should not be applied to any economic scenario without discrimination. In reality, myopia increases rather than decreases

the willingness to invest in some situations. Langer and Weber (2005) provide experimental evidence for this fact. Moreover, it is shown that the effect that myopia decreases the willingness to invest can be predicted by a more comprehensive application of the prospect theory. Langer and Weber argue that loss aversion is just one concept of the prospect theory among others, such as diminishing sensitivity in the gain and loss domain and probability weighting. If the other concepts of the prospect theory are incorporated and myopic loss aversion is extended to myopic prospect theory, the effect of myopia will not be unidirectional but will depend on the risk profiles of investment options. As an illustration, a series of junk bond investments, each one with a very low probability of default but high losses in case of default, prospect theory predicts that the series look even more attractive when evaluated myopically.

This research is inspired by the finding that the myopic loss aversion effect is not unidirectional but depends on risk profiles of investment options. It is also inspired by the inconsistent experimental results that frequency of information feedback is the driving force behind myopic loss aversion. The research comprises an experiment and a semi-structured focus group. The experiment aims at exploring the myopic loss aversion effect with different risk profiles while the focus group is conducted for a better understanding of the way decisions under uncertainty are made.

THE EXPERIMENT AND SEMI-STRUCTURED FOCUS GROUP

This research was composed of an experiment and a semi-structured focus group. The design of the experiment basically followed that of Gneezy and Potters (1997) to ensure comparability with the existing literature. The experiment consisted of two sessions having the same subjects and the same procedures but with two different risk profiles. The first risk profile (risk profile G) was the same as that of Gneezy and Potters (1997) and served as the control experiment. The second risk profile (risk profile F) was the focus of this experiment and was one having reverse probabilities of the first with adjustment of the respective sizes of gains and losses in order to hold the expected value constant.

It was a straight forward 2 x 2 within-subject between-risk profile experimental design (see Table 1). The 36 subjects were equally and randomly assigned to two distinct treatments, Treatment H and Treatment L. In Part I of the experiment, the subjects in Treatment H were allowed to make decisions every round on the amount of bet out of the initial endowment and receive information feedback about the outcome of the lottery after each round while the subjects in Treatment L had to make identical and binding decisions for 3 rounds. The subjects could not bet on their total earnings from previous rounds. In Part 2 of the experiment, the subjects had to decide on the amount of bet for another 3 rounds but this time, they betted on their total earnings in Part 1. In the first session, the subjects in Treatment H betted in 9 rounds of a lottery which returned 2.5 times the bet with a $1/3$ probability and nothing (i.e. the subjects lost the bet) with a $2/3$ probability (risk profile G). The probabilities and payoffs are made known to the subjects before the experiment. The procedures in Treatment L were identical to Treatment H except that the subjects placed their bets in blocks of three rounds. In the second session, the subjects stayed in the same treatment and the probabilities were reversed i.e. the lottery returns 0.75 times the bet with a $2/3$ probability and nothing (i.e. the subjects lost the bet) with a $1/3$ probability (risk profile F). All treatments and sessions were run using pencil and paper.

Treatment L was in fact corresponding to Treatment M in Bellemare et al. (2005) since subjects received information feedback about the outcome of the lottery after each round. However, they were told not to calculate the gains or losses for each round but for three rounds as a whole.

The subjects were given initial endowments of 100 points for each round in Part 1. No monetary incentives were made to the subjects.

The experiment was conducted at the Hong Kong Shue Yan University and the participants were undergraduate students from the Accounting Class. A semi-structured focus group was conducted after the experiment. The 6 members of the focus group were equally and randomly selected from each treatment.

This was an explorative study of the myopic loss aversion effect using a small-scale laboratory experiment. The aim of this study is to develop a new theory explaining the

observation that a short evaluation period appears to make risky assets less attractive to investors, recognizing that existing prospect theory based explanations are not satisfactory.

Risk profile G served as the control experiment and it was expected that this control experiment could successfully replicate the results of Gneezy and Potters (1997), considering the fact that Langer and Weber (2005) also used only 36 subjects and replicated the results. A major difference was that the subjects here were exposed to the same information feedback frequency as those in Treatment H using an additive approach. The arrangement was designed to capture the important issue of whether myopic loss aversion effect was due to information feedback frequency or the period of commitment. It was believed that Fellner and Sutter (2009) were right to conclude that the period of commitment or investment horizon was a crucial factor for the level of risky investments. The fact that Bellemare et al. (2005) did not find subjects in Treatment M investing significantly higher than those in Treatment H might be due to the design that the subjects in Treatment M were forced to experience the gains or losses for each round. It was expected that in this control experiment, the subjects in Treatment L would invest a significantly higher proportion than those in Treatment H as they would calculate the combined gains or losses for 3 rounds.

An important goal of this research is to explore whether reverse probabilities (risk profile F) can induce a reverse myopic loss aversion effect, noticing the observation that the probabilities of gaining and losing are more important than the respective sizes of gains and losses (Lopes (1996), Langer and Weber (2001) and Langer and Weber (2005)). Since it is not unreasonable to assume that the myopic loss aversion effect is symmetrical for want of any information suggesting otherwise, the reverse probabilities are chosen to induce a reverse effect. Another major reason for choosing the reverse probabilities is that they are “in the middle” of the probabilities that were used in risk profile G and risk profiles H and J (in which the probability of gaining was 90% and the probability of losing was 10%) in Langer and Weber (2005) and presumably, we may get the information that has been missing for a long time. A minor reason is that they are never used in the relevant literature. The prediction was that for risk profile F, the myopic loss aversion effect would be reversed or at least less pronounced. A semi-structured focus group was also in place for an understanding of the

subjects' views on risk taking.

In order to make it simpler for analysis, the average percentages of bet in the lotteries for the two treatments are compared in blocks of three rounds. The average percentages of bet and the corresponding standard deviations (across individuals) for Part 1 are presented respectively for risk profiles G and F in Table 2 and Table 3. The average percentages of bet of all rounds are given at the final rows.

The treatment effect is significant at a confidence level of 95% for risk profile G as expected. For risk profile F, the treatment effect is less pronounced and thus is not significant. The non-parametric Mann-Whitney test is used because normal distribution of observations cannot be assumed as the lower-bound and upper-bound are respectively 0 and 100. The *z*-values are transformations of the Mann-Whitney *U*-values corrected for ties. One-tailed significance levels are reported because the alternative hypothesis predicts that the bets in one of the treatments will be larger while the null hypothesis predicts no significant difference.

For risk profile G, the average percentages of bet in each round are markedly higher for Treatment L than for Treatment H but the standard deviations (across individuals) are markedly lower for Treatment L than for Treatment H. For risk profile F, the average percentages of bet and the standard deviations (across individuals) for the two treatments are similar with the average percentage of bet slightly higher and the standard deviation (across individuals) slightly lower for Treatment H in Rounds 4-6. For risk profile G, the average percentages of bet are going from high to low for Treatment H but low to high for Treatment L, reflecting backward-looking behavior basing on information feedback. However, the pattern is not so clear for risk profile F as the average percentage of bet in Rounds 4-6 is lower than that in Rounds 1-3 for Treatment L. It is noticed that the average percentages of bet are generally lower for risk profile G than those for risk profile F for both treatments. It is also noticed that the average percentages of bet for both risk profiles in this experiment are generally higher than those in the relevant literature. The reason could be that the subjects did not take it very seriously because no monetary incentives were provided to them. However, the fact that the treatment effect is significant for the control experiment (risk profile G) indicates that it does not change the basic results of the experiment.

The average amount bet, average percentage of bet and average total earnings for Part 2 are summarized respectively for risk profiles G and F in Table 4 and Table 5. The difference between the average amount bet for Treatment L and that for Treatment H is very significant ($p = 0.015$) for risk profile G while the difference between average percentage bet and average total earnings are only marginally significant. The average amount bet, average percentage bet and average total earnings for risk profile F across treatments are similar.

The control experiment (risk profile G) successfully replicated the results of Gneezy and Potters (1997) as expected. Unlike Treatment M in Bellemare et al. (2005) (in which the gains and losses were calculated for each round separately), the gains or losses in this experiment were calculated for three rounds as a whole. It seems to indicate that the way gains and losses are calculated is instrumental in inducing the myopic loss aversion effect.

The myopic loss aversion effect did not reverse in risk profile F, but was much less pronounced. It appears that the myopic loss aversion effect is not symmetrical and may indicate that the myopic loss aversion effect is not a general phenomenon as concluded in Langer and Weber (2005). The result that the average percentages of bet for the two treatments are similar may be due to the fact that the reverse probabilities used are “in the middle of” those in risk profile G and risk profiles H and J in Langer and Weber (2005) because the results are “in the middle” of the myopic loss aversion effect and a reverse myopic loss aversion effect. That is, “middle” probabilities produce “middle” effect. It may suggest that the average percentages of bet and the probabilities of gaining and losing are somehow related. Considering that they were the same subjects in risk profile G, the result could not be attributed to individual differences. It is also unlikely that the result is due to maturation effects because the subjects do not need any skills for lottery games.

Students in the focus group were asked to answer some questions and were then allowed to discuss the subject freely. The focus group lasted for about 15 minutes.

The questions and the response are summarized in Table 5. Most subjects examined past outcomes and about half tried to find patterns from past outcomes. There were about half trend followers while some committed gambler’s fallacy by bucking the trend. All found a loss in the lottery game an unpleasant experience but they expressed that it would not affect

the decision on the amount of bet. Moreover, most thought that luck was crucial to winning. During free discussions, almost all expressed that they preferred a high probability of winning and low return (risk profile F type) lottery to a low probability of winning and high return (risk profile G type) lottery, which was consistent with the results of the experiment that the bets were generally higher in risk profile F for both treatments. A general observation was that almost all students agreed that the probability of winning (or the probability of losing) is more important than the return in the determination of the amount of bets.

The results of the experiment seem to confirm that the period of commitment is a crucial factor for the myopic loss aversion effect. It is congruent to the findings of Langer and Weber (2008), and Fellner and Sutter (2009). But it is contrary to the very idea of myopic loss aversion: loss aversion and mental accounting in the form of frequent evaluation – a kind of narrow bracketing. The idea is that losses loom larger than gains and when people evaluate frequently, a loss hurts more because it is not compensated by a larger gain. Rejecting a single play of the gamble, Samuelson's colleague expressed his feeling that “ I won't bet because I would feel the \$100 loss more than the \$200 gain”. Thaler (1999) interpreted it as loss aversion and commented that “Samuelson's colleague should accept any number of trials of this bet strictly greater than one *as long as he does not have to watch!*”. Hence, it is believed that the frequency of information feedback that determines the frequency of the experience of losses is the main driving force behind myopic loss aversion. However, this explanation is not consistent with the findings of Langer and Weber (2008), and Fellner and Sutter (2009). Langer and Weber (2008) even commented that people would learn over time that occasional losses would be more than compensated by larger gains. It is also not consistent with the findings of this research from the semi-focus group that unpleasant experiences from a loss will not affect risk taking behavior.

Although Bellemare et al. (2005) found that varying the information condition alone was sufficient to induce myopic loss aversion behavior, it was probably due to the fact that the subjects were forced to experience the gains or losses for each round separately, thus making them view each round of the lottery separately despite a longer period of commitment. In fact, slightly higher average percentages of bet for Treatment M than for Treatment H were

observed in the last three rounds. It appears that the subjects were picking up and given time, significantly higher average percentages of bet for Treatment M might be found. To sum up, it is likely that the myopic loss aversion effect is not derived from information feedback frequency.

According to (Read, Loewenstein and Rabin (1999), one of the determinants of bracketing is cognitive inertia, that is bracketing depends on presentation. People usually bracket choices narrowly or broadly as the problems are presented. It appears that in some situations, the difference between narrow and broad bracketing implies a shift in viewpoint, not more processing power. It is noticed that myopic loss aversion effect was not generally observed in Hopfensitz and Wranik (2008). While the reason is yet to be found, it is possible that the design of the experiment is responsible for the results in that questions are asked every three rounds for the most prominent emotion and evaluations of past and future rounds. Therefore, even if the period of commitment seems to be a natural bracket, it is likely that bracketing involves other aspects of experimental design that makes the subjects choose the viewpoint.

The myopic loss aversion explanation says that: a single play of a bet having a positive expected value is unattractive because a loss is multiplied by a loss aversion factor that is greater than 2, say 2.5, in a piecewise linear value function. The piecewise linear value function measures preferences based on the prospect theory and the multiplication makes it yield negative expected utility. If each play is viewed as a separate event, then two plays of the gamble will just double the negative expected utility and will be unattractive. However, if the two plays of the gamble are viewed as a combination, then the two-bet parlay will yield positive expected utility, making it more attractive. The parlay will be even more attractive as the number of bets increases (Thaler (1999)). Hence, the myopic loss aversion effect hinges on the size of the combined net gain on aggregation. But that is not what is observed in this research and other experiments in the literature (Lopes (1996), Langer and Weber (2001) and Langer and Weber (2005)).

For the real cause behind the myopic loss aversion effect, there are a few leads. One of the most important clues is the major result of this research that the myopic loss aversion

effect disappeared when using a different set of probabilities while holding everything else constant. Following the point mentioned above, the average percentages of bet for risk profile G for both treatments are generally lower than those for risk profile F as shown in Table 2 and Table 3. Moreover, the standard deviations (across individuals) for Treatment L are generally lower than those for Treatment H (except in rounds 4-6 of risk profile F) as shown in Table 2 and Table 3. They are not only observed here but are general phenomena in the relevant literature (Blavatsky and Pogrebna (2010)). As seen from Table 7, the average percentages of bet for risk profile G in Langer and Weber (2005) are lower than those in risk profiles H and J for both treatments. Furthermore, the average percentages of bet are lower for risk profile G than those for risk profile J for both treatments notwithstanding that risk profile G has a higher expected value. Hence, it appears that the sizes of gains and losses may not be the real concern in risk taking behavior.

For a direct comparison, the standard deviations (across individuals) for similar experiments in the literature are normalized by the average percentage of bet. They are summarized in Table 8. It is noted that the normalized dispersions are not only lower for Treatment L with regard to the overall bet but lower in every block of three rounds of every experiment! This cannot be easily explained by the attributes of subjects or the designs of the experiments and is obviously far from random. Therefore, it seems to be reasonable to assume that the subjects perceived a lower risk in Treatment L because more people would be ready to invest more in a lower risk environment than in a higher risk environment and at the same time, risk averse people would invest less in a higher risk environment while risk loving person would invest more. That is why dispersions are larger for Treatment H. This is consistent with the observation that people are more agreeable to taking a lower risk than a higher risk.

Another important point is the observation in Langer and Weber (2005) that people seem to pay more attention to the probabilities of gaining and losing than the respective sizes of gains and losses (also evident in the semi-structured focus group). In other words, people are more concerned about the probabilities and this is supported by the literature (Lopes (1996), Langer and Weber (2001) and Langer and Weber (2005)).

Finally, we will examine the case of Samuelson's Colleague (SC). The intuition behind loss aversion is the sentiment that a loss hurts more than a gain benefits you (Benartzi and Thaler (1995)). Therefore, SC's comment "I won't bet because I would feel the \$100 loss more than the \$200 gain" when he turned down the bet is usually emphasized while SC's another comment "But in a hundred tosses of a coin, the law of large numbers will make it a darn good bet. I am, so to speak, virtually sure to come out ahead in such a sequence" when he accepted 100 tosses is usually neglected. The first comment is about the sizes of gains and losses and the second is about the probabilities of gaining and losing. The fact that he accepted the sequence of bets and rejected one bet implies that SC was more concerned about the probabilities of gaining and losing. In fact, Samuelson was arguing that if SC did not accept one bet because of the relative sizes of gains and losses, it was irrational for SC to accept the series of bets because he would be compounding a mistake in that the maximum loss (the size of losses) was 100 times higher "even though the probability of any loss becomes gigantically tiny (less than 1 in a million)" (Samuelson 1963). Samuelson would have been right if SC was still concerned about the relative sizes of gains and losses but he was wrong because SC was no longer concerned about them as SC had shifted his viewpoint from one bet to a sequence of 100 bets and his concern from the sizes of gains and losses to the probabilities of gaining and losing. What Samuelson did not know is that SC would feel the pain of a loss because for one bet, SC considered a loss is imminent (50% chance) but for a large sequence of such bets, the probability of a loss is so small that SC did not envision a loss (indeed, the probability of a loss might have been truncated to zero in SC's mind) and the pain derived there from because SC was pretty sure that he would come out ahead (the probability of winning is higher than 0.99). That is the real reason he accepted the sequence of bets. This explanation is consistent with the findings of Wedell and Bockenholt (1994) that the subjects refused a single play but endorsed multiple plays like SC because they thought that "the chances of coming out ahead are high".

Hence, all the leads point to the same direction: perceived risk and probability.

In Klos, Weber and Weber (2005), it was found that the probability of a loss and coefficient of variation showed the highest correlations with judgments of perceived risk. It

was also found that the probability of loss is a unique risk measure. In fact, some subjects did not perceive a lottery without losses as risky (a result also observed in Weber, Anderson and Birnbaum (1992)). Moreover, Langer and Weber (2001) found that some subjects might use a maximum loss-probability rule in deciding whether to accept lottery portfolios. Inspired by these findings, the probability of a loss and the coefficient of variation are calculated for this experiment and the experiment in Langer and Weber (2005) and are presented with overall distribution of outcomes. They are exhibited in Tables 9-12. For Treatment H, the probability of a loss and the coefficient of variation are calculated according to the probabilities of gaining and losing and, the respective sizes of gains and losses for one round. For Treatment L, the probability of a loss and the coefficients of variation are calculated for the overall distribution of outcomes for three rounds as a whole. The coefficient of variation is the ratio of standard deviation to the expected value and is also known as unitized risk. It measures the tradeoff between risk and return.

As seen from Tables 9 and 10, both the probability of a loss and the coefficient of variation are much lower for Treatment L for risk profile G (control) but only slightly lower for risk profile F. However, Tables 11 and 12 show that the probabilities of a loss for both risk profiles H and J are much higher for Treatment L while the coefficients of variation are somewhat lower. It is reasonable to believe that the average percentages of bet are significantly higher for Treatment L for risk profile G (control) because the subjects perceived a much lower risk in terms of the probability of a loss and a much better risk-return tradeoff in terms of the coefficient of variation and, the average percentages of bet are similar for both treatments for risk profiles F because the subjects perceived similar probability of a loss and risk-return tradeoff. It is also reasonable to believe that the average percentages of bet are significantly higher for Treatment H for risk profiles H and J because the subjects perceived a much lower risk in terms of the probability of a loss, although Treatment L has a better risk-return tradeoff. Hence, the subjects may consider the probability of a loss more important in risky choice, which agrees with Roy's safety-first criterion for decision-making under uncertainty (Roy 1952).

Table 13 shows that the average percentages of bet in Treatment L are higher than those

in Treatment H in the first three rounds, indicating the influence of the period of commitment and forward-looking behavior. The reason could be that the period of commitment worked as a natural bracket and the subjects in Treatment L viewed three rounds as a whole and had intuitive feelings of the lower probability of a loss and coefficient of variation for Treatment L with respect to the overall distribution of outcomes for three rounds. However, since the probability of a loss and the coefficient of variation were not explicitly shown, the subjects could only estimate intuitively the magnitude of the two risk measures. Hence, the subjects had to adjust or update the average percentages of bet according to new evidence as the rounds went although they might not be calculating the joint probabilities in their heads. It is therefore reasonable to believe that the subjects were adjusting or updating the average percentages of bet using the information feedback. Truly, the table shows the influence of information feedback frequency and backward-looking behavior. It is noted that the average percentages of bet for Treatment L were increasing from the first three rounds onwards to the last three rounds while the pattern for Treatment H is not so straight forward, representing the higher risk and lower predictability involved. This explanation is consistent with the findings of Fellner and Sutter (2009) that both the period of commitment and information feedback frequency had almost the same influence on myopic loss aversion effect but the period of commitment is crucial to the level of risky investments. It is also consistent with the fact that they did not find a cumulative effect of the period of commitment and information feedback frequency.

Table 14 exhibits the average percentages of bet in ascending order in this research. It shows that the probability of a loss can predict the ordering generally but when the probabilities of a loss are similar and around 30%, the ordering of the average percentages of bet of 75.28, 86.30 and 89.35 must be determined by the coefficients of variation of 5.715, 4.950 and 2.858.

Table 15 shows that the probability of a loss can fully explain the ordering of the average percentages of bet for the same expected value in Langer and Weber (2005). The probability of a loss can also explain the ordering for risk profiles with same probabilities of gaining and losing, but when the probability of a loss is equal, the average percentages of bet

corresponding to lower coefficients of variation prevail.

Table 16 exhibits the average percentages of bet in ascending order in Langer and Weber (2005). It shows that the probability of a loss can predict the ordering generally but when the probabilities of a loss are equal at 0.271, the ordering of the average percentages of bet of 67.90 and 75.50 must be determined by the coefficients of variation of 5.691 and 1.324 and when the probabilities of a loss are equal at 0.100, the ordering of the average percentages of 76.10 and 82.40 must be determined by the coefficients of variation of 9.857 and 2.294. These predictions are made without reference to the treatment mode or the risk profile.

A simple relationship and a decision rule can be deduced from Tables 14-16: (1) both the probability of a loss and the coefficient of variation are inversely related to the average percentage of bet; (2) do the ordering using the probability of a loss first; (3) when the probabilities of a loss are equal or similar and around 30%, the average percentages of bet corresponding to lower coefficients of variation prevail.

Indeed, SC's rejection of a single toss and acceptance of 100 tosses can be explained simply by the fact that the probability of a loss of 50% for one toss is much higher than 30% and that the probability of a loss of less than 1% for 100 tosses is much lower than 30%.

If the results of myopic loss aversion experiments can be explained in terms of the probability of a loss and the coefficient of variation, the treatment mode is redundant, that is, as long as the overall distribution of outcomes are known, information feedback frequency and the period of commitment or time horizon are irrelevant and the ordering of the average percentage of bet can be determined without knowing the treatment mode. Moreover, this explanation may also be applied to risk taking behavior with respect to multi-play or repeated gambles and a sequence of non-identical lotteries.

Tables 14-16 also show that the average percentages of bet are much higher when the probability of a loss is lower than or around 30%. A review of the literature suggests that it may not be accidental. It can be shown that according to the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), the market in equilibrium implies a probability of loss of approximately 30% if the rate of return on a security is normally distributed and is perfectly correlated with the market return when the market price of risk is set at 0.5 (Sharpe (1965) and Laughhunn and Sprecher

(1977)). Sharpe (1965) analyzed 34 open-end mutual funds during the period from 1954 to 1963 and empirically estimated that the market price of risk ((expected market return - risk free rate of return)/ standard deviation) is approximately 0.576 standard deviation (or 19.64%) away from the mean which implied a probability of loss of about 0.304. The result is similar using the returns from 1926 to 1992 in Canner, Mankiw and Weil (1997).

The 30% probability of loss echoes in criminology as a critical level for Deterrence Tipping Effect. Tittle and Rowe (1974) found that crime rate was much lower and was negatively related to the certainty of arrest when the probability of arrest (a proxy for the certainty of punishment) is above 30% but not below. The concept of the “tipping point” is that the certainty of punishment will only have a deterrent effect when the police can make an arrest in at least 30% of all reported crimes. The probability of arrest is the probability of loss for criminals. Bailey (1976) and Brown (1981) confirmed the deterrence argument. Bailey (1976) also showed that different levels of arrest were required for different crimes. The intuition behind this finding is simple: criminals will not care about the punishment if they do not believe that they will be caught! (kind of “*catch me if you can*” psychology)

A RIVAL THEORY TO MYOPIC LOSS AVERSION TO EXPLAIN THE EQUITY PREMIUM PUZZLE

A new theory of risk taking called Viewpoint/Safety-first theory (V/SF theory) is proposed as a rival theory to myopic loss aversion to explain the equity premium puzzle. The V/SF can explain the so-called myopic loss aversion effect observed in GP-type experiments in which a short evaluation period appears to make risky assets less attractive to investors. The new theory will not only explain the ordering of the average percentages of bet in this research but also the ordering in other GP-type experiments. The V/SF theory is a descriptive theory of risk taking behavior and has three basic postulates:

1. The relativity of risk, that is, risk is not absolute but is relative to viewpoint.
2. Risky choice is a two-step process rather than a one-step process as presupposed in

other theories.

3. Risk taking behavior (especially those manifested in GP-type experiments) is consistent with the safety-first principle and the mean-variance efficiency approach.

After reviewing the empirical evidence from the experiment in this research and other GP-type experiments, it is believed that individuals decide on the amount of bet according to their viewpoints which correspond to ways of bracketing which in turn correspond to levels of risk. In other words, they decide on the amount of bet according to the level of risk and that their risk taking behavior can be explained in terms of risk aversion and is consistent with the safety-first principle and the mean-variance efficiency approach. With reference to the experimental data mentioned above, it appears that risky choice is a two-step process in which risk is regarded as probability of loss in the screening step and as coefficient of variation in the risk/return trade-off evaluation step. In the screening step, individuals will use a probability of loss acceptable to them to filter out those lotteries or gambles with higher probabilities of loss. In light of the research on deterrence, it appears that a probability of loss of 30% is normally adopted by individuals. Moreover, CAPM also imposes a probability of loss of 30%. The screening step can also be understood as the satisficing approach as advocated by Herbert Simon: satisfactory and accept the lotteries or gambles if the probability of loss is lower than or equal to a predetermined value or unsatisfactory and do not accept the lotteries or gambles if it is not lower than or equal to a predetermined value. In the risk/return trade-off evaluation step, individuals will choose the risky options with the lowest coefficient of variation or the highest reward-to-variability ratio or the Sharpe ratio with a zero risk-free rate, that is, minimization of the coefficient of variation or maximization of the reward-to-variability ratio or the Sharpe ratio. The two-step process is similar to Telser's safety first principle that the investor should maximize the expected return, subject to the constraint that the probability of loss is not greater than a predetermined value except that the expected return should be risk adjusted. The use of the probability of loss and the coefficient of variation by individuals in the two-step process is inspired by the conclusion of Klos, Weber and Weber (2005) that the probability of loss is a unique risk measure and that the

probability of a loss and coefficient of variation show the highest correlations with judgments of perceived risk. It is also inspired by the finding in Langer and Weber (2001) that some subjects may use a maximum loss-probability rule in deciding whether to accept lottery portfolios.

Viewpoint is influenced by the presentation mode or the design of the experiment. Evaluation frequency and period of commitment help form viewpoint which determines the amount of bet but they do not have separate influence on the amount of bet or risky behavior of individuals. Different risky choices are made under different presentation modes not because the presentation modes themselves but because the presentation modes help form viewpoint and viewpoint correspond to a particular risk level. That is why Langer and Weber (2008), and Fellner and Sutter (2009) do not find a joint or cumulative effect of infrequent information feedback and long period of commitment since what really matters is viewpoint, not evaluation frequency or period of commitment.

Specifically, for GP-type experiments with a probability of $\frac{2}{3}$ to lose the bet and a probability of $\frac{1}{3}$ to win 2.5 times of the amount betted, the probability of loss is 0.667 and the coefficient of variation is 9.900 when it is bracketed as one round while the probability of loss is 0.296 and the coefficient of variation is 5.715 when it is bracketed as three round. It is obvious that both the probability of loss and the coefficient of variation are significantly lower when the subjects view three rounds as one bet and wager significantly higher amounts. On the other hand, for GP-type experiments with reverse probabilities while holding the expected value constant as in this research, the probability of loss is 0.333 and the coefficient of variation is 4.950 when it is bracketed as one round while the probability of loss is 0.259 and the coefficient of variation is 2.858 when it is bracketed as three round. Since both the probability of loss and the coefficient of variation are similar with treatment L slightly lower, the amounts of the bets for both treatments are similar with treatment L slightly higher. Experimental designs other than evaluation frequency or period of commitment also affect viewpoint. For example, the subjects in the multiple period commitment and frequent feedback condition in the experiment in Langer and Weber (2008) view three rounds as one bet and wager significantly more but the subjects in treatment M in the experiment in

Bellemare et al. (2005) view three rounds as three bets and wager significantly less than those in treatment L because they are forced to experience the gains or losses for each round separately.

In sum, the V/SF theory stipulates that investors are rational and that they make risky choices in a two-step process according to the risks that are relative to their viewpoints. Hence, the V/SF theory is consistent with the expected utility hypothesis, the mean-variance rule and CAPM. Under the V/SF theory, the risk taking behavior of investors can be explained by the relativity of risk and risk aversion. Investors reject a single gamble with a positive expected value because, at a certain viewpoint which corresponds to a certain way of bracketing, the risk in terms of probability of loss or coefficient of variation is too high for them. They will reject or accept a series of gambles according to the risks that are relative to their viewpoints and the corresponding bracketing. Investors may reject the series of gambles even if they bracket them together, depending on the risk profiles of the gamble. In contrast, myopic loss aversion hypothesizes that investors are emotional individuals who are loss averse and that their risk taking behavior cannot be explained by mainstream economic theories. Under the myopic loss aversion hypothesis, investors reject a single gamble with a positive expected value due to the negative utility calculated from a loss-averse piecewise linear value function based on the prospect theory. Investors would still reject a series of gambles if they bracket each separately because the summation of negative utilities would still be negative. They will accept a series of gambles only if they bracket them together and get an overall positive utility. Investors will get an overall positive utility finally because, as gambles are added, the positive expected value of the gambles will eventually offset the negative utilities due to loss that are multiplied by the index of loss aversion no matter how loss-averse investors are, regardless of the risk profiles of the gambles. The idea of myopic loss aversion that people's willingness to accept risks will always increase with decreasing myopia is flawed. The myopic loss aversion hypothesis predicts a unidirectional negative effect and thus fails to predict the positive effect for specific risk profiles. The predictions are not satisfactory even if it is extended to myopic prospect theory as in Langer and Weber (2005). While the V/SF theory is greatly different from the myopic loss aversion hypothesis in explaining the risky choices of investors in that it

is mainly based on Economics rather than Psychology, there is one thing in common: the presentation mode of information and bracketing affect risk taking behavior. That is why the V/SF theory can explain the equity premium puzzle equally well as myopic loss aversion if an annual feedback of portfolio valuations is assumed.

The relativity of risk as postulated in the V/SF theory is likened to the relativity of time and space with respect to the frame of reference in Albert Einstein's theory of relativity in Physical Science. The frames of reference in the theory of relativity differ in velocity and the frames of reference in the V/SF theory differ in viewpoint and the corresponding bracketing. Under the theory of relativity, people see different time and space in different frames of reference. Under the V/SF theory, people see different risk in different frames of reference. There is no preferred frame of reference under both theories. In Treatment L of GP-type experiments, the viewpoint is in respect of 3 rounds. Yet there are viewpoints in respect of 4 rounds, 5 rounds, 6 rounds, 7 rounds, 8 rounds and 9 rounds, all with different probabilities of a loss and coefficients of variation corresponding to their overall distributions of outcomes leading to different levels of percentage of bet. In other words, every viewpoint has its own particular risk and it is meaningless to state risk without reference to the viewpoint and there is no objective basis to claim that one particular viewpoint is preferred to the others. Truly, the most salient feature of the V/SF theory is the introduction of the relativity of risk, that is, risk is not absolute but is relative to viewpoint.

There is an example illustrating different viewpoints in Finance. An American who trades (buy low sell high) Euros in the foreign exchange market buys Euros at USD1.33 and sells it at USD1.40. From the point of view of the American, it is a profit of 5.26% $((USD1.40 - USD1.33)/USD1.33)$ but from the point of view of a European (sell high buy low), it is a profit of 5.05% $((-EUR0.752 + EUR0.714)/-EUR0.752)$. Both percentages are correct. It is just different points of view. There is no objective basis to claim that the American viewpoint is preferred to the European viewpoint and vice versa.

The safety-first component of the V/SF theory is based on Roy's safety-first principle. Roy's safety-first principle says that the decision maker should minimize the probability for outcomes below a certain disaster level and if the probability is not available, maximize the

safety-first ratio which is the expected return minus the disaster level, and then divided by the standard deviation, assuming that the returns are normally distributed. Maximizing the safety-first ratio is equivalent to minimizing the probability of disaster because the best alternative is the one where the disaster level is the maximum number of standard deviations away from the mean. The criterion can be summarized as follows:

Minimize $\Pr(x \leq d)$ or

Maximize $(E(x) - d) / \sigma$

where $E(x)$ is the expected value of the return x and d is the disaster level (Roy 1952). When the disaster level d is zero, $\Pr(x \leq d)$ becomes the probability of a loss (that is $\Pr(x \leq 0)$ excluding $\Pr(x=0)$) and the safety-first ratio becomes the reciprocal of the coefficient of variation. Accordingly, the decision maker should minimize the probability of a loss or the coefficient of variation.

The V/SF theory stipulates that the ordering of the average percentages of bet can be predicted by first looking at the probability of a loss and then the coefficient of variation with respect to the viewpoints formed under the circumstances (Treatments H and L and other designs of the experiment) as it is. Alternatively, it is stipulated that the decision maker strives to optimize the risk-return tradeoff with limited information, subject to the threshold or tolerable probability of a loss with respect to the points of view formed under the circumstances. Under this theory, the levels of risk are different in different treatments because the overall distributions of outcomes with respect to the viewpoints are different. The risk-return tradeoff may be indicated by the coefficient of variation. The coefficient of variation is standard deviation divided by the expected value or the mean. Since the magnitudes of different sets of data are different, their standard deviations cannot be directly compared and must be comprehended with regard to the mean value. Taking an example, assuming that the standard deviations of two sets of data are the same, say 50, and the expected values or the means are respectively 25 and 10, the coefficients of variation are respectively 2 and 5. Although the standard deviations are the same, the first has a lower

unitized risk. In investment, the meaning is that on average, the first investment compensates two units of risk with one unit of return and the second investment compensates five units of risk with one unit of return and thus the first is a better bet.

The task of deciding the amount of bet in GP-type myopic loss aversion experiments may be seen as a problem-solving process. The decision maker will deal with the problem the way it is presented due to cognitive inertia. For GP-type problem, the period of commitment is usually the natural bracket. The decision maker will bracket each round as one bet in Treatment H but three rounds as one bet in Treatment L. Viewpoint corresponds to a certain way of bracketing which in turn corresponds to a certain level of risk in terms of the probability of a loss and the coefficient of variation pertaining to the one bet. In deciding the average percentages of bet, the decision maker will first assess intuitively the probability of a loss and then the coefficient of variation with regard to the overall distribution of outcomes of the one bet corresponding to the viewpoint. That is, the probability of a loss takes precedence over the coefficient of variation and the decision maker will think about the risk-return tradeoff only when the probability of a loss is tolerable. The tolerable probability of a loss is not identified in this research but it could be around 30% as indicated by the results in this research and the literature (Laughhunn and Sprecher (1977) and Tittle and Rowe (1974)). The V/SF theory stipulates that the subjects consider two types of risk: the probability of a loss and the coefficient of variation. The decision maker's emphasis on the probability of a loss in risk taking behavior is consistent with Roy's safety-first criterion. The coefficient of variation works as a tool for finding the best risk-return tradeoff. The relation between the coefficient of variation and risk-return tradeoff is such that the lower the coefficient of variation, the better the risk-return tradeoff.

Thus, a modification of Roy's safety-first criterion can explain the risk taking behavior in GP-type experiments and the V/SF theory may be presented as:

Minimize CV or maximize the risk-adjusted expected return

Subject to $\Pr(x < 0) \leq \alpha$

where CV is the coefficient of variation of the overall distribution of outcomes and $\Pr(x < 0)$ is the probability of a loss which is believed to be around 30% (or $\alpha \approx 0.3$).

Since the overall distribution of outcomes and the expected value and standard deviations of the lotteries are not explicitly given and the subjects can only estimate the probability of a loss and the coefficient of variation and update their estimates based on the experience of gains and losses, the data may not completely show this modification of Roy's safety-first criterion but it appears that it is the thinking of the subjects as seen from the results of this research. It also appears that the subjects, as reflected by the actual risk taking behavior, are cleverer than the safety-first criteria advocated by Kataoka and Telser that investors should maximize the lower limit and the expected return respectively subject to the constraint because the subjects are looking for mean-variance efficiency rather than just maximizing the lower limit and the expected return. In fact, they maximize the risk-adjusted mean return or the Sharpe ratio with a zero risk-free rate subject to a probability of loss of about 30%. To be more precise, the subjects first screen using the probability of a loss and then decide the amount of bet according to the mean-variance efficiency of each lottery and treatment. The screening step is similar to the satisficing approach advocated by Herbert Simon in that lotteries are accepted if they are below α , the pre-determined value of the probability of a loss and rejected if they are not. The V/SF theory recognizes that humans have a limited computational power. Since the probability of a loss and the coefficient of variation are not shown explicitly, the decision maker will need to "experience the probabilities of gaining and losing" in order to adjust or update the average percentages of bet accordingly.

Levy and Sarnat (1972) showed that expected utility principle was a special case of Roy's safety-first criterion and that the safety-first criterion and the mean-variance rule lead to the same results when the disaster level or the minimum threshold return level is equal to the return on riskless investment. Moreover, Levy and Levy (2009) proposed an expected utility - safety first (EU-SF) model. Laughhunn and Sprecher (1977) opined that probability of loss which is the probability that the outcome of a decision will fall at or below an undesirable reference outcome originated from Roy's safety-first criterion is a more fundamental risk

criterion. They showed that the valuation result for risky securities from CAPM can be given a probability of loss interpretation and according to CAPM, the market in equilibrium imposed a requisite probability of loss condition on the rate of return from owning a risky security. Sharpe (1965) analyzed the annual returns of 34 open-end mutual funds from 1954 to 1963 and estimated that the market price of risk $[(E(R_m) - R_F)/\sigma_m]$ is 0.576. With this market price of risk, the market imposes a probability of loss of about 30% ($50\% - 0.576 \times 34.1\% = 30.36\%$), assuming that the returns are normally distributed. It means that the probability of having a return lower than the risk-free rate is about 30%. Using the distribution of annual real or nominal returns from 1926 to 1992 as shown in Canner, Mankiw and Weil (1997), we get similar results (36.36% for real returns and 35.68% for nominal returns). Thus, the “safety-first” part of the V/SF theory is consistent with the expected utility hypothesis, the mean-variance rule and CAPM.

Deviations from the prediction of expected utility hypothesis are often described as “irrational” because they depend on the way the problem is presented, not on the actual probabilities of gains and losses involved. There is also a popular belief that it is irrational for people to change its decision under risk with different presentation modes. The V/SF theory argues that different presentation modes help form different viewpoints. Viewpoint corresponds to a certain way of bracketing and bracketing in turn corresponds to a certain level of risk. When a different viewpoint is formed, people will respond to different risk by changing its decision. In particular, it is viewpoint rather than evaluation frequency or period of commitment in GP-type experiments that has a dominant influence on bracketing and bracketing points to a certain level of risk. Different evaluation frequencies and periods of commitment in GP-type experiments help form different viewpoints. For example, low feedback frequency and longer period of commitment help form a longer term viewpoint so that the subjects see lower risk in terms of the probability of loss in the screening step and the coefficient of variation in the risk/return trade-off evaluation step and thus bet more. Whereas evaluation frequency and period of commitment could be natural brackets and help form viewpoint, they do not determine viewpoint. This can be seen from the fact that the subjects in Treatment M of Bellemare et al. (2005) do not form a long term viewpoint even though they

are provided with low investment flexibility but more frequent information because they are forced to experience the gains or losses for each round separately.

If it is accepted that there is no preferred frame of reference and that the risk associated with a certain viewpoint should be treated in the same way as the others, the whole theory will be consistent with the expected utility hypothesis, the mean-variance rule and CAPM. However, some have claimed that investors are irrational and mainstream economic theories with risk aversion cannot explain their risk taking behavior. The reason for the claim could be that mainstream economic theories presuppose that risk is absolute and that risky choice is a one-step process. It is obvious that viewpoint and bracketing are crucial in the V/SF theory. Once determined, risk and preference are almost automatic. While the V/SF theory is a descriptive theory, it is suggested that bracketing should be tied to the objective and that a total of 9 rounds should be viewed as a whole in GP-type experiments and bracket accordingly if the objective of the subjects is to maximize their risk-adjusted return for the whole lottery game but not for any one round.

There are other theories purporting to explain GP-type myopic loss aversion experiments. Langer and Weber (2005) successfully explained the reverse myopic loss aversion effect by extending myopic loss aversion to myopic prospect theory, using the concept of diminishing sensitivity. However, they were puzzled to find that the average percentages of bet were much higher than the prediction and that subjects seemed to pay more attention to the probabilities of gaining and losing than to the respective sizes of gains and losses, which was not compatible with prospect theory (but consistent with the V/SF theory). They were also surprised to observe a reversal for risk profile H while it is predicted by the V/SF theory.

Blavatsky and Pogrebna (2010) considered the Fechner model of random errors a possible explanation of the myopic loss aversion effect. The intuition behind the model is that an occasional error can reverse an individual's deterministic preference for betting a higher amount on a risky lottery. It is unlikely that an individual's deterministic preference will be reversed in Treatment L because a larger error is required as the stakes are three times higher than in Treatment H. It follows that the average percentage of bets in Treatment L will be

always higher than that in Treatment H. However, reverse effects were found for risk profiles H and J. Therefore, it is not a probable theory for the explanation of the myopic loss aversion effect.

Blavatskyy and Pogrebna (2010) also considered a financial asset pricing model as a tentative explanation of the professional traders' behavior in the experiment of Haigh and List (2005), assuming that the traders might frame the experiment in terms of the asset pricing model as they were used to this model owing to the nature of their profession and training. Again, the model cannot explain the reverse myopic loss aversion effect as manifested in risks profiles H and J while a lower probability of loss can easily explain the reverse effect as discussed above. Furthermore, although professional traders are likely to have studied asset pricing models and understand risk-return tradeoff, it is hard to assume that undergraduate students do not understand risk-return tradeoff intuitively. Moreover, it is well known that investment practitioners usually use technical analysis in their daily dealings instead of applying financial models. Indeed, the finding that intermediate bets of traders were significantly different across two treatments can be explained by the attribute of the traders that they were more sensitive to gains and losses and were more alert to the change of trend and did the updating of the average percentages of bet quicker than undergraduate students. In a word, professional traders are trend followers.

If the V/SF theory is correct, it can also predict risky choices involving repeated gambles. The V/SF theory recognizes that humans have a limited computational power and that people need the information on the overall distribution of outcomes to make better decisions. Redelmeier and Tversky (1992) reported that a sequence of lotteries was more attractive when presented in an aggregated mode than in a segregated mode. In a recent study, the opposite was found with different types of lotteries (Langer and Weber (2001)). While the researchers related their findings to framing effect, the explanation would be much simpler if it is recognized that rationality of individuals is limited by the information they have and when the information on the overall distribution of outcomes are provided to them, they make better decisions. In Redelmeier and Tversky (1992) the subjects knew intuitively that playing the gamble 5 times was a better bet than playing it once but they, with limited computational

power, did not realize that it was actually a far better bet (with the probability of a loss of 3%) until the overall distribution of the outcomes was provided and that was why the acceptance rate increased when presented in an aggregated form. Langer and Weber (2001) found the opposite with a loan lottery (low loss probability and high loss size) because the subjects realized that playing the gamble 5 times was a worse bet than they intuitively thought when the overall distribution of the outcomes was provided. Moreover, Benartzi and Thaler (1999) found that repeated gambles were more attractive when single trial loss was reduced but this was not true when explicit distribution of potential outcomes were provided. They saw it as a display of myopic loss aversion. The V/SF theory explains the plain fact that the subjects had limited computational power (the human mind is not supposed to do the calculations for the distribution of potential outcomes for gambles repeated for 90 times or more) and when explicit distribution of potential outcomes was provided to them, they made better decisions.

The V/SF theory can also contribute to crime prevention. According to the theory, information for rational and repeated crimes should be presented in a way to make would-be criminals bracket more broadly so that the probability of a loss will be close to or greater than 30%, although the probability of arrest is usually lower. The purpose is to put across a Chinese proverb to would-be criminals: 上得山多終遇虎 (literally you will be killed by a tiger eventually, if you go to the mountain many times), meaning that criminals will be caught eventually, if they committed crimes many times. The message is important because would-be criminals probably do not have the computational power to understand that the probability of arrest could be higher and above 30% when they commit crimes repeatedly even though the probability of arrest for a single crime is low.

The V/SF theory can explain the equity premium puzzle equally well as myopic loss aversion, assuming annual feedback of portfolio valuations. Unlike myopic loss aversion, it does not hinge on loss aversion and the value function of prospect theory. The V/SF theory is not based on prospect theory, cumulative prospect theory or myopic prospect theory. In fact, the results of this research and other GP-type experiments are not consistent with the myopic loss aversion hypothesis. The V/SF theory explains the equity premium puzzle that when decision makers choose a short-term viewpoint for risky securities with a risk profile like

equities, they will see the investment as more risky and thus will invest less. The difference of the V/SF theory with the myopic loss aversion hypothesis was that the myopic loss aversion hypothesis always favors long evaluation period while the V/SF theory predicts that when decision makers choose a short-term viewpoint for risky securities with a risk profile like junk bonds, they will see the investment as less, not more risky and thus will invest more. In other words, the V/SF theory implies that risk taking behavior depends on the viewpoint of the decision maker as well as the risk profile of the risky security.

The myopic loss aversion hypothesis fails to fully explain the results of GP-type experiments in that it always favors Treatment L. However, the average percentages of bet for the two treatments were not significantly different for risk profile F in this research and the average percentages of bet for Treatment H were significantly higher than Treatment L for profiles H and J in Langer and Weber (2005). Moreover, the myopic loss aversion hypothesis emphasizes the evaluation frequency but the results in this research and other GP-type experiments shows that the period of commitment is the natural bracket. Furthermore, Blavatskyy and Pogrebna (2010) reexamined the results of several recent experimental studies on an individual level and found that the intermediate bets across treatments for the majority of subjects were not significantly different and that was inconsistent with the hypothesis of myopic loss aversion.

As discussed above, the V/SF theory can satisfactorily explain GP-type experiments and explains the equity premium puzzle as well as the myopic loss aversion hypothesis but without its shortcomings. However, it could just be coincident, considering the small amount of data available. Moreover, this research does not aim at explaining other types of myopic loss aversion experiments (Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman and Schwartz (1997), and Gneezy, Kapteyn and Potters (2003)) because they are of a different design. Further research is needed to determine whether the V/SF theory can also explain them.

REFERENCES

- Arkes, H.R. and Blumer, C., 1985. The psychology of sunk cost. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 35(1), pp.124-140.
- Arzac, E. and Bawa V., 1977. Portfolio Choice and Equilibrium in Capital Markets with Safety-first Investors. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 4(3), pp.277-288.
- Bailey, W., 1976. Certainty of Arrest and Crime Rates for Major Felonies: A Research Note. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 13(2), pp.145-154.
- Bawa, V., 1975. Optimal rules for ordering uncertain prospects. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 2(1), pp.95-121.
- Bawa V., 1978. Safety-First, Stochastic Dominance, and Optimal Portfolio Choice. *Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis*, 13(2), pp.255-271.
- Bawa, V., Brown, S. and Klein, R., 1979. *Estimation risk and optimal portfolio choice*. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company.
- Bellemare, C., Krause, M., Kröger, S. and Zhang C., 2005. Myopic Loss Aversion: Information Feedback vs. Investment Flexibility. *Economics Letters*, 87(3), pp.319-324.
- Benartzi, S. and Thaler, R.H., 1995. Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 110(1), pp.73-92.
- Benartzi, S. and Thaler, R.H., 1999. Risk Aversion or Myopia? Choices in Repeated Gambles and Retirement Investments. *Management Science*, 45(3), pp.364-381.
- Benartzi, S. and Thaler, R.H., 2002. How much is investor autonomy worth? *The Journal of Finance*, 57(4), pp.1593-1616.
- Berkelaar, A.B., Kouwenberg, R. and Post, T., 2004. Optimal portfolio choice under loss aversion. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 86(4), pp.973-987.
- Blavatsky, P. and Pogrebna, G., 2010. Reevaluating evidence on myopic loss aversion: aggregate patterns versus individual choices. *Theory and Decision*, 68(1), pp.159-171.
- Brown, D.W., 1978. Arrest Rates and Crime Rates: When Does a Tipping Effect Occur? *Social Forces*, 57(2), pp.671-682.
- Brown, S.E., 1981. Deterrence and the tipping effect. *American Journal of Criminal Justice*,

- 6(2), pp.7-15.
- Brown, S., Goetzmann, W. and Ross S., 1995. Survival. *Journal of Finance*, 50(3), pp.853-873.
- Browne, S., 1995. Optimal investment policies for a firm with a random risk process: Exponential utility and minimizing the probability of ruin. *Mathematics of Operations Research*, 20(4), pp.937-958.
- Browne, S., 1997. Survival and growth with a liability: Optimal portfolio strategies in continuous time. *Mathematics of Operations Research*, 22(2), pp.468-493.
- Browne, S., 1999a. Beating a moving target: Optimal portfolio strategies for outperforming a stochastic benchmark. *Finance and Stochastics*, 3(3), pp.275-294.
- Browne, S., 1999b. Reaching goals by a deadline: Digital options and continuous time active portfolio management. *Advances in Applied Probability*, 31(2), pp.551-577.
- Browne, S., 1999c. The risk and rewards of minimizing shortfall probability. *Journal of Portfolio Management*, 25(4), pp.76-85.
- Camerer, C.F., Babcock, L., Loewenstein, G.F. and Thaler, R.H., 1997. Labor Supply of New York city Cab Drivers: One Day at a time. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 112(2), pp.407-441.
- Chiu, M.C., and Li, D., 2009. Asset-liability management under the safety-first principle. *Optimization Theory and Applications*, 143(3), pp.455-478.
- Cohen, J., Zinbarg, E. and Zeikel, A., 1977. *Investment Analysis and Portfolio Management*. 3rd ed. Illinois: Irwin.
- Constantinides, G.M., 1990. Habit Formation: A Resolution of the Equity Premium Puzzle. *The Journal of Political Economy*, 98(3), pp.519-543.
- Constantinides, G.M. and Duffie, D., 1996. Asset pricing with heterogeneous consumers. *Journal of Political Economy*, 104(2), pp.219-240.
- Constantinides, G.M., Harris, M. and Stulz, R.M., 2003. *Handbook of the Economics of Finance*. Elsevier.
- Coval, J.D and Shumway, T., 2005. Do Behavioral Biases Affect Prices? *The Journal of Finance*, 60(1), pp.1-34.

- Diecidue, E. and van de Ven, J., 2008. Aspiration level, probability of success and failure, and expected utility. *International Economic Review*, 49(2), pp.683-700.
- Einstein, A., 1954. *Ideas and Opinions*. New York: Random House.
- Einstein, A., 1961. *Relativity: The Special and the General Theory*. 15th ed. New York: Three Rivers Press.
- Elton, E.J. and Gruber, M.J., 1995. *Modern Portfolio Theory and Investment Analysis*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Epstein, L.G. and Zin, S.E., 1990. 'First Order' Risk Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle. *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 26(3), pp.387-407.
- Fellner, G. and Sutter, M., 2009. Causes, Consequences, and Cures of Myopic Loss Aversion - An Experimental Investigation, *Economic Journal*, 119(537), pp. 900-916.
- Ferson, W.E. and Constantinides, G.M., 1991. Habit Persistence and Durability in Aggregate Consumption Empirical Tests. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 29(2), pp.199-240.
- Fishburn, P., 1964. *Decision and Value Theory*. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.
- Follmer, H. and Leukert, P., 1999. Quantile hedging. *Finance and Stochastics*, 3(3), pp.251-273.
- Friedman, M. and Savage, L.J., 1948. The utility analysis of choices involving risk. *Journal of Political Economy*, 56(4), pp.279-304.
- Gneezy, U. and Potters J., 1997. An Experiment on Risk Taking and Evaluation Periods. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 112(2), pp.631-645.
- Gneezy, U., Kapteyn, A. and Potters J., 2003. Evaluation Periods and Asset Prices in a Market Experiment. *Journal of Finance*, 58(2), pp.821-837.
- Gourieroux, C., Laurent, J.P. and Scaillet, O., 2000. Sensitivity analysis of values at risk. No 2000002, *Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales)*, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- Gourville, J.T. and Soman, D., 1998. Payment depreciation: the effects of temporally separating payments from consumption. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 25(2), pp.160-174.

- Grasmick, H.G. and Bryjak, G.J., 1980. The Deterrent Effect of Perceived Severity of Punishment. *Social Forces*, 59(2), pp.471-491.
- Gressis, N. and Remaley, W.A., 1974. Comment: "Safety First—An Expected Utility Principle". *Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis*, 9(6), pp.1057-1061.
- Hadar, J. and Russell, W., 1969. Rules for Ordering Uncertain Prospects. *The American Economic Review*, 59(1), pp.25-34.
- Hadar, J. and Russell, W., 1971. Stochastic Dominance and Diversification. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 3(3), pp.288-305.
- Haigh, M. and List, J.A., 2005. Do professional traders exhibit myopic loss aversion? *Journal of Finance*, 60(1), pp.523-523.
- Haley, M., 2003. *On the allocations of crops and stocks*. Doctoral dissertation. University of Iowa.
- Haley, M. and McGee, M., 2006. Tilting Safety First and the Sharpe Portfolio. *Finance Research Letters*, 3(3), pp.173-180.
- Haley, M. and Whiteman, C., 2008. Generalized safety first and a new twist on portfolio performance. *Econometric Reviews*, 27(4), pp.457-483.
- Hammond III, J., 1974. Simplifying the Choice between Uncertain Prospects Where Preference Is Nonlinear. *Management Science*, 20(7), pp.1047-1072.
- Hanoch, G. and Levy H., 1969. The Efficiency Analysis of Choices Involving Risk. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 36(3), pp.335-346.
- Heath, C. and Soll, J.B., 1996. Mental accounting and consumer decisions. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 23(1), pp.40-52.
- Heiman, G.W., 1996. *Basic Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences*. 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Herrnstein, R.J., 1982. Stimuli and the Texture of Experience. *Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews*, 6(1), pp.105-117.
- Herrnstein, R.J., Loewenstein, G.F., Prelec, D. and Vanghan, W., 1993. Utility Maximization and Melioration: internalities in Individual Choices. *Journal of Behavioral Decision*, 6(3), pp.149-185.

- Hinkle, D.E., Wiersma, W. and Jurs, S.G., 1998. *Applied Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences*. 4th ed. Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin.
- Hopfensitz, A. and Wranik, T., 2008. Psychological and environmental determinants of myopic loss aversion. *MPRA Paper* 9305, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Howard, D.A., 2005. Albert Einstein as a Philosopher of Science. *Physics Today*, 58(12), pp.34-40.
- Howell, D., 1999. *Fundamental Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences*. 4th ed. Pacific Grove, CA: Duxbury Press.
- Hsee, C.K., 1996. The Evaluability Hypothesis: An Explanation of Preference Reversals between Joint and Separate Evaluations of Alternatives. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 67(3), pp.247-257.
- Hsee, C.K., Loewenstein, G.F., Blount, S. and Bazerman, M.H., 1999. Preference Reversals between Joint and Separate Evaluation of Options: A Theoretical Analysis. *Psychological Bulletin*, 125(5), pp.576-590.
- Jaccard, J. and Becker, M., 2002. *Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences*. 4th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning.
- Jackson, F. and Pargetter, R., 1977. Relative Simultaneity in the Special Relativity *Philosophy of Science*, 44(3), pp.464-474.
- Jansen, D.W., Koedijk, K.G. and DeVries, C.G., 2000. Portfolio selection with limited downside risk, *Journal of Empirical Finance*, 7(3-4), pp.247-269.
- Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A., 1979. Prospect theory of decisions under risk. *Econometrica*, 47(2), pp.263-291.
- Kahneman, D. and Lovallo, D., 1993. Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking. *Management Science*, 39(1), pp.17-31.
- Kahneman, D. Tversky, A., 2000. *Choices, Values, and Frames*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kataoka, S., 1963. A Stochastic Programming Model. *Econometrica*, 31(1/2), pp.181-196.
- Keller, L. R., Sarin, R.K. and Weber, M., 1986. Empirical investigation of some properties of the perceived riskiness of gambles. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision*

- Processes*, 38(1), pp.114-130.
- Klos, A., Weber, E.U. and Weber, M., 2005. Investment Decisions and Time Horizon: Risk Perception and Risk Behavior in Repeated Gambles *Management Science*, 51(12), pp.1777-1790.
- Kritzman, M., 1994. What practitioners need to know about time diversification. *Financial Analysts Journal*, 50(1), pp.14-18.
- Langer, T. and Weber, M., 2001. Prospect Theory, Mental Accounting, and Differences in Aggregated and Segregated Evaluation of Lottery Portfolios. *Management Science*, 47(5), pp.716-733.
- Langer, T. and Weber M., 2005. Myopic Prospect Theory vs. Myopic Loss Aversion: How General is the Phenomenon? *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 56(1), pp.25-38.
- Langer, T. and Weber M., 2008. Does commitment or feedback influence myopic loss aversion? : An experimental analysis. *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 67(3-4), pp.810-819.
- Laughunn, D.J. and Sprecher, C. R., 1977. Probability of Loss and the Capital Asset Pricing Model. *Financial Management*, 6(1), pp.18-25.
- Levy, H., 2006. *Stochastic Dominance: Investment Decision Making Under Uncertainty*. New York: Springer.
- Levy, H. and Levy, M., 2009. The safety first expected utility model: Experimental evidence and economic implications. *Journal of Banking & Finance*, 33(8), pp.1494-1506.
- Levy, H. and Sarnat, M., 1972. Safety first: An expected utility principle. *Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis*, 7(3), pp.1829-1834.
- Li, Z., Yao, J. and Li, D., 2010. Behavior patterns of investment strategies under Roy's safety-first principle. *The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance*, 50(2), pp.167-179.
- Loewenstein, G.F. and Elster, J., 1992. *Choice Over Time*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Looney, C.A. and Hardin, A.M., 2009. Decision Support for Retirement Portfolio

- Management: Overcoming Myopic Loss Aversion via Technology Design. *Management Science*, 55(10), pp.1688-1703.
- Lopes, L. and Oden, G.C., 1999. The role of aspiration level in risky choice: A comparison of cumulative prospect theory and SP/A theory. *Journal of Mathematical Psychology*, 43(2), pp.286-313.
- Lopes, L.L., 1996. When time is of the essence: Averaging, aspiration, and the short run. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 65(3), pp.179-189.
- MaCurdy, T. and Shoven, J., 1992. Accumulating Pension Wealth with Stocks and Bonds. *Stanford University Working Paper*.
- Mankiw, N.G. and Zeldes, S.P., 1991. The Consumption of Stockholders and Non-stockholders. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 29(1), pp.97-112.
- Margenau, H. and Mould, R. A., 1957. Relativity: An Epistemological Appraisal *Philosophy of Science*, 24(4), pp.297-307.
- Mark Kritzman, M., 1994. What Practitioners Need to Know about Time Diversification. *Financial Analysts Journal*, 50(1), pp.14-18.
- Markowitz, H.M., 1959. *Portfolio Selection: Efficient Diversification of Investments*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Marschak, J., 1950. Rational Behavior, Uncertain Prospects, and Measurable Utility. *Econometrica*, 18, pp.111-141.
- Mehra, R. and Prescott, E.C., 1985. The equity premium: A puzzle. *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 15(2), pp.145-161.
- Merton, R.C., 1969. Lifetime portfolio selection under uncertainty: The continuous time case. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 51(3), pp.247-257.
- Merton, R.C., 1971. Optimum consumption and portfolio rules in a continuous-time model. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 3(4), pp.373-413.
- Odean, T., 1998. Volume, volatility, price and profit when all traders are above average. *Journal of Finance*, 53(6), pp.1887-1934.
- Powers, J., 1982. *Philosophy and the new Physics*. London: Methuen.
- Pyle, D.H. and Turnovsky, S.J., 1970. Safety-First and Expected Utility Maximization in

- Mean-Standard Deviation Portfolio Analysis. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 52(1), pp.75-81.
- Quirk, J. and Saposnik, R., 1962. Admissibility and Measurable Utility Functions. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 29(2), pp.140-146.
- Rabin, M., 2000. Risk aversion and expected utility theory: A calibration result. *Econometrica*, 68(5), pp.1281-1292.
- Read, D. and Loewenstein, G., 1995. Diversification Bias: Explaining the Discrepancy in Variety Seeking Between Combined and Separated Choices. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied*, 1(1), pp.34-49.
- Read, D., Loewenstein, G. and Rabin, M., 1999. Choice Bracketing. *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, 19(1-3), pp.171-197.
- Redelmeier, D.A. and Tversky, A., 1992. On the Framing of Multiple Prospects. *Psychological Science*, 3(3), pp.191-193.
- Reitz, T.A., 1988. The Equity Risk Premium: A solution. *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 22(1), pp.117-131.
- Roy, A.D., 1952. Safety First and the Holding of Assets. *Econometrica*, 20(3), pp.431-449.
- Roy, A.D., 1956. Risk and rank or safety first generalized. *Econometrica*, 23(91), pp.214-228.
- Roy, S., 1995. Theory of dynamic portfolio choice for survival under uncertainty. *Mathematical Social Sciences*, 30(2), pp.171–194.
- Samuelson, P.A., 1963. Risk and Uncertainty: A Fallacy of Large Numbers. *Scientia*, 98, pp.108-113.
- Samuelson, P.A., 1969. Lifetime portfolio selection by dynamic stochastic programming. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 51(3), pp.239-246.
- Shackle, G.L.S., 1949. *Expectation in Economics*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Sharpe, W.F., 1965. Risk-Aversion in the Stock Market: Some Empirical Evidence. *The Journal of Finance*, 20(3), pp.416-422.
- Sharpe, W.F., 1966. Mutual fund performance. *Journal of Business*, 39(1), pp.119-138.
- Sharpe, W.F., 1994. The Sharpe ratio. *Journal of Portfolio Management*, 21(1), pp.49-58.

- Shefrin, H.M. and Statman, M., 1984. Explaining investor preference for cash dividends. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 13(2), pp.253-282.
- Shefrin, H.M. and Statman, M., 2000. Behavioral portfolio theory. *Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis*, 35(2), pp.127-151.
- Shefrin, H.M. and Thaler, R.H., 1988. The behavioral life-cycle hypothesis. *Economic Inquiry*, 26(4), pp.609-643.
- Siegel, J.J., 1992. The Equity Premium: Stock and Bond Returns since 1802. *Financial Analysts Journal*, 48(1), pp.28-38.
- Siegel, J.J., 1992. The real rate of interest from 1800-1990: A study of the U.S. and the U.K. *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 29(2), pp.227-252.
- Siegel, L.J., 2009. *Criminology*. 10th ed. CA: Wadsworth.
- Simon, H., 1955. A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 69(1), pp.99-118.
- Simonson, I., 1990. The Effect of Purchase Quantity and Timing on Variety Seeking Behavior. *Journal of Marketing Research*, 27(2), pp.150-162.
- Simonson, I. and Winer, R.S., 1992. The Influence of Purchase Quantity and Display Format on Consumer Preference for Variety. *The Journal of Consumer Research*, 19(1), pp.133-138.
- Sprecher, C.R. and Pertl, M.A., 1980. Risk Retention and the Market Implied Probability of Loss. *The Journal of Risk and Insurance*, 47(2), pp.279-290.
- Stutzer, M., 2000. A portfolio performance index. *Financial Analyst Journal*, 56(3), pp.52-61.
- Stutzer, M., 2003. Portfolio choice with endogenous utility: A large deviations approach. *Journal of Econometrics*, 116(1), pp.365-386.
- Telser, L.G., 1955-1956. Safety First and Hedging. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 23(1), pp.1-16.
- Thaler, R.H., 1999. Mental Accounting Matters. *Journal of Behavioral Decision Making*, 12(3), pp.183-206.
- Thaler, R.H., Tversky, A., Kahneman, D. and Schwartz, A., 1997. The effect of myopia and loss aversion on risk taking: An experimental test. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*,

112(2), pp.647-661.

- Thaler, R.H. and Johnson, E.J., 1990. Gambling with the House Money and Trying to Break Even: The Effects of Prior Outcomes on Risky Choice. *Management Science*, 36(6), pp.643-660.
- Tittle, C.R. and Rowe, A.R., 1974. Certainty of Arrest and Crime Rates: A Further Test of the Deterrence Hypothesis. *Social Forces*, 52(4), pp.455-462.
- Tobin, J., 1958. Liquidity preference as Behavior toward Risk. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 25(2), pp.65-86.
- Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D., 1981. The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice. *Science, New Series*, 211(4481), pp.453-458.
- Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D., 1992. Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty. *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, 5(4), pp.297-323.
- Venkatraman, S., Aloysius, J.A. and Davis, F.D., 2006. Multiple prospect framing and decision behavior: The mediational roles of perceived riskiness and perceived ambiguity. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 101(1), pp.59-73.
- Vickson, R.G., 1975. Stochastic Dominance for Decreasing Absolute risk Aversion. *Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis*, 10(5), pp.799-811.
- Vickson, R.G., 1975. Stochastic Dominance Tests for Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion. I. Discrete Random Variables. *Management Science*, 21(12), pp.1438-1446.
- Vickson, R.G., 1977. Stochastic Dominance Tests for Decreasing Absolute Risk-Aversion II: General Random Variables. *Management Science*, 23(5), pp.478-489.
- Von Neumann, J. and O. Morgenstern., 1947. *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Weber, E.U., Anderson, C.J. and Birnbaum, M.H., 1992. A Theory of perceived risk and attractiveness. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 52(3), pp.492-523.
- Weber, E.U., Shafir, S. and Blais, A., 2004. Predicting risk-sensitivity in humans and lower animals: Risk as variance or coefficient of variation. *Psychological Review*, 111(2), pp.430-445.

- Wedell, D. and Böckenholt, U., 1994. Contemplating single versus multiple encounters of a risky prospect. *The American Journal of Psychology*, 107(4), pp.499-518.
- Weil, P., 1989. The Equity Premium Puzzle and the Risk-free Rate Puzzle. *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 24(3), pp.401-421.
- Whitmore, G.A., 1970. Third Order Stochastic Dominance. *American Economic Review*, 60, pp.457-459.
- Yaari, M.E., 1987. The Dual Theory of Choice Under Risk. *Econometrica*, 55(1), pp.95-115.

APPENDIX I

List of Tables

Table 1
Experimental design

Risk Profile	Treatment H	Treatment L
1st session - G (1/3, 2.50); (2/3, -1)	18	18
2nd session - F (2/3, 0.75); (1/3, -1)	18	18

Table 2
Part 1
Average Percentage of Bet (Risk Profile G)

	Treatment H^a	Treatment L^a	Mann-Whitney z^b
Rounds 1-3	65.93 (29.97)	68.33 (27.06)	-0.25 (0.401)
Rounds 4-6	57.83 (30.14)	76.11 (21.68)	-1.84 (0.033)
Rounds 7-9	57.06 (37.32)	81.39 (24.84)	-1.99 (0.023)
Rounds 1-9	60.27 (25.93)	75.28 (18.74)	-1.87 (0.031)

a. # obs. = 18 for both treatments. Standard deviations (across individuals) are in parentheses.

b. One-tailed significance levels (*p*-values) are in brackets.

Table 3
Part 1
Average Percentage of Bet (Risk Profile F)

	Treatment H^a	Treatment L^a	Mann-Whitney z^b
Rounds 1-3	84.07 (19.18)	88.89 (19.06)	-0.93 (0.176)
Rounds 4-6	86.48 (22.28)	85.56 (25.02)	-0.28 (0.390)
Rounds 7-9	88.33 (14.38)	93.61 (13.70)	-1.19 (0.117)
Rounds 1-9	86.30 (17.26)	89.35 (14.72)	-0.47 (0.319)

a. # obs. = 18 for both treatments. Standard deviations (across individuals) are in parentheses.

b. One-tailed significance levels (*p*-values) are in brackets.

Table 4
Part 2
Average Amount Bet, Average Percentage Bet and Average Total Earnings
(Risk profile G)

	Treatment H^a	Treatment L^a	Mann-Whitney z^b
Amount bet (Y)	393.74 (307.65)	593.89 (427.95)	-2.18 (0.015)
Percentage bet (F)	40.27 (35.74)	57.74 (39.78)	-0.98 (0.164)
Total earnings (parts 1 and 2)	965.40 (539.25)	1154.35 (732.08)	-0.63 (0.264)

a. # obs. = 18 for both treatments. Standard deviations (across individuals) are in parentheses.

b. One-tailed significance levels (*p*-values) are in brackets.

Table 5
Part 2
Average Amount Bet, Average Percentage Bet and Average Total Earnings (Risk profile F)

	Treatment H^a	Treatment L^a	Mann-Whitney z^b
Amount bet (Y)	792.53 (249.01)	757.67 (375.61)	-0.25 (0.401)
Percentage bet (F)	77.50 (26.26)	73.62 (34.67)	0.30 (0.382)
Total earnings (parts 1 and 2)	1108.61 (460.45)	1207.39 (521.97)	-0.25 (0.401)

a. # obs. = 18 for both treatments. Standard deviations (across individuals) are in parentheses.

b. One-tailed significance levels (*p*-values) are in brackets.

Table 6
Semi-structured Focus Group

Questions	Response
1. How did you determine the amount of bet for each round? Did you have any strategy?	2 - committed gambler's fallacy by bucking the trend 2 - higher amount of bet for higher probability of winning 1 - all in no matter what 1 - bet arbitrarily, stakes were about half the endowment
2. Did you examine past outcomes and see any patterns? Did you try to predict future outcomes based on what you come up with?	Most examined past outcomes and about half tried to find patterns from past outcomes
3. Did you believe that the chance of losing in the lottery for each round was higher than the objective probability of two-thirds? In other words, did you see losing as a trend or a run of bad luck?	4 - thought it's luck 2 - thought there were trends or patterns
4. Did you find a loss in the lottery game an unpleasant experience? Did this kind of unpleasant experience affects your decision and make you bet a smaller amount?	All found a loss in the lottery game an unpleasant experience but they expressed that it did not affect the decision on the amount of bet
5. Are you familiar with the probability theory? Do you think it holds true this time?	All understood probability theory and most believed that outcomes were random and consistent with probability theory

Table 7
Average Percentage of Bet in Langer and Weber (2005)

	Risk Profile G		Risk Profile H		Risk Profile J	
Treatment	H	L	H	L	H	L
Overall	44.6	59.9	82.4	75.5	76.1	67.9

Table 8
Normalized Standard Deviation (across individuals) (Risk Profile G)

	Gneezy and Potters (1997)		Haigh and List (2005)		Haigh and List (2005)-Traders		This experiment	
Treatment	H	L	H	L	H	L	H	L
Rounds 1-3	0.58	0.44	0.73	0.46	0.63	0.33	0.45	0.40
Rounds 4-6	0.67	0.48	0.59	0.43	0.85	0.26	0.52	0.28
Rounds 7-9	0.53	0.41	0.49	0.39	0.70	0.27	0.65	0.31
Rounds 1-9	0.53	0.41	0.60	0.42	0.72	0.26	0.43	0.25

Table 9
Overall Distribution of Outcomes
Risk Profile G (Control)

Treatment H		Treatment L	
Probability	Amount	Probability	Amount
0.333 (1/3) chance to gain	2.50 times of the bet	0.037 (1/27) chance to gain	7.50 times of 1 bet
0.667 (2/3) chance to lose	1.00 times of the bet (all the bet)	0.222 (6/27) chance to gain	4.00 times of 1 bet
		0.445 (12/27) chance to gain	0.50 times of 1 bet
		0.296 (8/27) chance to lose	3.00 times of 1 bet (all the bet)
Probability of a loss = 0.667		Probability of a loss = 0.296	
Coefficient of variation = 9.900		Coefficient of variation = 5.715	

Table 10
Overall Distribution of Outcomes
Risk Profile F

Treatment H		Treatment L	
Probability	Amount	Probability	Amount
0.667 (2/3) chance to gain	0.75 times of the bet	0.037 (1/27) chance to gain	7.50 times of 1 bet
0.333 (1/3) chance to lose	1.00 times of the bet (all the bet)	0.222 (6/27) chance to gain	4.00 times of 1 bet
		0.445 (12/27) chance to gain	0.50 times of 1 bet
		0.296 (8/27) chance to lose	3.00 times of 1 bet (all the bet)
Probability of a loss = 0.333		Probability of a loss = 0.259	
Coefficient of variation = 4.950		Coefficient of variation = 2.858	

Table 11
Overall Distribution of Outcomes
Risk Profile H in Langer and Weber (2005)

Treatment H		Treatment L	
Probability	Amount	Probability	Amount
0.9 chance to gain	0.30 times of the bet	0.729 chance to gain	0.90 times of 1 bet
0.1 chance to lose	1.00 times of the bet (all the bet)	0.243 chance to lose	0.40 times of 1 bet
		0.027 chance to lose	1.70 times of 1 bet
		0.001 chance to lose	3.00 times of 1 bet (all the bet)
Probability of a loss = 0.100		Probability of a loss = 0.271 (0.243 + 0.027 + 0.001)	
Coefficient of variation = 2.294		Coefficient of variation = 1.324	

Table 12
Overall Distribution of Outcomes
Risk Profile J in Langer and Weber (2005)

Treatment H		Treatment L	
Probability	Amount	Probability	Amount
0.9 chance to gain	0.15 times of the bet	0.729 chance to gain	0.45 times of 1 bet
0.1 chance to lose	1.00 times of the bet (all the bet)	0.243 chance to lose	0.70 times of 1 bet
		0.027 chance to lose	1.85 times of 1 bet
		0.001 chance to lose	3.00 times of 1 bet (all the bet)
Probability of a loss = 0.100		Probability of a loss = 0.271 (0.243 + 0.027 + 0.001)	
Coefficient of variation = 9.857		Coefficient of variation = 5.691	

Table 13
Average Percentage of Bet (Risk Profile G)

	Gneezy and Potter (1997)		Haigh and List (2005)		Haigh and List (2005)-Traders		Bellemare et al. (2005)	
Treatment	H	L	H	L	H	L	H	L
Rounds 1-3	52.0	66.7	42.77	56.50	48.85	66.22	56.6	63.9
Rounds 4-6	44.8	63.7	51.77	62.72	39.10	75.56	60.6	72.7
Rounds 7-9	54.7	71.9	58.13	68.28	48.83	81.41	61.4	76.6
Rounds 1-9	50.5	67.4	50.89	62.50	45.59	74.29	59.5	71.1

Table 14
Relationship Between Average Percentage of Bet and Probability of Loss, and Average percentage of bet and Coefficient of variation in this Research

Average percentage of bet	Probability of a loss	Coefficient of variation
60.27	0.667	9.900
75.28	0.296	5.715
86.30	0.333	4.950
89.35	0.259	2.858

Table 15

Relationship Between Average Percentage of Bet and Probability of Loss, and Average percentage of bet and Coefficient of variation in Langer and Weber (2005)

Same Expected Value			Same Probabilities		
Average percentage of bet	Probability of loss	Coefficient of variation	Average percentage of bet	Probability of loss	Coefficient of variation
44.60	0.667	9.900	67.90	0.271	5.691
59.90	0.296	5.715	75.50	0.271	1.324
75.50	0.271	1.324	76.10	0.100	9.857
82.40	0.100	2.294	82.40	0.100	2.294

Table 16

Relationship Between Average Percentage of Bet and Probability of Loss, and Average percentage of bet and Coefficient of variation in Langer and Weber (2005)

Average percentage of bet	Probability of a loss	Coefficient of variation
44.60	0.667	9.900
59.90	0.296	5.715
67.90	0.271	5.691
75.50	0.271	1.324
76.10	0.100	9.857
82.40	0.100	2.294

The Impact of Liquidity in Explaining the Differences in Returns for Direct and Indirect Property Investment in Hong Kong

Lam Chun-mo
The Open University of Hong Kong
Email: cmlam@ouhk.edu.hk

1. INTRODUCTION

Although there is a general conclusion that real estate property provides an important role in portfolio diversification, the findings about the superior risk-adjusted return for direct real estate investment over indirect real estate investment in property¹ stocks is inconsistent with the implication from the Efficient Market Hypothesis. The arbitrage mechanism implies that any asset that offers abnormal investment performance should be short lived. Although market sentiment or other psychological factors may cause the existence of abnormal return for assets in the short run, it is impossible for real estate to possess abnormal return in the long run if all aspects of the risk or peculiarities for investing in an asset are taken into account. This paper examines the long run investment performance of real estate and property stocks in Hong Kong by taking into account the impact of illiquidity.

Risk and Return of Direct Real Estate Investment

Sirmans and Sirmans (1987); Norman, Sirmans and Benjamin (1995); Chiang (1997); Seiler, Webb and Myer (1999); Benjamin, Sirmans and Zietz (2001); and Lam (2006) provide comprehensive review of the investment performance of real estate versus other assets. Most of these overseas studies report that the real estate property commands a higher risk-adjusted return than the financial assets.

There are a number of studies to compare the investment performance of real estate and

¹ Property, real estate or direct property refers to the physical property in this paper. Indirect property refers to the property stocks.

other assets in Hong Kong such as Freris (1991); Jones Lang Wootton (1994); Newell and Chau (1996); Chiang and Ganesan (1996); and Chiang (1997). Fu and Ng (2001) applied the present-value approach to recover lost information due to market inefficiency and this enhanced the real estate volatility. Hence, the risk-adjusted return of real estate got closer to common stocks. Based on style analysis, Chau, Wong and Newell (2003), and Newell, Chau and Wong (2004) found that property company stock was not a good substitute for direct property. Lam (2006) investigated the investment performance of Hong Kong's real estate and property stocks before 2002 with time-varying models.

Unsystematic Risks of Property Investment

If the risk of an investment is not just defined as the standard deviation of an outcome, the comprehensive risk-adjusted return for investing in real estate properties may be similar to the one for investing in property stocks. Comparing to investing in financial assets, there is a number of specific risks in property investment. Generally speaking, the physical property investment will involve relatively lower liquidity, higher management and transaction costs, and vacancy risk.

Most of the studies discussed above except Leggett (1995), Chiang (1997) and Lam (2006) did not address the illiquidity of holding real estate in performance assessment. Since this downside is not considered in most of the existing studies, the risk that measured only in terms of return variability tends to underestimate the true or complete risk of investing in real estate. Besides, real estate is indivisible and transaction is relatively infrequent. Investors also face the possibility that the property is being un-let since it takes time to search for a suitable tenant.

Chiang and Ganesan (1996), Chiang (1997), Lai and Wong (1998) and Lam (2006) indicated that the real estate market was generally relatively illiquid with costly information and transaction cost. Given identical risk (in terms of return variation), an asset with lower liquidity should command a higher return. It is not surprised that we observe lower level of risk for the appraisal / transactional based real estate return when comparing to property

stocks. They recommend further studying the impact of liquidity on real estate return.

Risk and Return of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)

To circumvent the unsystematic risk such as illiquidity, high management and transaction costs and lumpiness of direct property investment, securitised assets are developed. Under securitisation, physical properties are financially engineered into financial assets. The ownership of the underlying properties is traded in financial market. Although securitized direct properties is new to Hong Kong, they are quite popular overseas especially in the US.

The return from real estate investment trusts (REITs) in the US provides an alternative means to measure the investment performance of real estate. The REITs are traded in organized financial markets and behave like stock rather than physical properties. Returns from investing in securitised assets can be calculated based on the accrued income from REITs and the change in market prices. As long as the market price of REITs captures the value of its underlying assets, REITs may serve as proxies to measure the investment performance of physical properties.

Unlike the investment performance of direct real estate, the empirical findings for REITs are rather diverse and mixed. Han and Liang (1995); Corgel, McIntosh and Ott (1995); Chiang (1997); Benjamin, Sirmans and Zietz (2001); Zietz, Sirmans and Friday (2003); and Joseph, Ooi and Liow (2004) reviewed the findings for the performance of REITs. The major conclusion is that there is no consensus for the investment performance of REITs comparing to other financial assets. While a number of studies concluded that the REITs outperformed other assets, some other studies either found mixed results or identified the opposite observations.

For securitized properties like REITs to serve as good proxies in measuring the investment performance of physical properties, the market price of REITs should capture the value of its underlying properties. However, a number of studies such as Seiler, Webb and Myer (1996); Chau, Wong and Newell (2003); and Zietz, Sirmans and Friday (2003) have shown that securitized properties may not be good substitutes to estimate the investment

performance of direct properties because REITs in general behave more like common stock than the real estate.

The present research will argue that the downside of real estate investment is understated since certain unique features of real estate investment like the impact of illiquidity and vacancy risk are not accounted for in most of the existing studies. Unlike financial asset, it is more difficult to resell a physical asset like real estate property in a market. As indicated by Chiang (1997), and Lai and Wong (1998) studies, the real estate market is generally less liquid than the financial market with costly information and transaction cost. Given identical risk (in terms of standard deviation), an asset with lower liquidity should command a higher return. It is not a surprise that we observe lower level of risk (in terms of standard deviation) for real estate investment when comparing to property stocks as what the existing literature found.

This study will take up the findings from Lai and Wong (1998) and extend Chiang (1997) and Lam (2006) studies to further research in this aspect in order to resolve the puzzle in the literature. The negative attributes for investing directly in physical properties will be considered in the comprehensive risk-adjusted return assessment of direct and indirect property investment in this study. This paper will argue and show that the misconception about superior performance of direct property investment in Hong Kong was indeed there on face value.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the research methodology and data. Section 3 discusses the empirical results. Conclusions and implications are drawn in Section 4.

2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA

The Generalized Autoregressive Conditionally Heteroskedastic in the Mean (GARCH-M) model allows one to specify the risk premium as a function of conditional variance rather than the conventional market portfolio. Most of the studies on real estate investment performance have assumed constant conditional variance, linearity in risk

premium and return independence. However, these assumptions have been challenged in the finance literature. For example, Carroll and Wei (1988); Akgiray (1989); Poterba and Summers (1986); and Carroll, Thistle and Wei (1992) have shown that the relaxation of these assumptions could change the conclusion about the return generating mechanism. As being discussed in Baillie and DeGennaro (1990); Elyasiani and Mansur (1998); Campbell and Hentschel (1992); and Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (1993), the risk-return tradeoff parameter in GARCH-M model can be interpreted as the relative risk aversion of an investor.

As pointed out by Neuberger (1994), the inclusion of conditional variance in the mean equation in GARCH-M model is intuitively appealing. Since investors concern the volatility of return for the assets they hold, the required risk premium should vary as the volatility of assets changes. Pindyck (1984) and French, Schwert and Stambaugh (1987) also emphasize the importance of this point in their studies.

GARCH (1, 1)-M Model

In light of Baillie and DeGennaro (1990), Elyasiani and Mansur (1998), and Devaney (2001), the GARCH (1, 1)-M specification of the general model is applied in this study. Bollerslev (1987) shows that GARCH (1, 1) fits most of the economic time series. Laux and Ng (1993) indicates that this process is parsimonious and allows long memory in volatility process. The GARCH-M also allows the researcher to specific risk premium as the conditional variance instead of the risk measure defined by market risk under the CAPM.

The following system of equations for GARCH (1, 1)-M is applied in estimation.

$$(2.1) \quad \Delta ER_{i,t} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \Delta ER_{i,t-1} + \alpha_2 \Delta r_t + \alpha_3 \Delta CVr_t + \alpha_4 ILLIQ_{i,t} + \alpha_5 \sigma_{i,t}^2 + \varepsilon_t$$

$$(2.2) \quad \sigma_{i,t}^2 = \omega_0 + \omega_1 \sigma_{i,t-1}^2 + \omega_2 \varepsilon_{i,t-1}^2$$

$$(2.3) \quad \varepsilon_{i,t} | \Psi_{t-1} \sim N(0, \sigma_{i,t}^2)$$

where

$\Delta ER_{i,t}$ = Change of excess return of asset i at time t

Δr_t = Change of interest rate at time t

ΔCVr_t = Change of conditional variance of interest rate at time t

$ILLIQ_{i,t}$ = Illiquidity measure of asset i at time t

$\sigma_{i,t}^2$ = Conditional variance of ε_t of asset i at time t

Ψ_{t-1} = Information set at time $t-1$

Unsystematic Risk

Apart from estimating the standard risk-adjusted return for real estate investment (based on return's standard deviation), the physical investment in real estate property is associated with problem of illiquidity, high management and transaction costs, and vacancy risk. Unlike most of the previous studies, the effect of illiquidity on direct real estate investment will be taken into account explicitly when comparing the asset returns in this study. For comparison purpose, the impact of vacancy risk on excess return of domestic property will be examined as well.

Liquidity

To quantify the impact of illiquidity on excess return for different assets, the modified illiquidity measure proposed by Amihud (2002) is applied in this study.

Liquidity is an evasive and unobservable concept. Generally speaking, liquidity refers to cost and ease in converting an asset into cash. It reflects the discount that a seller has to pay or the premium that a buyer has to pay to execute a transaction. In other words, the liquidity reflects the effect of order flow on price. A number of measures have been employed in the literature in order to capture different aspects of liquidity such as bid-ask spread (like Kraus and Stoll (1972); Keim and Madhavan (1996)), transaction-by-transaction market effect (like Kyle (1985)) or the probability of information based trading (like Easley, Hvidkjaer and O'Hara (1999)). However, these fine proxies require the microstructure data that are not easily available especially for long time series data for stock or real estate properties. To resolve these problems, the adapted empirical illiquidity measure proposed by Amihud (2002)

is used in this study.

The illiquidity measure of asset i at month t as

$$(2.4) \quad ILLIQ_{i,t} = \frac{1}{M} \sum_{m=0}^{M-1} \frac{|R_{i,t+m}|}{V_{i,t+m}}$$

$R_{i,t+m}$ = return of asset i at month $t+m$

$V_{i,t+m}$ = dollar trading volume of asset i at month $t+m$

The illiquidity measure defined here is the average (from the current month to the next “M-1” month) ratio of the monthly absolute return to the dollar trading volume on that month. This measure is consistent with the proxy of market thinness proposed by Silber (1975) in terms of the ratio of absolute price change to absolute excess demand for trading, and Kyle’s idea of illiquidity that measure the impact of order flow on price. Intuitively, an asset is illiquid (i.e. high value of $ILLIQ_t^i$) if the asset’s price moves a lot with little response from trading volume. The “ $ILLIQ$ ” is expected to be positively correlated with excess return of an asset.

However, the above empirical Amihud measure is found to be nonstationary in the study. To resolve the problem, the Kamara, Lou and Sadka (2010) illiquidity measure, which is the change in the Amihud measure (in logs), is used instead as the monthly illiquidity measure in estimation.

Vacancy risk

Long period of mismatch in supply and demand could affect the property investors adversely. They have to face the vacancy risk and the subsequent loss in rental income caused by the excessive supply of space due to the property cycles. This implies that the property investors have to face additional vacancy risk that is not shared by stock investors in general. Hence, additional risk premium is required for investing in real estate.

The methodology of Chiang (1997) will be applied to adjust real estate return with the existence of vacancy risk. Simply speaking, the return is adjusted downward by the estimates of these peculiarities in real estate properties.

Data

Two different sets of assets are under investigation in this study. For real estate properties, four different sub-sectors are examined namely domestic, office, retail and flatted factories. Financial assets under investigation include the Hang Seng Property Sub-Index (HSIP) and selected property stocks namely Cheung Kong, Henderson Land and Sino Land. The 12-month deposit rate and best lending rate are the proxies for risk free rate and interest rate respectively.

The sample in this study mainly covers the period from September 1995 to November 2011. The major sources of data in this study are Hong Kong Rating and Valuation Department, Hong Kong Property Review, Centaline Property, DataStream and Hong Kong Monetary Authority. All the time series data in estimation are stationary.

3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS

A summary of monthly excess returns (from September 1995 to November 2011) and Sharpe indexes of various assets appears in Table 1. While the monthly excess returns for indirect properties are higher than direct properties in general, the Sharpe Indexes for the latter are higher than the former. The results are consistent with what have been found in the literature that direct properties command higher risk-adjusted returns when risk is measured in terms of standard deviation.

Table 1: Excess Return and Sharpe Index

	Excess Return	Sharpe Index
<u>Direct Properties</u>		
Domestic	0.453273	0.153590
Office	0.218439	0.931772
Retail	0.809078	0.204875
Flatted Factories	0.985507	0.314286
<u>Indirect Properties</u>		
HSI-Properties	0.720872	0.066820
Cheung Kong	0.909077	0.087122
Henderson Land	0.681897	0.055926
Sino Land	1.449590	0.099560

From Table 2, the coefficients on illiquidity measure are all positive, as what expected, and statistically significant at 1% to 10% level of significance. The results provide a very strong support for the effect of illiquidity on the excess returns of direct and indirect properties.

Table 2: Impact of Illiquidity

	Coefficient	Level of significance
<u>Direct Properties</u>		
Domestic	1.077979	1%
Office	0.019651	1%
Retail	1.443575	1%
Flatted Factories	1.475885	1%
<u>Indirect Properties</u>		
HSI-Properties	1.909806	5%
Cheung Kong	2.178676	5%
Henderson Land	2.005003	10%
Sino Land	4.569187	1%

The investment performance for direct and indirect properties measured in terms of time-varying Jensen Index is reported in Table 3. The coefficients on intercepts, which is the proxy for Jensen Index, are statistically insignificant at 10% level of significance. The results

imply that the real estate and property stocks provide similar return on risk-adjusted basis after taking into account the impact of illiquidity.

Table 3: Jensen Index

	Jensen Index	Level of significance (10%)
<u>Direct Properties</u>		
Domestic	-0.167199	Insignificant
Office	-0.005054	Insignificant
Retail	-0.314841	Insignificant
Flatted Factories	-0.203771	Insignificant
<u>Indirect Properties</u>		
HSI-Properties	0.098588	Insignificant
Cheung Kong	-0.510258	Insignificant
Henderson Land	0.100725	Insignificant
Sino Land	0.672014	Insignificant

For comparison purpose, the return for residential properties is further adjusted by vacancy risk. The results, shown in Table 4, are consistent with the ones without adjusting for vacancy risk as discussed earlier except that the coefficients for intercept and illiquidity are relatively smaller (in absolute value).

Table 4: Illiquidity and Jensen Index for domestic property with adjustment for vacancy risk

	Coefficient	Level of significance
Illiquidity	0.992121	1%
Jensen Index	-0.109689	Insignificant (10%)

On the whole, the above findings suggest that the observed abnormal risk adjusted return in the literature is inconsistent with the prediction from arbitrage is simply due to the omission of unsystematic risk like illiquidity in investment performance comparison. The empirical results provide positive support to the implication of the arbitrage mechanism that all assets should command similar risk-adjusted return in the long run when all aspects of the risk are considered. Hence, the puzzle of why real estate offers relatively superior investment performance is resolved.

CONCLUSIONS

The findings are consistent with the intuition that investors require higher return to compensate for holding of illiquid assets. The empirical results also show that superior investment performance of direct properties is disappeared after controlling volatility risk and illiquidity.

To summarize, the superior investment performance of direct property relative to indirect property is too good to be true. Its existence is simply due to the omission of the consideration for the fundamental difference in specific risks for investing in physical property and property stocks. The observed abnormal return for real estate only compensates for the unsystematic risks or extra risks that are borne by investors. The findings of the literature that real estate provides superior investment performance is more apparent than real. This study adds to the body of knowledge on portfolio investment performance that all assets with similar risk and return profile should command comparable risk-adjusted return when all the risk aspects of holding an asset are taken into account. Return variability measured by standard deviation for example, only captures part of the risk involved in property investment. As a result, the puzzle of why real estate offers superior investment performance as stated in the existing literature, which is inconsistent with the implication of the capital theory with the existence of arbitrage, is resolved.

Nevertheless, the above results do not imply property investment can be ignored. Investors are generally heterogeneous. They have different preference on various risk attributes and they also face different investment constraints like time horizon. Although the risk-adjusted returns for different assets are comparable, real estate provides different risk and return profile compared to other assets. For instance, investors who are more able to tolerate the illiquidity in holding physical property may opt to invest in real estate in order to achieve their optimal portfolios. Besides, real estate also provides an additional benefit by allowing investors to diversify the risks of their investment. It implies that real estate is still an important investment asset to be included in a portfolio especially for institutional investors even though property does not provide abnormal risk-adjusted return as reported in this study.

REFERENCES

- Akgiray, V., 1989. Conditional heteroscedasticity in time series of stock returns: evidence and forecasts. *Journal of Business*, 62, pp.55-80.
- Amihud, Y., 2002. Illiquidity and Stock Returns: Cross-Section and Time-Series Effects. *Journal of Financial Markets*, 5, pp.31-56.
- Baillie, R.T. and DeGennaro, R.P., 1990. Stock Returns and volatility. *Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis*, 25, pp.203-14.
- Barkham, R. and Geltner, D., 1994. Unsmoothing British Valuation-Based Returns Without Assuming an Efficient Market. *Journal of Property Research*, 11, pp.81-95.
- Benjamin, J.D., Sirmans, G.S. and Zietz, E.N., 2001. Returns and Risk on Real Estate and Other Investments: More Evidence. *Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management*, 7(3), pp.183-214.
- Bollerslev, T., 1987. A conditional heteroscedastic time series model for speculative prices and rates of return. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 69, pp.542-47.
- Campbell, J. and Hentschel, L., 1992. No news is good news: an asymmetric model of changing volatility in stock returns. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 31, pp.281-318.
- Carroll, C., Thistle, P., and Wei, K., 1992. The robustness of risk-return nonlinearities to normality assumption. *Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis*, 27, pp.416-35.
- Carroll, C. and Wei, K.C.J., 1988. Risk Return and equilibrium: An extension. *Journal of Business*, 61, pp.485-99.
- Chau, K.W., Wong, S.K. and Newell, G., 2003. Performance of Property Companies in Hong Kong: A Style Analysis Approach. *Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management*, 9(1), pp.29-44.
- Chiang Y.H., 1997. *Property Investment in a Portfolio Context – Analysis of Risk and Return of Office Property Investment in Hong Kong*. Ph.D. The University of Hong Kong.
- Chiang Y.H. and Ganesan S., 1996. Property Investment in Hong Kong. *Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management*, 2(2), pp.141-58.
- Cho, H., Kawaguchi, Y. and Shilling, J.D., 2003. Unsmoothing Commercial Property Returns: A Revision to Fisher-Geltner-Webb's Unsmoothing Methodology. *Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics*, 27(3), pp. 393-405.
- Corgel, J.B., McIntosh, W. and Ott, S.H., 1995. Real Estate Investment Trusts: A Review of

- the Financial Economics Literature. *Journal of Real Estate Literature*, 3, pp.13-43.
- Coyne, T.J., 1993. Returns to Financial Assets vs. Returns to Residential Real Estate: The Business Cycle Matters. *Real Estate Finance*, 10(1), pp.53-9.
- Defusco, R.A., McLeavey, D.W., Pinto, J.E. and Runkle, D.E., 2001. *Quantitative Methods for Investment Analysis*. USA: Association for Investment Management Research.
- Devancy, M., 2001. Time varying risk premia for real estate investment trusts: A GARCH-M model. *The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance*, 41, pp.335-46.
- Easley, D., Hvidkjaer, S., O'Hara, M., 2002. Is information risk a determinant of asset returns?, *Journal of Finance*, 57(5), pp.2185-221.
- Elyasiani, E., and Mansur, I., 1998. Sensitivity of bank stock returns distribution to changes in the level and volatility of interest rates: a GARCH-M model. *Journal of Banking and Finance*, 22, pp.535-63.
- Fisher, J.D., Gelther, D.M. and Webb, R.B., 1994. Value Indices of Commercial Real Estate: A Comparison of Index Construction Methods. *Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics*, 9, pp.137-64.
- Fogler, H.R., 1984. Twenty Percent in Real Estate: Can Theory Justify It?. *Journal of Portfolio Management*, 10(2), pp.6-13.
- French, K.R., Schwert, G.W. and Stambaugh, R.F., 1987. Expected stock returns and volatility. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 19, pp.3-29.
- Freris, A.F., 1991. *The Financial Markets of Hong Kong*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Froland, C., Gorlow, R. and Sampson, R., 1986. The Market Risk of Real Estate. *Journal of Portfolio Management*, 12(2), pp.12-9.
- Fu, Y. and Ng, L.K., 2001. Market Efficiency and Return Statistics: Evidence from Real Estate and Stock Markets Using a Present-Value Approach. *Real Estate Economics*, 29(2), pp.227-50.
- Glosten, L., Jagannathan, R., and Runkle, D., 1993. On the relation between the expected value and the volatility of the nominal excess return on stocks. *Journal of Finance*, 48(5), pp.1779-801.
- Han, J. and Liang, Y., 1995. The Historical Performance of Real Estate Investment Trusts. *Journal of Real Estate Research*, 10(3), pp.235-62.
- Hoag, J.W., 1980. Toward Indices of Real Estate Value and Return. *Journal of Finance*, 35(2),

pp.569-80.

- Howells, P.G.A. and Rydin, Y.J., 1990. The Case for Property Investment and the Implications of a Unitized Property Market. *Land Development Studies*, 7, pp.15-30.
- Ibbotson, R.G. and Siegel, L.B., 1984. Real Estate Returns: A Comparison with Other Investment. *Real Estate Economics*, 12(3), pp. 219-42.
- Irwin, S.H. and Landa, D., 1987. Real Estate, Futures, and Gold as Portfolio Assets. *Journal of Portfolio Management*, 13, pp. 29-34.
- Jones Lang Wootton, 1994. *Performance Analysis of Hong Kong Property: An Assessment of Risk Adjusted Return*. Hong Kong: Jones Lang Wootton Research.
- Joseph, T., Ooi, L. and Liow, K.H., 2004. Risk-Adjusted Performance of Real Estate Stocks: Evidence from Developing Markets. *Journal of Real Estate Research*, 24(4), pp.371-95.
- Kamara, A., Lou, X., and Sadka, R., 2010. Has the U.S. Stock Market Become More Vulnerable over Time?. *Financial Analysts Journal*, 66(1), pp. 41-52.
- Keim, D.B. and Madhavan, A., 1996. The upstairs market for large-block transactions: analysis and measurement of price effects. *Review of Financial Studies*, 9, pp.1-36.
- Kraus, A. and Stoll, H.R., 1972. Price impacts of block trading on the New York Stock Exchange. *Journal of Finance*, 27, pp.569-88.
- Kyle, A., 1985. Continuous auctions and insider trading. *Econometrica*, 53, pp.1315-35.
- Lai, T.Y. and Wong, K., 1998. Appraisal Smoothing: The Other Side of the Story. *Real Estate Economics*, 26(3), pp.511-35.
- Lam, C.M., 2006. *The Investment Performance of Hong Kong Real Estate and Property Stocks*. Ph.D. The University of South Australia.
- Laux, P.A. and Ng, L.K., 1993. The sources of GARCH: Empirical evidence from an intraday returns model incorporating systematic and unique risk. *Journal of International Money and Finance*, 12(5), pp. 543-60.
- Leggett, D.N., 1995. An Empirical Analysis of Efficient Real Property Liquidity Premiums. In: A.L. Schwartz, and S.D. Kapplin, ed. 1995. *Alternative Ideas in Real Estate Investment*. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Ch.7.
- Liow, K.H., 2001. The Long-term Investment Performance of Singapore Real Estate and Property stocks. *Journal of Property Investment and Finance*, 19(2), pp.156-74.

- McMahan, J., 1981. *Institutional Strategies for Real Estate Equity Investment*. New York: Practicing Law Institute.
- Neuberger, J.A., 1993. Interest rate risk at US commercial banks. *FRBSF Weekly Letter*, [online] Available at:
< <http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/1993/el93-26.pdf> > [Accessed 19 June 2012].
- Newell, G. and Chau, K.W., 1996. Linkages between direct and indirect property performance in Hong Kong. *Journal of Property Finance*, 7(4), pp.9-29.
- Newell, G., Chan, K.W. and Wong, S.K., 2004. The level of direct property in Hong Kong property company performance. *Journal of Property Investment and Finance*, 22(6), pp. 512-32.
- Norman, E.J., Sirmans, G.S. and Benjamin, J.D., 1995. The Historical Environment of Real Estate Returns. *Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management*, 1(1), pp. 1-24.
- Pindyck, R.S., 1984. Risk, inflation, and the stock market. *American Economic Review*, 74, pp. 335-51.
- Poterba, J. and Summers, L., 1986. The persistence of volatility and stock market fluctuations. *American Economic Review*, 76, pp.1141-51.
- Seiler, M.J., Webb, J.R. and Myer, F.C., 1996. Are EREITs Real Estate?. *Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management*, 5(2), pp.171-81.
- Seiler, M.J., Webb, J.R. and Myer, F.C., 1999. Diversification Issues in Real Estate Investment. *Journal of Real Estate Literature*, 7(2), pp.163-79.
- Silber, W.L., 1975. Thinness in capital markets: the case of the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. *Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis*, 10, pp.129-42.
- Sirmans, G.S. and Sirmans, C.F., 1987. The Historical Perspective of Real Estate Returns. *Journal of Portfolio Management*, 13(3), pp.2-31.
- Webb, J.R., 1990. On the Exclusion of Real Estate from the Market Portfolio. *Journal of Portfolio Management*, 17(1), pp.78-84.
- Webb, J.R. and Rubens, J.H., 1987. How Much in Real Estate? A Surprising Answer. *Journal of Portfolio Management*, 13(3), pp.10-4.
- Zietz, E.N., Sirmans, G.S. and Friday, H.S., 2003. The Environment and Performance of Real

Estate Investment Trusts. *Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management*, 9(2), pp. 127-65.

Regime-Switching Volatility: Evidence from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange

Yihua Xu
Equity Derivatives, BOCI Securities Limited
Email: xuyihua@gmail.com

Yingxuan Zhang
Hong Kong Shue Yan University
Email: zhangyingxuan@hotmail.com

Xiao Chen
Guangzhou Luogang Meteorological Bureau, China

1. INTRODUCTION

Accurate forecasting of asset volatilities plays a critical role in derivative valuation, trading and risk management. While the academia and industry have done extensive work on volatility modeling (see Poon and Granger, 2003), however, volatility forecasting is by no means an easy task for academic researchers and practitioners. Evidenced by the 2008 financial crisis, volatility level could change remarkably in a very short time period. Take Hong Kong stock market for example, from 2005 to early 2007, the volatility index of Hang Seng Index (VHSI) ranged from 10.86% to 26.03%. The Hong Kong stock market had been in a very calm regime in this pre-crisis period. During the 2008 financial crisis, VHSI increased quickly, ranging from 25.32% to 104.29%. The market had been in an extremely volatile regime. Traditional models for volatility forecasting, such as the GARCH model, typically show high volatility persistence and could not capture such regime-switching behavior of volatility.

An alternative to the traditional GARCH model is the markov regime switching (MRS) model, which is designed to capture the regime-switching behavior of the financial time series data. It is assumed the financial time series could switch between a high volatility regime and a low volatility regime. Empirical applications of MRS models to commodity prices, stock returns and exchange-rate return data can be found in Alizadeh et al. (2008), Henry (2009),

Wilfling (2009) and Bohl et al. (2011). For more detailed specifications of the MRS model, the readers are advised to check Hamilton (1990), Gray (1996), and Hamilton (2005).

In this paper, we employ the MRS model to investigate the dynamic behavior of the HSI volatility. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The MRS model is presented in section 2. Section 3 describes the HSI data and gives the estimation results. Section 4 summarizes our findings and concludes this paper.

2. THE MARKOV REGIME SWITCHING MODEL

The Markov Regime Switching model allows for some or all of its parameters to switch across different regimes. Assume that the return process can switch between a low volatility regime and a high volatility regime, the return process can be given as:

$$\begin{aligned} y_t &= \mu_1 + \varepsilon_t, & \text{for low volatility regime 1} \\ y_t &= \mu_2 + \xi_t, & \text{for high volatility regime 2} \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \varepsilon_t &\sim N(0, \sigma_1^2), & \text{for low volatility regime 1} \\ \xi_t &\sim N(0, \sigma_2^2), & \text{for high volatility regime 2} \end{aligned}$$

The value of μ_1 is the expected return in the low volatility regime, while μ_2 is the expected return in the high volatility regime. Respectively, σ_1 is the volatility of the return process in the low volatility regime, while σ_2 is the volatility of the return process in the high volatility regime.

In the markov regime switching model, the transition between regime 1 and regime 2 is governed by a regime transition matrix. This matrix controls the probabilities of switching from one regime to another, and can be represented as:

$$P = \begin{bmatrix} p_{11} & p_{21} \\ p_{12} & p_{22} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} p & (1-q) \\ (1-p) & q \end{bmatrix}$$

The element in the above transition matrix determines the switching probability. For example, p_{11} represents the probability of staying in regime 1, while p_{12} represents the probability of switching from regime 1 to regime 2. Likewise, p_{22} represents the probability of staying in regime 2, while p_{21} represents the probability of switching from regime 2 to regime 1. In this paper, we simply assume that the regime transition matrix is constant over time. For time varying transition probability regime switching models, see Wang (2003) for more details.

The above markov regime switching model can be calibrated by maximum likelihood estimation using Hamilton's filter or Baum-Welch algorithm. For further details on the estimation of the MRS model, the readers are suggested to see Hamilton (1994), Kim and Nelson (1999), and Mitra (2010).

3. REGIME SWITCHING VOLATILITY IN HSI

3.1 Data

The data used in this research is the HSI daily returns sampled from 2 January 2001 to 30 December 2011 (2716 observations). The return data is constructed by adjusting dividend payments. Figure 1 displays the daily HSI and return data during the sampling period. The HSI volatility index (VHSI) data for the same sampling period is also presented in figure 1. The trajectory of the VHSI data exhibits a well-documented feature of many financial time series, namely volatility clustering, which refers to the observation, as noted by Mandelbrot, that "large changes tend to be followed by large changes, of either sign, and small changes tend to be followed by small changes."




Figure 1 Daily HSI and Return Data During The Sampling Period

Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics of the HSI daily return data. The mean is quite small, while the kurtosis is significantly larger than the normal value of 3, indicating that the return distribution is more outlier prone.

Table1: Descriptive Statistics of HSI daily return

Mean(%)	Std	Min(%)	Max(%)	Skewness	Kurtosis
0.0032	0.0071	-5.8986	+5.8225	0.0056	11.0843

3.2 Estimation Result

We estimate the markov regime switching model using Perlin's MS_Regress package (Perlin, 2010), which is a MATLAB toolbox specifically designed for the estimation, simulation and forecasting of a general markov regime switching model.

Model parameters and the regime transition matrix are shown in Table 2. The low volatility regime exhibits a positive mean daily return, which represents the feature of a bull market, while the high volatility regime exhibits a negative mean daily return, which represents the feature of a bear market.

Table2: MRS model parameter estimation

μ_1	μ_2	σ_1^2	σ_2^2	p_{11}	p_{12}	p_{21}	p_{22}
0.0002	-0.0004	0.000022	0.000144	0.9953	0.0047	0.0167	0.9833

The explained HSI daily return, the conditional standard deviation of the low volatility regime equation, and the smoothed regime probabilities are displayed in Figure 2. The smoothed state probabilities plot shows a clear evidence that the HSI return switched between the low volatility regime and the high volatility regime in the sampling period.




Figure 2. The Explained HSI Daily Return, Conditional Standard Deviation of Low Volatility Regime Equation, & The Smoothed Regime Probabilities

4. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we employed the markov regime switching model to study the HSI daily returns. Both the mean return and the standard deviation are allowed to switch between a low volatility regime and a high volatility regime. The regime switching probabilities are controlled by a constant transition matrix. Model parameters are then estimated for the HSI daily returns. Empirical result shows a clear evidence of regime switching in HSI data.

A possible application of the markov regime switching model is for option pricing and

volatility trading. Classic option pricing models are based on the Black-Schole-Metron framework, which assumes that asset returns follow the geometric Brownian motion. Option pricing based on the markov regime switching model could thus be used to check if there are mispricing in options, and will be the subject of our future research.

REFERENCES

- Alizadeh, A.H., Nomikos, N.K., and Pouliasis, P.K., 2008. A Markov Regime Switching Approach For Hedging Energy Commodities. *Journal of Banking and Finance*, 32, pp.1970-1983.
- Bohl, M.T., Salm, C.A., and Wilfling, B., 2011. Do Individual Index Futures Investors Destabilize The Underlying Spot Market? *Journal of Futures Markets*, 31, pp.81-101.
- Gray, S.F., 1996. Modeling the Conditional Distribution of Interest Rates as a Regime-Switching Process. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 42, pp.27-62.
- Hamilton, J.D., 1990. Analysis of Time Series Subject to Changes in Regime. *Journal of Econometrics*, 45, pp.39-70.
- Hamilton, J.D., 1994. *Time Series Analysis*. Princeton University Press.
- Hamilton, J.D., 2005. Regime Switching Models. *Palgrave Dictionary of Economics*.
- Henry, Ó.T., 2009. Regime Switching In The Relationship Between Equity Returns And Short-Term Interest Rates in the UK. *Journal of Banking and Finance*, 33, pp.405-414.
- Kim, J. and Nelson, R., 1999. *State Space Model with Regime Switching: Classical and Gibbs-sampling Approaches with Applications*. The MIT Press.
- Mitra, S. and Date, P., 2010. Regime Switching Volatility Calibration By The Baum-Welch Method. *Journal of Computational Applied Mathematics*, 234(12), pp. 3243-3260.
- Perlin, M., 2010. *The MATLAB Package for Markov Regime Switching Models (November 23, 2010)*. [online] Available at:< <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1714016>>.
- Poon, S.-H. and Granger, C.W.J., 2003 Forecasting Volatility in Financial Markets: A Review, *Journal of Economic Literature*, 41(2), pp.478-539.
- Wang, P., 2003. *Financial Econometrics*. Taylor and Francis.

Wilfling, B., 2009. Volatility Regime-Switching In European Exchange Rates Prior To Monetary Unification. *Journal of International Money and Finance*, 28, pp.240-270.

The Consideration of On-going Socio-economic Needs of Citizens

Bhzad Sidawi
University of Dammam
Email: Bsidawi@ud.edu.sa

1 INTRODUCTION

Saudi population, particularly the Poor has certain socio-economic needs and rights that cannot be ignored. These would change over time such as the family size, the need to get extra income. To accommodate these needs, citizens usually make changes to their properties. Internal and external alterations; repairs and renovation are frequent procedures, many opt to carry out on their properties for various reasons.

The initial field study on banks and the government funded organization namely; Real Estate Development Fund (REDF) in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) showed that they are reluctant to provide mortgages to low-income citizens as it is considered high risk to do so. Mortgages offered by REDF are very limited and usually take very long time to be granted due to bureaucratic financing process and mechanisms (Sidawi and Meeran 2011).

The initial field study showed also that banks and REDF are happy to provide some limited support to such on-going needs but maintain that this would come under price which poor citizens cannot afford. This paper argues that considering population's need and providing financial support is vital as it would help citizens to translate their needs into the built environment and carry on with life normally and smoothly.

A field survey has recently been undertaken in 2011 in Dammam and Alkhuber cities, Eastern Province of KSA to gauge the citizens' socio-economic needs, how far it is supported by banks and REDF and how these needs impact the built environment. A questionnaire survey, discussion forum and interviews were used to achieve the objectives of the research. With regards to the questionnaire, four hundred and twenty responses were received. Accordingly, eleven interviews were conducted and a discussion forum was held together with eight participants. The next sections highlight the citizens' socio-economic needs and the

difficulties that face the authorities in translating these needs into the built environment.

2 THE LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review points out to the on-going socio-economic needs of low-income population and how this issue should be addressed in the built environment. It also discusses why banks and REDF are incapable to meet these needs and what is the possible negative impact on the population particularly the poor and on the property value. The following sections discuss the present and future needs of the KSA's citizens. These can be categorized under the social needs and the economic rights and needs.

2.1 The Population's Socio-economic Rights and Needs

The following paragraphs discuss the population needs and how these needs would be addressed in the built environment. Maslow (1975) set the hierarchy of these needs as the following: physiological needs, safety needs, belongingness and love needs, esteem needs, self-actualisation needs, the desire to know and understand, needs. Some Islamic scholars suggested the order of the human needs is: the religion, life, intellect, property and posterity (the same reference). Akbar (1992) defined three types of individual rights/ responsibilities with respect to a property that can be exercised in the Islamic world which are control and management, ownership, and use. The latter includes right of use and right of benefit. The transfer of the right of benefit to relatives or a third party means the owner would keep the property ownership right with himself/herself while granting somebody else the right of use of the property or a part of the property by letting it, or granting the right of benefit of the property to somebody to use for a commercial or business purpose. In the Islamic world, this right is practised to this day and the reason behind the transfer of this right by the owner is for good causes such as to help poor relatives financially. The property ownership and/or control rights can be transferred partially or wholly from the original owner to other owners and/or individuals (e.g. property managers, relatives etc.). The exercise of these rights should not

interfere or violate rights of other parties or the rights of the neighbours (Ahmed and Parry, 2002, Ahmed and Parry, 2001 a & b). This dynamic and flexible transfer of the rights throughout the life of the property would affect the value of the property as the responsibility of ownership, control/ management and use would be exercised by different individuals or group of people. A number of research studies have highlighted the importance of the consideration of characteristics such as those mentioned above in the home design and suggested that it is essential to build up knowledge that would be used in housing design to provide tailored design solution to peoples' needs, lifestyle and future preferences (Hillier 1996, Hillier and Hanson 1984, Hojrup 2003, Habraken 2003, Salama 2006).

Many researchers suggested that non-consideration of owner's lifestyle in the architectural design has created an unsuitable environment for the clientele in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Al-Kurdi 2002a &b, Darweesh, 2003). These researchers recommended that property should be adaptable and flexible enough to accommodate the changing requirements of the client. Al-Naim and Mahmud (2007) mentioned similar factors which are lifestyle driven as the motivations behind the transformation of properties. They include (i) the adoption (by the client) of some modern lifestyle features such as the installation of a modern kitchen or bathroom (ii) the need to achieve a higher degree of privacy for some spaces (iii) to adapt the spaces to suite the owner's lifestyle by, for example, increasing the number of spaces or changing the functions of some spaces. However, there are other reasons for the 'transformation/ adaptation' such as initial financial constraints faced by the client and the client's need for an additional income. This latter reason manifests into reality when the owner transforms a part of the property to a shop that can be run by the owner or let to somebody else in order to generate additional income to support the family (ibid). This 'transformation' tradition is rooted deep in the history of Arabic and Islamic cities. A substantial number of such transformations which occurred during these cities' evolvement and throughout their life are found by a number of researchers such as Ibn Al Rami (1995), and others. These transformations can be considered as a part of people's socio-economic life which is practised particularly by low income people (Mahmud 2007). On the other hand, it is proposed that the way that the client exercises these rights would affect the property's value

and in turn affect the financing arrangements. The research done by Sayce (2004) supports this hypothesis as it pointed out a number of user characteristics such as the occupier's satisfaction with the property that have an impact on the property value. The occupier's satisfaction is very likely to be affected by the capability to exercise the right of use. Hence this right of use should be supported fully. Absence of this right could easily affect the property value negatively.

2.2 Property-Related Financing Problems And Its' Impact On The Built Environment

The previous section highlights the rights of every citizen to own a property. However, low income citizens cannot afford to buy a property. In the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, more Saudis will demand government's housing in the future. The housing affordability for Saudis and non-Saudis would decline substantially from present to future because housing prices rise rather faster than incomes. Struyk (2005) suggested that Saudis will experience a decline in housing affordability over the next two decades because the increase in purchasing power is approximately 25%, against a 50% housing price rise. Aldosary et al (2007) mentioned there is a mass demand for government's housing within the kingdom, particularly by middle-income Saudi families. Therefore, financial help should be provided to citizens to enable them of buying a property. Research studies showed that the conventional well-run mortgage facilities are not designed according to the poor people's needs and capabilities so they have generally fail to reach the poor (UN-Habitat 2005). Low income citizens, who managed to own a property, would find themselves under continuous financial pressures that would not enable them to do proper improvements or changes on their properties. A number of governments and private financial institutes have realized the fact that low income citizens need financial support regarding these issues and have suggested various financing schemes such micro finance programmes to finance the cost of housing improvements. However, these programmes were not very efficient as poor citizens were forced to use their own limited income, seek additional resources from family and friends, and borrow on informal credit markets (UN-Habitat 2005). As alternative strategy, community funds programmes were

suggested to sort out the problem. These are financial mechanisms that encourage savings through establishing and strengthening local savings groups, providing collective finance for shelter improvement (UN-Habitat 2005). However, much of their work remains experimental and it rests somewhat uneasily between financial approaches and poverty reduction programming (UN-Habitat 2005). In KSA, Bank Al Tasleef Al Saudi usually grant loans for restoration, repairs and refurbishment purposes amounting to 80,000-100,000 SAR for a duplex (i.e. terraced or semidetached house) and 40,000-50,000 SAR for a flat. This amount is however not enough to finance the cost of an extension. Moreover, bank Al Tasleef has its' difficult conditions, such as the borrower's age which should be between 25-55 years with a salary that is not less than 5000 SAR. The applicant should have no other financial obligations, and a Kafeel (i.e. guarantor) who should pay the loan back in case that the applicant failed to do so.

3 CONSTRAINTS ON THE TRANSLATION OF PEOPLE'S RIGHTS AND NEEDS INTO THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT

The translation of the population's rights and needs into the built environment would be constrained by the following types of constraints; financial and property-related.

3.1 Financial Constraints

One of the citizen's rights is to own a property and to alter his/her property according to his/ her needs. The majority of the population in KSA, particularly the poor, needs financial support to buy a property or to alter their properties. The financial support from financial institutions such as Banks is restricted by tough lending conditions that they apply it to avoid potential risks and financial loss. This policy is affected of a number of financial restrictions such as: The financial market rigidities, the Islamic financing practices, liquidity, uncertainty, ownership risks, security/ recourse, default and documentary complexity (Sidawi and Merran 2011).

3.1.1 *The property-related issues and expenses*

Banks are concern of possible on-going and dynamic environmental impacts on the property, and how the property would respond, may affect the property value. So they consider any financing whether it is initial financing i.e. mortgages or on-going financing as holding a risk. Environmental impacts on properties are attributed to climate changes and they include rising global temperatures, rising sea levels and increasing frequency and intensity of extreme weather. Extreme weather and natural disasters are expected to be more frequent in coming years (DEFRA 2008). In the future, properties may deteriorate faster and the systems may collapse or fail quicker. Properties will be expensive to run if they do not interact naturally with the environment. The degree of a property's capability to positively respond to environmental impacts would affect its value. Myers et al (2007) and Sayce et al (2003) suggested a link between the property value and sustainability indicators. The sustainability indicators are: building flexibility, energy efficiency, transport requirement, pollutants, location, occupier profile, ecology and design. Sayce et al (2004) created an appraisal model that incorporates the sustainability indicators, into calculations of property value. The impact of each of the sustainability indicators on property value was done based on the changes in the allowances fixed for each of the property appraisal criteria. The property appraisal criteria include the following: rental growth, rental depreciation, cashflow and risk (2003). On the other hand, properties should be frequently maintained to prolong their service life. Steemers (2003) pointed out that the absence of frequent maintenance would create a situation at a later date in which the maintenance would become exorbitantly expensive. The maintenance of residential properties in KSA is not mandatory as there is lack of state mandate for adequate maintenance opposite to well-developed mandatory maintenance laws in to some extent in the developed countries. Therefore, properties are ill maintained and a significant share of the housing stock in Saudi Arabia would need replacement in the next 20–25 years and around 30% requires improvement in the next 5 years (Steemers 2003). As a summary, the environmental issues would have serious impact on the property value in the short term as well in the long term. Thus it would affect the banks' lending policy and the policy in turn would affect the population's needs and rights. The study argues that on-going

financing to low-income citizens is necessary to enable the citizens to practise normally and smoothly their daily life and to reduce the impact of negative factors that would affect the property value.

4 THE FIELD SURVEY RESULTS

4.1. Socio-Economic Needs

Respondents plan to do changes on their properties at present to accommodate their needs regardless of the fact that the property is rented or owned at present. All of the respondents are planning to carry on alterations. More than half of respondents said that the reasons for changes at present include: the increase of the family size at present and to adapt the property according to the family lifestyle (table 1). Some respondents said that other reasons include the willingness to generate an additional income, to divide the property into two residential units and because of some relatives who chose to live with the family.

Eighty percent of the respondents said that the reason for future changes are: the increase of the family size and children who become adults. More than two thirds of them said that the reasons are to adapt the property according to the family lifestyle, to generate an additional income. Other reasons for future changes include dividing the property into two residential units, and that some relatives who would choose to live with the family.

	At present		In the future	
	Not applicable (%)	Applicable (%)	Not applicable	Applicable (%)
The increase of the family size	42	58	18	83
To adapt the property according to the family lifestyle	53	47	28	72
To generate an additional income	59	41	29	71
Children who become adults	69	31	15	85
To divide the property into two residential units	87	13	53	47
Some relatives who want to live with the family	88	12	80	20
Other reasons	63	38	25	75

Table 1: What would be the reason behind the present or the future alterations?

4.2. Type Of Changes To The Built Environment

50% said that they plan to do internal alterations such as maintenance and refurbishment to the properties. 99% plan to do so in the future. 20% said that they plan to do external alterations such as building extra floor, make changes to the elevations and external services work. 94% plan to do external changes in the future. 14% said that they plan to transform the property or part of it into commercial/ non-residential use. 76% said they plan to do so in the future. It is noted that the percentage of people that they plan to do external changes is 20% which is higher from the percentage of people who got mortgages. This matter needs further investigation to find out whether they have the right to do so from the landlord.

4.3. Present And Future Financial Support

The survey showed that the majority of respondents (i.e. 91%) have not managed to get any mortgage loan to buy a property in the past or at present. Few respondents (i.e. 9%) have managed to get a loan in the past or recently, however the amount of loan that granted to them was small i.e. less than 500.000 SR. Most of the respondents are willing to get a loan to buy a property.

	At present		In the future	
	Not applicable (%)	Applicable (%)	Not applicable (%)	Applicable (%)
Type of alteration on the property				
Internal alterations	50	50	1	99
External alterations	80	20	6	94
Transformation of the property or	86	14	24	76
Other alterations	90	10	20	80

Table 2: Whether the customer plans to do any alterations to the property

Respondents were highly unsatisfied about all financial and administrative services of banks and REDF. The respondents pointed out that all types of ownership, control, management rights should be included in the contract of the mortgage loan. These include the owner's right to alter the property, to let or sell it or a part of it, to hire someone to manage it and to transfer the ownership/ benefit right to somebody else. Respondents said that they do not want financial support regarding granting benefit to a third party but need support regarding the cost of management, ownership and alterations. However, they said each type of support should be provided in the designated period that they had specified. The most needed support in respect to the chronological order was: external alterations expenses, internal alterations expenses and cost of assigning someone to manage the property (table 3). The respondents gave their views about issues that affect the property value. They said that the most issues that affect the property value are: the degree of quality of the property, the degree of energy efficiency of the property, the owner/ occupant daily lifestyle activities and conversion of a part of the property into Commercial.

The in-depth analysis of the survey results showed that the higher income citizens have more tendencies to undertake alterations on the property than lower income citizens. This can be simply explained by the fact that they have more financial resources and it is easier for them to reach to financial help than the lower income citizens. All respondents have put nearly the same weight for the present and future reasons behind the alterations on the property.

Higher income citizens are looking for sooner financial support regarding the cost of alterations than the lower income respondents. This can be simply explained, that they plan to buy a property soon, if they have not already had one, and do changes. Whereas lower income citizens have much longer way which would start with finding a way to buy a property thus start to do incremental changes.

Expenses that would be supported by banks	No need to support it at present (%)	Being supported at present (%)	3-5 years (%)	6-10 years (%)	11-15 years (%)	After 16 years or more (%)	Mean support needed (columns 3-6)	Std. Dev.	Skew.
Internal alterations expenses	8	6	43	36	3	4	2.6231	0.7621	1.405
External alterations expenses	8	5	36	44	3	4	2.7092	0.7309	1.157
Cost of assigning somebody to manage the property	35	5	27	27	2	4	2.71983	0.8291	1.299
Cost of repairs that are resulted from negative impacts of the environment on the property	9	6	40	33	8	5	2.7339	0.8506	1.11
Cost of granting right of benefit to a third party	62	6	13	11	1	6	2.9725	1.0841	0.899
Cost of adaptation of the property	31	5	21	22	15	6	3.0931	0.9687	0.434
Cost of the effect of possible Natural disaster on the property	12	6	29	25	14	14	3.1443	1.0847	0.504

Table 3: At which stage during the loan repayment period, should the following issues be supported financially by banks (Mean Column scale: 2: 3-5 years, 3: 6-10 years, 4: 11-15 years, 5: after 16 years. Std. Deviation and skewness values are for columns 3 to 6)

The interviewees complained that the government support does not reach easily to them. Also they complained that they did not get the right and sufficient support from their government employers. The interviewees were totally unsatisfied about the REDF's performance as they said there is long waiting list of REDF to get a loan or a land plot. Furthermore, the loan amount is very small and is given on instalments whereas the property prices are going up dramatically. Furthermore, the REDF's land plots have no planning permission and the citizens would wait for long period until the planning permission is granted. The study shows that citizens aim to own a property, other than the one they occupy, for a number of reasons such as to let it and benefit from the rent. They do not accept to buy a property jointly with a close relative or so as they said this would end up with social problems and it is not acceptable nowadays. The interviewees complained about bank conditions regarding the mortgage loans and the high interest rates. It seems that it difficult for low income citizens to find a guarantor to support their application for a mortgage and even for a normal loan. This would complicate the matter further as they would not be possible for them to get any financial help. A government bank which Al Tasleef Al Saudi provides limited loans for repairs and restoration purposes but again these are not enough to finance any external alteration works. The interviewees complained that these loans would increase the financial debt burden on the shoulders beside it would be virtually impossible for low income citizens to get a loan if they already got a mortgage loan. The interviewees said that the cost of property's alterations should be paid by whoever is capable to pay it such as REDF and the government. It is also vital to create a social security system that would support and protect the citizen. The interviewees said that the employer responsibility is to support to provide or construct dwellings. Most of the interviewees have low salaries and complained about the present unstable living conditions whereas most of them live in a rented accommodation, unreasonable increase in rent price whereas the owner has the absolute power,. Some of them did not manage to get any help, very few have managed to get help from the relatives to buy or get a property.

The study found that the family/ tribe support scheme is conducted by some families whereas the rich would help the poor. This helps some of the interviewees to get or buy a

property. In regards to the conversion of a part of the property to a commercial use, The researcher would like to highlight the citizens are not educated about financial risks that would incur regarding their decision to start a new business and provide an extra income. So they definitely need support from experts who would advise them about the feasibility of doing this or that type of commercial activity. The absence of on-going support –as the participants pointed out- would affect badly the property’s quality and the family’s life. The family would have a number of property defects that should be sorted out whereas the family do not have any financial resources to pay for the cost of repairs.

5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The field survey showed the type and Chronological sequence of these socio-economic needs. It pointed out the citizens’ views about the financial support amount and timing that should be provided by financial institutes to meet the initial and on-going needs. The participants have highlighted anxiously the negative impact of the lack of initial and on-going support on their economic and social life and their properties. The paper has pointed out the present financial system is not capable to fulfil the citizens’ initial and on-going requirements in respect to the property-related issues.

On the other hand, the study found the present financing system is constrained by a number of issues. Some of these are external such as these related to the financial market and some are internal which the bank applies on themselves to minimize potential risk. These constraints have negative impact on the performance of banks and REDF and disable these institutes to provide efficient and satisfactory service to clients. It is obvious that the financing system that is implemented by Saudi banks is not functioning well in KSA and there is an emergent need to re-evaluate the system and create a financing system that does not only utilize Islamic financing tools -such as: Ijarah, Murabaha etc- but also is built up upon the Islamic social model that prompts the community coherence and integrity or Takaful¹ and

¹ Takaful is an alternative form of cover that a Muslim can avail himself against the risk of loss due to misfortunes. Takaful is based on the idea that what is uncertain with respect to an individual may cease to be uncertain with respect to a very large number of similar individuals

by implementing Islamic financing mechanisms such as Qared Hasan², charity loans (e.g. Zakat and Sadaqa or charity payment) and use it to help the poor clients. This would support the right of poor citizens to own a property and to undertake incremental improvements. Eventually, banks, REDF, charities, the government and local communities should sooner rather than later, join efforts to set up strategies to tackle the property-related problems, otherwise, the problem would be very hard to control and cure.

REFERENCES

- Ahmed, K.G. and Parry, C.M., 2001a. Towards a relevant framework for participatory decision making processes in low-income neighbourhoods in Cairo, Egypt: As an approach for socio-culturally responsive public housing product. In: *1st International Postgraduate Research Conference on the Built and Human Environment*. University of Salford.
- Ahmed, K.G. and Parry, C.M., 2002. Design for the poor in Egypt: Satisfying User Needs or Achieving the Aspirations of Professionals? the case of Mubarak National Housing Project for Youth, *the Design Research Society International Conference*. London: Brunel University.
- Ahmed, K.G. and Parry, C.M., 2001b. *Traditional Settlements, User Participation and the 'No-Harm' Principle Towards a contemporary participatory process in low-income public housing in Islamic cities. IAPS Second International Symposium Traditional Environments in a New Millennium: Defining Principles and Professional Practice*. Turkey: Amasya.
- Akbar, J.A.A., 1992. *The Architecture of the earth in Islam* (in Arabic). KSA: Dar Al-Qebla.
- Al-Kurdi, F., 2002a. The labor city in Dammam: an analysis of its house forms. *Advanced workshop ARAR 602*. King Faisal University.
- Al-Kurdi, F., 2002b. *Lifestyle and house form: the case of Aramco houses under home ownership in Dhahran*. Unpublished graduate dissertation, King Faisal University.

² Qared Hasan is a loan extended on a goodwill basis, and the debtor is only required to repay the amount borrowed.

- Al-Naim, M. and Mahmud, S., 2007. Transformation of traditional dwellings and income generation by low-income expatriates: The case of Hofuf, Saudi Arabia. *Cities*, 24(6), pp.422-433.
- Aldosary, A., Alshuwaikhat, H., Quadri, S.I. and Raziuddin, M., 2007. *Al Saedan Chair on Affordable Housing- revised report, KFUPM, Volume I, determining affordable housing stocks in administrative areas, Saudi Arabia Kingdom*. [online] Available at: <<http://www.kfupm.edu.sa/crp/Saeedan/Volume%20One.pdf>> [Accessed July 2008].
- Darweesh, L., 2003. *Dweller-initiated changes and transformations in Built environment: the impact of building regulations*. Unpublished MSC thesis. King Faisal University.
- DEFRA, 2008. *Climate change & energy*. [online] Available at: <<http://www.defra.gov.uk/Environment/climatechange/>> [Accessed July 2008].
- Habraken, J., 2003. Questions that will not go away: some Remarks on long term trends in Architecture and their impact on Architectural education. In: *Keynote Speech: Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the European Association of Architectural Education-EAAE*. Crete, Greece: Hania, pp.32-42.
- Hillier, B., 1996. *Space is the Machine*. UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Hillier, B. and Hanson, J., 1984. *The Social Logic of Space*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hojrup, T., 2003. *State, Culture, and Life Modes: The Foundations of Life Mode Analysis*. London, UK: Ashgate.
- Ibn Al-Rami, M.I.I., 1995. *Al-Ilan bi-ahkam al-bunyan (in Arabic)*. Dar Ishbiliy, KSA: Markaz al-Dirasat wa-al-Ilam.
- Mahmud, S., 2007. Identity crisis due to transformation of home environment: the case for two Muslim cities, Dhaka and Hofuf. *METU JFA*, 24(2), pp.37-56.
- Maslow, A.H., 1943. A Theory of Human Motivation. *Psychological Review*, 50(4), pp.370-396.
- Myers, G., Reed, R. and Robinson, J., 2007. The Relationship between Sustainability and the Value of Office Buildings. In: *13th Annual Pacific Rim Real Estate Conference*, 21 - 24 January 2007, Curtin University of Technology, Perth. WA.

- Salamah, A.M., 2006. A life style theories approach for affordable housing research in Saudi Arabia. *Emirates Journal for Engineering Research*, 11(1), pp.67-76.
- Sayce, S., 2003. Integrating sustainability into the appraisal of property worth: identifying appropriate indicators of sustainability. In: *The American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association conference*, August 21 – 23, 2003, Skye, Scotland.
- Sayce, S., Ellison, L. and Smith, J., 2004. Incorporating sustainability in commercial property appraisal: evidence from the UK. In: *The 11th European Real Estate Society Conference*, 2-5 June 2004. Milan, Italy.
- Sidawi, B. and Meeran, S., 2011. A framework for providing lifelong finance to the owners of affordable dwellings in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. *Cities*. 28, pp.138-146.
- Stemers, K., 2003. Establishing research directions in sustainable building design, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research Technical Report 5 September 2003. [online] Available at: <http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/research/theme2/final_reports/it1_28.pdf> [Accessed December 2008].
- Struyk, R.J., 2005 Housing Policy Issues in a rich country with high population growth: the case of Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. *Review of Urban & Regional Development Studies*, 17(2), pp.140-161.
- United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), 2005. *Financing Urban shelter. Global report on human settlements*. [online] Available at: <<http://www.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/GRHS.2005.0.pdf>> [Accessed December 2011].

Chinese Central Government Policy Priorities During Power Transitions

Tristan McInnis
Peking University
Email: tristan.mcinnis@gmail.com

INTRODUCTION

The Chinese government has been studied extensively since the reform and opening period post 1978. There are countless books on the speed of growth, lack of democracy, social problems, and so forth, but it has always been a problem for scholars to understand how exactly the policies proposed by the central government came to be. We do not have a front-row seat to the power struggles and factionalism that inhabit the world's largest governing body. For political reasons this is all kept behind closed doors. Scholars can infer from the stance of those in the top party hierarchy whether one side has bested the other. However, in the days of modern public relations this inference is proving even more difficult with such tip lipped Presidents as Hu Jintao, who stays very well scripted to party lines (Shirk, 2007; Lam, 2006). So what of the scholar's ability to evaluate party control and policy? They are relegated to that of observer, more specifically, to observe the types of policies and how well they are implemented. Scholars write on the level of policy control the central government has over the bureaucratic hierarchy from lowest level cadres to provincial heads, based on how fast or fully the central government plans are implemented.

CHINA MODEL

Kenneth Lieberthal wrote of China's "fragmented authoritarianism" in so far as China has a very complex hierarchical system that sometimes comes into conflict with factions from within (Lieberthal, 2005). For the practical purposes of studying policy implementation there is a very real political component. The CCP (Chinese Communist Party) and the Chinese

State are interlinked in overlapping functions and thus it is near impossible to separate political and bureaucratic functions (Lieberthal, 2005). China is maturing as an authoritarian state with many unique characteristics that make copying the “china model” a somewhat futile affair. The main features are that of a neo-authoritarian model of governance whereby the links between culture, tradition, national security, and maintenance of the status quo are the top priorities.

DECENTRALIZATION / RECENTRALIZATION DEBATE

Without going too far into specifics regarding tax rates and transfers or purely looking at the economic rationale behind this decentralization/centralization debate, the purpose of this paper then is rather to look at the nature of *power* of the state and how it is exercised in policy implementation. As such, the work of going over the specific history is not outlined here. A theoretical argument based on assumptions of historical legacy about the nature of the Chinese state governing structure and therefore assumptions about the CCP and its bureaucracy are detailed within. This principal-agent problem will be applied to help explain party policy implementation. This paper asserts that the incentive structures created by the CCP engender certain loyalties to those that are most directly in charge of them and this explains the nature of the principal agent relationship between center and periphery.

To build upon a base with which to argue effectively, definitions of power and the types of decentralization are outlined below. Using a rational choice framework, power is defined here as that of “social power”, or the ability of an actor to create incentive structures that bring about the desired outcomes of the principal actor (Dowding, 1996). There are four types of decentralization outlined hereafter. The first being *administrative decentralization* which “occurs when national authorities permit their subnational agents to make certain policy decisions, subject to review and possible veto from above”. The second is *political decentralization* that refers to a system where “subnational governments have the right to make certain policy decisions”, which are not “subject to overrule by higher levels”. Moreover, these politically decentralized areas may include those which can elect their local

officials separate from central state intervention. Then there is *fiscal decentralization* by its very nature refers to matters of tax revenues. Lastly, *Government decentralization* is linked to all three of the types above and can come in various forms (Cai & Triesman, 2006).

REFORMS AND POWER

The Chinese reform and opening period was a gradual transition and thus parallels to the shock therapy approach used in former eastern bloc states does not fit well with the Chinese experience. The speed of reforms under China's gradual approach maintained the information channels for the CCP (Y. Huang, 1995). The leadership under Deng essentially experimented with the different reforms and those who achieved success were promoted and had their projects expanded. However, to say that China is complex is an understatement and the nuances of policy proposals take on a new light in the heated political atmosphere in Beijing. What seems reasonable in faraway Guangdong province can be met with fierce resistance by party hard-liners keen on maintaining state control. For the early reform years Deng played well politics well and continually moved people who achieved success closer to the top positions such as Zhao Ziyang (Shirk, 2007; Pei, 2006).

The Chinese economy had differed from the Soviet model because aside from having one central plant for manufacturing one specific item, the Chinese had built "parallel" industries across the provinces. This is the difference between the Chinese "M-form" economy over the Soviet "U-form". This type of reform has been called "market preserving" (Montinola, Qian, and Weingast, 1995; Jin, Qiang, and Weingast, 2005). So right after the opening and reform period you had a natural condition of competition built in. This helped to ease dislocations and moreover it stimulated the competition. It is precisely this type of decentralization that enabled local and provincial leaders to have some fiscal incentive to increase the output or efficiency of the industry in their region and do whatever was possible for them to perform. Moreover with this idea of increasing performance and output, enterprises were forced to restructure. While these restricting activities created their own externalities by way of societal impact or discontent with the reform era, there is no question

that this impact of reform and opening had a positive impact on GDP growth (Bergsten, 2008).

These are facts of the governance system but do not help to explain the why question, why did China decentralize certain industries over others? Who would be in charge? These are much more political questions which will be elaborated later. The practical argument is that opening and decentralization helped make Chinese enterprise more efficient and thus led to higher levels of growth. But this did not remain a constant and Treisman and Cai argue that if we take into account the factional power there is a corresponding “ebb and flow” linked to reforms and thus it helps to explain why the reforms had continual success even in the 1990s when leadership sought to recentralize in the face of waning central government power over the provinces (Cai & Treisman, 2006). Andrew Nathan wrote that even though China is a “unitary system”, powers at the lower level are essentially grants from the central government. In a study of twenty-eight provinces between the years 1979-1995 conducted by Li and Zhou, they found that it was much more likely for those leaders whose provinces had high growth that they would get a promotion.

Factionalism and interest groups play a major role in Chinese politics within the CCP. It goes without saying that China is a unitary state, but there are specific regional and ideological groups that bind together to push for certain policy initiatives. While Deng did not wield the power that Mao had he was very skilful in the way that he promoted and positioned his allies in key positions around the country. The experiments of the Special Economic Zones for example were carried out in Guangdong and used as a model for other parts around the country (Lieberthal, 2005).

Reforms of the SEZs far from being from a showcase of decentralization very much speak to the centralized system that the government could conduct these large scale experiments and then in the 1990s roll out the opening of economic reforms in spite of the factionalism at the center (Bergsten, 2008).

Not many authoritarian regimes would see the need to create such a drastic reform to their economy. But it goes without saying that Deng had imagined China to be much more developed than it should have been. He took on pragmatic reforms after Mao was side-lined

following the disastrous Great Leap Forward campaign in the 50s (Lieberthal, 2005). Today's CCP really speaks to the practical nature of governance rather than some ideological ferment of Mao's era or more aptly put, to the self-preserving nature of their own style of governance. While China has a socialist market economy, it retains little if any of the old characteristics which were ascribed to it in the post 1949 years. So what was the motivation for opening China up in the first place? Deng and those close to him realized that if China wanted to be a serious player that it had to change some of its policies and allow for foreign capital and know-how to infiltrate the Chinese. In the equation of land, labour, and capital it was the later that China had scant availability. Yet, how did they hope for this to be achieved while not making any changes to the political structure? While economic reforms took place there were also institutional and political reforms. The political reforms did not mean democratization but entail "devising institutional mechanisms that minimize the odds the party will lose control over local elites" (Landry, 2008). Moreover, that the foundation in all of this was the preservation of the Party and directly linked to that was the monopoly over cadre affairs. By having control of this bureaucratic function the Party was in the position of maintaining both state and Party simultaneously with the former being the most important and the later a formality. You could not separate Party and Government with positions of power being tied to your hierarchy within the Party.

LEGITIMACY THROUGH REFORM?

It is not in the nature of authoritarian regimes to relinquish control to local elites, the power dynamic drastically changes to benefit the locals. Autocratic regimes are not inclined to delegate authority to those local elites for fear of alternative power structures and the use of local resources to challenge the central leaders (Treisman, 1999). The idea of decentralization of "power" then runs counter the nature of the Party with its top down hierarchy. The point then is to build a strong bond between the objectives and natural disposition of the local leaders with those of the central Party. As with using the definition of power provided the Party was reticent of the need to link central and local objectives.

In Hobbes view it is natural that people should give up certain rights so that the collective might achieve great progress and stability. And yet, he advocated for strong property rights which are non-existent within in China. China no longer even promises to have reforms in the future like they did in the 1980s which led to the standoff with students in Tiananmen Square. So what holds them all together? The social contract between state and society is simple: do not engage in politics and instead pursue your economic interests. Those who do well in business are praised in modern day China; however the tone in recent years has shifted to one of concern. The high levels of corruption, cronyism, and nepotism all show signs of the strain in China as the picture of business dealings in China are muddled by an increasingly vocal press. Most Chinese believe that those with tremendous wealth did something un-proper to achieve it. Between 1999 and 2004 the Central Party School survey showed that corruption was the biggest problem for the government among all other quandaries (Pei, 2007).

Recentralization in China has really taken a very brutish and sinister tone. The police apparatus has been beefed up and surveillance of its citizens has reached deeper and deeper into the daily life. In fact this year the budget reached \$95 billion compared with \$92 billion for the military budget (Buckley, 2011 “China internal security spending jumps past army budget”). The point is moot when you consider there is great overlap between the military and paramilitary budgets with the later sometimes filling in for surveillance or internet security operations. Rather this shows the Party’s commitment to control dissent within and moreover that they place national stability at the forefront. Additionally, there are experiments taking place with highly sophisticated biometric technology in Shenzhen and it was in Beijing during the 2008 Olympics that advanced facial recognition software was rolled out on the subway and around the cities major landmarks and business districts. The Orwellian state presence of big-brother has left a shadow over the growing civil society in China. To put it bluntly, China has recentralized core security areas so that it may hold on to its power even after it seems the mandate of heaven is lost. This all amounts to digging in. Stronger ties to the military and building its own paramilitary force have tied the strong arm to the proverbial political head. The interest groups that have been co-opted go from not only the standard bearers of

communist rule such as the military to now intellectuals at the top universities in China along with those “red businessmen”(Pei, 2007; Shirk, 2007). Not to say that these groups may become dissatisfied with the regime, but rather they are wholly connected to each other’s fate. If the Party goes down, so does the patronage to conduct research, and so too does the power of the red-businessmen who have been protected through Party affiliation.

The decentralization in China that took place really opened the door for the first cracks in an authoritarian regime. The interest groups could now utilize more tools then previously available. Moreover, those who had tremendous economic growth were in an even more advantageous position to exact higher gains at the expense of other areas. While at this stage in China’s development there still exist far too many linkages to the CCP and maintaining its stability, that could easily change if the economic situation sours. Or if they Party is seen as detrimental to the interests of those power brokers, for example the private entrepreneurs who may be hurt by more redistributive tax policy. Economic development can corrode authoritarian rule and also has this effect of creating localities with power that could lead strengthening of opposing party rule (Weingast, 2000; Landry, 2008). While “local malfeasance has been a consistent theme in Chinese political history”, is the current situation any different (Wedeman, 2001)?

CADRE CONTROL

So how then does the CCP maintain its political control since the reforms? The appointment system is one way and the second is the lack of alternatives. The “ganbu” or appointment system for party officials is a lynchpin in this new vision of CCP bureaucratic control. This personnel appointment system watches over the world’s largest bureaucracy. While more than just a glorified human resources department the cadre management is crucial to maintaining stability and control for the Party. This is the Party monopoly on organizational discipline and moreover this structures the principal agent relationships between local Party institutions and officials with whom Beijing is impressed (Landry, 2008). The political power displayed by Beijing is again a social power that constrains the decisions of the local leaders

along the Party's preferential lines. There is policy space within the lower levels of the hierarchy but only in so far as it remains within the broad central leadership requirements and keeps the Party cohesive. The Party has been remarkably deft and co-opting new groups into the regime. Thus the system of appointments keeps those ambitious leaders in check. Notwithstanding there are instances of building regional cliques such as Jiang Zemin and his Shanghai faction or building groups based on background such as the up and coming Princeling faction under Xi Jinping and Bo Xilai.

With no clear opposing forces in sight the most viable option for gaining control of this vast bureaucracy comes from within. Fighting the entrenched interests and working your way through the CCP architecture seems available alternative to working with the masses. To work within the Party is highly preferable for many graduates these days benefits of having the “guanxi” are the necessary ways of breaking the glass ceiling for those prized jobs and lifestyle that come with it. While social mobility and income inequality rise ever higher to the tops of the CCP agenda and the subsequent social unrest that go along with them pose a threat to regime legitimacy, the numbers applying to join the party continue to increase. The old adage “if you can't beat them, join them” seems apropos.

CONCLUSION

To conclude, the Chinese state is constantly trying to adapt to the challenges it faces with ruling such a vast territory and with such a sizeable population. The bureaucracy is in place to handle major projects like the three gorges dam or sending a man a man to the moon, but it is the more mundane aspects of governance that seem to slip. Of China's many quandaries from the demographic time bomb, corruption, massive amount of non-performing loans and environmental degradation the CCP remains intact. As the Party demonstrates its ability to control core state functions it is displaying its power and yet showcasing its weakness and fear at the same time. It fears the mob and decidedly is quite happy to leave the civil society fragmented. If the disparate groups in China were to find one common voice for their concerns the power dynamic could change quite quickly. The constant surveillance, the

preoccupation with studying the colour revolutions that occurred in Eastern Europe, has led the scholars/observers to give credence to the idea that authoritarian regimes fear the loss of power. The CCP displays this same level of anxiety. On the political spectrum China remains “trapped” as Pei Minxin put it, not able to continue on the logical path of reforms with a more open political society and yet unable to move backwards for fear of hurting the economic progress at the heart of CCP legitimacy. The quandary has placed China into a unique category. As the current shift of the economy towards more consumption and away from the export model which has driven them to success for the past thirty years. It seems for the moment that without a viable alternative, the continued stability will see the social contract remain intact. The Chinese Leviathan remains strong even in the face of major obstacles.

REFERENCES

- Bergsten, C.F., 2008. *China's Rise: Challenges and Opportunities*. Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics.
- Buckley, C. China internal security spending jumps past army budget. [online] Available at: <<http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/05/uschinaunrestidUSTRE7222RA20110305>> [Accessed 1 Dec 2011].
- Gong, T., 2006. Corruption and Local Governance: the Double Identity of Chinese Local Governments in Market Reform. *Pacific Review*, 1, pp.85-102.
- Lam, W.W., 2006. *Chinese politics in the Hu Jintao era: new leaders, new challenges*. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.
- Lam, W., 2010. Is China Afraid of Its Own People?, *Foreign Policy*. [online] Available at: <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/09/28/is_china_afraid_of_its_own_people> [Accessed 1 Dec 2011].
- Landry, P.F., 2008. *Decentralized Authoritarianism in China: The Communist Party's Control of Local Elites in the Post-Mao era*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lieberthal, K., 2005. *Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform*, 2nd ed. New York: W.W. Norton.

- Ma, Q., 2002. Governance of NGOs in China since 1978: How much Autonomy. *Non-profit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, 31, pp.305-328.
- Naughton, B., 2007. The Assertive Center: Beijing Moves Against Local Government Control of Land?. *China Leadership Monitor*, 20.
- Pei, M.X., 2006. *China's Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Shirk, S.L. 2007. *China: Fragile Superpower*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Wedeman, A.H., 2003. *From Mao to Market: Rent Seeking, Local Protectionism, and Marketization in China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Weatherley, R., 1999. *The discourse of human rights in China: historical and ideological perspectives*. New York, N.Y.: St. Martin's Press.
- Zheng, Y.N., Lu, Y.Y. and White, L.T., 2010. *Politics of Modern China*. New York: Routledge.

Vigilante Activities for Residential Community: An Empirical Study in Liuzhou, China

Lena Y. Zhong
City University of Hong Kong
Email: ylzhang@cityu.edu.hk

Holly Heng He
City University of Hong Kong
Email: heheng@cityu.edu.hk

INTRODUCTION

By reviewing various forms of public participation in crime control and criminal justice, Peter N. Grabosky (1992) informed us of an increasing trend of non-governmental actors participating in crime prevention which was traditionally regarded as the core function of authorities in western industrial societies. There has been widespread growth of private security sector to meet the increasing demand for public security requirements, considering the very limited financial capacity of governments. This overlaying and cooperation between governmental and private resource in public security has been prevalent in Australia, as noted by Grabosky (1992). The work of David Weisburd (1988) on vigilantism as community social control reminded us that vigilante actions could be operated as a kind of strength in crime prevention. However, scatteredly motivated from grassroots, vigilantism is inclined to attract more media eyes than scholarly attention. Moreover, among various forms of non-governmental resource in crime prevention, vigilantism unfortunately receives rare attention in criminological scholarship during the past decade. At the least, it becomes one of the least developed topics in criminology, though there have been a few scholarly discussions on vigilante behaviors during the 1990s. Except for a very limited anthropological studies (e.g. Ray Abrahams, 1998), little sustained empirical research with a special criminological perspective is conducted on vigilante activities. Furthermore, the research on the effect of vigilantism in crime prevention is still sparse and shallow.

Compared with its western counterparts, vigilante behavior has received even less academic discussion in mainland China. Actually, vigilantism has emerged and developed distinctively in China. Being operated more like the neighborhood watch group in the United States, various forms of vigilante activities are thriving and displaying their effects in crime prevention in Chinese communities. A residential patrol team (RPT) has turned out to be a typical example which has been successfully operated in Liuzhou, a city located in Guangxi, mainland China. The RPT is a volunteer organization constituted by local private citizens with the longest history (about one decade) in Liuzhou city., the success (e.g. its evident deterrence on crimes and deviances, its persistent operation regardless of budgetary restraint and other obstacles) of this residential patrol team in crime prevention and order maintenance has intrigued extensive social attention, including government officials, scholars and the general public. What contributes to the establishment of the RPT? Why is it successful in deterring the crimes and deviances in the community? Why can it survive as the oldest volunteer patrol team in the whole city? What is the major reason for its widespread impacts in the whole city? A comprehensive introduction of this typical RPT in Liuzhou city can better show the distinctive operation of vigilantism in mainland China, which also contributes to the academic discussion on role of vigilante activities in crime control in Chinese context. To better answer the above intriguing research questions, this study aims to introduce the operation of RPT, including its objectives, formation, budget, tasks, effectiveness and impacts on grassroots security; and discuss the reasons of the emergence of such neighborhood watch activities and its relationship with the official responses to crimes by drawing upon vigilante activities in western democracies. To serve the later discussion, it is better first to review the concept and features of vigilantism as analyzed in western countries.

DEFINITION OF VIGILANTISM

As acknowledged by Les Johnston (1996), there has been little criminological research on the definition of vigilantism. There are currently two types of approaches to vigilantism: one is media reports, though rich in materials with a sensationalist style but without adequate

clarity or rigor; the other one is academic discussions, though sufficient in rigor but still lack of the conceptualization of vigilantism (Johnston, 1996). Though a few serious attempts have been devoted to conceptualize and categorize vigilantism, there still exist some inconsistencies and equivocalness in their explications. When advocating more concrete academic definitions to typify vigilante actions, J. Paul Grayson offered a general illustration: “the vigilante is someone who does not necessarily wait for state functionaries to take action with respect to ruptures of the moral order although he or she may take action in concert with them” (1992 p.24).

H. J. Rosenbaum and P. C. Sederberg (1976) defined that “when individuals or groups identifying with the established order defend that order by resorting to means that violate these formal boundaries, they can be usefully classified as vigilantes” (1976 p.4). Sederberg (1978) extended this definition by emphasizing the specific intention of vigilante acts which excluded it from criminal offenses. His further explanation can guide us to distinguish among different vigilantisms which have been scattered in various academic articles or media reports: crime control vigilantism, social group control vigilantism and regime control vigilantism. Even so, the academic discussion on vigilante behaviors still lack of systematic elaborations which have not clearly clarified the analytical scope of their analyses. For example, Les Johnston (1996) revolved on crime control vigilantism, while David Kowalewski (1996) focused on social group control vigilantism and regime control vigilantism.

According to R. P. Ingalls (1988 p.15), “organization is necessary for the formation of vigilante groups”. R. L. Shotland (1976) and Shotland and L. L. Goldstein (1984) emphasized the spontaneous vigilantism “occurs when bystanders not only apprehend a criminal but also mete out punishment themselves” (1984 p.16). The further differentiation between organized and spontaneous vigilantism is useful for us to analyze the concrete forms of RPT operation. Though, according to Johnston (1996), spontaneous violent reactions by a victim to an assailant cannot be vigilante behaviors, which is incongruent with the definition of spontaneous vigilantism given by Shotland and Goldstein (1984), he still acknowledged that some forms of unrehearsed acts (e.g. bystanders apprehend and punish criminals) in a specific social conditions (e.g. inhabiting in a homogenous community or lacking sufficient faith in

criminal justice system) involved predisposition and premeditation, which were claimed as preconditions of vigilantism.

FEATURES OF VIGILANTISM

In very limited literature to conceptualize vigilantism, Johnston (1996) argued that vigilantism possessed six necessary features: first, it involved the activities of planning and premeditation; second, those engaged in vigilante activities were private citizens by voluntary participation; third, it was a form of “autonomous citizenship” and a part of social movement; fourth, it used or threatened the use of force; fifth, it emerged to protect an established order from any threat of transgression; sixth, it provided assurances of security to control crimes or other social infractions.

There is a common foundation upon which both Johnston (1996) and Kowalewski (1996) rested: vigilante actions are regarded as emerging to defend the institutionalized norms from any threat of disruption. It is the defending for institutionalized norms that provide the initial justification for involving vigilantism in criminological talk. Johnston (1996) underscored vigilantism raised when the established order was under any threat from imputed transgressions, while Kowalewski (1996) claimed that, with the legitimacy based on upholding conventional norms, vigilante behaviors have been normalized by the regimes to counter the dissident movement. To quash dissents, the regimes, which aimed to protect elite interests, mobilized their resource, including supportive citizens or vigilantes to cope with the dissident movement. Thus, vigilantism could be conceived as an unconventional political approach used by the elites to fight unconventional dissidents, or viewed as a special political mirror-image of dissent groups.

There is another similarity between Johnston and Kowalewski in the analysis of vigilantism. Johnston (1996) viewed that vigilante actions were constituted by autonomous citizenship which was usually not sanctioned or authorized by the state. Besides, vigilante activates should be demarcated from law-enforcement behaviors of police officers regardless of on-duty or off-duty. Kowalewski (1996) regarded that vigilante were poorly trained and

supervised, since there was little need to train vigilante groups given the conventional means adopted by the regimes fail to stem the dissident movement. Besides, the less supervision of the regimes can greatly developed the organizational advantages of vigilante groups (e.g. mobility and the like).

When discussing vigilantism's feature of private volunteer agency, Johnston (1996) emphasized the modes of "autonomous citizenship" which was generally undertaken without state approval or was not sanctioned or sponsored by the state. However, Kowalewski (1996) argued vigilante groups in western countries rarely aroused from the grassroots. He further claimed that private counter-dissident groups were mainly mobilized by elites who organized, funded, trained and armed them.

Likewise, Johnston and Kowalewski differed in their views regarding the participatory means in vigilant groups. The former claimed the voluntary participation by private citizens as a predisposition of vigilantism, while the latter mentioned the possibility of forcible recruitment of new members by vigilante groups. As analyzed by Kowalewski (1996), the pressure of attracting new strength for the dangerous work and the authoritarian characteristics of vigilante groups make the recruitment of new members become more forcible or violent.

When it comes to crimes and deviances, their statements are in total oppositional stances. The most significant feature proposed by Johnston (1996) that embedded vigilantism into criminological discussion was its reaction to crime and social deviance. The vigilante actions illustrated by him were viewed as an important auxiliary strength to curb crimes or social deviances. However, Kowalewski (1996) argued vigilante groups might create more social disorders or involve in criminal activities but without necessary judicial prosecution. Considering the great threats from vigilante crimes and violent attacks, rank-and-file police officers were encouraged to be involved in the disbandment coalition against vigilante groups.

Citing plenty of examples¹ about vigilante activities in America, Kowalewski (1996)

¹ The examples used by Kowalewski (1996) include: 1) Pinkerton detectives and other private groups used by American coercive organs to quell the labor movement; 2) American Protective League used by Bureau of Investigation against the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) and other unionist; 3) Private Secret Army Organization formed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as part of its counter-dissident COINTELPRO program; 4) World Anti-Communist League utilized by the FBI and National Security Council (NSC) to harass

further proved the vigilantism against counter-dissent was a kind of low-cost auxiliary force in law enforcement, when the regimes budgets are restrained. He also claimed that flexibility and mobility enabled vigilante groups to response quickly and easily towards a dissident movement, which was touted as a private “rapid deployment force” for a regime.

FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH VIGILANTE BEHAVIORS

Previous studies, though scarce in amount, have discussed variously the factors associated with the emergence and prevalence of vigilante behaviors across different nations. For example, Ray Abrahams (1998) relied on his empirical research in Tanzanian and a wide range of secondary sources related to vigilantism in various countries across different periods to discuss the issues concerning law, power, authority and the state. Drawing upon the substantial materials, such as the vigilante activities in North America and Europe, he further pointed out that the emergence was closely related to the failure of criminal justice system in some jurisdictions (e.g. the incompetence of police, the slowness of due process, the tension between law and justice, etc.). This may echo with the claims of L. Taylor (1976) that the resurgence of vigilante groups may be attributable with the popular disenchantment with the justice system.

David Weisburd (1988) carried out the first quantitative examination of participating in vigilante behaviors in the Gush Emunim settlements, which showed that the likelihood of acting as vigilantes were higher among those coming from smaller or more victimized outposts. Though his findings were likely to be specific to the Israeli scene, the collected data provided a strong support for a criminological model which underscored the role of the vigilante as an agent of community social control. Likewise, Shotland and Goodstein (1984) suggested that the emergence of spontaneous crime control vigilantism was highly associated with two interesting conditions: the first involved an increasing crime creating a strong sense of vulnerability shared by community members; the second related to the social and ethical

dissenters and Central American refugees; 5) The Legion of Justice directed by the FBI to vandalize the offices of the antiwar movement.

homogeneity of communities, which facilitated communications and trusts between participants and encouraged the identification with the victim.

Johnston (1996) also noted that the social homogeneity within one community and low level of trust on local criminal justice system could serve as preconditions for community crime prevention or for the operation of vigilante activates against crimes or deviances (Johnston, 1996). Considering the paucity and patchiness of empirical research on vigilantism in both UK and USA, Johnston (1996) further encouraged more analyses by considering more elements on the prevalent types of vigilante activities (individual, group, ad hoc, recurrent, patrol based, surveillance based), the participants (by age, sex, class, ethnicity, housing type, urban/rural residence), the motivation of engagement (victimization, fear of victimization, revenge, frustration with the justice system), the way of organizing, the longevity, and its relationship with local agencies (police).

For the contributing factors working differently in various countries, there is even less academic discussion so far. The prevalence of vigilante behaviors was higher in the nations where the vigilantism had been highly frequent in the past, or the culture of private violence was widely popular or traditionally lauded (Kowalewski, 1996). These nations include the United States, where individuals and groups took the law into their own hands outside the official legal apparatus in the past live, Russia, and Colombia, where the use of private force against political enemies decades ago during the period of persists into the present. Though Canada, different from the U.S., did not have a tradition of popular sovereignty which can ideologically legitimized vigilante activities (Torrance, 1986; McNaught, 1975; Lipset, 1990), Grayson (1992) claimed that the support for crime control spontaneous vigilantism was independent of national political tradition and crime rates, etc.

Drawing upon the above western studies on the definition, features of vigilantism and its associated factors, this paper aims to use an empirical case based in Liuzhou city to illustrate the concrete formation, operation and function of a typical example of crime control vigilantism in mainland China.

DATA COLLECTION

The study adopted a combined technique of community observation, in-depth interviews with RPT members and local residents, and a documentary analysis of relevant media sources. For the community observation, the researcher approached the targeted community in Liuzhou, a major city centrally located in Guangxi, mainland China, to observe its social environment, the maintenance of social order, and the operation of the RPT. For in-depth interviews, a group interview was conducted with the participation of six RPT members, including the team leader of the RPT. All of them have retired and their ages range between 50 and 80. The group interview was conducted in a semi-structured style with a strict guarantee of anonymity and confidentiality throughout the research. The discussion among RPT members was heated and active, and abundant information regarding its formation, operation, function and impacts was obtained during about 3 hours. For the documentary analysis of media sources, the researcher used internet search engines, such as Google and Baidu, to retrieve relevant local media reports on the RPT in Liuzhou city, with the combination of key words of “義務巡邏隊” (the Chinese term of “volunteer patrol team”) and “柳州” (the Chinese term of “Liuzhou”), or the combination of “居民巡邏隊” (the Chinese term of “residential patrol team”) and “柳州”. The researcher analyzed how the media portrayed the operation and social impacts of RPT as well as its relationship with local police departments.

REASONS FOR THE EMERGENCE

We find that two factors directly contribute to the establishment of RPT. First of all, the deteriorated social order and the increasing victimization experiences within or around the community. Geographically located near the main railway station, bus terminal and wholesale market where the flow of population was rather high, the social order around the community was quite poor (Chen & Yang, 2010). Burglaries and thefts became usual occurrences within and around the community. Under the threats of increased crimes and deviances, the needs for

protecting public security and maintaining social order of the community were increasingly high. Obtaining the support from the neighborhood committee and local property management agency, a residential patrol team (RPT) was formed under an active advocacy of a few victims followed by passionate participations of local residents in the community.

“Community residents here were frequently inflicted by bicycle thefts before. The couples who advocated for establishing the RPT were stolen 8 bicycles in total!”
(Interviewee A)

“Before the building of the RPT, many households in the community complained that they were victimized by burglaries very often.” (Interviewee B).

The shortage of police manpower becomes the second factor that directly precipitates the establishment of the RPT. It is reported that this community is comprised of twenty household buildings inhabited by more than 3100 persons (Qin & Qin, 2009). However, there is only one police officer being responsible for the community public security, which makes its police – public ratio even lower than 1.38/1000, the estimated police – public ratio in mainland China as noted by L. Zhong (2009). The scantiness of local police resource not only affects the timely response of officials towards crimes or deviance, but also engenders many loopholes in maintaining local social order. Therefore, forming a grass-roots organization from bottom-up to maintain social order is more urgent and feasible, which can turn out to be an effective supplement to assist the official responses towards crimes and deviances.

“The community police officer does not have sufficient time to patrol around our community on a regular base.” (Interviewee C).

THE FUNCTION OF THE RPT

Considering the paucity of residents staying at home during working hours, RPT

members patrol routinely within the community to remove any threat to public security, especially for those vacant houses and unattended vehicles. Besides, unlocked doors and vehicles, mischievous behaviors (playing with fire, climbing walls or windows, posting or graffiti), strangers from outside of the community (e.g. panhandlers, hawkers), suspicious activities, any potential dangers (e.g. inappropriate usage of fire, gas and electrical) all belong to their scope of monitoring. Without any working uniform, each of them wears a red badge on their elbow to show their responsibilities in maintaining the social order for the community. To perform more professionally, about 5 members, led by the team leader, patrolled in a line, which slightly imitates the walk of People's Armed Police soldiers. "Who are you looking for?" became the pet phrase of RPT members when they came across any stranger within the community (Lai, 2011). Though many of them are senior citizens and lack of specialized training, their patrols became an eye-catching activity in such a calm community.

"Our main duties are community patrols which last from 9am to 10:30am and from 2:30pm to 4:00pm every working day." (Interviewee A)

"We only have 3 to 5 patrol members in each shift (day)." (Interviewee C)

"Apart from the inside area, we sometimes patrol outside around the community."
(Interviewee D)

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RPT

Though we find that the RPT's work arrangement is quite simple and team members are also lack of professional training, their patrols still exert apparent deterrent impacts on the offenses within the community. There are continuous decreases of crimes and deviances within the community since the establishment of the RPT. It is also reported that since its establishment, RPT team members have removed 20 latent dangers of incidents, prevented 18 property losses, mediated 54 disputes of various kinds, helped and educated 8 problem

youths, arrested 11 criminal suspects and provided 26 important clues for the local police (Lai, 2011). It is obviously indicated that the patrol of team members actually serve as not only a kind of crime fighter which timely curbs ongoing offenses, but also an effective guardian which has greatly decreased the chances for potential offenders.

“Since the formation of the RPT, public security within and around the community has improved greatly with an obvious reduction in thefts and burglaries.” (Interviewee E)

Besides, the deterrent effects of the RPT on potential offenses work not only directly but also indirectly. Their routine patrols have delivered a sense to residents as well as outsiders that the social order within and around their community is under regular control and strict surveillance. Any deviances might be discovered easily or criticized publicly; any crime offenders might be arrested instantly and easily. The higher possibility of being arrested and shamed has not only deterred potential offenders, but also reminded local residents of that the established norm and social order formed within the community could not be easily violated. It is reported that the phenomenon of “residents’ fear of thieves” has turned into “thieves’ fear of residents” in this community (Lai, 2011).

“The security management here becomes stricter and more normative, and the personnel component entering and exiting our community is less complex than before.” (Interviewee D)

It is important to note that the improvement of local social order relies more on the indirect deterrent effect rather than the direct one. The function of RPT cannot develop without the cooperation of community police officers, community security guards, residents and neighborhood-based institutions located within the community. The essence of RPT in maintaining social order lies in its initiative to mobilize both the official and public response to deviances and crimes. If they discover any suspected offenders or suspicious activities, they

will notify the security guards or report to the police by dialing hotline “110” instantly.

“Considering our limited abilities and strengths, we need the security guards to help us arrest thefts, and have to report the police to deal with the arrested offenders at last.” (Interviewee C)

We observed that they often greeted with familiar persons with a smile or a few chatting during their patrols. “Do you remember to lock your motorcycle?”; “Do you lock your door and window well?”; “Be careful, as I found one guy is suspicious around your house this morning.” This kind of informal regulation and governance of social order effectively could informally drive the vigilance of local residents and timely mobilize the private strength in maintaining the social order altogether. The emergence of RPT indicates the importance of adhering to the rules and norms collectively set based on the common interests of community residents. It is reported that the RPT members have further solved many potential conflicts (e.g. disputes among residents), removed much annoyance (e.g. disturbing noises from neighborhood, children’s mischievous behaviors and juvenile delinquencies) except for their patrol duties (Chen & Yang, 2010). The operation of RPT has increased the public security sense, enhanced the cohesion among residents, ameliorated the social environment and atmosphere in the community, and thus naturally produced a set of agreed norms within the community to intangibly regulate the conducts and behaviors of local people. Therefore, the significance of the RPT relies more on the gradual building and long-term safeguarding of social norms within the community rather than one-off stopping of certain offenses or curbing of several offenders.

“When we find certain unlocked vehicle, we will tell its owner... the office of security guards is set at the gate of our community, which also coordinates our work to check every vehicles entering and exiting the community.” (Interviewee B)

“In order to ensure the community security, we expel those hawking or panhandling out of our community. For those persons providing in-home service, e.g. delivering drinking water and gas canisters, we only allow them staying here within a limited time.” (Interviewee F)

“As a member of both RPT and the community, we are in duty bound to do good deeds to improve the relationship among the residents, such as mediate the disputes among residents, providing convenience for those in need.” (Interviewee D)

“The catchphrase for our RPT is ‘community is our home and its security depends on all of us’.” (in Chinese: “小區是我家,安全靠大家”) (Interviewee A)

MOTIVES AND OBSTACLES FOR THE PERSISTENCE

One intriguing issue attracting media attentions is why the RPT can maintain its operation for a decade and becomes the oldest volunteer patrol team in the whole city. Though some of them quitted for various reasons, there are still 13 members persisting in their positions. Besides, more persons are expected to join with new strengths and fresh opinions. Although most team members repeatedly emphasized the importance and initiative of the advocates for the RPT, it is still noteworthy that the gradual formation of the RPT cannot do without the common needs of curbing crime and the similar victimized experience shared among residents. The social homogeneity within the community is rather high since many residents are working in the same places near the community, such as the nearby railway station, hospitals, schools, and factories. It is reported that the formation of the team members could be described by ‘seven kinds of olds’ (in Chinese ‘七老’) which include ‘old CCP (Chinese Communist Party) member’ (‘老黨員’), ‘old cadres’ (‘老幹部’), ‘old staffs’ (‘老職工’), ‘old workers’ (‘老工人’), ‘old teachers’ (‘老教師’), ‘old doctors’ (‘老醫師’), ‘old family members’ (‘老家屬’) (Su, Peng & Qin, 2010; Huang, 2011; Lai, 2011; Han, 2011). The

familiarity and intimacy between residents can communications and negotiations among them, which makes the advocacy and lobby for establishing the RPT quite easy.

“The old couples who advocated the RPT have made great contribution to its (RPT) establishment ... they explained their proposal patiently to each household from door to door even if they have to face their potential refusals or indifferences.” (Interviewee C)

“I consider the minds of our community residents are quite pure and simple, since the workers from the railway station bureau usually have good a tradition of behaving with better moral ethic and working with full responsibility and passion.” (Interviewee A)

Except for the introvert motivation of its core members, the extrovert support is also indispensable for the survival and development of the RPT. Since participating into residential patrol team is completely voluntary, there is no regular financial support from outside at the early period of its operation, such as governmental subsidy, commercial sponsorship or charitable donation. Its operation is basically self-financing for many years. To be specific, RPT members themselves solve the funds problem as possible as they can. The shortage of financial and other material resources become one of the biggest restraints for its smooth operation. We further discovered that their office was only 7-8 meter square big with rather simplistic and old facilities: only one table, one locker and two sets of wood sofa chair. Except for a few posters on the wall, we could not find any more decoration in the office. It seems that extra support is crucial for the ongoing operation of RPT. It is reported that except for red badges, flashlights, and whistles, team members have to prepare umbrellas and batteries by themselves (Qin & Qin, 2009).

“Team members bring their own water and umbrellas when performing patrolling duties. The office facilities were all furnished by our team members from their

own home.” (Interviewee B)

“We are also embarrassed to ask the neighborhood committee to cover our expenses of the stationeries, such as pens and paper, which are worth of only one or two yuan.” (Interviewee A)

During recent years, the RPT obtained tremendous supports from local police departments, which financially and morally sustained its continual running. We observed plenty of photos posted on the office wall and most of them captured the activities jointly attended by police officers and RPT members, such as attending meetings, visiting RPT members of the police, (the police) conferring honorary plaques (to the RPT). The group interview among RPT members becomes more active and heated when we mentioned the recognition and support from local police department, which also made them more talkative when facing other media interviews. It is ever reported that local police sub-bureau treat the RPT as an ideological and moral education base for police officers, who should be dispatched regularly to visit RPT members and learn from its operation (Su, Peng & Qin, 2010). It has become a novelty in the local program of educating and regulating the police force in Liuzhou city. Besides, the community police indicated that he often met RPT members and debriefed the situation of community social order from RPT members (Huang, 2011). The frequent contacts between local police departments and the RPT turn out to be mutually beneficial for them. For one thing, the RPT can not only develop its function within the community but also promote its impacts in other communities. For another thing, local police departments can penetrate deep into the community and shorten their distance with local residents.

“The police sub-bureau visited us in the spring festival with 2000 yuan, which provided us with great mental comfort and financial support.” (Interviewee A)

“Though it is only 2000 yuan, it is a significant recognition giving all of us great confidence and impetus to continue and improve our work.” (Interviewee B)

“The police sub-bureau even printed many posters to advertise our RPT, and conferred us an honorary plaque for our work of maintaining public security.”
(Interviewee E)

“We keep contacts with them (local police sub-bureau and police station) ... sometimes, they invite us to attend their forum to share our experience in maintaining social order.” (Interviewee F)

SOCIAL IMPACTS OF THE RPT

The RPT also turns out to be a cost-saving alternative to maintain social order given a shortage of official resources. Considering its grass-roots membership and voluntary motivation, the operation of RPT can rapidly mobilize extensive response in the public without costing too many expenses. The RPT was ever touted as “a good assistant for the community police” and “a bodyguard for the community security” (Han, 2011). Though it could be treated as an educational example for other communities even for local police departments, the continual operation of the RPT cannot proceed smoothly without tremendous supports from local police sub-bureau and police station, which could also be interpreted as the official utilization of private resources adopted by the government who fails in responding crimes and deviances. The impacts of the RPT implies that the comingling of official and non-official strength in order maintenance can, on one hand, make better use of the community resource, and, on the other hand, alleviate the pressure on police officers given the shortages of police resource in mainland China.

“We also ever faced the crisis of disbanding our team two years ago, since many members left the team due to their own problems, such as aging, health, and migration ... the recognition and the support from local police departments really provide us great confidence to keep on.” (Interviewee A)

“As an excellent example in the whole city, why cannot we keep it on?”

(Interviewee D)

“Since we are the oldest patrol team in the whole city, we cannot just give it up.”

(Interviewee E)

DISCUSSION

According to the classification of Sederberg (1978) on various forms of vigilantism, the RPT belongs to the scope of crime control vigilantism and the performance of RPT members in crime prevention act consistently with six features of the vigilantism illustrated by Johnston (1996). 1) The surveillance of a potential victim or the observation of a particular community constitutes the first precondition of vigilantism. 2) The voluntary formation of community residents make the RPT qualified for the second feature. 3) The basic self-financing mode and its organization from the bottom up indicate its qualification for the third characteristic. 4) though RPT members do not have lethal arms to act force or sufficient physical constitutions to combat, the desire to absorb who are physically stronger and with more skills in arresting and wrestling, as addressed by Johnston (1996), has already upheld the philosophy of the use of force or threaten the use of force. 5) The RPT and its evident function in controlling crimes and deviances both indicate its engagement to protect an established social order from the imputed transgression. 6) The objective of forming the RPT driven by increasing victimizations and growing senses of insecurity further reflects the statement of Johnston (1996) that the motivation of vigilante activities emerges from the concern to minimize objective threat to persons or arise from a popular desire to offer people the assurance of public security.

However, its budgetary sources and other tangible and intangible supports from local police departments indicate the crime control vigilantism in China acts differently from its counterparts in certain western countries (e.g. the UK), which neither involve the activities undertaken by companies for commercial profit nor include the backing of the state's authority (Johnston, 1996). Though vigilantism of the RPT emerges without the state approval,

or, at the least, without the mobilization of government, it receives considerable supports from officials and thus serves as a non-official actor in crime control and order maintenance. Nevertheless, the participation of private citizens in law-enforcement has been proved to save the cost for the government in allocating official force to public security (Grabosky, 1992; Kowalewski, 1996).

Drawing upon the vigilante activities discussed in the western world, we can better answer the initial questions raised at the early stage. For contributing factors for the establishment of the RPT, there are a few similarities as well as differences between Chinese vigilantism and its western counterparts. First of all, our empirical findings are consistent with the views of Shotland and Goodstein (1984) who emphasized a strong sense of vulnerability driven by an increasing crime, and with the opinions from Weisburd (1988) who informed us of the growing victimized experience that precipitated vigilante behaviors as an agent of community social control. Besides, the successful mobilization of private citizens involved in vigilante activities further reflects the importance of social homogeneity which facilitates to communications and trusts between participants and serves as a precondition for effective community crime prevention (Shotland & Goodstein, 1984; Johnston, 1996).

Another important factor we cannot ignore is the inadequate official resource (e.g. police force) in law-enforcement which has rarely been discussed in western literatures. The rather low police – public ratio in mainland China makes the scantiness of police officers a distinctive factor directly contributing to the emergence of vigilante activities in crime control. The objective reality of failure in mobilizing official response to crime and deviance is greatly different from the subjective insecurity felt by the public as discussed previously in western literatures, such as the disappointment of police incompetence (Abrahams, 1998), public distrust with local criminal justice (Johnston, 1996) and popular disenchantment on justice system (Taylor, 1976).

Our findings further suggest the effective deterrence of RPT lies in the twofold roles of RPT members within the community: first, a resident inhabiting within the community; second, an informal law-enforcement actor. The merging of double identities makes RPT members maintain the social order with more flexibility and negotiability, which greatly differ

from law-enforcement officers who perform law-enforcement with more authoritarian power and managerial stance. The overlapped roles as both a citizen and a guardian turn out to be an advantage for vigilante participants as compared with police officers who have inadequate time and manpower to penetrate into the community. The social-geographical similarity and interpersonal familiarity with community residents help RPT members to perform their duties without producing unnecessary opposition to or increasing too many distances with other residents. The easiness of RPT members in accessing to communities and obtaining more local trust corresponds to the statement of Kowalewski (1996) that vigilante formations were more mobile with single-purpose and more familiar with local contexts than office-strapped bureaucrats. Likewise, the advantages of non-governmental actors (private citizens) in public security echoes the illustration of Grabosky (1992) that citizen participation with a certain degree was desirable for contributing to a better informed citizenry as well as strengthening the legitimacy of criminal justice institutions.

Though our empirical study has addressed the important issue advocated by Johnston (1996) that the longevity of vigilantism is considerably associated with the commitment of vigilante groups, it is still necessary to compare between official and non-official responses to crimes in mainland China before we can fully answer the questions regarding the long existence and prevalent impacts of the RPT in Liuzhou city. Meanwhile, it is also intriguing to analyze their relationship in the western counterparts. Obviously different from western democracies, especially the United States, non-official responses to crimes in mainland China are always under the control of authorities. Considering the subordinate status of vigilante groups in China, we can discuss it with more retrospect on social group control vigilantism and regime control vigilantism in America which have shown many similarities with Chinese situation. Though not being mobilized by the government, the non-official vigilante action is permitted as an informal strength to prevent any offensive behaviors posing great threats on social order or collective norms established and regulated by the authority. Chinese vigilante actions are operated similarly with the vigilantism portrayed by Kowalewski (1996) that vigilantism in America could be viewed as an uncharacteristically risky policy for regimes to preserve national values or to adopt as an unconventional countermovement against a

dissident movement. Though Kowalewski's analysis on vigilantism involves more political discourses, he still pointed out the manipulation of vigilantism by the elite class to safeguard the established norms and its power in social control. In China, the reality of paucity in police resource and the high official attention paid to the social stability considerably justify the mobilization of non-official resource without too much obstacles to remove the collective dangerousness, which is involved in political considerations necessary to maintain order in a one-party socialist state (Epstein & Wong, 1996). Even though receiving minimal training and loose supervision, vigilante groups can be well utilized by the police as an ally to enhance social control at the grassroots, which is especially significant in the era of community policing in contemporary China.

CONCLUSION

Considering the current "journalistic conflation" (Johnston, 1996) of vigilantism in mainland China, this study relies on an empirical experience with a combined technique of community observation, group interview and documentary analysis of relevant media reports to introduce the concrete formation, operation and function of a residential patrol team (a typical example of crime control vigilantism) in mainland China. The findings inform us that neighborhood watch activities in Chinese context could be easily mobilized at the grass-roots level due to the especial insufficiency of police resource arranged in residential communities. In view of the subordinate status of vigilante groups operated in China, the government may consider utilizing non-official resource from grassroots to cope with the failure in official response towards crimes and deviances. Hence, the expansion and promotion of the RPT operation should be started in those communities which are higher in social homogeneity or might be in urgent need of expelling threats of increasing deviances. Apart from the above preconditions for vigilante activities, the officials should further provide necessary backings which can legitimately, financially and morally support the longevity of vigilante groups. It would be much beneficial and cost-effective for the government and the police make better use of vigilante strength by cultivating social capital among residents within communities and

promoting the interaction between government and non-governmental participants in law-enforcement and order maintenance.

It is hoped that this empirical study can remind the officials to solve the problems in mobilizing adequate police force for law-enforcement in community. However, more efforts should be devoted to serious academic analysis on vigilantism, such as exploring other potential factors (e.g. the popularity and tradition of private violence, popular sovereignty, etc.) for the emergence, prevalence and evolution of vigilante activities across various nations by considering different political traditions or cultures, and seeking more elements which might drive the motivation, formation, and operation as advocated by Johnston (1996).

REFERENCES

Abrahams, R., 1998. *Vigilant Citizens: Vigilantism and the State*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Chen, Y.H. and Yang, W.K., 2010. A memoir of “Xiyanghong” volunteer patrol team: An extract from the notes of the community police officer Yuan Lei, from police sub-bureau in Liunan District. [online] Available at: <www.chinalnn.com/Html/Article/Class11/Class15/15_216910.html> [Assessed 1 February 2012].

Epstein, E.J. and Wong, S.H., 1996. The concept of “dangerousness in the People’s Republic of China and its impact on the treatment of prisoners. *British Journal of Criminology*, 36 (4), pp.472-479.

Grabosky, P.N., 1992. Law enforcement and the citizen: Non – governmental participants in crime prevention and control. *Policing and Society: An International Journal of Research and Policy*, 2(4), pp.249-271.

Grayson, J.P., 1992. Vigilantism in Canada and the United States. *Legal Studies Forum*, 16(1), pp.21-39.

Han, L., 2011. Protecting a community security for ten years: A report of “Xiyanghong” volunteer patrol team in Limin Community, Liunan District. [online] Available at: <www.lznews.gov.cn/xqpd/lnq/20111023/055521.html> [Assessed 1 February 2012].

- Huang, Z.Z., 2011. *A community patrolled by a group of retired persons shows decreases in crime rates for years*. [online] Available at:
[`<news.gxnews.com.cn/staticpages/20111012/newgx4e94cb3d-4219882-1.shtml>`](http://news.gxnews.com.cn/staticpages/20111012/newgx4e94cb3d-4219882-1.shtml)
 [Assessed 1 February 2012].
- Ingalls, R.P., 1988. *Urban Vigilantes in the New South: Tampa, 1882-1936*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.
- Johnston, L., 1996. What is vigilantism? *British Journal of Criminology*, 36(2), pp.220-236.
- Kowalewski, D., 1996. Countermovement vigilantism and human rights: A propositional inventory. *Crime, Law & Social Change*, 25, pp.63-81.
- Lai, J.Q., 2011. *Approaching the volunteer patrol team in Limin Community, Liunan District, Liuzhou city*. [online] Available at:
[`<www.pagx.cn/html/2011/10-18/20111018092142121.html>`](http://www.pagx.cn/html/2011/10-18/20111018092142121.html) [Assessed 1 February 2012].
- Lipset, S.M., 1990. *Continental Divide*. London: Routledge.
- McNaught, K.W., 1975. "Political Trials and the Canadian Political Tradition", in Friedland, M. eds., *Courts and Trials*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Qin, F.L. and Qin, Y.G., 2011. *The volunteer patrol team constituted by "seven olds" in Liuzhou city*. [online] Available at:
[`<www.liuzhou.gov.cn/zwgk/xxdt/qxdt/200909/t20090901\_296139.htm>`](http://www.liuzhou.gov.cn/zwgk/xxdt/qxdt/200909/t20090901_296139.htm) [Assessed 1 February 2012].
- Rosenbaum, H.J. and Sederberg, P.C., 1976. "Vigilantism: An analysis of establishment violence", in Rosenbaum, H.J. and Sederberg, P.C. eds., *Vigilante Politics*. Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Sederberg, P.C., 1978. The phenomenology of vigilantism in contemporary America. *Terrorism*, 1, pp.3-4.
- Shotland, R.L., 1976. "Spontaneous vigilantism: A bystander response to criminal behaviour", in Rosenbaum, H.J. and Sederberg, P.C. eds., *Vigilante Politics*. Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Shotland, R.L. and Goldstein, L.L., 1984. The role of bystanders in crime control. *Journal of*

Social Issues, 40, pp.1.

- Su, J.M. Peng, X.W. and Qin, F.L., 2010. The police learned from the spirit of “Xiyanghong” volunteer patrol team: The police sub-bureau in Liunan District treated volunteer patrol team as an ideological and moral education base for police officers. [online] Available at: <www.gxfzw.com.cn/news/news_show.asp?id=98988> [Assessed 1 February 2012].
- Taylor, L., 1976. Vigilantes – why not? *New Society*, 4, pp.259-260.
- Torrance, J., 1986. *Public Violence in Canada, 1867-1982*. Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press.
- Weisburd, D., 1988. Vigilantism as community social control: Developing a quantitative criminological model. *Journal of Quantitative Criminology*, 4(2), pp.137-153.
- Zhong, L., 2009. Community policing in China: Old wine in new bottles. *Police Practice and Research*, 4, pp.157-169.

Politics of Space and the Formation of Village Landscapes in Northeastern Guangdong

Vesper Y. Chen

Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

Email: chanyukting@gmail.com

INTRODUCTION


The walled houses found in South China have distinctive features that differentiate them from the building forms of the other vernacular architectures. In recent years, walled villages and walled houses in the New Territories of Hong Kong are well discussed by scholars¹. However, most of the publications about walled houses in China tend to be the anthology of buildings of, by and for the privileged without about the houses of a historical process in the perspective of village landscapes.² With detailed analysis and comparison of the old and new houses of a Hakka-speaking community in northeastern Guangdong, this paper is going to identify the meaning of the changing spatial form. Through the approach to politics, a better understanding in the mechanism of control of forms and context could be achieved.

With rapid social change in the last century, it is observable that every Chinese city or town contains fragments of historical cultural landscapes which intertwined with its current spatial configurations. Many village landscapes are made up of both old-styled and new form of buildings. A close look at the coexistence between the traditional walled houses and the newly built standalone houses in Xingning County, we can find out a relational logic behind their rule of form, which is strongly influenced by political campaigns and socialist way of management of the rural area from 1949 onwards.

¹ See Bard, *A Guide to the Antiquities of Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Urban Council, 1991), pp. 14-28; Lung, *Xianggang gujin jianzhu* (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 1992); Wang, "Axial Inversion: The Transformation of the Spatial Structure and its Ritual Axis in Hong Kong's Walled Villages," in *Hong Kong Paper in Design and Development*, vol. 1 (1998): 26-33; Lui, "Village Cultural Resources Development: An Adaptive Reuse Study of a Hakka Village and its Environs." In *Localizing Global Traditions: Contemporary Scenarios* (Traditional Dwellings and Settlements working paper series, vol.122).

² See Ronald G. Knapp's edition, *Chinese Landscape: the Village as Place* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992); he looks at the Chinese village in the sense of place. This edited book combines articles talking about tradition vernacular architectures and the modern buildings of Chinese villages, avoiding issues of the pattern of architectural formation and their structural meanings.

GEOGRAPHICAL FEATURES



Map 1. *caption*: The black color area in the middle of the map is Xingning city. The other is rural area. (source: *Zhongguo guoqing congshu: baixianshi jingji shehui diaocha*)

Xingning is a county lying in the northeastern Guangdong Province, the upstream of *Dongjiang* 東江 (the East River) and *Hanjiang* 韓江 (the Han River). The northern part of Xingning is occupied by 400~1000 meter high mountains and the southern part, below sea level for 150 meters, is the largest basin area in Guangdong Province,³ surrounded by some

³ Source from *Zhongguo guoqing congshu: baixianshi jingji shehui diaocha: Xingning juan* (Beijing: Zhongguo

200~400 meter high hills. In short, the topology of Xingning is higher in the north and lower in the south. The climate in this 23°50'~ 24°37' N latitude area is characterized by harsh sun in summer and bitter wind in winter and spring; the temperature averages 28.5°C in summer and 11.5°C in winter. The annual precipitation is around 1,540.3mm from 1959 to 1985, mostly concentrated in summer. As a result, a few man-made ponds constructed by the local communities are distributed over an area of around 2,100 square kilometers. Before 1949, the poor water-containing capacity and the low-lying drainage area result in the coexistence of drought and flood in this long and narrow area (see Map 1).





Figure 1. *caption:* Re-taken from an original picture, showing the landscapes of a well-preserved house in late 1990s. Photo taken on September 14, 2010.

VILLAGE LANDSCAPE BEFORE 1949

As the basic living units, there are more than 4000 walled houses in Xingning,⁴ making up almost all the village landscapes. Though their technique of construction is similar to *tulou* 土樓 (or “earthen buildings,” the multi-storeyed tamped-earth-walled houses) in Fujian, the forms and layouts of walled houses in Xingning are different.⁵ Most of them are one-storey high, half-moon in shape, not as defensive as the multi-storeyed houses. Walled house, including the habitation building, was with ritual space, courtyards and subsidiary facilities – and usually with a half-moon shaped pond in front of the structure. Sometimes, trees are planted at the back of the structure to provide privacy, and rows of toilets are arranged to be built next to the main building (see Fig. 1).



⁴ See *Xingning shi renmin zhengfu wenjian* 興寧市人民政府文件 no. 71 (2009).

⁵ See Sullivan, "Traditional Chinese Regional Architecture: Chinese Houses." In *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Branch*, vol. 12, p. 140.

Figure 2. *caption:* This is the original draft of *Qianji raowu*, a double tier U-shape walled house. The main building includes three halls. Each small box of the U-shape building is a room which can be kitchen or bedroom. The dark bold lines are the drains inside the house. The lines exhaled from the central marks the directions.

Similar to the other Chinese traditional architectures, the structure of walled house was built up from a few simple and standardized elements and concepts that based up on a few simple principles and practices: (a) walled enclosure, (b) axuality, (c) north-south orientation and (d) the courtyard.⁶ Living units in a walled house are not independent. They are compartments which face the courtyard inside, but these compartments packed tightly together to create an external wall. Characterized by simplicity and symmetry based on balance and axuality, the architectural space of the house is organized around a center – the center of the middle hall in the main building (see Fig. 2). The central axis of walled house is defined by the main alleyway connecting the front entrance to the ritual hall of the main building. Usually, a lower hall is the gateway to the middle, the public space of the family. Behind the middle hall, there is an upper hall which enshrines the tablet of the patron and his wife. In addition, the upper hall is the ritual space of the inhabited community. Most of the important life rituals are performed in the upper hall, such as the Lantern ritual for the new born male babies, ancestral worships, and the death ritual. The central axis represents shared a religious value within the culture of the local community.

Among all the “architecture without architect,” it is remarkable that walled houses are pedigreed in the perspective of social history and forms. It is not a static building. As the number of residents increase, the architecture could be extended in different ways.⁷ Some may construct another tier of U-shape compartments or transversed houses to surround the existing building. Some may set up a branch of the family to have their own house built in a totally remote place. However, in late 1940s, the construction of walled houses declined, coupled with the fall of local economy. In the following passages, I will focus on the case of the Rao family’s walled houses which are located northeast to the urban area of Xingning.

⁶ See Boyd, *Chinese Architecture and Town Planning* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 49.

⁷ See Zeng, “Kejia ‘weiwu’ wushi yanjiu.” In *Lingnan shidi yu minsu*, edited by Zeng (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1949), pp. 280-315.

The case of Rao family's walled houses

Based on intimate ties of kinship and locality the residents of a village, usually in South China, or the same compound are the descendants of a shared ancestor (sometimes it is claimed to be so).⁸ Rao family's walled houses, constructed and living by Rao descent group, shows the order of lineage.

Rao family's walled houses locate at the edge of the northern part of Xingning city, where it takes an hour's walk from the traditional walled city of Xingning County. The complex is made up of four parts: the original house (*Qianji Rao wu* 謙記饒屋), two extensions (*Wu gangwu* 五杠屋 and *Si gangwu* 四杠屋), and a building which was built by one of the branches of the Rao (see Fig. 3).



Figure 3. caption: This is a map of Rao's family walled house. Left of the U-shape walled-house is the extension of the original building. The irrigation of the rice fields is parallel to the drain system of the house. (source: GoogleMaps.)

⁸ See Freedman, *Lineage Organization in South China* (London: Athlone Press, 1965); also in Freedman, *Chinese Lineage and Society* (London: Berg Publishers Ltd., 1971).

For the poor or some relatively small-scale families, it is impossible to accomplish the construction of a walled house at once. Most of them would build the main hall first. When they become wealthier, they would continue the U-shape structure or add a U-shape extension. Take the construction of the Rao family's walled houses as an example; after the completion of the main building in 1877, the patrons, three male members of the family, started to build the other peripheral U-shape houses in 1887. However, because the Rao family failed to purchase their neighbors' land, they could only construct *Wu gangwu* (five rows of-length houses) next to the existing, by the end. Once any of the members of the descent group had created a new segment, they could build a separate house sharing the same geomancy with the ancestral houses (*zuwu* 祖屋). *Si gangwu*, a square structure on the left side of *Wu gangwu*, was a further extension of the Rao family's walled houses. However, it was fully occupied by the Zhang family since the Land Reform in 1952. In 1958, the residents of *Si gangwu* and the fourth part of the complex were organized into a *shengchandu* 生產隊 (production team), which resulted in a division of the connection among the architectures, physically and mentally.

However, the patrilineal mechanism of expanding the walled houses seemed to be incompatible to Communist ideology. From 1949 onwards, series of political campaigns and policies modified the social relationship among the walled house dwellers. Since then, the construction, or reconstruction, of walled houses had come to a full stop.

NEW SETTLEMENTS

With limited resource, residents of the Rao family's walled houses were unable to improve either the quality or quantity of living, for three decades since the founding of the People's Republic. Rao as a surname group revealed by Fei Hsiao-tung (Fei Xiaotong) in 1981 during his (re-)visit to Kaixiangong 開弦弓, was described by him as, "not only are most of the villagers living in the same houses in which they lived in 1936, but those houses now appear rather more dilapidated than in 1936 and are providing shelter for a much larger

number of people."⁹

The Chinese government acknowledged a critical housing problem in the countryside by the end of the 1970s. Following by political uncertainty after 1976, the Chinese Communist Party in December 1978 convened the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee (*shiyi jie san zhong quanhui* 十一屆三中全會). It marked not only the beginning of the reform era, but also acted as a critical juncture in redressing errors in economic policy which had frustrated the improvement of living standards. It brought liberation to the tension of the social label system as well as village space, giving possibility to peasants themselves for the improvement of their quality of life, such as housing problems. In rural China, many reform policies began in late 1970s and had been progressively extended throughout the 1980s. One of the most mentioned policies was the "responsibility system" (*zeren zhi* 責任制) in its various forms in late 1970s and, subsequently, the promotion of a commodity economy (*shangpin jingji* 商品經濟)--"The form that eventually became most widespread in the countryside devolved land and the other agricultural resources to households."¹⁰ The "responsibility system" together with a housing boom, started in early 1980s and continued, for a decade or two, spreading through most of China's countryside.

From 1979 to 1985, more dwellings were constructed in China than in the thirty years after the Communist takeover. According to Li, more than 5 square meters of housing stock per person was added during the course of this *housing boom*.¹¹ Instead of constructing houses in classical designs with traditional materials, more and more buildings adopted cutting edge designs and materials in the mid 1980s. Toilet was accepted to be built inside the residential house and cement was widely used for better refurbishments. By the outlook, there seems to be a high degree of consistency among the newly constructed houses in rural China, at least, in the South.

Helen F. Siu, an anthropologist who has done a lot of field research in China, comments on the village landscape in reformed China,

⁹ See Fei, *Chinese Village Close-up* (Beijing: New World Press, 1983), p. 205.

¹⁰ See Judd, *Gender and Power in Rural North China* (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 8.

¹¹ See Li, "Economic Reform Brings Better Life." In *Beijing Review* 28: 15-22; also in *Beijing Review* 29: 18.

"We passed through a number of towns and villages; they were all alike, so much so that the houses are roofed in tiles of a single color. I was deeply depressed with this first impression, mainly because it seemed to have nothing culturally sharp left."¹²

The village landscapes that Siu observed during her journey were standalone small houses with two or three storey. Every household had certain amount of land enabling them to have their own plan of use. For the building materials, kiln-dried bricks and wood frame construction were adopted at first; later on, there was an increase in the percentage with cement.¹³ Nevertheless, the economic reform did not alter much about people's mindset. The making of the new settlements shows subtle influences from the ancestral ideology and kinship. Consider the form and layout of the new settlements, we can find out a relational logic beneath the rule of form with these traditional walled houses.

Continuation and transition of the form

Although the new settlements were constructed in the form of standalone houses, in the village setting, the principle of *sameness* and the interest of the community should be considered as of highest priority.¹⁴ When I asked the villagers to evaluate their life, usually, they emphasized that all of them were peasants, living at similar dwelling in rural village. Communal interest of landscapes is explained through the idea of

¹² Translated by the author; see Siu and Bol, "Region, Structure and order: A dialogue across historiography and anthropology." In *Wenshizhe*, vol. 5, pp. 5-20.

¹³ See Xiao, "Woguo cunzhen jianshe jiakuai mianmao gaiguan," In *Renmin ribao: haiwaiban* (People's Daily: overseas edition), November 8, 1985, p. 1; see also Jianzhubu cunzhen jianshe xinxi yanjiuchu 建築部村鎮建設信息研究處, "Zhongguo cunzhen jianshe fazhan sishi nian." In *Cunzhen jianshe*, vol. 34 (October, 1989): 2-4.

¹⁴ See Tam Wai-lun, "Communal Worship and Festivals in Chinese Villages." In *Chinese Religious Life*, edited by David A. Palmer, Glenn Shive, and Philip L. Wickeri (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).




Figure 4. caption: This photo was taken on 10 Oct 2010, showing the plan of the new settlement. The curve at the bottom stands for the ancestral house. Every single box is a *jian*.

fengshui 風水. From the planning of the new settlements of the Rao family's walled houses, or an bird-view from above to have a panoramic understanding of the community, the importance of the ancestral house in designing the new housings can be observed (see Fig. 4).



Fig. 5. *caption*: In front of a pond mentioned in *Qianji raowu*. From the photo, it could be seen that only a few new houses are higher than the ancestral house at the front. Most of them were re-modeled into three-storey towers in mid-1990s, leading to a second phase of housing boom. (by Author, taken on August 27, 2010.)

1. New settlement as an axial/centripetal living unit.

The new settlement is located at the back of traditional walled house. According to the rule of extension, it is possible to have the new dwellings built next to or behind the original structure.¹⁵ The residential units are aligned facing the new roads and were divided by small alleys in a fishbone grid pattern. A new axis, hence, connects the central axis of the traditional walled house. A local expression is widely used to explain this continuance - keep the *fengshui* 風水 of the house. It is said that the original formal design is the best of the area. Thus, the descent houses nearby should follow the *fengshui* of their ancestral house. However, the axis is blocked as the boundary of the left and right of the living units. The left side is Production Team 9 and the other side is Production Team 10.

¹⁵ Interview with Rao Shaoying, a ritual specialist and head of the carpenters in the Rao surname group, October 10, 2010.

2. The height of the individual houses is standardized which should not go over the original walled house.

Due to the concern of *fengshui*, new settlement should not stand out from the rest in order to follow the sitting principle of the ancestral walled house, back to the northeast and face to the southwest; the height of the buildings must be no more than two storey, shorter than the external wall of the ancestral house. This arrangement creates a buffer zone which relates the old and the new hamlets to keep a visual consistency - it is difficult for people to alert of the new housing if he or she is seeing the ancestral house from the south to the north (see Fig. 5).

3) The basic unit of the new settlement is *jian* 間.

“The space between four columns, known as the *jian* or bay, ‘the space between’ is the common denominator, the unit of space manipulated as a module to give shape to all Chinese buildings.” (Knapp 1990:26) From the masterplan of the new settlements, we can see that local people are still using this traditional concept evolved from the ancestral house, in order to arrange their new housing land. According to the context of the new housing plan, *jian* intertwines two aspects: the political decision on land distribution and the influence of the spatial structure of walled house.

Ideas of fengshui

As a sense of place or the experience of architectural space, *fengshui* is a kind of language which has been taken-for-granted as part of Chinese culture. Rossbach thinks that it is the Chinese art of landscape and building placement, which relies partially on intuitive and visceral insights (Rossbach 1983). Nevertheless, the decision making process of the new housing plan was based on a political procedure rather than the design of a *dili xiansheng* 地理先生 (“wind and water interpreter”). According to the recall of some Rao seniors, a “housing committee” was organized by the local residents to discuss the land sharing issue in the early 1980s. The members of the housing committee included all the “poor peasants,” leaders of the production team, and some representatives of the other households. Though the social label system was demolished before the establishment of the committee, “poor peasants”

enjoyed a strong political power to negotiate a better place.

Political meaning of the central axis

Though the spatial structure of the new dwellings follows the traditional central axis and thus, the physical boundary of the community is maintained, the meaning of them is political, rather than family values oriented under the reign of the communist regime.

The central axis divided the new settlement into two parts: Production Team 9 and Production Team 10. It became a physical boundary among the residents. However, in the original plan, the alleyways of the complex were not blocked by the buildings. The central axis, which divides the right and the left, was a production of politics which had changed the local understanding of space.

Two crucial policies has changed the social landscapes of villages in China since 1950, *tugai* 土改 (land reform) and *huafen jieji chengfen* 劃分階級成份 (identification of class structure). According to the government's instruction, most of the families in the Rao descent group were considered to be *pochan dizhu* 破產地主 ("bankrupted landlords") while their neighbor, the Luo descent group, was *pinnong* 貧農 ("poor peasant") - an honorable social label during the course of the Maoist era, with more political rights. Some of the powerful members of the Luo descent group, who became cadres in the new regime, occupied the best rooms of *Qianji raowu*. In 1958, as a product of the Great Leap Forward 大躍進 (1958-1960), the right half of *Qianji raowu* was combined with *Luowu* 羅屋 (House of the Luo) to form Production Team 9. Residents of the other half formed Production Team 10. In the old days, the fishing pond in front of *Qianji raowu* was managed by different branches in the Rao family. But in 1952, after *tugai fucha* 土改複查 (re-examination of land reform), only the poor peasants who lived at *Qianji raowu* and *Wu gangwu* had a share of the benefits. Since then, this arrangement of living space has lasted for more than 60 years. The system of production team, production brigade, and the people's commune provided a continuing framework for rural Chinese society from the early 1960s to late 1970s. Even now, within the boundary of *Qianji raowu* and the new hamlet, villagers continued using the concept of "Team" to identify themselves. In the everyday life of the villages, they seldom cross-over.

In addition to the re-modeling of the social relationship, rebuild of public facilities is a contextual feature for the formation of village landscapes. In the history of urban planning, public facilities tended to formalize and institutionalize certain relationships. Scholars have already sketched out a number of cases in the urban setting.¹⁶ However, construction and reconstruction of public facilities, such as schools, an airport, reservoirs, irrigation channels, and markets, modified the spatial relationship of the vernacular architecture and its residents' sense of space.

With a boarder map of the locality of Rao family's walled house, the road system obviously provided a framework for understanding this area. All the main roads connecting the village to the outer space were built for approaching important public facilities at the very beginning. For example, a main road in the center of the map was built for Ningjiang Middle School 甯江中學, reconstructed in 1950s. The main road on the right of the map was built in late 1950s because of the construction of Xingning Airport. The main road on the left was designed for a wholesale market in the late 1980s.¹⁷ With the road system, the construction plan of Rao family's new settlements should remain space to build a village road to connect the aforesaid facilities. This road between *Qianji raowu* and the new settlement creates a boundary of old and new. As a result, to the younger generation who spent only very little time in the ancestral house, the traditional architecture is strange and "dangerous" to their lives.

By reviewing the history of Xingning, most of the area was seriously affected by drought and flood constantly.¹⁸ The drainage area of *Ningjiang* 甯江 (Ning River) was flooded and the other territories were suffering from drought (see Map 2). As an important part of construction of "rural villages," reinforcing dams and the other facilities, water

¹⁶ See Leith, *Space and Revolution: Projects for Movements, Squares, and Public Buildings in France, 1789-1799* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991).

¹⁷ Attracting investment from overseas Chinese led to the construction of real estate for wholesale market of commodities. These huge wholesale markets of *Dongxuegong* 東學宮批發市場 and Xingning 興寧商業城, locate at the north edge of the city area of Xingning; and have eventually became new landmarks of the town that altered the mental map of the locals. With promotion of the local government buying land in suburbs return the villagers with large amount of money in a short run. It helped the locals to accumulate wealth for starting their own business. Many villagers in Xingning started their business in the market, such as selling commodities or setting up transportation means to southern Jiangxi, or any other parts of Guangdong.

¹⁸ See *Xingningshi shuilizhi*, edited by Xingningshi shuilizhi bianjizu (1987).

management was an important policy in the early days of the Communist reign. Coupled with the construction of *Heshui* Reservoir 合水水庫 and *Heshanyan* Reservoir 和山岩水庫 in the 1960s, the irrigation system of the downstream villages should have been changed, influencing the existing water management facilities. For instances, the irrigation channels of *Qianji raowu* was redirected to another neighboring walled house, building up an additional relationship between the residents of *Qianji raowu* and the villagers nearby.



Map 2. caption: The circled area locates Rao family's walled houses. Legends on the top-right corner notes the followings: with horizontal lines the flooded zone; the bounded areas the wetlands; and the dots denote dry zones.
(source: *Xingningshi shuilizhi*.)

CONCLUSION: FORMS AND POLITICS

David Harvey describes, changes of place as a historical process which caused by “changing material practices of production, consumption, information flow, and communication coupled with the radical reorganization of space relations and of time horizons within capitalist development.”¹⁹ But indigenous residents as well as governors, ditch-diggers as well as architects are active shaping the landscapes.

Discussions of the politics of space can be dated back to Henri Lefebvre’s writing about the “production of space” more than two decades ago, provides a framework that can be used to relate the sense of place encountered in cultural landscape studies to the political economy.²⁰ Relevant researches on the political approach of spatial study are discussed in the urban setting.²¹ On traditional houses and settlements, Rapoport argues that there were two kinds of form-giving factors that affected the creation and development process of house/settlement form. Primary factors, according to him, were the socio-cultural issues, or way of life of traditional cultures. Secondary factors were the physical ones, such as climate and technology, which in his opinion were the modifying factors in shaping house form.²²

In this paper, I tried to demonstrate the changing meaning of the central axis and the hidden force behind the form of vernacular architecture through the formation of the village landscapes of the Rao surname group. From the traditional walled houses to the modern standalone dwellings, the formation of village landscape is a historical process which intertwined with social relationships of the residents. Political factors, in the case of the Rao family’s new settlement, are dominant to the form of the new settlement. The remaining structural continuance and the central axis became the production of political status. Central governments were previously known to have active involvement in the modification of urban

¹⁹ See Harvey, “From Space to Place and Back Again: Reflections on the Condition of Post modernity,” paper delivered at Graduate School of Architecture and Urban Planning Colloquium (May 13, 1991), University of California at Los Angeles, p.39.

²⁰ See Hayden, “Urban Landscape History: The Sense of Place and the Politics of Space.” In *Understanding Ordinary Landscapes*, edited by Paul Groth and Todd W. Bressi (New York: Yale University Press, 1997).

²¹ See Leith, 1991.

²² See Rapoport, *House Form and Culture* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), chap. 3 and 4.

landscapes.²³ In rural Guangdong, the reconstruction of village landscape was practiced through the remodeling of political status. Before the Communist Party came into power, the form and the development of the local architectures are product for reproduction in the sense of ancestral worship and family values. When the Communist regime reigns in the walled house village, the political dominance, house form and village landscapes would also be affected through the construction of public facilities and series of policies over various dimensions of social relationships.

REFERENCES

- Anon., 2009. *Xingning shi renmin zhengfu wenjian* [興寧市人民政府文件] no. 71.
- Bard, S., 1991. *A Guide to the Antiquities of Hong Kong*. Hong Kong: Urban Council.
- Fei, H.T., 1983. *Chinese Village Close-up*. Beijing: New World Press.
- Freedman, M., 1965. *Lineage Organization in South China*. London: Athlone Press.
- _____, 1971. *Chinese Lineage and Society*. London: Berg Publishers Ltd.
- Harvey, D., 1991. *From Space to Place and Back Again: Reflections on the Condition of Post modernity*, paper delivered at Graduate School of Architecture and Urban Planning Colloquium (May 13), University of California at Los Angeles.
- Hayden, D., 1997. Urban Landscape History: The Sense of Place and the Politics of Space. In: P. Groth and T.W. Bressi, eds. *Understanding Ordinary Landscapes*. New York: Yale University Press.
- Hung, C.T., 2011. *Dibiao: Beijing de kongjian zhengzhi* (Landmark: Spatial-politics in Beijing). Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.
- Jianzhubu cunzhen jianshe xinxi yanjiuchu. 1989. *Zhongguo cunzhen jianshe fazhan sishi nian. Cunzhen jianshe*, 34 (October 1989), pp. 2-4.
- Judd, E.m 1994. *Gender and Power in Rural North China*. Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press.
- Knapp, R.G.,eds., 1992. *Chinese Landscape: the Village as Place*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
- Leith, J.A., 1991. *Space and Revolution: Projects for Movements, Squares, and Public Buildings in France, 1789-1799*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

²³ See Chang-tai Hung, *Dibiao: Beijing de kongjian zhengzhi* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2011).

- Li, 1985. Economic Reform Brings Better Life. *Beijing Review*, 28, pp.15-22.
- Lu, Y.D., 1990. *Guangdong minju*. Beijing: Zhongguo jianzhu gongye chubanshe.
- Lui, A., 2000. Village Cultural Resources Development: An Adaptive Reuse Study of a Hakka Village and its Environs. In *Localizing Global Traditions: Contemporary Scenarios*. Traditional Dwellings and Settlements working paper series, vol.122.
- Lung, P.Y., 1992. *Xianggang gujin jianzhu*. Hong Kong: Joint Publishing Ltd.
- Raporport, A., 1969. *House Form and Culture*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
- Siu, H.F. and Bol, P., 2007. Region, Structure and Order: A dialogue across historiography and anthropology. *Wenshezhe*, 5, pp.5-20.
- Sullivan, L.F. 1972. Traditional Chinese Regional Architecture: Chinese Houses. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Branch*, 12.
- Tam W.L., 2011. Communal Worship and Festivals in Chinese Villages. In: D.A. Palmer, G. Shive and P.L. Wickeri, eds. *Chinese Religious Life*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Xiao, T.H., 1985. Woguo cunzhen jianshe jiakuai mianmao gaiguan [Increasing changes in the face of construction in the natino's villages and towns]. *Renmin ribao: haiwaiban* [People's daily: overseas edition], 8 Nov, p.1.
- Xingningshi shuilizhi bianjizu. 1987. *Xingningshi shuilizhi*. N.p.
- Zhongguo guoqing congshu bianjibu. 1994. *Baixianshi jingji shehui diaocha: Xingning juan*. Beijing: Zhongguo dabaikequanshu chubanshe.

The Three Gorges Dam: Getting a Sense of the Magnitude and Scope of the Project and its Moral Implications

Dan Zhou
The University of Newcastle
Email: Dan.zhou@uon.edu.au

Ronald S. Laura
The University of Newcastle
Email: Ron.Laura@newcastle.edu.au

INTRODUCTION

In the paper that follows we argue that without sufficient understanding of the epistemological framework within which any particular value-judgment is made, there is little hope of arbitrating rationally and resolving, at least in logical principle, a dispute of conflicting interests. One poignant example of such a logical impasse can be found, we believe, in the case of China's Three Gorges Project. To keep the paper within manageable bounds, we shall proceed on the assumption that our audiences will be tolerantly well acquainted with the magnitude of this monumentally massive dam construction, thus alleviating the need for us to rehearse its detailed description further here. Our objective divides into two parts: first to tease out the protracted debate surrounding the pros and cons of damming the Yangtze River, and second, to show that in the light of the dominant epistemology of power which has politically framed the debate, the final decisional outcome to construct the three Gorges Dam, despite the substantive environmental and humanitarian arguments why it should not be built, was a foregone conclusion.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE THREE GORGES DAM

It is widely accepted that it was Sun Yat-sen, who initially proposed in 1913 that a major power generation dam should be built in China on the Yangtze River, the eventual location of the present day Three Gorges Dam. Although Sun's ambitious idea was received enthusiastically by some, the advent of World War I (1914-1918) gave rise within China to a whole host of political, socio-cultural and economic problems, each of which in its own peculiar way shifted 'priority spending' away from the monumental Three Gorges Dam construction (CTGPC1 2008, Dai 1994). It was not until the early 1950s, when devastating floods left a trail of destruction wide enough to draw world attention to China's flood problems that Sun Yat-sen's proposal of a power generation dam on the Yangtze was resurrected. This time, however, the emphasis was not simply on the benefits such a dam would reap by way of hydroelectric power; the emphasis was focused also on the alleged benefits which damming the Yangtze might provide by way of flood control.

LI RUI'S MINI DAM PROPOSAL

In 1954 the then Vice Minister of Electric Power, Li Rui, proposed that instead of one massive dam of the kind Sun Yat-sen had in mind, construction should begin with small 'experimental' dams. These smaller dams would not be built all at once, but designed rather to be built sequentially so that the technical and unforeseen difficulties associated with earlier dam constructions could be anticipated and more easily be rectified. Smaller dams were also deemed to be less costly in that funding for the overall project could be justifiably regulated and apportioned by building one dam at a time. Similarly, it was contended that the efficiency of dam construction itself could be improved with each dam built. Given the educational value to be gained from compensating for the engineering shortcomings of each progressive dam construction, every subsequent construction would be better placed to avoid the particular problems which confronted previous engineering planning designs. (Dai 1994,

¹ CTGPC-China Three Gorges Project Corporation.

Kenneth Liebarthal and Michel Oksenberg 1988)

Vice Minister, Li Rui, later concluded clearly that the building of one massive dam would inevitably involve inundating many cities and the sacrifice of much farmland along the Yangtze. He also admonished that the construction of one massive dam might actually exacerbate the problem of flooding to the middle and lower reaches of the river.

INEQUITABLE FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITIES OF DIFFERENT PROVINCES

In the mid to late 1950s another more subtle issue arose having to do with the covertly inequitable division of financial responsibility to be taken for financing the project by different provinces. Since Sichuan is located upstream, for example, its officials objected that the location of the actual dam structure on the Yangtze meant that Sichuan would have to bear the primary fiduciary costs associated with its construction, while the practical benefits of the dam would be enjoyed primarily by the province of Hubei which is situated downstream. Although the issues surrounding the equitable financial responsibility of the relevant provinces for the construction of the dam were not easily resolved, the then Head of the Yangtze Planning Office, Lin Yishan, looked auspiciously upon the project, especially given the support shown for it in this period, by the now late Chairman Mao Zedong. For example, in 1958 Chairman Mao made public his view that it was imperative for China to have the largest hydroelectric dam in the world. With so strong a political vindication of the Three Gorges Dam Project, the persistent debate and criticism of the dam construction were, according to Lieberthal and Oksenberg, decidedly discouraged, if not suppressed (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988, Dai Qing 1998).

By 1959 preparation work for the Yangtze dam project was underway, but political momentum for the project stopped abruptly in 1960, due to the impending onset of a severe economic depression resulting from the overzealous financial optimism advertised in a propaganda campaign which exaggerated the actual stage of China's economic development. Known as 'The Great Leap Forward'², the campaign which was designed

²'The Great Leap Forward' was an ambitious governmental attempt initiated by Chairman Mao Zedong at the

to foster confidence in China's economy, collapsed disastrously through public realization that the campaign was more propaganda than fact (Backer 1996, Beattie 2002).

THE IMPACT OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION ON THE PROJECT

By 1963, however, interest in resuscitating the Three Gorges Dam Project again emerged, this time in large part because new political policies incorporated a governmental investment scheme for building what was called a 'Third Front' of industry in the southwest area of China. Despite this new attitude of optimism, progress on the dam project was once again short-lived with the advent of the Cultural Revolution which erupted in 1966. It is well-established that during this period a number of China's political relationships were strengthened, while others were weakened and even dissolved. Once a close ally of China, for example, the Soviet Union had by 1969 become so alienated from China that the Chinese government delayed further construction of the dam due to the growing fear that the Soviet Union was very likely to sabotage the project upon its completion. (Sutton 2004).

THE NEW WAVE OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT IN CHINA

It was nearly a decade before new economic reforms were introduced in 1978 which strongly urged that China's rapidly developing industrial base would be impeded without sufficient energy. In 1979, political interest in the Three Gorges Dam was reinforced by renewed pledges of investment and international confidence in China's massive economic potential. This new wave of foreign investment provided the type of assurances needed for the Chinese State Council to formalize the allocation of funding and the recommencement of construction on the dam. Given State Council's renewed and undaunted commitment to

end of 1950s (1958-1961) aimed to modernize China's economy. Through the process of rapid industrialization, and collectivization, those ideological campaigns aimed to transform China from an agrarian economy into a modern communist society. This period led to a massive environmental degradation and to a huge famine that could have caused the death of up to 30 million people.

completing the Yangtze dam project, it is perhaps not surprising that critics were quick to remind those who would listen that State approval for the resumption of the dam construction was activated even before a reliable feasibility study had been conducted. Hoping to dispel growing concerns about the dam's potentially damaging impact on the environment, along with worries about the technical feasibility of the construction itself, coupled with humanitarian concerns about relocation schemes for huge populations of people inhabiting or working in the land area to be inundated, the State Council eventually sanctioned a major feasibility study. Undertaken between 1982 and 1983, this first major feasibility study did admittedly address some environmental and some humanitarian issues, but they were addressed, we suggest, in the context of a framework of political power epistemology in which decisional outcomes were subservient to a hidden agenda that defined the construction of the Three Gorges Dam as a necessary condition of China's ascendance to world political and economic power.

In practical terms this meant that though the objections to the dam would be heard, they would not be acted upon. The 'lip service' paid to the critics of the dam would be politically paid, but the cost was no more than an idle ritual.

PROBLEMS WITH THE FIRST FEASIBILITY STUDY

By the mid-eighties persistent debate on the overall integrity of the initial feasibility study led leaders from the city of Chongqing to request that a new feasibility study be conducted in 1986. The hope was that this new study might more accurately reflect the international standards of reliability needed to assess the deeper environmental and humanitarian issues associated with the immediate construction and ongoing actual functioning of the dam. It was to be hoped also that this new feasibility study might also approve the request by leaders of Chongqing that the height of the dam be raised substantially. With the Chongqing formal request for a height increase in the dam and growing criticism both nationally and internationally about its environmental, technical and socio-cultural impacts, the demand for a new feasibility study was initiated in 1986. Given the official

endorsement of yet another feasibility study and the fact that official approval for the construction of the dam had already been given, considerable political pressure was soon placed on professionals involved in the project to sign off in its favour, despite recalcitrant and lingering doubts in the minds of some that far too many questions still remained unanswered. Despite this sensitive if not threatening political environment, Hou Xueyu, ecologist, was courageous enough to resist the pressure to give his approval to this new feasibility report, explaining that to his mind it failed to acknowledge the extensive and long term environmental devastation and ongoing eco-disruption that would inevitably result from the construction of the dam. According to Hou Xueyu, the putative benefits of the dam were being falsely exaggerated, while debate about finding real solutions to the environmental and other deleterious socio-cultural problems associated with so massive a dam project were being marginalized to maintain the political focus on the importance of its construction to ensure China's status as a world power in every sense.

PROFESSIONAL CONDEMNATION OF THE FINAL FEASIBILITY STUDY

Despite the favourable light in which the 1986 feasibility study endeavoured to display what were actually controversial facts about the benefits of the dam, Hou Xueyu's public condemnation of the study resonated with the concerns of other environmentalists, Chinese engineers, philosophers and human rights advocates who found the courage to express their concerns and doubts more vociferously. Lamentably, as the official Chinese governmental position in favour of the dam construction hardened, it became increasingly difficult for dissenters to express publically their reservations without reprisals and punitive measures being taken against them. One important critic during this period was the Chinese engineer, turned journalist, Dai Qing, whose edited volume on the topic served to provide a reasonably safe forum for those with professional expertise to reflect critically on the intractable issues surrounding the dam project. Nonetheless, the values orientation afforded by the epistemology of power framework ensured that it was the value of power itself that would determine the outcome of debate, not logic, not reason, not even environmental or

humanitarian concerns.

EPISTEMOLOGY OF POWER POLITICS AND THE MARGINALIZATION OF MORAL DISCOURSE

Our point in providing this brief discussion of the historical background of the protracted debate surrounding the decision to approve the Three Gorges Dam Project is to show unequivocally that the moral dimension of the controversy is still very much alive, as evidence continues to accrue about its adverse environmental and deleterious socio-cultural effects. It is also well worth reiterating that amongst those who have inveighed against the building of the dam are many highly trained professional people in fields of direct relevance to the issues raised. As has been pointed out here and elsewhere (Dai 1998, Ryder & Barber 1990), amongst the many voices raised in ‘protest’, we have heard from hydraulic power engineers, sedimentation specialists, geologists, archaeologists, social scientists, environmentalists, to name only a few. Even Chinese military and national security specialists have expressed their concerns that the centralization of so much hydroelectric power in one place serves increasingly to make the Chinese nation especially vulnerable to potentially cataclysmic terrorist intrusions. Despite the well-spring of wisdom and constructive challenge made so readily available by these experts, their views opposing the dam construction have been silenced in the sense that there are few if any public forums for them to be heard (Beattie 2002). Indeed, there are some critics outside China who claim that the former Chinese Prime Minister, Li Peng, deliberately made it as difficult as possible for those people of dissenting intellectual disposition to be heard in any public forum. (Ponseti & López-Pujol 2006)

At least “two generations of Three Gorges dam opponents from Li Rui, formerly Mao Zedong’s personal secretary and a Vice Minister of water resources, to Dai Qing, a former Guangming Daily journalist who in February 1989 published an anthology of articles opposing the dam, have been discriminated against, dismissed from office, publicly humiliated, branded as ‘rightists’ and sometimes sent to prison for their dissenting views. Yet it is often these critical voices which are most urgently needed during the kind of rapid

modernization on which China has embarked.

It is to be hoped that it is now clear from the foregoing discussion of the ongoing debate about the construction of the Three Gorges Dam that there have been many voices both within and without China raised in well-considered protest of this massive project. The problem resides not from the absence of adversarial voice, but from the fact that the voice of challenge has been either muffled, made politically inaudible, and cavalierly dismissed or covertly suppressed by threatening the security of those who found ways of making their voices audible enough to make the proponents of the dam construction uncomfortable. In the end, the decision to push the dam project through Chinese government doors superseded the question whether the voices raised against it were judicious and sustained by values that reflect our humanity and respect for nature more than our quest for money, power and status.

As Mao Zedong and in more recent decades, the former Premier of China, Li Peng have made manifestly clear, the construction of this largest hydroelectric power station in the world was intended to serve politically as a symbol to the world of the emergence of the awakening political and economic ‘giant’, the new ‘superpower,’ China. Underpinning the political decision-making has been a ‘hidden-agenda’ of ideology defined by the epistemology of power. According to Laura’s critique of the epistemology of Power, the problem is that no concept of knowledge is value-free, but the dominant paradigm of knowledge is motivated by the obsession of mankind with power, so power becomes the ultimate value which knowledge embeds (Patterson 2001, Laura 1998, Stapledon & Crossle 1997). Put more simply, knowledge equals power and power is expressed through technologies of dominance and control. The technologization of nature in the name of modernization is the fundamental tool of power epistemology. The outcome of this form of knowledge is what he calls the theory of transformative subjugation. Technologization is the process through which we transform the living world around us by reconstructing it in ways which ensure that it is easier to dominate, subjugate, expropriate and thus control. And herein lies the problem. To make it easier to know the world by dominating it, we subjugate it to our technological reconstructions which make it more predictable and easier to control by transforming the living world into an increasing inert, chemicalized, lifeless and dead one. The more synthetic we make our

reconstructions of the world, the easier it is to ensure that the things of our making are as predictable as possible and under our control. We make ourselves kings but the kingdom over which we in the end rule is our own reconstructed world of lifeless things. And the most efficient politics of power propagate themselves by implementing pedagogies of learning which are themselves informed and defined by the symbols of power they idolized. To 'know' the world is to gain power 'over it and it is the power we have over the world that both enables and covertly encourages us to dominate and control it'. Knowledge is not value-free, nor are the pedagogical frameworks in our schools which parade the outcome of technologization and modernization as the hallmark of progress. Until we understand the extent to which the epistemology of power has shaped both our educational and political system, we shall remain imprisoned by the values of vested interest and exploitation which characterize not only our relationship with nature, but also with each other.

REFERENCES

- Barber, M. and Ryder, G., 1993. *Damming The Three Gorges. What dam builders don't want you to know*. Toronto: Earthscan Publications.
- Beattie, J., 2002. Dam building, dissent, and development: The emergence of the Three Gorges Project. *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies*, 4 (June Issue), p.138-158.
- Becker, J., 1996. *Hungry Ghosts: China's Secret Famine*. London: Shapiro, chapters 1 and 2, pp.21-93.
- Bridle, R., The Dam Debate goes on. *The WCD Work Programme*. [online] Available at: <<http://www.icid.org.uk/Newsandviews/33/debate2.pdf>> [Accessed 20 December 2007].
- Challman, D., 2000. THE WHOLE DAM STORY: A Review of the China Yangtze Three Gorges Dam. *Energeia*. [online] Available at: <http://www.caer.uky.edu/energeia/PDF/vol11_1.pdf> [Accessed 20 December 2007].
- Chaudhuri, A., 2003. Three Gorges Dam: Fortune or Folly?. *MURJournal*. [online]

- Available at: <<http://web.mit.edu/murj/www/v09/v09-Reports/v09-r3.pdf>>
[Accessed 16 January 2008].
- Czachor, B., 2007. The Three Gorges Dam and the Influence of Globalization in Central China. *Dialogue @ RU*. [online] Available at: <http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~dialogs/vol_03/essays/b_czachor/index.html>
[Accessed 21 December 2007].
- CWRC (Changjiang Water Resources Commission), 1993. *Survey on Inundation Losses of the Three Gorges Project*. Unpublished survey report (In Chinese). Wuhan, China, 1994. *Outline on the Handling of Reservoir Inundation and Resettlement Planning for the Three Gorges Project on the Yangtze River*. Unpublished Document (in Chinese). China: Wuhan.
- Dai, Q., ed., 1998. *The river Dragon has come! The three gorges dam and the fate of China's Yangtze River and its people*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
- Heggelund, G., 2006. Resettlement Programmes and Environmental Capacity in the Three Gorges Dam Project. *Development and Change*, 37(1), pp.179-199.
- Heggelund, G., 2005. Running into Dead Ends: Challenges in Researching the Three Gorges Dam, *China Environment Series*, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 7, pp.79-83.
- Laura, R.S. and Cotton, M.C., 1998. *Empathetic Education*. London: Routledge.
- Lee, W.J., 2004. The Environmental Impact of Large Scale Hydroelectric Development: Lessons from Three Gorges. *IEEE Energy Systems Research Centre*, The University of Texas. [e-journal] Available through: IEE Ecplore Digital Library [Accessed 22 December 2007].
- Lieberthal, K. and Oksenberg, M., 1988. *Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Patterson, K., 2001. *Power and Purpose*. [online] Available at: <<http://www.kortexplores.com/node/95>> [Accessed 20 January 2011].
- Ponseti, M. and López-Pujol, J., 2006. The Three Gorges Dam Project in China: history and consequences. *ORIENTATS-2006*, ISSN 1696-4403. [online] Available at

- <<http://ddd.uab.es/pub/hmic/16964403n4p151.pdf>> [Accessed 20 December 2007].
- Sutton, A., 2004. The Three Gorges Project on the Yangtze River in China". *Geography*, 89(2), p.111-126.
- Stapledon, O. and Crossle, R., 1997. *An Olaf Stapleton Reader*. NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Three Gorges Dam, Yangtze River, China*. [online] Available at: <http://www.coe.montana.edu/ee/rmaher/ENGR125_FL06/Three%20Gorges%20Dam.pdf> [Accessed 20 December 2007].
- Tan, Y. and Yao, F., 2006. Three Gorges Project: Effects of resettlement on the environment in the reservoir area and countermeasures. *Population and Environment*, 27, pp.351–371.
- Xie, P., 2009. Three-Gorges Dam: Risk to Ancient Fish. *W A T E R B R I E F S*. [online] Available at: <<http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/sci;302/5648/1149b>> [Accessed 20 December 2007].
- <<http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/sxgc/t36512.htm>>.
- <<http://american.edu/ted/threedam.htm>>.
- 中国长江三峡工程开发总公司. [online] Available at: <<http://www.ctgpc.com/cn>> [Accessed 23 September 2009].

Religious Revival and De-ethnicisation in China: Reshapping Boundaries

Francis Khok Gee Lim
Nanyang Technological University
Email: fkglim@ntu.edu.sg

INTRODUCTION

As the Chinese state adopts greater toleration for religion and religious practices over the last two decades, religion has experienced a general revival throughout the country. This has also attracted increasing official and scholarly attention on the effects of religious revival on the ethnic minority regions. One important reason is the perceived close link between religious identity and ethnic identity among the minority minzu, such that an intensification of religiosity among these communities would have profound implications for the ways they relate to one another and with the state institutions, touching on issues such as social cohesion, competition for scarce resources, economic development, and political stability. In terms of the intensity of scholarly attention and official scrutiny, two religions in particular stand out: Islam and Tibetan Buddhism. This is because these religions have been often been linked with the ethno-nationalism and separatist movements spurred on by certain sections of the Uighur and Tibetan populations.

In this paper I discuss the possibility of a de-ethnicization process resulting from religious revival, a phenomenon that tends to be ignored by analysts studying religion and ethnicity in the minority regions of China. By using the concept of “legibility” proposed by James Scott, I first discuss how the Communist state attempted to make legible the diverse groups of people in the country through the minzu shibie project. Following from this, I utilize case studies of Tibetan Buddhism, Islam and Christianity from published sources and my fieldwork data to suggest that religious revival could also result in a de-ethnicization process that can impact on minzu in two main ways: first, exerting centrifugal pressures on sub-minzu groups, and second, allowing the minority groups to transcend minzu boundaries

and facilitating their integration into de-ethnicized, translocal and cosmopolitan communities.

RELIGION AND ETHNICITY AMONG THE MINORITIES

That religion is an important resource for minority identity formation has been noted for a long time by the participants of the minzu shibie project, the public media, as well as scholars of minority affairs. In fact, for some minority nationalities in particular, religious identity and ethnic identity are often seen as inseparable. Some scholars (e.g. Gladney 1991; Sutton and Kang, 2009) have used the term “ethno-religion” to describe the kind of religion that is closely related with ethnicity. For example, in their research on the impact of tourism on religion and ethnicity in the Huanglong region in western Sichuan, Sutton and Kang argue that “local identities have been tied almost indissolubly into religious practices” (2009: 191). They note that ethno-religion is especially relevant for the Tibetans and Muslims as it is a crucial mediating factor for their interactions with the state and with the Han Chinese in everyday life. They come to this conclusion:

“Religion and ethnicity have been categorized and controlled in the same terms, a process that has helped to define and also mediate differences among nationalities, and in the successive periods of political change since the 1950s, the two have been suppressed and revived in tandem. ‘Religion’ on China’s ethnic frontier appears to be almost an intrinsic aspect of ethnicity” (Sutton and Kang 2009: 191, *my italics*)

Interestingly, Sutton and Kang also quote Ye Xiaowen, the long-time former director of China’s Religious Affairs Bureau, which, importantly in the present context, takes the form Religious and Minority Affairs Bureau (RMAB) in the minority regions. Representing the official position, Ye expresses the view that the “religious question” is often intimately linked with the “national question”:

“In a nation (minzu) with a broad-based and profound religious belief, the

religious and national sentiments, the religious and national psychology, and religious and national customs, religious and national culture, the religious and national consciousness of every believer are intertwined and infiltrate each other, sometimes even becoming inseparable” (Ye Xiaowen, quoted in Sutton and Kang 2009)

The main aim of the preceding discussion is to show that for many state officials and scholars, religion is very frequently seen as one of the key markers of minzu identity in China. In fact, certain minority groups have been defined primarily in terms of their religions, such as the Uighurs, Tibetans, Hui, and Dai, just to name a few. One of the reasons is that in these groups a majority profess a particular faith. Hence in terms of the understanding of religious revival among the minorities, researchers often focus on whether the phenomenon might lead to a strengthening of ethnic identity—which involves the strengthening of ethnic boundaries defined partly or predominantly in religious terms—and what this development means for inter-ethnic relations and the minorities’ interactions with the state. Since many of the minority groups in China live in the frontier provinces with their co-ethnics residing in neighbouring countries, to the central government in Beijing minority issues also touch on matters related to national unity, sovereignty, and development. It is thus not unusual to encounter reports in the domains of public media, officialdom and academia about the potential threat to social and political stability as a result of religious revival, such as the rise in Islamism in Xinjiang or the revival of Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and rituals. To further understand the view of many that religion and ethnicity are often inseparable, it is necessary to examine one of the most profound state interventions into the minority areas, the minzu shibie, or “nationalities/ethnic classification” project.

ETHNIC GROUPS MADE “LEGIBLE”

There is a large body of literature on the state’s project in the identification of “nationalities”, known as the minzu shibie, and my intention here is primarily to draw on certain important insights from the existing literature to illustrate my central argument in this

paper. I would also like to suggest that James Scott's concept of "legibility" can be a useful analytical tool with which to examine the minzu shibie project and its effects. The Communist regime's "national identification" project in the early 1950s can be conceptualized as its effort to make the many ethnic groups in the country "legible" and hence to be understood, manipulated, and disciplined for the broader goal of nation-building.

In his book, *Seeing Like a State*, Scott seeks to investigate why grand projects of the state often failed, with many producing the very opposite of the intended effects. From a broad survey of large state-sponsored projects from across the world, Scott comes to the important conclusion that the fundamental problem behind the failure lies in the modern state's penchant for drastically simplifying reality to fit into its neat administrative categories. One serious consequence of this is the neglect or dismissal of local knowledge, which Scott argues is crucial for effective management of the complexities of the natural environment and social life. Practically, this implies that in order to control its subjects and territory, the state must necessarily "narrow its vision". This narrowing of vision involves processes of simplification, codification and abstraction—the "dismembering [of] an exceptionally complex and poorly understood set of relations and processes in order to isolate a single element of instrumental value" (1998: 21), a condition that Scott describes as "legibility". When the domain of the state becomes "legible", its people and physical environment can then be subject to state's manipulation. Minzu shibie can be seen as an attempt by the Communist state to render legible the diverse groups of people living within the country.

Stevan Harrell has provided one of the most compelling accounts and critique of the minzu shibie project undertaken by the CCP. The project is not only about the imposition of political control over the unruly minority regions. Guided by ideas of evolutionary Marxism which classify peoples according to their prevailing modes of production, minzu shibie was simultaneously a cultural project that slotted peoples into a hierarchical system that ranked them according to their economic and cultural achievements. When the Communist leadership first came to power, it needed detailed descriptions of the peoples under its rule in order to determine "the ladder of history a particular group might have been at the time of the Communist takeover" (Harrell 2003: 42). The minzu classification project, like Sun Yatsen's

notion of the Republic of Five Nationalities (*wuzu gonghe*) decades before, was carried out in the service of development, national integration, and crucially, ordering. The main difference was the CCP's reliance on evolutionary Marxism and the Stalinist criteria for identifying nationality: a "nation" refers to a group of people who share common language, territory, economy, and psychology manifesting as culture. In addition, the nations in a multinational country could be classified in a hierarchical order in terms of their progress, at the point of identification, along the evolutionary stages of modes of production. One important result of this hierarchical ordering was the positioning of the Han majority, which wielded political power at the central government, as having attained the most advanced stage of civilizational evolution. The Han *minzu* were thus held up as the model for the other minority peoples. As Louisa Schein (2000) argues, state-produced representations of the minority Others through the *minzu shibie* did not just entail the construction of cultural differences; they also served to create and to legitimize hierarchies structured along the axes of class, gender, education and region.

While in present-day China the *minzu* classification system has become some sort of Durkheimian social fact imbued with features of coerciveness and immutability, a number of scholars have shed light on the complexity and contingent aspects of the *minzu shibie* project. Thus, Stevan Harrell has analysed how ethnic identification and practices in the everyday life of the minority peoples do not conform neatly to the state's system of *minzu* classification that stresses exclusivity and permanence. This rigid system as currently applied by the state in its effort to classify, order, and control—i.e. to make "legible"—the diverse populations of China has been superimposed upon a highly fluid and complex reality, one "in which members of local and regional communities relate to each other in a variety of ways according to a variety of identities based on different combinations of the four factors specified in the *minzu* definition and other factors that are not there, such as religion, class, and political control or allegiance" (Harrell 2001: 313).

Further, the ethnic identification project was not as systematic and "scientific" as many have assumed. As Thomas Mullaney has shown, when the Communist regime first initiated the *minzu shibie* effort, it was highly reliant of a group of experts—ethnologists, linguists,

historians, philologists—for their taxonomic methods and advice to gain an understanding of the complexities of the minority regions and to eventually demarcate the boundaries that set one ethnic group from another. Thus, at the initial stage of the minzu shibie project, these groups of participating scholars were not so much “seeing like the state” than assisting the state “to see”. For the Communist leadership to understand, manage, and ultimately control the various ethnic groups in the country, it needed to establish visible units into which these groups can be assigned. The problem is that for effective management the number of such units cannot be prohibitively large:

“Authorities decided that, if minzu was truly going to be one of the axes of Chinese citizenship, the state could not permit people to choose their own designations at will. There would have to be a predetermined set of authorized minzu categories from which each person would select. These categories would have to be mutually exclusive, limited in number, of a reasonably large size, but also sufficiently grounded in local realities so as to elicit popular support”
(Mullaney 2010: 329)

The result is that out of more than 400 applications for recognition as minzu, only 56 were eventually endorsed.

In an important essay, Yang Bin (2009) discusses the contingent and pragmatic ways with which researchers, under state’s employment, determined which groups to be classified as minzu. Using the case of Yunnan, Yang shows the inconsistent ways researchers and officials narrowed down the large number of minzu applications to just around 22, depending on factors such as the amount of time the researchers had in the field, whether the elites of the minority groups are convincing in pressing their case to the researchers, the nature of ties between local elites and the Communist party officials, etc. In addition, Yang’s study shows that the criteria for the determination of groups as minzu did not always conform to the Soviet model as many have believed. Minzu as a distinctive category “includes all kinds of ethnic or pro-ethnic groups, no matter which state of society they are in...[and] could be a mix of

several ethnic groups, one single ethnicity, a sub-ethnic unit or just a tribal community” (2009: 767).

As an ideological practice, the minzu project has evolved into a system of ethnic classification that stresses exclusivity and permanence, with the invented minzu categories as units that allow for strong state intervention into society. Minzu policies are thus double-edged: theoretically all peoples are considered equal, and many ethnic minorities have been given spaces to for voicing out and resources are made available on the national stage. However, this national stage is also dominated by the Han Chinese, indicating that the minzu system is also a state-formulated hierarchical system imposed on the ethnic minorities. The system has also allowed for state penetration into affair of ethnic minorities to an unprecedented degree (Yang 2009). With this discussion of the minzu shibie project, in what follows I shall examine how religious revival among the minority minzu could disrupt the boundary-making effort of the state.

RELIGIOUS REVIVAL AND REDRAWING OF BOUNDARIES

As highlighted previously, the classification effort of minzu shibie has reduced hundreds of self-identified ethnic groups into a more manageable number, for both reasons of political expediency and scientific taxonomy. One good example that illustrates this process is the Hui, for whom the main ethnic marker is the Islamic faith. As studied by Dru Gladney and others, the Hui are dispersed throughout different regions of China, in cities and the rural areas, many of whom do not share one or more of the Stalinist criteria for nationality, namely common territory, language, cultural practices, and economic activities. It is worthwhile to present a lengthy quote from Gladney’s extensive study of the Hui:

“For Hui communities in Northwest China, Islam is taken to be the fundamental marker of their identity...Hui urban communities, such as that in Beijing, then to express their identity in terms of cultural traditions: he pork tabu, entrepreneurship, and craft specializations...In southeastern Hui lineages, genealogical descent is

the most important aspect of Hui identity. To be Hui is to be a member of a lineage that traces its descent to foreign ancestors, who just happened to be Muslim” (Gladney 1998: 126-7).

This last group of approximately 60,000 no longer practice Islam, but adhere to folk religion, Buddhism, Daoism, Christianity, and Marxist secularism (Gladney 1998: 112). When we further examine the religion-ethnicity nexus, we see a complex picture of the Hui as comprising of different communities adhering to different Islamic sects. Muslims in China are overwhelming Sunni, which in turn is divided into four main branches: the Gedimu or the “Old School”, Sufism, Ikhwan/Yihewani, and Xidaotang. This means that a revitalization of religion could conceivably impact on the sub-minzu sectarian affiliations, resulting not so much in the revitalization of the Hui as a minzu as increasing division among the sub-minzu communities that make up the Hui. Indeed, some recent studies of the Hui have highlighted such a trend.

For example, Susan McCarthy’s (2005) study of the Islamic revival among the Hui in Yunnan shows an intense debate raging among them over what constitute “authentic” Islam. On one side stand those who support close links between Islamic and Chinese cultures in the forging of the Hui identity. For these Hui, mainly of the Gedimu/Qadim sect, a comprehensive, authentic Islamic education comprises not only Islamic theology, philosophy, history and Arabic, but also Chinese philosophy, history, language and literature. The main aim of this curriculum is to cultivate Muslims who are also culturally Chinese. On the other side of the debate stand those, like the Haba Hui, who believe that an authentic Islam should be largely shorn of Chinese cultural influence and should re-orientate itself towards the Arabic world. For them, “pure” Islamic education should focus solely on the study of Islamic theology, philosophy, history and Arabic, and mosques should be built in accordance with Arabic architectural style with cupolas and minarets instead of resembling Chinese temples. Some young Haba Hui even view their future as being tied more closely to the Middle East than to China, with their religious identity increasingly associated with a global Muslim community, with Arabic as the universal Islamic language.

With regard to de-ethnicization, we are able to draw two lessons from McCarthy's case study of the Hui in Yunnan. First, as highlighted by scholars such as Gladney, Hui is a highly differentiated minzu, divided along not only regional but also sectarian lines. Religious revitalization among the Hui impacts on different sub-minzu communities in multifaceted ways, and could actually lead to greater division rather than strengthening of the Hui as a minzu as conceived by the state. Second, as the Arabization movement indicates, religious revival among the Hui can involve a de-ethnicization process that reconfigures the vector of integration away from particularistic minzu identity towards a more universal identity of global Islam.

While the preceding discussion of the Hui highlights the process of de-ethnicization in terms religious revival's impact on sub-minzu and transnational relations, what follows is an examination of how religious revival and de-ethnicization do not necessarily lead to societal fragmentation but can indeed facilitate greater integration with the market and the Chinese polity. Tibetan Buddhism will serve as an illustrative case.

Tibetan Buddhism has received intense scrutiny partly because of its association with the Tibetan government-in-exile in northern India, which until recently was led by the 14th Dalai Lama who had fled Tibet in 1959 following the Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule. While the Dalai Lama has longer ago rescinded his demand for Tibetan independence from the People's Republic, the relationship between the China and the Dalai Lama and his followers is still fraught with immense tension over issues such as the interpretation of what is "real autonomy" for Tibet, the appropriate paths for its development, and the possibility of the Dalai Lama's return to his homeland. Adding to these contentious issues is the existence of a hard-line group of Tibetans which disagree with the Dalai Lama's moderate "Middle Path" and are engaged in efforts to fight for full Tibetan independence from China.

The re-opening of Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and the state's greater toleration for the practice of religion by the Tibetan people in the Reform era has paved the way for a general revival of Tibetan Buddhism in the Tibetan cultural areas. Some scholars have noted how key religious figures and the religious communities they have set up have exerted a centripetal force that draws in huge number of faithfuls and provided huge impetus to the revival of

Tibetan culture in general (e.g. Germano 1998; Huber 1999). The strong link between religious revival and ethnicity has also been noted by Lawrence Epstein and Peng Wenbin (1998) in their study of a folk ritual known as the *luröl* (“music festival”) in the Repgong region of Qinghai. As part of Tibetan “folk religion” with “rituals consist of a series of dances, sacrifices, propitiation of local mountain deities, and rites that celebrate village solidarity and purity, long life and fertility” (Epstein and Peng 1998: 124), the *luröl* rituals were prohibited during the Cultural Revolution and subsequently experienced a revival when restrictions were lifted, and when the Repgong region, with its famous monastery, began to welcome substantial number of tourists. Epstein and Peng show that the revival of the *luröl* rituals was vital for the maintenance and strengthening of the Tibetans’ links to their locality, gods, and ethnic identity. In fact, Epstein and Peng argue that the rituals were antihegemonic in that they seek to undermine the state’s effort at assimilating the Tibetans and their culture under its vision of the Chinese nation by enacting strong symbolic boundaries that reaffirm the separateness of Tibetans as a *minzu*.

Melvyn Goldstein’s (1998) research on the revival of monastery life in the famous Drepung monastery on the outskirts of Lhasa shows how a significant number of monks at the monastery has been caught up with the struggle over the political status of Tibet vis-à-vis China. As the state authorities slowly loosen its grip over religious life in Tibet and elsewhere, it also faces real prospect of challenges to its vision of a united country when religious personnel with sympathies for ethno-nationalism and separatism take on prominent roles in protest movements. Goldstein demonstrates that in the case of Drepung, many monks are actively involved in the struggle over the state’s harsh control over Tibet, bolstered by a new found confidence in the general revival of Buddhism in Tibetan society and the material support they manage to garner from ordinary Tibetans.

Studies such as those discussed above tend to present a picture that highlights the intimate links between religious revival, rising ethnic consciousness, and for some, political dissidence. While I do not seek to deny the valuable insights presented by such studies, it is also important to be aware that religious revival, strengthening of ethnic boundaries and political dissidence do not always go together in the minority regions. In fact, if we were not

careful, we might end up “seeing like the state” when we wittingly or otherwise see cultural differences and boundaries in somewhat absolutist terms. No doubt there is some truth in the above view about the link between religion and ethno-nationalism. But I wish to suggest that its explanatory function is not exhaustive, and that we should not fall into the temptation to see like the state in terms of its *minzu* classification. Tibetan Buddhism is a domain not only for the Tibetans, but also other *minzu* such as the Mongolian, Naxi, and increasingly, the Han. Mathew Kapstein (2003), in his broad survey of Tibetan Buddhism outside the Tibetan Autonomous region, found that the religion’s popularity has been rapidly growing among non-Tibetans, many of whom are Han from the cities and overseas Chinese. If we take the multi-ethnic feature of Tibetan Buddhism into account, it is possible to argue that Tibetan Buddhism revival lead not necessary to socio-political fragmentation but could in fact facilitate integration among different ethnic groups.

We can see the de-ethnicized, integrative aspect of Tibetan Buddhism clearly on Wutai shan, Shanxi province, a mountain sacred to the Buddhists as the abode of Bodhisattva Manjushri. Gray Tuttle, through his observations over a decade, has been struck by the revival of Tibetan Buddhism on Wutai Shan partly due o the intense interest shown by of non-Tibetans—especially the Han Chinese and the Mongols. As evidence that not only the ethnic Tibetans are closely associated with Tibetan Buddhism, Tuttle presents the stories of three ethnic Chinese, Dharma-master Fazun (1902-80), Nenghai Lama (1886-1967), and Dharma-master Qinghai (1922-90), who have been instrumental in the transmission of Tibetan Buddhism among the Chinese during the Republican and Communist eras. As one of Nenghai Lama’s closest disciples, Qinghai had started his studies at the Jinci Temple in Sichuan and subsequently followed his master Nenghai to Wutai shan. While he had never been to Tibet proper for his training, Qinghai had the opportunity to receive the oral transmission from the revered Tibetan monk and scholar, Sherab Gyatso, when the latter visited Wutai shan in the 1950s.

Dharma-master Qinghai was especially influential in the revival of Tibetan Buddhism in Wutai shan in the decade post-1978 till his death in 1990. During this time he played a critical role in the renovation of several important temples damaged during the Cultural Revolution

and managed to attract a strong following. When religious freedom was restored after the Cultural Revolution, Dharma-master Qinghai began an intensive project to revitalise Tibetan Buddhism on Wutai shan. Apart from overseeing repair work on a number of temples, he was also took it upon himself to propagate Tibetan Buddhism among the Chinese. Currently, the Yuanzhao Temple where Qinghai took up residence in 1984 is the central temple associated with the master and the transmission of Tibetan Buddhism among the Chinese. After Qinghai passed away, his Chinese followers sponsored the building of a gigantic Tibetan-style stupa as a memorial to their master, one among many that have been erected in recent years. Indeed, Tuttle attributes the rapid growth in the number of new stupas on Wutai shan to the strong presence of Chinese Tibetan Buddhists in the last two decades (Tuttle 2006: 20). The rapid growth of Tibetan Buddhism on Wutai shan, supported in no small part by the Chinese and Mongolian Tibetan Buddhists, further illustrates how the revival of a religion normally associated with a particular minzu in China can involve a universalization, and hence de-ethnicization, of the religion concerned, with important implications for inter-minzu relations. As Tuttle notes,

“What is most impressive about the flourishing of Tibetan Buddhism at Wutai shan is the ability of people of various ethnic backgrounds mutually to co-exist in a Buddhist community...In this atmosphere, ethnicity is less important than Buddhist learning and practice...When Chinese, Mongols, and Tibetans are living together in various temples, through their common language is Chinese, their shared practice and affiliation is Tibetan Buddhism” (2006: 24).

Beyond the borders of China, Tibetan Buddhism has for decades been globalized through travelling monks, the global media, the support of non-Tibetans for the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan independence movement, and the ever growing number of faithfuls in different countries worldwide. To explain the attraction of things Tibetan in the West, some scholars have examined through psychological theories how Westerners have projected their fantasies and nostalgia onto the Tibetans. This has occurred partly through a long history of Tibet's

relative seclusion from the rest of the world due to its harsh environment and unwelcoming rulers, and partly due to the popularisation of myths surrounding Himalayas as the abode of the gods (Bishop 1990; Hutt 1996). Fascination with Tibetan Buddhism and the Tibetans intensified following the conferment of the Nobel Peace Prize to the Dalai Lama and the support given to the Tibetan cause by Western celebrities. In recent years, Tibetan lamas have been travelling the world giving dharma classes and talks, opening religious and cultural centres, collaborating with scholars on Tibetan studies at prestigious European and American universities, and attracting ever-growing number of devotees (e.g. Lopez 1998; Capper 2004; Samuel 2005). What this development reveals is that while the globalization of Tibetan Buddhism has no doubt contributed to the revitalization of Tibetan culture in China and strengthened ethnic identity among the Tibetans, it has simultaneously universalizes the religion away from the particularistic domain of the Tibetan minzu. In short, the globalization of Tibetan Buddhism, similar to the fate of other so-called world religions, can result in its de-ethnicization. In the rest of this section, we shall briefly explore the case of Christianity.

Joseph Xiao was a twenty-year old Catholic from Gongshan County in the Nujiang Autonomous Prefecture, northwest Yunnan, bordering the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR). In 2005 he served as my guide when I embarked on a fieldtrip to the mountainous county to conduct research on the Catholic communities in this remote corner of southwest China. At the time, Joseph was enrolled as a seminarian in a junior seminary in Xi'an, Shaanxi province, hoping to become a Catholic priest and eventually return home to serve his community. Joseph was also a Tibetan.

The Gongshan Dulong-Nu Autonomous County and the neighbouring counties of Deqin and Markham—the latter is located in the TAR—form an area where members belonging to what I term Tibetan Catholicism can be found (Lim 2009a). This group of around six thousand Tibetan Catholics—made up of both Tibetans and non-Tibetans such as the Naxi and the Nu—is the legacy of the effort by French and Swiss missionaries to convert the Tibetans to Christianity from the mid-nineteenth century to the early 1950s, when all foreign missionaries were expelled by the Communist regime. When I first started my ethnographic research, there was one Tibetan Catholic priest serving the faithfuls, with at least three other

young Tibetan men at various stages of their seminary training. The reasons why I use the term “Tibetan Catholicism” are two-fold. First, many members of this community, who are dispersed throughout different neighbouring counties, have a strong awareness of the history of the Tibetan mission and see their community as its legacy. Second, regardless of their actual official minzu status, the Catholics rely on Tibetan-language prayers (such as the Lord’s Prayer and the Hail Mary), hymns, and Bible readings produced by the missionaries for both their daily devotions and in the Mass if it is presided over by a priest who proficient in Tibetan.

While Joseph’s father is Tibetan, his mother is Nu; Joseph is officially registered in his identity card as Tibetan, but his sister is registered as Nu. The example of Joseph and his family and their religious faith confounds the state’s effort to classify peoples according to neat categories of minzu. Tibetan and Nu are the main languages spoken in Joseph’s family, while Tibetan is the dominant language among the different minzu in the area. Joseph is Tibetan, but he is a Catholic and not a Buddhist. Minzu identity within the Joseph’s family and others are often chosen with pragmatic aims in mind; Joseph’s sister was registered as a Nu to take advantage of the preferential treatment that the Nu minzu—but not the Tibetan—enjoy in the Gongshan Dulong-Nu Autonomous county. Their Catholic religion has experienced a strong revival since the 1990s, when a wealthy returnee from Taiwan donated and managed to raise large sums of money to rebuild many village chapels; when the whole region opened up for tourism which saw a large influx of tourists visiting this highly exotic community; and with visits by Catholics from other places in China and overseas who often offer material and monetary donations. By the early 2000s, fifteen village chapels in the Gongshan county had been either refurbished or rebuilt, the main church in Deqin county which was built in 1905 had been renovated, and a new massive church building had been erected in Yanjing, in the Markham county in the TAR (largely through the financial support of a French missionary order). In this case, the revival of Tibetan Catholicism has not resulted in the strengthening of Tibetan ethno-nationalism but a revitalization of a religio-ethnic community (cf. Madsen) that is composed of a number of different minzu. Meanwhile, the Tibetan Catholic community is becoming increasingly integrated both with Catholics of other

minzu in the rest of China, and with the global Catholic church (see also Lozada 2001; Cao 2011).

In the next section, I shall explore the impact of tourism, especially ethnic tourism, on the revitalization of religion, and discuss how this may in turn lead to another form of de-ethnicization that integrates minority minzu into the emerging national and global market economy.

TOURISM, RELIGION, AND ETHNICITY

Since China embraced market reforms in earnest in the early 1980s and started opening up to the rest of the world by welcoming both capital and tourists, the tourism industry has become one of the engines of economic growth for the country and has drastically transformed the country's physical environment as well as its socio-cultural landscapes (e.g. Sofield and Li 1998; Oakes 1998; Nyíri 2006; Lim 2009b). During the Maoist era people's movements were severely restricted, with only a small number of the country's citizens able to travel for leisure (often as part of working trips or officially-sanctioned patriotic educational programmes). In this period, tourism was more a tool of the regime's propaganda machine than a viable industry. Distinguished foreign visitors were shepherded around the country viewing first-hand China's major industrial "achievements" as it embarked on an intensive modernization programme to showcase to the world the success of socialism. During the Cultural Revolution, as part of their "ideological work", Red Guards travelled throughout the country to visit prominent sites associated with the Communist Revolution (Nyíri 2006: 3), a type of domestic tourism that is the harbinger of present-day "Red Tourism" (*hongse lüyou*). Following the market reforms of the early 80s, the state started to realize the tremendous potential of tourism as an engine of economic development, especially for the impoverished remote minority areas, and began to open the country up to foreign tourists. Many to these early international tourists were overseas Chinese who had maintained a keen interest in their ancestral homeland and wished to travel to China to visit either relatives or get acquainted with elements of Chinese culture. In the last two decades, the massive surge in

international tourist arrivals has occurred in tandem with China's increasing economic, political, and cultural prominence in the world stage, culminating in the 2008 Beijing Olympics.

Meanwhile, domestic tourism in China receives a further boost from the rapidly expanding middle class in the country. Rising income has meant that more and more Chinese people are able to participate in the consumerist economy that has been the result of market reforms, and many are travelling both domestically and overseas for their holidays. As I have discussed elsewhere (Lim 2009), one of the most significant developments in China's tourism scene in recent years has been the growing number of "independent" tourists and backpackers, who mostly work and live in the cities. They tend to rely on the internet to plan their trips and to form travel communities that involve activities such as the sharing of post-trip feedbacks, holiday advice, gossips, literary and photographic works; buying and selling of travel paraphernalia; arranging meetings for meals and drinks; organizing volunteering trips to the needy communities; and mobilizing members in aid of disaster relief efforts. For many such independent tourists—and also for other Chinese and international tourists on packaged tours—a sojourn among the minorities to experience "simple" and "authentic" folkways (*minfeng*) is one of the most popular activities.

Partly to stimulate economic growth, the minority regions have been embarking on a drive to develop the tourism industry by attracting local and outside capital for investment in tourism infrastructure such as hotels, airports, roads, utilities, and tourist attractions. Tim Oakes (1998) is right to suggest that tourism development in the minority areas is not just an economic activity. It is also a political and cultural project of the state to "civilize" the poor and backward minority regions to be modern citizens through efforts in stimulating "cultural development" (*wenhua fazhan*). In nation-building terms, the *minzu* culture is usually essentialized as unchanging culture, which paradoxically requires modernization through efforts of the state and the outside world. On the one hand, the state hopes that tourism as a means of economic development would bring to the minority peoples advancement in material culture and an improvement in the standard of living, so that they are able to catch up with the supposedly more "modern" Han Chinese people who are held as the model *minzu*.

On the other hand, the introduction of private and state capital in the development of tourism can bring about deeper integration between the minority regions and the national economic-political orders.

In terms of tourism resources, the minority areas not only possess plenty of enchanting physical landscapes such as high mountains, pristine forests, sweeping deserts, and expansive grasslands. The “tourist gaze” (Urry 1990) constructed by the tourism industry and media—based on the principle of difference—tend to represent the minority peoples and their own cultures as exotic attractions to satisfy the nostalgic feeling for a relative more “authentic” (*chunzhen*) and “simple” (*zhipu*) life among the city dwellers. The state’s ideological construction of the minority peoples as relatively “backward” *minzu* with their traditions supposedly still “untouched” by modernity—the very ideological construction that seeks to integrate the minorities into the multi-national Chinese civilization led by the Han—opens up opportunities for the commodification of *minzu* cultures to be exploited by the surging influx of tourism capital in the minority regions. The increasing importance of tourism as a viable source of income for both the local authorities and the ordinary people in the minority areas has resulted in the *minzu* cultures being promoted as investment enticement and commodities, now subjected to continuous invention, revitalization, and manufacture as part of local specializations to attract tourists and capital. Yunnan, for example, began to embrace ethnic tourism in the early 1990s and a site called Yunnan Ethnic Folk Villages was built on the outskirts of the provincial capital, Kunming, in order to preserve and showcase diverse ethnic cultures of Yunnan, and to attract tourists to Kunming and to other parts of the province (Li 2011).

As an essential component of *minzu* culture, religion and its recent revitalization in the minority regions have to be examined in the context of tourism development. In recent years, throughout the minority regions many temples, churches, mosques and other religious sites are being renovated and promoted as interesting tourist attractions; tourism guidebooks and brochures highlight important religious festivals of the minorities to entice both tourists and pilgrims; and religious specialists such as monks, nuns, priests, imans, and shamans act as “culture brokers” in their occasional service as tour guides and interpreters for the visitors.

Sponsors lavish enormous amount of monetary and material support for the organization of religious events and rituals as part of local status and political contestations. Ordinary people's growing awareness of religious practices and artefacts as important tourism commodities further accentuates their commitment to preserve and promote their religious traditions and institutions. In the context of this paper's substantive concern, tourism-induced revival of a religion that is usually associated with a particular minzu, i.e. an "ethno-religion", can draw into its ambit the participation of other minzu and groups, contributing to the de-ethnicization of the religion. An interesting illustrative case is that of the revival of Tibetan culture and religion in a county in northwest Yunnan renamed recently as Shangri-La.

The renaming campaign started in 1996 when Zhongdian county officials planned to promote nature and ethnic tourism to create jobs for the local population, to increase county revenues, and to eventually transform the larger Diqing prefecture into a "leading" Tibetan area in China. With the help of a number of experts, they began to collect evidence to show that county was actually the famed Shangri-La, a mythical land in the Himalayan region where people do not age and live harmoniously with one another and with the environment. In a word, paradise on earth. The huge irony is that "Shangri-La" was first coined by the American author, James Hilton, in his novel, *The Lost Horizon*, which was later made into a film. The experts and county officials of Zhongdian, both Tibetans and non-Tibetans, accepted Hilton's fictional descriptions of Tibetan Buddhist lamas, the various ethnic communities, and the physical environment of Shangri-La as true accounts, and apparently saw striking similarities between Hilton's Shangri-La and Zhongdian (Hillman 2003).

The fact that "Shangri-La" was Hilton's invention—some say it is the corruption of the Tibetan term, Shambala, the western paradise in Tibetan Buddhist mythology —and did not have local provenance did not matter to the officials bent on creating a paradise in this part of Yunnan in their effort to promote tourism. As Ben Hillman shows, they turned the "four phonetic syllables from an English-language word into four distinct words of local Tibetan origin", to mean "the heart's sun and moon" (Ibid.: 178). In support of the county's application for the name-change, Yunnan provincial government prepared a report for the State Council which underscored that "the name represents what people of all races are

searching for—a desire that among people and between people and nature there be no conflict, no chaos (*qingluan*), only economic prosperity, national unity (*minzu tuanjie*) and social stability” (Ibid.: 179). In December 2001 the State Council approved the application to change to the county name from Zhongdian to Shangri-La, and in May the following year the county marked the name change with a huge Arts Festival. Since then, the county and the surrounding region have witnessed a revival of Tibetan religion and profound transformation in the region’s sacred landscape. Hordes of tourists mix with Tibetan Buddhist pilgrims to circumambulate the major monasteries such as the Songtseling and the sacred mountain of Karwa Karpo. Government bureaucrats, many of whom are non-Tibetans, consider religious sites primarily as “cultural resources” for attracting tourists. Many of these state officials have huge economic stakes in the tourism industry as they are also entrepreneurs running hotels, restaurants, shops, travel agencies, and other tourism services (Kolås 2004).

Thus the religious revival witnessed in Shangri-La County has to a considerable extent been facilitated by the development of tourism there. What is important to note is that the transformation of Zhongdian into Shangri-La to be the leading Tibetan area in China, is a multi-ethnic enterprise. At the Arts Festival during which the new name was launched, officials who presided over the ceremony were from diverse ethnic background (Hillman 2003: 185). Non-Tibetan tourists flock to the county and the Diqing prefecture looking to satisfy their fascination with the “mysterious” Tibetan religious culture packaged by the tourism industry and state bureaucrats using the exotic, albeit American-inspired, name of Shangri-La. In her study of the revitalization of Tibetan culture at Shangri-La County, Ashild Kolås (2004: 275) writes that

“ ‘Shangri-La’ provides an answer to the dreams of urban Chinese, attracted to a place where people live ‘in harmony with each other and the environment’. For whatever reasons, this is something that people in Diqing are becoming aware of, and that further affects the meanings they attach to the place where they live”.

In contemporary contexts of tourism and popular culture, Tibetan Buddhism is not solely the

domain for the Tibetans and their ethnic identification. It draws into its sphere diverse groups of people with their own respective interests and agenda, the same time as its boundary stretches beyond the Tibetan minzu to incorporate other ethnic communities.

CONCLUSION: ON NOT SEEING LIKE THE STATE

At the beginning of this paper I noted the penchant of many analysts of minority affairs to link religious revival in the minority areas to a heightening of ethnic consciousness and ethnic pride. With regard to the Uighurs and Tibetans, it is common to see comments and analyses highlighting the possibility that religious revival and rising ethnic feelings, if left unchecked or unaddressed, can foster ethno-nationalism that challenges the hegemonic rule of the Communist regime, and even foment separatist movements that might result in the fragmentation of the country. Underpinning many such analyses are the implicit assumptions ethnic boundaries are compounded by religious markers and that cultural differences are absolute—very similar to the way the Communist state constructs minzu through the minzu shibie.

Minzu shibie can be seen as an example of modernist social engineering, an effort which can be understood with the concept of “legibility” proposed by James Scott. One defining characteristics of the modern state is its reliance on universally valid, objective and precise measures and systems of knowledge that have been derived from processes of simplification, abstraction, and codification. The minzu shibie project represents one particular historical instance when the state attempted to make legible an inherently complex, fluid reality: multiple possible ways of being ethnic in the life of ordinary people were reduced, simplified, and curtailed by the imposition of a system based on the principle of cultural difference that slotted people into mutually exclusive minzu categories. Although the initial stages of the minzu classification project were plagued by ambiguity, contingency, political manoeuvring, and arbitrariness, eventually it involved the state’s imposition of a strict order upon a highly complex social reality.

The institutionalized minzu system presents to us a “primordialist” model of ethnicity

that emphasizes strong historical continuities in people's attachments to community, territory, and culture. However, as many theorists (e.g. Karl Barth) of culture and ethnicity have shown, cultural differences are not absolute and boundaries are constantly shifting and negotiated. It is undeniable that religion is an important source of identification, be it ethnic, gender, political or cultural. However, we should be wary of reductionist thinking that constantly conflates religion with identity, and avoid habitually accounting for religion's revival or persistence "purely in terms of the identity it can bestow on its followers" (Coleman and Collins 2004: 3). Hence, in the context of this paper, even the revival of an "ethno-religion", such as Tibetan Buddhism, does not solely, or necessarily, result in the strengthening of ethnic identity. As my discussion of Islam and the Hui minzu has shown, religious revitalization can exert centrifugal pressures on sub-minzu units: members of the Hui minzu belonging to different Islamic sects can be at odds with one another over the interpretation of "authentic" Islam.

Thus, religious and ethnic boundaries do not always neatly coincide, contrary to the assumptions of the minzu system. Religious revival can lead to a process of de-ethnicization, or more precisely, de-minzuization. By highlighting the processes of de-ethnicization I do not wish to suggest that religious revival has nothing to do with ethnicity. What I attempt to do in this paper is to both highlight the pitfalls of "seeing like the state", and to direct our attention to a process, brought about by religious revival, that re-draws boundaries and situates groups of people in relationships which are either sub or trans-minzu, and which are often also translocal or transnational. By focusing on the effects of tourism and cultivation of translocal ties, this paper illustrates how religious revival can also facilitate the integration of minority groups into the market, the state, as well as de-ethnicized and cosmopolitan communities.

REFERENCES

- Bishop, P., 1989. *The Myth of Shangrila: Tibet, Travel Writings, and the Creation of Sacred Landscape*. London: Athlone.
- Cao, N.L., 2011. *Constructing China's Jerusalem: Christians, Power, and Place in Contemporary Wenzhou*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Capper, D., 2004. "Enchantment with Tibetan Lamas in the United States." *Journal of Contemporary Religion*, 19(2), pp.137-153.
- Coleman, S. and Collins, P., 2004. Introduction: Ambiguous Attachments: Religion, Identity and Nation. In: S. Coleman and P. Collins, eds. *Religion, Identity and Change: Perspectives on Global Transformations*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Epstein, L. and Peng, W.B., 1998. Ritual, Ethnicity, and Generational Identity. In: M.C. Goldstein and M.T. Kapstein, eds. *Buddhism in Contemporary Tibet: Religious Revival and Cultural Identity*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Gladney, D.C., 1991. *Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People's Republic*. Cambridge, MA.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University.
- , 1998. Clashed Civilizations? Muslim and Chinese Identities in the PRC. In: D.C. Gladney, ed. *Making Majorities*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- , 2003. Islam in China: Accommodation or Separatism? *The China Quarterly*, 174, pp.451-467.
- Goldstein, M.C., 1998. The Revival of Monastic Life in Drepung Monastery. In: M.C. Goldstein and M.T. Kapstein, eds. *Buddhism in Contemporary Tibet: Religious Revival and Cultural Identity*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Harrell, S., 2001. *Ways of Being Ethnic in Southwest China*. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press.
- Hillman, B., 2003. Paradise Under Construction: Minorities, Myths and Modernity in Northwest Yunnan. *Asian Ethnicity*, 4(2), pp.175-188.
- Huber, T., 1999. *The Cult of the Crystal Mountain: Popular Pilgrimage and Visionary Landscape in Southeast Tibet*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Hutt, M.J., 1996. Looking for Shangri-La: From Hilton to Lāmichhāne. In: Tom Selwyn, ed. *The Tourist Image: Myths and Myth-making in Tourism*. Chichester and New York: John Wiley.
- Kapstein, M.T. 2003. A Thorn in the Dragon's Side: Tibetan Buddhist Culture in China. In: Morris Rossabi, ed. *Governing China's Multi-ethnic Frontiers*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, pp. 230-269.
- Kolås, Å., 2004. Tourism and the Making of Place in Shangri-La. *Tourism Geographies*, 6(3), pp.262-278.
- Lim, F.K.G., 2009a. Negotiating 'Foreignness', Localizing Faith: Tibetan Catholicism in the Yunnan-Tibet Borderlands. In: J. Bautista and F. Lim, eds. *Christianity and the State in Asia: Complicity and Conflict*. London and New York: Routledge.
- _____, 2009b. 'Donkey Friends' in China: The Internet, Civil Society and the Emergence of the Chinese Backpacking Community. In: T. Winter, P. Teo and T.C. Chang, eds. *Asia on Tour: Exploring the Rise of Asian Tourism*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Lopez, Jr., Donald S., 1998. *Prisoners of Shangri-La: Tibetan Buddhism and the West*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lozada, Eriberto P., Jr., 2001. *God Aboveground: Catholic Church, Postsocialist State, and Transnational Processes in a Chinese Village*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Madsen, R., 1998. *China's Catholics: Tragedy and Hope in an Emerging Civil Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- McCarthy, S., 2005. If Allah Wills It: Integration, Isolation and Muslim Authenticity in Yunnan Province in China. *Religion, State & Society*, 33(2), pp.121-136.
- Mullaney, T.S., 2010. Seeing for the State: The Role of Social Scientists in China's Ethnic Classification Project. *Asian Ethnicity*, 11(3), pp.325-342.
- Nyíri, P., 2006. *Scenic Spots: Chinese Tourism, Cultural Authority and the State*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Oakes, T., 1998. *Tourism and Modernity in China*. London: Routledge.
- Samuel, G., 2005. *Tantric Revisionings: New Understandings of Tibetan Buddhism and*

- Indian Religion*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Schein, L., 2000. *Minority Rules: The Miao and the Feminine in China's Cultural Politics*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Scott, J.C., 1998. *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Sofield, T. and Li, F., 1998. Tourism Development and Cultural Practices in China. *Annals of Tourism Research*, 25(2), pp.362-92.
- Sutton, D.S. and Kang, X.F., 2009. Recasting Religion and Ethnicity: Tourism and Socialism in Northern Sichuan, 1992-2005. In: Thomas D. DuBois, ed. *Casting Faiths: Imperialism and the Transformation of Religion in East and Southeast Asia*. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Tuttle, G., 2006. Tibetan Buddhism at Rib o rtse lnga/Wutai Shan in Modern Times. *Journal of the International Association of Tibetan Studies*, 2, pp.1-35.
- Urry, J., 1990. *The Tourist Gaze*. London: Sage
- Yang, B., 2009. Central State, Local Governments, Ethnic Groups and the Minzu Identification in Yunnan (1950-1980s). *Modern Asian Studies*, 43(3), pp.741-775.
- Yang, L., 2011. Ethnic Tourism and Cultural Representation. *Annals of Tourism Research*, 38(2), pp.561-585.

Who Supported the Church in Canton?¹

-- A Story on 'Nanjuan' by Jiu Gun-Hoi--

Doi Ayumu

The University of Tokyo

Email: ayumudo0208@hotmail.com

INTRODUCTION

This paper focuses on a fundraising campaign, so called 'Nanjuan(南捐),' which was launched by a Cantonese pastor, Jiu Gun-Hoi(招觀海), in the late 1920s. There are no previous studies introducing his campaign except the work by Zhao Chunzhen. (趙 2009) Then what reasons are there for thinking that Nanjuan has something important for research on the Christian history in China?

In discussing the academic value of Nanjuan, I would first like to mention two problems I believe research on twentieth century Chinese Christian history holds. The first is its approach method. Although studies done in the 19th century on the Christian movements such as the Boxers' uprising focused on the relationship between *jiaomin*(教民) and *feijiaomin*(非教民), or Christians and non-Christians, studies from the 20th century rarely touch upon the non-Christians. For example, SATO Kimihiko's work pays keen attention to the local feuds in North China villages to bring light on the composition of the clashes between the church and the local society. (佐藤 1999) But the historical studies concerning on Christianity in China in the twentieth century have weighed so heavily on the studies on personal histories, the "indigenization" of Christianity for Chinese soil, and text interpretation, that a view point from "outside" of the churches has been left behind. When we look at the anti-Christian movement in the 1920s, we can easily find that discourse on Chinese Christianity does not only include discussions about Christian thoughts and Christian education, but also criticism from various scholars, intellectuals as well as politicians in China. This movement shows us an example of

¹ This paper was translated to English for this conference. The original article was published in Japanese in 2010. (See 土肥 2010)

how many people, outside of the Chinese Christian and foreigners, had paid attention to the social work pursued by the Christian church. Therefore, it is necessary to bring more light to the relationship between the local churches and the ordinary people in local areas even in the 20 century, for which the anti-Christian movement can be an example.

The second problem involves the choice of research topic. The Boxer's uprising was backed by the expansion of the German Catholic church which was supported by the Tianjin and Beijing Treaty, signed at 1858 and 1860 consecutively, and the imperial invasion into the North China village society. The influence of this historical background led Joseph Lee(2003) to criticize previous works that "most of the studies deal with Christian missionary movements in northern and central China, partly because of the legacy of the Boxer Uprising in the West, and partly because the North China plain typifies the conventional Western image of China as an agrarian society." He definitely argues that most of the studies have so far insisted on northern local areas. If so, following studies have must take into consideration the diverse local regions in China and shed the partiality to specific fields. This study thus focuses on Canton in order to bring diversity into the research on Christian history in China. Of course when we turn our attention to South China, it is natural for us to recollect some articles concerning this area, such as those of KABA Toyohiko(蒲 2003) and Carl T. Smith(1985). However, the former research merely touches upon the local area in South China and the latter elucidates on the birth of the elite or social middlemen through Christian education in Hong Kong during ninetieth century, and thus, both studies seemed not enough to draw our attention to the viewpoint from those "outside" of church.

The study and interpretation of Jiu's Nanjuan will help in filling some of the gaps resulting from the two problems mentioned above. Even if it is possible to imagine that at that time non-Christians visited churches or chapels in local community, any texts recording such visits will and must be hardly left by now. One exception to the lack of records can be found in fundraising campaigns led by the church which encourage the "outside" of churches to donate. These campaigns assisted in creating a reciprocal relationship between those 'inside' and 'outside' of the church by tying church members with people outside the church. There is no doubt that it was through these fundraising campaigns that local churches were maintained at

least during the Republican period. This research aims to bring light to the practical situation of those on the ‘outside’ who were involved with churches by tracing the fundraising campaign of Nanjuan.

In pursuing this goal, Henrietta Harrison’s work (2008) will enrich my survey. Her work positions the Holy Childhood Association, an association founded in France, as a ‘transnational aid organization’ and discusses the management of orphanages in China through the case of the association. Harrison also touches upon the association’s fundraising method. She traced the fact that ‘bourgeois families’ empathized with and made donations to the association during their participation in the activities of Roman Catholic Church in China, and that high class officers donated much money for Catholic-run orphanage. (Harrison 2008)

What makes this research different from that of previous studies including Harrison’s is that it makes a survey of, not the Chinese people in local Canton society but, overseas Chinese societies. This is because the church community of Canton had a close relationship with the overseas Chinese. For example, Zhao mentions in his work that “overseas Chinese donations have supported self-supporting churches at Kwangtung.”(趙 2009) Recent studies also emphasize the historical situation of Chinese Christians in overseas society.(山本 2010, 朱 2009) These researches assisted in guiding my interest to the mutual relationship between the Christian community and the overseas Chinese.

Based on the considerations above, the purpose of this work is as follows. First, this research will focus on the process and specific situation of Nanjuan based on Waioi Tong’s periodicals and Jiu’s writings. Drawing on the details, I will analyze what kind of Chinese people took part in this campaign and the reason why, during Nanjuan, so many non-Christians sympathized with Jiu’s cause. In sum, the goal of this research is to analyze the realistic situation of those who supported the church in the 20th century from the perspective of the fundraising campaign.

1. JIU GUN-HOI AND WAIOT TONG

Jiu's life and the Christian history in Canton

This chapter gives an outline of the local history of Christianity in Canton by illustrating the story of Jiu and Waioi Tong. Jiu Gun-Hoi was a pastor in Canton area from 1910s until 1940s. Although his name has been mentioned within some texts on the Christian community of Canton, his origin was left unexplained. However, the fragments of descriptions and an interview with his cousin Jiu Zoining(招載寧) enabled me to grasp a parcel of his life.

Jiu was born at Hengsha ward(橫沙區) in Canton city in January 1889 and died in April 1967 (see figure 1.). It has been known that his clan produced many skillful doctors. Jiu Gun-Hoi's father, Dawo(達和), also worked in Waioi Tong's clinic.(Jiu Zoining 2010) As far as my research reveals, Jiu grew up in relatively well-off environment. A few years after his conversion, a Chinese teacher for religious education, Huang Qiming, recollected him as the most vigorous anti-Christian. It seems that he did not have much interest in Christianity. But as other Lingnan students converted to Christianity and through the influence of the sincere interpretation of Christianity given by O. F. Wisner(尹嘉士), the president of the school, he decided to convert as well. (黃啟明 1916) At this time, he met Chung Wingkwong(鍾榮光), the vice president of Lingnan University and a member of Waioi Tong. Chung trained him very strictly in junior high school and Jiu always called Chung as Yifu(誼父, 契爺) to represent his awe and respect. (Jiu Zoining 2010) Chung was well known for devoting his life to raising donations from all over the world, so it is natural to think that Jiu held high respect for him.

On the other hand, when we take a glimpse at the history of Christianity in Canton, we can see the beginning of a change of the missionary enterprise in America in the 1870s. As Timothy Tseng(1996) mentioned, overseas Chinese preachers returned to their country and became active during this period. The returned Chinese Christians began their work directly on building self-support churches at Kwangtung as well as improving old Chinese customs. Similarly, Smith pointed out as well that "as the converts of this work had partaken of missionary zeal, they [overseas Chinese in America] became imbued with the desire to have

their new faith preached to friends and relatives in China.”(Smith 1985) We are enough to understand both viewpoints. And both studies should apply to Canton’s case.

Founding of Waioi Tong and the Beginning of Nanjuan

Above study argues that a lot of Chinese Christians returned from abroad, and engaged in church activities with missionaries. Since the late Qing period, Chinese Christians from abroad occupied an important place in the Christian community. Waioi Tong(惠愛堂) was not an exception. The founder of the church, named Liang Zhuchen(梁柱臣), stayed in Victoria, Australia with some foreign missionaries from 1856 to 1862. The London Missionary Society examined the possibility of preaching among the overseas Chinese, and as a result its missionaries sent him to Australia in order to preach among Chinese miners there(劉 2003). His work seemed to have been unsuccessful, and after a few years his work at Australia was terminated. After returning to Canton, he asserted to be autonomous and preach to Fatshan actively until his death.(劉 2003) Thus Yeung Xiangfu(楊襄甫) and his company proclaimed the ‘self-supporting’ of the church in 1906, as they repaid all of the debt from foreign missionaries.(編者未詳 1950)

It was Jiu whom Yeung, Jiu’s predecessor, sent to America for study. After studying at California University and Yale University to get theological degree, Jiu returned to Canton in 1920. After Yeung’s death he took over his post as the new pastor. While city government proceeded to execute its street construction plans in 1923, the church had to remove to other place. The members suggested holding a fundraising campaign around Southeast Asia to collect 100, 000 Yuan but this challenge was stopped by an anti-Christian movement and the Chinese Communists’ upheaval in the 1920s. After the situation calmed down, the leaders of the chapel chose Jiu, Chung Fen Ting(鐘芬庭, the wife of Chung Wingkwong), and Lo Dosang(羅道生, a female doctor) as ‘special envoys for Nanjuan (南捐特派員).’

Then, what was the purpose of Nanjuan? Quoting from Jiu(1930), the weakest point in China is “that people have no literacy, no place to study, and even cannot rely on the doctors even if they have pain.” He first of all begun his sentence from the fact there are few educational

and medical instructions:

Our chapel keeps the belief that God holds tender loving care for the lives of His people and does not harm them injudiciously (上天好生之心). It is from this belief that Christianity delivers its message to others, and so, building an institution to bring happiness to the commoners will be one of our chapel's missions.(招 1930)

Waioi Tong already got hold of a land along *Hui Ai Dong Lu*(惠愛東路), and set up *ad interim* a medical center and a playground but the space was not enough. Hence, the members of the chapel formed “a plan to build a permanent commoner school and hospital and so on, in the leftover [place] of a new chapel.” (招 1930) In short, the purpose of Nanjuan was to build a hospital and school for commoners with a chapel. The sentence written by Jiu indicates that the goal is not only to build ‘a new chapel’ as a religious institution, but to build a general institution including teachers and medical staff. This development reflects the increased concern towards ‘social movements’ among Chinese Christians and missionaries after anti-Christian movements during the 1920s. As YAMAMOTO Sumiko suggested, Christianity in China came to deliberate on how they can contribute for the ‘new’ China (山本 2006).

As shown above, Waioi Tong originated from a background in which overseas Chinese took part in their homeland's enterprise since the 1870s. Guided by Liang Zhuchen, who has experience working abroad, and Yang Xiangfu, a progressive intellectual as well as a revolutionary, the chapel can be said to be, from the viewpoint of the history of Christianity in China, a “self-supported” entity. And from this base, recognizing the necessity for Christians to make social contribution from the anti-Christianity movement, Jiu started Nanjuan.

2. THE SITUATION OF NANJUAN AND ITS LOGIC

The previous chapter explained the establishment of Waioi Tong and the purpose of Nanjuan. This chapter and the next will argue in detail how Jiu and the other two members

proceeded with the campaign, including what process they adopted and with what logic they appealed to the overseas Chinese societies in Southeast Asia of the necessity of contribution.

Difficulties for Nanjuan

How was Nanjuan carried out? Before answering this question, we should remember that at that time the running fundraising campaign was unfavorable for a Chinese like Jiu for various reasons. First, it was the first time for Jiu to visit Southeast Asia. Although he made many overseas Chinese friends when he studied in America, his name was obscure in the Southeast Asian region. For example, a Chinese student in Siam asked him with no pretension, “Did Mr. Chung Wingkwong also come this time?” This question clearly indicates how the overseas Chinese paid less attention to him than Chung (招 1933).² Although Waioi Tong originated from the London Missionary Society, it had less connection with foreign missionaries and overseas Chinese than others.

Second, distrust against Christianity movement in overseas society was almost as severe as the situation in China mainland. For example, when it became known that Yinghua Xuexiao, a Methodist school in which Fujianese Chinese abroad studied, compelled its students to attend services within their compound, their parents protested to the school for forcing religious activities to their children. A hundred students left the school and the Chinese directors who opposed to missionaries’ method resigned from their positions as a result of the protest (朱 2009). The overseas Chinese living in Southeast Asia paid keen attention to the anti-Christian Movement in China mainland. Another example is a Chinese periodical which published a series of articles on the relationship between Christian mission and Imperialism in Siam and Burma.(亦鏡 1923, 1928)³ These cases exemplify how the overseas Chinese society generally held distrust for Christianity and its institutions.

Third, restrictions on Chinese immigration and the fear against the spread of communism within British and French colonial governments threw its shadow over Nanjuan’s continuation.

² Chung Wingkwong visited Southeast Asia to appeal the fundraising campaigns for the university, from 1909 to 1910, and 1917 to 1918.(香港嶺南大學同學會 1996)

³ The article was published as a four-part series ending in April 1924.

Jiu's campaign was held at the same time when the colonial governments were nervous about communism movements around the area.(鬼丸 2006) Besides, it was much more difficult for Chinese to enter the colonies to start a fundraising campaign. After returning to Canton, Jiu recollected that "appealing to the hearts of the people to fundraise in Malaya was definitely not easy." (招 1933)

The preparation and the specific process

With such hardships in mind, the leaders of Nanjuan seemed to have prepared carefully in advance. Before sailing to Southeast Asia, Jiu not only obtained recommendation letters from Lam Yiucheung(林耀翔) of Lingnan University in Canton, but also went to Hong Kong and Macau to meet with the overseas Chinese there as well as the missionaries to get hold of letters of introduction from them. Ms. Chung and Dr. Lo sent prior notice of Jiu's visit to the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in each region.(招 1930)

Jiu's memoir demonstrates that there was a set procedure which he followed during the fundraising campaign. First, when he visited a place in Southeast Asia, he was accompanied by *Juankuanzhe*, the exhorters (see following chapter). Second, when the overseas Chinese pledge to make a contribution, he encouraged them to remit the donation to 'Chung Wingkwong at Waioi Tong.' Lastly, Jiu and his company would put a notice in the region's Chinese newspaper with thank you and the list of donors with the amount of donation each donor made. When all procedure finished, Jiu left them for next place finally Jiu followed these steps everywhere he visited.(招 1933) The Wong brothers' donation is a good example which illustrates these steps. In August 1928, when Jiu arrived at Kuala Lumpur through Singapore, the Wong brothers offered 30, 000 Yuan for building new institutions as well as their company's office for Jiu's use while he stayed to contact with other Chinese for a few months. The brothers' big contribution was reported in a local Chinese newspaper, *Zhonghua Shangbao* (中華商報) and publicized to the overseas Chinese society. On the other side, a chapel member confirmed the receipt of the Wong brothers' contribution at Hong Kong on September

11, 1928. It was after this was completed that Jiu left for Siam⁴. (無記名 1928 a, 1928 b)(招 1933)

With such *accurate* steps, Jiu was able to get reliance from the overseas Chinese. It was at this same time when the staff of Canton Fangbian Hospital(廣州方便醫院) also visited Singapore to collect contribution as Jiu did. However, due to a rumor that Canton City government stopped the benevolent societies' management of the hospital for requisition which spread amongst the overseas Chinese, that the Chamber of Commerce stopped collecting contributions for a while. The rumor was turned out to be a groundless one and the fundraising campaign was soon restarted again. (無記名 1927 a, 一新 1927) It seems that many donors abroad were usually concerned on how the collected money was used. For this reason, Jiu use the name of Chung Wingkwong to make it clear by whom and how the contributions were used. As Chung was a well known person, Jiu mentioned his name to cover his nameless status. Except for the campaign in Batavia where Jiu was put in jail for about two months, Nanjuan followed above procedure to collect the money.

The logic linking up overseas Chinese with Nanjuan

In this chapter, I will analyze how Jiu appealed to the overseas Chinese to receive donations. Surprisingly, there are no mentions about his specific statements within his memoir or report. However, Li Ziqian(李子謙) who incooperated with him for donation in Rangoon reports what Jiu said as follows: 'There were many hospitals and commoner schools which foreign missionaries managed in Canton originally. But because they recently evacuated to avoid the upheaval, all of these managements now belong to the Chinese. Therefore we have to remove our dependent nature to arouse independent spirit.'(李子謙 1928) Jiu first explains that political unrest, such as the labor strike at Hong Kong and Canton commune, lead to the missionaries' evacuation and the subsequent difficulties in the management of the hospitals and educational institutions. Thereafter, he asserts that this is the chance for the Chinese to give up its 'dependent nature' and take on the obligation to manage those institutions. Listening

⁴ Wong brothers offered more 10,000 Yuan after this donation.

to Jiu's address, Li Ziqian praised that "this [thought] will not only prompt benevolence and education but also build self-support church. It is like killing three birds with one stone. (...) Alas, pretty good." (李子謙 1928)

His statement has a specific feature. The feature is that, although Nanjuan aimed at building its new chapel with attached institutions, he persuaded his audience to donate for Waioi Tong without using the phrase "Christianity." There is no doubt that his statement took the overseas society's disgust for Christianity into consideration. A similar example can be found in the case of Lingnan University. During the anti-Christian movement, the parents of returned overseas Chinese students were reluctant to let their sons enter the mission school. In order to vindicate the school policy, Lingnan University stated that the education for overseas Chinese is fundamentally 'sound,' because the university contributed to the 'social welfare' with sacrificing spirit originating from Christianity. This logic tied the idea that social works by Christian churches serve for public with the zeal that overseas Chinese usually have in making contributions to their homeland. To return to the quotation mentioned by Li, on the flipside, it can be easily surmised that Li places more importance on 'benevolence and education.' From a viewpoint of the Chinese abroad, building commoner hospital and schools was a welcomed proposal. But, whether they were Christian or not, there was less positive attention to Chinese Christian's affair - self-supporting - than above two factors. Jiu's short statement enables us to understand the care he took in order to fundraise against the overseas Chinese attitude toward Christianity.⁵

The analysis above leads to two conclusions. First, there were various handicaps for Jiu and his company from the beginning of Nanjuan. So, they had to collect the donations following a set process prepared in advance. From the introducing the contributors to the remittance to mainland, coordinators in Canton and Hong Kong supported Nanjuan. Second, the appeal to the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia was made by linking up the overseas Chinese's zeal for benevolent activities with the construction of hospital and school by Waioi Tong. As Li Ziqian mentioned, the overseas Chinese and Waioi Tong had the same purpose of

⁵ *Lat Pau* reported the arrival of Jiu and two companies, but mentioned their profiles neither as a Christian pastor nor the church memberships. It is possible that a part of those Chinese abroad who responded to Nanjuan provided the money without fully understanding the character of Nanjuan.(顯稿 1927)

enlarging ‘benevolence and education.’

3. SUPPORTING NANJUAN

The previous chapter mentioned Nanjuan’s practical process and its logic for appealing to donors in Southeast Asia. This chapter will analyze Nanjuan further by examining those who cooperated with this campaign. Here I will classify the people who supported Nanjuan during the approximately three years of fundraising into categories based on their background.

Three Categories of Supporters

The first category is the alumni of Lingnan University. The Wong brothers, previously mentioned above, are a good example of this category, as they were graduates of Tongzhi School(通志學校), which is affiliated with Lingnan University.⁶ The alumni have welcomed Jiu heartwarmingly and took care of his sojourn in Singapore, Calcutta, Cholon, Siam and Burma.(招 1930) Sometimes they offered the money for Waioi Tong. Although Jiu’s humorous sermon embarrassed the senior and conservative Christians in Canton much, it attracted young Lingnan students.(劉 1975) Therefore, it is possible to imagine that Lingnan alumni who had felt a closeness to Jiu cooperated with his activities around Southeast Asia.

The second category is the members of the chapel and overseas Chinese Christians. Let me take Xu Changhe and Changnian brothers ^{in Burma as an example.} Their father, Xu Jiying(許濟英)was a pastor and their mother, Li Biyui(李碧玉), was born in Panyu and graduated from the True Light Women’s School in Canton. After the two got married, they immigrated to Burma. However, unfortunately Pastor Xu passed away and having five kids, Ms. Li managed her family by running a rice refinery and a pawnshop. After Ms. Li’s death, her sons, the Xu brothers, took over the family business and when Jiu arrived at Rangoon, provided him with 3000 Rupees. During her lifetime, Ms. Li was interested in the educational activities at

⁶ The elder brother 容康’s name was enlisted as one of missing members at beginning of 1927. But as other members got information that he stayed at Kuala Lumpur, Jiu was arranged for a meeting with the brothers. (無記名 1927 b, 招 1930)

Lingnan University and was a regular donor who once made a donation towards the university building.(無記名 1928 d)

Donor Lei Weiqing(李為清) of Penang is also a similar case. She was born in Panyu(番禺) and was a member of another church in Canton. When Jiu visited Penang, the Jinan Incident had just occurred in May 1928. The overseas Chinese donated much more for this incident than for Waioi Tong. Nanjuan faced difficulty there. However, in spite of this situation, Lei donated what little money she had for Waioi Tong. Jiu reports of his admiration for her contribution as ‘a poor widow who threw in two mites.’ (招 1930, See. Mark 12:41-44)

The third category is Jiu’s clan and those whose native village was the same as Jiu. We can take the fundraising campaign in French Indochina as an example. Jiu had an aunt, Jiu Yuelan(招若蘭), who lived in Cholon near Saigon who had the perfect conditions to assist the activities of Nanjuan. She was not only a Christian, but also the wife of Wong Lemhing(黃霖慶), who was a alumna of Lingnan University . To refer back to Harrison’s work mentioned in the first chapter, while the supporters of The Holy Childhood Association were ‘bourgeois family’ who went to their church frequently, it was the overseas Chinese of regional and blood connections played important roles in Nanjuan.

Of course this classification simplifies the many who were involved in Nanjuan. It should be understood that actually, one person can be put into multiple categories. For example, the Wong brothers were (1) alumni of Lingnan University and were (2) Chinese Christians abroad. Zhao Ruolan was (1) a Christian as well as (2) belonging to the same lineage. Chen Zhaoxiang whom Jiu met in Singapore was from Canton, a Chinese Christian and an alumnus of Lingnan. He can be classified in all of three categories. (招 1930, 無記名 1929)

Supporters as the Donate Exhorters

The texts related to Nanjuan indicate these three categories above as well as supporters in mainland China. However the actual environment of Nanjuan defies the hypothesis that the people classified into the three categories donated for Waioi Tong. Rather, it is more realistic to evaluate that they assisted in encouraging the majority of the overseas Chinese to donate to the

cause. Jiu's report refers the three categories as '*quanjuanzhe*' [donate exhorters. 勸捐著].(招 1930) As an example that illustrates this, the record of the donations collected in Rangoon show that the contributions are made in 'group' names rather than individual. Of 34 donors, only twelve were individual donors and the rest, twenty-two donors, were small shops, banks, companies and a church. Apart from the church, twenty-one 'group' donors consisted of donations from those who did not have any relationship with Christian church in Canton nor even Lingnan University.(招 1930)

Jiu's report also specifies this detail. Within the report, when he mentions *quanjuanzhe* and the Xu brothers, Jiu states that "besides, there were too many of those who donated two hundred [rupees], three hundred [rupees] or several [rupees] to count." This sentence lends to the possibility that those who were not mentioned in his report and those who were "too many (...) to count" refer to the overseas Chinese without any relationship with the Christian Church or Lingnan University. It can be assumed from this fact that it was not just the *quanjuanzhe* – those who can be classified in one or more of the three categories -- that responded to Nanjuan. The success of Nanjuan, then, can be thought of as the result of the synergy between the overseas Chinese zeal and Waioi Tong's work, as pointed out in the previous chapter, as well as the encouragement for donation carried on by the exhorters.

Based on the analysis above I can state following facts. Those who cooperated with Nanjuan can be classified in three categories: Lingnan alumni, Chinese Christians living abroad, and Jiu's clan or relatives. Generally one person can encompass one or more of these categories. However, it cannot be said that everyone that can be classified into the three categories donated for Nanjuan. Many amongst them, such as the exhorters, played the important role in promoting the necessity of donation toward the majority of overseas Chinese.

At this time, economic depression seriously hit the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia. As Jiu reported to Waioi Tong, "because the price of rubber and tin in every region slumped, [the campaign is] hard to start in Southeast Asia. Please send instruction on how to proceed." Nanjuan itself held the possibility of setback in some cases.(無記名 1928 c) In the worst-case scenario, we can easily imagine a situation where Jiu would encounter a case in which someone spreads a rumor to slander Nanjuan, refused to donate, and advised not to

donate.(香港嶺南大學同學會 1996)⁷ In such an environment, the exhorters, which tied Jiu with the overseas society and promoted to the necessity of the donation, had invaluable importance.

The end of Nanjuan and after that

Nanjuan suddenly came to an end. When Jiu and the exhorters were carrying on the fundraising in Batavia, Dutch East Indies, he was captured by the Dutch colonial government. The authority judged that Jiu was in touch with the independent movement by Scarno. After jailed period, he was sent back to China. It was the 7th of February when he finally returned to Canton through Hong Kong.(招 1933)⁸ At the end of Nanjuan, the members of the chapel summed up the result that they could collect total worth 80,000 Yuan, leading to the completion of Honchou Tong(漢秋堂. See figure 2) which was named for the grandfather of the Wong brothers, in November 1930.(貫一 1930, 無記名 1928 e)⁹

Ironically, the donations raised through Nanjuan were unable to realize its “plan to build a permanent commoner school and hospital and so on, in the leftover [place] of the new chapel.” This was because the donations collected in Southeast Asia was not enough to cover all of the expenses which was needed for the land purchase expenses (48,000 Yuan), for the building Honchou Tong (40,000 Yuan), and for the interiors (5, 000 Yuan). (貫一 1930)¹⁰ The donations raised through Nanjuan were not used for building the commoner hospital. Although Jiu traveled around Southeast Asia to plead the necessity of education and medical institutions, the donations from the overseas Chinese resulted in no direct contribution to ‘benevolence and education.’ The members of the Waioi Tong felt deep dissatisfaction about this situation.

⁷ Chen Jiwu(陳輯五), a professor of Lingnan University experienced the trouble when he sailed to San Francisco for appealing the donation for agriculture school of the university.

⁸ The newspaper reported that Lin Yaoxiang introduced Jiu to Scarno in order to embellish his memoir. The article showed sympathy for Jiu and his unfortunate situation. (無記名 1930)

⁹ Wong brothers’ grandfather was Loke Yew (陸佑, 1844-1917), in Heshan of Kwangtung, who has many times provided his money with benevolent works carried out in mainland China.

¹⁰ The expected budget for the construction was 50,000 Yuan in 1920, but by 1928, the cost of the land and the construction of Honchou Tong increased and lent to need for additional funds.

Although our Honchou Tong, belonging to our Waioi Tong, was completed at 1930, after building the new chapel our members think that the result of Nanjuan was successful in building only a new chapel, and that [the problems of] commoner hospital and a school house has not been settled yet.(招 1933a)¹¹

It is true that Nanjuan resulted in collecting the money worth 80,000 Yuan, although it did not fulfill its original goal of 100,000 Yuan. However, the new chapel made with the funds raised by Nanjuan did not satisfy its members who wished to contribute to social work. And so, from 1930 to 1937, while Waioi Tong called out to domestic communities in Canton and Shanghai for donations, Jiu sailed to America in order to appeal to the overseas Chinese in America.(編者未詳 1937)¹² It was in Spring 1937 when they finally realized the “plan to build a permanent commoner school and hospital and so on, in the leftover [place] of the new chapel.”(編者未詳 1950)

CONCLUSION

Looking over the social situation during Nanjuan, as the anti-Christian movement and the upheavals around Kwangtung effected on the activities of churches at 1920s, Waioi Tong had to find a way to recover from the decline of members by securing the members with whom got less connection . In Canton’s case, the region had a strong relationship with the overseas Chinese. Hence the chapel sent ‘special envoys’ to the overseas Chinese communities at Southeast Asia, asking for donations through the exhorters. This process, as I have pointed out above, is founded on the logic which synchronized the overseas Chinese’s interests in social activities in the mainland, with the social work handled by Chinese Christian churches. It was Waioi Tong which responded to the overseas Chinese’s request like

¹¹ There was no information about the commoner schoolhouse within their periodicals. It is my guess that they used a piece of land as the playground and Honchou Tong as a schoolhouse.

¹² The records left by the mayors of Canton show that appeal to donate to Waioi Tong were made, for maintaining the social works while mentioning Nanjuan simply. On the other hand, Jiu visited Hawaii and America to collect donations, but this campaign was unsuccessful. (招 1933a)。

such as “benevolence and education” mentioned by Li Ziqian in Rangoon.

In case of the Holy Childhood Association, French middle class families were moved by the poster of a non-Chinese grandfather holding in his arms a Chinese baby abandoned by his mother, “dramatic rescues,” distributed by the association. At the same time, the ‘emotional power’ of the donors made up the whole policy of the association.(Harrison 2008) Nanjuan also shares the logic behind fundraising by making the people empathize with the benevolent work done by Christians. However, in case of Nanjuan, it is worth noticing that they emphasized the non-religious logic of “benevolence and education,” because overseas Chinese communities held certain disgust for Christianity and its activities.

A few years after Nanjuan, Hop Yap church in Hong Kong brought attention to the difference between *collection*(獻金) and *donation*(捐金) in an article: The former is to devote the money given by God to God, the latter is to “throw aside the money which one managed to earn (犧牲捐捨)” for others. While in the former case, one feels content that “it was good for God,” the latter case only enables one to feel content that “it was good for people.” Because of this, donations are needed to compel, to read one’s faces, and to touch one’s emotions for the money.(無記名, 1933) Referring to this concept, Nanjuan can be thought as *donations*(捐金) which took advantage of the overseas Chinese feeling that they tend to throw aside the money which they managed to earn (犧牲捐捨) for “benevolence and education,” and accordingly, different from religious *collections*. Actually, another article within Hop Yap church’s periodical gives a criticism against their fundraising campaign. Because seizing following campaign made by Waioi Tong, a man got money by fraud with professing a member of the church. As this man even used the name of another church, Waioi Tong has been blamed indirectly.(譚沃心 1934) Appealing donation in following campaign was not easy for them.

At least for Kwangtung district during the Republican period, those people who took part in church activities from ‘outside’ of the Christian communities included the overseas Chinese who supported Waioi Tong’s work through the donations. It seems that most of them were not Christians. But, they were subsumed under the church activities without knowing, as they threw money aside(犧牲捐捨) for building the commoner hospital and school for which

Jiu appealed vigorously. It did not matter whether they believed in Christianity or not. Jiu admired Li Weiqing in Penang as ‘a poor widow who threw in two mites.’ Backing to this logic, how many moving stories like hers case did Jiu experience during Nanjuan?

figure 1. a gravestone of Jiu Gun-Hoi and his wife.



Photography by author, at a cemetery of Chinese Christians, April 2010.

figure 2. the whole view of Honchou Tong.



an extract from 『南捐報告』 p. 3.

REFERENCES

- 貫一 1930, '遷建堂中之南捐事略', *惠愛叢刊*, 11 月, 22-23 頁
- 黃啟明 1916, '嶺南學生宗教觀念變遷概狀', *畢業錄*, 嶺南學校, 20-21 頁
- 李子謙 1928, '慈善與教育——為廣州惠愛堂作', *惠愛堂月刊*, 1 月、3 頁
- 譚沃心 1934, '廣東協會總幹事關於揭發騙徒的來函', *合一週刊*, 6 月 24 日, 4 頁
- 無記名 1927 a, '捐助廣州方便醫院南洋華僑義捐會最近消息之匯志(3)', *叻報*, 10 月 26 日, 8 頁
- 無記名 1927 b, '會友部啟事', *惠愛堂月刊*, 1·2·3 月合刊, 3-5 頁
- 無記名 1928 a, '南捐嘉音(錄星架坡中華商報)', *惠愛堂月刊*, 8 月, 2 頁
- 無記名 1928 b, '建堂計劃', *惠愛堂月刊*, 9 月、2 頁
- 無記名 1928 c, '議案紀要', *惠愛堂月刊*, 9 月, 2 頁
- 無記名 1928 d, '說明', *南大與華僑*, 第 7 卷第 1 号, 10 月, a spread
- 無記名 1928 e, '執事部月會議事選錄', *惠愛叢刊*, 7 月、2 頁
- 無記名 1929, '會友住址', *惠愛叢刊*, 11 月, 2-6 頁
- 無記名 1930, '招觀海被捕', *叻報*, 1 月 3 日、13 頁
- 無記名, 1933, '捐金與募金', *合一週刊*, 10 月 8 日、3 頁
- 顯稿 1927, '平民的呼[sic]——學校...醫院...幼稚園...', *叻報*, 10 月 25 日, 6 頁
- 亦鏡 1923, '錄評海外兩個國民黨機關報關於基督教的筆墨官司', *真光*, 第 22 卷第 11 号、11 月, 31-46 頁
- 亦鏡 1928, '與為《我們為什麼要去反對基督教》文的譚金洪先生說幾句話', *真光*, 第 27 卷第 4 号、4 月、65-68 頁
- 一新 1927, '為曾向援助廣州方便醫院南洋華僑義捐會捐款者進一言', *叻報*, 11 月 26 日, 2 頁
- 招觀海 1933a, '西捐經過記略', *惠愛月刊*, 4 月, 1 頁
- 陳国欽 2008, *瞬逝的輝煌——嶺南大學 64 年*, 廣東人民出版社, 廣東
- 閔肇碩·容應莢 1997, *香港開埠與閔家*, 廣角鏡出版, 香港
- 劉端滔編 1975, *港粵澳名牧生平 第 1 集*, 中華基督徒送書會, 香港
- 劉紹麟 2003, *中華基督教會合一堂史——從 1843 年建基到現在*, 中華基督教會合一堂, 香港
- 劉粵聲 1932?, *美洲華僑教會*, 出版社未詳, 出版地未詳
- 吳義雄 2010, '動蕩年代的變遷——從教會名冊看 20 世紀前期的廣州基督教——'同編, *地方社會文化與近代中西文化交流*, 上海人民出版社, 上海
- 香港嶺南大學同學會編 1996, *鍾榮光先生傳*, 香港嶺南大學同學會, 香港
- 趙春晨·郭華清等 2008, *宗教與近代廣東社會*, 宗教文化出版社, 廣東
- 招觀海 1930, *南捐報告*, 中華基督教會惠愛堂, 廣州
- 招觀海 1933, *天南遊記*, 出版社未詳, 出版地未詳
- 朱峰 2009, *基督教與海外華人的文化適應——近代東南亞華人移民社區的個案研究*, 中華書局, 北京
- 編者未詳 1923, *三藩市長老會七十周年紀念錄內附長老基督青年美華長老傳到總會年報*, 出版社未詳, 三藩市
- 編者未詳 1916, *畢業錄*, 嶺南學校, 廣州
- 編者未詳 1937, *廣州惠愛堂募建平民醫院小啓*, 出版社未詳, 廣州

- 編者未詳 1950, 中華基督教會惠愛堂建基 115 周年及東遷 20 周年紀念特刊, 出版社未詳, 廣州
- 『父招觀海牧師・繼母何絳雲墓碑』(2009 年修建)、広州市基督教公墓
- 鬼丸武士 2006, ‘「ヌーラン事件」——戦間期アジアにおける国産共産主義運動とイギリス帝国治安維持システム——’, *国際政治*, 第 146 号, 70-87 頁
- 可児弘明 1979, *近代中国の苦力と「猪花」*, 岩波書店
- 蒲豊彦 2004, ‘潮州、汕頭の義和団事件と慈善結社’, *中国近代化の動態構造*, 245-273 頁
- 佐藤公彦 1999, *義和団の起源とその運動——中国民衆ナショナリズムの誕生*, 汲古書院, 227 頁
- 園田節子 2009, *南北アメリカ華民と近代中国——19 世紀トランスナショナル・マイグレーション*, 東京大学出版会
- 土肥歩 2010, ‘招觀海の「南捐」についての考察—東南アジア華僑・華人による惠愛堂への募金の構図’, *年報 地域文化研究*, 第 14 号, 2010 年, 218-240 頁
- 濱下武志 2006, ‘華僑・華人史研究をめぐる東南アジアと東アジアの連続と断絶’, *東南アジア研究*, 第 43 巻第 4 号, 332-345 頁
- 宮内肇 2009, ‘清末民初期の地域エリートの動態’, *20 世紀中国の社会システム*, 京都大学人文科学研究所, 517-545 頁
- 山本真 2010, ‘華僑とキリスト教からみる福建近現代史——福建僑郷、サラワク訪問期’, *中国研究月報*, 第 64 巻第 9 号, 31-41 頁
- 山本澄子 2006, *中国キリスト教史研究 増補改訂版*, 山川出版社
- 李培德 1999, ‘19 世紀香港広東商人の商業ネットワーク’, *華僑・華人史研究の現在*, 汲古書院
- Harrison, H., 2008. “A Penny for the Little Chinese”: The French Holy Childhood Association in China, 1843-1951. *the American Historical Review*, 113(1), pp.72-92.
- Jiu, Z.N., 2010. Interview on a history on Jiu Gun-Hoi by Doi Ayumu, Zhao Xuan and Zhao Zongjing at July 9th, 2010.
- Lee, J.T.-H., 2003. *The Bible and the Gun—Christianity in South China, 1860-1900*. New York and London: Routledge, p. xxiv.
- Smith, C.T., 1985. *Chinese Christians—Elites Middlemen, and the Church in Hong Kong*. London and New York: Oxford University Press.
- Tseng, T., 1996. Chinese Protestant Nationalism in the United States, 1880-1927. *Amerasia Journal*, 22(1), pp.31-56.

The Super Girl Voice Phenomenon, Cultural Hegemony and Cultural Dynamics in Contemporary China

Huang Yu¹

City University of Hong Kong

Email: yhuang27@cityu.edu.hk

INTRODUCTION

The cultural power relationship among various ideologies and communities has been a key research focus for Chinese cultural studies scholars. Dai Jinhua used the metaphor of “the hall of mirrors” to demonstrate the multiple power centres in conflicts and conspiracy in the 1990s’ Chinese culture (2004, p.41). Dai discerned the “reconstruction and a parody, an employment and a consumption of ideology” in her analysis of the “Mao Zedong fever”, one of the most remarkable social and cultural phenomena at the turn from 1980s to 1990s (2002). Since its revival in the 1990s, the Chinese popular culture is marked with dual features between the consumerist capitalism and the revolutionary ideology. Tao Dongfeng described the contemporary Chinese culture as “an intertwined tripartite relationship that comprises three parts, i.e. the revolutionary culture, the Enlightenment-elitist culture, and the consumer

¹ The idea of “contemporary China” involves two nomenclature issues: what is “China” and when is “contemporary”? As Tu Wei-ming maintained, the meaning of being Chinese is “intertwined with China as a geographical concept and Chinese culture as a lived reality” (Tu 1994:1). In terms of periodization, Chinese orthodox historians divide “modern Chinese history” (中国近代史) and “contemporary Chinese history” (中国现代史) by the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. See Qin Shan, *An Introduction to Modern China History 1840-1949*, Guangzhou: Jinan University Press, 2009. Also see Qi Pengfei 齐鹏飞, Yang Fengcheng 杨凤城 eds., *Dangdai zhongguo biannianshi (1949,10-2004.10)* 当代中国编年史(1949.10—2004.10) [The Periodical History of Contemporary China (1949.10-2004.10)], Beijing, Renmin chubanshe, 2007. The same periodization is used in the “Outline of Chinese Modern and Contemporary History” (中国近现代史纲要), a compulsory course for Chinese college students provided by the Publicity Department of the Central Committee of the CPC and the Education Department of China. When talking about contemporary China, some would stress on the recent three decades since the opening-up in 1978 (Preston and Haacke 2003). To avoid such tautology as “the cultural dynamics in a Cultural China” and to suspend periodization debates, I define “contemporary China” within the spatio-historically context as mainland China since 1949 with a focus on the post-Mao Era.

culture” (2007, p.7). Tao found that the use of revolutionary symbols in different kinds of advertisements as an exhibition of the commodification of revolutionary culture/discourses in the 1990s. Such appropriation of revolutionary culture for commercial goals, as Tao further maintained, resulted in cultural mixture and cultural hybridity (2005).

This paper investigates the Super Girl Voice phenomenon in order to achieve some understanding of the mechanisms underlying cultural dynamics in contemporary China. In the following parts, I will analyse the case of Super Girl Voice phenomenon in the theoretical framework of the Gramscian theory of hegemony, which indicates three types of relationship between the State and civil society. Then, I will use the SGV Phenomenon as a dispersive prism to break light up into its constituent spectral colours. In this case, the “white light” resembles the cultural and social reality, and the spectrum stands for the coexistent and interactive cultural and social substances or forces. My analysis mainly addresses three questions: What are the major cultural and social substances? How did they react to the SGV Phenomenon respectively? What changes did this phenomenon cause in the original power relations?

CULTURAL DYNAMICS, CULTURAL HEGEMONY AND POWER RELATION

A physical term, *dynamics* normally refers to the study of the causes of motion and changes in motion. Founder of French positivism and sociology Auguste Comte brought out the idea of *social dynamics* and *social statics* to explore how a society reacts to inner and outer changes and deal with its regulation mechanisms in a structuralist approach – the *statics* denote the synchronic dimension while the *dynamics* refer to the diachronic dimension (1969 p.1).² The Comtian theoretical framework set the ground of the discipline of sociology that

² L'étude positive de l'Humanité doit être décomposée en deux parties essentielles : l'une, statique, concerne la nature fondamentale du grand organisme ; l'autre, dynamique, se rapporte à son évolution nécessaire. » My version of translation is “The positive studies of humanity should be decomposed into two essential parts: the static part is about the fundamental nature of grand organism; and the dynamic part corresponds to its necessary evolution”. See Auguste Comte, *Système de politique positive ou traité de sociologie*, Tome II & III, Paris: Les Presses universitaires de France, Troisième édition, 1969, p1.

employs quantitative methods to explain and predict social and cultural change. However, such positivist approach has some fundamental limitations. As J.L. Lemke observed, the significant role of discursive, semiotic practices and material, ecosystem processes are often neglected in the model of cultural dynamics. Furthermore, he maintained that “it is difficult to make a truly dynamic account of social and cultural systems, since most of our traditional concepts (individuals, institutions, cultures, societies, languages, discourses) are formulated in essentially static terms”. He proposed to solve these problems using the key tool of linguistics as the meta-system of human culture (Lemke, 1993).³

This paper takes these conceptual and practical problems as a departing point and uses the term *cultural dynamics* in the perspective of cultural studies, which, in Raymond Williams’s sense, means to see culture as signifying or symbolic systems related to material production with full respect to its complexity and plurality (Williams, 1983). I use the term “dynamics” with a particular sense of ***dynamic equilibrium***: on the one hand, various social and cultural substances are in equilibrium relations; on the other hand, under the effect of inside or outside factors, these substances may grow at the same rate but their ratios remain the same.

To better study the cultural dynamics in a social context, I seek reference from the Gramscian idea of cultural hegemony. As a keyword in cultural studies, the English word “hegemony” is taken directly from the Greek word “*egemonia*” or “*egemon*”, which means leader and ruler in the sense of a state other than his own. In a broader sense, it is used to describe the political predominance based on public consent. In twentieth century, this concept has become important in Marxism, especially in the work of Antony Gramsci (Williams, 1976). During his imprisonment under the Mussolini regime, Italian Marxist and politician Antonio Gramsci reflected over socialist movements in Europe and developed his idea of cultural hegemony. Forgacs pointed out that in Gramsci’s vocabulary, “hegemony” mainly meant leadership of a class alliance. This leadership is based on the economically

³ The editor of this special issue M.A.K. Halliday attributed the revival of cultural dynamics in 1990s to the shift in the sciences of society and culture from the dominating European structuralism to the evolutionary historicism. However, he pointed out that such idea is used in a more sophisticated form. See M.A.K. Halliday, “Language as cultural dynamic” in *Cultural Dynamics*, Volume 6, No. 1-2, 1993, pp. 1-10.

central role of the leading class and is secured politically by that class's making economic concessions and sacrifices to its allies. In his prison notebooks, its meaning was extended in two ways. Firstly, it is also applied to the rule of other classes at other periods of history. Secondly, it means cultural, moral and ideological leadership over allied and subordinate groups. In this sense, hegemony is identified with the formation of a new ideological "terrain", with political, cultural and moral leadership as with consent. It is also linked with a chain of associations and oppositions to "civil society" as against "political society", to consent as against coercion, to "direction" as against "domination" (Gramsci, 2000). In the exercise of hegemony, intellectuals play important roles in different categories. The "organic" intellectuals exist in every social group and represent their disparate interests; while the "traditional" category, especially identified with the ecclesiastics, refers to the autonomous and independent social group that held a monopoly of a number of important services (Ibid, 300-302).

In Britain, academic interests in Gramsci's work increased when British Leftist movements thrived since the mid-1950s (Ransome, 1992). Gramsci's unfinished project inspired a number of various observations that read hegemony as 1) description of a process of struggle to maintain control over the subordinate classes, 2) active human agents against social control, or 3) a process of conscious intellectual reflection and synthesis (Ibid, 132-133). Perry Anderson scrutinized the concept of hegemony and found "a slippage of meaning" of it in Gramsci's prison writings. He summarized three versions of the relations between Gramsci's key concepts and saw each of them as Gramsci's response to a fundamental problem for Marxist analysis of the bourgeois State without providing an adequate answer to it. Anderson argued that the dichotomy of State and civil society as central elements of Gramsci's discourse is insufficient to explain the complex relations between the different institutions of a capitalist social formation. Hence, Anderson called for further discussions to formulate proletarian strategy in metropolitan capitalism (Anderson, 1976). When reviewing Anderson's characterization of the three versions, Peter D. Thomas observed that the third version indicates a concentric relationship between the State and civil society,

which “exhibited a tendency towards the identification of the state and civil society” in Gramsci’s writings (2009, p.51).

I contend that cultural dynamics in contemporary China could be visualized with a concentric relationship specified by Thomas. The circle of State and civil society were identical in the “totalist” regime, which Tsou Tang defines as a political regime taking total control of the state and the society and intertwined with social revolution in the beginning of twentieth century China (Tsou,1982). In the post-Mao Era, Chinese society has experienced a transformation of state ideology from a totalist control to an “integrated intervention” described by Guy Debord – a synthesis of a powerful political leader and abundant commodities that conflict with each other (1990, p.51). Gregory B. Lee observed that politicization is the main feature of Chinese society in the decade from 1979 to 1990 (2009, p.32). The concluding decade of 20th century witnessed the de-politicization drift when a consumerist and nationalist capitalism thrived. The state authorities have learned to apply this spectacular consumerism to consolidate its ideological domination over the citizen-consumer. The only ideology left for them, however, was nationalism (Lee, 2003). In the first decade of 21st century, a more neutralized discourse of “harmonious society” was articulated and promoted by Hu Jintao’s regime as an ideological remedy for the wealth disparity and social instability (Boutonnet, 2009).

In contemporary society, television serves as a crucial media spectacle to reflect the cultural dynamics of situated social contexts. For Williams, television is not only the invention of scientific and technical research, but also functions as a powerful medium of news and entertainment, as well as of social communication. (2003, p.3) In this paper, I use the Super Girl Voice phenomenon, which is one of the most influential media spectacles in contemporary China to study the social changes and cultural dynamics. Since the 1990s, the Chinese television systems have experienced the tension between the commercialisation and government control. On the one hand, the Chinese television industry has adopted the new policies of "conglomeration" to restructure the market and stimulate competition.⁴ On the

⁴ For a retrospective of this industrialization process, please see Diao Mingming, *Research into Chinese Television Development: Television Industrialisation in China*, PhD Thesis, Macquarie University, 2009.

other hand, the state remained its absolute control over the Chinese media in terms of ownership, resource allocation, and personnel appointment and removal.⁵ Under such transformation, local television stations in Guangdong, Hunan, and Shanghai took the initiative to produce profit-oriented programmes. The category of reality television programmes met such demand. The first decade of 21st century witnessed the prevailing of reality television programs all over the world.

A Chinese imitation of the American reality television singing competition *American Idol*, the *Chaoji Nüsheng* 超级女声 [The Super Girl Voice] Singing Contest (hereafter referred as SGV Contest) is produced by Hunan TV and its subsidiary company EE Media with the sponsorship of Mengniu Group.⁶ Despite of its short life span (2004-2006), the SGV Contest became an influential social and cultural event that involves massive participation, mediated controversies, intellectual concerns, and state intervention. The Super Girl Voice phenomenon thus provides us with a case of contemporary Chinese society and culture worthy of further studies.

THE DUAL FEATURE OF CHINESE POPULAR CULTURE

As a product of Chinese television industry, the SGV Contest proves that the current Chinese popular culture continues to demonstrate the symbiosis of the consumer culture and mainstream ideology. The idea of popular culture is defined in various ways.⁷ I am using the definition of Williams that popular “was being seen from the point of view of the people rather than from those seeking favour or power from them”. He therefore stated that “popular culture was not identified by *the people* but by others, and it still carries two older senses: inferior kinds of work; and work deliberately setting out to win favour; as well as the more

⁵ Zhao Yuezhi borrowed a metaphor of “underdogs and lapdogs” from an in-house ditty for journalists at China Central Television’s News Commentary Department to illustrate the state’s direct control over the Chinese mass media. See Zhao Yuezhi, “Underdogs, Lapdogs and Watchdogs: Journalists and the public sphere problematic in China” in Gu, Edward and Merle Goldman eds. *Chinese Intellectuals between State and Market*, London and New York, RoutledgeCurzon, 2004, pp.43-74.

⁶ Meng Niu, literally Mongolian Cow, is the biggest Chinese milk-production enterprise.

⁷ John Storey listed eight definitions such as folk culture, mass culture, the “other” of high culture, an arena of hegemony, postmodern culture, the “roots” and “routes” of cultural identities, popular or mass art, and global culture. See John Storey, *Inventing Popular Culture: from Folklore to Globalization*, Oxford: Blackwell, 2003.

modern sense of well-liked by many people, with which of course, in many cases, the earlier senses overlap” (1977, p.237). Such overlapping of senses is found in the contemporary Chinese case. Since its revival in the 1990s, the Chinese popular culture is marked with dual features between the consumerist capitalism and the revolutionary ideology (Tao, 2005).

On the one hand, the SGV phenomenon exemplifies the Chinese consumerist capitalism that emerged in the early 1990s. Its producers aimed at maximization of its market opportunities by promoting popular consumerism. The SGV Contest was born out of the internal competition among various terrestrial television channels in Hunan province. Xia Qing, producer at the Hunan Entertainment Television Channel, happened to read an article on *Nanfang Zhoumo* 南方周末 (Nanfang Weekend) about the British reality TV programme *Pop Idol*. Inspired by this article, Xia drafted a proposal of a television singing contest in the form of talent show to compete with a similar programme produced by another channel in Hunan TV (Xia, 2006). This proposal was considered novel and feasible by Wei Wenbin, head of Hunan Broadcasting and Television Bureau and director of Hunan Television. However, Wei found the proposed programme title too elitist and the proposed theme rather limited. Finally, the programme was entitled “Super Boy Voice” with a slogan of “the singing festival for the mass” (大众歌会) (Huang, 2006). In the following year, the Super Girl Voice Contest was broadcast by Hunan Entertainment Channel as a strong rivalry to the “Star Academy” 明星学院 singing contest of Hunan Economic Channel.⁸ At the same time, a similar programme named *Mengxiang Zhongguo* 梦想中国 (Dream China) produced by China Central Television (CCTV) also arouse public interests. In order to secure its national viewership and promote its branding strategy of “Happy China”, Hunan TV decided to nurture the SGV Contest and aired it on the Hunan Satellite Television (Huang 2006). This provincial contest was expanded to Wuhan, Nanjing and Chengdu by collaboration with the local television producers. Its viewership exceeded the “Dream China” Contest of CCTV 2 (Net 1).

As indicated by its title, this female-exclusive singing contest proclaimed to invite any

⁸ The title of this programme is identical with the Endemol-production which was franchised globally. However, there was no financial affiliation between this Chinese programme with Endemol.

aspiring female singer to ‘sing along as loud as she wants’⁹ despite their difference in terms of age, appearance or singing skills.¹⁰ Every applicant has had her audition in front of a panel of professional judges in the preliminary rounds filmed in four cities around China.¹¹ The shortlisted contestants entered the regional elimination contests that were broadcasted live to television viewers. The viewers voted for their favourite singer via telephone calls or mobile phone text messages. The finalists selected from the regional rounds went to HNTV in Changsha for the national finals, where television viewers determined the winners by phone-in or text message votes. The top finalists won contracts for professional singers from Shanghai Tianyu Company.¹² The 16 year-old second runner-up Zhang Hanyun became a household name overnight after her song ‘Sweet and sour is me’¹³ aired with a television advertisement for Mengniu yogurt. The second season of the SGV Contest in 2005 made some new attempts to mediate professional aesthetics and the masses’ tastes by its deliberately designed elimination mechanism. It continued regional auditions in five cities, which attracted more than 150,000 contestants in total. In a sequential series of regional contests, the entrants were eliminated by a procedure comprised of the panel’s decision and votes by the viewers via phone calls or mobile phone text messages. A ‘panel of the masses’ of thirty-one members would vote between the contestant favoured by the panel and the one with the most votes among the rest of contestants.¹⁴ In the national finals, the television viewers selected the top finalists via text messages and phone calls.¹⁵

The SGV fad was unprecedented in terms of its commercial gain and public involvement. In order to avoid the administrative constraints, Hunan TV launched its

⁹ This is a literal translation of its slogan, which is *Xiang chang jiu chang, chang de xiang liang* 想唱就唱，唱得响亮。

¹⁰ Considering the fact that every contestant on the main show is young and skilful, I would challenge such assertion and consider it as a marketing strategy.

¹¹ The cities where the auditions take place are selected according to the marketing campaign of Meng Niu. In year 2004, the cities include Chengdu, Wuhan, Changsha and Nanjing. In year 2005, the cities include Guangzhou, Changsha, Zhengzhou, Chengdu and Hangzhou.

¹² Shanghai Tianyu Company is an agent of artists established by Wang Peng, husband of the producer of the Super Girl Voice Contest and former staff of HNTV.

¹³ This is a literal translation of *Suansuan tiantian jiu shi wo* 酸酸甜甜就是我。

¹⁴ This group contains a certain number of voted-out regional finalists and volunteer viewers chosen by the Hunan TV.

¹⁵ Each mobile number could send 15 votes, and a mobile number that is registered at the China Mobile call-in service could have 15 extra votes. It costs 0.1 yuan (RMB) to make one text message vote. The call-in voting service charges 1 yuan (RMB) per minute.

affiliated company Shanghai EE Media Company 上海天娱传媒, which was the main executor of the SGV Contest in a national level. The contestants were required to sign a contract with EE Media and thus became part of the company asset that could be transferred to other artist agencies at a higher price. In SGV Contest Season 2005, the sponsor Mengniu Group invested 300 million RMB for the marketing campaign that incorporated the advertisement of SGV Contest and the Mengniu yogurt product. The five areas for preliminary auditions, i.e., Guangzhou, Changsha, Zhengzhou, Hangzhou and Chengdu, were chosen according to the sales strategy of Mengniu Group. The idea of making an ordinary girl the super star was promoted in the Mengniu yogurt television advertisement aired on CCTV1 during the prime time before the CCTV News Broadcast. The voting mechanism via telephone calls and text messages was also commercialized. Each text message cost 0.5 to 1 RMB and only 15 votes could be made from one single mobile number. The last episode of the national final on the night of August 26th, 2005, drew over 280 million viewers at one point. The champion Li Yuchun won 3,528,308 votes; the first runner-up Zhou Bichang won 3,270,840 votes; and the second runner-up Zhang Liangying 1,353,906.

On the other hand, the highly commercialized attempts in the production and promotion of the SGV Contest still sought legitimacy in revolutionary cultural tradition that emphasizes on the concepts of “Dazhong” 大众 (the people) and of the “Minjian” 民间 (the folks). Wu Jing and Hu Chunchun found the national final for championship of the 2005 SGV Contest a typical example of this feature. In this contest, the stage was decorated in the style of traditional gala with the chorus of young girls and elderly women singing the theme song of this contest. On this stage, well-established female singers, one from the military system and the other a renowned folk song singer, were invited as tutors of these finalists in singing (Wu & Hu, 2007). Other attempts to appeal to the mainstream ideology include the regulation of Hunan TV that the songs to be performed must include folk songs and revolutionary “red” songs. The contestants were also told to give up their “avant-garde” style in appearance (Dai, 2005).

Despite the appropriation of mainstream ideology, the targeted audience of SGV do not interpret this show with a revolutionary sense. They are not only passive receivers but also

active meaning creators. As De Certeau argued, the users of the cultural products also carry out operations of their own (de Certeau, 1988). These operations were encouraged by the participatory characteristic of the SGV Contest. Despite the fact the only the skilled contestants could enter the final elimination, a large number of amateur participants still had their chance to perform in front of the judges and spectators. A middle-aged enterprise owner Huang Xin drew wide attention due to her mediocre yet confident performance against the sarcastic panellists. Supporters of certain contestants formed communities under distinctive names applying witty spoonerism. To list a few, the fans of Zhang Liangying called themselves “Liangfen”, a combination of the morpheme “liang” from her name and “fen” (fans) that means a kind of local food in the hometown of Zhang. And the fans of Li Yuchun identified themselves as “Yumi”, a word meaning “maize corn” that consists of “yu” and the morpheme “mi” signifying “fans” in Mandarin Chinese (Yang, 2009).¹⁶

DEMOCRACY DEBATED AMONG CHINESE INTELLECTUALS

As the national finals were broadcast from mid-July to the end of August, media coverage shifted from news features and personal profiles to commentaries and intellectual discussion. These controversial discourses were articulated in two venues. The first venue of publication was liberal newspapers such as *Nanfang Dushi Bao* 南方都市报 [Southern Metropolitan Daily], *Nanfang Zhoumo* 南方周末 [Southern Weekend], *Nanfang Renwu Zhoukan* 南方人物周刊 [Southern People Weekly], *Xinjing Bao* 新京报 [Beijing News], *Beijing Qingqian Bao* 北京青年报 [Beijing Youth Daily], etc. On the contrary, this event was intentionally ignored by Party organs such as *Renmin Ribao* 人民日报, *Jiefang Ribao* 解放日报, and their provincial counterparts.¹⁷ The second venue was the internet-based

¹⁶ Yang Ling did a study based on her own participation and observation as a fan of Ji Minjia, one of the top five finalists in the 2005 SGV Contest. She contended that the fans activities demonstrate the meaning production through the act of consumption.

¹⁷ A study on media coverage of the Super Girl Voice Contest from the preliminary auditions in March to the national finals in August shows a disparity of press coverage by Party organs and market-oriented newspapers. See « *Zhongguo qingshaonian yanjiu zhongxin 'qingshaonian wenhua xianxiang yu radian wenti jiance yanjiu' ketizu* » 中国青少年研究中心“青少年文化现象与热点问题监测研究”课题组 [The group for “Adolescent cultural phenomena and key issue monitoring research” at the China Youth & Children Research Center], *Guanyu 'Chaojiniusheng' de meiti baodao fenxi* 关于“超级女声”的媒体报道分析 [An analysis of the

forums for Chinese liberalist intellectuals, i.e. *Shiji Zhongguo* 世纪中国 and *Wenhua yanjiu wang* 文化研究网.¹⁸ These public commentaries shared the common ground that SGV contest was a commercial breakthrough, massive cultural movement, and a media event of great social impact. The key issue of its controversy lay in the cultural orientation to which this event would lead (Liu 2005). This was where opinions diverged.

The first controversy focused on the aesthetic taste of the SGV Contest. Should it be celebrated for its “reaction to the elite culture” or condemned for its “vulgar characteristics”? Scholarly criticism of the SGV Contest mainly targeted its profit-making nature and vulgarity. The climax came when a symposium against “vulgarization in entertainment-oriented programmes” convened by the Committee of Presenters of Radio and Television of the Chinese Radio and Television Association. Shi Tongyu used the SGV Contest as an example of profit-driven “vulgar television programmes”. Cui Yongyuan supported Shi’s criticism against the viewership domination. Their intention to criticise the profit-oriented strategy of public television was interpreted by *Jinghua Shibao* 京华时报 [The Beijing Times] as an elitist attack on popular culture, with the SGV Contest as the major target (Cui, 2005 & Zhao, 2005). The dispute about the vulgarity of popular culture was concluded with an open discussion among three Chinese scholars reported by *Xin Jing Bao* on August 20th. Li Yinhe, Zhu Dake and Yu Guoming declared their support for the SGV Contest as it shows the resistance to cultural monopoly and indicates cultural pluralism (Zhao, 2005).

The second controversy concerned the authenticity of “Chaonü Democracy”. The SGV Contest succeeded in its open access and voting mechanism, which encourages mass participation. Should they be read as indicators of the emergence of Chinese civil society and democratic progress? Wang Zhengxu associated the Super Girl Voice contest with the concept of civil society in a Habermasian sense (Wang, 2005). Zhu Zhida recognized the growth of civil society within the rise of mass culture (Zhu, 2005). Yang Liangqing argued that the

media coverage about the Super Girl Voice (Contest)] , <http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/40555/3754217.html#> , retrieved on October 1, 2010.

¹⁸ “Century China” is a website where liberal commentaries are published. This website is no longer accessible. Articles published on it were collected and published on the website of Xueshu zhonghua 学术中华 [Academic China]. See <http://www.xschina.org/item.php?channel=%D0%C7%C6%DA%CE%C4%DD%CD&item=2005%C4%EA8%D4%C2C>, retrieved on July 1, 2010.

selection process encouraged a democratic citizenry (Yang, 2005). On the night of the last episode of the national final of SGV Contest (August 26), An Ti¹⁹ made a statement that this contest was a substitute for Chinese democratic practices on his blog (An Ti, 2005). Xu Jilin tried to “demystify the *Chao Nü* democracy” by arguing that voting by itself does not equate to democracy, of which the essential factors should be transparent procedures, equal rights, liberal discussions, respect for the others, and impartial rules that surpass any individual will. The SGV Contest lacked any of these factors since the selection was manipulated by its producers who arbitrarily changed the rules (Xu, 2005). To mediate this dispute, Cui Weiping tried to redefine democracy in the way of Hu Shi that “democracy is a way of life” in an article titled “The posture of democracy”²⁰(Cui, 2005).

The two mediated controversies illustrate well how the masses demonstrate a power base that could transfer easily to the political sphere, and that there is resistance in the political sphere to accept that demonstration of power using the idea of intellectualism. Besides these polarized opinions, there was also a conspicuous silence, which might be read in various ways. One facile interpretation might be made based on G. C. Spivak’s assertions that the subaltern cannot speak not only because they have no chance to raise their voices but also because their speech cannot be understood within the dominant discourse (1988). However, these alleges do not suffice to explain the facts that more individuals were mobilized to raise their voice as contestants, supporters or commentators during the three seasons of SGV Contest, and that advanced communication technology gave larger access to the voters to decide the contest result. As I see it, the SGV Contest did promote the idea of equality and encourage social mobility by the means of Xuanxiu 选秀, literally the selection of talents. However, ignorant imaginaries of democracy can only be “a negative reaction to totalitarianism than as a positive response to democracy” as Zhang Longxi observed in the prodemocracy movements in China. It is in this sense that he stressed on the indispensability of intellectual rigor and reflexive mobility to understand democracy and its self-deconstruction (1998, p. 171).

¹⁹An Ti 安替 is the pseudo name of Zhao Jing 赵静, a blogger, columnist and former journalist at suspended liberal newspaper *Ershiyi Shiji Huanqiu Baodao* 二十一世纪环球报道 [21st Century World Herald]. He is most known for his anti-war reports during the Iraq war in 2003.

²⁰ The term shenduan 身段 in the title literally means a woman’s figure or a dancer’s bodily movement.

STATE INTERVENTION CALLS IT TO AN END

Since the second season of the SGV Contest in 2006, state authorities began to intervene the SGV phenomenon with two various approaches. The first approach is embodied in Liu Zhongde's continuous and severe criticism against the SGV Contest on public occasions. Liu attacked the SGV for its vulgarity that has distained the highbrow art (Peng, 2006). He convened a press conference at which he further illustrated his points that the profit-driven cultural products will undermine the aesthetic taste of the youth and the state authorities are obliged to regulate the Chinese cultural market (Peng, 2006). The fact that Liu had been the director of the Department of Culture of Chinese central government and deputy head of the Department of Propaganda of CCP Central Committee has made his criticism more authoritative, if not official (Zhao, 2006). His approach represented the politicized aesthetics of the state machine in the 1990s.

Besides the aesthetic judgment of Liu Zhongde, the second approach demonstrated the administrative regulation over the diffuse spectacles. In year 2007, CCTV made its gesture by gradually withdrawing from the thriving Xuanxiu market. The Xuanxiu programme *Mengxiang Zhongguo* 梦想中国 (Dream China) did not appear on the list of programmes for authorization from the state administration. The career development *Zhenrenxiu Juedui Tiaozhan* 绝对挑战 was put off air on March 28th without further explication. A popular talk show *Jin Ye* 今夜 (Tonight) said farewell to its audiences in April. The first *Zhenrenxiu* programme on CCTV, *Feichang 6+1* 非常 6+1 (Super 6+1), was suspended during the 2008 Olympic Games. On the other hand, fierce competition of Xuanxiu programmes still took place among the local television channels despite the tightened state control. It took great effort of Hunan Satellite to obtain the state sanction of *Kuaile Nansheng* 快乐男声 (Happy Boy Voice), a male version substituting the *Chaoji Nüsheng* 超级女声, with alternation of its title. This male-exclusive contest is considered as Hunan Satellite TV's counter-attack to the similar programme *Jiayou Haonaner* 加油好男儿 (My Hero) produced by the rivalry SMG.

In September, 2007, SARFT announced 'The Notice of the reinforcement of management of the selection-genre of radio and television programme participated by the

mass' (Guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang qunzhong canyu de xuanbalei guangbo dianshi huodong hejiemu de guanli de tongzhi 《关于进一步加强群众参与的选拔类广播电视活动和节目的管理的通知》). Specific regulations concerning the authorization, production, broadcasting, and programme content of the *Xuanxiu* 选秀 programmes are given in this notice. Some crucial restriction takes effect since October 1st, 2007: The *Xuanxiu* 选秀 programmes on the regional satellite channels are excluded from the 'prime time' between 19:30 to 22:30. Only voting by audience at the scene is allowed. Any form of voting by television audience (including short message via mobile phone, telephone and internet votes) is strictly forbidden.

²¹ The March of 2008 saw only one approved and aired *Xuanxiu* programme, which is the *Juedui Changxiang* 绝对唱响 (Singing along in pairs) produced by Jiangsu Satellite TV. The second permit is given to *Jiayou ! Haonaner* 加油 ! 好男儿 (My Hero). Hunan Satellite TV suspended its production of any *Xuanxiu* programmes in year 2008. It was in year 2009 that Hunan TV resumed its singing contest such as the Happy Girl Voice Contest 2009 and the Happy Boy Voice 2010. In mid-September, 2011, the Chinese Administration of Radio and Broadcasting issued a new measure to forbid any talent show programme to be aired in the prime time (7-10 pm), which led to the infinitive suspension of series of Super Girl Voice Contest.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The Super Girl Voice Phenomenon is a typical case that demonstrates the changes in the negotiating forces in contemporary Chinese cultural dynamics. In general, the Chinese cultural scene is still determined by the dominant state ideology, which applies a more

²¹ Other quantitative and qualitative criteria are given in this Notice as follows: In this exhaustive list of restrictions. The authorisation of *Xuanxiu* programmes broadcast in local television channels and satellite channels of CCTV is highly centralized in the way that programme producers should apply to the state administration three months in advance. The list of panel members, especially when it involves foreigners, should be submitted to the state administration for approval. Self-censorship is demanded with quantitative and qualitative criteria: The selection process should take more than 80% of the programme duration. The percentage of Chinese songs performed in singing contests should be over 75%. The participants should 'cater to the aesthetic standard of the people (*Da zhong* 大众)'. All sensational performances of the participants, the presenters or the panel members are forbidden. The number of programmes, the broadcasting time and audience scale are also limited. See [http:// www.chinasarft.gov.cn/articles/2007/09/21/200709211114606210182.html](http://www.chinasarft.gov.cn/articles/2007/09/21/200709211114606210182.html), retrieved on January 10th, 2008.

neutralized political rhetoric in the name of civilisation to achieve public consent. Under such integrated state control, the Chinese popular culture, particularly in the field of televisual production, is making a sensational entertainment appeal to its audience. This televisual entertainmentism, as Neil Postman asserted, may compromise our judgement and weaken our resistance to tyranny. In that case, it is a trivial culture rather than a captive culture that will jeopardize our society (Postman 1985:1). It is out of this fear that some Chinese intellectuals voiced their concerns about the prevalence of entertainment culture exemplified by the SGV Contest. Therefore, the SGV Phenomenon also indicates the call for change in China, which is suffering wealth disparities and social injustice albeit it achieved miraculous growth in economic power in the recent decades.

Finally, let us look at the real problem: *how to change?* Two options were given in the aforementioned controversies about the SGV Contest: The first one is a bottom-up approach of mass democracy and the second one is a top-down reform relying heavily on intellectual enlightenment and education. I took the populist stance when I started this research five years ago, speculating that this phenomenon might enhance public engagement and arouse democratic awareness among the Chinese citizens. By the same token, the word *Xuanxiu* 选秀, literally the selection of talent, was chosen as one of the top ten Chinese new words in year 2006 (Net 2). At the final stage of my thesis preparation, one of my thesis reviewers sent me a report about a scene at the 2011 *Kuaile Nüsheng* 快乐女声, literally Happy Girl Voice.²² In this article, the participants were reported to be “a crowd of onlookers” -- in Chinese *weiguan* 围观.²³ As one of the top ten Chinese new words in year 2010, the term *weiguan* is translated in a new word *circusee* as combination of *circus* and *see* (Net 3). The path from *Xuanxiu* to *Weiguan* shows that cultural populism²⁴ may easily turn into cultural

²² This is a modified version of *Super Girl Voice* Contest approved by the State authorities.

²³ Most participants were born in the 1990s and spent their teen years watching Super Girl Voice Contests. They were reported to be a non-believer of the Super Girl miracle and care very little about the results. The reporter used a phrase *weiguan* 围观 to describe this situation. See “Kuainü baoming shouri yu renqi ganga, cansaizhe duolingjing” [Few people signed up for the Happy Girl Voice Contest on the first day of application, most of the contestants were composed], <http://ent.sina.com.cn/y/2011-04-02/03223271609.shtml>, retrieved on April 2nd, 2011.

²⁴ Jim McGuigan pointed out that the term of populism is often used in political discourse than in cultural discourse. It means the mobilisation of political majorities around a set of simple and probably disingenuous slogans’, perhaps appealing to the lowest common denominator. See Jim McGuigan, *Cultural Populism*, London and New York: Routledge, 1992, p1.

cynicism when the massive movement failed to achieve its intended goals. As Hui Po-keung stated, cynicism in cultural politics derives from the “scarcity of hope” for social mobility. One result of this cynicism may be the negative submission to fate, while the other result will be the radical resistance to the existing institution (Hui, 2010).

If Hui’s reasoning holds, neither result of the populism/cynicism will be feasible to solve the current problems in Chinese society. Therefore, I change my position when concluding my thesis. To make my point clear, I hold the belief that the intellectuals are the key to social reform that should be implemented on the premise of an educated citizenry. I suggest that the ideal cultural dynamic equilibrium shall be based on two conditions in a concentric model after the Gramscian cultural hegemony theory. First, the State shall remain as the core that orients the circle of society. Second, the concept of intellectual shall not be used as a normative concept that draws a boundary between the few and the majority. *Zhishifenzi*, the Chinese term for “intellectual” literally meaning “knowledge molecule”, should not be used as a normative concept that draws a boundary between the few and the majority. Rather, it should be defined in Said’s idea of public intellectual, who is “an individual endowed with a faculty for representing, embodying, articulating a message, a view, an attitude, philosophy or opinion to, as well as for a public.” (1994). To put it in a Gramscian way, the organic intellectuals shall be the key to social reform, which cannot be implemented without an educated citizenry.

REFERENCES

- Adorno, T.W., 1981. *Prisms*. Translated by Samuel and S. Weber. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
- Anderson, P., 1976. The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci. *New Left Review*, 100, pp.5-18.
- An Ti, 2005. *Chaonü jieshu le, shenme caishi zhongguo de chaonan juexuan?* [*The Super Girl Voice contest has ended; what is China's superman selection?*]. [online] Available at: < http://www.boxun.com/hero/anti/129_1.shtml > [Accessed 10 June 2010].
- Arnold, M., 1994. *Culture and Anarchy*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- Boutonnet, T., 2009. *Towards a "Harmonious" Consumer Society? The Discourse and Spectacle of Social Harmony in the Construction of a "Civilised" China (1978-2008)*. Ph.D. University Jean Moulin Lyon 3.
- Comte, A. 1969. *Système de politique positive ou traité de sociologie*, Tome II & III. Paris: Les Presses universitaires de France, Troisième édition.
- Cui, Y.Y., 2005. Dizhi Disu Yule Jiemu, Cui Yongyuan: Shoushilü shi Wane Zhiyuan [Resistance to vulgar entertainment programmes, Cui Yongyuan: television ratings are the root of all evils]. *Jinghua Shibao [Beijing Times]*, 20 Jul.
- Cui W.P., 2005. Minzhu de shenduan [The posture of democracy], *Xinjingbao [New Beijing Express]*, 31 Aug.
- Dai J.H., 2002. Redemption and consumption: depicting culture in the 1990s. In: J. Wang and T.E. Barlow, eds. *Cinema and Desire: Feminist Marxism and Cultural Politics in the Work of Dai Jinhua*. London and New York: Verso, pp.172-188.
- Dai Q.T., 2005. Yige dianshi yule jiemu yinfa de shehui zonghezheng [The social complex caused by an entertainment television programme]. *Zhongguo Xinwen Zhoukan [China News Weekly]*, No.48, p.25.
- De Certeau, M., 1988. Chapter III "Making Do": Uses and Tactics. In: translated by S. Rendall. *The Practice of Everyday Life*. Berkeley: University of California Press, p.31.
- Gramsci, A.. 2000. *The Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings*. David Forgasc ed., New York: New York University Press, pp.422-423.

- Huang X.Y., 2006. *Wei Wenbin he ta de dianshi xiangjun* [Wen Wenbin and his Hunan army of television], Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, pp.236-247.
- Huang, Y., 2011. The Chinese Intellectual Sphere Revisited: An Analysis of Two Mediated Controversies about the 2005 Super Girl Voice Contest. In: *Transtext(e)s Transcultures 跨文本跨文化*, No. 6.
- Hui P.-K., 2010. Cong quanru dao gaozhi : dangdai xianggang de wenhua zhengzhi [From cynicism to kynicism: cultural politics in contemporary Hong Kong]. In W.S. Law, ed. *Wenhua Yanjiu yu Wenhua Jiaoyu* [Cultural Studies and Cultural Education]. Hong Kong: Department of Cultural Studies, Lingnan University, pp.81-97.
- Lee, G.B., 2003. *Chinas Unlimited: Making the Imaginaries of China and Chineseness*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, p.51.
- Lee, G.B. 2009. *China's Lost Decade*. Lyon: Tigre de Papier.
- Lemke, J.L. 1993. Discourse, dynamics, and social change. *Cultural Dynamics*, 6(1-2), pp.243-275.
- Liu, K., 1996. Wenhua baquan yu wenhua geming de puxixue [The genealogy of cultural hegemony and cultural revolution]. *Huacheng* [Floral City], 5, pp.197-205.
- Liu, Q., 2005. Chaojinüsheng yu shenghuo shijie de chenggong shenhua [The Super Girl Voice and the successful myth of the living world]. *Xin Jing Bao* [New Beijing Express], 18 Aug.
- McGuigan, J., 1992. *Cultural Populism*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Net 1. *Hunan weishi 2004 kuaile zhongguo chaoji nüsheng zonghe shuju fenxi* [The Integrated Data Analysis for the 2004 Happy China Super Girl Voice (Contest) of Hunan TV]. [online] Available at: <
http://www.zt.zj.com/y/2005cjnsh_hz/2/100114.html> [Accessed 15 January 2010].
- Net 2. *Hanyu pandian 2006 zhengji huodong ruxuan qian ershiwei guoneici* [The top 20 words in domestic context in the "inventory report of Chinese Language of 2006"]. [online] Available at: <http://edu.sina.com.cn/1/2007-04-22/1820138108.html> [Accessed 20 December 2008].

- Net 3. 2010 nian shida zhongwen xinci pandian [The bilingual inventory report of top ten Chinese new words in year 2010]. [online] Available at: <
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/language_tips/trans/201012/14/content_11700875_11.htm> [Accessed 20 April 2011].
- Postman, N., 1985. *Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Peng, G.Y., 2006. Chaonan Chaonu beizhi dianwu yishu [The Super Boy and Super Girl (Contests) were said to have distained art]. *Huaxia Shibao [Hua Xia Times]*, 21 Apr.
- Ransome, P., 1992. *Antonio Gramsci: A New Introduction*. Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp.9-15.
- Said, E.W. 1994. *Representations of the Intellectual - the 1993 Reith Lectures*. New York, Pathenon Books, pp.8-9.
- Spivak, G.C., 1988. Can the subaltern speak ?. In: C. Nelson and L. Grossberg, eds. *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, pp.271- 313.
- Storey, J., 2003. *Inventing Popular Culture: from Folklore to Globalization*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Tang, T., 1982. *Political Totalism, Authoritarianism, and Hegemony: A Proposed Theoretical Scheme for the Study of the Transformation of the Traditional Sociopolitical Order into a Communist System in China*. Presented at the Northern Illinois University, October 27.
- Tao, D.F., 2005. The Commercialised Revolutionary Culture in Contemporary China. In: D.F. Tao and Y.P. Jin, eds. *Cultural Studies in China*. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, pp.69-84.
- Thomas, P.D., 2009. *The Gramscian Moment: Philosophy, Hegemony and Marxism*. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers.
- Wang, Z.X., 2005. Chaojinüsheng rebo yu gongmin shehui de xingqi [The popular Super Girl Voice contest and the emergence of civil society]. *Nanfangdushibao [The Southern Metropolitan Daily]*, 31 Jul.

- Williams, R., 1976. *Keywords: a vocabulary of culture and society*. New York: Fontana, pp. 117-118.
- Williams, R., 1977. *Marxism and Literature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Williams, R., 1983. *Keywords: a vocabulary of culture and society*. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 87-93.
- Williams, R., 2003. *Television: Technology and Cultural Form*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Wu, J. and Hu C.C., 2007. Mingbai de aimei—cong “Chaojinusheng” kan zhongguo dazhong yule moshi [The conspicuous ambiguity- the model of Chinese mass entertainment seen from the “Super Girl Voice” (Contest)]. *Wenhua yanjiu [Cultural Studies]*, pp.62-63.
- Xia, Q., 2006. *Cong Kaishi dao Xianzai – buweirenzhi de “Chaoji nusheng” [From beginning to now – the unknown aspects of Super Girl Voice]*. Jilin: Jilin meishu chubanshe, pp.98-99.
- Xu, J.L., 2005. Chuochuan Chaonü minzhu de shenhua [Demystifying the “Super Girl Voice democracy”]. *Nanfang dushi bao [The Southern Metropolitan Daily]*, 29 Aug.
- Yang, L.Q. Chaonü pingxuan zhong de gongmin yishi [The citizen awareness in the Super Girl Voice selection]. *Zhongguo qingnian bao [The Chinese Youth Daily]*, 26 Aug.
- Yang, L., 2009. *Chaonü fensi yu dangdai dazhong wenhua xiaofei [The Fans of Super Girl Voice Contest and the Cultural Consumption of Contemporary Popular Culture]*. Ph.D. Capital Normal University (Beijing).
- Zhao, J.C., 2005. Chaoji Nüsheng: yichang dazhong wenhua dui jingying wenhua de fandong [Super Girl Voice: the Popular culture’s reaction to elite culture]. *Xin Jing Bao [Beijing News]*, 20 Aug.
- Zhao, N.N., 2005. Yule jiemu disu aipi zhuanjia cheng ‘chaojinüsheng’disu [The vulgar entertainment programmes criticized; experts claim that ‘Super Girl Voice’ is vulgar]. *Jinghua shibao [Beijing Times]*, 20 Jul.
- Zhao, L., 2006. Zhongguo zui nandang de guan zenme dang – duihua wenhuabu qianbuzhang Liu Zhongde [How to be the “most challenging official – an dialogue with Liu Zhongde,

the former director of the Chinese Department of Culture]. *Nanfang Zhoumo* [The Southern Weekend], 9 Aug.

Zhang, L.X., 1998. Western theory and Chinese reality. In: *Mighty Opposites: From Dichotomies to Differences in the Comparative Study of China*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

Zhu, Z.D., 2005. Chaojinüsheng jiang xingcheng shenme yi'? [What kind of entropy will the Super Girl Voice Contest bring?]. *Jiangnan shibao* [Jiangnan Times], 22 Aug.

Cooperation and Confrontation: A Macro Analysis of the MediaSport Institution in Contemporary China

Ping Wu
University of Bedfordshire
Email: wu.ping@beds.ac.uk

INTRODUCTION

Since the early 1980s, the relationship between the media and sport has emerged to be a major research field. Mediated sport is shaped by a variety of forces including production conventions and techniques, politics and economics of broadcasting and print media production, and ideologies of the producers (Kinkema and Harris, 1998, p.27). ‘MediaSport institution’ is a concept developed by Wenner (1998) and refers to the political and economic context, within which the technical production of mediated sport occurs. Academic studies of MediaSport institution fall into two categories: macro analysis and micro analysis. Wenner (1998, p.9) argues that macro-level political-economic analyses of sports organizations and media organizations form the backbone of MediaSport institution analysis. Any attempt to understand the interplaying of the media and sports organizations in mediated sport production should start from the understanding of the broader social, political and legal contexts. Bernstein and Blain (2003, p.2) note that the media production of sport has been explored to a lesser extent than that pertaining to the ‘textual emphasis’ existing in studies of mediated sport.

This study examines the relationship between the Chinese news media and the Chinese elite sport system within the broader political and economic context and therefore provides a macro-level analysis of MediaSport institution in contemporary China.

POLITICAL FUNCTION OF THE NEWS MEDIA IN CHINA

Every area of Chinese society has been experiencing dramatic changes since 1978. The Chinese news media are no exception. There have been drastic changes in operation, autonomy, news content and reporting strategy. However, the very nature of the Chinese news media as the mouthpiece of the Communist Party of China (CPC) remains untouched. As Zhao (1998, p.7) points out, the results of reform ‘signify a change in the content of news media rather than in the nature of the news media, which still operate as instruments of the Party’s policy initiatives’.

Since the Chinese communist news media system took its initial shape in the 1940s, the news media have always been the CPC’s ‘mouthpiece’, and the CPC leaders of different generations have all insisted that the news media must be a propaganda tool of the Party. Between 1949 and 1978, the CPC’s central task was class struggle. The news media were the frontline where the CPC led the proletariat’s fight against the bourgeoisie and media propaganda was used as a means of organizing and mobilizing mass movements. Since 1978, the CPC’s central task has been economic reform. Accordingly, interpreting reform policies and promoting the achievements of economic reform has become the news media’s major duty. Although the CPC did encourage the news media to make news less politicized (Li, 1990; Chan, 1993), it should be noted that this change of news content and reporting strategy was the CPC’s initiative acted upon by the news media and the CPC has never really loosened its control over the news media.

Zhou (2002) suggests that the CPC’s control over the news media falls into three types: pre-publication control, mid-publication control and post-publication control. Pre-publication control refers to direct supervision of the qualifications of the news media; mid-publication control refers to censorship of news content; post-publication control refers to punishing those which have breached the relevant laws, regulations or challenged the party line.

The very essence of pre-publication control is state ownership. All the news media in China are owned by the state, no private ownership is allowed. All the radio and television stations are run directly by government at different levels. All the newspapers are subjected to

stringent registration requirements. As Polumbaum (1990, p.49) observes, all the news media, no matter whether run directly by government or not, 'are broadly answerable to Party policy and more directly supervised by Party groups and committees both within and above'. Since the late 1980s, state ownership of the news media has become more and more 'nominal'. On the one hand, the state no longer grants subsidies to most media organizations, which, instead, become self-supporting and pay taxes to the government nowadays. On the other hand, private capital has already gained its share in the Chinese news media. However, in order to guarantee the effectiveness of the CPC's control, the state will not give up its 'nominal' ownership.

As the sole owner of the news media, the party-state controls the daily operation of the news media directly and tightly. The Central Propaganda Department (CPD) sets up the overall tone and direction for the news media, and lists topics to be covered and reporting taboos to be observed (Polumbaum, 1990; Zhao, 1998; Jiao, 2005). The general secretary of a municipal or provincial party committee should himself preview important editorials and top news stories of the party organ newspaper under his/her leadership (Jiang, 1990; Su, 1994; Zhao, 1998). However, it is the CPC's appointing the leading personnel of the news media that ultimately guarantees the party's control to be effective. In any political or governmental unit in China, 'the Party is usually equivalent to the unit's immediate leaders' (White, 1990, p.93). The unwritten rule is that only members of the CPC can be presidents or chief editors of the news media (Lu, 1982; White, 1990; Su, 1994; Chen, 1999; Jiao, 2005). 'No chief editor could ignore the power of political authorities to appoint and remove leading personnel at news organizations' (Polumbaum, 1990, p.51). While the destiny of leading personnel of the Chinese news media is in the hands of the party committee of a higher political rank, the destiny of ordinary reporters and editors is in the hands of their president and chief editor. In such a system, it is not difficult to understand why 'self-censorship' is so common (Polumbaum, 1990; White, 1990). As to this point, Su (1994, p. 84) makes a brilliant comment: 'In the Leninist state the truth of authority replaces the authority of truth'. The state-ownership and the leading personnel being appointed by the party mean that the news media are in effect part of the government and the power of the news media also becomes a

kind of governmental authority (Chu and Chu, 1983; White, 1990; Hood, 1994; Kan, 2001; Chen, 2003). That is why most Chinese officials fear the news media whose political rank is higher than theirs. Critical news stories and comments published in the party organs of a higher rank are often regarded as the official opinions of the higher party committee.

POLITICAL FUNCTION OF ELITE SPORT IN CHINA

Being introduced into China from the West to realize the nation's salvation and rehabilitation, modern sport was first played in the Chinese army as part of military training at the end of the 19th century (Hu, 2002). From the very beginning modern sport was entrusted with the mission of 'strengthening the country and the race'. In the early stages of modernization of sport in China before 1949, the development of sport was inseparably connected with the political fight for rejuvenation, independence and sovereignty of the nation. The elite sport system was formally set up soon after the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 and was entrusted with the political mission of extending the political influence of China and building a positive image of China (Han, 2000). Intriguingly, the function of elite sport has been further politicized since 1978. The 1980s were regarded as the 'golden era' of Chinese elite sport and many heavily politicized slogans were proposed, such as 'win glory for the state [*weiguo zhengguo*]', 'rejuvenate China [*zhenxing zhonghua*]' and 'make it to the top in Asia and advance into the world's forefront [*chongchu yazhou zouxiang shijie*]'. The achievements of Chinese athletes have been interpreted officially as the "great successes scored in the ongoing economic reform" and 'a symbol of the prosperity and development of the nation' (Chang, Xiao and Sun, 1998, p. 74).

Currently, elite sport fulfils the political function of 'winning glory for the state' in China to satisfy two main demands. One is the demand of the CPC to legitimize its governing power. The other is the nationalistic fervor that has run higher and higher as Chinese economy keeps on booming (Hu, 1999; Ma and Deng, 1999). The administrative system of elite sport in China is state-funded and government-run and its ultimate goal is to win gold medals in international competitions for China (Bao, 1998; Hu, 1999; Long, Tang and Long, 1999;

Zhang and Tang, 1999; Hu, 2002; Han, 2003; Hong, Wu and Xiong, 2005). This system is named ‘the whole-country support system [*juguo tizhi*]’. The highest-ranking sports official defined the ‘whole-country support system’ as a system that took the national interest as its highest goal, and mobilized and allocated all the relevant resources in the whole country, both spiritual and material, to achieve something of great importance or significance on a worldwide scale (Li, 2001; Yuan, 2002).

There are four administrative layers in the system. At the top is the General Administration of Sport (GAS), which is responsible for the administration of sports affairs at a national level. All the provincial administrations of sport are on the second layer, followed by all the municipal administrations of sport. At the bottom are the county commissions of sport. The GAS is under the direct control of the State Council and funded by the central government. Its leading officials are appointed by the Central Committee of the CPC. The provincial administration of sport is under the direct control of and funded by the provincial government, and their leading officials are appointed by the provincial committee of the CPC. The municipal administration of sport and the county commission of sport are similar, as they are also part of, and funded by, the local governments and their leading officials are always appointed by the local party committees. So, a sports authority is not directly subordinate to any sports authorities on a higher administrative layer. For example, although being the highest-ranking governing body of sport in China, the GAS can neither directly influence the appointment of a certain provincial sports official, nor decide how much subsidy a certain provincial administration of sport will be allotted.

As long as an athlete has been recruited by a provincial sports authority, he/she becomes quasi-public servant and is paid a wage by the state. The state used to employ all professional athletes after they retired from active sport as well, but this policy came to an end in the late 1990s (Xie, 2002; Xu, 2003). Now the state can only guarantee to find Olympic champions and world champions a job (Yuan, 2002). The vast majority of Chinese professional athletes will have to face the risk of unemployment after they no longer play sport for the state. Before a professional athlete retires, he/she has normally spent at least 10 years on regular professional training but has learnt very little other than the sport he/she plays. Therefore,

very few Chinese professional athletes are qualified to do any job other than sport. This reality makes the struggle for the chance of participating in international competitions, especially the Olympic Games, extremely keen and heated in China. The decisions made by the GAS and its subordinate administrative centers of different sports, are to a certain degree, crucial for the fate of many Chinese athletes. This power of allotting the chance of participating in international competitions is vital in those strong-hold sports of China such as table tennis, badminton and women's weightlifting. When the number of athletes who are capable of winning gold in the Olympics or world championships is much bigger than the number required in these competitions, the decisions regarding which athletes should represent China are often made in consideration of some factors other than sporting capability. For most sports, there are no open Olympic qualifiers in China. Therefore, the power of allotting the chance of making the Olympics is easily abused.

All the coaches working with provincial teams and national teams are paid by the state and are therefore, just like the sports officials, public servants. They are appointed to their positions by their leaders in sports administrative organizations and their leaders will also decide if they should be promoted or not some day in the future. Actually, Chinese professional athletes, coaches and sports officials are all staff members of sports administrative organizations.

POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NEWS MEDIA AND THE SPORTS AUTHORITIES IN CHINA

The news media and the sports authorities are both part of the government in China, so, their relationship is, in the first place, a positional relationship conditioned by the Chinese political system. There are four types of positional relationships between the news media and the sports authorities. How effective administrative power can settle dispute between a news media organization and a sports administrative organization depends on their positional relationship in the political system.




Figure 1: The news media and the sports authorities in the Chinese political system

Superior-Subordinate Relationship

The *China Sports Daily* is a party organ under the direct control of the GAS. Their relationship is a superior-subordinate one. Such a relationship is essentially a relationship between an owner and the owned. The best-selling sports newspaper in China, the *Titan Sports Weekly*, makes several million *yuan* for its owner, the Hunan Provincial Administration of Sport (HPAS), every year. In return, the HPAS seldom intervenes in the operation of the *Titan Sports Weekly* but always holds the power of removing the president and the chief editor of the newspaper. Administrative power can adjust a superior-subordinate relationship very effectively and the news media organization and the sports authority that owns it can hardly be in conflict. The *Titan Sports Weekly* is regarded as the most credible sports newspaper in China, but it has never published any negative news about the HPAS. Similarly, the *China Sports Daily* always praises the great achievements of the GAS. Currently in China, there are news media owned and controlled by sports administrative organizations, but there is no

sports administrative organization owned and controlled by the news media.

Directly Parallel Relationship

If a news media organization and a sports administrative organization hold the same political rank, and are under the direct control of the same party committee and government, their positional relationship is a directly parallel one. The relationship between a national newspaper, e.g. *the People's Daily*, and the GAS falls into this category. So does the relationship between a provincial news media organization and the sports administration in the same province, e.g. the relationship between the *Hebei Daily* and the Hebei Provincial Administration of Sport. When their positional relationship is a directly parallel one, a news media organization and a sports administrative organization are relatively independent of each other. Neither of them can directly control the other. However, they are, at the same time, two departments of the same government. The leading personnel of the two organizations are appointed by the same party committee at a higher level, which always states clearly that the local news media's duty is to report the great achievements of all walks of the society under its leadership, and the achievements are regarded as their political credibility by Chinese officials at all levels. Therefore, very few negative reports on local issues can be found in the local news media. Administrative power can adjust a directly parallel relationship very effectively and the news media organization and the sports administrative organization are both willing to cooperate and avoid disputes. Although administrative power is rarely resorted to in practice, it is still the fundamental reason why the news media organization and the sports administrative organization try to cooperate.

Vertical Relationship

If a news media organization and a sports administrative organization are neither of the same political rank nor subordinate to each other, their positional relationship is a 'vertical' one. The relationship between the GAS and all the provincial news media is of this kind. So

does that between a national media organization, e.g. the *People's Daily*, and all the provincial sports administrations. The feature of a vertical relationship is that even the one of a higher political rank has no influence on the appointment of the leading personnel of the other. For example, the *Football Weekly*, which is owned by the *Guangzhou Daily*, very often criticizes Chinese football. Although the leading officials of the GAS and the Chinese Football Association feel angry about the newspaper, they have no power to sack the leading personnel of the newspaper. A provincial sports administration is even more powerless when it has to face the national news media. Once a national news media organization reports sport affairs that happen in a province negatively, the leading officials of the provincial sport administration will be under great pressure. Not only do they themselves not have enough political power and privilege to influence the national news media organization, but their leaders in the provincial party committee and government can also do very little about it, because the chief editor of a national news media organization, e.g. the chief editor of the *People's Daily*, is a party and government official holding the same rank as that of the general secretary of a provincial party committee. Administrative power cannot adjust this kind of relationship very well and most of the disputes between the news media and sports administrative organizations occur here. The feature of a vertical relationship also offers explanation for the 'bizarre' phenomenon in Chinese sports reporting: the provincial and municipal news media are much bolder in reporting national sports affairs but rarely criticize local sport; while the national news media are very positive in reporting national sports affairs but sometimes report provincial sport negatively.

Indirectly Parallel Relationship

If a news media organization and a sports administrative organization are of the same political rank but not subordinate to the same party committee at a higher level, their positional relationship is an 'indirectly parallel' one. For example, the relationship between the news media of Province A and the sports administration of Province B is in this category. Administrative power cannot adjust an indirectly parallel relationship effectively. However,

disputes in such a relationship are not common either. The reason is that the news media of a certain province are often not interested in sports affairs in other provinces. However, once a sports affair in a province has already become a sensational news event, especially when it is a negative one, the news media of other provinces will show a big interest and provide extensive follow-up reporting.

COMMERCIALISATION OF THE NEWS MEDIA IN CHINA

The period between 1978 and 1992 witnessed the first stage of commercialization of the Chinese news media. At the end of 1978, the *People's Daily*, together with 7 other news media based in Beijing, appealed to the Ministry of Finance to grant a special policy so that the press could be run as an enterprise. The Ministry of Finance rapidly approved their appeal. This new policy was referred to as 'running a public institution on a commercial basis [*shiye danwei, qiyehua guanli*]' and soon followed by other news media organizations all over the country. From then on, the news media have become economic entities with relative financial independence (Zhao, 1998; Chen, 1999; Fang, 2000; Zhou, 2002). On 28 January 1979, the *Liberation Daily* published the first advertisement in a newspaper after the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). In April 1979, the *People's Daily* also started to carry advertisements. On 14 May 1979, the CPD formally approved the 'experiment' of resuming advertising (Chen, 1999). By 1992 one-third of the newspapers in China had already achieved financial independence (Zhao, 1998). By 1994, the government terminated subsidies for most of the newspapers except a couple of most politically privileged national party organs (Chan, 1993; Polumbaum, 1994; Zhao, 1998). In 1992, the CPC formally justified the concept of 'socialist market economy'; and the 'commercial nature' of the mass media was openly approved (Liang, 1992) and the second stage of commercialization of the news media started. At this stage, the process of commercialization took new directions. The *Oriental Radio Station* and the *Oriental Television Station* were set up in Shanghai in October 1992 and January 1993 respectively. The establishment of the two stations ended the old 'rule' that there should only be one radio station and one television station in any one city, and unleashed the competition

among radio and television stations in China. Of greater significance was that the initial operation of the new radio and television stations was funded with bank loans rather than government subsidies. In January 1995, the *Sichuan Daily*, the party organ of the Party Committee of Sichuan Province, launched a new tabloid, the *Huaxi Metropolis Daily*, as its subsidiary paper. The ‘Huaxi Model’ was quickly copied by other provincial party organ papers (Chen, 1999; Huang, 2001). More and more new provincial tabloids took part in the competition against the old municipal evening newspapers. In April 1999, the *Ha’er’bin Daily* Group changed itself from a legal institution [*shiji faren*] to a legal enterprise [*qiye faren*] by registering in the Industry and Commerce category (Zhou, 2002). After more than 30 years of commercialization, the vast majority of the news media organizations in China have to earn their bread and butter in the market nowadays. However, it will be naïve to suggest that the invisible hand of the market has changed the very nature of the Chinese news media.

Capital does have great influence on news content and reporting strategy now, but the Chinese news media still have to answer to and satisfy the CPC and government first and foremost. Although private capital, including foreign capital, has quietly invaded the Chinese news media in the names of joint venture, joint-company or contract system [*chengbao*] since the mid-1990s and the ownership of the Chinese news media has indeed become multi-elemental (Wei, 2001; Wang, 2003), no private capital is permitted to be invested directly in reporting and editing yet. All the radio and television stations are still directly run by the government, and the number of broadcasting organizations is strictly limited. The situation of newspapers and magazines is slightly better. However, the strict registration system guarantees a market monopoly which benefits all the Chinese news media ‘competing’ in the market (Polumbaum, 1994; Chen, 1999; Yu, 2000; Zhou, 2002; Dai, 2003; Dai, 2006). He (2003, p.158) articulates the result of economic reform in China as ‘having established a new economic system, which commits itself not only to the old power system but also to the exchanges in the market, upon the old political and social basis’. Her conclusion is also true for the commercialization of the Chinese news media, which is part of economic reform in China. Commercialization of the news media has created a new institution, which commits

itself to the ‘new’ interests of capital while still committing itself to the ‘old’ interests of political authority. This new institution guarantees large monopoly profits, which in turn help to consolidate the status quo rather than shake it up.

Nevertheless, commercialization has indeed resulted in more autonomy of the Chinese news media. The competition for advertising is actually the competition for audience and readers. In order to attract a bigger audience and more readers, the Chinese news media have to throw away their old conventions of reporting and editing and become capable of changing their news focus in time to reflect the ups and downs of real social life. Without autonomy in reporting and editing, very few Chinese news media would survive in the market (Chan, 1993; Plumbaum, 1994; Liu, 1998; Zhao, 1998; Huang, 2001; Zhou, 2002).

COMMERCIALISATION OF ELITE SPORT IN CHINA

In the early 1990s, elite sport was still entirely funded by the government in China, but the central government hoped elite sport would not be a 100 percent government-run institution any more in the foreseeable future. In 1993, the National Sports Committee, the predecessor of the GAS, made their reform plan public and their goal was that sport would ‘face the market, enter the market and be industrialised [*mianxiang shichang, zhouxiang shichang, yi chanyehua wei fangxiang*]’. In the same year, the ‘professionalism experiment’ commenced and men’s football became the first ‘experimental plot’. Later, ‘professionalism’ was also introduced into basketball, table tennis, badminton and volleyball. After the professional leagues were set up, the income of some top players skyrocketed. The ways of financing elite sport also diversified. Since 1994, a sports lottery has been run throughout the country and more than one-third of the lottery money has been invested in the Olympic Glory Programme [*aoyun zhengguang jihua*] (Wu, 2004). Commercial interests have been introduced into elite sports competitions. For example, the Shanghai Municipal Administration of Sport raised 160 million *yuan* by hosting the 8th National Games in 1997 and the Guangdong Provincial Administration of Sport raised 230 million *yuan* by hosting the 9th National Games in 2001 (Wu, 2004). Because of their absolute monopoly of competition

resources and sports human resources, the sports authorities gain considerable financial benefits in the process of commercialization.

However, the reform has failed to hit some major targets set up by the central government initially. Although several ‘professional’ leagues and a number of ‘professional’ clubs have been set up, Chinese elite sport is still tightly controlled by governmental administration. In the name, the professional sports clubs are run ‘jointly’ by industrial or commercial enterprises and provincial sports administrations. The enterprises invest with capital and the provincial sports administrations invest with playgrounds, training facilities and sports teams (Lu, 2004; Wang, 2004; Zhou, 2009; Han and Fu, 2011). However, the enterprises’ investment is in essence just sponsorship, while provincial sports administrations simply provide a provincial sports team for renaming. The appointment of head coach and the recruitment of players are still controlled by the sports authority. All the ‘professional’ leagues are properties owned by the administrative centers subordinate to the GAS (Liang, 2005). These administrative centers are playing an intriguing dual- role: they are the ‘referees’ and, at the same time, also ‘players’ (Zhou and Yang, 2000; Liang, 2002). For example, the Football Administrative Center (in fact another name of CFA), on the one hand, administers football affairs for public good; on the other hand, runs the professional league for their own good (Guo and Lu, 2002).

Today, Chinese sports administrative organizations are still mainly funded by the government, they are not dependent upon commercial sponsorship. Commercial sponsorship is a ‘bonus’ but not a ‘salary’ for them. This guarantees them a dominant position in their relationship with commercial sponsors. The very nature of the sports authority as government body remains unchanged.

ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NEWS MEDIA AND THE SPORTS AUTHORITIES IN CHINA

Since economic reform started, the Chinese news media and Chinese sports administrative organizations have been allowed to pursue their own economic interests and

become more and more profit-driven. They both want to maximize their own economic interests in the production of MediaSport, but their economic interests are different from each other's. Therefore, conflict becomes inevitable.

In everyday operation, the Chinese news media report elite sport to attract a greater audience rather than praise Chinese sportspeople for their 'winning glory for the state'. Although, quite often, they still have to stick to the Party's line, the real motive is to make more profits. Consequently, the philosophy employed by the news media to report elite sport has become very different from that before economic reform. First, the news media no longer treat all sports equally. Most media coverage is devoted to a small number of popular sports such as football, basketball, volleyball, table tennis, tennis and badminton. All these popular sports have regularly scheduled tournaments that cover most of the year. Therefore, they guarantee a stable supply of materials for the news media to produce sports stories on a daily basis. Second, the Chinese news media no longer stick to the propaganda model when they report Chinese elite sport. Among the different kinds of news, national news and local news are the most important and sensitive and most scrutinized by the CPC's propaganda authorities. Even in these two areas, the Chinese news media, especially the Chinese newspapers, can often present negative stories. As to sport, the Chinese news media are understandably much bolder in reporting negatively, because it is generally accepted that sport lacks political sensitivity. Bad news sells and it is true in today's China as well, therefore, reporting Chinese elite sport negatively when they can is not a choice made by the Chinese news media, in the first place, according to their journalistic principles or professional conscience, but according to their survival strategy in the market.

The sports authorities need media coverage of Chinese elite sport for two reasons. First, positive media coverage can help elite sport gain support from the general public and, more importantly, approval from the government. Second, more media coverage of a certain sport can help the sports administrative organization in charge to pursue more economic benefits including commercial sponsorship, competition revenue and advertising revenue. The administrative organizations in charge of the popular sports may feel little pressure in seeking for media coverage, for the news media are eager to cover the popular sports extensively for

their own economic interests. For the minor sports, media coverage is very valuable. The administrative organizations in charge of the minor sports have to actively seek for the news media's cooperation; otherwise they can hardly get any commercial sponsorship and other economic benefits. However, the sports authorities always want positive media coverage only.

Obviously, the sports authorities and the news media have different interests in the production of MediaSport. The news media want to report the popular sports, while the sports authorities want minor sports to be reported more often. The news media want sports news to be sensational and negative as long as they do not breach any rules of the CPC. However, the sports authorities want Chinese elite sport to be reported positively. In the capitalist West, it is generally accepted that there is a symbiotic and interdependent relationship between the media and sport (Wenner, 1998; Horne, 2006; Boyle and Haynes, 2009; Wu, 2010). However, the relationship between the news media and the sports authorities in China is more complicated than 'interdependent'. In China, elite sport is still funded by the government; therefore, it does not depend on media coverage in the same way as its Western counterpart does. This does not mean that Chinese elite sport does not need media coverage. The difference is that its need for media coverage is not as desperate as that of Western professional sports. The Chinese news media need the sports authorities' cooperation too. Two main sources of sports news are sportspeople and sporting events, which are both tightly controlled by the sports authorities in China. Therefore, the Chinese news media can barely ignore the interests of the sports authorities. The news media just cannot report Chinese elite sport always in the way they really want. They have to sacrifice their principles to a certain degree to retain their cooperative relationship with the sports authorities. However, they cannot meet all the demands of the sports authorities either, as they may lose their audience and readers if they allow themselves to become a puppet in the hands of the sports authorities.

CONCLUSION

In spite of the continuing appeal for freedom of the press since 1978, the Chinese news media are still acting as the CPC's mouthpiece. The CPC's control over the news media is still

tight and effective. All news media organizations are owned by the party-state. All leading personnel of the news media are appointed by the CPC and are therefore, in fact, party and government officials. There is no evidence that the CPC may loosen its control over the news media in the foreseeable future. Chinese elite sport fulfils a fundamentally political function to represent the party-state's interests, and its highest goal is to 'win glory for the state'. Although, since the 1980s, there have been criticisms of politicization of elite sport and all kinds of problems generated by the whole-country support system, no significant change will be detectable in this respect in the near future. In fact, China's hosting the 2008 Beijing Olympics and overtaking the USA to top the gold medal table has made elite sport further politicized. The news media and the sports authorities are both part of the government in China. Their relationship is essentially decided by their positions in the political system. Administrative power can adjust superior-subordinate and directly parallel relationships between them effectively, but has little influence on vertical and indirectly parallel relationships. Most of the disputes between the news media and the sports authorities occur in vertical or indirectly parallel relationships.

Among all the changes brought by economic reform in China, the one with the most distinctive 'Chinese characteristics [*zhongguo tese*]' may be that many government bodies are allowed to pursue economic benefits with their institutionalized power. The news media and the sports authorities are among them. Economic reform changed the Chinese news media into entities that have to earn their living in the merciless market. After having satisfied the CPC and government, they have to try their best to meet, even only partly, the demand of their audience and readers. Consequently, sport, which is regarded as of less political sensitivity, is not unusually reported in a sensational and critical style. Economic reform also changed the Chinese elite sport system. On the one hand, elite sport is still funded by the state and run by the government. On the other hand, the sports authorities are allowed to seek commercial sponsorships and other economic interests. Media coverage of sport is important and, sometimes, crucial for the sports authorities in their seeking for these interests. However, the economic relationship between the Chinese news media and the Chinese sports authorities is not an interdependent one. The Chinese news media have to earn almost every penny they

need from the market; while Chinese sports administrative organizations can still function regularly even without any commercial input.

Two issues need to be clarified. First, it is worth noting that the relationship between the news media and the sports authorities in China is first and foremost structured by the political system but not by economic interests, for neither the Chinese news media's nature as the CPC's mouthpiece nor the Chinese sports authorities' nature as government departments has been changed by economic reform. Second, for professional sports in the West, 'television is the lifeline that has allowed them to prosper and influence the leisure-time activity of a large segment of the population' (Bellamy, 1989, p.122). Without broadcasting right fees paid by television organizations, these professional sports can hardly operate or even exist (Horne, 2006; Boyle and Haynes, 2009; Wu, 2010). However, the relationship between Chinese television organizations and Chinese elite sport in sports broadcasting is very different. On the one hand, sports administrative organizations are mainly funded by the government and they can operate normally without any television money. On the other hand, there is no real free market for sports broadcasting in China. The China Central Television (CCTV) has monopolistic control in this area, and this monopolistic control is an institutional privilege authorized by the government. Because of this absolutely monopolistic control the CCTV needn't pay any broadcasting right fees for most domestic sporting events. Instead, organizers of domestic sporting events often have to pay the CCTV for its broadcasting expenses. The relationship between television and sport in China deserves further investigation and should be examined with a theoretical approach rather different from that employed in the West. This aspect of MediaSport is not explored in this paper, as sports broadcasting, a process rather different from sports news production, is not the major concern of this study.

REFERENCES

- Bao, M., 1998. Jingji tiyu zai liangzhong jingji tizhi xia yunxing tedian fenxi [Discussion of the characteristics of elite sport in planned economy and market economy]. *Tiyu kexue* [Sports Sciences], Issue 1, pp. 6-10.
- Bellamy, R. V. Jr., 1989. Professional sports organizations: media strategies. In: L. A. Wenner, ed., 1989. *Media, sports & society*. London: Sage, pp.120-133.
- Bernstein, A. and Blain, N., 2003. Sport and the media: the emergence of a major research field. In: A. Bernstein and N. Blain, eds., 2003. *Media, culture: global and local dimensions*. London and Portland: Frank Cass, pp.1-30.
- Boyle, R. and Haynes, R., 2009. *Power play: sport, the media and popular culture*. 2nd ed. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Chan, J. M., 1993. Commercialization without independence: trends and tensions of media development in China. In: J. C. Yu-shek and M. Brosseau, eds., 1993. *China review 1993*. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, pp.25.1-25.21.
- Chang, Y., Xiao, H. and Sun, Y., 1998. Jingji tiyu zouxiang shijie [Chinese elite sport marching to the world]. In: The Literature and History Committee of the State Sport Committee, ed., 1998. *Zhongguo tiyu gaige shiwu nian* [The fifteen years of sport reform in China]. Beijing: The State Sport Committee. pp.74-98.
- Chen, H., 1999. Jiushi niandai zhongguo chuanmei de zhidu yanbian [The evolution of the Chinese news media system in the 1990s]. *21 shiji* [The 21st century], June Issue, pp. 4-14.
- Chen, L., 2003. Lun woguo yulun jiandu de xingzhi he cunzai de wenti [The nature and the problems of supervision by public opinion in China]. *Xinwen yu chuanbo* [Journalism and Communication], Issue 9, pp.18-21.
- Chu, G. C. and Chu, L. L., 1983. Mass media and conflict resolution: an analysis of letters to the editor. In: G. C. Chu and F. L. K. Hsu, eds., 1983. *China's new social fabric*. Boston: Kegan Paul, pp. 175-224.

- Dai, Y., 2003. Jiaru WTO hou zhongguo chuanmei mianlin wu da wenti [The five problems the Chinese media are facing after China has joined the WTO]. *Xinwen yu chuanbo* [Journalism and Communication], Issue 1, pp.4-8.
- Dai, Y., 2006. Zhongguo chuanmei chanye guizhi de jiegou yu chongguo [Restructuring the Chinese media system]. *Qingnian jizhe* [Young Journalists], Issue 2, pp. 29-31.
- Fang, H., 2000. Zhongguo xinwen chuanbo shiye yibai nian [A century's development of the Chinese journalism and communication]. *Guoji xinwen jie* [The World of International Journalism], Issue 6, pp. 5-13.
- Guo, C. and Lu, W., 2002. Zhongguo zuqiu xiehui xingzhi de jieding chuyi [Defining the nature of the Chinese football association]. *Shandong tiyu xueyuan xuebao* [Journal of Shandong Physical Education Institute], Issue 3, pp. 1-4.
- Han, D., 2000. Lun woguo zhengguang jingji de gongneng bianhuan he gaige chulu [The changes in the functions of the 'Honour Contest' in China and the reforming approaches]. *Tiyu yu kexue* [Sport and Science], Issue 4, pp.10-16.
- Han, X. and Fu, D., 2011. Zhongguo jingji tiyu zhiyehua zhong de liyi chongtu jiqi falv kongzhi [The interest conflicts and legal controls in the professionalization of Chinese competitive sport]. *Shanghai tiyu xueyuan xuebao* [Journal of Shanghai University of Sport], 35 (6), pp. 1-4.
- He, Q., 2003. *Zhongguo xiandaihua de xianjing* [China's descent into a quagmire]. Hong Kong: Broad Press.
- Hong, F., Wu, P. and Xiong, H., 2005. Beijing ambition: an analysis of the Chinese elite sports system and its Olympic strategy for the 2008 Olympic Games. *International Journal of the History of Sport*, 22(4), pp. 510-529.
- Hood, M., 1994. The use and abuse of mass media by Chinese leaders during the 1980s. In: C. C. Lee, ed., 1994. *China's media, media's China*. Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 37-57.
- Horne, J., 2006. *Sport in consumer culture*. London: Palgrave.
- Hu, X., 1999. Gao shuiping jingji yundong zai woguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan zhong de diwei he zuoyong [The status of elite sport in Chinese economy and its effect on social development]. In: The Policy, Law and Regulation Department of the General

- Administration of Sport, China, ed., 1999. *Tiyu ruan kexue yanjiu chengguo huibian 1997-1998* [The collection of research studies in sports social sciences (1997-1998)]. Beijing: The General Administration of Sport, China, pp.77-90.
- Hu, X., 2002. Xin shiji zhongguo tiyu de lilun chuangxin [New theories of Chinese sport in the new century]. *Tiyu* [Sport], Issue 10, pp. 11-15.
- Huang, C., 2001. China's state-run tabloids: the rise of city newspapers. *Gazette*, 63(5), pp.435-450.
- Jiang, Z., 1990. Guanyu dang de xinwen gongzuo de jige wenti [Some key issues in the Party's news work]. *Qiushi* [Seeking for Truth], Issue 5, pp. 2-7.
- Jiao, G., 2005. *Taofa zhongxuanbu* [Denouncing the central propaganda department]. Hong Kong: Xiafeier International Press.
- Kan, J., 2001. Luelun xinwen baodao chengxu, fangfa he yuyan de hefaxing [The legality of procedure, style and language of news reporting]. *Zhonghua xinwen bao* [The Chinese Journalism Paper], February 26, p. 3 and March 5, p.3.
- Kinkema, K. M. and Harris, J. C., 1998. MediaSport studies: key research and emerging issues. In: L. A. Wenner, ed., 1998. *MediaSport*. London: Routledge, pp. 27-54.
- Li, R., 1990. Jianchi zhengmian xuanchuan weizhu de fangzhen [Giving priority to positive propaganda]. *Qiushi* [Seeking for Truth], Issue 5, pp. 8-18.
- Li, Z., 2001. Buduan shenhua dui tiyu yundong kechixu fazhan keguan guilu de renshi zai renshi [Deepening our understanding of the objective rules of sustainable development of sport]. *Tiyu* [Sport], Issue 11, pp. 5-10.
- Liang, H., 1992. Shehuizhuyi shichang jingji xia de baoye guanli [Newspaper administration in socialist market economy]. *Zhongguo jizhe* [Chinese journalists], Issue 12, p.5.
- Liang, J., 2002. Tiyu chanyehua jincheng zhong de zhidu chuangxin lilun yanjiu [Research on the new institution arrangements in the commercialization of Chinese sport]. *Tianjin tiyu xueyuan xuebao* [Journal of Tianjin Physical Education Institute], Issue 2, pp.7-11, 21.
- Liang, X., 2005. Dangqian woguo tiyu zhiyehua (shichanghua) gaige bixu mingque de jige lilun wenti [Some theoretical problems that have to be clarified in the current

- professionalism (commercialization) reform of Chinese elite sport]. *Tiyu keyan* [Scientific research of sport], Issue 2, pp.1-4.
- Liu, H., 1998. Profit or ideology? The Chinese press between party and market. *Media, Culture & Society*, 20, pp. 31-41.
- Long, B., Tang, W. and Long, Y., 1999. Woguo jingji tiyu zhiyehua sibuqu: shehuihua, shitihua, shichanghua he changyehua de sibian [The four steps of the professionalization of Chinese elite sport]. *Wuhan tiyu xueyuan xuebao* [Journal of Wuhan Physical Education Institute], Issue 2, pp. 13-18.
- Lu, K., 1982. The Chinese communist press as I see it. In: J. L. Curry and J. R. Dassin, eds., 1982. *Press control around the world*. New York: Praeger, pp.128-145.
- Lu, L., 2004. Woguo zhiye lanqiu julebu fazhan de kunjing yu duice [The dilemma of the development of Chinese professional basketball clubs and the possible solutions]. *Guangzhou tiyu xueyuan xuebao* [Journal of Guangzhou Physical Education Institute], Issue 1, pp.25-26.
- Ma, J. and Deng, J., 1999. Shilun zhongguo tiyu zaoqi xiandaihua de minzu jiefang douzheng [Analysis of the early modernisation of Chinese sport and the national liberation]. *Beijing tiyu shifan xueyuan xuebao* [Journal of Beijing Normal Institute of Physical Education], Issue 2, pp. 92-96.
- Polumbiaum, J., 1990, The tribulations of China's journalists after a decade of reform. In: C. C. Lee, ed., 1990. *Voices of China: the interplay of politics and journalism*. New York: Guilford Press, pp.33-68.
- Polumbiaum, J., 1994. Striving for predictability: the bureaucratization of media management in China, In C. C. Lee, ed., 1994. *China's media, media's China*. Boulder: Westview Press, pp.113-128.
- Su, S., 1994. Chinese communist ideology and media control. In: C. C. Lee, ed., 1994. *China's media, media's China*. Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 75-88.
- Wang, A., 2003. *25nian: 1978-2002nian Zhongguo dalu sifenzhiyi shiji jubian de minjian guancha* [25 Years: the grass-roots observations of the great changes in mainland China

- during a quarter century between 1978 and 2002]. Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe [The World Knowledge Press].
- Wang, J., 2004. Woguo zhiye tiyu julebu chanquan guanxi de xianzhuang he duice [The status quo of the ownership of professional sports clubs in China and the possible solutions]. *Nanjing tiyu xueyuan xuebao* [Journal of Nanjing Physical Education Institute], Issue 1, pp. 37-39.
- Wei, Y., 2001. Zhongguo chuanmeiye liyong yewai ziben hefaxing yanjiu [Research on the legality of investment in the Chinese media by outsiders]. *Xinwen yu chuanbo yanjiu* [Research on Journalism and Communication], Issue 2, pp. 2-11.
- Wenner, L. A., 1994. Playing the MediaSport game. In: L. A. Wenner, ed., 1994. *MeidaSport*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 3-13.
- White, L. T. III, 1990. All the news: structure and politics in Shanghai's reform media. In: C. C. Lee, ed., 1990. *Voices of China: the interplay of politics and journalism*. New York: Guilford Press, pp.88-110.
- Wu, P., 2010. Sport and the media. In: P. Craig and P. Beedie, eds., 2010. *Sport sociology*, 2nd ed. Exeter: Learning Matters, pp.180-198.
- Wu, Z., 2004. Woguo tiyu tourongzi tizhi wenti yanjiu [Research on the funding system of Chinese elite sport]. *Tiyu wenhua daokan* [Guidance of Sports Culture], Issue 2, pp. 9-15.
- Xie, Y., 2002. 21 shiji chu woguo jingji tiyu guanli tizhi yu yunxing jizhi yanjiu [Research on the administrative system and operation of Chinese elite sport at the beginning of the 21st century]. *Xi'an tiyu xueyuan xuebao* [Journal of Xi'an Physical Education Institute], Issue 4, pp.11-14.
- Xu, J., 2003. Guanyu woguo tiyu tizhi tedian jiqi fazhan de yanjiu [Research on the features and development of the Chinese sport system]. *Nanjing tiyu xueyuan xuebao* [Journal of Nanjing Physical Education Institute], Issue 6, pp. 44-46.
- Yu, G., 2000. *Meijie de shichang dingwei* [The media's positioning in the market]. Beijing: Beijing guangbo xueyuan chubanshe [Beijing Institute of Broadcasting Press].

- Yuan, W., 2002. Shenhua gaige, jiakuai fazhan, nuli kaichuang xin shiqi tiyu gongzuo xin jumian [Deepen the reform, accelerate the development and create a new situation of Chinese sport in the new era]. *The China Sports Daily*, August 26, p.1.
- Zhang, J. and Tang, H., 1999. Dui woguo weilai jingji tiyu guanli tizhi yu saizhi de yanjiu [Research on the future administration and competition of Chinese elite sport]. *Wuhan tiyu xueyuan xuebao* [Journal of Wuhan Physical Education Institute], Issue 2, pp. 8-12.
- Zhao, Y., 1998. *Media, market, and democracy in China: between the party and the bottom line*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Zhou, A. and Yang, M., 2000. Shichang jingji tiaojian xia woguo zhiye tiyu zai guomin jingji zhong de diwei [The role of professional sports in Chinese economy under the market economy conditions]. *Guangzhou tiyu xueyuan yuanyao* [Journal of Guangzhou Physical Education Institute], Issue 2, pp.15-19.
- Zhou W., 2002. *Meiti qianyan baogao: yige hangye de biange quanjing he weilai zouxian* [The report from the frontier of the media: a panorama and prediction of reform in the profession]. Beijing: The Guangming Daily Press.
- Zhou, W., 2009. Woguo zhiye tiyu chanye zhengfu guizhi de xianzhuang fenxi [Analysis of status quo of governmental regulation to professional sports industry in our country]. *Shanghai tiyu xueyuan xuebao* [Journal of Shanghai University of Sport], 33(2), pp. 6-10.

新時期後中國的海洋經略—從黃水向藍水的發展

(1980-現在)

林皓賢

香港樹仁大學

電郵：booster6292001@hotmail.com / hylam@hksyu.edu

一) 導言

近來外界對於中國軍力提升的，的一個關注點為中國首隻航母瓦良格號的下水，一些國家又再將中國威脅論重提輿論上。其實要解決中國會否如外界所說的那種對周邊國家構成威脅，可以從中國海軍的發展歷程從新來一次審視。中國海軍在經歷毛澤東時期後，在1980年代開始有一個發展的里程碑。現在中國海軍開始強大起來，正是發萌於此。在經歷十年文化大革命浩劫後，新中國經歷了兩年的空位期，雖然說華國鋒在1981年前仍保住中共黨主席和軍委主席，但其實1978年以來鄧小平及其支持者已逐步掌權後。1979年3月，鄧小平在黨的理論工作務虛會議上的講話中指出：“我們當前以及今後相當長一個歷史時期的主要任務是什麼？一句話，就是搞現代化建設 (鄧小平 1993)¹。在十一屆三中全會之後，中國共產黨繼承堅持並發展了“四個現代化”的思想。到了1980年代鄧小平便開始實行改革開放政策，其主要內容便是四個現代化—工業、農業、國防和科學技術現代化。而海軍建設現代化正是國防現代化的其中一項重點工作。

中國八十年代起作出的「四個現代化」，是中國改革開放及其總體戰略上富國強兵、中國崛起大前提的目標工作。由於本文是探討新時期階段的海軍發展，故只集中於國防現代化上帶給海軍的討論，及經濟現代化對於海軍建設的助力。

影響新時期的海軍發展的內外因素

改革開放實施以後這三十年間，新中國實施了急遽變化，不論在內部國力的發展，以及外部環境與美、蘇、日、台及東盟的外交，都有顯著的變化。這種變化基本上是由於新中國的國力發展，特別是經濟上的勢力漸漸形成了在全球經濟體系上舉足輕重的地位所致。海軍發展亦得力於這種經濟列車高速前進帶來的成效，特別是踏入2000年後。在這三十年間，從內部來說，最顯著影響新中國海軍發展的因素無疑是改革開放帶來的經濟動力，但是人事的調動及國家國防政策亦是另外兩個不能忽視的因素；而外來因素不得不提的，一是1991年蘇聯解體、二是兩次波斯灣戰爭（1990-1991&2003）所帶來的衝擊，三是1996年台海危機美國的態度。這些都直接間接地推動了新中國海軍的發展路向。

首先從內部的影響因素而論，改革開放無疑是一個很重要的推動因素。在經歷文化大革命後，正是百廢待興時期。雖然從數據上來看，文化大革命期間國民生產總值仍然

¹ 鄧小平 1993，鄧小平文選，人民出版社，北京，162-163頁。

有一定增長² (R.麥克法夸爾、費正清編，俞金堯等譯 1992)，但是對於國防建設的是沒有太大建樹，而文革對黨政機關及軍隊中的衝擊，對於中國當時的實際破壞是遠遠超過表面經濟數字上的增長。故鄧小平（1904-1997）上臺後，開始調整中國發展的總體戰略，其中最重要的一項是，在調整時期（1977-80 年），中國的計劃經濟方針不僅要求人民重視對外貿易³ (R.麥克法夸爾、費正清編，俞金堯等譯 1992)，而且還決定加入國際貨幣基金組織（The International Monetary Fund）和世界銀行（World Bank），獲得大量資助性貸款⁴ (R.麥克法夸爾、費正清編，俞金堯等譯 1992)。這標誌中國的經濟不再是封閉，而這條道路使中國未來規劃總體戰略上，可以說是更多的選擇機會。

從外部環境而言，中國在這三十年間面臨著國際關係上急遽的轉變，首先是 1991 年蘇聯解體，蘇聯解體有對中國有幾個很重要的影響。在國際政治上，主導第二次世界大戰後五十年來國際社會的兩極體系瓦解，世界從此走入後冷戰時代，一些學者認為，由於世局趨向緩和，所以都將注意力轉向經貿發展上，為廿一世紀的來臨儲備國力⁵（張建邦、翁明賢等 1998；吳東林 2010）。這影響到中國在往後二十年間的國防政策的立足，繼續採取「先經後軍」的路線，直到現在；另一方面中國成為了僅存的社會主義大國，在意識形態的衝突上首當其衝為西方國家，特別是美國所針對，美國在二戰後早已設下了兩條圍堵中國的「島鏈」⁶（江雨 2008）（參圖 1），單是衝出「第一島鏈」的封鎖已夠中國傷腦筋，而另一方面中國的經濟持續地高速增長卻又是西方國家對中國的發展感到矛盾。軍事上來看，由於意識形態上的衝突，再加上八九年「天安門事件」的影響使中國在現代化建軍過程極難甚至說不可能獲得美國為首的北約陣營技術，但是蘇聯解體卻又為中國提供了一個機會，前蘇聯的成員國中的俄羅斯及烏克蘭，基於自身的經濟困境，以及俄羅斯與中國在意識形態上的相近，使雙方合作互動快速深化，而俄、烏兩國亦成為中國取得現代化軍事武器的主要管道⁷（林穎佑 2008）。同時，俄羅斯由於自身的國力困境，在新的國際環境上採取了加強中國力量以遏制美、日的方針，於是中國在蘇聯解體後的十年來，能較易得到俄式援助來促進現代化國防發展⁸（平可夫 2011）。

其次是兩次波斯灣戰爭為中國帶來的影響。1991 年的波斯灣戰爭，美國所展示的新世代作戰方式使解放軍明白到傳統的人民戰爭已經過時。有識之士大都認識到，波斯灣

² 參（美）R.麥克法夸爾、費正清編，俞金堯等譯 1992，*劍橋中華人民共和國史下冊*，中國社會科學院出版社，北京，483-484,488 頁。

³ 同上，500 頁。

⁴ 同上，501 頁。

⁵ 張建邦、翁明賢等 1998，*跨世紀國家安全戰略*，麥田出版社，台北，53-54 頁。而事實上，中國的發展在江澤民時期亦是持類似的觀點，參 吳東林 2010，*中國海權與航空母艦*，時英出版社，台北，219 頁及江澤民 1992，「國際形勢和我們的對外政策」，*江澤民在中國共產黨第十四次全國代表大會上的報告*，載人民網，中國共產黨全國代表大會歷年數據庫

<http://cpc.people.com.cn/BIG5/64162/64168/64567/65446/4526313.html>。檢視日期：2011 年 3 月 10 日。

⁶ 第一島鏈北起日本群島、琉球群島，台灣島，向南伸至菲律賓群島、印度尼西亞，並且和東南半島的越南形成鏈形島嶼帶。而第二島鏈則北起日本的南方群島，以關島為核心，向南伸至加羅林群島。江雨 2008，「島鏈與中國海軍各遠洋的發展」，*艦載武器*，12 期，28 頁。

⁷ 基本上，中國的武器裝備主要是俄式已是人所共知，這是自毛澤東時期以來的傳統，蘇聯解體後，中國更容易取得較為先進的武器，這是由於俄羅斯雖然承繼了前蘇聯大部分領土，但同時亦繼承了它的巨額債務，所以發展經濟成為了它的首要問題，而蘇聯時代研發的武器成為了俄羅斯「套現」的其中一個方法，例如，先進的 su27 多用途戰鬥機便是於此時賣給中國，另外現時在大連被改裝修復中的瓦良格號航空母艦亦是因此而讓中國可以從烏克蘭手上買回來，參林穎佑 2008，*海疆萬裡－中國人民解放軍海軍戰略*，時英出版社，臺北，107 頁。

⁸ 平可夫 2011，「轉型之中的俄對外軍事戰略與部署」，*漢和防務評論*，1 月號，47 頁。

戰爭給人們的結論是精確制敵武器正成為決定戰場勝負的主要工具⁹ (平可夫 2006)。而中國第三代領導層亦體認到此一事實，江澤民（1926-）在一篇「關於二十年來軍隊建設的歷史經驗」中強調了解放軍應朝「科技強軍」之路進發。同時，解放軍透過蘇聯解體，獨立國家需要大量資金的時機，大量進口先進裝備¹⁰ (林穎佑 2008)。而波斯灣戰爭帶給中國軍方的最大教訓在於，如果在未來要應付台海問題而發動戰爭的話，基於外國的可能干預，有必要發展「綜合火力癱瘓」及「速戰速決」戰略¹¹ (平可夫 2006)，這亦是後來解放軍反介入戰略發展的基調，這一點將在第四節中再講述。

最後便是 1996 年的台海危機。台海危機對解放軍海軍的整備發展及戰略發展有十分重要的影響。事件是以解放軍在東海的演習為高潮，而美國則派遣「獨立號」航空母艦及第五航艦戰鬥群東來，聯同從波斯灣趕來的「尼米茲號」航艦戰鬥群在東海展示了美軍的實力。雖然最終雙方沒有爆發衝突，但是事後美國卻與日本延伸了安保條約的內容，使美日安全合作的範圍擴展至南沙群島及台灣海峽¹² (林穎佑 2008)，這完全是針對中國而來的盟約；而解放軍方面亦因這次危機意識到與美軍在科技及軍力上的差距，特別是讓中國方面瞭解到航空母艦不單是作為海軍艦艇，而是可以作為外交上的震懾工具。這種震撼，使 1996 年後的中國海軍建軍的方式積極地向國防戰略規劃方面進發，而不再滿足於近海的防衛工作，最終要建設一支海上遠洋打擊的「藍水海軍」¹³ (林穎佑 2008)，以及加緊為建設航空母艦作準備。

新中國自改革開放三十年間，海軍發展的變化遠比前三十年快速，因應國內的發展及國際形勢的不同變化，大致可以分成三個時期，這三個時期的戰略規劃亦隨著時代發展而不斷發展。

二） 鄧小平主政時代的海軍發展階段及海洋戰略規劃

1979 年至 1992 年是中國改革開放的首十二年，此時期亦是鄧小平主政時代。中國依據「一個中心、兩個基本點、三步走」的基本路線，至冷戰結束前已成為一個強大的經濟實力的強國¹⁴ (吳東林 2010)。從數字上可以看出，這種經濟力量的突飛猛進。例如，1978-1984 年農村生產每年平均增長為 4.8%，是之前 26 年的年平均生產增長率的兩倍¹⁵ (吳東林 2010)；1978 年以前，對外貿易額從未超過 150 億美元，但是開放後每年對外貿易總額皆超過 200 億美元，1987 年時更達到 826.5 億美元¹⁶ (吳東林 2010)。

經濟開放對於軍事發展在這時期有什麼意義？實際上，在八十年代中，軍事開支是不升反降的。1979 年中越戰爭曾造成軍費開支短期暴漲，戰爭完結後，中國開始了對軍事和國防建設的現代化進程，1981 年，鄧小平提出了「必須把人民解放軍建設為一支強大的現代化、正規化的革命軍隊」¹⁷ (鄧小平 1993)，首先 1982 年中央軍委決定了對軍

⁹ 平可夫 2006，*平可夫看後冷戰三場戰爭與台海衝突*，加拿大漢和資訊中心，密西沙加，214 頁。

¹⁰ 林穎佑 2008，*海疆萬裡－中國人民解放軍海軍戰略*，時英出版社，臺北，67 頁。

¹¹ 平可夫 2006，*平可夫看後冷戰三場戰爭與台海衝突*，加拿大漢和資訊中心，密西沙加，217 頁。

¹² 林穎佑 2008，*海疆萬裡－中國人民解放軍海軍戰略*，時英出版社，臺北，76 頁。

¹³ 一般而言，海洋環境可分為三種地區，即遠洋、緣海及濱海，而因為英文名稱關係也稱為藍水、綠水及棕水（黃水）。棕水海域指最靠近陸地的 200 海浬範圍，因夾雜了泥土呈黃褐色得名；藍水海域則是指遠離陸地的大洋水域。林穎佑 2008，*海疆萬裡－中國人民解放軍海軍戰略*，時英出版社，臺北，29 頁。

¹⁴ 吳東林 2010，*中國海權與航空母艦*，時英出版社，臺北，82 頁。

¹⁵ 同上，頁 83。

¹⁶ 同上。

¹⁷ 鄧小平 1993，*鄧小平文選*，人民出版社，北京，394 頁。

兵種進行大規模調整，而在 1985 年鄧小平更宣佈將裁軍 100 萬的決定。而在 1985 年的改革中，為配合裁軍而將原來 11 個軍區合併成 7 個，裁撤了 31 個軍級軍級單位、4,054 個師團級單位，並且將沿用多年的野戰軍編制改為集團軍編制，而最重要的一點是，技術兵種的總數首次超過陸軍步兵的總量。到 1990 年，解放軍實際裁掉了 103 萬 9,000 人，淘汰的過時各種火炮近萬門，坦克 1,100 輛、飛機 2,500 架、艦艇 610 艘¹⁸ (中共中央黨史研究室第三研究部 2002)。而軍費開支比例在國內生產總值中則持續下降¹⁹ (吳東林 2010)。但是，這不代表中國的軍事實力就會下降，一方面就如鄧小平在 1985 年指出「軍隊裝備真正現代化，只有國民經濟建立了較好基礎才有可能。」²⁰ (吳東林 2010)，其次是在改革開放的首十年，裁軍及改革軍隊體制²¹，本身是為了「經濟為主、國防為從」的總體戰略層面服務的，如果沒有強大的經濟基礎，便不能夠將軍隊裝備提升至現代化的水準，故四個現代化的先後次序很明確，而最終也是為了有一個現代化國防；再者，裁軍及縮減軍事國防開支的比例這種「消腫」方法，卻使一直以來軍隊機構重疊、臃腫的問題開始獲得解決，透過大量裁減人員和淘汰落後裝備，減省軍隊人事經費，反而使軍隊的裝備質素明顯提高，亦能將省卻的軍事開支用於經濟建設方面。而從事實來看，即使中國國防經費比例自 1978 年開始便呈逐年下降的趨勢，但是，由於國民生產總值逐年成長比例遠大於國防經費在當中所佔的比例，所以從實際數字上是不減反增²² (吳東林 2010)。與國防建設有密切關係的工業發展，在國民生產總值中與其他產業比較均佔最大比例，由此而言，國防經費及工業總產值的實際成長，對於中國的國防發展是十分有利的。

中國海軍在此時期的實際進展，可分為戰略及武備兩個層代。從戰略定位來看，鄧小平在主政之初，認為進入八十年代，世界和平力量迅速增長，和平與發展已成為時代的兩大主題。國際體系中冷戰的局勢漸趨緩和，體認出世界大戰一時打不起來，而且還有可能避免²³ (中華人民共和國國務院新聞辦公室 1995)。於是從大戰略上的「早打、大打、打核戰爭」的國防重點轉變為打贏在和平時期的「局部戰爭」²⁴ (謝茂松 2010)，而自八十年代中期起解放軍亦將戰略重點改為「中國周邊的小型戰爭」²⁵ (伯納德·柯爾 2006)，導致這種轉變的另一原因在於 1979 年中越戰爭解放軍海軍表現不佳所致²⁶ (林穎佑 2008)。是次戰爭雖然以中國勝利作結，但是中國海軍並未直接介入此次戰事，與及海軍航空兵未能有效支援部隊的進攻，使西沙群島主權雖然得以維護，但卻無法將中國的軍事力量進一步投射至南沙群島。就在中央將戰略重點放到「中國周邊的小型戰爭」不久，1988 年又再一次爆發了南沙群島海戰²⁷ 劉華清 (1916-2011)。在回憶錄中所言，

¹⁸ 中共中央黨史研究室第三研究部 2002，*中國改革開放史*，遼寧人民出版社，遼寧，137 頁。

¹⁹ 從 1971 年佔國民生產總值 17.4%，到 85 年便下降至 7.5%；國防開支從 1978 年佔國民生產總值的 4.6%，下降至 1992 年的 1.04%¹⁹。參 吳東林 2010，*中國海權與航空母艦*，時英出版社，台北，83, 111 頁。

²⁰ 同上，115 頁。

²¹ 鄧小平將軍隊與黨的關係區隔開來，使政治局中不再有軍人背景的成員。

²² 例如 1978 年的國防經費是 167.84 億，到 1992 年便達到了 377.86 億，增長近 2.25 倍。參 吳東林 2010，*中國海權與航空母艦*，時英出版社，台北，137 頁。

²³ 中華人民共和國國務院新聞辦公室 1995，*中國的軍備控制與裁軍白皮書*，11 月，載中國軍網：http://www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/database/2004-09/30/content_26773.htm，檢視日期：2010 年 1 月 12 日。

²⁴ 謝茂松 2010，*亢龍有悔－中共反介入戰略之研究*，高手專業出版社，臺北，40 頁。

²⁵ 伯納德·柯爾 2006，*海上長城－走向廿一世紀的中國海軍*，老戰友文化事業，桃園，34 頁。

²⁶ 先是 1974 年解放軍海軍在西沙群島中永樂島海域與南越海軍發生衝突，此次戰爭使解放軍海軍在體認到其實力在現代局部戰爭的不足及對維護主權的艱難。林穎佑 2008，*海疆萬裡－中國人民解放軍海軍戰略*，時英出版社，臺北，25 頁。

²⁷ 又名「314 海戰」。

除了中國當時「佔領的永暑礁、華陽礁和國民黨軍隊駐守的太平島外，其餘露出水面的島礁幾乎均被越南、菲律賓、馬來西亞侵占。他們的目的很明顯，就是經濟利益，特別是想爭奪海底的石油資源．．．．．」²⁸ (劉華清 2004)。由於「南沙問題」對於當時的中國是邊疆領土最急切的問題，亦是當時強調的「周邊」地區，很大程度地幫助了海軍更有立場地爭取國防預算。

正正是此一時期，中國開始了海軍現代化及爭取海權的道路。在此時期海軍的武器進展不是太多，主要的造艦計畫包括了飛彈驅逐艦、護衛艦(巡防艦)、海上補給艦等²⁹ (林長盛 1996)，但鄧小平時期最重要的海軍武器發展成就是水下核威攝力量誕生。1974 年 091 漢級核動力潛艦雖然已建造，但是與艦艇配套的魚 3 型魚雷直到 1984 年才研製成功³⁰ (林穎佑 2008)，故很長一段時間漢級潛艦是「有艇無雷」。而到了 1988 年，漢級大深度潛水、水下全速航行及深水魚雷發射等試驗，才最後完成了其研製的過程³¹ (林長盛 1996)，而另一個更重要的研發便是 092 夏級核子彈道飛彈潛艦的建造。在夏級問題上，除了彈道飛彈系統的技術問題，最重要的是導航定位問題要解決，在 1983 年夏級成軍時，是採用慣性導航、星光導航及衛星導航三種技術結合，但是這一年的彈道飛彈試射卻失敗收場，有消息甚至指一艘夏級潛艦在此損毀。直到 1988 年巨浪一型飛彈才在夏級潛艦上成功發射³² (林長盛 1996)，也就標誌了解放軍海軍在此時開始擁有了水下戰略核威攝力量。

戰備的進步還是次要，更重要的是戰略思想的改變。前述中國的國防戰略定位在此時期開始改變為重點應付局部戰爭，而海軍戰略亦相應地調整。此時鄧小平委任劉華清 (1916-2011) 以上將身份出任海軍司令員一職，意味著海軍角色地位的轉變，建國以來，海軍長期只是陸軍的附從角色，亦由於國防大戰略上著重於大戰及核子戰爭的觀念，使海軍發展只是著眼於「近岸防禦」。而鄧小平對於國防政策轉變，則表示了今後中國有需要向海洋發展，而近岸防禦觀念已不能適應大時代的趨勢。特別是《聯合國海洋法公約》(1982) 公佈後，如劉華清所說：「海洋戰略是國家戰略重要的組成部分。捍衛領海主權，維護國家海洋權益，迫切要求海軍制定一整套與國家海洋戰略需要相適應的海軍戰略．．．．．根據新的海洋法，我國可以劃定 300 平方公里左右的管轄區域，這些海域和大陸架．．．．．是我國賴以生存和發展的資源寶庫和安全屏障³³ (劉華清 2004)。」是而劉華清上場後，在 1985 年正式提出新的海軍戰略構核，由「近岸防禦」轉變成為「近海防禦」。

「近海防禦」的基本特徵是具有區域性和防衛性，將來犯的敵人在大陸沿岸海域予以殲滅或擊潰³⁴ (林穎佑 2008)。而其重點是在於海上防禦範圍必須有極大的縱深，充分發揮海軍在海上防禦時的整體作用³⁵ (林穎佑 2008)，在 1989 年，劉華清曾下令進行

²⁸ 劉華清 2004，*劉華清回憶錄*，解放軍出版社，北京，534-535 頁。

²⁹ 例如在七十及八十年代，自製軍艦開始加入中國海軍當中，包括 1971 年建成的 051 型旅大級導彈驅逐艦（排水量 3,670 噸）。參林長盛 1996，*解放軍的武器裝備*，明鏡出版社，香港，151-152 頁。80 年代開發江湖級飛彈巡防艦（排水量 1,425 噸），此型艦款及其改良型主要是解放軍海軍為針對水面作戰而設計建造，最大的特色在於已加裝了鷹擊系列反艦飛彈及反潛聲納系統，但防空方面仍然是弱項。參林長盛 1996，*解放軍的武器裝備*，明鏡出版社，香港，146 頁。

³⁰ 林穎佑 2008，*海疆萬裡－中國人民解放軍海軍戰略*，時英出版社，臺北，54 頁。

³¹ 林長盛 1996，*解放軍的武器裝備*，明鏡出版社，香港，128 頁。

³² 同上，129 頁。

³³ 劉華清 2004，*劉華清回憶錄*，解放軍出版社，北京，436 頁。

³⁴ 林穎佑 2008，*海疆萬裡－中國人民解放軍海軍戰略*，時英出版社，臺北，28 頁。

³⁵ 同上。

一項名為「2000年海軍的均衡發展」的研究，將此戰略稱為「近海積極防禦」³⁶（伯納德·柯爾 2006；林穎佑 2008）。這也就說明了，解放軍在海軍戰備上為何會開始加入旅大級等遠洋艦隻，開發遠洋大型艦艇，正表示了海軍開始走向海洋的目標。如果說，新中國建立首三十年的海軍只是黃水海軍，那新時期開始解放軍海軍便從「黃水」走向「綠水」了³⁷。

這時期與戰略發展相關的另一個重大政策是中國開始重視其海洋權益，為維護近三百萬平方公里的海洋權益及儲藏量龐大的南海油氣資源³⁸（萬文豪 2004），中國開始放眼海洋，並在1982年簽署了《聯合國海洋法公約》，同時，為了確保周邊具爭議性的海疆主權，1992年中國亦頒佈了《領海及毗連區法》³⁹（邱子軒 2008），用以作為與鄰國面對海洋領土爭端時的法理依據。

三） 新中國海洋戰略的轉捩點－劉華清和他的海洋戰略規劃

近代陸權國家如德國、俄國轉向海權發展時，都有一些相似的背景特徵，例如說是本身重陸輕海的傳統觀念、本身擁有較強的陸軍而海軍則是弱勢、而最終又有一個重視海權的將領出來提倡實行改革海軍及提出新的海軍戰略和發展方針，如德國之有馬查恩特（Curt von Maltzahn）（1849-1930）⁴⁰（鈕先鍾 1995）、蘇聯之有高西柯夫（Sergey Georgiyevich Gorshkov）（1910-1988）等。而帶領新中國海軍急速成長，並倡導新中國海軍的海洋事業發展的，便是劉華清。1982年被譽為中國解放軍新一代海權之父，「解放軍馬漢」的劉華清被委任為海軍司令員一事對海軍發展影響深遠，對於新時期海軍建設有重大的貢獻。在劉華清海軍司令員任內及後在中央軍委副主席任內，大力推動海軍從「近岸防禦」走向「近海防禦」，以及獨立於陸軍發展之路。在繼續論述中國第三代及第四代領導集團期間的海軍發展前，有必要先論及劉華清對海軍的重要性。

劉華清本是陸軍出身，原服役於劉伯承鄧小平軍中（劉鄧大軍），1952年蕭勁光任海軍司令員時，把劉華清從二野軍中調到大連海校，開始接觸海軍，1954年根據組織安排，前往蘇聯伏羅希格夫海軍學院學習，而當時正正是蘇聯在高西柯夫帶領下大整海軍的時期，高西柯夫正任教於該學院。新中國成立之初的海軍理論是很受蘇聯影響，而劉

³⁶ 伯納德·柯爾 2006，*海上長城－走向廿一世紀的中國海軍*，老戰友文化事業，桃園，322頁。但是這種近海的範圍對於海軍是多少呢？不同學者均曾對這一戰略定義作過探討，海外學者伯納德·柯爾（Bernard D. Cole）指出，「近海」具有多種不同定義，其範圍從150海浬至600海浬不等，劉華清本人認為，對中國而言，近海是指從中國大陸海岸至第一島鏈之間的廣大水域。由於中國改革開放後與周邊國家的經貿往來日益重要，走出海洋已是中國必然的道路，而太平洋的戰略態勢亦會變得愈來愈重要，中國海軍的作戰活動範圍將會擴及海洋、內陸甚至太空，而佔據此一地區取得中國海軍的立足點是第一步；林穎佑從中國統一台灣的觀點出發，指出「近海防禦」的戰略構想可以有效覆蓋所有「近海」島嶼，如台灣、釣魚台列島、南沙群島，有利於統一祖國的使命。參伯納德·柯爾 2006，*海上長城－走向廿一世紀的中國海軍*，老戰友文化事業，桃園，304-305頁及林穎佑 2008，*海疆萬裡－中國人民解放軍海軍戰略*，時英出版社，臺北，29頁。

³⁷ 有指解放軍近海防禦區域只及第一島鏈亦是一個棕水區，但事實上，解放軍對於綠水的概念是相當模糊，而近海也不全然是從距離出發，反而是指作戰目標。無可否認，從逐島作戰走向在第一島鏈範圍內的縱深防禦來說，解放軍海軍戰略範圍已是向前邁向一大步。

³⁸ 萬文豪 2004，「中共海軍戰略演進之研究」，*國防雜誌*，台北，19卷，9期，9月1日，載全球防務網站：<http://www.defence.org.cn/article-13-67900.html>。

³⁹ 邱子軒 2008，*龍鷹共舞－中共與美國海事安全互動*，秀威資訊科技，台北，7-8頁。

⁴⁰ 鈕先鍾 1995，*西方戰略思想史*，麥田出版有限公司，臺北，418頁。

華清的海權思想亦有一大部分是受到高西柯夫影響⁴¹ (林穎佑 2008)。

早在 1970 年，當時任職海軍副參謀長的劉華清有感海軍與第六機械工業部聯合上報給中央的《關於海軍艦艇十年發展規劃的請示報告》「指導方針混亂、忽視長遠、急於求成，重生產、輕科研」，嚴重地與時代脫節，而沒有全盤的戰略考慮，故此就曾提出過《關於海軍裝備問題的匯報》⁴² (糜振玉 2005 年 3 月)。當中這份匯報提出的重點在於海軍在整頓裝備時要有全盤計畫，對中央的戰略要心中有數，按戰爭需要、任務需要來裝備、建設武器⁴³ (劉華清 2004)。1982 年，他受命以上將身份接任海軍司令員一職，經過一年多的親臨海軍前沿的考察，在 1983 年開始大力整頓了當時混亂而虛弱的海軍⁴⁴ (劉華清 2004)。到了 1985 年，他正式提出中國的海洋戰略問題。他認為「缺乏一個完整的海軍戰略」⁴⁵ (劉華清 2004) 一直是新中國海軍的最大問題，從劉華清的觀點中，他所說的前一章說「缺乏完整的海軍戰略」並不是指中國海軍沒有戰略思想，在毛澤東時代海軍的「近岸防禦」的確是海軍的作戰思想，但是在他看來，這是不足的。他認為一個完整的海軍戰略並不只是在敵人入侵時如何防禦，以及附從於陸軍。海軍應該有其獨立性、特殊性、有一個完整海洋觀及發展指導⁴⁶ (劉華清 2004)。他認為馬漢提出的海權思想和海軍戰略理論，為西方國家在對外擴張、實行海上霸權方面提供了有力的理論武器⁴⁷ (劉華清 2004)，而中國海軍要發展及有效保護自己的權益亦應發展出自己的海軍戰略思想，而且，發展海軍，鄧小平和劉華清有一個共識：海軍發展不僅依賴經濟實力，同時還需要一套完整的戰略思想作指導⁴⁸ (劉華清 2004)。為此，他先是在 1984 年提出了「積極防禦、近海作戰」的海軍作戰方針。到了 1985 年底，他正式提出了「近海防禦」的海軍戰略。

劉華清的新中國海軍戰略思想，可從兩方面來說明，一是「近海防禦」思想理念；二是他對新中國海軍未來的發展階段的藍圖。

首先是劉華清的「近海防禦」思想。上文已提過劉華清對於近海範圍的定義，故此處不再重述，從他的回憶錄中，可以看到他的海軍戰略主要內容，第一是新中國的海軍戰略是「近海防禦」。劉華清將各國的海軍戰略基本區分為遠洋進攻型、區域防禦型及沿岸防禦型，而「近海防禦」不是沿岸防禦，而是區域防禦型；其次，中國的海軍戰略性質是防禦性的；海軍的作戰區方面，在一個長時期主要是「第一島鏈」及沿該島鏈的外沿海區，以及島鏈以內的黃海、東海及南海海區。這一個區域劃分很大程度地建基於當時中國海軍的實力，以及中國與周邊國家有爭議的地方，特別是東海及南海，從此一點上很大程度反映了劉華清對於以海軍保護領海權益的想法，亦堅定地認為此兩個地區的主權是無可退讓的⁴⁹ (劉華清 2004)。

制定海軍戰略的目的是維護新中國國家統一和領土完備及海洋權益，應付海上局部戰爭，維護亞太地區和平；而海軍的戰略任務，可以區分為和平時期和戰爭時期兩個方面的任務。和平時期的任務是實現和維護包括台灣在內的領土國家統一、為國家外交政策服務、作為一支威懾力量遏止可能而來的侵略、應付海上局部戰爭及支援和參加「國

⁴¹ 林穎佑 2008, *海疆萬裡－中國人民解放軍海軍戰略*, 時英出版社, 臺北, 26 頁。

⁴² 糜振玉 2005, ‘當代海軍建設的開拓者－劉華清’, *國際展望*, 512 期, 3 月, 80-81 頁。

⁴³ 劉華清 2004, *劉華清回憶錄*, 解放軍出版社, 北京, 358-359 頁。

⁴⁴ 同上, 頁 417-432。

⁴⁵ 同上, 頁 432。

⁴⁶ 同上, 頁 433-435。

⁴⁷ 同上, 頁 433。

⁴⁸ 同上, 頁 436。

⁴⁹ 同上, 頁 437-438。

家社會主義建設」；而戰爭時期則要獨立作戰及協同陸、空軍作戰、保護海上交通及運輸線、及在統帥部指揮下參加核反擊作戰⁵⁰ (劉華清 2004)。

從以上可以看到，劉華清的海洋戰略方針十分著重於中國海上領土權益的保護，他特別提到了台灣統一的問題及多次提及中國的海上權益，而這是配合當時的國際環境的。因為南沙及南海主權正在在此時不斷地受到挑戰；其次，從他的思想中可以看出一部分受到高西柯夫影響的痕跡。高西柯夫為了大力推動蘇聯海軍的轉型及發展，曾多次論及海軍在和平時期的功用⁵¹ (高西柯夫，錢懷源、黃志潔譯 民國四十六(1957年))，例如，他認為西方國家海軍⁵²職責在不限於在戰鬥中執行使命，在平時亦是實施外交的重要力量，而「今天的帝國主義者正極力利用海軍這種特質」，對其他國家施加政治壓力⁵³ (高西柯夫，錢懷源、黃志潔譯 1957)。他認為蘇俄海軍則是「一種和平政策和民族友誼的工具」，而劉華清在其回憶錄上亦有類似的言語，如「遏止帝國主義、霸權來自海上的侵略，維護亞太地區和平」、「為國家外交政策服務」⁵⁴ (劉華清 2004)。此外是他對於海軍在和平時期及戰爭時期的劃分法，亦可以看到帶有高西柯夫的影子⁵⁵ (高西柯夫，錢懷源、黃志潔譯 1957)。

近年中外學者在研究劉華清的戰略思想時，都提出與這個思想內容配合的是其「三階段的海洋戰略」⁵⁶ (劉廣華 2001 年 10 月；伯納德·柯爾 2006；Goldman 1997)。而不少學者如伯納德·柯爾、Michael Mcdevitt 等都認為劉華清的三階段海洋戰略是有年限目標的。但綜觀其回憶錄，可以發現他本人雖然有一個大致的階段目標，實際上並沒有明確地提到。如果從他的回憶錄中看，劉華清的海軍發展階段藍圖實際上只有兩階段，亦即是回憶錄中提到的「海洋戰略」內容第三點有關作戰海區方面。從此劃分，首階段中國海軍的在一個長時期的作戰區域為「第一島鏈及沿該島鏈的外沿海區，以及島鏈以內的黃海、東海及南海海區。」在他認為，這一海區既包括了國際海洋法公約賦予中國管轄的全部海域，包括了南海諸島⁵⁷ (劉華清 2004)。而第二階段，則是隨著中國的經濟力量的強大和科技水平的提升，海軍力量的壯大，將其海軍的作戰區逐步擴大至太平洋北部達到第二島鏈。但是這又是否說明是要控制此一水域呢？劉華清提到：「海軍戰略的性質是防禦性的……就是將來海軍現代化了，海軍戰略的性質也不會改變。」⁵⁸ (劉華清 2004)

根據劉華清的戰略思想及其對海軍作戰區的階段藍圖，對中國海軍的建設產生了巨大影響。1987 年他卸任海軍司令員一職，轉任中央軍委第一副主席，更能支持海軍的裝

⁵⁰ 同上。

⁵¹ 高西柯夫，錢懷源、黃志潔譯 民國四十六年(1957)，*蘇俄海軍的崛起*，黎明文化事業出版，臺北。

⁵² 在他而言即帝國主義，原文稱之為帝國主義海軍。

⁵³ 高西柯夫，錢懷源、黃志潔譯 民國四十六年(1957)，「作為和平時期帝國主義工具的海軍」，*蘇俄海軍的崛起*，黎明文化事業出版，臺北，158 頁。

⁵⁴ 劉華清 2004，*劉華清回憶錄*，解放軍出版社，北京，437 頁。

⁵⁵ 高西柯夫，錢懷源、黃志潔譯 民國四十六年(1957)，「戰爭中與和平時期的海軍」，*蘇俄海軍的崛起*，黎明文化事業出版，臺北，7-20 頁。

⁵⁶ 西方及台灣學者持相似觀點的不計其數，例如伯納德·柯爾及 Michael Mcdevitt 均認為首階段目標為控制第一島鏈內的海域，其設定目標為 2000 年，而第二階段目標則是 2020 年時能控制「第二島鏈」水域，而最終第三階段是在 2050 年時建立一隻全球化海軍。參 Michael Mcdevitt，劉廣華譯 2001，「中共海軍將何去何從？」，*國防譯粹*，28 卷，10 期，10 月，14 頁及伯納德·柯爾 2006，*海上長城—走向廿一世紀的中國海軍*，老戰友文化事業，桃園，304-306 頁。其實持此論者，或多或少受到近年中國海軍發展的情況來作評估，參 Goldman, J.B.，林敏譯 1997，「西方眼中的中共馬漢—劉華清」，*亞太安全譯文彙集 2*，國防部史政編譯局，台北，224 頁。

⁵⁷ 劉華清 2004，*劉華清回憶錄*，解放軍出版社，北京，437 頁。

⁵⁸ 同上。

備提升發展，從此開始，中國海軍在第三、四代領導人時期，繼續在國家經濟急速發展的情況下，邁向現代化的海軍之路。

四）江澤民主政時代的海軍發展階段及海洋戰略規劃

1991 年至 2000 年是改革開放第二期，中國開始了江澤民主政時代。在江澤民主政初期，中國已實現了國家發展政策「三步走」的第一個目標，即在 1990 年時實現國民生產總值比 1980 年時翻一番，及解決人民的溫飽問題⁵⁹（中國共產黨全國代表大會歷年數據庫 1992）。

此一階段中國的綜合國力的增長是顯而易見的⁶⁰（吳東林 2010）。眾所周知，20 世紀最後十年中國的經濟發展迅速，中國在這十年的經濟成長率平均維持在 10.46%，進出口總額、國內生產總值及國民生產總值等方面成效愈趨穩定發展，為國防工業現代化的建設創造了有利的條件。與前一時期相比，江澤民時代國防經費比例佔國內生產總值平均值在 1.17%，而得益於國家的經濟發展，國防經費實際上繼續增長（詳參見圖表 3.2）。1993 年國防經費為 425.8 億，1995 年至 1997 年，中國年度國防費分別為 636.72 億元、720.06 億元和 812.57 億元人民幣⁶¹（中華人民共和國國務院新聞辦公室 2004），到 2002 年便高達 1707.78 億，增長了近 4 倍多⁶²（吳東林 2010）；但實際上，國防費佔同期國家財政支出的比例也在逐年下降⁶³（中華人民共和國國務院新聞辦公室 2004）（參圖 2）。而工業發展在國民生產總值中與其他產業比較仍然佔最大比例，在 2002 年時佔 39.4%⁶⁴（吳東林 2010）。國防事業與工業仍然是發展中，國防現代化繼續打穩根基。

在此時期另一重點是解放軍針對國際環境轉變，認為「和平發展」已是當今時代主題，於是在九十年代中期開始再一次進行裁軍，在 2000 年的《中國國防白皮書》上，中國發佈了自 1997 年後的裁軍政策及成果，從 1997 年至 2000 年三年內再裁軍 50 萬人⁶⁵（中華人民共和國國務院新聞辦公室 2004），報告亦指出解放軍總規模僅保持在 250 萬人，其中海軍精簡 11.4%。精簡架構意味著解放軍此時開始由著重士兵數量的「數量型」軍隊轉向為著重質素的「質量型」軍隊。而海軍本身是科技軍種，這種精簡政策實際上對海軍發展是有莫大效益。有些論者認為，解放軍海軍在不斷地裁減兵力數量，使海軍仍然是各兵力中最少的兵種，對於新時期的海權及海軍戰略的發展呈負相關趨勢，對於要再發展航空母艦是負面的（吳東林 2010）⁶⁶。但是，江澤民時代的中國實際上始

⁵⁹ 參 中國共產黨全國代表大會歷年數據庫 1992，江澤民在中國共產黨第十四次全國代表大會上的報告，《人民網》：<http://cpc.people.com.cn/BIG5/64162/64168/64567/65446/4526311.html>。檢視日期：2010 年 12 月 8 日。

⁶⁰ 例如 1991 年國內生產總值是 21,781.5 億，但到了 1994 年已達到 48,197.9 億，是前一時期的一倍，亦標誌了提早完成第二步的目標；到了 2000 年更高達 99,214.6 億，是 1978 年改革開放前的 27.2 倍。參 吳東林 2010，*中國海權與航空母艦*，時英出版社，台北，248 頁。

⁶¹ 中華人民共和國國務院新聞辦公室 2004，2002 年中國國防白皮書，載中國軍網 http://www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/database/2004-09/30/content_26804.htm。檢視日期，2010 年 12 月 8 日。

⁶² 吳東林 2010，*中國海權與航空母艦*，時英出版社，臺北，272 頁。

⁶³ 中華人民共和國國務院新聞辦公室 2004，2004 年中國國防白皮書，載中國軍網 http://www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/database/2004-12/27/content_97683.htm。檢視日期，2010 年 12 月 8 日。

⁶⁴ 吳東林 2010，*中國海權與航空母艦*，時英出版社，臺北，272 頁。

⁶⁵ 中華人民共和國國務院新聞辦公室 2004，2000 年中國國防白皮書，載中國軍網 http://www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/database/2004-09/30/content_26793.htm。檢視日期，2010 年 12 月 7 日。

⁶⁶ 如台灣軍方學者吳東林便認為，自 93 年起中國便不斷一直裁軍，即使是面對頻繁的南海衝突及 96 年台海危機後，仍然沒有增兵的打算，這種兵員額變化未應反映出軍事戰略需求。參 吳東林 2010，*中國*

終受到一定程度的限制。例如中國的國民生產總值雖然不斷上升，但在國家支出方面仍然是赤字，故此才要不斷縮減國防經費的比例；另一方面是中國海軍仍然是處於一個過渡階段：新舊武器並存、半現代化及新老軍事思維仍充斥著海軍。海軍發展需要繼續向現代化整軍打好基礎，推行「消腫政策」才能向新時代海軍的目標前進。故此階段繼續裁軍實是必須的。

裁軍政策除了是為了配合改革開放外，另一個重要的顯示便是江澤民時代國防戰略思想再一次的向前轉變。鄧小平時期的打贏「周邊地區的局部戰爭」方針，在江澤民時代則再一次發生改變。前面曾提到波斯灣戰爭給人們的帶來的啟示是精確制武器是戰爭勝負的關鍵，在觀察過波斯灣戰爭後，甚至有將領提出解放軍在當時是「短腿慢手」⁶⁷ (萬文豪 2004)。正是在這種思路下，1993 年「中央軍委擴大會議」中決定將國家戰略方針放在「打贏高技術條件下的局部戰爭」⁶⁸ (萬文豪 2004；謝茂松 2010)，當中江澤民也提過強調了解放軍應朝「科技強軍」之路發展。

江澤民時期的海軍戰略仍然是延續劉華清時期定下來的「近海防禦」戰略方針的發展，在海洋的全盤規劃上沒有太大的變化，而只是向著既定的目標繼續前進。但是要注意的是，就如上文提到這時期的經濟力量日益強大，解放軍海軍得到的資源亦日益豐厚，所以此時期最大的變化不是戰略思想上，而是裝備發展 (應天行 2011 年 3 月號)⁶⁹。如果說此期研發的旅大級仍然有反潛、防空及匿蹤能力不足的弱點，則這時期研發的一批新型的水面艦相對地比較強，並且火力上比前期大大提升。綜合而言，這時期製造的驅逐艦，作戰半徑大約都維持在 2,500 哩以上，而且具有早期預警、快速反應、即時判斷、集中指揮、分散控制等功能，戰鬥力比旅大級提高了不少；如「深圳號」的 4 座四聯裝鷹擊 82 飛彈反射器，八單元海紅旗 7 飛彈發射器（防空用）⁷⁰，並配備了較先進的直 9C 反潛直升機。從防禦火力來看，「深圳號」具有甚強的反艦與反飛彈能力，艦上配有先進武器及電子設備，艦上設有聲納、光學指揮儀等等，主要是為反潛艇而設，而艦上的雷達刻意減少桅杆上的電子感應器，艦身傾向以減少受敵人偵察而設計。這不能不說是中國自製艦的一個進步。但由於沒有近距離反潛火箭發射器及深水炸彈發射器，而反潛與防空戰力剛甚弱。而這又是此時期自製艦隻的一個特點⁷¹ (應天行 2011 年 3 月號)。

2009 年英國《詹氏防衛周刊》(Jane's Defence Weekly) 曾指出中國的海軍實力世界排行第四⁷² (世界新聞網，大陸新聞組 無日期)。其實說白了便是製造「中國威脅論」，由於不是本文的論述重點故不在此加以評論，但是中國軍力引起其他國家關注，甚至說中國軍力強大，很大程度建基於其海軍潛艦在九十年代開始的大力發展。水面艦隻實力在此時期與西方先進國家仍有一段距離，所以除了自行研發外，向俄國進口「現代級」

海權與航空母艦，時英出版社，台北，337 頁。

⁶⁷ 「短腿慢手」是一名中共將領檢視波斯灣戰爭後，首次以此一口頭禪形容共軍，比喻共軍缺乏作戰所需之運輸機具，而即使共軍抵達戰場後，亦因武器射程短而無力重擊敵人。參萬文豪 2004，「中共海軍戰略演進之研究」，*國防雜誌*，19 卷，9 期，9 月 1 日，台北，載自全球防務網站

<http://www.defence.org.cn/article-13-67900.html>。

⁶⁸ 同上，另參謝茂松 2010，*亢龍有悔——中共反介入戰略之研究*，高手專業出版社，臺北，40 頁。

⁶⁹ 例如，解放軍海軍在此時期參照外國技術，自行研發了多艘水面艦隻，計有：051B 型旅海級驅逐艦深圳號（排水量 7,400 噸）、052 型旅湖級驅逐艦（排水量 4,200 噸）、052B 型旅洋 I 級驅逐艦（排水量 7,500 噸）、052C 型旅洋 II 級驅逐艦（排水量 7,500 噸）。參應天行 2011，「從近年中國新艦研製看其海軍戰略之轉變」，*全球防衛雜誌*，237 期，3 月號，36 頁。

⁷⁰ 可同時攻擊三枚 8.5 公里內來襲的低飛反艦飛彈。

⁷¹ 應天行 2011，「從近年中國新艦研製看其海軍戰略之轉變(上)」，*全球防衛雜誌*，237 期，3 月號，36 頁。

⁷² 世界新聞網，大陸新聞組 2011，「世界軍力排名 中國第 4」，轉載網站：

http://www.worldjournal.com/pages/full_china/push?article%20世界軍力排名+中國第4&id=3592315世界軍力排名+中國第4&instance=chbull2，檢視日期：2011 年 2 月 12 日。

驅逐艦便是另一科技強軍的途徑⁷³(姜來根 1998)。而受「第一島鏈」的局限，水面艦隻難以衝出島鏈封鎖，所以這時期開始中國海軍加速了先進潛艦的研發。其標誌便是宋級潛艦的出現。在毛澤東及鄧小平時期，中國最先進的傳統動力潛艦便是 035 型明級，具魚雷發射管，可發射 16 枚魚雷或 32 枚水雷⁷⁴ (高睿 2007)，但是其綜合戰力不高，再加上機體老舊已不合現代戰爭需要。故此一方面中國向俄羅斯引進基洛級潛艦⁷⁵ (中華兵器大全 2010)，除了作為主力戰力外，更重要是為了研究其靜音性能及整體戰力，如何放到中國的新一代潛艦中。而同時，為了加強水下兵力及適應新的作戰環境，代號 039 的宋級潛艦於 1998 年正式下水，往後又參照了基洛級的技術而進行改裝⁷⁶(高睿 2007)。據說中國目前有 12-13 艘的宋級及其改良型潛艦，再加上在 2000 年前後購入了共 12 艘的基洛級潛艦⁷⁷(林穎佑 2008)，正是這批軍力形成了對東亞及東南亞各國的忌憚力量。

五) 胡錦濤時代的海軍發展階段及海洋戰略規劃

2002 年至 2010 年是改革開放的第三個階段，亦是中國共產黨第四代領導人主政時代⁷⁸(中國共產黨全國代表大會歷年數據庫 2007)。進入廿一世紀後，中國的綜合國力仍然呈高速增長的態勢(詳參表 6.1)，隨著經濟力量的擴大及收入的增加，國防開支亦有上升，從 1998 年到 2007 年國防費年平均增長 15.9%，同期 GDP 按當年價格計算年平均增長 12.5%，國家財政支出年平均增長 18.4%；而從 2008 至 2010 年的國家財政支出及國防費等數據來看(參圖 2)，國防費增幅則有所下降。而國費開支，主要是用於三個方面，其中之一正是「推進中國特色軍事變革。針對採購價格、維修成本不斷上漲勢頭，

⁷³ 現代級驅逐艦是目前中國在役驅逐艦中唯一一款向俄羅斯購入的驅逐艦，它採用了俄式裝備，配有 3M-80E 反艦導彈，能以超音速、掠海低飛的形式攻擊敵艦，是針對美國神盾系統而設計的。是目前中國海軍火力最強大的水面艦隻，而在防空能力上，現代級配有 Shil-1 對空導彈，可以擔負中距離防空能力，在反潛能力上，現代級擁有 533mm 口徑魚雷發射管，並有 2 具反潛火箭發射器及 Ka-27 反潛直升機，有充足的反潛能力。除了成為主要的水面戰力外，更重要的是透過技術轉移使中國獲得現代化的防空及反潛能力。參姜來根 1998，21 世紀海軍艦船，國防大學出版社，北京，111 頁。

⁷⁴ 高睿 2007，「明級(035)常規潛艇」，每日甘肅，6 月 16 日，[線上]，載於網站

<http://mil.gansudaily.com.cn/system/2007/06/16/010381917.shtml>。檢視日期：2010 年 11 月 7 日

⁷⁵ 武器:6 具 533 毫米魚雷發射管，配備 24 枚魚雷 俱樂部一 c”反艦導彈，其推進系統為 2 台柴電機組，一台推進電機和 1 台經航電機。功率 2940 千瓦(約 4000 馬力)，7 葉低噪音螺旋槳單軸推進。參中華兵器大全 2010，中國基洛 636M 型潛艇，1 月 18 日，[線上]，載中華兵器大全網站

<http://www.cnweapon.com/html/news/2010-01/news28731.html>。檢視日期：2011 年 2 月 12 日。

⁷⁶ 宋級全長 74.9 米、寬 8.4 米，排水量 1,700 噸(水上)及 2,250 噸(水下)，航速分別是 15 節(水上)及 22 節(水下)。武器為「鷹擊 82」(C801)反艦導彈，及 533 毫米魚雷管 6 具，可發射「魚-4」自導魚雷，備彈 18 枚。參高睿 2007，「宋級(039)潛艇」，每日甘肅，6 月 16 日，[線上]，轉載於網站：<http://mil.gansudaily.com.cn/system/2007/06/16/010381916.shtml>。檢視日期：2010 年 11 月 7 日。

⁷⁷ 基洛級又分為 877EKM 型基洛級及 636M 型基洛級，前者是華沙公約組織設計的外銷型，後者是專為俄軍設計的自用型，而以此型的靜音能力及整體戰力較佳。參 林穎佑 2008，海疆萬裡－中國人民解放軍海軍戰略，時英出版社，臺北，51 頁。

⁷⁸ 踏入改革開放的第三個十年，正如胡錦濤(1942-)在「十七大」中的報告指出：「農村綜合改革逐步深化，農業稅、牧業稅、特產稅全部取消，支農惠農政策不斷加強。國有資產管理體制、國有企業和金融、財稅、投資、價格、科技等領域改革取得重大進展，· · ·進出口總額大幅增加，實施“走出去”戰略邁出堅實步伐，開放型經濟進入新階段。」中國共產黨全國代表大會歷年數據庫 2007，胡錦濤在中國共產黨第十七次全國代表大會上的報告，[線上]，轉載自《人民網》：

<http://cpc.people.com.cn/BIG5/104019/104099/6429414.html>，檢視日期：2011 年 3 月 8 日。

適當增加高技術武器 裝備及其配套建設經費。」⁷⁹ (中華人民共和國國務院新聞辦公室 2011)。

從以上可以看到中國在進入 21 世紀及加入世貿後的經濟驚人增長，毫無疑問，以「軍隊服從整個國家大局」及「經濟為主，國防為從」的政策主軸仍然延續至現在。不過，基於中國國力的增長，以及 21 世紀科技的轉變，此時期中國的國防政策亦再一次出現隨時代轉變。踏入廿一世紀，世界各國都開始重視高科技的信息系統對軍事革命中所帶來的影響。故此第四代的領導集團亦適時調整了中國的國防戰略立足點。在 2004 年的中國國防白皮書中提到中國的國防目標中其中幾個重點是「制止分裂，促進統一」、「捍衛國家主權、領土完整和海洋權益」、「堅持國防建設與經濟建設協調發展的方針，建立符合中國國情和適應世界軍事發展趨勢的現代化國防」，文中特別提到「提高資訊化條件下的防衛作戰能力」⁸⁰ (中華人民共和國國務院新聞辦公室 2004)，到了 2006 年，《中國國防白皮書》中明確指出：

「依據國家安全和發展戰略的要求，中國制定了新時期積極防禦的軍事戰略方針。這一方針立足打贏資訊化條件下的局部戰爭……健全聯合作戰指揮體制、聯合訓練體制和聯合保障體制，優化力量結構，完善部隊編成，加快建立適應打贏資訊化條件下局部戰爭的作戰力量體系。⁸¹ (中華人民共和國國務院新聞辦公室 2009)」

從這一點標誌了中國的國防重點再一次緊貼時代轉變，如果配合 1997 年中國在國防計劃上軍隊建設中看胡錦濤時期的《中國國防白皮書》，可以看出當中的「三步走政策」已是定調⁸² (中華人民共和國國務院新聞辦公室 2008)，而縱觀這十年間的海軍建設，中國正逐步完成科技強軍及現代化建軍的目標。特別是在 2003 年「361 事件」⁸³ (林穎佑 2008) 後。解放軍海軍深切正視了新舊武器並存、半現代化及新老軍事思維等海軍中的問題。中國解放軍海軍在第三代領導人及第四代領導人執政之初，為了盡快拉近與外國的差距，其發展主要有三種，一是自行研製，例如宋級潛艦，而其改良型則參照基洛級特定技術；二是外購，如俄式的基洛級潛艦及現代級驅逐艦；三則是在透過外購軍艦進行逆向工程獲得先進技術，主要是在空軍及海軍航空兵的戰機，而很多時候，解放軍海軍也是在研發成功後只作小量生產作試驗，例如解放軍的核子潛艦，在整個九十年代

⁷⁹ 中華人民共和國國務院新聞辦公室 2011，2010 中國國防白皮書，[線上]，新浪新聞中心轉載，網址：http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2011-03-31/101922214879_7.shtml

⁸⁰ 中華人民共和國國務院新聞辦公室 2004，2004 年中國國防白皮書，[線上]，載中國軍網：http://www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/database/2004-12/27/content_97681.htm。檢視日期：2011 年 3 月 18 日。

⁸¹ 中華人民共和國國務院新聞辦公室 2009，2008 年中國國防白皮書，[線上]，載中國軍網：http://www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/database/2009-01/21/content_1627265.htm。檢視日期：2011 年 3 月 18 日。

⁸² 這三步走政策是推進國防和軍隊資訊化、統籌經濟建設和國防建設和深化國防和軍隊改革。其中的重點是 2010 年前打下堅實基礎，2020 年前基本實現機械化並使資訊化建設取得重大進展，21 世紀中葉基本實現國防和軍隊現代化的目標。爭取到 2020 年形成一整套既有中國特色又符合現代軍隊建設規律的科學的組織模式、制度安排和運作方式。參考中華人民共和國國務院新聞辦公室 2008，2008 年中國國防白皮書，[線上]，載中國軍網：http://www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/database/2009-01/21/content_1627265.htm。檢視日期：2011 年 3 月 18 日。

⁸³ 「361 事件」是指 2003 年，北海艦隊一艘番號 351 的明級潛艦因機械操作不當，造成全艦官兵 71 人罹難。這次意外暴露了解放軍現代化下的盲點，例如原訂滿載 57 人的明級潛艦卻有 70 人喪生，而潛艦失蹤後北海艦隊居然沒有詳查，日後是由解放軍空軍當作不明國籍潛艦來處理。事後海軍司令員石雲生及政委楊懷慶遭撤職查辦，由軍事科學院院長張定發接任海軍司令一職。參 林穎佑 2008，海疆萬裡－中國人民解放軍海軍戰略，時英出版社，臺北，86-87 頁。

一直只有 6 艘，就是 80 年代研製的 5 艘漢級及 1 艘夏級潛艦，所以，在此時期解放軍海軍內部一直充斥著很多來自不同國家的軍事技術，這種情況可以說是屬於過渡型的海軍，而且，由於要不斷參照外國技術應用在自身各部分系統上，使解放軍軍事工業又進入「再過渡」的階段，形成「永遠過渡」的解放軍軍事工業⁸⁴ (林穎佑 2008)。

不過從 2000 年到現在這十年間，很多新型的現代化大型艦艇加入海軍當中，這些艦艇都具有以下特點：電子信息化程度高、火力強、具有遠洋性能，排水量愈來愈大、重量輕、體積小兼具匿蹤性能等。而以往解放軍很多時候仰賴外國，特別是俄國的情況，隨著一些技術轉移協定的簽署及引進了俄羅斯現代級驅逐艦及基洛級潛艦後，自身的研發技術開始提升，並且有質量上的躍進⁸⁵ (應天行 2011 年 3 月號)；值得重視的是第三代護衛艦的設計。如 054 型江凱 I 級護衛艦，與前期中國的護衛艦比較絕對是一大躍進，其優點在於整體外觀簡潔而整體，擺脫了從前江湖級、江衛級上層結構零散低矮的印象，亦符合歐洲國家的先進設計，有效減低了被雷達偵探到的可能；煙囪亦有紅外線抑制裝置，減低被紅外線探測到的可能，內凹的船體亦有助於遠洋航行⁸⁶ (應天行 2011 年 3 月號)；054A 型江凱 II 級則是中國最新型的護衛艦，它是第一型遠洋多用途飛彈護衛艦，054A 型在 054 型的基礎更進一步它參考了其他國家的設計模式，改進了 054 型的隱身能力⁸⁷ (應天行 2011 年 3 月號)。從總體上看，它的設計是追求防空、反潛、反艦三方面的平衡，事實上，它已達到國際海軍現役飛彈驅逐艦的標準，所以中國自完成 052C 型驅逐艦後，開始暫停研發驅逐艦，改而大力生產護衛艦，而 054A 型江凱 II 級在有 5 艘服役的情況下仍然持續生產，一反過去解放軍海軍小批生產試驗的傳統，極有可能成為未來中國海軍的主力護衛艦及航母編隊中的主力艦。

眾多的大型新艦艇的加入，意味中國海軍在戰略定位上正在向遠洋艦隊方向進發。如果在江澤民時代因為實力不足的情況下，仍然只求維持在「第一島鏈」海域範圍內的權益，與及透過使用潛艦作為威懾力量的話，那胡錦濤時代的中國海軍正開始走向一種新的戰略階段。劉華清在 1986 年制定海軍戰略時便已提到，隨著中國經濟力量和科學技術的加強，中國海軍的作戰區域將逐步擴大到「第二島鏈」⁸⁸ (劉華清 2004)。而從

⁸⁴ 林穎佑 2008，*海疆萬裡－中國人民解放軍海軍戰略*，時英出版社，臺北，58 頁。

⁸⁵ 例如 051C 旅州級，因為艦上使用了俄製的「RIF-M (S-300F/SA-N-6) 艦空導彈垂直發射系統」等等先進防空武器。外界便稱之為「中華俄式神盾」。現時有兩艘，分別是瀋陽號及石家莊號，在 06 年通過海試，現時已服役。由於是中國現時最新的服役艦，故 09 年在中國的多國海軍檢閱活動中，高度獲得重視。參應天行 2011，「從近年中國新艦研製看其海軍戰略之轉變」，*全球防衛雜誌*，237 期，3 月號，38-39 頁。052C 旅洋 II 級飛彈驅逐艦亦有與 051C 旅州級類似的防空裝置，稱為「海紅旗」HQ9 防空飛機彈系統，類似於上述俄系系統，但由於是中國自行研發，因此被稱為「中華神盾」。現時有兩艘，分別是蘭州號及海口號同在 05 年服役。參應天行 2011，「從近年中國新艦研製看其海軍戰略之轉變」，*全球防衛雜誌*，237 期，3 月號，36 頁。另外 052B 型旅洋 I 級驅逐艦具有更優勝的多用途功能。除了一般的反潛功能外，艦上亦配備了 Ka-28 反潛直升機，加強了反潛能力；另又有最先進的聲納系統及反魚雷武器，能有效反擊潛艇同時，艦上亦配有一門自動艦炮，能有效打擊對艦導彈；同時亦備有近程防空武器，其防空炮火亦較以往的先進、有效，現時有兩艘，分別是廣州號武漢號，同樣是在 04 年服役。參應天行 2011，「從近年中國新艦研製看其海軍戰略之轉變」，*全球防衛雜誌*，237 期，3 月號，34-35 頁。

⁸⁶ 現時有兩艘，分別是馬鞍山號及溫州號，05 年皆在東海艦隊服役。參應天行 2011，「從近年中國新艦研製看其海軍戰略之轉變」，*全球防衛雜誌*，237 期，3 月號，75-76 頁。

⁸⁷ 在火力方面，054A 型加入了 32 枚紅旗 HQ16 艦對空飛彈垂直發射系統，擁有了中程防空能力。其 76 毫米主炮射程、射速比以往的更為強大；在反潛能力上，亦沿襲了前代的性能，並在反潛導彈上有所加強。而更重要的是其作戰指管通情系統 (C31)，能將艦上各個子系統綜合為一個有機體，具有非常高的可靠性、抗損性與抗干擾性。該型號艦種現時有 5 艘，分別是東海艦隊的徐州號及舟山號、南海艦隊的巢湖號、玉溪號和黃山號。5 艦最遲在 2008 年已全部服役。參應天行 2011，「從近年中國新艦研製看其海軍戰略之轉變」，*全球防衛雜誌*，238 期，3 月號，79 頁。

⁸⁸ 劉華清 2004，*劉華清回憶錄*，解放軍出版社，北京，437 頁。

上文的種種數據可以看到，現在正是劉華清、鄧小平一代人預想的那個突破島鏈的時代。事實上，中國對於衝破「第一島鏈」已經不再有所顧忌。如果說九十年代還只能靠潛艦從水下突穿第一島鏈的話，則中國近年透過與各國不同的海軍演習、以及 2008 年起前往索馬里護航等事已可說明，中國已具備控制第一島鏈範圍的及突破此範圍的自信與能力。踏入 2000 年後，中國的突穿島鏈行動除了傳統上仍用潛艦水下突穿外，主要是透過聯合軍演、出訪其他國家與及派護航艦隊往亞丁灣三種途徑。其中在島鏈內的軍演可說是相當頻密，例如 2003 年與巴基斯坦軍艦進行首次的聯合軍演⁸⁹（環球時報 2003）、同年與印度的首次海上聯合演習⁹⁰（BBC 新聞網中文版 2003）、接著是 2004 年與法、英、澳大利亞等國在黃海的演習等⁹¹（中國國防報 2004），不過要說真正的突穿島鏈演習，最新一次可以說是 2010 年 4 月東海艦隊由 10 艘艦艇組成的編隊，從東海出發穿越沖繩群島進行反潛演習⁹²（東方軍事網 2010）。這種演習毫無疑問總是有點挑戰美日圍堵中國海權的意味，但同時亦代表了中國海軍的實力正具備了亦完成了鞏固「第一島鏈」內的海上利益。此外，自 1985 年中國首次派出海軍出訪南亞三國後⁹³（錢曉虎、查春明 2009 年 1 月），除了一些國際危機如 1998 年美國敵炸中國大使館、新中國幾乎每年均會派出海軍遠航訪問，2001 年之後中國艦艇出訪與外國來訪艦艇次數大增，其中有幾次是遠赴歐美的採訪及在亞洲的聯合軍演，包括 2001 年同時四支編隊出航隊⁹⁴（錢曉虎、查春明 2009 年 1 月）、2002 年「青島號」與「太倉號」環球航行（錢曉虎、查春明 2009 年 1 月）⁹⁵、2006 年「青島號」和「洪澤湖號」訪問美國、加拿大、菲律賓，並首次與美海軍進行海上聯合搜救演習等（錢曉虎、查春明 2009 年 1 月）⁹⁶。總計 2001-2011 年 3 月間中國海軍的遠航行動便多達 37 次⁹⁷（蘇冠群 2011 年 4 月號），代表了中國海軍現時的戰略取向是利用海軍作為其「藍色外交」的工具⁹⁸（蘇冠群 2011 年 4 月號），說其是中國式的炮艦外交也不為過。亦因如此，新中國海軍在第四代領導層執政時期，正開始了走向遠洋的第二階段戰略。

⁸⁹ 環球時報 2003，「演習不針對第三方 中巴首次海上軍演很成功」，10 月 24 日，轉載自《人民網》：<http://www.people.com.cn/BIG5/junshi/2154472.html>，檢視日期：2011 年 4 月 12 日。

⁹⁰ BBC 新聞網中文版 2003，「中國印度海軍將首次聯演」，11 月 3 日，載 http://news.bbc.co.uk/chinese/trad/hi/newsid_3230000/newsid_3238300/3238383.stm，檢視日期：2011 年 4 月 12 日。

⁹¹ 中國國防報 2004，「黃海：中國海軍與法、英、澳海軍連番軍演」，12 月 28 日，[線上]，載《中國互聯網新聞中心》<http://big5.china.com.cn/chinese/2004/Dec/740994.html>。檢視日期：2011 年 4 月 12 日。

⁹² 東方軍事網 2010，「美國智庫稱中國海軍遠端海空協同作戰能力成熟」，5 月 1 日，[線上]，載 <http://big5.eastday.com:82/gate/big5/mil.eastday.com/m/20100501/u1a5180499.html>。檢視日期：2011 年 4 月 12 日。

⁹³ 此三國為巴基斯坦、斯里蘭卡、孟加拉。參錢曉虎、查春明 2009，「南亞三國，走出國門第一步」，*走向深藍的航跡—新中國海軍艦艇歷次遠洋出訪紀實*，解放軍出版社，北京，1 月，2-17 頁。

⁹⁴ 這四支船隊分別是：2010 年 5 月 2-6 月 14 日，哈爾濱號驅逐艦與太倉號綜合補給艦組成編隊訪問巴基斯坦及印度；8 月 23 日-11 月 6 日深圳號驅逐艦和豐倉號補給船還赤道航線；9 月 16 日-10 月 30 日宜昌號護衛艦和太倉號綜合補給艦訪問澳大利亞及新西蘭；及 11 月 10-26 日玉林號護衛艦訪問越南。詳參 錢曉虎、查春明 2009，「世紀首航，四支編隊同時出征」，*走向深藍的航跡—新中國海軍艦艇歷次遠洋出訪紀實*，138-172 頁。

⁹⁵ 這次航行跨越印度洋、大西洋、太平洋及亞、非、歐、南美、及大洋洲五大洲，訪問了當中的十國十港。參 錢曉虎、查春明 2009，「環球航行，千年夢想今朝成真」，*走向深藍的航跡—新中國海軍艦艇歷次遠洋出訪紀實*，解放軍出版社，北京，1 月，186-289 頁。

⁹⁶ 錢曉虎、查春明 2009，「環球航行，千年夢想今朝成真」，*走向深藍的航跡—新中國海軍艦艇歷次遠洋出訪紀實*，解放軍出版社，北京，1 月，321-365 頁。

⁹⁷ 這些行動包括了自 08 年開始的亞丁灣護航。參 蘇冠群 2011，「別有用心？解放軍海軍艦砲外交」，*全球防衛雜誌*，238 期，4 月號，71 頁。

⁹⁸ 蘇冠群 2011，「別有用心？解放軍海軍艦砲外交」，*全球防衛雜誌*，238 期，4 月號，72 頁。

六) 新時期解放軍海軍的戰略特點

整個新時期中國最大的成就便是其經濟發展。而作為戰略技術軍種的海軍，得益於新時期突飛猛進的經濟實力使海軍的力量獲得很大的躍進。如果綜合新時期三十年來海軍的發展，可以歸納出此時期與毛澤東時代十分不同的戰略特點。

首先，從整個海軍的戰略發展取向，是服從於中國的總體戰略之下，而中國在此時期的總體戰略便是發展經濟。中國「經濟為主、國防為從」的大戰略最終成果便是中國經濟力量急速躍升，所取得的龐大收益使他有更大的資金及外交後盾（星島日報 2010）⁹⁹來建設其國防力量。而反過來說，從劉華清提出新中國的「海軍戰略」理論此三十年間，中國海軍發展都是依從此「經濟為主、國防為從」理論，發展海軍其中一個目的便是保護國家的海洋及領土權益。而劉氏近海防禦的海權觀念，正是除了軍事戰略角度外，亦考量經濟戰略的利益。從再深一層次去看，他所指出的「海軍戰略的目的是為了維護領土完備及海洋權益」，而這個海洋權益，除了是海洋領土資源外，還有海上交通線及運輸線。今天的中國除了人們常提到有三百萬平方公里的海洋領土及 18,000 多公里的海岸線，更重要的，是他的海上龍脈—能源通道。由於中國經濟發展使其能源需求愈來愈大，推動了中國海軍更迫切的現代化¹⁰⁰（伯納德·科爾，牛志譯 2007），另外，中國的海洋利潤愈來愈豐厚¹⁰¹（蘇冠群 2011 年 4 月號）。所以，中國的近海防禦戰略，其概念亦包括了海上「生命線」，亦即是其交通線的安全。而正正是為了保護經濟發展，從側面而言是體現了中國的「經濟為主、國防為從」的思想。

其次，中國海軍自「近海防禦」戰略提出的開始，正按步就班地向「衝出島鏈」的目標發展。劉華清提出的要控制第一島鏈內水域範圍，對於現時的中國解放軍海軍實力已經不是一件難事。但是控制第一島鏈內的水域這個方針，其實還是有其側重點的。而其戰略重心便是在南海。新中國海軍是分為北海、東海、南海三支艦隊，各有防區亦各有任務定位。北海艦隊駐地在山東青島，而此處正是扼守京津海上門戶的重要據點。一百年前，李鴻章建立的北洋水師選擇在遼東的旅順、大連及山東的威海作為北洋基地，提出的思想便是：「一旦有警，則以鐵甲及大兵輪船分排橫垣於旅順、北隍城島之間扼截敵船，不使北上。即有一二闖越者，彼接濟既斷，又懼我師之襲其後，心孤意怯，份且速退。如此則大沽、北塘不守之固。燕齊遼碣之間，周圍洋面數場裡竟成內海，化門戶為堂奧，莫善於此。」¹⁰²（張俠 楊志本等編 2001）以及「將來可漸拓遠島為藩籬，化門戶為堂奧，北洋三省皆在捍衛之中。」¹⁰³（吳汝綸 1984）北海艦隊與當年北洋海軍的基本任務是相同，都是有保衛京師門戶的重責。同時，北海艦隊本身配備了兩艘 051C 驅逐艦、及兩艘 052 驅逐艦，此外還有多艘潛艦。不過，由於蘇聯解體後，中國北方的壓力大減，反而東、南海問題日益嚴峻，於是北海艦隊現時主要是一個防守態勢，而在全艦戰略計劃中最大的功用便是提供核子戰略嚇阻，因為現時中國的 091 夏級彈道導彈核

⁹⁹ 今時今日，沒有一個國家能忽視中國的潛在發展力，而且西方國家在華投資額往往是天文數字。很多時候，中國與外國，特別是美日間的對奕中，除了日益強大的海軍外，能夠運用的便是經濟牌。例如去年中日撞船事件後，日本最終肯釋放中國船長，原因便在於日本受壓於中國日益升級的制裁行動、包括經濟制裁及限制稀土出口。參 星島日報 2010，「評論指日方受壓決定釋放船長」，9 月 24 日，[線上]，載 <http://www.singtao.com/breakingnews/20100924a171432.asp>。檢視日期：2011 年 4 月 14 日。

¹⁰⁰ 伯納德·科爾，牛志譯 2007，「龍脈——中國海軍現代化與能源安全」，*艦載武器*，第 11 期，13 頁。

¹⁰¹ 單計 2009 年，中國海上獲利就高達 8000 億美元。參蘇冠群 2011，「別有用心？解放軍海軍艦砲外交」，*全球防衛雜誌*，238 期，4 月號，66 頁。

¹⁰² 張俠，楊志本等編 2001，*清末海軍史料*，海洋出版社，北京。

¹⁰³ 吳汝綸 1984，*李文忠公（鴻章）全集第二冊*，奏稿卷三十九，文海出版社，臺北，1229 頁。

潛艦及 092 的 5 艘漢級核子動力潛艦均部署在北海艦隊¹⁰⁴ (LIVEDOOR WIKI 2011)。人們要看的反而是東海與南海方面的情况。

上文不斷提出的控制島鏈內海域範圍，重點還要看東海及南海兩艦隊的分別。今天的東海艦隊最大的任務有兩個：一是維持東海的海洋權益；另一個便是應付可能出現的台海戰爭或是作為武力攻台的主力。但前一任務的主要對手是日本、後一任務的對手是台灣，而兩個國家背後，真正的潛在敵人卻是美國。而解放軍海軍現時由於與美國的實力仍有很多距離¹⁰⁵，所以儘管與日本在東海問題及釣魚台的問題上的紛爭無日無之，但仍然沒有輕言動用武力，而儘量從外交途徑及經濟方式解決。可以說，其東海的戰略態勢仍是一個守勢。相反，南海的狀況則遠遠不同，近年中國海軍在南海的經營部署相當積極。例如 2010 年 7 月三大艦隊在南海舉行聯合作戰軍演¹⁰⁶ (大公報 2010)，同年 9 月，解放軍海軍將新型的商級核動力潛艦部署在南海艦隊的前沿基地海南島的三亞基地¹⁰⁷ (文匯報 2010) 等事，反映出解放軍海軍將戰略重心向南發展的決心。事實上，上文一直提到中國的近海防禦戰略是為了保護其海上權益，而這是包含於交通線在內的。1996 年台海危機後，中國發現印度洋—南中國海航線是美軍派航空母艦前往台海的要道之一，也是日本的經濟及石油管道命脈¹⁰⁸ (林穎佑 2008)，而上文亦提過，這裡同時亦是中國的能源龍脈，馬六甲海峽、龍目海峽、巽他海峽是進入印度洋海上交通線的必經路線，特別是馬六甲海峽，他是中國最重要的國際貿易路線，亦是中東原油進入中國的重要航道¹⁰⁹ (伯納德·柯爾 2006) (參圖 3)；更重要的是東南亞國家對於中國有龐大的商業利益，馬來西亞、印尼、菲律賓、柬埔寨、越南等國每年向中國的進口大量日用品、電子產品及出口大量商品，以 2005 年為例，中國與東南亞國家場的總貿易額易高達 1,300 億美元¹¹⁰ (喬·瓦納，漢興 2008)。在這些國家中間的商業航道不能不加以保護，再加上南沙群島與南海主權利益，在軍隊服從經濟的戰略思想下，中國對南海的投入遠比其餘兩海積極。值得指出的是，南海艦隊是目前三大艦隊中，驅逐艦及護衛艦最多的¹¹¹ (喬·瓦納，漢興 2008)，所以亦有人認為，中國修復後的瓦良格號航空母艦，亦很大機會完工後部署在此。

最後一點是中國此時期的「海軍外交」。上一節曾詳述了在胡錦濤時期，新中國海軍對外的遠洋任務是十分頻繁。現時中國由於沒有嚴重的戰爭威脅，再加上「和平崛起」的方針下，中國基本上是不會輕易發動戰爭的。但是一支軍隊是需要維持其戰鬥意識，特別是海軍這種軍種，在海洋千變萬化的環境中更需要熟習每一個海域情况。既然中國不像美軍一樣每五至八年便會發動一次軍事行動「練兵」，那出訪其他國家及與他國進行聯合演習便是唯一一個可行的途徑。此外，中國的頻繁出海從深入一點來看還是有其

¹⁰⁴ LIVEDOOR WIKI 2011，「日本周邊國的軍事武器」，載於網址：

<http://wiki.livedoor.jp/namacha2/d/FrontPage>。檢視日期：2011 年 1 月 18 日。

¹⁰⁵ 這些距離不只是艦艇上的實力不足，另一些問題是中國軍隊的信息化仍遠不及美國，及海軍航空兵飛機的作戰半徑不足問題。

¹⁰⁶ 大公報 2010，「南海艦隊演練 射 16 型 71 枚導彈」，7 月 31 日，載

<http://www.takungpao.com.hk/news/10/07/31/junshi08-1291389.htm>，檢視日期：2010 年 9 月 18 日。

及大公報 2010，「三大艦隊南海聯合作戰軍演」，7 月 30 日，載

<http://www.takungpao.com.hk/news/10/07/30/junshi01-1290727.htm>，檢視日期：2010 年 9 月 18 日。

¹⁰⁷ 文匯報 2010，「日稱三亞將成中國航母戰略要地」，10 月 22 日，載文匯網：

<http://news.wenweipo.com/2010/10/22/IN1010220005.htm>，檢視日期：2011 年 1 月 18 日。

¹⁰⁸ 林穎佑 2008，*海疆萬裡—中國人民解放軍海軍戰略*，時英出版社，臺北，144 頁。

¹⁰⁹ 伯納德·柯爾 2006，*海上長城—走向廿一世紀的中國海軍*，老戰友文化事業，桃園，104 頁。

¹¹⁰ 喬·瓦納，漢興 2008，「中國海軍：向東還是向南」，*艦載武器*，2008，11 期，20 頁。

¹¹¹ 同上。

戰略意義。除了要以「藍色外交」宣示國威外，吸取外國海軍的經驗外，更重要的是在可能的情况下，達成與周邊國家的友好，美、台等國認為中國正在南亞國家中建立「珍珠鏈戰略」(圖4)，以保護上述海上運輸線的安全，對此，中國方面一些學者已提出否定，但是，從中國近來的外交部署與及對應美國在東南亞對中國的圍堵，所謂的「珍珠鏈」其實亦是中國抗衡美國在東南亞的部署的一條出路。例如，2001-2011年中，就有4年是訪問巴基斯坦，是眾多出訪國家之冠。巴基斯坦是中國在南亞中一個重要的戰略伙伴，特別是制衡印度的事上。而巴基斯坦可說是所謂的「珍珠鏈戰略」中重點國家，2008年中巴兩國已簽訂協議，中國將協助巴基斯坦興建瓜達爾港及監聽站¹¹² (謝茂松, 2010)；另外斯里蘭卡、緬甸等國亦有類似的合作¹¹³ (謝茂松 2010)，如斯里蘭卡的漢巴特托港、緬甸的實兌基地等。2010年中國海軍亦有利用護航艦隊回程之時訪問這兩國¹¹⁴ (蘇冠群 2011年4月號)。由此可見，中國海軍的頻頻出訪，從戰略發展的角度來看，是有其重大效益的。在未來一段長時間裡，中國政府可能將繼續運用海軍作為和平發展的政治工具，向外國宣示中國海權之餘，亦繼續延續其外交大使。中國海軍未來的發展將會繼續這種政治意義。

七) 現時中國與主要對手的戰略互動及其整體評價

前文主要從大戰略角度大致論述新中國在新時期經濟發展間，他的海軍戰略如何隨著國家情勢及國際形勢產生轉變。接下來還有一些影響大戰略的重點軍事戰略問題需要再作一下補充。由於篇幅所限及已非文章主體部分，故此對於論述的問題只會作一概括性分析。

航空母艦問題

劉華清在海軍司令員時代，早就認為一個擁有300多萬平方公里「海洋國土」的中國，隨著海洋事業及海上經濟的發展，單靠中小型艦艇去守海護航實在捉襟見肘¹¹⁵ (劉華清 2004)，事實亦都證明，要維護中國，特別是南海方面的利益航母是必需的。早在1974年的西沙自衛反擊戰中，海軍航空兵第六師殲擊部隊不敢從海南島飛往482公里外的西沙群島與美軍航空兵接戰，原因在於其「腳短」問題¹¹⁶ (鍾堅 2003年7月)，甚至當越軍退到南沙群島發展，海航兵竟束手無策，為了解決中國海航兵戰機作戰半徑不足，當時的中國領導層除了在西沙永興島興建機場及1994年開始研制出空中加油機外¹¹⁷ (劉華清 2004)，就是加速航母的研究工作。只是八十年代至九十年代，中國的經濟力量仍然不足以去應付航空母艦的興建。台灣學者吳東林曾以經濟學角度入手，分析過中國在鄧小平時期與江澤民時期的航空母艦建造問題。他指出，在鄧小平時期，中國的發展重心是以經濟建設為主，而即使當時中國體認到要發展航空母艦，但是中國的財力與技

¹¹² 謝茂松 2010, *亢龍有悔—中共反介入戰略之研究*, 高手專業出版社, 129頁。

¹¹³ 同上, 頁128。

¹¹⁴ 蘇冠群 2011, '別有用心?解放軍海軍艦砲外交', *全球防衛雜誌*, 238期, 4月號, 71頁。

¹¹⁵ 劉華清 2004, *劉華清回憶錄*, 解放軍出版社, 北京, 478頁。

¹¹⁶ 鍾堅 2003, '突圍: 中共建構航艦之研析', *尖端科技軍事雜誌*, 227期, 7月, 6頁。

¹¹⁷ 劉華清 2004, *劉華清回憶錄*, 解放軍出版社, 北京, 542-544頁。

術卻限制其航空母艦發展，故在鄧小平時代，航母問題只能止於論證階段¹¹⁸（吳東林 2010）；到了江澤民時代雖然是經濟發展最迅速的時期，但是財力資源及技術仍然限制了發展航母¹¹⁹（吳東林 2010）。不過此時期已開始了技術上的探索，例如八十年代開始，中國先後利用有軍方背景的公司，買了四艘退役的航空母艦回來研究（林穎佑 2008）¹²⁰。

對中國來說，航空母艦的興建與其他軍種建設很不同。第一，它不像驅逐艦般單完成一首船便可以具備戰鬥力，而是要其他艦種造成護航戰鬥群，否則它只是一艘巨大的海上鋼鐵棺材；第二，航空母艦的最大攻擊力在於其艦載機，而中國的海軍航空兵艦機一向力弱及沒有資源¹²¹（伯納德·柯爾 2006），要發展航空母艦就要同時改革海軍航空兵的技術。同時，即使航母上的甲板有多長，對戰機起飛來說仍是一個屬於短程。故此而解放軍海軍既缺乏亦無法取得美軍所用的蒸汽彈射技術，故此只能另辟途徑，而滑跳甲板在現時成為了唯一可行途徑¹²²（林穎佑 2008）；第三，由於航母是屬於大噸位海軍艦種，所以在鋼材技術、以及發動機技術等都要特別處理。一直說中國的技術限制就在於前，特別是鋼材物料上。而發動機現時仍是仰賴俄羅斯及烏克蘭進口的發動機，中國的自製發動機技術仍然有待突破。

既然中國製造航母要解決的問題這麼多，那是否有必要繼續開發？一些反對擁有航母人士的觀點認為，在現代新軍事事務革命下，現代海上戰場決勝關鍵是 C4ISR 系統構成的網狀化作戰（解放軍稱為網絡中心戰），而航母現時任務反而多數是對地攻擊的支援。而如果解放軍空軍已取得空中加油機，則中國的陸基航空兵的作戰半徑大增的情況下，基本可以取代航母的地位，協助解放軍海軍控制海洋空域。

但是，從劉華清，甚至隨後的海軍司令員石雲生對海軍的發展規劃藍圖來看，解放軍海軍最終要將戰略控制區域發展至「第二島鏈」的話，是不能沒有航空母艦的。首先，第二島鏈的中心關島本身是美國太平洋海軍艦隊的基地。長遠來說，解放軍海軍如果在此地區與美軍衝突，他們要面對的，便是美軍的航艦戰鬥群。而另一方面，由於中國並沒有放棄武力收復台灣的立場。而現時台海的制空、制海權已轉移至台灣東岸、中央山脈以西的地區。因為台灣海空軍的主要大型基地都在此¹²³（KDR 編輯部 2011 年 1 月號），而美軍是否會介入是一個不可預料的問題，在戰爭期間的高頻率出動下，空中加油機是否真的足以完全支援陸基空軍？答案是顯然的。故此，發展航空母艦戰鬥力有助於中國未來在西太平洋爭取戰略主導，而對戰局亦有深遠影響。

¹¹⁸ 吳東林 2010，*中國海權與航空母艦*，時英出版社，臺北，210 頁。

¹¹⁹ 同上，338 頁。

¹²⁰ 此四艘分別為澳洲海軍的墨爾本號、前蘇聯的明斯克號及基輔號，以及烏克蘭從蘇聯手上接收過來的瓦良格號。墨爾本號因是二戰時代的產物，故在研究後 1985 年拆成廢鐵。明斯克號及基輔號後來則在研究後成為了公園。至於瓦良格號本文在往後還要說明。參林穎佑 2008，*海疆萬裡－中國人民解放軍海軍戰略*，時英出版社，臺北，104-110 頁。

¹²¹ 因為資源很多時都配給了空軍，最明顯是當中國空軍已經取得第三代的 su27、su30 及開發了殲 10 時，2000 年海軍航空兵仍然是舊式的殲 6、殲 7、殲 8 及強 5 攻擊機，參伯納德·柯爾 2006，*海上長城－走向廿一世紀的中國海軍*，老戰友文化事業，桃園，192 頁。不過這種情況近年終於有改善，海航兵終於能裝備殲 10，甚至其改良型作為海航兵主力。

¹²² 美軍的目前使用的 c-13-1 蒸汽彈射機可幫助 7 萬磅的 F14 在航母上起飛，而世上亦只有美國可以作出此種彈射技術。法國海軍的戴高樂號航母上的蒸汽彈射機亦是向美國買的；而滑跳甲板則是為了沒有彈射機的情況下，利用航艦上向前突起的飛行甲板角度來達到短場起飛的目的，要利用這種技術，除了要計算甲板角度外，同時亦要加大艦載機的推力和翼面積的比例，俄羅斯的庫茲涅佐夫上將級航母就是以此技術來讓米格 29K 起飛。參林穎佑 2008，*海疆萬裡－中國人民解放軍海軍戰略*，時英出版社，臺北，113-114 頁。

¹²³ KDR 編輯部 2011，「台海制空、制海權轉移到東岸」，*漢和防務評論*，75 期，1 月號，53 頁。

而事實上，中國在研發航母的工作上，在本世紀第一個十年過去後已取得了一定進展。這得益於「瓦良格號」的來華。很多分析家在中國購買「瓦良格號」之初，都認為它不會被修復，這是由於它本身只完成了 70%，而在交付中國時，有傳它的推動系統都被破壞，故此即使修復了也只是供中國研究製艦技術及如何研發國產航艦（伯納德·柯爾 2006；KDR 編輯部 2011 年 1 月號）¹²⁴，但十年過去後，直至 2011 年四月，當時的證據已顯示瓦艦已完全修復，所有艙室、發電設備、動力艙及動力系統已還原¹²⁵（KDR 編輯部 2011 年 1 月號），而武器裝備如 FL-3000N 飛彈系統及 730 型近迫防禦炮、及更重要的是陣列雷達、衛星通訊天線及 C31 資料鏈天線¹²⁶（蘇冠群 2011 年 3 月號）亦已上艦。顯示瓦艦正式下水海試的日子已不遠，而最終瓦良格號亦於 2011 年 8 月 10 日首次試航¹²⁷（中國評論新聞網 2011），並且在 11 月底至 12 月初進行第二次試航¹²⁸（鳳凰衛視 2011），隨後在返學不足兩星期於 12 月 20 日進行第三次試航¹²⁹（中國電信新聞中心 2011）。種種跡象顯示，由於瓦艦是中國第一艘航母，無疑它是具有很高的實驗成份。按照慣例，改造完成的“瓦良格”號將成為大連艦艇學院的訓練艦，故外界推斷老仍是主要作為訓練艦之用，但是由於其大幅度地改裝上艦的實戰系統，故此可以將之看成是國產航母戰鬥群的先行實驗船體，同時是具有實戰用途的¹³⁰（平可夫 2010）。必要時可作為海軍打擊力量。

在此有必要亦提到艦載機，前述中國海軍航空兵的機體遠比空軍落後是一個極大問題。海航兵最先進的機體是在驅逐艦上的直 8、直 9 等艦載直升機及進口自俄羅斯的 KA28、KA29 及 KA30 直昇機。戰鬥機中主要還是 JH7A 殲轟機¹³¹（KDR 編輯部，2011 年 4 月號），但是近年隨著海軍政策開始轉向遠洋及大力發展航母，海航兵終於能獲得殲 10 戰機作為其主力¹³²（蘇冠群 2011 年 3 月號）。而且，中國正著手研發 Su33 上艦及從 Su33 仿製而成的殲 15 上艦問題。海軍航空兵亦終於有與空軍對等的戰鬥力，而最新的消息亦指出，海軍航空兵已接收了首批的殲 10 改良型的殲 11B¹³³（KDR 編輯部 2011 年 5 月號），明顯地，中國軍方對於海航兵的未來的戰鬥力必然愈來愈重視。

由此可見，航空母艦的發展對中國海軍戰略上來說是必然的。而照目前的趨勢來看，將來中國還會繼續自行研制國產的航母，重點的部署還是在南海及東海艦隊上。

¹²⁴ 柯爾教授在 2000 年時曾說，瓦艦並不適合再進行改裝，而當時亦沒有證據說中國將建造或計劃建造航艦。參伯納德·柯爾 2006，*海上長城—走向廿一世紀的中國海軍*，老戰友文化事業，桃園，195 頁。另外，平可夫到近年還認為它只會成為 J15 艦載機的訓練平台，而不會完全修復。參 KDR 編輯部 2011，‘大連全面修復 VARYAG 航母’，*漢和防務評論*，75 期，1 月號，22 頁。

¹²⁵ KDR 編輯部 2011，‘大連全面修復 VARYAG 航母’，*漢和防務評論*，75 期，1 月號，22 頁。

¹²⁶ 特別是 C31 天線，這是美軍 LINK-11 的仿製品，它使艦隊間的數據通訊範圍拉大至數千公里，亦使解放軍的 C4ISR 建設已有成果。參蘇冠群 2011，‘山寨？自創？中國航空母艦發展論證’，*全球防衛雜誌國際版*，237 期，3 月號，28-30 頁。

¹²⁷ 中國評論新聞網 2011，‘中國航母平台首次出海試航 航母迷湧進大連’，8 月 11 日，[線上]，載：<http://www.chinareviewnews.com/doc/1017/9/5/9/101795949.html?coluid=4&kindid=16&docid=101795949&mdate=0811092440>，檢視日期：2011 年 8 月 13 日。

¹²⁸ 鳳凰衛視 2011，‘中國“瓦良格”號航母二次試航 將測試艦載機’，11 月 30 日，[線上]，載鳳凰網 http://phtv.ifeng.com/program/news/detail_2011_11/30/11002719_0.shtml，檢視日期：2011 年 12 月 15 日。

¹²⁹ 中國電信新聞中心 2011，‘20 日中午：瓦良格號第三次出海試航’，12 月 20 日，[線上]，載中國電信新聞網 <http://news.21cn.com/junshi/gn/2011/12/20/10200162.shtml>，檢視日期：2011 年 12 月 30 日。

¹³⁰ 平可夫 2010，*中國製造航空母艦*，漢和出版社，密西沙加，206-207 頁。

¹³¹ KDR 編輯部 2011，‘J11BSM 克隆多用途戰鬥機是否會取代 JH7A 殲擊轟炸機’，*漢和防務評論*，78 期，4 月號，63 頁。

¹³² 蘇冠群 2011，‘山寨？自創？中國航空母艦發展論證’，*全球防衛雜誌國際版*，237 期，3 月號，26 頁。

¹³³ KDR 編輯部 2011，‘中國海軍航空兵接收首批 J10b’，*漢和防務評論*，79 期，5 月號，41 頁。

整體海洋戰略的評價－控制南海及與美台在東海的博弈

今天，儘管在中國境內的山區及偏遠地區有很多農民仍然活在貧窮線之下，但是在國際上，中國幾乎可以說已經擺脫了貧窮大國的形象。而得力於經濟的發展，海軍這種需要大量資金的技術軍種亦得以全面提升實力。上文提過不少學者都認為中國最終是要在 2050 年時建立一支全球性的海軍。不論此說法真確性如何，人們要想的是，中國現在是不是有必要地建立一支像美國全球性海軍？從馬漢的理論看來一個國家要建立一支強大海軍，在於其海外貿易和商品生產能力。他在書中指出：「如果海權真正建立在一種廣泛平時貿易的基礎之上，從事商業的習性往往必然是依靠海洋強大起來的民族特點¹³⁴ (Mahan 2007；安常容譯 2006)。」今天中國得益於全球化經濟體系下，國力火速上升。而為了保護領海重要的資源及確保應大的商業交通線，海軍必須要有足夠的力量。

本文曾提及過多次，中國現時涉及的海洋利益與領土爭端主要是東海釣魚台及石油問題，和南海的南沙群島領土問題。而隨著美國的重返亞洲政策實施，這兩個地區的問題將會牽涉到美國的介入。實際上，美國從來沒有掩飾過對中國的公開圍堵政策，近年他的海軍戰略而轉移至西太平洋方向，並與中國周邊國家緊密聯繫，挑起對中國的不信任。同時，每年在南中國海、東海上進行針對中國的大型海上演習，包括 F22 戰鬥機多次進出沖繩¹³⁵ (KDR 編輯部 2011 年 3 月號)。這些行動表明了中國要完全控制及突破島鏈封鎖，再一次有一股極大的阻力出現。

上文曾提及南海地域上，中國是佔有優勢。但是中國這種優勢是有缺點的，就是在中國未有航空母艦服役之前，它對於此海域的空中軍力投射是弱於東南亞國家的，特別是越南，而且這股優勢只是 2000 年後美國退出亞洲後才能擁有。雖然自西沙機場建成後，中國海航兵的飛機對於南海的空域控制是有效地加強了，不過在此地區其實仍然有美國的軍事力量，亦即以菲律賓蘇比克海軍基地為中心的東南亞基地群，美軍太平洋艦隊的航母戰鬥群軍力可以從這裡對北到朝鮮半島、南至大洋洲、西連中東的廣大海域內的危機和突發事件作出快速反應¹³⁶ (中國網 2005)。在沒有美軍的情況下，中國海軍的主要對手主要是越南、菲律賓、馬來西亞等國是有優勢的，但若美國在此地區介入，則水面至空中的優勢便即時喪失。而近年美軍又在新加坡樟宜建立海軍基地，並且與馬來西亞、菲律賓、汶萊、泰國等東南亞國家協商，爭取使美艦艇可進入這些國家的港口補給、維護¹³⁷ (達巍 2003)。可見美國已正逐步採取重返亞洲政策。在此情況下，中國可以有的便是利用其龐大的水下力量作出抗衡。故此中國在近年發展大型艦隻的同時，仍不忘研發新的潛艦技術，同時將 093 潛艦部署在南海的三亞基地，便是此一方向的明證。此外，中國亦繼續大力開發三亞基地，並且向東擴建了亞龍灣區域¹³⁸ (黃斐 2012 年 1

¹³⁴ Mahan, A. T., 2007. *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783*. at www.gutenberg.net [Accessed on 15, October, 2010] 本文引用中譯本：馬漢著，安常容等譯 2006，*海權對歷史的影響：1660-1783*，共軍出版社，1 月，48 頁。

¹³⁵ KDR 編輯部 2011，「周邊國家形成對中國的公開、隱形圍堵網絡」，*漢和防務評論*，77 期 3 月號，53 頁。

¹³⁶ 中國網 2005，「東南亞基地群」，[線上]，6 月 6 日，載中國網網址：
<http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/zhuanti/mjjdtz/881642.htm>

¹³⁷ 達巍 2003，*美國在全球的主要軍事基地及設施*，10 月 24 日，[線上]，載環球視野網址：
<http://www.globalview.cn/ReadNews.asp?NewsID=390>

¹³⁸ 黃斐 2012，「海南亞龍灣－海軍綜合艦艇基地探秘」，*全球防衛雜誌軍事家*，247 期，1 月號，63 頁。

月號)，並且，將亞龍灣基地發展成為中國海軍的綜合艦艇基地。現時在亞龍灣中部署的，是新組建的驅逐艦第九支隊，以及用作核子潛艦的第二基地，中國海軍目前最新銳的幾個飛彈驅逐艦及護衛艦型號都部署於此¹³⁹（黃斐 2012 年 1 月號），可見中國軍方對南海的重視。

值得注意的是，中國的水下戰鬥力只依靠核潛艦是不足的，因為連帶新建成的 093 商級核潛艦及 094 晉級核子彈道飛彈潛艦，目前亦只有十艘。而且作為核打擊力量，中國海軍亦不會輕易將 094 調離北海艦隊，因其巨浪 2 型導彈在北方能有效地對美國本土實施打擊。故此，在南海的水下戰力，反而是依靠常規動力潛艦，而中國現時對元級潛艦安裝 AIP 絕氣動力系統的研發¹⁴⁰（江雨 2008 年 10 月號），將大大加強其水下潛航時間，使中國的潛艦成為此地區的「地區核潛艦」¹⁴¹（KDR 編輯部 2011 年 1 月號；KDR 編輯部 2011 年 1 月號），在未來的日子，中國海軍應該會部署更多的水下戰力於此區，配合原有的多首新型驅逐艦來維持其南海上的優勢。

不過，除了加強軍力部署外，更重要的是，中國需要與東南亞國家建立有效的戰略伙伴關係，因為從地理上來看，東盟國家在地理上形成了對南海四分之三以上海疆的包圍，而中國則愈來愈依賴南海的航線，如不能與東南亞國家建立良好戰略關係，則中國的「南海龍脈」將會受到嚴重威脅¹⁴²（鞠海龍 2007），而亦會影響南海的主權，同時影響了東海方面的戰略部署。

中國船舶信息中心近來刊出了《中國海軍艦艇未來發展前瞻》（2009）一文，當中表示中國海軍艦艇未來發展趨勢為：噸位大型化、艦身隱形化、功能多樣化、武器精確化及系統資訊化。而正在研發中的大型驅逐艦，將會是超過一萬噸的¹⁴³（中國船舶信息中心 2009）。大型艦隻的建立，正是中國決心走向藍海的標誌，以上 5 項指標，亦是中國決心要追上國際海軍水平的顯示。不過現時在東海水域，中國的海軍力量仍是受到很大的壓力。這是因為此地區更有可能直接地面臨美國的軍事介入。

個別來看，日本三個自衛隊中，只有海上自衛隊的力量還足以值得留意¹⁴⁴（星島日報 2009），而更重要的是日本現時擁有所謂「準航母」之稱，直通飛行甲板的大型直升

¹³⁹ 現時部署在亞龍灣的，包括了 052B 旅洋級、052C 旅洋 II 級，053H3 江衛 II 奴、054A 江凱 II 級等艦種，與及證實了至少兩艘 093 核動力潛艦及多艘基洛級 636M 在內。參黃斐 2012，「海南亞龍灣—海軍綜合艦艇基地探秘」，*全球防衛雜誌軍事家*，247 期，1 月號，64 頁。

¹⁴⁰ AIP 絕氣動力系統是指不直接利用空氣中的氧氣，而利用系統自身所帶的液氧支持熱機或電化學系統的工作，通過密閉系統內「燃燒」的能量轉換為潛艦提供動力。參江雨 2008，「AIP 對中國海軍的意義和未來發展」，*艦載武器*，45 期，10 月號。

¹⁴¹ 由於 AIP 能使常規潛艦於水下隱蔽性及航行時間大大提高，故安裝 AIP 的常規潛艦有「區域核潛艦」的稱號，中國在南海、印度洋、台海等區域的活動將能獲得大大加強。參 KDR 編輯部 2011，「「新元」潛水艦技術分析」，*漢和防務評論*，75 期，1 月號，26 頁及 KDR 編輯部 2011，「中國推出 AIP 技術」，*漢和防務評論*，75 期，1 月號，31 頁。

¹⁴² 鞠海龍 2007，*亞洲海權地緣格局論*，中國社會科學出版社，北京，243 頁。

¹⁴³ 中國船舶信息中心 2009，「中國海軍艦艇未來發展前瞻」，10 月 3 日，[線上]，轉載新浪新聞網網址：<http://news.sina.com.cn/c/sd/2009-10-03/045018774467.shtml>。檢視日期 2011 年 4 月 20 日。

¹⁴⁴ 〈星島日報〉近年曾有過這樣記載：「日本海上自衛隊早已成為亞太除美國海軍以外最強大的海上力量之一，具有較強的遠洋機動作戰能力。根據《2007—2008 年簡氏艦船年鑒》統計，日本海上自衛隊裝備潛艇 16 艘、驅逐艦 44 艘、護衛艦 9 艘、裝備作戰飛機 200 多架，主要為反潛飛機，尤其以 P-3C 反潛巡邏機為多，達 100 架，在全球僅次於美軍。」星島日報 2009，「“鬆綁”後的日本海上自衛隊裝備世界一流」，8 月 18 日，[線上]，載星島環球網網址

http://ny.stgloballink.com/global/200908/t20090818_1085347.html，檢視日期 2011 年 4 月 20 日。

機驅逐艦「日向」號，雖然是直昇機驅逐艦，但實際上可以換上像垂直升降的戰鬥機。對於中國來說這是不能忽視的力量。將來如果東海地區，無論是釣魚台或是東海油田問題最終導致武裝衝突，中國海軍能否有足夠力量應付之是有疑問的，所以 2010 年中日爆發釣魚台危機，中國始終沒有用上東海艦隊去釣魚台，就是不想將釣魚台問題激化至不能收拾的地步。在中國海軍力量相對日本仍然不足及「和平崛起」的大方針下，中國對日本的戰略仍是以「經濟牌」為主。但是 2011 年三月後，東亞的國際局面又為之一變。日本「311 大地震」對於整個東亞的國際形勢有著深切影響，此地震前，日本正面臨著像時殷宏教授所說的既崛起又衰落的現象¹⁴⁵ (殷弘 2006)，但在地震後面對著重大的人命傷亡，日本單是要面對東北部各災區的善後工作便已大感頭痛。而最嚴重的是，地震後福島第一核電廠的核幅射洩漏仍然嚴重，並且已經影響到周邊海域¹⁴⁶ (星島日報 2011)。單是要控制及解決此一問題，相信日本政府要花上一段以年計的長時間，曾有傳言指出日本的核危機是源於日本本身在秘密儲存核廢料研制核武器，不論此說是否成立，要注意的是，日本在現時國內出現問題的情況下，它的對外態度反而會採取更強硬的姿態而不會示弱於人，這可能是基於政府穩定國內人心，並且穩定政府威信而致。所以在地震後日本即使一方面接受中國方面的援助，但同時對於東及釣魚台的問題反而變本加厲，亦可能是這種原因。

中國對於日本的搏奕，在近年來即使亦因應日本的行為開始強硬起來¹⁴⁷ (環球網報道 2012)，但大方向上會否有任何轉變，甚至從以往的守勢轉移為進攻態勢仍有待觀察。但相比起來，中國在台灣問題上便較為積極了。台灣不僅是中國長久以來需要收復的領土，同時它的戰略位置對於中國出海太重要。中國若收復台灣，則自地理上將整條島鏈自中間切斷，中國海軍遠洋艦隊和航空兵也得到一個攻守皆宜的基地群和避風港。以台灣為基地的海、空作戰範圍可以直達日本、菲律賓側翼，大陸與台灣島形成的 T 字形陣地，將以半包圍形式威懾周邊，使中國海軍南北相顧而護得更有效的海上安全能力¹⁴⁸ (鞠海龍 2007)，從而迫使封鎖中國島鏈的中段支撐點後退到太平洋內部的關島。中國現時仍未放棄收復台灣的計劃。隨著時代轉變，中國軍方內部仍然繼續研究在現代環境的攻台作戰。而這種作戰研究主要是在反介入戰略、奪佔外島戰略及如何進攻本島¹⁴⁹ (KDR 編輯部 2011 年 3 月號；KDR 編輯部 2011 年 3 月號)三個方面上。相比中國軍力的急速提升，台灣的軍事力量真是可說是每況愈下。單是台灣現時空軍最先進的幻影

¹⁴⁵ 崛起是指政治上的張揚及軍事上的積極性，包括派出自衛隊去伊拉克及東海問題的強硬態度；而衰落卻是指經濟上。日本已經持續二十年的經濟不景，而且由於近二十年中國的經濟發展反而更顯其頹勢。參時殷弘 2006，「中國崛起的條件：從對外關係角度出發的討論」，*國際政治與國家方略*，北京大學出版社，北京，222 頁。

¹⁴⁶ 相關報導可參閱星島日報 2011，「日本核危機擴大」，3 月 14 日，[線上]，網址：<http://hk.news.yahoo.com/article/110314/3/n7kc.html>。

¹⁴⁷ 中國在這年來對於日本在釣魚台的行為開始不能再容忍，例如在 2012 年 2 月 19 日，中國國家海洋局的“海監 66 號”通過無線設備要求日本海上保安廳測量船“昭洋”號停止海洋調查活動，而以往都是很多時是向中方提出抗議，指責中國漁政執法船或科考船在這一海域進行相關活動，中國只是被動地解釋、回應，並闡明中方在此問題上的立場。中方主動對日方在釣魚島海域的活動予以警告或抗議，去年 5 月和 9 月各有一次，這次則是第三次。外間評論指中國希望把對釣魚島的主權聲索落實到行動上、變被動回應為主動出擊的表現。參環球網報道 2012，「我在钓鱼岛争端中开始以牙还牙 未必是坏事」，2 月 19 日，[線上]，載環球網 http://mil.huanqiu.com/weapon/2012-02/2475762_8.html，檢視日期，2 月 29 日。

¹⁴⁸ 鞠海龍 2007，*亞洲海權地緣格局論*，中國社會科學出版社，北京，244 頁。

¹⁴⁹ 參 KDR 編輯部 2011，「中國積極研究奪佔外島」，*漢和防務評論*，77 期，3 月號，62-65 頁。及 KDR 編輯部 2011，「中國軍隊如何進攻台灣本島」，*漢和防務評論*，77 期，3 月號，66-71 頁。

2000-5 及 F16 已是 90 年代的產物，美國遲遲不肯同意出售 F16C/D 使台灣空軍實力與中國方面距離愈來愈大 (華夏經緯網 2002)¹⁵⁰，而海軍上的「四大金剛」 (華夏經緯網 2008)¹⁵¹ 作戰能力強差人意外，本身近來已開始出現零附件缺料和維修危機¹⁵² (北京新浪網 2009)，由於美國早已停產相關的零件，未來如何繼續能使用都是問題；最令人關注的是台灣本土的防空系統，就在中國殲 20 試飛的同時，台灣方面亦進行防空火力實彈測考，最終 19 枚各型飛彈有 6 枚未能擊中目標，估算成功率只有 68%，而一般來說 73 %才是符合經驗常數¹⁵³ (王志鵬 2011 年 3 月號)，再加上台灣本身的自製軍備工業薄弱，無怪乎有說現在是台灣國防的黑暗時期。

基本上，面對這樣的台灣軍力，如果不是美國在背後的話，中國要武力統一台灣是大有可能的。但是，就是因為美國在太平洋的軍力，使中國到現在仍不敢，亦不能隨便地武力出兵台灣，當然國際形勢及其大戰略來看，和平統一對雙方均有利。但中國軍方基於美國極有可能介入的情況下，在制定攻台作戰時，便要計算美國介入的可能性及種種影響因素。故此，中國軍方針對有可能出現的美軍介入台海局勢而制定出「反介入戰略」。這種思想是以「間接戰略」、「積極防禦」、「不對稱作戰」思維為核心的理論¹⁵⁴ (謝茂松 2010)。簡單而言，便是當美軍意圖介入台灣局勢時，中國從外交上對美軍發出抗議作為政治上的第一擊，而由於解放軍預計，美國要介入台灣起碼要 72 小時，故此，中國對台灣的進攻的首 48 小時便很重要，亦要在這黃金 48 小時內，迫使台灣接受統一做成既成事實。同時中國利用其龐大的水下力量，作為封鎖及阻隔美國航母戰鬥群的介入。為了有效執行此戰略，中國近年嘗試研制以彈道導彈如東風 21C/D 打擊航母的戰略¹⁵⁵ (林穎佑 2008)，及興建大型的 071 大型船塢登陸艦¹⁵⁶ (KDR 編輯部 2011 年 4 月號)，而「瓦良格號」及未來的國產航艦如成功服役，則整個反介入戰略將會有更充足的實力及更有成功的機會。

但是現時解放軍海軍仍沒有十足的把握對抗美軍，而在和平統一的方向下，反介入戰略現階段的作用亦只是對美軍的威懾作用，旨在讓其對介入東亞水域事務的多一重考慮。中國在此地區實際上來說是佔不了任何優勢的。

八) 總結－藍水海軍應與和平崛起方針的相輔相承

新中國的海軍發展經歷了六十個年頭後，中國已經從一支近岸防禦的警備小型海

¹⁵⁰ 雖然就算有 F16C/D 也不能將這個距離縮小，而且台空軍失事率一向高企，參華夏經緯網 2002，‘台空軍失事率世界第一’，5 月 2 日，[線上]，載華夏經緯網 <http://www.huaxia.com/2003627/00018983.html>。檢視日期 2011 年 4 月 18 日。

¹⁵¹ 即紀德級驅逐艦，分別是基隆號、馬公號、左營號及蘇澳號。排水量 9600 噸，比臺灣最大的成功級軍艦還要大出一倍以上，是現時台灣最大的軍艦。參華夏經緯網 2008，‘台海軍王牌主力“吉德”艦’，3 月 19 日，[線上]，載華夏經緯網 <http://www.huaxia.com/thjq/wzzdlj/2008/03/885671.html>。檢視日期 2011 年 4 月 18 日。

¹⁵² 北京新浪網 2009，‘台海軍基德艦零件短缺面臨導彈無法發射危機’，5 月 20 日，載北京新浪網 <http://dailynews.sina.com/bg/chn/chnmilitary/sinacn/p/2008-10-14/1045525362.html>。檢視日期 2011 年 3 月 20 日。

¹⁵³ 王志鵬 2011，‘這樣的表現，台灣未來國防黑暗十年’，*全球防衛雜誌國際版*，237 期，3 月號，58 頁。

¹⁵⁴ 謝茂松 2010，*亢龍有悔－中共反介入戰略之研究*，高手專業出版社，臺北，41-47 頁。

¹⁵⁵ 林穎佑 2008，*海疆萬裡－中國人民解放軍海軍戰略*，時英出版社，臺北，167 頁。

¹⁵⁶ 已證實有兩艘已下水，此種艦船能攜帶四艘 80 噸級氣墊船和一個營的兩棲遠征突擊車。如果四艘同時出航，一次便能實施一個機械化團渡海登陸。詳參 KDR 編輯部 2011，‘第二艘 071 大型船塢登陸艦下水’，*漢和防務評論*，78 期，4 月號，35 頁。

軍建設成一支有能力遠航的大型遠洋艦隊。如果說中國在 2008 年前還未確立海軍主力的建設重心，仍是一個過渡階段的話，則 2009 年起江凱級巡防艦（護衛艦）及各驅逐艦的神盾化已表明了中國已經確立了其發展的大方向，再加上「瓦良格號」的修復已經接近完成階段，中國海軍的遠洋性質已經基本確立，而明顯地所謂的島鏈已經不能再困著中國海軍。六十年來「龍遊淺水」的狀況可有望在未來五年來正式被打破。

本文開首時曾論及美國、台灣等地的研究人士、學者很多時都以「中國威脅論」來看待中國海軍近年的發展迅速。例如美國國防部每年發表一次的《中國軍力報告》便是當中的表表者，即使報告的所用的資料來源有很多是不確定及值得質疑的地方。但其用意便是要提高西方社會對於中國軍力的擔憂狀況，而這是成功的。事實上，儘管中國軍事力量發展引起鄰近國家及美國等西方國家的憂慮，如果建基於整個大環境來看，中國海軍的發展根本上不會產生像外界所說的「海軍霸權」的情況出現。因為這對於中國來說是沒有好處。

中國發展海軍最重要的一項工作是維護其海洋權益，包括領土及交通線。近年中國對於南海的部署已逐漸證明了這一點。但是，中國會動輒地便訴諸武力嗎？答案是否定的。對現在的中國來說，和平的大環境才是其最大的利益。中國領導層近一兩年雖然已經不是再這麼頻密地提出「和平崛起」的口號，但是在對於現時的中國，經濟的迅速發展，國民生產總值不斷地有突破增長的情況下，一個和平的大環境對於中國遠遠比利用武力去爭奪資源、收復領土更有利於中國發展。即使對於台灣問題，中國「和平崛起」的大戰略雖然並不表示會放棄武力收復台灣。但觀乎中國「先經後政」的方式與台灣的溝通，中國如非必要時亦不會用武力攻台，即使近年東海艦隊方面的裝備仍在不斷提升中。而為了消除周邊國家的不安及「中國威脅論」的影響，中國海軍近年的定位是成為中國的外交武器。中國領導人幾乎以每年一次的頻率派遣中國艦隊出洋遠航，訪問外國或執行軍事任務，正是為了向外界宣稱中國海軍是和平用途的海軍，不斷地參與多邊合作的活動是為了展現與國際合作、和諧的形象以消彌各國對於「中國威脅論」的意識。

中國海洋事業要再發展，出了繼續現在的武器開發外，同時需改革現行的制度。例如世界各國都有統一的海岸防衛機關，但是中國近海的海事執行機構除海軍外仍然分散在眾多部門之下，無疑是影響了其維護海洋利益的效能；此外，中國的海洋法規仍然有其缺憾，《海洋白皮書》中亦沒有一個清晰的海洋規劃戰略。中國的海上力量要有效地行之於自己的領土內，這兩方面的配套是必須要改善的。

中國海軍未來的發展，不會發展出一支像美國一樣的全球性海軍，這是幾可肯定的事情。但是為了維持著中國發展的態勢及周邊領土的安全，中國海軍必然要走向大型化。近年艦隊的綜合整體作戰能力不斷提升，使中國的有形作戰能力愈來愈高，而這種能力亦推動中國從以往只在島鏈內活動，進而遠航至全國任何一個國家，執行各種海事安全任務，而這些任務又將提高中國海軍人員的軟實力。所以，即使中國不會像美國一樣建立一支海軍的霸權，但是由於中國的和平崛起的方針及維護海權利益的必要，故此中國海軍在未來將必然成為區域性—西太平洋的強勢海軍，從而實現其區域性「遠洋海軍」的戰略，以保護中國國家的海洋權益。

附錄：

(圖表 1) 美國國防部報告書中第一及第二島鏈示意圖¹⁵⁷ (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2010)



The First and Second Island Chains. PRC military theorists conceive of two island "chains" as forming a geographic basis for China's maritime defensive perimeter.

圖片出處：ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS—Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2010, p.23.


¹⁵⁷ Office of the Secretary of Defense 2011. ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS—Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2010, p.23.[Online]
<http://www.huanqiu.com/zhuanli/china/zhongguojunlibaogao/> [Access on 26 April 2011.]

(圖表 2) 1980 至 2009 年中國國防基要費數據表 (中華人民共和國國務院新聞辦公室 2008；中華人民共和國國務院新聞辦公室 2011)¹⁵⁸

年度	國內生產總值(億元人民幣)	國家財政支出(億元人民幣)	國防費(億元人民幣)	國防費佔國內生產總值比重(%)	國防費佔國家財政支出比重(%)
1980 年	4545.62	1228.83	193.84	4.26	15.77
1981 年	4891.56	1138.41	167.97	3.43	14.75
1982 年	5323.35	1229.98	176.35	3.31	14.34
1983 年	5962.65	1409.52	177.13	2.97	12.57
1984 年	7208.05	1701.02	180.76	2.51	10.63
1985 年	9016.04	2004.25	191.53	2.12	9.56
1986 年	10275.18	2204.91	200.75	1.95	9.10
1987 年	12058.62	2262.18	209.62	1.74	9.27
1988 年	15042.82	2491.21	218.00	1.45	8.75
1989 年	16992.32	2823.78	251.47	1.48	8.91
1990 年	18667.82	3083.59	290.31	1.56	9.41
1991 年	21781.50	3386.62	330.31	1.52	9.75
1992 年	26923.48	3742.20	377.86	1.40	10.10
1993 年	35333.92	4642.30	425.80	1.21	9.17
1994 年	48197.86	5792.62	550.71	1.14	9.51
1995 年	60793.73	6823.72	636.72	1.09	9.33
1996 年	71176.59	7937.55	720.06	1.06	9.07
1997 年	78973.03	9233.56	812.57	1.09	8.80
1998 年	84402.28	10798.18	934.70	1.19	8.66
1999 年	89677.05	13187.67	1076.40	1.31	8.16
2000 年	99214.55	15886.50	1207.54	1.35	7.60
2001 年	109655.17	18902.58	1442.04	1.50	7.63
2002 年	120332.69	22053.15	1707.78	1.42	7.74
2003 年	135822.76	24649.95	1907.87	1.40	7.74
2004 年	159878.34	28486.89	2200.01	1.38	7.72
2005 年	183217.45	33930.28	2474.96	1.35	7.29
2006 年	211923.46	40422.73	2979.38	1.41	7.37
2007 年	257305.56	49781.35	3554.91	1.38	7.14
2008 年	314045.00	62592.66	4178.76	1.33	6.68
2009 年	340903.00	76299.93	4951.10	1.45	6.49

¹⁵⁸ 本圖表主要是參考中華人民共和國國務院新聞辦公室：《2008 年中國國防白皮書》及《2010 年中國國防白皮書》整理而成。

（圖表 3） 美國國防部關於中國原油供應來源方向圖示¹⁵⁹ (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2010)



資料來源： ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS – *Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2010*, p.23.

（圖表 4） 珍珠鏈戰略示意圖¹⁶⁰ (United States Joint Forces Command, 2008)



資料來源： *The Joint Operating Environment 2008*.

¹⁵⁹ Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2011. ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS – *Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2010*, p.21.[Online]
<http://www.huanqiu.com/zhuanli/china/zhongguojunlibaogao/> [Accessed 26 April 2011].

¹⁶⁰ United States Joint Forces Command, 2008. *The Joint Operating Environment 2008* [Online]
<http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2008/JOE2008.pdf> [Accessed 26 April 2011].

(圖 5) 美國國防部對中國國內軍力分佈顯示圖¹⁶¹ (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2010)



圖片來源： ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS –Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2010, p.61.

¹⁶¹ Office of the Secretary of Defense 2011. ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS – Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2010, p.61.[Online]
<http://www.huanqiu.com/zhuanli/china/zhongguojunlibaogao/> [Accessed 26 April 2011].

參考書目

- 大公報 2010, '南海艦隊演練 射 16 型 71 枚導彈', 提取資料日期為 2010 年 9 月 18 日, 由 <<http://www.takungpao.com.hk/news/10/07/31/junshi08-1291389.htm>>
- 大公報 2010, '三大艦隊南海聯合作戰軍演', 提取資料日期為 2010 年 9 月 18 日, 由 <<http://www.takungpao.com.hk/news/10/07/30/junshi01-1290727.htm>>
- 中共中史黨史研究室第三研究部 2002, *中國改革開放史*, 遼寧人民出版社, 遼寧, 137 頁
- 中國共產黨全國代表大會歷年數據庫 1992, '江澤民在中國共產黨第十四次全國代表大會上的報告', *人民網*, 提取資料日期為 2010 年 12 月 8 日, 由 <<http://cpc.people.com.cn/BIG5/64162/64168/64567/65446/4526311.html>>
- 中國共產黨全國代表大會歷年數據庫 2007, '胡錦濤在中國共產黨第十七次全國代表大會上的報告', *人民網*, 提取資料日期為 2011 年 3 月 8 日, 由 <<http://cpc.people.com.cn/BIG5/104019/104099/6429414.html>>
- 中國國防報 2004, '黃海: 中國海軍與法、英、澳海軍連番軍演', *中國互聯網新聞中心*, 提取資料日期為 2011 年 4 月 12 日, 由 <<http://big5.china.com.cn/chinese/2004/Dec/740994.html>>
- 中國船舶信息中心 2009, '中國海軍艦艇未來發展前瞻', *新浪新聞網*, 提取資料日期為 2011 年 4 月 20 日, 由 <<http://news.sina.com.cn/c/sd/2009-10-03/045018774467.shtml>>
- 中國評論新聞網 2011, '中國航母平台首次出海試航 航母迷湧進大連', *中國評論新聞網*, 提取資料日期為 2011 年 8 月 13 日, 由 <<http://www.chinareviewnews.com/doc/1017/9/5/9/101795949.html?coluid=4&kindid=16&docid=101795949&mdate=0811092440>>
- 中國電信新聞中心 2011, '20 日中午: 瓦良格號第三次出海試航', *中國電信新聞網*, 提取資料日期為 2011 年 12 月 30 日, 由 <<http://news.21cn.com/junshi/gn/2011/12/20/10200162.shtml>>
- 中國網 2005, '東南亞基地群', *中國網*, 由 <<http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/zhuanti/mjjdtz/881642.htm>>
- 中華人民共和國國務院新聞辦公室 1995, '中國的軍備控制與裁軍白皮書', *中國軍網*, 提取資料日期為 2010 年 1 月 12 日, 由 <http://www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/database/2004-09/30/content_26773.htm>
- 中華人民共和國國務院新聞辦公室 2004, '2000 年中國國防白皮書', *中國軍網*, 提取資料日期為 2002 年 12 月 7 日, 由 <http://www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/database/2004-09/30/content_26793.htm>
- 中華人民共和國國務院新聞辦公室 2004, '2002 年中國國防白皮書', *中國軍網*, 提取資料日期為 2010 年 12 月 8 日, 由 <http://www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/database/2004-09/30/content_26804.htm>
- 中華人民共和國國務院新聞辦公室 2004, '2004 年中國國防白皮書', *中國軍網*, 提取資料日期為 2011 年 3 月 18 日, 由 <http://www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/database/2004-12/27/content_97683.htm>

中華人民共和國國務院新聞辦公室 2009，‘2008 年中國國防白皮書’，*中國軍網*，提取資料日期為 2011 年 3 月 18 日，由
http://www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/database/2009-01/21/content_1627265.html>

中華人民共和國國務院新聞辦公室 2011，‘2010 中國國防白皮書’，*新浪新聞中心*，由
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2011-03-31/101922214879_7.shtml>

中華兵器大全 2010，*中國基洛 636M 型潛艇*，*中華兵器大全網站*，提取資料日期為 2011 年 2 月 12 日，由<http://www.cnweapon.com/html/news/2010-01/news28731.html>>

文匯報 2010，‘日稱三亞將成中國航母戰略要地’，*文匯網*，提取資料日期為 2011 年 1 月 18 日，由<http://news.wenweipo.com/2010/10/22/IN1010220005.htm>>

王志鵬 2011，‘這樣的表現，台灣未來國防黑暗十年’，*全球防衛雜誌國際版*，237 期，3 月號，58 頁

世界新聞網，大陸新聞組 2011，‘世界軍力排名 中國第 4’，提取資料日期為 2011 年 2 月 12 日，由[http://www.worldjournal.com/pages/full_china/push?article 世界軍力排名+中國第 4 &id=3592315 世界軍力排名+中國第 4&instance=chbull2](http://www.worldjournal.com/pages/full_china/push?article%20世界軍力排名+中國第4&id=3592315%20世界軍力排名+中國第4&instance=chbull2)>

北京新浪網 2009，‘台海軍基德艦零件短缺面臨導彈無法發射危機’，提取資料日期為 2011 年 3 月 20 日，由
<http://dailynews.sina.com/bg/chn/chnmilitary/sinacn/p/2008-10-14/1045525362.html>>

平可夫 2006，*平可夫看後冷戰三場戰爭與台海衝突*，加拿大漢和資訊中心，密西沙加，214, 217 頁

平可夫 2010，*中國製造航空母艦*，漢和出版社，密西沙加，206-207 頁

平可夫 2011，‘轉型之中的俄對外軍事戰略與部署’，*漢和防務評論*，1 月號，47 頁

江雨 2008，‘AIP 對中國海軍的意義和未來發展’，*艦載武器*，45 期，10 月號

江雨 2008，‘島鏈與中國海軍各遠洋的發展’，*艦載武器*，12 期，28 頁

江澤民 1992，‘國際形勢和我們的對外政策’，江澤民在中國共產黨第十四次全國代表大會上的報告，中國共產黨全國代表大會歷年數據庫，*人民網*，提取資料日期為 2011 年 3 月 10 日，由
<http://cpc.people.com.cn/BIG5/64162/64168/64567/65446/4526313.html>>

伯納德·柯爾 2006，*海上長城—走向廿一世紀的中國海軍*，老戰友文化事業，桃園，34, 104 頁

伯納德·科爾，牛志譯 2007，‘龍脈——中國海軍現代化與能源安全’，*艦載武器*，11 期，13 頁

吳汝綸 1984，*李文忠公（鴻章）全集第二冊*，奏稿卷三十九，文海出版社，臺北，1229 頁

吳東林 2010，*中國海權與航空母艦*，時英出版社，台北，82-83, 111, 115, 137, 210, 219, 248, 272, 337, 338 頁

東方軍事網 2010，‘美國智庫稱中國海軍遠端海空協同作戰能力成熟’，提取資料日期為 2011 年 4 月 12 日，由
<http://big5.eastday.com:82/gate/big5/mil.eastday.com/m/20100501/u1a5180499.html>>

林長盛 1996，*解放軍的武器裝備*，明鏡出版社，香港，128-129 頁

林穎佑 2008，*海疆萬裡—中國人民解放軍海軍戰略*，時英出版社，臺北，26, 28, 54, 58, 67, 76, 167 頁

邱子軒 2008，*龍鷹共舞—中共與美國海事安全互動*，秀威資訊科技，臺北，7-8 頁。

姜來根 1998，*21 世紀海軍艦船*，國防大學出版社，111 頁

馬漢著，安常容等譯 2006，*海權對歷史的影響：1660-1783*，共軍出版社，1月，48頁

星島日報 2009，‘“鬆綁”後的日本海上自衛隊裝備世界一流’，提取資料日期為2011年4月20日，由<http://ny.stgloballink.com/global/200908/t20090818_1085347.html>

星島日報 2010，‘評論指日方受壓決定釋放船長’，提取資料日期為2011年4月14日，由<<http://www.singtao.com/breakingnews/20100924a171432.asp>>

星島日報 2011，‘日本核危機擴大’，由<<http://hk.news.yahoo.com/article/110314/3/n7kc.html>>

時殷弘 2006，‘中國崛起的條件：從對外關係角度出發的討論’，*國際政治與國家方略*，北京大學出版社，北京，222頁

高西柯夫，錢懷源、黃志潔譯 民國四十六年(1957)，‘作為和平時期帝國主義工具的海軍’，*蘇俄海軍的崛起*，黎明文化事業出版，臺北，158頁

高西柯夫，錢懷源、黃志潔譯 民國四十六年(1957)，‘戰爭中與和平時期的海軍’，*蘇俄海軍的崛起*，黎明文化事業出版，臺北，7-20頁

高睿 2007，‘明級(035)常規潛艇’，*每日甘肅*，提取資料日期為2010年11月7日，由<<http://mil.gansudaily.com.cn/system/2007/06/16/010381917.shtml>>

高睿 2007，‘宋級(039)潛艇’，*每日甘肅*，提取資料日期為2010年11月7日，由<<http://mil.gansudaily.com.cn/system/2007/06/16/010381916.shtml>>

張俠，楊志本等編 2001，*清末海軍史料*，海洋出版社，北京

張建邦、翁明賢等 1998，*跨世紀國家安全戰略*，麥田出版社，台北，53-54頁

喬·瓦納、漢興 2008，‘中國海軍：向東還是向南’，*艦載武器*，11期，20頁

華夏經緯網 2002，‘台空軍失事率世界第一’，華夏經緯網，提取資料日期為2011年4月18日，由<<http://www.huaxia.com/2003627/00018983.html>>

華夏經緯網 2008，‘台海軍王牌主力“吉德”艦’，華夏經緯網，提取資料日期為2011年4月18日日，由<<http://www.huaxia.com/thjq/wzzdlj/2008/03/885671.html>>

鈕先鐘 1995，*西方戰略思想史*，麥田出版社有限公司，台北，418頁

黃斐 2012，‘海南亞龍灣—海軍綜合艦艇基地探秘’，*全球防衛雜誌軍事家*，247期，1月號，63-64頁

萬文豪 2004，‘中共海軍戰略演進之研究’，*國防雜誌*，19卷，9期，9月1日，台北，由<<http://www.defence.org.cn/article-13-67900.html>>

達巍 2003，‘美國在全球的主要軍事基地及設施’，10月24日，*環球視野*，由<<http://www.globalview.cn/ReadNews.asp?NewsID=390>>

鳳凰衛視 2011，中國“瓦良格”號航母二次試航 將測試艦載機，*鳳凰網*，提取資料日期為2011年12月15日，由<http://phtv.ifeng.com/program/news/detail_2011_11/30/11002719_0.shtml>

劉華清 2004，*劉華清回憶錄*，解放軍出版社，北京，358-359, 417-438, 478, 534-535, 542-544頁

鄧小平 1993，*鄧小平文選*，人民出版社，北京，162-163, 394頁

錢曉虎、查春明 2009，‘南亞三國，走出國門第一步’，*走向深藍的航跡—新中國海軍艦艇歷次遠洋出訪紀實*，解放軍出版社，北京，1月，2-17頁

錢曉虎、查春明 2009，‘環球航行，千年夢想今朝成真’，*走向深藍的航跡—新中國海軍艦艇歷次遠洋出訪紀實*，解放軍出版社，北京，1月，186-289, 321-365頁

應天行 2011，‘從近年中國新艦研製看其海軍戰略之轉變’，*全球防衛雜誌*，237期，3月號，36頁

- 應天行 2011, '從近年中國新艦研製看其海軍戰略之轉變', *全球防衛雜誌*, 238 期, 3 月號, 79 頁
- 環球時報 2003, '演習不針對第三方 中巴首次海上軍演很成功', *人民網*, 提取資料日期為 2011 年 4 月 12 日, 由<<http://www.people.com.cn/BIG5/junshi/2154472.html>>
- 環球網報道 2012, '我在钓鱼岛争端中开始以牙还牙 未必是坏事', *環球網*, 提取資料日期為 2012 年 2 月 29 日, 由
<http://mil.huanqiu.com/weapon/2012-02/2475762_8.html>
- 糜振玉 2005, '當代海軍建設的開拓者—劉華清', *國際展望*, 編輯地未知, 512 期, 3 月, 80-81 頁
- 謝茂松 2010, *亢龍有悔—中共反介入戰略之研究*, 高手專業出版社, 臺北 40, 41-47, 128-129 頁
- 鍾堅 2003, '突圍：中共建構航艦之研析', *尖端科技軍事雜誌*, 227 期, 7 月, 6 頁
- 鞠海龍 2007, *亞洲海權地緣格局論*, 中國社會科學出版社, 北京, 243-244 頁
- 蘇冠群 2011, '山寨?自創?中國航空母艦發展論證', *全球防衛雜誌國際版*, 237 期, 3 月號, 26, 28-30 頁
- 蘇冠群 2011, '別有用心?解放軍海軍艦砲外交', *全球防衛雜誌*, 238 期, 4 月號, 66, 71-72 頁
- BBC 新聞網中文版 2003, '中國印度海軍將首次聯演', 提取資料日期為 2011 年 4 月 12 日, 由
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/chinese/trad/hi/newsid_3230000/newsid_3238300/3238383.stm>
- Goldmam, J.B., 林敏譯 1997, '西方眼中的中共馬漢—劉華清', *亞太安全譯文彙集 2*, 國防部史政編譯局, 台北, 224 頁
- KDR 編輯部 2011, '「新元」潛水艦技術分析', *漢和防務評論*, 75 期, 1 月號, 26 頁。
- KDR 編輯部 2011, '大連全面修復 VARYAG 航母', *漢和防務評論*, 75 期, 1 月號, 22 頁
- KDR 編輯部 2011, '中國推出 AIP 技術', *漢和防務評論*, 75 期, 1 月號, 31 頁
- KDR 編輯部 2011, '台海制空、制海權轉移到東岸', *漢和防務評論*, 75 期, 1 月號, 53 頁
- KDR 編輯部 2011, '中國軍隊如何進攻台灣本島', *漢和防務評論*, 77 期, 3 月號, 66-71 頁
- KDR 編輯部 2011, '中國積極研究奪佔外島', *漢和防務評論*, 77 期, 3 月號, 62-65 頁。
- KDR 編輯部 2011, '周邊國家形成對中國的公開、隱形圍堵網絡', *漢和防務評論*, 77 期, 3 月號, 53 頁
- KDR 編輯部 2011, 'J11BSM 克隆多用途戰鬥機是否會取代 JH7A 殲擊轟炸機', *漢和防務評論*, 78 期, 4 月號, 63 頁
- KDR 編輯部 2011, '第二艘 071 大型船塢登陸艦下水', *漢和防務評論*, 78 期, 4 月號, 35 頁
- KDR 編輯部 2011, '中國海軍航空兵接收首批 J10b', *漢和防務評論*, 79 期, 5 月號, 41 頁
- LIVEDOOR WIKI, 2011. '日本周邊國的軍事武器' [online] Available on:
<<http://wiki.livedoor.jp/namacha2/d/FrontPage>> [Accessed 18 January 2011].
- Mahan, A. T., 2007. *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783*. [online] [Accessed 15 October 2010].

- Michael Mcdevitt, 劉廣華 2001, ‘中共海軍將何去何從?’, *國防譯粹*, 28 卷, 10 期, 10 月, 14 頁
- Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2010. *ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS—Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010*, p.21,23,61. [online] Available on: <<http://www.huanqiu.com/zhuanli/china/zhongguojunlibaogao/>> [Accessed 26 April 2011].
- R.麥克法夸爾、費正清編, 俞金堯等譯 1992, *劍橋中華人民共和國史* (下冊), 人民出版社, 北京, 483-484, 488, 500, 501 頁
- United States Joint Forces Command, 2008. *The Joint Operating Environment 2008*. [online] Available on: <<http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2008/JOE2008.pdf>> [Accessed 26 April 2011].

中國大陸改革開放三十年來的民生改變

羅永生
香港樹仁大學
電郵：wslo@hksyu.edu

一、背景簡述

從抗日爭戰到國共內戰，中國經歷連年戰爭後，百廢待舉。1949年10月中華人民共和國成立，中國共產黨執政後，開始逐步恢復了國民經濟並開展了有計劃的經濟建設，至50年初基本上完成了對生產資料私有制的社會主義改造，實行國營工業化，又在農村推行「土改」，實行土地分配，鼓勵中、小農發展生產的積極性。結果成功抑止了戰時的惡性通貨膨脹，並且在改善民生工作上取得一定成績。(李玉良 2004)

可惜踏入50年代中期以後，「大躍進」和「人民公社」、的出現，不但達不到增加產量及提高產品質量的目的，反而連年減產，國民經濟大幅度急劇下降。(凌志軍 2011) 同時由於犧牲農業發展工業的政策所導致的全國性的缺糧和飢荒，結果造成1959-1961年的「三年困難時期」。(曹樹基 2005) 當時有「三年天災，十年倒退」的一句話，直到現在，仍有老一輩農民嘆道：“大躍進年代是農民生活得最悲慘的年代。”(李銳 1996) 繼之以60、70年代不斷的政治運動，大大打擊各類生產活動，整體國民經濟停滯不前，甚至瀕臨崩潰邊緣。

1978年12月18日中國共產黨第十一屆中央委員會第三次全體會議(簡稱十一屆三中全會)在北京召開，會上鄧小平指出：“從1958年的大躍進、人民公社，到後來的文化大革命，整整二十年，農民和工人的收入增加很少，生活水平很低，生產力沒有多大發展，……大多數農民是在處非常貧困的狀況，衣食住行都非常困難。”並由於長期來的分工規律，限制了農民從事多種經營和非農業產業，將大量的和日益過剩的勞動力積壓在農村和有限的耕地上，長期實行“城市工業，農村農業”的生產模式，對於國家工農業發展現代化是不利的，必須全面改革，使城鄉關係調節變得緊密，才能有利於農業、工業的迅速發展。鄧小平明確提出改革開放應從農業開始，目標是要大幅度提高國民的生活水平。(鄧小平時代編委會 1998)

1978年初，安徽省鳳陽縣小井莊、小崗村等地的農民因旱災失收，面臨飢荒，他們為求生存，決定實行包產到戶，私下均分生產小隊下轄的土地與勞動工具，展開自負盈虧的農業生產，這在人民公社下是屬於私分共有財產的重罪。然而這兩村在當年的農業收入中就創造了驚人的成績。(陳桂棣 2009) 期後這種包產到戶的農業生產責任制，分別在安徽省和四川省試行，並取得了成績。1980年5月31日，鄧小平在中共中央的講話中公開發持了這項措施。不久，在中國所有的農村都開始實行以家庭聯產承包責任制

為主要形式的體制轉變，這種決定在堅持土地最終所有權為國家的情況下，許可農民自行生產、自負盈虧，只繳納部分農業產品。並鼓勵農村發展鄉鎮企業和農業副業，向專業化、商品化的方向繼續發展，並廢除了不適合農村生產力發展的人民公社體制。中國的改革開放正式從農村開始。(徐勇 1998)

二、開放改革三十年的食糧供應

根據國家統計局編定的《中國統計年鑒》(1979-2011)所列數字，我們可以掌握到改革三十年來，主要農產品的生產供應數字：

	1.糧食(穀物、豆類、薯類)	2.棉花	3.食用油類	4.甘蔗	5.水果
1978 年	30476.5(萬噸)	216.7	521.8	270.2	657.0
1998 年	51229.5	450.1	2313.9	8343.8	5452.9
2006 年	49804.2	753.3	2640.3	9709.2	17102.0
2009 年	53082.1	637.7	3154.3	11558.7	20395.5

除糧食產量增加約 1.5 倍外，其他各種屬經濟作物類的農產品，其增幅數字均以數倍，甚至百倍。值得注意的是食用油類大幅增加，說明 70 年代末、80 年代初內地食用油供應不足的情況已成歷史，記得當年不少港人回鄉探親時，食油是必備的「手信」。至於水果的品種則不再局限於當年的蘋果和鴨梨為主，葡萄和蕉的供應分別由約 8 萬噸和 6 萬噸，大幅加到 627 萬噸和 690 萬噸。

至於主要副食品生產供應，其情況如下：

	1.肉類產量(豬牛羊)	2.奶類	3.禽蛋	4.水產品
1978 年	無記錄	無記錄	無記錄	465.4
1998 年	5723..8(萬噸)	745.4	2021.2	3906.5
2006 年	7089.0	3302.5	2424.0	4583.6
2009 年	7649.7	3732.6	2742.5	5116.4

這些兩組數字反映在改革頭一階段，主要糧食供應充足(米袋子)，副食品則僅及要求，後一階段則主糧增長放緩，副食品產量急增。這多少反映國民生活水平已由改革初期的解決溫飽問題，提升到進入小康局面，國民甚至開始講究對飲食的追求。

三、工業產品與消費品

改革開放三十年來，我國工業高速增長，規模不斷壯大，從 70 年代的一窮二白發展

為今天門類齊全的現代化工業體系，成為國民經濟的主體支柱。資料顯示，從 1949 年至 1998 年間，我國按可比價工業總產值計算的年均增長率為 13.6%，其中 1979-1998 年為 15.9%。建國初工業產價僅佔 GDP 的 17.6%，到 1998 年工業佔 GDP 的份額已上升至 42.2%。

而個別生產項目中，以下列數項增長至為鉅大：

	1.發電量*	2.啤酒**	3.化纖#	4.水泥#	5.汽車##	6.洗衣機^	7.電冰箱^
1978 年	2566.00	40.00	28.46	6524.00	14.91	0.04	2.80
1989 年	5848.00	643.00	148.09	21029.00	58.35	825.40	670.79
2006 年	28657.66	3543.58	2073.18	123676.48	727.89	3560.50	3530.89
2009 年	29827.76	4162.18	2747.28	164397.78	1379.53	4973.63	5930.45
	8.空調^	9.手提電話^	10.微型計算機(電腦)^	11.彩色電視機^			
1978 年	0.02	無	無	0.38			
1989 年	37.47	無	7.54	940.02			
2006 年	6849.42	48014	9336.44	8375.40			
2009 年	8078.25	61924.47	15009.47	9898.79			

*億千瓦小時、**萬千公升、#萬噸、##萬輛、^萬台

值得注意的是除了發電量、化纖和水泥屬傳統工業範疇外，其餘各項產品均屬新興消費性商品，這反映改革開放以來，國民消費水平正不斷提升。當然消費商品的激增，有相當部分是出品為主。但從宏觀角度而言，消費水平就是在現有的社會生產力水平下，社會的各種財富作了各種必要的扣除後的消費支出。所以消費水平從量的方面體現國民的消費狀況及需要的滿足程度。

根據國家統計數字，2000 年國內居民年消費額按人口平均為 3049 元，扣除價格因素外，比 1952 年增加了 6.2 倍，年均遞增 4.2%，其中改革後(即 1978 年後) 年均遞增 7.3%，較改革前快了 5.1%。1978-1998 年的 20 年間，全國平均每個農村居民消費支出，增加了 1474 元，較 1952 年的數字增長了 12.7 倍，年平均增加 74 元，年遞增 14%；扣除價格因素後，實際增長也達 3 倍以上，每年實際遞增達到 6%。

從 49 年到改革開放以前，自行車、縫紉機、手表、收音機等，稱為“老四件”的“百元級”消費品進入中國平民家庭；80 年代改革初期，“老四件”已經飽和，所以“新六件”(彩電、洗衣機、電冰箱、電風扇、錄影機、照相機)等“千元級”消費品，在不到十年的時間，廣泛進入普通家庭之中，成為一般的消費品。2001 年中國城市居民家庭平均每百戶擁有彩色電視 121 台，比 1989 年增長了 1.3 倍；電冰箱 82 台，增長了 1.2 倍；洗衣機 92 台，增長了 21%；電風扇 171 台，增長了 32.6 倍；照相機 40 架，增長了 1.3 倍。另外還有影碟機 43 台，錄放像機 20 台；踏入 21 世紀以來，電腦“萬元級”和汽車、樓房、股票(基金)等“10 萬元級”等消費品開始進入國內中、高等收入家庭之中。

近年來，國內家庭用於教育、文化、娛樂、旅遊、服務等消費支出的佔家庭總支出的比重也大為提高。(張宇 2008)

值得一提的是糧票制度作為自 1955 年開始，中國大陸計劃經濟體制下，伴隨糧食定量供應在流通領域糧食及糧食制品買賣的票証，到 1993 年正式廢除。這象徵過去在計劃經濟下國家直接控制貨品供應與價格的年代宣告終止，人民不須再憑票才可購買(或配給)所需物品，而商品價格亦由市場的求供關係來決定。

四、小結

從 1978 年至 2010 年，中華人民共和國由一個尚有 4 億餘人生活在溫飽線下，與世隔絕的國家，變成了一個經濟繁榮，有著活躍市場的強大經濟實體，改革開放 30 年來，中國隨著經濟的發展，國民生活水得以提升，基本解決了 13 億人的溫飽問題。另方面，中國也在邁向工業化的道路上前進，並成為價廉物美的世界工廠。而中國的經濟結構也隨著改革開放而巨變：大量的非公有制成分為中國的經濟繁榮做出了貢獻，而非公有制所佔的比例還在進一步攀升。國有制經濟開始逐漸轉型，令更多的資本能夠流入市場。經濟規劃方針放棄了原有的計劃經濟體制，開始逐步引入市場經濟的理念。(謝志強 2008)

從開始改革開放的 1978 年到 2005 年，中國大陸經濟總量增長了 11 倍，按年度平均匯率折算的國內生產總值由 2153 億美元增加到 22257 億美元，人均國內生產總值由 225 美元增長到 1707 美元，2005 年進出口貿易總額達 14200 億美元，而外匯儲備由 2002 年的 2684 億美元，一路攀升，截至 2011 年底月為止，中國的外匯存底累積近 3.181 萬億美元，為世界單一國家外匯儲備之冠。(國家外匯管理局 2011)

近三十年來，中國大陸民生改善情況簡表

	1949	1978	今天
人均收入	起伏不定，戰後休息政策，經濟恢復，但政局動盪，1958年“大躍進”及1966年的“文化大革命”。人民收入有限，大學畢業生工資以十元計。	改革開放，工商業得以發展，人民收入大增。大學畢業生工資以百元計。	全方位開放，深化改革政策，國際化，外資不斷投入，國民知識水平上升。大學畢業生工資以千元計。
生產種類	農業：糧食(以稻米為主)	農業：除糧食以外，尚有各樣經濟作物、甚至大規模的禽畜海產生產。	
	工、商：無私人個體經營，工商業相對缺乏。	工、商：由個體經營到集團上市集資。行業種類繁多、如：汽車、手機、乳類產品、房地產、基建、金融保險。	
購買渠道	單位統購、統銷：農貿市場、國營商店，憑票配給、供不應求，大排人龍。	自由市場：1.大型超市、2.百貨大樓、3.綜合商場、4.(24小時)便利店、5.專門店。貨品供應充裕，不虞匱乏，排隊人龍消失。	
消費品	舊四件(百元) 自行車、 縫紉機、 手錶、 收音機	新六件(千元) 彩色電視、 錄影機、 電冰箱、 電風扇、 洗衣機、 照相機	新四件(萬元) 轎車、 電腦(手提電腦)、 房子、 票子(股票、基金)
食糧 (主糧、副食品)	兩者皆缺、供應不足(國民處於飢餓、窮困邊緣)	主糧供應充足(米袋子)，副食品僅及要求。(國民基本溫飽)	主糧要求下降，副食品要求急增。(進入小康，開始講究)

參考書目

- 于光遠 2008, *1978：我親歷的那次歷史大轉變；十一屆三中全會的台前幕後*，天地圖書有限公司，香港
- 中國統計局 1980-2012, *中國統計年鑒(1979-2011)*，中國統計出版社，北京
- 李良玉 2004, “建國初期的土地改革運動”，*江蘇大學學報：社科版*，1 期，1 月，39-44 頁
- 李銳 1996, *大躍進親歷記*，遠東出版社，上海
- 徐勇 1998, *包產到戶沉浮錄*，珠海出版社，珠海
- 凌志軍 2011, *歷史不再徘徊：人民公社在中國的興起和失敗*，人民日報出版社，北京
- 陳桂棣 2009, *小崗村的故事*，華文出版社，北京
- 曹樹基 2005, *大饑荒：1959—1961 年的中國人口*，時代國際出版有限公司，香港
- 國家外匯管理局 2011, *中國外匯儲備（2011 年）*，國家外匯管理局，北京
- 張宇 2008, *中國模式：改革開放三十年以來的中國經濟*，中國經濟出版社，北京
- 鄧小平時代編委會 1998, *三中全會二十年：鄧小平時代*，黨建讀物出版社，北京
- 謝志強 2008, *偉大歷程：改革開放三十年*，湖南人民出版社，長沙

Happiness and Work-Family Balance in Chinese Society

Wai Kee Yuen

Hong Kong Shue Yan University

Email: wkyuen@hksyu.edu

Wan Ling Chu

Hong Kong Shue Yan University

Han Yu Hou

Hong Kong Shue Yan University

INTRODUCTION

The well-known "Easterlin income-happiness paradox" recalls the traditional wisdom "money cannot buy happiness". Easterlin (1995) finds that although the economies in developed countries continue to grow, the level of social happiness remains unchanged. The positive correlation between income and happiness tends to break down over time. Recent literature identified that 'relational good' is one of the main determinants of happiness (Gui and Stanca 2010). For most people, family relationship is the first relational good experienced. Indeed, family relationships are usually the most important relationships among all relational goods. Families provide people with a sense of belonging, fulfilling the need for love and providing psychological support. Antonio (2010), in his review of the Austrian theory, claimed that happiness relies largely on relational goods. Layard (2005) identifies family relationships as one of the "big seven" factors affecting adult happiness. Borooah (2006) provides evidence that a good family is one of the determinants of happiness for people globally.

In Chinese society, Confucian teaching about family relationships tends to be the building block of Chinese culture. Mencius, the most important and influential Confucian after Confucius himself, points out five important human relationships. In Mencius' view, it is important to ensure that these five relationships are instilled in people: love between father and son, rightness between ruler and minister, distinction between husband and wife, proper

order between older and younger brothers, and faithfulness between friends. It has been said that if the government could educate people on these “five relationships”, internal contradictions would be reduced and there would be harmony within society (Yong, 2010, Ge 1994). Three out of the five relationships are related to family, thus highlighting the importance of family relationships in Chinese society. According to the first of the four books in the Chinese Classic, the Great Learning, the way to become a good leader is for one to first ‘self-cultivate’ and have a harmonious family. When one’s life is ‘cultivated’, one’s family will be in harmony and then one’s state will be well governed; and this can then be extended to all other states; then one can bring peace to the world (Dietz, 2010). Today, the Chinese still consider family relationships as the most important of human relationships.

Cultivating and maintaining family relationships involve time and money to fulfil the material needs of the family. Similar to other economic goods, family relationships involve opportunity costs: people need to make a rational trade-off between work and family to enhance their happiness. In this paper, the rational choice of time allocation between work and family is termed as work-family balance and this rational choice is constrained by the family environment, working environment and social environment.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Family relationships can be positively linked to happiness. It is often easy for family members to identify happy family members. Sandvik et al., (1993) show that happy people are always described by their family members, such as parents, husbands and/or wives as being happy. Just imagine the happiness of sharing a joyful event with your family. If your family is happy, this will almost certainly add to your happiness. Yet there are constraints on the happiness derived from family relationships. For example, in a small nuclear family, that being a father, mother and one child, there is the family obligation for the parents to earn enough to finance their living expenditure, to provide a comfortable home, to provide education and healthcare, and to allocate time for childcare. In this example, the choices in the work-family balance lie in the allocation of time for the child and the allocation of time to

earn money to finance family expenditure. Daniel and Angus (2010) found that the ‘magic number’ for US household income is US\$75,000 per annum. Beyond this amount, money cannot buy happiness. Moreover, the happiness derived from the family is also constrained by the family environment such as family structure and family obligations. If the family structure changes to include more family members such as the grandfather and grandmother, family members may share the burden of childcare, and this presumably would add to the happiness of all family members. In the traditional Chinese family, the father is responsible for earning the money to support the whole family, while the mother has the responsibility for childcare as well as care of any other elderly people within the family unit. As such, father and mother do not share the financial burden equally. However, the social environment has evolved and nowadays, it is more common for both the father and mother to share the family’s financial burden more equally than in the past. Plug and van Praag (1995) indicate that the increase in income is necessary to support a larger family, while maintaining the subjective well-being of the family. Indeed, how much money should be earned, what kind of education should be provided, and how comfortable a home should be, all depends on the social status of the family. Björn (2010) reports that status contributes more towards happiness in richer European countries than in poorer ones. Thus the social environment may constrain the happiness gained from achieving the right work-family balance. Another such example is that expectations from family members may put pressure on other family members and, as a result, constrain their happiness. The success of the one-child policy in China has resulted in parents setting very high expectations on their only child. The high expectations from parents means that the child may feel the pressure or stress to succeed in life and as a result this may constrain his/her happiness. In this example, the constraint on the happiness of the single child is derived from the family structure and their social values. To fulfil family expectations, the single child may choose to allocate more time to work than to cultivate family relationships. This may have a negative effect on the happiness of the entire family.

Working relationships can also be positively linked to happiness. Having a job provides the individual with a position in society and may help him/her with self-esteem. People work

for money as well as for job satisfaction. Glaeser et al., (2002) considered those satisfactions as “non-market returns” which can be directly related to happiness and individual relationships. People may prefer to sacrifice higher wages for greater job satisfaction. For example, if one has a good working relationship with one’s boss, it is almost always certain that one will feel happier at work. A working mother will be happier if her boss is understanding and can arrange flexible working hours for her to accommodate childcare. Booth and van Our (2008) find that women prefer part-time jobs especially for partnered women. If one has a good relationship with one’s work team, one normally engages in the work place with greater happiness (Argyle 1989). For example, should one’s family member have a serious illness requiring one’s time, it will be helpful to have a good working relationship with one’s team as other team members can share one’s workload such that one can allocate more time to care for the infirm family member. The above examples show that finding the right work-family balance may also depend on the working environment. A flexible working environment and good work relationships release the constraints in achieving the right work-family balance thus making one happier. However, at a time of high unemployment, work environments may be highly intense and competitive and, as such, harsh. One may choose to allocate more time to work but may not necessarily be happier. In this regard, it appears that workers in the public sector tend to be happier than those working in the private sector, since they are less likely to be made redundant, especially during a recession. A large amount of literature has reported the importance of job security on an individual’s happiness (Green 2006; Gallie, 2003; Luechinger et al., 2010). Indeed not having a job is a source of unhappiness for those who normally work (Goldsmith et al. 1996).

HYPOTHESES

This paper investigates the following four hypotheses:

Hypothesis one: There is a positive correlation between satisfaction of work-family balance and individual happiness since people will make a rational choice.

Hypothesis two: Happiness is correlated with family environment variables such as family

obligation, living conditions and expectations from family, as family environment variables serve as constraints on happiness.

Hypothesis three: Happiness is correlated with working environment variables such as interpersonal relationships, company's work-family policy and working conditions, as working environment variables serve as constraints on happiness.

Hypothesis four: Happiness is correlated with demographic variables such as gender, income, age, education level and marital status, as these variables identify the role of individuals, and reflects their value in society.

METHODOLOGY

Data were collected by means of a web questionnaire survey conducted by the Economics and Wellbeing Research Project at Hong Kong Shue Yan University. This was carried out during the first three weeks of August 2010 in Hong Kong and in Beijing. The questionnaire is divided into four main parts: general questions, family environment, working environment and demographic variables. General questions involved questions about the happiness, pressure and work-family balance of the respondents. The family environment questions collected information about the respondents' family obligation, living conditions and expectations from family. Questions on the working environment involved information about interpersonal relationships at work, company's work-family policy and working conditions. The final part of the questionnaire dealt with the demographic variables such as gender, age, education, household income and marital status. A total of 129 completed web questionnaires were successfully collected in Hong Kong and 113 were similarly collected in Beijing. As the questionnaires were carried out over the Internet, it was unsurprising that over 83% of the respondents were educated above college level. Their ages ranged from 18 to 54 with 58% being in the range of 18 to 30. Additionally, over 80% of the respondents were from families with household incomes above the median household income in their respective cities: that is, HK\$12000 in Hong Kong and RMB4069 in Beijing. The data set from the web

survey tended towards the young, higher-educated middle income families. Details of the demographic distributions are shown in Appendix Table A1.

Since the majority of the respondents were Chinese, the original questionnaire was written in the Chinese language. All questions were set in similar fashion. For example, the choices from 1 to 5 were ranked from ‘full dissatisfaction’ or ‘very unhappy’ to ‘full satisfaction’ or ‘very happy’. Table 1 below shows the questions and their corresponding notations.

Table 1: Notations and Questions

Notations	Questions
DBJHK	Dummy for Beijing, Hong Kong (1,2)
HAPP	Do you feel happy in your lifetime now? (1=Very unhappy ... 5=Very happy)
WFB	Are you satisfied of the time distribution between family and work ? (1=Fully unsatisfied... 5=Fully satisfied)
Dummies: DPACHIEVE DHEALTH DFAMILY DPWEALTH	What is your main source for happiness? (Personal achievement, Personal Health, Family, Personal Wealth, others) Personal achievement (1,0) Personal Health (1,0) Family (1,0) Personal Wealth (1,0)
STRESSWF	What is your main stress come from; Work or Family? (1=Mainly from Family...5=Mainly from Work)
HANDLEWF	Can you handle both work and family considered of time and pressure? (1=Certainly cannot Certainly can)
PACHIEVE	Do you think the personal achievement will be better compared with last year? (1=Certainly not ... 5=Certainly)
Family Environment	
FIMPW	In your opinion, do you think the family is more important compared with the work achievement? (1=Certainly not ... 5=Certainly)
FFIN	What is your personal income account for total family income? (1= 0 to 20%...5=80% to 100%)
NEEDCARE	Is there any family member who is unable to take care of oneself so that you have to look after them (including children, parents and other family members)? (No, Yes)
FENVIR	Are you satisfied with your living environment now? (1=Fully unsatisfied... 5=Fully satisfied)
FCRISIS	Are you worried the family financial crisis will exist in short time?

	(1=Certainly not worried... 5=Certainly worried)
FCAREW	Does your family care about your work achievement? (1=Certainly not care ... 5=Certainly care)
Working environment	
WINTERP	Are you satisfied with the interpersonal relationship among colleagues? (1=Fully unsatisfied... 5=Fully satisfied)
WFPOLICY	Does your company provide work-family policy? (Yes, No)
COMPWI	Do you think the current company's management culture increase your working initiative? (1=Certainly not... 5 =Certainly)
WENVIR	Are you satisfied with the comfort level of your working environment? (1=Fully unsatisfied... 5=Fully satisfied)
UNEMP	Are you worried about losing the current job in the near future? (1=Certainly not... 5 =Certainly)
TRANS	How many hours will you spend on the way to work and back home? (1=within 15 minutes...5=More than 2 hrs)
OT	Have your current working time more than the hours in the contract? (1= Less than 1 hr...5=More than 5 hrs)
Demographic variables	
GENDER	Gender (1= Male, 2= Female)
HEALTH	Are you satisfied with the physical status and health condition? (1=Fully unsatisfied... 5=Fully satisfied)
HINCOME	Household income
AGE	Age
EDU	Education level
MAR	Marital status (1= Single, 2= Married)

This paper estimates the following model using three data sets: Beijing data, Hong Kong data and a combined Beijing and Hong Kong data, or 'pool data'. For the pool data, a dummy *DBJHK* is added to identify the differences between Hong Kong and Beijing. The equation for general happiness used in this paper is:

$$\begin{aligned}
HAPP_i = & DBJHK_i + WFB_i + DPACHIEVE_i + DHEALTH_i + DFAM_i + DWEALTH_i + STRESSWF_i \\
& + HANDLEWF_i + HEALTH_i + PACHIEVE_i + FIMPW_i + FENVIR_i + FFIN_i + FCRISIS_i + NEEDCARE_i + \\
& FCAREW_i + WINTERP_i + WENVIR_i + OT_i + TRANS_i + UNEMP_i + WFPOLICY_i + COMPWI_i + GENDER_i + MAR \\
& R_i + AGE_i + EDU_i + HINCOME_i +
\end{aligned}$$

Where ε is the independent and identically distributed random variable; the subscript i indicates an individual.

This paper uses the commonly used ordered probit estimation as the workhorse to handle the ordinal scale date (see: Greene 2000). A positive estimated coefficient indicates that an increase in the ordinal scale of the independent variable influences the dependent variable in such a way that the conditional probability of the dependent variable falling into a higher ordinal scale increases while the opposite happens in the case of a negative estimated coefficient. (See: Boccaletti and Moro, 2000). Winkelmann (2005) used ordered probit estimation to identify the intra-family correlation of happiness. In addition, Tsou and Liu (2001) investigated the determinants of happiness in Taiwan using ordered probit estimation.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Table 2: Empirical results

Dependent Variable: HAPP						
	Pool data		Hong Kong		Beijing	
	Coefficient	Std. Error	Coefficient	Std. Error	Coefficient	Std. Error
<i>BJHK</i>	-0.3238	0.2259	-	-	-	-
<i>WFB</i>	0.5365**	0.1091	0.5422**	0.1713	0.4556**	0.1744
<i>DPACHIEVE</i>	-0.5757	0.3598	1.5622	1.1171	-1.0644**	0.4600
<i>DHEALTH</i>	0.1031	0.3730	1.6693	1.1268	0.1187	0.5022
<i>DFAM</i>	0.0332	0.3178	1.7325	1.0958	0.1025	0.3856
<i>DWEALTH</i>	-1.0477**	0.4521	0.9679	1.4404	-1.2329**	0.5363
<i>STRESSWF</i>	-0.1099	0.0950	-0.3897**	0.1537	0.0474	0.1523
<i>HANDLEWF</i>	0.0644	0.1143	-0.0793	0.1900	0.1619	0.1700
<i>HEALTH</i>	0.1154	0.0963	0.2438	0.1779	0.0184	0.1474
<i>PACHIEVE</i>	0.1023	0.0905	0.1652	0.1527	0.1888	0.1441
<i>FIMPW</i>	-0.0382	0.1076	0.1369	0.1771	-0.2204	0.1630
<i>FENVIR</i>	0.6858**	0.1097	0.6926**	0.1811	0.6023**	0.1594
<i>FFIN</i>	-0.0885	0.0741	-0.3784**	0.1259	0.0712	0.1143
<i>FCRISIS</i>	0.0831	0.0899	0.1364	0.1788	-0.0272	0.1273
<i>NEEDCARE</i>	0.1134	0.2203	0.2131	0.3441	-0.0859	0.3613
<i>FCAREW</i>	-0.0232	0.1025	0.1001	0.1882	-0.1151	0.1565
<i>WINTERP</i>	0.0311	0.1122	0.2821	0.1998	-0.1615	0.1659

<i>WENVIR</i>	-0.1394	0.1156	-0.3083	0.1889	0.0610	0.1834
<i>OT</i>	-0.0978	0.0742	-0.0414	0.1225	0.0313	0.1116
<i>TRANS</i>	-0.1507**	0.0645	-0.3103**	0.1113	-0.1056	0.1137
<i>UNEMP</i>	-0.1063	0.0938	0.1614	0.1667	-0.2041	0.1435
<i>WFPOLICY</i>	-0.0991	0.2145	-0.0054	0.3375	0.0057	0.3428
<i>COMPWI</i>	0.1750**	0.0882	0.3506**	0.1531	0.1070	0.1279
<i>GENDER</i>	0.1426	0.1740	0.3017	0.3037	-0.0392	0.2516
<i>MARR</i>	0.8638**	0.2888	0.7993	0.4335	1.1958**	0.5087
<i>AGE</i>	0.0907	0.0916	-0.0693	0.1450	0.1733	0.1579
<i>EDU</i>	0.1924	0.1269	0.3998	0.2443	0.2815	0.1778
<i>HINCOME</i>	0.2180**	0.0728	0.1387	0.1183	0.2947**	0.1090
Pseudo-R ²	0.3039		0.3994		0.3343	
Sample Size	242		113		129	
** significant at 5%						

Satisfaction of work-family balance and individual happiness

Generally, the models illuminate the link between happiness and work-family balance, especially in relation to time allocation. People tend to make rational decisions in weighting marginal benefits and marginal costs in the allocation of work-family time facing the constraint of earning enough to satisfy the material wants of the family. However, people may or may not be satisfied with their work-family time allocation. In all three data sets (Pool data, Hong Kong data and Beijing data) the empirical results show that respondents who are satisfied with their allocation of time between work and family are likely to be happier than those who are less satisfied. Therefore it is proposed that any work policy that can release the constraints of work-family time allocation can enhance happiness.

Happiness and the family environment

The empirical results show that in both cities happiness is correlated with how comfortable one's family living environment is. Accordingly, people who feel more comfortable with their family living environment are happier. Having a comfortable home is very important to the Chinese, as traditionally, the Chinese life is centred on the family and

the home. In this regard, there is the old Chinese saying that to achieve a happy society, one must “live comfortable and work happy”. Cultivating family relationships requires both time and place, and in this context, work-family balance provides the time and a comfortable home provides the place. However, the housing bubble in China and Hong Kong has made it very difficult for people to afford a home, let alone make the home comfortable. A housing policy that releases the pressure for people to obtain a comfortable home can presumably make people feel happier.

In addition, people who bear a heavier financial burden for their family tend to be less happy in Hong Kong, but not in Beijing. The high financial burden has altered the Chinese traditional role of gender division of labor, that of the male working to support the family while the female stays at home to take care of the elderly and the young. The high living standards increase the financial obligation for families in Hong Kong, therefore both husband and wife need to work full time to share the burden. This changing role has placed constraints on family time for people in Hong Kong, therefore making them less happy.

Notably, people in Hong Kong do not consider wealth as a factor for happiness. On the contrary, in Beijing, wealth is a significant factor to achieving happiness. This goes against popular belief that as an international business centre, people in Hong Kong care more about their wealth while, as the traditional political and cultural centre, people in Beijing are more concerned about keeping traditional Chinese family values. One possible explanation is that the two cities are at different stages of economic development: Hong Kong is a well-developed business centre and economic growth is moving at a much slower rate than that of mainland China. People in Hong Kong have already accumulated a certain level of wealth, thus happiness derived from being wealthy appears to have diminished. On the other hand, Beijing is still experiencing high economic growth, and people there have many opportunities to accumulate wealth, and as such believe that by having greater wealth will mean that they are more successful than others.

Further, high economic growth in Beijing has created more opportunities, and people in Beijing appear to be more concerned about their personal achievements than people in Hong Kong. Using the dummy variable, personal achievement was significant. However, similar to

the case of wealth, people who consider personal achievement as their main source of happiness are less happy than those who do not. As the variable “personal achievement in comparison to last year” is not significant, it appears that people do not place much weight on their own personal achievement; it is the relative personal achievement that appears to matter. Traditionally, in the Chinese culture, the word “family” refers to the extended family which includes other relatives and kinfolks apart from the nuclear family of parents and children. There are many occasions and festivals in the Chinese calendar where relatives come together, for example, Lunar New Year. Comparing personal achievements and wealth amongst relatives normally serve as a yardstick for self-evaluation. Further, economic growth may create opportunities but may not translate to an equality of wealth or personal achievement among relations such that those who are less well-off tend to feel unhappy. Indeed it has been documented in literature that one of the reasons for higher income not bringing greater happiness was that individuals were more likely to compare themselves with others (Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Layard 2003).

There is a Chinese idiom which says to teach people to be contented with their wealth and live happily. However, the Chinese are generally a proud people and it is commonplace to boast about one’s personal achievements or wealth especially at family reunions. For example, a couple in Beijing will spend two months of their salary during the few days of Lunar New Year so as to show off their wealth or personal achievements. Indeed, this culture has made people unhappy, contrary to the belief that people consider wealth and personal achievement as a source of happiness.

By contrast, there are more nuclear families than there are extended families living together in Hong Kong. The uncertainty of the economic and political conditions of 1997 has caused many Hong Kong people to migrate to other countries. As such, the links with relatives or kinfolks are weaker than those in a more traditional Chinese society like that depicted in Beijing. Additionally, the people of Hong Kong have been influenced by the west, and tend to be more individualistic in their outlook on life. People tend to be more concerned about their own lifestyle rather than comparing wealth or personal achievements. Thus comparing personal achievement and wealth amongst relatives tends to have a less significant

effect on happiness.

Happiness and the working environment

In Hong Kong, stress from work affects people's happiness but this does not appear evident for people in Beijing. Additionally, a company's management culture tends to affect respondents from Hong Kong but not those from Beijing. Both the highly competitive work environment and high standard of living in Hong Kong have added stress to people's work, thus reducing their happiness. On the other hand, anything that reduces stress from work tends to enhance happiness. In Hong Kong, it has been shown that companies with a culture of motivating their workers helps to release the stress from work. Other researches have documented that good management, that of giving employees a feeling of trust and fairness, showing care for your employees, are main determinants for job happiness (Hosie et al. 2006, Cowell, 2004). Indeed happy employees perform better than less happy ones (Dayton and Parkside, 2000). It is perhaps important for Hong Kong companies to pursue employee-orientated management culture as Hong Kong is an international business and financial centre, competing for world market talent.

For the respondents in Beijing, the high economic growth appeared to relieve competition and reduce the effect of stress from work. As such, people in Beijing appear to be less concerned about the stress from work or their financial obligations towards the family.

The empirical results show that time for commuting is negatively related to happiness for the respondents in Hong Kong. This is not the case for respondents in Beijing. The time cost derived from traffic jams in Hong Kong has a much more serious impact than that in Beijing. Indeed the average hourly wage in Hong Kong is higher than that in Beijing, thus people in Hong Kong face a higher time cost in travelling to work.

Impact of demographic variables on happiness

For respondents in Beijing, happiness is significantly correlated with marital status. The

married feel happier than the singles. However, both marital status and household income do not appear to affect the happiness of people in Hong Kong. Marriage is a celebrated occasion and an important rite of passage in the Chinese culture. It marks a person's change of status from being the son or daughter to becoming the husband or wife. As the new responsibilities of married life also bring financial burdens, the high standard of living in Hong Kong may place constraints on the happiness derived from married life.

Happiness has a significant and positive correlation with total family income for people in Beijing, but not in Hong Kong. In Beijing, people appear to feel happier when their total family incomes have increased. Clearly, high family income may release the constraint of getting the right work-family balance. However, influenced by western individualism, people in Hong Kong tend to be more concerned with their personal income, than the combined family income, as a source of happiness.

The pool data estimation ignores the difference in the stages of economic development as well as the culture differences between the cities. As a result, the Pseudo-R square is the lowest among the three estimations. The pool data estimations confirmed that for the Chinese, work-family balance is a determinant for happiness. As for the sources of happiness, only wealth appears to play a role. However, comparing personal wealth tends to make people unhappy. One importance factor that affects happiness is the living environment. In both cities, it is not easy for people to obtain a comfortable home for their family. As such, they place a higher weight on living conditions as a source of their happiness. In respect of happiness as a relational good, people need time and space to cultivate relationships. Work-family balance provides the time while a comfortable home provides the space.

As for other variables, such as the relative importance of family in comparison to work, interpersonal relationships, working environment, working overtime and work-family policies of the company, these conditions do not appear to affect happiness significantly. The results reflect that given the time balance between work and family, many related working and family environmental factors appear to be under control or are not weighted as significant constraints to achieving a work-family balance. Additionally, the variable "worrying about being unemployed" is also insignificant. This may be due to the strong economic recovery during

the survey period. The unemployment rate in Hong Kong is below 4% and the strong growth in China has been creating a lot of job opportunities. As such, respondents do not consider “worrying about being unemployed” as a factor affecting happiness.

Turning to personal and demographic variables, pool data estimation shows that only marital status and household income affect happiness significantly. Variables such as age, education and health are not significant. These results reflect the distortion of the sample towards the young, well-educated and high income group. Additionally, the males and the females do not appear to exhibit different concerns affecting happiness. This is perhaps due to the fact that in both cities, both men and women share the financial burden of the family.

CONCLUSION

The empirical results confirm the hypothesis that work-family balance is an important element for happiness in both Hong Kong and Beijing. People who are satisfied with their work-family balance tend to be happier than those who are not. Clearly, as Hong Kong and Beijing are at different stages of economic and social development, the main sources of happiness for people in the two cities vary. Hong Kong is a well-developed, wealthy and highly competitive city, and people there do not consider wealth a source of happiness. However, they consider stress from work a source of unhappiness. On the other hand, Beijing is at a stage of extensive development and rapid economic growth. People in Beijing view relative wealth and personal achievement as sources of happiness. However, comparing wealth among family relations brings unhappiness instead.

In relation to the hypothesis that family environments serve as constraints on happiness, only the home environment is correlated with happiness in both cities. In both Hong Kong and Beijing, the assets bubble has reduced the ability for people to afford a comfortable home. However, maintaining relationships among family members requires both time and space. As such, the need to provide a comfortable home appears to constrain the happiness of people in both cities. In Hong Kong family financial obligations is found to be correlated with happiness. This can be explained by the high standard of living and competition in Hong

Kong creating greater financial burdens on people in Hong Kong as compared to those in Beijing.

As for the hypothesis that working environments serve as constraints on happiness, all the variables are insignificant in Beijing. In Hong Kong, both the traffic time and company's management culture affect the happiness of people. The per capita GDP in Hong Kong is higher than that of Beijing, yet life in Hong Kong is harsh. Thus any policy that reduces stress from work can improve the happiness of people, for example, flexible working hours and employee-oriented company policies play an important role in helping people achieve work-family balance in Hong Kong.

Finally, turning to the hypothesis that demographic variables can be correlated with happiness, only marital status and household income affect people's happiness in Beijing. This is also the case for the pool data. Although the empirical results are constrained by the sample being distorted towards the young, well-educated and high income group, the empirical results have revealed some interesting phenomenon relating to the happiness of people of the two cities.

REFERENCES

- Antonio, M., 2010. The Austrian theory of relational goods. *International Review of Economics*, 57(2), p.143.
- Argyle, M., 1989. *The Social Psychology of Work*, 2nd ed. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Boccaletti, S. and Moro, D., 2000. Consumer Willingness-To-Pay for GM Food Products in Italy. *AgBioForum*, 3(4), pp.259-267.
- Booth A.L. and van Our, J.C., 2008. Job Satisfaction and Family Happiness: The Part-time work puzzle. *Economic Journal*, 118, pp.77–99.
- Borooah V.K., 2006. How much Happiness is there in the world? A cross-country study. *Applied Economics Letters*, 13, pp.483–488.
- Cowell, N.M., 2004. Myth of the Lazy Jamaican Worker. *Social and Economic Studies*, 53(3), pp.1-30.
- Daniel, K. and Angus, D., 2010. High income improves evaluation of life but not emotional well-being. *Scientific journal Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences in the United States*, August Issue, pp.16489-16493.
- Dayton, U. and Parkside, U., 2000. Employee Happiness and Corporate Financial Performance. *Financial Practice and Education*, 10(2), pp.47-52.
- Dietz, A.M., 2010. The self-cultivation and personality of the superior person in Confucianism. US: California institute of integral studies.
- Easterlin, R.A., 1995. Will Raising the Incomes of All Increase the Happiness of All?. *Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization*, 27(1), pp.35-48.
- Gallie, D., 2003. The quality of working life: is Scandinavia different?. *European Sociological Review*, 19, pp.61-79.
- Ge, Z., 1994. MENCIUS (372-289 B.C.) *Prospects: the quarterly review of comparative education*, vol. 24(1\2), pp.121-130.
- Glaeser, E.L., Laibson, D. and Sacerdote, B., 2002. An Economic Approach To Social Capital. *Economic Journal*, 112(483), pp.437-458.
- Green, F., 2006. *Demanding Work. The Paradox of Job Quality in the Affluent Economy*.

- Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Greene, W.H., 2000. *Econometric Analysis*. 5th ed. New York: Prentice-Hall International.
- Gui, B. and Stanca, L., 2010. Happiness and relational goods: well-being and interpersonal relations in the economic sphere. *International Review of Economics*. 57(2), p.105.
- Hosie, P.J., Sevastos, P. and Cooper, C.L., 2006. *Happy performing managers; the impact of affective wellbeing and intrinsic job satisfaction in the workplace*. UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Layard, R., 2003. Income and Happiness: Rethinking Economic Policy, Lecture 2, London School of Economics, London ([see cep.lse.ac.uk/events/lectures/layard/RL040303.pdf](http://cep.lse.ac.uk/events/lectures/layard/RL040303.pdf)).
- Layard R., 2005. *Happiness; Lessons from a New Science*. New York: The Penguin Press.
- Plug, E.J.S. and Van Praag, B.M.S., 1995. Family equivalence scales within a narrow and broad welfare context. *Journal of Income Distribution*, 4, pp.171-186.
- Sandvik, E., Diener, E. and Seidlitz, L., 1993. Subjective Well-Being: The Convergence and Stability of Self-Report and Non-Self-Report Measures. *Journal of Personality*, 61(3), pp.317-342.
- Stutzer, B.S. and Frey, A., 2002. *What Can Economists Learn from Happiness Research?*. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 40(2), pp.402-435.
- Tsou, M.W. and Liu, J.T., 2001. Happiness and Domain Satisfaction in Taiwan. *Journal of Happiness Studies*, 2(3), pp.269-88.
- Venezia, C.C., 2004. The Ethical Reasoning Abilities of Accounting Students: Comparison between the U.S. and Taiwan. Doctoral Dissertation. Nova Southeastern University. Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, United States.
- Winkelmann, R., 2005. Subjective Well-Being and the Family: Results from an Ordered Probit Model with Multiple Random Effects. *Empirical Economics*, 30(3), pp.749-61.
- Yong, H., 2010. Confucius and Mencius on the motivation of be moral. *Philosophy East and West*, 60(1), pp.65-88.

Work-Family/Family-Work Conflict on Affective Commitment: Moderating Role of Gender

Millissa F. Y. Cheung
Hong Kong Shue Yan University
Email: fychung@hksyu.edu

Chi-Sum Wong
The Chinese University of Hong Kong

INTRODUCTION

The conflict between work and family has been a heated topic for researchers and practitioners over the past three decades (Bordoel et al., 2008; Haar and Bardoel, 2008; Taylor et al., 2009; Westring and Ryan, 2011). It is a form of inter-role conflict in which participation in the work-family role is made difficult by participation in the family-work role (Greenhaus and Beutell, 1985). Conflict between work and family exists in both domains, with work sometimes interfering with family (Work Family Conflict; WFC) and family sometimes interfering with work (Family Work Conflict; FWC). The prevalence of WFC and FWC originates from an increase in the number of working women, working single mothers, and the elderly who require help from their families (Boyar et al., 2005). However, relatively few studies have investigated whether both WFC and FWC relate to work attitudes (Anderson et al., 2002; Premeaux et al., 2007). Clearly, affective commitment is an important work attitude that contributes to a higher level of work performance and citizenship behavior, and also a lower level of turnover (Carmeli, 2005; Vandenberghe and Bentein, 2009). The concept of affective commitment is used to describe employees who strongly identify with and enjoy their relationships with an organization (Allen and Meyer, 1990; Meyer and Allen, 1991). In fact, researchers (Premeaux et al., 2007) suggest that affective commitment is influenced by WFC and FWC (Premeaux et al., 2007) because the conflicts between work and family exhibit time concerns and role demands to meet in either domain. Aside from WFC and FWC, gender (Aven et al., 1993; Elizur and Koslowsky, 2001; Peng et al., 2009) and family

characteristics (Frone et al., 1997; Greenhaus and Parasuraman, 1986) may also influence employees' level of affective commitment. This is because men are expected to give their jobs top priority (Pleck, 1977) whereas dual career women may spend more time, attention, and energy on family than on work (Michel et al., 2011). In addition, working women are less able to take time away from their work roles to meet family expectations (Duxbury and Higgins, 1991). Little has been done, however, to examine whether and how the gender influences the effects of WFC and FWC on the level of employees' affective commitment. This investigation is valuable because an overwhelming amount of research has focused on WFC rather than simultaneously considering WFC and FWC in the same study. Furthermore, most studies (Foley et al., 2005; Luk and Shaffer, 2005) have been confined to the examination of situations that influence the effects that support/stressors have on WFC and/or FWC. Finally, most studies on WFC/FWC have been conducted in individualistic societies such as the United States, with comparatively less work focusing on collectivistic societies in which individuals are focused on close interpersonal harmony and strong hierarchies.

In the current study, we address the shortcomings mentioned above by extending existing WFC studies to include an examination of the influence of both WFC and FWC on employees' affective commitment. We also investigate whether and how such effects are moderated by the gender. The proposed moderation model has been empirically validated on 196 employees from diverse Hong Kong firms. Hong Kong is a Special Administrative Region of China where the high cost of living drives a lot of married women into the workforce. In 2001, there were more working females than males between the ages of 20 and 39 in Hong Kong (Census and Statistics Department, 2011), and consequently, the number of dual-earner families increased. By 2001, over 50% of married women had entered the workforce. Women are also increasingly likely to gain a higher education degree, which means that an increasing number of married women are taking managerial and professional positions. Despite shifts in social roles, Hong Kong women have remained very traditional in their position as spouse and maintain the primary responsibility for childcare and housework. As indicated by Aryee (1993) and Yalom (2000), the increasing shift toward sharing family responsibilities that is common in other areas has still not occurred in Hong Kong.

The significance of this study is that it enriches past WFC and FWC investigations in three meaningful ways. First, our study simultaneously examines the influence of WFC and FWC on employees' attitudes, specifically affective commitment. Second, we integrate WFC and FWC with the gender ideology literature. The interaction of gender with WFC/FWC context exerts a different degree of influence on the level of affective commitment. Finally, we contribute to the limitations of past studies on WFC and FWC by introducing a non-North American context. Practically, the results of our study provide guidance to HR managers regarding employee screening and motivation, particularly when the society in question is experiencing a change in workforce demographics and life-cycle. Given the critical issue of work-family balance, human resources (HR) has a salient role in building a supportive work environment and formulating effective human resources management practices to help employees balancing the work and family domains.




Figure 1. Proposed moderation model.

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Work-family conflicts

Work-family conflict arises when an individual has to perform multiple roles that require time, energy, and commitment (Greenhaus and Beutell, 1985). In an examination of work-family conflict, Zedeck and Mosier (1990) proposed four models that can be applied to the relationship between work and family, including spillover, compensation, segmentation, and conflict. For example, Zedeck and Mosier (1990) applied the spillover theory to posit that an individual who is satisfied with work may also be contented at home, and vice versa. Other researchers (Champoux, 1978; Evans and Barolome, 1984) adopted the compensation theory, which suggests that the relationship between work and family environments is inverted, allowing individuals to invest different amounts of time, energy, and commitment in work and family domains. Other researchers (Evans and Bartolome, 1984; Payton-Miyazaki and Brayfield, 1976) postulated that work can be segmented from family, and individuals that experience success in work does not need to sacrifice success in the family domain, and vice versa. For example, Michel and Hargis (2009) used segmentation theory to explain how WFC influences work and family satisfaction. Grover (1993) used the role conflict theory to explain how an individual whose interests are conflicted may need to make sacrifices in order to balance work against family roles.

Indeed, WFC is bidirectional – work can interfere with family and family can also interfere with work – hence the introduction of FWC. Regardless of whether conflict comes from work or family, it is categorized into behavioral-based, time-based, and strain-based conflict. Behavioral-based conflict occurs when in-role behavior is incompatible with the expected behavior in another domain (Greenhaus and Beutell, 1985). An example of this would be a situation in which the behavior and expectations required of an individual at work are incompatible with the behavior desired from that individual at home within the family domain.

Time-based conflict occurs when an individual serves multiple roles with increased

workloads and role ambiguity, and this gives rise to increasingly tight time schedules for fulfilling work and family roles. Organizational sources of time-based conflict in the workplace include excessive work hours and inflexible schedules or shifts, whereas sources in the family include the presence of young children or dependents, and large families (Green and Zenisek, 1983).

Strain-based conflicts exert a negative influence on the work-life balance through mechanisms such as energy depletion. Strain-based conflicts include time and workload pressure and job insecurity. Plausible sources of strain-based conflict include high workloads, tight deadlines, and increased role ambiguity (Greenhaus and Beutell, 1985). Strain-based conflict can be alleviated by the domestic role that females play within the family (Wallace, 1999).

Our extensive review of the literature on WFC revealed five lines of research. The first line examines WFC antecedents, including workplace social support (DiRenzo et al., 2011; Grandey et al., 2007; Michel et al., 2010; Kossek et al., 2011; Seiger and Wiese, 2009; Shockley and Allen, 2007), stressors and support (Luk and Shaffer, 2005; Michel et al., 2011), perceived organizational support and stressors (Foley et al., 2005), personality (Michel et al., 2011; Rantanen et al., 2005), work-family benefit availability and supportive work-family culture (Thompason et al., 1999), negative affect (Carlson, 1999), supportive work-family culture (Premeaux et al., 2007), coworker support and LMX (Major et al., 2008), job characteristics and formal work-family policies (Taylor et al., 2009), psychological job control (Kossek et al., 2006), perception of control (Thomas and Ganster, 1995), and job levels (DiRenzo et al., 2011).

The second line of research investigates the individual outcomes of work-family conflict, such as depression, hypertension, employee satisfaction, life satisfaction, turnover intentions, and substance abuse (Brunetto et al., 2010; Burke and Greenglass, 1999; Frone, 2000; Grandey and Cropanzano, 1999; Higgins et al., 1992; Frone et al., 1997; Lapierre et al., 2008). Organizational outcomes of work-family conflict include absenteeism, affective commitment, and the intention to leave (Greenhaus et al., 2001; Kossek and Ozeki, 1998).

The third line of research examines work-family conflict as a mediator in the

relationship between workplace support and psychological contract fairness (Taylor et al., 2009), between work-family culture and self-reported distress (Mauno et al., 2005), and between procedural and interpersonal justice and work stress (Judge and Colquitt, 2004).

The fourth line of study focuses on situations that influence the strength of the relationship between work and family stressors/support and WFC. For example, Luk and Shaffer (2005) suggested that family-friendly policies and supportive family supervisors moderate the relationships between work domain stressors (time commitment and work role expectations) and family domain stressors (time commitment, family role expectation, and parental demand) as they relate to WFC and FWC. In addition, Foley and associates (2005) found that perceived organizational support moderates the positive relationship between role overload and WFC.

The last and most recent line of research focuses on the examination of situations that moderate the relationships between WFC and employees' work outcomes. One such exceptional study was conducted by Carr and associates (2008). They found that work-family centrality moderates the relationships between WFC and job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and retentions. While an overwhelming amount of research has focused on WFC, the simultaneous consideration of both WFC and FWC remains under-researched. In addition, sparse work has been done to investigate the situational factors that moderate the effects that WFC and FWC have on employees' work attitudes.

WFC and affective commitment

We use the spillover theory to explain the negative relationship between WFC and affective commitment. Spillover theory (Kanter, 1977) contends that despite physical and temporary boundaries between work and family, individuals' emotions and behavior in one sphere carry over into the other. For example, employees who have a bad day at work might display a higher tendency to carry the bad mood with them when they return home. When employees' work demands infringe on the demands made by family, the inadequate time and dual roles make employees feel stressed because they are unable to complete the required

daily tasks. This inability to complete required tasks leaves these employees with high levels of occupational stress that make it difficult to stop thinking about work when they get home, which influences their behavior within the family environment (Smith, 2000). Such occupational-related stress manifests in individuals and their families as mental and physical health problems (National Institute for Occupational Safety, 2004; Tennant, 2001). If a work organization fails to provide adequate supportive resources, namely flexible work arrangements and job autonomy, employees experiencing occupational stress may have a negative spillover into the family environment - making them less likely to develop close emotional bonds with the organization. In fact, some researchers (Wright and Hobfoll, 2004; Premeaux et al., 2007) have suggested that individuals are more likely to develop and maintain an emotional attachment to the organization they work for when the entity is regarded as a key source of resources.

Hypothesis 1a: WFC will be negatively related to affective commitment.

FWC and affective commitment

The role theory is used to explain the negative link between FWC and affective commitment. As implied by this theory, individuals become psychologically involved in their work and family roles while attempting to meet the role expectations of each domain. Situations that require employees to meet family expectations (such as picking up a sick child from school) during work hours impose greater time and role pressure on the employees. As some researchers note (Greenhaus and Beutell, 1985; Higgins et al., 1992), employees with greater family role expectations find it difficult to devote sufficient time and energy to work. These employees may then have limited psychological time, attention, and energy to build a strong emotional attachment to the organization that employs them.

Hypothesis 1b: FWC is negatively related to affective commitment.

Moderating the role of gender on WFC and affective commitment

The gender ideology model (Feldberg and Glenn, 1979; Marsden et al., 1993) explains how gender moderates the negative relationship between WFC and affective commitment. The gender ideology model stresses gender roles as the key reason for gender differences in work attitudes. In fact, researchers highlighted that females tend to spend more hours than males on housework and childcare activities (Hochschild, 1989). Owing to the fact that females regard housework and childcare as their primary responsibilities, females who need to take on additional work roles may experience a dual pressure when attempting to balance the two domains. When female employees perceive a higher level of WFC than males, they may be strongly de-motivated to develop close emotional bonds with the organization that employs them.

Second, according to the fixed-sum-of-scarce-resources theory (Staines, 1980), females who take on extensive work roles may experience anxiety and guilt because such roles are inconsistent with society's familial role expectations. This increase in negative emotions may prompt female employees to perceive WFC as even more damaging, creating a stronger disincentive to develop a high level of affective commitment with the organization.

Third, researchers (Barnett and Baruch, 1987; Duxbury and Higgins, 1991) have also suggested that females are less able than males to take time away from work to meet family expectations. When female employees are faced with limitations to their ability to control the time available to them, they may regard the work environment as threatening, which further reduces their interest in building emotional bonds with the organization that employs them.

Hypothesis 2a: The relationship between WFC and affective commitment is a more negative experience for females than it is for males.

Moderating the role of gender on FWC and affective commitment

On the basis of traditional social roles, females are expected to make childcare and family responsibilities a priority (Galinsky et al., 1991; Hochschild, 1989; Schwartz, 1992).

However, some females will rather choose to delay the occurrence of work-family imbalance by giving birth to children after they have achieved some degree of career success (Abbott et al., 1998). On basis of this situation, working females must balance their family and work roles. Given the additional work role, it is unavoidable for females to experience a negative spillover of family needs into work ones. For example, female employees might make personal calls to the childcare center that their children attend during work hours. In an attempt to fulfill different work and family needs, these females may face increased pressure from time demands, resulting in a resource drain. Resource drain theory suggests that resources such as time, attention, and physical and psychological energy are finite (Edward and Rothbard, 2000; Small and Riley, 1990; Staines, 1980; Tenbrunsel et al., 1995). Given the primary role of family responsibility and the availability of finite resources within the lives of working females, increasing the resources applied to meeting the demands of family roles results in a decrease in the resources available for the demands of the work roles. Assuming an individual has a limited amount of expendable physical and psychological resources, increased family time demands may deplete a large amount of resources, which leaves female employees with fewer resources to apply at work. Because affective commitment requires time and effort to build, we expect that females with FWCs will have access to fewer resources for building affective commitment.

Hypothesis 2b: The relationship between FWC and affective commitment is more negative for females than for males.

METHOD

Procedure

We randomly selected organizations from the following industries as listed in the Directory of Hong Kong to secure a diverse working sample: civil service, community, personal, social service, financial, insurance, real estate, wholesale, retail, import-export trade, hotel, transportation, and storage services. We contacted the human resource managers of the

selected organizations to solicit their participation. For those who were willing to participate, we dispatched local research assistants to collect data from the respondents on-site. In addition, we also asked the respondents to pass another set of questionnaires to their spouses and reminded the respondents not to discuss their answers with their spouses when completing the questionnaire. To increase the confidentiality of the responses, self-addressed envelopes were provided for the respondents and their spouses. WFC measurements were obtained from two sources to mitigate problems related to common method variance. During the on-site data collection, our research assistants clearly explained the research objectives and procedures for collecting data, guaranteeing the anonymity of the respondents. First, we conducted twenty pilot tests from a Hong Kong service firm to ensure that the measures and meanings of the constructs were properly expressed. Next, we followed Brislin and associates (1973) procedures of back translation, with one researcher translating the items from English into Chinese, then back translating the items from Chinese to English. The purpose of doing so was to catch and correct any discrepancies in the meaning of every item. Next, we addressed these discrepancies and improved the clarity of our instructions.

Of the 951 distributed questionnaire packages, 196 matched employee-spouse responses were returned, yielding a 20.6% rate of response. In the sample, 39.3% were female and 60.7% were male. Most participants were young, between 22 and 57 years old, with a mean age of 36.4 years ($SD = 8.14$) and they worked between 28 and 90 hours per week with a mean of 52.5 hours per week ($SD = 8.17$).

Measures

Work-Family Conflict (WFC) and Family-Work Conflict (FWC)

Six WFC and FWC items were adopted from Carlson and associates (1998). Responses were on a five-point scale (1 = ‘Strongly disagree’, 5 = ‘Strongly agree’). One example of a WFC item is, “My work keeps me from my family activities more than I would like.” One example of an FWC item is, “The time I spend with my family often does not allow me to spend time in activities at work that could be helpful to my career.” To minimize the problem

of common method variance (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986), both the employees and their spouses provided the WFC ratings. The correlation for these ratings was 0.48, which suggests a fairly strong correspondence between employees and their spouses. The reliability estimates for WFC and FWC were 0.90 and 0.86, respectively. Because spouses were less likely to know the extent of FWC being experienced, we did not ask the spouses about FWC.

Affective commitment

Affective commitment was measured by Meyer, Allen, and Smith's (1993) scale. An example item was, "I do not feel a strong sense of belonging to my organization." The reliability of this sample was 0.90.

Gender

Male respondents were coded as 0, and female respondents were coded as 1.

Analytical procedure

Prior to testing the three hypotheses, we used the AMOS 16.0 software package to conduct a confirmatory factor analysis comparing the fit indices of a three-factor model that comprised the quality of WFC, FWC, and AC (affective commitment). Because the chi-square test is sensitive to sample size, the overall model fit was tested using the following fit indices, including the root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA), the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), and the comparative fit index (CFI). A reasonable model fit was revealed when the RMSEA was below .08 (Browne and Cudeck, 1993) and the TLI and CFI were above 0.90 (Byrne, 1998). The results indicated that the hypothesized three-factor model, namely WFC, FWC, and AC ($\chi^2 = 597$, $d.f. = 88$, CFI = 0.97, TLI = 0.96, RMSEA = 0.06) had a better fit than the single-factor model ($\chi^2 = 795.5$, $d.f. = 90$, CFI = 0.65, TLI = 0.89, RMSEA = 0.09). The change in the Chi-square value was significant ($\Delta\chi^2 = 198.5$, $d.f. = 2$, $p < 0.001$), yielding a high level of convergent validity for the three-factor model.

Next, we ran a factor analysis to confirm the number of extracted factors. The rotated

component matrix results indicated that three factors were extracted, resulting in an eigenvalue greater than 1, explaining 70.89% of the total variance. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of 0.90 ($p < 0.001$) was higher than the acceptable level of 0.50.

The fact that the reliability of WFC, FWC, and AC were above the acceptable level of 0.70 indicated a high degree of convergent validity. The average variance extract (AVE) for WFC and AC (1.86), and for FWC and AC (1.46), were found to be greater than the squared correlation between the latent variables of WFC and AC (0.24), and FWC and AC (0.23). Clearly, the relationships among WFC, FWC, and AC were exposed to a minimal level of common method bias. In addition, we also closely followed the recommendations of Podsakoff and colleagues (2003) to reduce the possibility of common method bias by intermixing items of different constructs, including negatively recoded items, and collecting data from different respondents in various places in different time periods.

To test Hypotheses 1a and 1b, the structural equations path between WFC and AC, as well as FWC and AC, were tested. Relating to Hypothesis 2, we split the sample into males and females and then conducted multi-group structural equations modeling analyses. The relevant structural path of each hypothesis was constrained to be equal across groups as the baseline model. This model was then compared to the model that allows the hypothesized paths to be freely estimated across the gender groups. The hypothesized gender differences are revealed when the change in chi-square value of the model is significant. To test whether males or females exhibit a significantly stronger relationship between WFC/FWC and affective commitment, we compared the beta value of WFC and AC between males and females.

RESULTS

Testing hypotheses

The means, standard deviations, and correlations among the variables are shown in Table 1. In this table, the means ranged from 3.14 to 6.14 and the standard deviations ranged

from 1.02 to 1.63. WFC was negatively related to AC ($r = -0.49, p < 0.01$) and FWC ($r = -0.49, p < .01$). The results of the structural equations modeling indicated that affective commitment was negatively predicted by WFC ($\beta = -0.59, p < .001$) and FWC ($\beta = -0.24, p < .05$). Hence, Hypotheses 1a and 1b were supported.

Table 1. Means, standard deviations, and correlations

	Mean	S.D.	1	2	3	4	5
1. Gender (female = 1)	.61	.49					
2. FWC	5.44	1.37	.23**	-.07			
3. WFC	6.14	1.63	.13	-.06	.62**		
4. AC	3.14	1.02	-.14*	.09	-.49**	-.49**	---

$n = 196$

Note:

FWC = Family-work conflicts

WFC = Work-family conflicts

AC = Affective commitment

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$.

Next, we conducted multi-group structural equations modeling analyses to test Hypothesis 2a. We split the sample into male and female groups. The overall fit of the baseline model (with path coefficients constrained to be the same for the two groups) to the data was acceptable. The chi-square value was 298.70 ($d.f. = 54, p < 0.001$) with RMSEA = 0.05, TLI = 0.97, and CFI = 0.98. When the path involved in the hypothesis was freed, the model chi-square value decreased ($\chi^2 = 249.4, d.f. = 52, p < 0.001$) and RMSEA = 0.10, TLI = 0.76, and CFI = 0.79, prompting a significant change ($\Delta\chi^2(2) = 49.30, p < 0.001$). In addition, the negative relationship between WFC and affective commitment was found to be significantly stronger for females ($\beta = -0.61, p < .001$) than for males ($\beta = -0.47, p < 0.001$). Therefore, Hypothesis 2a was supported. Regarding Hypothesis 2b, the chi-square value of the baseline model on the relationship between FWC and affective commitment was 181.30 ($d.f. = 54, p < 0.001$) with RMSEA = 0.08, TLI = 0.96, and CFI = 0.98. When the path between FWC and affective commitment was freed, the model chi-square value decreased ($\chi^2 = 143.50, d.f. = 52, p < 0.001$) with RMSEA = 0.08, TLI = 0.92, and CFI = 0.92, prompting a

significant change ($\Delta\chi^2(2) = 37.80, p < 0.001$). Surprisingly, the negative relationship between FWC and affective commitment was stronger for the male group ($\beta = -.052, p < 0.001$) than for the female group ($\beta = -0.42, p < 0.001$). Thus, Hypothesis 2b was not supported.

Additional analysis

Our hypotheses concentrated on the phenomenon of how employees react when faced with WFC and FWC. The results largely support our expectation that the strength of this reaction depends on the employees' gender. However, it is also possible that gender has a direct effect on WFC and FWC. For instance, as females tend to take on more of the responsibilities required by their families, they may experience more WFC and FWC. If this is the case, it may not be suitable to interpret the effects of their moderation alone. To test this possibility, we conducted t-tests on WFC and FWC using gender to divide our sample into subgroups. The results are shown in Table 2. No significant differences were observed for our sample. It appears that, at least for our sample, females may have to adjust their management of family responsibilities so that they do not experience more WFC and FWC. However, although the level of WFC and FWC are the same, their reactions in terms of affective commitment are different. Thus, the moderating effects of gender should not have been confounded by their direct effect on WFC and FWC.

Table 2. T-test results on WFC and FWC for different gender

	Male (n=105)		Female (n=89)		T-statistics
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	
WFC	4.70	1.02	4.52	0.85	1.38
FWC	4.64	1.02	4.42	0.83	1.67

DISCUSSION

This study set out to examine the moderating role of gender on the effects that WFC and FWC have on employees' level of affective commitment. As expected, the relationship between WFC and affective commitment was found to be stronger for females than it was for

males. Unexpectedly, the relationship between FWC and affective commitment was found to be stronger for males than for females.

Our findings indicate that gender can moderate the negative effects of WFC/FWC on affective commitment. The concern with family as the primary responsibility may generate role conflict and time stressors for employees who need to balance their work and family domains. In this context, employees may view WFC and FWC more negatively due to the draining of resources for family needs that prevents them from developing a high level of affective commitment.

Surprisingly, our results revealed that the negative relationship between FWC and affective commitment is stronger for males than for females. One plausible explanation for this is that males tend to make work a higher priority than family (Pleck, 1977). HR researchers (Duxbury et al., 1992; Pleck, 1985; Voydanoff, 1988) also highlighted the fact that males tend to spend more hours engaged in paid employment than females. When males are asked to put family needs before work needs, males resist because doing so is inconsistent with societal and organizational norms. Males also largely believed that the devotion of time and effort to family during work hours slowed the pace of their career development. In this context, males may perceive FWC as a greater hindrance that distracts their full attention from their work, creating a more extreme drop in the level of affective commitment than witnessed among female employees. Comparatively, females who make housework and family responsibilities their priority are more psychologically prepared for the time stress and strain of performing dual careers. Compared to males, females may perceive FWC as less threatening, which results in it having a less pronounced effect on their level of affective commitment.

This study is one of the first HR studies that propose and report that gender is a good moderator that influences the negative effects of WFC and FWC on affective commitment. Specifically, our findings provide empirical support for the gender model (Marsden et al., 1993; Ngo and Tsang, 1998). Owing to the strong influence of traditional gender role ideology, Chinese women are used to giving family roles priority over their work roles. In addition, Chinese women are more willing to make sacrifices for their careers, particularly in a

collectivistic society such as China. Our results also extend the HR study of Premeaux and associates (2007), which only examined the link between WFC and FWC and affective commitment. In addition, our results enrich the HR study of Carr, Boyar, and Gregory (2008) that examined the moderating role of work-family centrality on WFC and employees' outcomes. Our findings theoretically integrate gender into WFC and FWC studies, and therefore contribute to the limited HR studies on WFC/FWC by introducing a non-North American context.

Practically, this study provides some suggestions to HR managers for enhancing the level of employees' affective commitment. First, HR practitioners should pay attention to both WFC and FWC because both types of conflicts are detrimental to the level of employees' affective commitment. For example, HR managers should be aware of the family roles of their employees and provide them with beneficial work arrangements. For example, some company functions may be organized in a way that allows them to accommodate employees' family members so that employees can fulfill the demands from both sides simultaneously. Alternatively, given the salient moderating role of gender, HR managers could be encouraged to know the degree of family responsibility that they carry, such as the number and age of their children. Knowing such information would allow them to set reasonable deadlines and effectively assign job duties. In particular, HR researchers (Bedeian et al., 1988; Kelly and Voydanoff, 1985) have suggested that the number of children employees exert significant influences on affecting the employees' ability to accommodate family demands along with work responsibilities (Bedeian et al., 1988; Kelly and Voydanoff, 1985). Individuals with younger children at home reported more conflict between work and family (Burke et al., 1979) because their situation left them with less time, attention, and energy to apply at work (Grandey and Cropanzano, 1999). Finally, in light of Swody and Powell (2007)'s study, HR practitioners may welcome the suggestions of employees before the formulation and implementation of supportive work-family practices to alleviate the employees' time and role strain brought by the work-family imbalances.

This study is not without limitations. First, the cross-sectional nature of this study does not allow for a true test of causality, nor does it rule out the possibility of reverse causality.

Second, we only collected data from employees' spouses on WFC, which made it difficult to cross-validate the ratings provided.

Future research is needed to assess the applicability of the findings to other professionals, cultures, and organizations. Based on the research (Adams et al., 1996; Carlson and Perrewé, 1999; Greenhaus and Parasuraman, 1999) that suggests that social support is related to WFC/FWC, we propose that future studies focus on whether the degree of family support and family-supportive supervisors moderate the effects of FWC and WFC on affective commitment. Researchers could also test our proposed moderation model on other forms of work behavior, such as employee retentions and absenteeism. We hope that our study will provide the insights researchers need to address these issues and gain additional understanding of the conditions that affect the strength of the link between WFC/FWC and employees' work responses.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, our findings demonstrate that gender is good moderator that affects the relationship of WFC/FWC on affective commitment. Our findings suggest that HR managers should be equipped with the skills and ability to implement effective HR policies and practices to support their employees in balancing work and family domains in the key objective of strengthening the employees' affective bonds to the organization.

REFERENCES

- Abbott, J., De Cieri, H. and Iverson, R.D., 1998. Costing turnover: Implications of work/family conflict at management level. *Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources*, 36, pp.25-43.
- Adams, G.A., King, L.A. and King, D.W., 1996. Relationship of job and family involvement, family social support, and work-family conflict with job and life satisfaction. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 81(40), pp.411-420.
- Allen, N.J. and Meyer, J.P., 1990. The measurement and antecedents of affective, continuance, and normative commitment to the organization. *Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology*, 63(1), pp.1-8.
- Anderson, S.E., Coffey, B.S. and Byerly, R.T., 2002. Formal organizational initiatives and informal workplace practices: Links to work-life conflict and job-related outcomes. *Journal of Management*, 28(6), pp. 787-810.
- Aryee, S., 1993. Antecedents and outcomes of work-family conflict among married professional women: Evidence from Singapore. *Human Relations*, 45(8), pp. 813-837.
- Aven, F.F., Parker, B. and McEvoy, G.M., 1993. Gender and attitudinal commitment to organizations: A meta-analysis. *Journal of Business Research*, 26(2), pp.63-73.
- Bardoel, E., De Cieri, H. and Santos, C., 2008. A review of work-life research in Australia and New Zealand. *Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources*, 46(3), pp.316-333.
- Barnett, R.C. and Baruch, G.K., 1994. Social roles, gender and psychological distress. In: R.C. Barnett., L. Biener., and G.K. Baruch, ed. 1987. *Gender and stress*. New York: Free Press, pp.122-143.
- Bedeian, A.G., Burke, B.G. and Moffett, R.G., 1988. Outcomes of work-family conflict among married male and female professionals. *Journal of Management*, 14(3), pp. 475-491.
- Boyar, S.L., Maertz, C.P. and Pearson, A.W., 2005. The effects of work-family conflict and family-work conflict on nonattendance behaviors. *Journal of Business Research*, 58(3), pp.919-925.
- Brislin, R.W., Lonner, W.J. and Thorndike, R.M., 1973. *Cross-cultural research methods*. New York: Wiley.
- Brunetto, Y., Farr-Wharton, R., Ramsay, S. and Shacklock, K., 2010. Supervisor relationships

- and perceptions of work-family conflict. *Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources*, 48(3), pp. 212-232.
- Burke, R.J. and Greenglass, E.R., 2001. Work-family conflict, spouse support, and nurse-staff well-being during organizational restructuring. *Journal of Occupational Health Psychology*, 4, pp. 327-336.
- Burke, R.J., Weir, T. and DuWors, R.E., 1979. Type A behavior of administrators and wives' reports of marital satisfaction and well-being. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 64(1), pp. 57-65.
- Carlson, D.S., 1999. Personality and role variables as predictors of three forms of work-family conflict. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, 55(2), pp. 236-253.
- Carlson, D.S. and Perrewé, P.L., 1999. The role of social support in the stressor-strain relationship: An examination of work-family conflict. *Journal of Management*, 25(4), pp. 513-527.
- Carlson, D.S., Kacmar, K.M. and Williams, L.J., 1998. *The development and validation of a multi-dimensional measure of work-family conflict*. Proceedings of the 1998 Academic of Management Meeting, San Diego, California, U.S.A.
- Carmeli, A., 2005. Perceived external prestige, affective commitment, and citizenship behaviors. *Organizational Studies*, 26(3), pp. 443-464.
- Carr, J.C., Boyar, S.L. and Gregory, B.T., 2008. The moderating effect of work-family centrality on work-family conflict, organizational attitudes, and turnover behavior. *Journal of Management*, 34(2), pp. 244-262.
- Champoux, J.E., 1978. Perceptions of work and nonwork: A reexamination of the compensatory and spillover models. *Sociology of Work and Occupations* 5, pp. 402-422.
- DiRenzo, M.S., Greenhaus, J.H. and Weer, C.H., 2011. Job level, demands, and resources as antecedents of work-family conflict. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, 78(March), pp. 305-314.
- Duxbury, L. and Higgins, C., 1991. Gender differences in work-family conflict. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 76(1), pp. 60-74.
- Duxbury, L., Lee, C., Higgins, C.A. and Mills, S., 1992. Time spent in paid employment. *Optimum*, 23(2), pp. 38-45.

- Edwards, J.R. and Rothbard, N.P., 2000. Mechanisms linking work and family: Clarifying the relationship between work and family constructs. *Academy of Management Review*, 25, pp.178-199.
- Elizur, D. and Koslowsky, M., 2001. Values and organizational commitment. *International Journal of Manpower*, 22(7), pp. 593-599.
- Evans, P. and Bartolome, F., 1984. The changing pictures of the relationship between career and family. *Journal of Occupational Behavior*, 5(1), pp. 9-21.
- Feldberg, R. and Glenn, E.N., 1979. Male and female: Job versus gender models in the sociology of work. *Social Problems*, 26(5), pp. 524-38.
- Foley, S., Ngo, H.Y. and Lui, S., 2005. The effects of work stressors, perceived organizational support, and gender on work-family conflict in Hong Kong. *Asia Pacific Journal of Management*, 22(3), pp.237-256.
- Frone, M.R., 2000. Interpersonal conflict at work and psychological outcomes: Testing a model among young workers. *Occupational and Health Psychology*, 5(2), pp. 246-255.
- Frone, M.R., Russell, M. and Cooper, M.L., 1997. Relation of work-family conflict to health outcomes: A four-year longitudinal study of employed parents. *Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology*, 70(4), pp. 325-335.
- Galinsky, E., Friedman, D. and Hernandez, C., 1991. *The Corporate reference guide to work family programs*. New York: Families and Work Institute.
- Grandey, A.A. and Cropanzano, R., 1999. The conservation of resources model applied to work-family conflict and strain. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, 54, pp. 350-370.
- Grandey, A.A., Cordeiro, B.L. and Michael, J.H., 2007. Work-family supportiveness organizational perceptions: Important for the well-being of male blue-collar hourly workers? *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, 71, pp. 460- 478.
- Green, D.H. and Zenisek, T.J., 1983. Dual career couples: Individuals and organizational implications. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 2(3), pp. 171-184.
- Greenhaus, J.H. and Parasuraman, S., 1986. A work-nonwork interactive perspective of stress and its consequences. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 8, pp. 37-60.
- Greenhaus, J.H., Parasuraman, S., Granrose, C.S., Rabinowitz, S. and Beutell, N.J., 1989. Sources of work/family conflict among two-career couples. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, 34(2), pp. 133-153.

- Greenhaus, J.H. and Beutell, N.J., 1985 Sources of conflict between work and family roles. *Academy of Management Review*, 10(1), pp. 76-88.
- Grover, S.L., 1993. Why professionals lie: The impact of professional role conflict on reporting accuracy. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 55(2), pp. 251-272.
- Haar, J.M. and Bardoel, E., 2008. Positive spillover from the work-family interface: A study of Australia employees. *Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources*, 46(3), pp. 275-287.
- Higgins, C.A., Duxbury, L.E. and Irving, R.H., 1992. Work-family conflict in the dual-career family. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 51(1), pp. 51-75.
- Hochschild, A., 1989. *The second shift*. New York: Viking.
- Household composition of domestic households.*, 2001. Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department.
- Judge, T.A. and Colquitt, J.A., 2004. Organizational justice and stress: The mediating role of work-family conflict. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 89(3), pp.395-404.
- Kanter, R.M., 1977. *Work and family in the United States: A critical review and Agenda for research and policy*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Kelly, R.F, and Voydanoff, P., 1985. Work-family role strain among employed parents. *Family Relations*, 34(3), pp. 367-374.
- Kossek, E.E. and Ozeki, C., 1998. Work–family conflict, policies, and the job–life satisfaction relationship: A review and directions for organizational behavior–human resources research. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 83(2), pp. 139–149.
- Kossek, E.E., Lautsch, B.A. and Eaton, S.C., 2006. Telecommuting, control, and boundary management: Correlates of policy use and practice, job control, and work-family effectiveness. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, 68, pp. 347-367.
- Lapierre, L.M., Spector, P.E., Allen, T.D., Poelmans, S., and Cooper, C.L., 2008. Family supportive organization perceptions, multiple dimensions of work-family conflict, and employee satisfaction: A test of model across five samples. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, 71(1), pp. 92- 106.
- Luk, D. and Shaffer, M.A., 2005. Work and family domain stressors and support: Within and cross-domain influences on work-family conflict. *Journal of Occupational and*

- Organizational Psychology*, 78(4), pp. 489-508.
- Major, D.A., Fletcher, T.D., Davis, D.D. and Germano, L.M., 2008. The influence of work-family culture and workplace relationships on work interference with family: A multilevel model. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 29(7), pp. 881-897.
- Marsden, P.V., Kalleberg, A.L. and Cook, C., 1993. Gender differences in organizational commitment: Influences of work positions and family roles. *Work and Occupation*, 20(3), pp. 368-390.
- Mauno, S., Kinnunen, U. and Pyykko, M., 2005. Does work-family conflict mediate the relationship between work-family culture and self-reported distress? Evidence from five Finnish organizations. *Occupational and Organizational Psychology*, 78, pp.209-231.
- Meyer, J.P. and Allen, N.J., 1991. A three-component conceptualization of organizational commitment: Some methodological considerations *Human Resource Management Review*, 1, pp. 61-98.
- Meyer, J.P., Allen, N.J. and Smith, C., 1993. Commitment to organizations and occupations: Extension and test of a three-component conceptualization. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 78, pp. 538-551.
- Michel, J.S. and Hargis, M., 2008. Linking mechanisms of work-family conflict and segmentation. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, 73(3), pp. 509-522.
- Michel, J.S., Clark, M.A. and Jaramillo, D., 2011. The role of the five factor model of personality in the perceptions of negative and positive forms of work-non work spillover: A meta-analytic review. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, 79(1), pp. 191-203.
- Michel, J.S., Kotrbam, L.M., Mitchelson, J.K., Clark, M.A. and Baltes, B.B., 2011. Antecedents of work-family conflict: A meta-analytic review. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, 79, pp. 689-725.
- Michel, J.S., Michelson, J.K., Pichler, S. and Cullen, K.L., 2010. Clarifying relationships among work and family support, stressors, and work-family conflict. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, 76(1), pp. 91- 104.
- Ngo, H.Y. and Tsang, W.N., 1998. Employment practices and organizational commitment: Differential effects for men and women? *The International Journal of Organizational*

- Analysis*, 6(3), pp. 251-266.
- Payton-Miyazaki, M. and Brayfield, A.H., 1976. The good job and the good life: Relation of characteristics of employment to general well-being. In: A.D. Biderman and T.F. Drury, ed. *Measuring work quality for social reporting* Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, pp.105-150.
- Peng, K.Z., Ngo, H.Y., Shi, J. and Wong, C.S., 2009. Gender differences in the work commitment of Chinese workers: An investigation of two alternative explanations. *Journal of World Business*, 44(3), pp. 323-335.
- Pleck, J., 1977. The work-family role system. *Social Problems*, 24, pp. 417-428.
- Pleck, J., 1985. *Working wives/working husbands*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Podsakoff, P.M. and Organ, D.W., 1986. Self-reports in organizational research: Problems and prospects. *Journal of Management*, 12(4), pp. 69–82.
- Podsakoff, P.M., MacKenzie, S.B., Lee, J.Y. and Podsakoff, N.P., 2003. Common method biases in behavioral research: A critical review of the literature and recommended remedies. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 88(5), pp. 879-903.
- Population census*, 2011. Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department.
- Rantanen, J. Pulkkinen, L. and Kinnunen, U., 2005. The big five personality dimensions, work-family conflict, and psychological distress: A longitudinal view. *Journal of Individual Differences*, 26(3), pp.155-166.
- Schwartz, F., 1992. *Breaking with traditional: Women and work and the new facts of life*. New York: Warner Books.
- Seiger, C. and Wiese, B.S., 2009. Social support from work and family domains as an antecedent or moderator of work-family conflicts? *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, 75(1), pp. 26-37.
- Shockley, K.M. and Allen, T.D., 2007. When flexibility helps: Another look at the availability of flexible work arrangements and work-family conflict. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, 71(3), pp. 479-493.
- Small, S.A. and Riley, D., 1990. Toward a multidimensional assessment of work spillover. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 52(1), pp.51-61.
- Smith, A., 2000. The scale of perceived occupational stress. *Occupational Medicine*, 50(5), pp. 294-298.

- Staines, G., 1980. Spillover versus compensation: A review of the literature of the relationships between work and non-work. *Human Relations*, 33(2), pp. 111-129.
- Swody, C.A. and Powell, G.N., 2007. Determinants of employee participation in organizations' family-friendly programs: a multi-level approach. *Journal of Business and Psychology*, 22, pp. 111-22.
- Taylor, B., DelCampo, R.G. and Blancero, D., 2009. The relationship between work-family conflict/facilitation and psychological contract fairness among Hispanic business professionals. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 30(5), pp. 643-664.
- Tenbrunsel, A.E., Brett, J.M., Maoz, E. Stroh, L.K. and Reilly, A.H., 1995. Dynamic and static work-family relationships. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 63(3), pp. 233-246.
- Tennant, C., 2001. Work-related stress and depressive disorders, *Journal of Psychosomatic Research*, 51(5), pp. 697-704.
- Thomas, L. and Ganster, D., 1995. Impact of family supportive work variables on work-family conflict and strain: A control perspective. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 80(1), pp. 6-15.
- Thompson, C.A., Beauvais, L.L. and Lyness, K.S., 1999. When work-family benefits are not enough: The influence of work-family culture on benefit utilization, organizational attachment, and work-family conflict. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, 54(3), pp. 392-415.
- Vandenberghe, C. and Bentein, K., 2009. A closer look at the relationship between affective commitment to supervisors and organizations and turnover. *Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology*, 82(2), pp. 331- 348.
- Voydanoff, P., 1988. Work role characteristics, family structure demands and work/family conflict. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 50(August), pp. 749-761.
- Wallace, J.E., 1999. Work-to-non-work conflict among married male and female lawyers. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 20, pp. 797-816.
- Westring, A.F. and Ryan, A.M., 2011. Anticipated work-family conflict: A construct investigation. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, 79(2), pp. 596-610.
- Worker health chartbook*. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. 2004. *Worker Health Chartbook*. (NIOSH Publication Number 2004-146). NIOSH: Cincinnati, OH.

- Wright, T.A. and Hobfoll, S.E., 2004. Commitment, psychological well-being and job performance: An examination of the conservation of resources (COR) theory and job burnout. *Journal of Business and Management*, 9, pp. 389-406.
- Yalom, M., 2000. *A history of the wife*. New York, NY: Harper Collins.
- Zedeck, S and Mosier, K.L., 1990. Work in the family and employing organization. *American Psychologist*, 45(2), pp. 240-251.

Factors Affecting Family Resilience: A Research on Validating FAAR Model

P.Y. Lui, L.Y. Lo*, M.T. Leung, Y.K. Wong, H.Y. Mak, K.C. So and L.P. Lee
Hong Kong Shue Yan University
*Email: lylo@hksyu.edu

INTRODUCTION

Family resilience is commonly referred to a family's ability in struggling against adversity. It reflects a capability of a family to address and manage the problems in the real life situations (Orthner, Jones-Sanpei and Williamson, 2003; Patterson, 2010). Different models have been proposed in the investigation of family resilience since the last few decades. Hill's (1949) ABCX Family Crisis Model was the one of the early family-stress framework which described the crisis formation of a family. Later, based on Hill's work, a Double ABCX Model (McCubbin & Patterson, 1983a) was then developed. It was an advanced model which explained how the families recover from the crisis and achieve adaptation. Afterwards, the Family Adjustment and Adaptation Response (FAAR) Model (Patterson, 1988) was further modified which described the interaction between different components in the overall family adaptation process.

OVERVIEW OF THE FAAR MODEL

In FAAR Model (Patterson, 1988), it describes when a family faces the demands, it would use its own capabilities in order to meet with the challenges and attempt to achieve an equilibrium status. If demands outweigh the family's strengths, crises may occur. Therefore, the families have to adjust and adapt repeatedly so as to achieve the equilibrium status from time to time.

During the process of adjustment, meaning is a critical factor. There were two levels of meanings in the FAAR model. The first level is the situational meaning. It refers to how a

family gives meaning to the demands and the family capabilities. Since the situations happen in a family may change from time to time, it is noted that the situational meaning varies across time. The second level is the global meaning (or family schema) which refers to the implicit and shared beliefs among a family (e.g., trust among family members). It is noted that the global meaning was a relatively stable in the overall family adaptation process.

Patterson's FAAR Model (1988) was commonly adopted as theoretical basis in different family studies (e.g., Carnes & Quinn, 2006; Poth, 2004; Rothwell & Han, 2009; Watson, 2008). which focus on the relations among family's strengths, stressors and demands. Apart from these, the family strengths claimed in FAAR Model (Patterson, 1988) are also validated by other studies. Family cohesion (Olson, Sprenkle and Russell, 1979), family communication (Stinnett, 1979), religious foundation (Kelley & Sequeira, 1997), and economic strength (Conger & Conger, 2000; Cronsnoe, Mistry and Elder, 2002; Simons, Whitbeck, Melby and Wu, 1994), are all family's strength that can be regarded as a protective factors in tackling the family's stressors and demands. Orthner et al. (2003) has systematically formulated a Family Strength Index (FSI), which has summarized the family strengths into six dimensions, which includes economic strength, communication strength, problem solving strength, social support strength, family cohesion strength, and religion support strength. All these six factors were found to be contributive in resolving family crisis (Orthner et al., 2003).

FOCUS OF CURRENT RESEARCH

The three family crises being studied in Orthner et al.'s research (2003) were less differentiated and specific than what FAAR Model suggested. The crises generally referred to "personal and family problems... come up during the course of everyday living" and "meet the various need". The only specific crisis concern whether children would have "educational opportunity that will help them succeed". As proposed by Patterson (1988), different crises bring different effects to family. In the FAAR Model, crises are differentiated into four board categories such as the individual survival needs and developmental tasks, family tasks of maintenance and development, changing social conditions, and illness. Therefore, in the

present research, the crises which suggested in FSI (Orthner et al., 2003) were replaced by the ones suggested in the FAAR Model (Patterson, 1988). But specifically, the crises under the category of changing social conditions are not included as the crises (e.g., Tornado and draft youth for war) do not match with the situation in Hong Kong.

Second, as mentioned in FAAR Model, a global meaning component is also a critical strength which may affect the family resilience. So, on top of FSI, a global meaning component (family schema) is newly added into the measurement. The reason of not including another type of meaning, i.e., situational meaning, into the FSI is due to its variability. The situational meaning would vary across situation and crisis which becomes difficult to be reliably expressed in an inventory, like FSI.

A major aim of the current research is to modify FSI (Orthner et al., 2003) with the support of FAAR Model. Besides, it is predicted that different family strengths (predictors) have different degrees of influences when a family faces various crises (outcome measures).

METHODOLOGY

Participants

There were a total number of one hundred and sixteen participants (M=20, F=94) in this study. Their age was distributed as twenty to thirty (N=5), thirty to forty (N=24), forty to fifty (N=62), fifty to sixty (N=20), over sixty (N=5). The participants are the parents who have at least one child under eighteen years old living together.

Materials

Two sets of inventories were adopted in the current research. In order to measure the family strengths, FSI (Orthner et al., 2003) with the original thirty-two items was adopted. Particularly, in the economic domain, one additional item “my family is able to manage the daily medical expense” was newly added as the original item “every family members are

covered by medical insurance” may not truly reflect family’s capability in dealing with the medical expense in Hong Kong. Also, three more items were added into the problem solving domain in FSI. These three items indicated the characteristics of family schema including framability (family optimistically face the problems), relativism (family have a realistic expectation in solving problem) and shared control (family share the consequence of how the problems are being solved). All of them were randomized in the questionnaire. See Table 1.

Table 1. Family Strengths in FSI

Strength Dimensions	No. of Items
Economic Strength	5
Communication Strength	7
Problem solving Strength	6
Social support Strength	4
Family cohesion Strength	6
Religious support Strength	4

Family crises was examined by another set of inventory. In this part, there were in total eight items which were adopted from the one suggested in FAAR Model (Patterson, 1988). They were summarized in Table 2. Participants were asked to filled in the confidence level, in a 5-point likert scale, when dealing with those eight different types of family crises.

Table 2. Crises adopted from FAAR Model

1. Dealing with Children Developmental Problem
2. Dealing with Familial financial problem
3. Dealing with Intra-familial conflicts
4. Dealing with Breadwinner’s Unemployment
5. Dealing with Family Members’ Hesitation to Share Family Duties
6. Dealing with Family Members’ Incidental Medical Situation
7. Dealing with Children having Chronic Illness
8. Dealing with Loss of Family Member

Procedure

A Non-governmental organization in Hong Kong (Wong Cho Tong District Elderly Community Centre) was invited to help in questionnaires distributing. All the questionnaires were distributed and collected from October to November, 2011. Participants were required to return the questionnaires once completed. If they encountered any problems during the process of filling the questionnaire, they can contact two of our researchers for further clarification.

RESULT AND ANALYSIS

Descriptive results of reliability, mean and standard deviation of each type of the family strengths are shown in Table 3. Descriptive results of the means and standard deviations of the confidence scoring in different family crises are shown in Table 4.

Economic strength and problem-solving strength were positively correlate to the confidence level of handing each of the eight family crises (in short, the confidence level would be referred as “family crises” in the following), including dealing with children developmental problem, familial financial problem, intra-familial conflicts, breadwinner’s unemployment, family members’ hesitation to share family duties, family members’ incidental medical situation, children having chronic illness and loss of family member. All p-values were smaller than 0.05. See Table 5. Whereas social support strength did not correlate to the confidence level in any of the eight crises i.e., outcome measures.

There were positive correlations between communication strength and six of the outcome measures including dealing with children developmental problem, dealing with familial financial problem, dealing with intra-familial conflicts, dealing with breadwinner’s unemployment, dealing with family members’ hesitation to share family duties and dealing with family members’ incidental medical situation (all p-values are smaller than 0.05). There was no significant correlation between communication strength asset and the crisis of dealing with children having chronic illness ($r = .151$, $p > .05$) or dealing with loss of family

member ($r = .084$, $p > .05$).

There were significant positive contributions between the family cohesion strength and six of the outcome measures, which are dealing with children developmental problem, dealing with familial financial problem, dealing with intra-familial conflicts, dealing with breadwinner's unemployment and dealing with family members' hesitation to share family duties. No significant correlations were found between family cohesion strength and dealing with family members' incidental medical situation, dealing with children having chronic illness and dealing with loss of family member.

Except a significant correlation was found between religion support strength and the dealing with breadwinner's unemployment, religion support strength did not correlate with other seven crises.

Regression models were carried out to investigate the contributions of different types of family strengths (see Table 6) towards the confidence level of handling different family crises. Economic strength showed significant positive contributions to the outcome measures of dealing with familial financial problem ($\beta = .40$, $p < .05$), dealing with breadwinner's unemployment ($\beta = .25$, $p < .05$) and dealing with loss of family member ($\beta = .30$, $p < .01$). The economic strength showed no significant contributions to other outcome measures such as dealing with children developmental problem, dealing intra-familial conflicts, dealing with family members' hesitation to share family duties, dealing with family members' incidental medical situation or dealing with children having chronic illness.

The problem-solving strength showed significant positive contributions to the confidence in dealing with intra-familial conflicts ($\beta = .54$, $p < .05$), dealing with breadwinner's unemployment ($\beta = .40$, $p < .05$), dealing with family members' hesitation to share family duties ($\beta = .50$, $p < .01$), dealing with family members' incidental medical situation ($\beta = .47$, $p < .05$), dealing with children having chronic illness ($\beta = .53$, $p < .01$) and dealing with loss of family member ($\beta = .50$, $p < .01$).

Family cohesion strength contributed significantly to the confidence of dealing with children developmental problem ($\beta = .32$, $p < .05$) but no significant contributions is found in other outcome measures. Communication strength, social support strength and religion

support strength showed no significant contributions to any of the outcome measures. Please see Table 6.

DISCUSSION

Inconsistency is found between the results of the current study and those of past findings. Firstly, unlike the reported results in past studies, only three of the six family strengths show significant contributions in the regression analysis of the current study. The importance of the six areas of family strength has been emphasized in the work of Orthner (2003), Patterson (1988) and several past studies (e.g., Kelley & Sequeira, 1997; Olson, Sprenkle and Russell, 1979; Stinnett, 1979). Patterson (1988) suggested that communication strength is a critical family strength since it enables the family to coordinate their effort by reducing ambiguity. In addition, social support is often viewed as one of the key resources to a family in struggling with different stressors in past literature (Cassel & Tyroler, 1961; Cohen & Syme, 1985; Patterson, 1988). Religion beliefs and religion foundation was also mentioned as an important element of a healthy family (Curran, 1983; Kelley & Sequeira, 1997). However, a different picture is found in our study. Communication strength, social support strength and religion support strength showed no significant contributions to the confidence in resolving different family crises. Only the economic strength, problem-solving strength and the family cohesion strength were positively contributed to the outcome measures. It is possible that such difference between the current results and those of past studies is resulted by cultural differences.

Impact of Culture Differences

The impact of cultural differences on family adaptation has been discussed in past literature. Tseng and Hsu (1991) suggested that culture influences family functioning such as the values, the concept of stress and the coping strategies of a family. Kalili (2003) also proposed that the family functioning as well as the meaning of resilience operates differently

in different cultures. Thus, it is believed that culture influence family resilience and how a family perceives the importance of different family strengths.

According to the nature of the family strengths, the six family strengths in this study can be divided into emotional assets and practical assets. Among the six family strengths, family cohesion strengths, communication strengths, social support strengths and religion support strengths are considered as the emotional ones since they are mainly related to emotional components such as bonding, supports and relationships. Problem-solving strengths and economic strengths are considered as the practical ones as they are more about instrumental and practical resources. In Western society, the expression of emotions functions as an important social roles such as maintaining relationships (Sun, 2008). However, the emotional elements are less important in Chinese society. Chinese people believe that emotional expression has no instrumental use since it cannot help any ends in solving a problem (Sun, 2008). It suggested that Chinese people value practical family strengths more than emotional family strengths in dealing with crises. Therefore, in our current study, the family strengths showing significant contributions to the outcome measures are often more practical ones such as the problem-solving strength and the economic strength. And the family strengths which are more emotional such as communication strength, social support strength and religion support strength show no significant contributions.

Exceptional Case

Family cohesion strength is the only emotional family strength which shows significant contribution to the outcome measures. It positively contributed to the dealing with problems in children development. A possible reason for this exceptional case is that the difference of the nature between the problems in children development and other crises. Normally, other crises listed in the outcome measures are some problems which have explicit solutions. For example, financial problems can be solved by giving extra economic support. However, the problems in children development often do not have precise solutions. It can be a transitional stage in the family life cycle. According to the family life cycle model of Carter and

McGoldrick (1998), during the stage of Family with Young Children, individual may experience psychological problems such as incapability, personal power loss and intimacy dissatisfaction. It is important for the family to have the family cohesion strength which helps all the family members to work together to tackle the developmental problems of children. Therefore, the family cohesion is more important than other practical family strengths in this case.

Contributions of Economic Strength

Secondly, the degree of contributions of economic strength in the present study is found to be different with the previous studies. The impacts of economic factors on family functioning have been stressed in different past studies (Conger & Conger, 2000; Crosnoe, Mistry & Elder, 2002; Simons et al., 1994). These studies suggested that economic strengths are linked with both economic and non-economic aspects of the family functioning. For example, Simons and his colleagues (1994) found that the involvement of the parents in parenting roles decreased when the family was under high economic stress. Yet, in the current study, the economic strength only shows contributions to those financial related outcome measures. It suggested that besides economic strengths, other family strengths are required in dealing with other non-economic family crises. Orthner (2003) pointed out that intervention researchers, program developers, and policymakers have been given more attention to economic dimensions of a family than other dimensions such as relationship quality. The current result offers insights into new directions for professionals working with family that strengthening family strengths other than economic strengths is needed in order to promote family resilience.

More on Global Meanings

Thirdly, problem-solving strength positively contributed to six out of eight outcome measures in the current study. The high proportion of contributions of the problem-solving

strength matches with Chinese culture. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, Chinese people view practical family strengths as more important than the emotional ones in dealing with family crises. Therefore, problem-solving strengths become very important in dealing with different crises. However, there is also another possible reason. In this study, items covering the concept of family schema were newly added in the problem-solving strength assets. It is also possible that the current result is influenced by the contribution of family schema. To avoid this possibility, it is necessary to make the family schema into a separated construct so as to explore the effect of the family schema. Yet, the sample size in the current study (N=116) is too small for running a valid regression analysis with seven constructs. A future study, with a larger sample size is therefore recommended to independently study the potential separate effect of problem-solving strengths and the family scheme towards the confidence level to resolving family crises.

CONCLUSION

In the present study, the FSI was modified with the supplement of the FAAR model. The contributions of different family strengths in dealing with different family crises were investigated. Firstly, it suggested that families in Hong Kong value practical family strengths more than the emotional family strengths with the influence of culture differences. Secondly, the Economic Strengths only show significant contributions to the financial related crises but not those non-economic crises. It suggested that other family strengths are needed for a family in dealing with non-economic crises. Lastly, the Problem-Solving Strengths showed a high proportion of contributions to the outcome measures. As items covering the Family Schema were newly added in, it may influence the results. The Family Schema will make into a separated construct and a new set of regression analysis with larger sample size is going to be carried out. A focus group with some families on the perception of family resilience will also be conducted.

REFERENCES

- Carnes, S.L. and Quinn, W.H., 2006. Family adaptation to brain injury: Coping and psychological distress. *Families, Systems, & Health*, 23(2), pp.186-203.
- Carter, E. and McGoldrick, M. eds., 1998. *The expanded family life cycle: Individual, family and social perspectives*. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
- Cassel, J. and Tyroler, H.A., 1961. Epidemiological studies of culture change: I. Health status and recency of industrialization. *Archives of Environmental Health*, 3, pp.25-33.
- Cohen, S. and Syme, S. L., 1985. *Social support and health*. New York: Academic.
- Conger, R.D. and Conger, K.J., 2002. Resilience in Midwestern families: Selected findings from the first decade of a prospective, longitudinal study. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 64, pp.361-373.
- Crosnoe, R., Mistry, R.S. and Edler, G.H., 2002. Economic disadvantages, family dynamics, and adolescent enrollment in higher education. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 64, pp.690-702.
- Curran D., 1983. *Traits of a healthy family*. Minneapolis, MN: Winston.
- Hill, R., 1949. *Families under stress*. New York: Harper.
- Kalil, A., 2003. *Family resilience and good child outcomes: A review of the literature*. Wellington: Ministry of Social Development.
- Kelley, D.L. and Sequeira, D.L., 1997. Understanding family function in a changing America. *Communication Studies*, 48(2), pp.93-108.
- Olson, D.H., Sprenkle, D.H. and Russell, C. S., 1979. Circumplex model of marital and family systems: Cohesion and adaptability dimensions, family types, and clinical application. *Family Process*, 18, pp.3-28.
- Orthner, D.K., Jones-Sanpei, H. and Williamson, S.A., 2003. Family strength and income in households with children. *Journal of Family Social Work*, 7, pp.5-23.
- Patterson, J., 1988. Families experiencing stress: The family adjustment and adaptation response model. *Family Systems Medicine*, 6(2), pp.202-237.
- Patterson, J.M. and McCubbin, H.I., 1983. The impact of family life events and changes on

- the health of a chronically ill child. *Family Relations*, 32, pp.255-264.
- Poth, R.K., 2004. An investigation of family stress and family hardiness in predicting family adaptation with cardiac rehabilitation patients. *Humanities and Social Sciences*, 64 (10-A), p.3602.
- Rothwell, D. and Han, C.K., 2009. Assets as a resource variable in the stress management of low-income families. *Center for Social Department*, 9-50, pp.1-17.
- Simons, R.L., Whitbeck, L.B., Melby, J.N. and Wu, C-I., 1994. Economic pressure and harsh parenting. In: R. D. Conger & G. H. Edler, Jr., eds. *Families in troubled times: Adapting to change in rural America*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter, pp. 207-222.
- Stinnett, N., 1979. In search of strong families. In: N. Stinnett, B. Chesser and J. DeFrain, eds. *Building family strengths*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, pp. 23-30.
- Sun, C. T. L., 2008. *Themes in Chinese psychology*. Singapore: Cengage
- Tseng, W.S. and Hsu, J., 1991. *Culture and Family: Problems and Therapy*. New York: Haworth Press.
- Watson, S.L., 2008. "Something you have to do"- Why do parents of children with developmental disabilities seek a differential diagnosis?. *Developmental Disabilities Bulletin*, 36 (1 – 2), pp.168- 198.

APPENDIX

Table 3. Descriptive results of reliability, mean and standard deviation of each type of the family strengths

Variables	Number of items	Reliability	Mean	S.D.
Economic Strength Asset	6	.84	2.68	.72
Communication Strength Asset	7	.86	3.08	.51
Problem-Solving Strength Asset	9	.90	3.20	.47
Social Support Strength Asset	3	.72	2.86	.65
Family Cohesion Strength Asset	5	.76	3.19	.43
Religion Support Strength Asset	4	.90	2.26	.93
Familial Efficacy	8	.88	3.27	.76

Table 4. Descriptive results of the means and standard deviations of the confidence scoring in different family crises

Family crises	Mean	S.D.
<i>Dealing with Children Developmental Problem</i>	3.62	.909
<i>Dealing with Familial financial problem</i>	3.27	1.118
<i>Dealing with Intra-familial conflicts</i>	3.56	1.017
<i>Dealing with Breadwinner's Unemployment</i>	2.78	1.245
<i>Dealing with Family Members' Hesitation to Share Family Duties</i>	3.45	1.069
<i>Dealing with Family Members' Incidental Medical Situation</i>	3.19	1.245
<i>Dealing with Children having Chronic Illness</i>	2.99	1.405
<i>Dealing with Loss of Family Member</i>	2.59	1.568

Table 5. Bivariate Pearson Correlation between family strengths and family challenges

Outcome Measures 1: <i>Dealing with Children Developmental Problem</i>								
Outcome Measures 2: <i>Dealing with Familial financial problem</i>								
Outcome Measures 3: <i>Dealing with Intra-familial conflicts</i>								
Outcome Measures 4: <i>Dealing with Breadwinner's Unemployment</i>								
Outcome Measures 5: <i>Dealing with Family Members' Hesitation to Share Family Duties</i>								
Outcome Measures 6: <i>Dealing with Family Members' Incidental Medical Situation</i>								
Outcome Measures 7: <i>Dealing with Children having Chronic Illness</i>								
Outcome Measures 8: <i>Dealing with Loss of Family Member</i>								
Family Strengths/ Outcome	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Economic Strength Asset	.187*	.513*	.292*	.400*	.356*	.207*	.204*	.376*
Communication Strength Asset	.268*	.388*	.397*	.260*	.290*	.212	.135	.163*
Problem-Solving Strength Asset	.312*	.442*	.502*	.391*	.443*	.316*	.279*	.305*
Social Support Strength Asset	.099	.021	.069	.022	-.022	-.036	-.066	.020
Family Cohesion Strength Asset	.350*	.360*	.348*	.326*	.357	.179	.162	.122*
Religion Support Strength Asset	.040	.077	-.055	.206*	.002	.087	.158	.144

*p< .05

Table 6. Regression Analysis for Family Assets Predicting Respondents' Confidence of Specific Family Outcomes

Outcome Measures 1: <i>Dealing with Children Developmental Problem</i>								
Outcome Measures 2: <i>Dealing with Familial financial problem</i>								
Outcome Measures 3: <i>Dealing with Intra-familial conflicts</i>								
Outcome Measures 4: <i>Dealing with Breadwinner's Unemployment</i>								
Outcome Measures 5: <i>Dealing with Family Members' Hesitation to Share Family Duties</i>								
Outcome Measures 6: <i>Dealing with Family Members' Incidental Medical Situation</i>								
Outcome Measures 7: <i>Dealing with Children having Chronic Illness</i>								
Outcome Measures 8: <i>Dealing with Loss of Family Member</i>								
Family Strengths/ Outcome	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Economic Strength Asset	.02	.40*	.06	.25*	.18	.06	.07	.30**
Communication Strength Asset	-.11	.10	-.05	-.23	-.29	-.08	-.25	-.20
Problem-Solving Strength Asset	.17	.17	.54*	.40*	.50**	.47*	.53**	.50**
Social Support Strength Asset	-.00	-.17	-.07	-.12	-.15	-.14	-.16	-.07
Family Cohesion Strength Asset	.32*	.04	.01	.09	.19	-.11	-.07	-.25
Religion Support Strength Asset	-.07	-.02	-.11	.12	-.08	.07	.15	.12

*p< .05

Belief in a Just World and Quality of Life among People Living in HIV at Malayisa

Siah Poh-Chua
Universiti Tunku Abdul Rahman
Email: siahpc@utar.edu.my

Tan Jiunn-Han
Universiti Tunku Abdul Rahman

Sivan Koran
Universiti Tunku Abdul Rahman

The first case of HIV was reported in 1981. There were about 26.2 million People living with HIV (PLWH) worldwide in 1999, which increased to 33.3 million in 2009. The reason of the increasing number of PLWH is due to a greater chance to receive treatment that helps to reduce AIDS-related death. The annual new HIV infections are actually fell 21% between 1997 and 2010(Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, 2011).

The first case of HIV in Malaysia was reported in 1986. According to Malaysia AIDS council (“Malaysian AIDS Council,” 2011), there were a total of 91362 HIV infections, 16352 AIDS case, and 12943 AIDS related deaths in Malaysia. Most PLWH are males, Malays, drug users, ages from 30-39 years.

The mortality rate of PLWH was increasing until the use of highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART) (Miners et al., 2001). Since the mortality rate of PLWH was under control, more researchers and programmers have paid their attention to the quality of life (QoL) of PLWH. Improved QoL was therefore recognized as a vital outcome of medical treatment for the PLWH (Wu, 2000).

Quality of life (QoL) is a term which was first used after the Second World War. QoL has been defined in several different ways since then. Many articles define the concept of QOL differently (Meeberg, 1993). Most early uses of the term QOL refers to well-being, conceptualized either as the objective conditions of living of an individual or the person's experience of life, or as both. Researchers from different disciplines have contributed to the

development of the concept and measurement of QOL (Spilker, 1990).

Cella and Bonomi (1995) defined health-related quality of life (HRQL) as the extent to which one's usual or expected physical, emotional, and social health that are affected by a medical condition or its treatment. HRQL of PLWH is not only influenced by clinical factors but also by psychosocial factors (Carrieri et al., 2003), such as health control belief, psychological distress and personality (Préau et al., 2005).

Some studies have found the close relationship between psychological mechanisms and QoL of people living with HIV (PLWH), such as negative perception of life cause PLWH adopt maladaptive coping mechanisms that finally affect their quality of life (Deo, Shyangwa, Shrestha, Singh, & Amaya, 2011); positive emotion support from close others leads PLWH to engage in healthy lifestyle behaviors that improve their QoL (Deichert, Fekete, Boarts, Druley, & Delahanty, 2008); positive cognitive appraisal and family resiliency improve the QoL of PLWH (Frain, Berven, Chan, & Tschopp, 2008).

Belief in a just world (BJW) is defined as a belief that the world is perceived as a just place where people generally get what they deserve (Lerner, 1980). People who have this belief are more likely to adopt just means to achieve their goals, to trust others to treat them fairly and to appraise their life as meaningful (I. Correia & Dalbert, 2007). This belief is continually reinforced in morality tales of our culture, in which good is always rewarded and evil punished (Claire & Manuel, 1990). This belief plays an important function in our lives, so that we are only able to plan our lives or achieve our goals by assuming that our actions do have predictable consequences. For example, those with high BJW will quickly act to restore justice by helping the victim while encounter evidence suggesting that the world is not just.

BJW influences how people judge PLWH. Studies found that male participants not only view PLWH as responsible for their own plight but also they regard PLWH as psychologically threatening; in the disease itself and relevant homosexual activity (Connors & Heaven, 1990; Furnham & Gunter, 1984). Besides, studies have found the close relationship between BJW and mental health, such as BJW are negatively associated with anxiety, depression and general psychological distress among German flood victims (Otto, Boos, Dalbert, Schöps, & Hoyer, 2006); BJW are positive associated with mental health, occupational trust and

subjective quality of working life among employed individuals (Otto, Glaser, & Dalbert, 2009).

How about the relationship between BJW and HRQL? Correia, Batista and Lima (2009) found a significant correlation between BJW and satisfaction with life. However, to our knowledge, there is no study has been conducted to explore the relationship between BJW and HRQL among PLWH.

We aimed to explore the relationship between BJW and HRQL in this study. We expected that those PLWH with a high BJW are more able to accept their statue and therefore more able to adjust themselves for having a better QoL. Therefore, we expect a significant positive correlation between BJW and HRQL will be found.

METHOD

Participants

73 PLWH from 2 NGOs in Malaysia were invited to participate in this study. About 39.7% was from a HIV shelter home and about 60.3% was from a drop-in centre. About 80.3% of them are males. The range of age is 21 to 68. About 52.8% of them were Malay, 30.6% was Chinese and 16.6% was Indian or others. About 49.3% unemployed and 61.6% stayed with their friends in the shelter home. 76.4% was infected with HIV through sexual intercourse with same or opposite sex, and 23.6% were infected through sharing needle for drug injection.

Further data analyses suggested that the demographic backgrounds of those participants from the HIV shelter home and those who are not are different. Most participants from the HIV shelter home are males, drug users, heterosexual, under medication, older, non-Malays, non-Muslim, unemployed and has been diagnosed as a PLWH for a longer period (see Table 1).

Table 1
Demographic comparison between PLWH in HIV Shelter Home and Drop-in Centre

Demographic factors		Shelter Home	Drop-in Centre	Chi-square
Gender	Male	100%	66.7%	12.04***
	Female	0%	33.3%	
Drug User	Yes	60.7%	7.0%	24.21***
	No	39.3%	93.0%	
Sexual Orientation	Heterosexual	88.9%	19.4%	22.26***
	Homosexual	11.1%	80.6%	
Medical adherence	Yes	100%	68.2%	11.42***
	No	0%	31.8%	
Age	< 39.5 Years Old	13.8%	68.2%	20.78***
	> 39.5 Years Old	86.2%	31.8%	
Ethnicity	Malay	17.2%	75.0%	23.36***
	Non-Malay	82.8%	25.0%	
Religion	Muslim	18.5%	82.9%	27.62***
	Non-Muslim	81.5%	17.1%	
Employment Status	Employed (Full & Part time)	0%	68.3%	33.01***
	Unemployed	100%	31.7%	
Diagnosis Period	< 59.5 Months	17.2%	63.6%	15.19***
	> 59.5 Months	82.8%	36.4%	
Relationship	single	55.2%	44.2%	0.84
	Not single	44.8%	55.8%	

Apparatus

The questionnaire includes 3 parts. Participants needed to fill in their demographic data in the first part, such as their employment status and their age.

BJW. After the demographic data is the BJW scale. This scale contains 7 items. Participants needed to circle a number from 1 to 6 to indicate the extent that they agreed to each item. A higher number indicates participants were more agreed to the item.

HRQL. Following the BJW scale is the HIV/AIDS-Targeted Quality of Life (HAT-QoL) scale. There are 9 dimensions (34 items) in this scale, which are overall function (6 items), life satisfaction (4 items), health worries (4 items), financial worries (3 items), medication worries (5 items), HIV mastery (2 items), disclosure worries (5 items), feelings about doctors or provider trust (3 items), and sexual functions (2 items). Participants needed to circle a number from 1 to 5 to indicate how often they have such feelings. Scores on each subscale were adjusted to range from 0 to 100. A higher score indicates a lower impact of HIV infection on the quality of life of the PLWHs.

Procedure

Firstly, the questionnaire was translated from English into Chinese and Bahasa by using the back translation method. The results revealed a similar internal consistency for both the Chinese and Bahasa versions to the English version. At the same time, we contacted the NGOs to get their approval to conduct the study. A questionnaire was distributed to those participants who were able to read and write. We interviewed those who could not read and write one by one. Before starting the study, we briefed them the content of inform consent form and only gave them the questionnaire or interviewed them after they agreed to the content of inform consent form by signing their names. A token was given to participants after they completed the study.

RESULTS

BJW.

We ran *t-test for independent sample means* to compare the BJW score across demographic data. The results showed that participants who are older, unemployed, and staying at shelter home; have a higher BJW score than those who are younger, employed and not staying at HIV centre (see Table 2).

Table 2
Comparisons across demographic data in BJW

	Demography	<i>N</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i>
Age	< 39.5 years old	34	26.88	6.98	2.89	71	.005
	>39.5 years old	39	31.51	6.66			
Employment Status	Employed	28	26.51	6.98	2.62	68	.011
	Unemployed	42	30.91	6.82			
Location	Drop-in centre	44	27.98	7.11	2.08	71	.042
	Shelter home	29	31.45	6.82			

HRQL.

Again, we ran a *t-test for independent sample means* to compare HRQL across the two centers, which found that participants from the shelter home have a lower health worries and financial worries, but have a higher provider trust than those from a drop-in centre (see Table 3).

Table 3
Comparisons between two locations in HRQL

HRQL	Location	<i>N</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i>
Health Worries	Drop-in centre	44	60.94	28.05	2.904	71	.005
	Shelter home	29	49.62	19.59			
Financial Worries	Drop-in centre	44	49.62	30.81	-2.15	71	.035
	Shelter home	29	64.94	28.03			
Provider Trust	Drop-in centre	42	60.11	22.36	-7.58	64.41	.001
	Shelter home	29	90.81	11.43			

BJW and HRQL. Overall, significant correlations were found between BJW and life satisfaction, $r(71) = .34, p = .003$; and between BJW and provider trust, $r(71) = .43, p = .001$. However, while we ran the correlation between BJW and HROL differently between the HIV centre and the drop-in centre, no significant correlation was found in those participants from the drop-in centre, but significant positive correlations between BJW and life satisfaction, $r(27) = .52, p = .004$, and between BJW and provider trust, $r(27) = .62, p = .001$, were found in those from HIV shelter home.

DISCUSSION

The aim of this study is to examine whether there is any significant relationship between BJW and HRQL. We recruited participants from two NGOs, one is a shelter home and the other is a drop in center. From the results, we can see that there is a significant relationship between BJW and two types of HRQL (life satisfaction and provider trust). In other words, those who have a higher BJW are more likely to feel happy with their life and also more likely to trust their medical doctors. Nonetheless, after comparing PLWH from two different centers, the results suggested that such relationship only emerged in those PLWH who lived at the shelter home.

From the comparison of demographic data among PLWH in these two NGOs, we can

see that there are many differences between them. Those who stayed at the shelter home have a higher BJW than those at the drop in center. We believed this could be because most PLWH who stayed at the shelter home are drug users. They believed that due to their own faults, it was fair for them to be infected with HIV. Nonetheless, they still able to receive financial and medical helps from NGOs, they were therefore more satisfy to their life and trust the medical providers more. In contrast, most PLWH who were recruited from the drop in center were younger and were not infected by sharing needles but by sexual behaviors. Compare to using drug, having sex was not regarded as a fault. Most of them were still healthy and able to work to earn a living. Therefore no significant correlation between BJW and HRQL was found among them, even though they did worry about their HIV status and whether their medical doctors would able to help them or not.

An important implication of this study is that different ways of infection may cause PLWH to use different psychological mechanism to interpret their HIV status and their feelings of life. Counselors and programmers may need to consider using different approaches to assist PLWH to improve their quality of life, such as the financial worry of PLWH in the shelter home, the health worries and provider trust of those PLWH in the drop in center. Furthermore, since those who are staying at the shelter homes having a higher BJW and followed by a higher level of HRQL, government and NGOS dealing with PLWH may consider to build more shelter homes and provide better support to this group of people. Nonetheless, future study may consider including more factors to see what is the mechanism that causes different correlations that we have found in this study, such as the process of attribution.

REFERENCES

- Carrieri, P., Spire, B., Duran, S., Katlama, C., Peyramond, D., François, C., Chêne, G., et al., 2003. Health-related quality of life after 1 year of highly active antiretroviral therapy. *JAIDS Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes*, 32(1), p.38.
- Cella, D.F. and Bonomi, A.E., 1995. Measuring quality of life: 1995 update. *Oncology-Huntington*, 9(11), pp.47–60.
- Claire, A. and Manuel, V., 1990. The Just World Theory. *Ethnics* [e-journal] 3(2) Available at:< <http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/iie/v3n2/justworld.html>> [Accessed 10 February 2012].
- Connors, J. and Heaven, P.C.L. (1990). Belief in a just world and attitudes toward AIDS sufferers. *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 130(4), pp.559–560.
- Correia, I. and Dalbert, C., 2007. Belief in a just world, justice concerns, and well-being at Portuguese schools. *European Journal of Psychology of Education*, 22(4), pp.421-437.
- Correia, P. I., Batista, M. T., & Lima, M. L. (2009). Does the belief in a just world bring happiness? Causal relationships among belief in a just world, life satisfaction and mood. *Australian Journal of Psychology*, 61(4), pp.220–227.
- Deichert, N.T., Fekete, E.M., Boarts, J.M., Druley, J.A. and Delahanty, D.L., 2008. Emotional support and affect: associations with health behaviors and active coping efforts in men living with HIV. *AIDS and Behavior*, 12(1), pp.139–145.
- Deo, B.K., Shyangwa, M.P., Shrestha, S.N., Singh, J. and Amaya, M.N., 2011. People Living with HIV: Perceived Stress, Coping mechanism and Quality of life. *Health Renaissance*, 8(3). [online] Available at:< <http://www.nepjol.info/index.php/HREN/article/view/4212/0>> [Accessed 23 February 2011].
- Frain, M.P., Berven, N.L., Chan, F. and Tschopp, M. K., 2008. Family Resiliency, Uncertainty, Optimism, and the Quality of Life of Individuals With HIV/AIDS. *Rehabilitation Counseling Bulletin*, 52(1), pp.16 -27.

- Furnham, A. and Gunter, B., 1984. Just world beliefs and attitudes towards the poor. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 23(3), pp.265–269.
- HIV Statistics, 2011. *Malaysian AIDS Council*. [online] Available at:< http://www.mac.org.my/v3/?page_id=792> [Accessed 5 February 2012].
- Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, 2011. *UNAIDS World AIDS Day report 2011*. [online] Available at:< http://www.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/documents/unaidspublication/2011/JC2216_WorldAIDSday_report_2011_en.pdf > [Accessed 10 February 2012].
- Lerner, M.J., 1980. *The belief in a just world: A fundamental delusion*. Plenum Press New York.
- Meeberg, G. A., 1993. Quality of life: a concept analysis. *Journal of Advanced Nursing*, 18(1), pp.32–38.
- Miners, A., Sabin, C., Mocroft, A., Youle, M., Fisher, M. and Johnson, M., 2001. Health-related quality of life in individuals infected with HIV in the era of HAART. *HIV clinical trials*, 2(6), pp.484–492.
- Otto, K., Boos, A., Dalbert, C., Schöps, D. and Hoyer, J. (2006). Posttraumatic symptoms, depression, and anxiety of flood victims: The impact of the belief in a just world. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 40(5), pp.1075-1084.
- Otto, K., Glaser, D. and Dalbert, C., 2009. Mental Health, Occupational Trust, and Quality of Working Life: Does Belief in a Just World Matter? *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 39(6), pp.1288-1315.
- Préau, M., Vincent, E., Spire, B., Reliquet, V., Fournier, I., Michelet, C., Leport, C., et al., 2005. Health-related quality of life and health locus of control beliefs among HIV-infected treated patients. *Journal of psychosomatic research*, 59(6), pp.407–413.
- Spilker, B., 1990. *Quality of life assessments in clinical trials*. Raven Pr.
- Wu, A.W., 2000. Quality of life assessment comes of age in the era of highly active antiretroviral therapy. *Aids*, 14(10), p.1449.

Changes of Education to Overseas Chinese (1980 – 2000): An Example of Yokohama Yamate Chinese School

Wai Shing Lee¹

The Chinese University of Hong Kong

Email: wsleewilson@alumni.cuhk.net

INTRODUCTION

This paper aims at examining the changes of overseas Chinese education in Japan from 1980 to 2000, using Yokohama Yamate Chinese School (YYCS, with a majority of Mainland Chinese students) as a case study. YYCS, presently located at Yoshihama-cho, Yokohama, has a long history in providing education to overseas Chinese. Notwithstanding the school claims its foundation year was 1897 as the first overseas Chinese school in Japan, it actually began in 1953 after the “School Incident” (“SI”). The establishment of YYCS was a consequence of the political conflict between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC), and this conflict determined the direction of educational affairs of YYCS to preserve the Chinese nationality by, in fact, regarding PRC as a legitimate government. After a few decades of development, there were various changes in both China and Japan, especially the normalization of Sino-Japanese relation in 1972. Over the past three decades, overseas Chinese in Japan were mainly the third or fourth generation who were born and raised in there. They speak Japanese as fluent as natives and can naturally enter the mainstream of local educational system. Also, more education choices for children of “new overseas Chinese” family to choose, and low birthrate among overseas Chinese society in Japan caused a decrease in the number of children leading continuous crisis and challenges for overseas Chinese schools. However, the number of students of YYCS had being increased since the turn to the 21st century. Given a highly fusion of Chinese and Japanese in the contemporary Japanese society, the path of preserving and preaching Chinese nationality among overseas Chinese community was no longer suitable for YYCS as the educational

¹ I would like to acknowledge my thesis supervisor, Professor Benjamin Wai Ming Ng, for his support. Also, I thank Dr. Lim Tai Wei for his insight and Miss Elim Yee Lam Wong for her comment.

direction. This research starts from how YYCS has adapted to the transition of the social environment and highlights that YYCS has shifted its role in order to maintain the school.

Previous research is scattered, little, and most of them narrow to political level or ordinary developments of each overseas Chinese school. Literatures published before 1970s were mostly affected by the legitimacy due to the political split in China and most of them wrote about the “SI” of Yokohama Overseas Chinese School (YOCS, with a majority of Taiwanese students) in the post war period, in which overseas Chinese with mainland China origin were expelled from the school. Tzang Koang-en and Chiang Yeun-ching from Taiwan took YOCS as an orthodox and neglected YYCS, to give details such as school administration, financial status, facilities, and curriculums (1958). This research simply dichotomized the account for the developments of school based on which side they favored. Studies, lacking analysis in cultural and social context and simply giving a historical growth of each school, were common before PRC entered the United Nation in 1971. The political bias had gradually faded out after 1970s with more notions linked to Japanese social development. Compared with preceding research, Zhu Hui-ling fairly examined all five existing overseas Chinese schools and discussed constraints on expansion of the schools in Japanese society like government educational and migration policies, and changes in overseas Chinese communities in contemporary times (1996). Harisawa Takashi gave a similar description to Zhu’s work but he emphasized on curriculums in a comparison basis of the five schools and the interaction with Japanese educational progress (2003). They have highlighted the neglected part on the relation between the schools and the Japanese society, however, YYCS were not the only target of research and they illustrated substantially the social side while cultural aspect remained untouched. Contrasting those scattered explorations, Yue Cheng-nan provided a comprehensive account, the only study that took YYCS as a sole research subject, from historical background, characteristics of education, to opportunities and challenges in the future (2010). Although Yue observed the cultural influence, she principally concentrated on Chinese language teaching and its impacts to the overseas Chinese community in Yokohama, and neglected the cultural role played by YYCS. In short, the above research output of YYCS is still limited while more about the position of YYCS in the transition of the

Sino-Japanese relation and Japanese society can be explored.

To fill in the missing exploration of the cultural role of YYCS between two countries and between ethnic Chinese and Japanese in Yokohama, this paper is divided into two parts. The first part describes the historical background traced back to 1952 when “SI” happened, indicating that the motivation of founding YYCS was to provide education for expelled students. The next part outlines the development of school after 1980 to prove that YYCS became a cultural carrier in response to the transformation of Japanese society. By comparing the social environment and curriculum development between these two periods, the author concludes that the role of YYCS has changed in order to accommodate to the progress of Japanese society.

THE “SCHOOL INCIDENT” IN 1952 AND THE FOUNDATION OF YYCS

This part briefly portrays the background of YYCS from 1952, when the “SI” happened that caused the foundation of YYCS and influenced the educational purpose of the school. The existence of YYCS was a result of political discrepancy between Mainland China and Taiwan, and the early development of YYCS consequently reflected this situation. The school aimed at educating students the patriotism toward China, which can be regarded as a national education as well, until 1980s when Mainland China started economic reforms and increased business cooperation with Japan. Therefore, the “SI” was a decisive event affecting YYCS for about 30 years.

There have been two-sided explanations for why “SI” occurred, depended on what political view one stands for. Although the ROC retreated to Taiwan in 1949, it was still the sole official government of China recognized by the Japanese government until 1972 and a confrontation among overseas Chinese population in Yokohama arose due to the different favor on whether ROC or PRC represented the Chinese government. In 1st August and 1st September 1952, Taiwan Representatives with the support of Japanese police forces took over the management of YOCS, and teachers, students and parents, who considered it to be an occupation, were ejected and not allowed to enter the school (Wei-chu Huang and Yan-chu

Zhang 2005, p. 106-111). Those expelled teachers and parents formed the Management Committee of Yokohama Overseas Chinese School and decided 14 places, where were residences of overseas Chinese families, for students to continue routine schooling. It was called “dispersed education.” A source from Taiwan perspective asserted that only 70 out of 850 students were left after the incident, while Mainland China party said there were more than 600 students having education at the 14 dispersed residential places (Tzang and Chiang 1958, p. 51; Huang and Zhang 2005, p. 112). No matter how many students were expelled, they were the founding students of YYCS later in September 1953. Since YYCS was established under the background of political divergence and the occupation of the school, its early direction of development focused on how to educate students the patriotism toward China.

After being expelled from YOCS, teachers and parents believed a stable venue for schooling was needed instead of dispersed education, so they should equipped with hardware and software. For hardware, after receiving nearly a year of dispersed education, the expelled students eventually could study at a campus. In 1st September 1953, a two-storey wood building located at no. 43, Yamate-cho was established and named “Yokohama Overseas Chinese School Yamate Temporary Campus.” For software, a school mission was framed as an instructive guidance that emphasized national identity:

This school uses national language [Chinese language] in educational process to educate overseas Chinese students natively speaking national language, from preschool to secondary school...cultivates them the morality of five loves—love the mother country, love learning, love working, love public property and love cleaning. [The school] aims at enhancing the quality of lifestyle and the cultural standard in overseas Chinese community; contributing to the developments of China and Japan; and encouraging friendship between the two countries. (Huang and Zhang 2005, p. 116)

From the above, words like “national,” “mother country,” and “China” were used, and

especially, the first “five loves” was to love the mother country. Most words were related to China and it provided students an ideology training to conceive the national consciousness. What could be precisely regarded as a national education of YYCS was trying to prohibit students from speaking Japanese in the school since September 1955. The first principal Wu Le-ji explained that one of the missions was to consolidate students’ patriotism toward China and respect for the national language of Chinese (Le-ji Wu 1962, p. 148). But it was not easy for students not to speak Japanese from childhood and to talk with each other in Mandarin, therefore, the school banned Japanese language in the campus and the result turned out to be positive. There was a connection between language and national consciousness, particularly with, as Benedict Anderson has explained, influences of political entities (Benedict Anderson 1991, p. 46). In the context of YYCS, the school performed as a role like a political party setting a thorough policy to abolish students’ speaking habit in order to strengthen the national identity. This regulation and the objective revealed a strong desire of whole school to preserve and promote the consciousness of nation for the students. In 1959, a school hymn composed by Huang Wei-chu, who graduated in 1955 and was the fourth principal of YYCS, could give a suitable demonstration of the national education provided by YYCS in the early period from its start.

Glory! My Yokohama Overseas Chinese School, the lighthouse of national
education.

Stand straight in storms, grow under united overseas Chinese community.

Five loves of the school motto fosters few elites, but alumni in every year are
talents.

Classmates! The mighty mother country likes the sun, shining the twinkling
future.

Let’s move forward hands in hands, to pursue the truth and endeavor to be an
example.

Learn hard to create a better tomorrow, and transform the nature. (Huang and
Zhang 2005, p. 119)

The hymn mentioned national education at the first sentence to influence the students with a sense of motherland China being strong and great, and told them to unite under the nation to have better future. It seemed to be a conclusion of what YYCS was looking for and a feedback to the school mission.

Facing many difficulties at the beginning especially with few resources, YYCS became steady and continued promoting national education to students. After an establishment of another new complex in 1966, YYCS expanded the curriculum to high school. In a notice of students recruitment, the school clarified the reason of expansion and it was because their hearts faced the motherland China where was constructing the great socialism. They understood that the national education did not fulfill the expectancy of compatriots living in Japan and the society. In order to teach compatriots' children national consciousness and proficient national language, a high school was thus established (Huang and Zhang 2005, p. 122). Moreover, a monthly journal named "Minzu Jiaoyu Tongxun" (Newsletter of National Education) published in 1970. The goal of YYCS was shown in the title that national education was in the top priority in the school agenda throughout 1970s.

To summarize the development of YYCS from the beginning until 1980, it played a role of an education provider, particularly emphasizing on national consciousness, as a response to the political environment in Mainland China. Since the "SI" divided overseas Chinese school into two, it affected the introduction of national education based on the patriotism toward Mainland China. Nevertheless, the situation altered in 1980s due to the socio-economic changes of China and Japan, and the relation of two countries.

CHANGE IN POSITION: DEVELOPMENT OF YYCS AFTER 1980

Normalization of Sino-Japanese relation in 1972 and the economic reform of PRC since 1980, leading to a huge change of socio-economic environment between two countries, caused an increase of new immigrants in Japan. Meanwhile, the Japanese government released the condition of naturalization in 1985. It was easier for overseas Chinese to be

naturalized than before. These factors contributed to a change in national identity among overseas Chinese and, so, the education policy of YYCS. This section analyzed how YYCS was affected, in particular the cultural aspect, during the socio-economic transition of Japanese society since 1980s.

Given the above circumstances, YYCS was facing a great challenge because of the decline in the number of students. Table 5 lists the number of admitted students from 1971 to 2000. Despite there was admissions of high school until 1984 and, hence, a reduction was reflected in 1985 after the cancellation of high school, a trend of decrease in admission still existed continuously until 1994. There were several reasons in terms of social background and government policy that prompted YYCS to propose adjustments differed from national education since 1980s.

Table 5 Number of students in YYCS from 1971 to 2000

Academic Year	No. of students	Academic Year	No. of students	Academic Year	No. of students
1971	314	1981	444	1991	252
1972	370	1982	420	1992	244
1973	432	1983	387	1993	252
1974	487	1984	343	1994	242
1975	479	1985	321	1995	246
1976	484	1986	307	1996	255
1977	474	1987	302	1997	269
1978	469	1988	303	1998	278
1979	472	1989	275	1999	303
1980	467	1990	265	2000	313

Source: Editorial committee of treatise on hundred year of history of Yokohama Yamate Chinese School, ed. 2005, p. 275.

The social background of 1980s was totally different to 1950s and 1960s when YYCS had just founded. The huge advance of Sino-Japanese relation, particularly after the economic reform of PRC in 1980, enlarged the communication between the two countries. The most significant evidence would be an increase of the population of overseas Chinese in Japan.

Table 6 shows a growing tendency of overseas Chinese population holding Chinese nationality in Yokohama from 1978 to 2001. Although the relation between China and Japan was re-established in 1972, the migration of PRC citizens to Japan rose considerably as late as 1981 when China started the reformation. These new comers settling in Japan for reasons such as business and education were different to those “old overseas Chinese” originally in Japan living for a long time, principally diverse in the feelings to China. “Old overseas Chinese” chose overseas Chinese education in the past was to prepare for a return to China, but “new overseas Chinese” in 1980s from China tended to seek any opportunity in Japan and they were less willing to go back to China. This inevitably lowered the demand for education provided by overseas Chinese schools including YYCS.

Table 6 Population of overseas Chinese in Yokohama (1978-2001)

Year	No. of people	Year	No. of people	Year	No. of people
1978	4,508	1986	5,717	1994	12,554
1979	4,418	1987	6,300	1995	12,700
1980	4,430	1988	7,442	1996	13,225
1981	4,652	1989	8,492	1997	13,267
1982	4,753	1990	9,649	1998	14,246
1983	4,912	1991	10,847	1999	15,320
1984	5,181	1992	11,937	2000	17,219
1985	5,371	1993	12,117	2001	19,235

Source: City of Yokohama 2010.

Also, simplified process in naturalization in 1985 was another influential factor. The Japanese government amended the law of migration to allow foreigners to be naturalized if either father or mother was Japanese. Since there was a continuous growth of overseas Chinese population, many of them married Japanese spouses and have mixed ethnic children with Japanese nationality. The trend of intermarriage between Chinese and Japanese is shown in Table 7 and reveals the corresponding pattern with Table 6. This affected YYCS to have increased number of students with Japanese nationality from 1991 as shown in

Table 8. Both the increase in overseas Chinese population and the change of nationality among ethnic Chinese children indicated a shift in generation and, therefore, YYCS adjusted the national education policy.

Table 7 Number of people with Chinese nationality marrying spouses with Japanese nationality in Japan from 1981 to 2000

Year	Japanese husbands Chinese wives	Chinese husbands Japanese wives	Year	Japanese husbands Chinese wives	Chinese husbands Japanese wives
1981	1032	235	1991	3871	789
1982	1345	285	1992	4638	777
1983	1864	296	1993	4691	766
1984	1704	300	1994	4587	695
1985	1766	380	1995	5174	769
1986	1841	349	1996	6264	773
1987	1977	432	1997	6630	834
1988	2234	431	1998	7036	787
1989	3291	614	1999	7810	836
1990	3614	708	2000	9884	878

Source: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 2010.

Table 8 Nationality of students in YYCS in specified years

Academic Year	Chinese nationality (%)	Japanese nationality (%)	
		Ethnic Chinese	Ethnic Japanese
1991	67.9	30.6	
1995	61.6	20.7	15.3
2000	55.4	26.9	15.0
2004	42.3	38.2	16.9

Source: Yue 2010, p. 33; Editorial committee, ed. 2005, p. 276.

As mentioned, YYCS tried to use language as a tool to construct national consciousness among students and though it was similar after 1980s, the intention was slightly changed. Due to the shift of generation from the first to the third or fourth, YYCS comprehensively adjusted the medium of languages in classes. To reinforce the advantages of secondary students to be recruited in labour market or pursue further education, the curriculum of the secondary school division introduced the same system of Japanese secondary school and used Japanese

language as the medium of education. It was a huge difference in the motivation of choosing the language used. The main purpose was to build up national consciousness for students before while in 1980s the practical social situation was under consideration. For primary school, an educational reformation proceeded in 1993 to teach students Chinese language as a kind of foreign language (Yue 2010, pp. 34-39). It was not only an adjustment in the method of language teaching, but also a modification of concept in response to the social development. YYCS replaced the subject title “national language” with “Chinese language” in 1996 and this symbolized a change of direction with the social advancement simultaneously. YYCS realized that language was not the only way for national consciousness construction, and it might incur further decrease in admission if it insisted on the connection between languages and nation awareness. In fact, the policy of language teaching of YYCS is relatively thorough compared with the other four overseas Chinese schools in Japan. In junior high school, all subjects were conducted by Japanese language merely except Chinese language lessons, while other schools conducted in or with an aid of Chinese language in most subjects (Harisawa 2003, p. 134). This demonstrated a total reverse of the prohibition of speaking Japanese and showed less emphasis upon “national.” Apart from viewing through language education, the educational system was correspondingly amended.

In response to the change of social environment, YYCS had increasingly imitated the Japanese educational system. Originally, a new academic year started in every September after WWII. When YYCS was founded in 1953, academic year started in March and further moved to April in 1967, but the semester system was still different from Japanese schools. Starting from 1981, the number of academic semesters was adjusted from two per year to three in order to match identically with the Japanese educational systems, and adapted all Japanese national holidays in the school almanac (Huang and Zhang 2005, p. 124). This was a consideration to integrate into the Japanese society, expressing a compromise between national education and practical needs. Indeed, since most graduates from YYCS have entered to Japanese high schools largely located at Kanagawa Prefecture and Tokyo Metropolitan, it was essential for YYCS to carefully consider how to position the educational policy, if not, it would be a serious damage to the number of admission due to the low demand for overseas

Chinese schools in the transition era. Hence, the aim of YYCS was gradually changed and the school was concerned more about cultural issues rather than solely national awareness-oriented.

Huang Wei-chu agreed the change of educational principle and indicated the main themes of new direction. “Both overseas Chinese and ethnic Chinese put Japan at the core of living, so the principle of education to overseas Chinese has naturally amended,” he said, “what is important is neither the education of preparation for return to China nor the narrow-minded national education, but to inherit the Chinese culture. Thus, overseas education in Japan nowadays is to learn Chinese culture. At the same time Chinese and Japanese construct their identity respectively, learning the culture of where they are living soundly is more important” (Harisawa 2003, p. 46). Two themes were recognized from Huang’s explanation. The first one was inheritance of Chinese culture and the other was identity construction. These were not merely for Chinese but also Japanese and outlined the new role of YYCS.

Indeed YYCS still has being emphasized the sense of nation, but it changed the method to the promotion of culture. Japanese schools introduced graduation travel for all final year students in 1953. YYCS was influenced by this custom and introduced it to high school year three students. In 1982, because of the cancellation of high school, junior three students had the chance to visit other parts of Japan as graduation travel. This practice changed to let junior two students go back to China in 1997. The missions and aims of travel gradually became clearer. The school could foster students in national identification by providing them with opportunities to visit China, practice Chinese language, understand history and culture, and investigate society (Huang and Zhang 2005, p. 126). It was one of the cultural educations illustrating how YYCS promoted national sense and maintained the aim of school. Compared to singing school song or prohibition of speaking Japanese, graduation travel let students feel what Chinese culture was directly, and students could build up the feelings to China through their own experience of cultural travel.

Principal Huang also claimed that the education of YYCS nowadays was a target on cultural diversity with Chinese culture as the pillar (Harisawa 2003, p. 47). That meant the strict national education was laid down. As displayed in

Table 8, ethnic Japanese were also welcome to be admitted and there are steady percentages of around 15% of the Japanese children each year. In fact, YYCS had mutual activities with Japanese society reflecting an increase in communication which was beneficial to identity building. In 1987, the school hosted a basketball competition of the “Cup of China-Japan friendship” annually and invited more than ten of Japanese schools for cultural exchange (Huang and Zhang 2005, p. 126). Through this type of cultural activity and other similar practice, students of YYCS could establish a perception of a united group against Japanese fellows; Japanese students could understand what YYCS was. This was a manifestation of cultural diversity, which facilitated the identity construction. Since 1980s it was a progress of YYCS compared with the past and YYCS endeavored to change the educational role, which may attributed to the transition of Japanese society.

At the beginning of new academic year in 2000, YYCS confirmed a new mission at the start of 21st century and it could be an appropriate conclusion that YYCS had transformed since 1980s to suit the Japanese society. “Students of YYCS should inherit and exalt the Chinese culture, while they should also learn and practice the proficiency of Chinese and Japanese languages; should possess an ability as Japanese schools request to enter the Japanese educational system for further study; graduates should have profound sentiment to China” (Huang and Zhang 2005, p. 128). Although the school claimed for preserving Chinese, there was no national consciousness wordings, contrasting to the objective announced in 1953. Therefore, the position of YYCS may be regarded as a cultural carrier to promote Chinese culture to “new overseas Chinese” as well as Japanese in the transition of Japanese society.

CONCLUSION

YYCS has own historical background but it was not conservative and did not resist to change the role. When it was founded, the school consisted of teachers and students who favored PRC and was expelled from YOCS. Under the environment of the Cold War and political split of China, overseas Chinese education in YYCS was considered that it might be relevant for the construction of mother country. So, in the early year, graduates went back to

China and the national education was taught to students. However, the situation changed from 1980s as socio-economic transformation in both Chinese and Japanese societies and Sino-Japanese relation. YYCS amended the language teaching policy and educational system in order to match with the changing overseas Chinese community. National education was tuned to suit with the circumstance. Applying cultural education and mutual interaction with Japanese society to the methods of education, YYCS adjusted its aim to cultural diversity and through these activities to preserve and inherit Chinese culture to assist students in building national consciousness.

To be concluded, YYCS is a unique existence of overseas Chinese schools in Japan. Before 1980, it generally served overseas Chinese to provide them practical knowledge and also the national education, while after 1980 it has being served both nationality, no matter ethnic Chinese or Japanese, to teach them cultural heritage. In spite of the transition of society, YYCS transformed from mere education provider to cultural carrier promoting Chinese culture, by which the school could still spread the importance of national sense. In short, the study of YYCS is not only an educational issue or a part of Sino-Japanese relation, but also an integrated cultural and social research.

REFERENCES

- Anderson, B., 1991. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London & New York: Verso.
- City of Yokohama, 2010. Table 16 Population of Foreigner by Nationality and Area, *Statistical Table*, 人口のあゆみ 2010, [online] Available at: <<http://www.city.yokohama.lg.jp/ex/stat/jinko/ayumi/index-j.html>> [Accessed 16 February 2012]
- Editorial committee of treatise on hundred year of history of Yokohama Yamate Chinese School, ed. 2005. *Hengbin Shanshou Zhonghua Xuexiao Bainian Xiaozhi 1898-2004* 横濱山手中華學校百年校志 1898-2004 (*Treatise on Hundred Year of History of Yokohama Yamate Chinese School, 1898-2004*). Yokohama: Yokohama Yamate Chinese School.
- Harisawa, T., 2003. *Riben Huaqiao Xuexian Zhi Yanjiu* 日本華僑學校之研究 (*Study of Overseas Chinese Schools in Japan*). M.Phil. National Taiwan Normal University.
- Huang, W.C. and Zhang, Y.C., 2005. Bainian Xiaoshi 百年校史 (The Hundred Years of History of the School). In: Editorial committee of treatise on hundred year of history of Yokohama Yamate Chinese School, ed. 2005. *Hengbin Shanshou Zhonghua Xuexiao Bainian Xiaozhi 1898-2004* 横濱山手中華學校百年校志 1898-2004 (*Treatise on Hundred Year of History of Yokohama Yamate Chinese School, 1898-2004*). Yokohama: Yokohama Yamate Chinese School, pp. 41-132.
- Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2011. Table 9-18 Trends in marriages by nationality of bride and groom, Marriages, *Vital Statistic of Japan 2010*, vol. 1.
- Tzang, K.E. and Chiang, Y.C., 1958. *Overseas Chinese Education in Japan*. Taipei: Overseas Publication Service.
- Wu, L.J., 1962. Shinian De Bianhua He Jinbu 十年的變化和進步 (Changes and Progress in Ten Years). In: Editorial committee ed., *Hengbin Shanshou Zhonghua Xuexiao Bainian Xiaozhi 1898-2004*, pp. 148-150.
- Yue, C.N., 2010. *Study on the Educational Characteristic of Yokohama Yamate Chinese*

School. M.Phil. Jinan University.

Zhu, H.L., 1996. *Dangdai Riben Huaqiao Jiaoyu* 當代日本華僑教育 (*Overseas Chinese Education in Contemporary Japan*). Taiyuan: Shanxi Education Publish.

Wayang as an Alternative Learning Method to Solve Indonesian Problem in Education and Culture

Astri Setiamurti
Bogor Agricultural University
Email: astri.setiamurti@gmail.com

Nur Hannah Muthohharoh
Bogor Agricultural University

Moh. Miftachur Rizqi
Bogor Agricultural University

INTRODUCTIONS

Learning method used by a teacher will be influential on a student learning achievement. In some areas in Indonesia, especially in the rural areas, the teachers still use Teacher Learning Center (TCL) and use only one media, the audio media. In the TCL method that just use one media, teachers are dominating in learning process and students are passively listening to what teacher convey is. This makes a classroom atmosphere seemed monotonous and causing students get bored easily. In addition, it also decreases the motivation to learn and furthermore reduce the creativity of the students. While in the Student Learning Center (SCL) method, teachers act only as facilitators and students are asked to think and discuss their opinion. Teaching and learning process should be built as comfortable as possible so the learning goal can be accomplished. Because of that, we need more communicative teaching method that use an attractive media, one of them is using Wayang as media learning. Wayang is one of Indonesian folk art made of bamboo, wood, leather which are carved in detail. Wayang performance is using audio-visual methods which can attract the attention of the audiences.

In the globalization era, a nation will get an identity crisis if that nation can't maintain their culture. Aje (2008) said that in terms of ideology, political, economic, social and cultural future, if it can't be anticipated the era of globalization and the information will be threats,

challenges, obstacles and interference in the acculturation process of ideology values of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Wayang is one of Indonesian culture that began to be abandoned by the community. By using Wayang as a teaching media, students can more easily understand the subject matter and also know Indonesian culture. Furthermore, the Wayang are able to answer the problems of education which is currently being discussed in Indonesia, it is about moral education for students. The values contained in Wayang can provide a wide range of moral lessons that are taught to students. This paper explains how to find a way out of trouble with the perspective of every community that has values and culture respectively.

METHODS

The method used in data collection is observation and literature study. Direct observation of activities carried out in a college student movement when practicing the Wayang as learning media at Cihideung Ilir Government Elementary School, Bogor district, Indonesia. Besides, the activities of *Program Kreativitas Mahasiswa Pengembangan Masyarakat (PKM-M)* at Gunung Batu Government Elementary School, Bogor district, Indonesia. Literature studies conducted to obtain secondary data as well as supporting the observations to reinforce the concepts that will be used to look at phenomena that exist in the field. While the primary data obtained from unstructured interviews with a student activist.

RESULTS

Problems of Learning Methods

As explained before, learning process in Indonesia is more directed at the TCL. This method has some weakness, such as the lack of active involvement of students during the learning process. The class may seem boring if students only hear the teacher's explanations, because someone has a certain capacity to be able to focus. The atmosphere will lead the students to do not pay attention to what is conveyed by the teacher and find something else to

do. In this case the teachers must be more creative in teaching process, such as by using media learning. One of media media learning that can be apply is Wayang. Wayang can be apply as a media learning to explain some subjects, such as explaining the process of metabolism, the teacher can create a story that played with Wayang so the students will be interested and know what their teacher convey is.

When students can understand a subject matter and they do it happily then that knowledge does not only stored in short term memory but can also be stored in long term memory. Apply Wayang as media learning can improve students' memory because the audio-visual learning method is more memorable than the audio onwly or visual only. Implementation of apply Wayang is enable to make interaction between teachers and students. This requires both teachers and students to participate actively in order to understanding and sympathy each other. In addition, it can enhance the imagination of students so that students become more creative.

One of the mistakes in the education system in Indonesia was more referring to the Western education system and less emphasizing the potency of local culture. In fact by using the potency of local culture will lead to a sense of closeness and a sense of belonging to learn more from teacher or from students. In addition, students can learn more about the traditional culture of the region.

History and Types of Wayang

Wayang is an original culture in Indonesia. UNESCO had declared Wayang as Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity Indonesia in 2003. Indonesia has various types of Wayang which are spread all over the Indonesia region and every region has different characteristics Wayang. According to Ahira (n.d), Wayang as a culture of Indonesia has significance in the community. The functions of Wayang are:

1. Education. Wayang's stories, shapes, and characters contain the values of the philosophy of Indonesia. For example, the stories about God, nature, goodness, and crimes.
2. Information. Wayang is communication media in terms of delivering the message.
3. Religion. Wayang can be performed on special occasions. Mainly ceremonial reinforcements to resist, and ruwatan (freeing influence evil spirits).
4. As entertainment. Wayang is a folk art entertainment. However, over the times, the Wayang becomes entertainment for all walks of life.

Table 1 Types of Wayang Based on Materials

Types of Wayang			
Wayang Kulit	Wayang Golek	Wayang Gung	Wayang Orang
1. Wayang Purwa 2. Wayang Madya 3. Wayang Gedog 4. Wayang Dupara 5. Wayang Wahyu 6. Wayang Suluh 7. Wayang Kancil 8. Wayang Calongarang 9. Wayang Krucil 10. Wayang Ajen 11. Wayang Sasak 12. Wayang Sadat 13. Wayang Parwa	1. Wayang Golek / Wayang Thengul (Bojonegoro) 2. Wayang Menak 3. Wayang Papak / Wayang Cepak 4. Wayang Klithik 5. Wayang Beber	1. Wayang Timplong 2. Wayang Arya 3. Wayang Potehi 4. Wayang Gambuh 5. Wayang Parwa 6. Wayang Cupak	1. Wayang Gung (Kalimantan Selatan) 2. Wayang Topeng (wayang orang menggunakan topeng di Kalimantan Selatan) 3. Wayang Suket

Source: Adopted from <http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayang>

The table above shows the types of Wayang based on the materials. The wayang were derived from various regions in Indonesia, for example, Wayang Golek from Sundanese, Wayang Kulit from Javanese. And each Wayang has their uniqueness according to region of origin. By using Wayang as a learning method, we assess the way out of problem in education

and culture based on they own perspective. Also this method is using the values that have been rooted in the community, so it will be more easily internalized and persist in a continuous.



Figure 1 Wayang Kulit

Source:

<http://www.moreindonesia.com/wayang-kulit-shadow-puppets-cultural-heritage/wayang-kulit->



Figure 2 Wayang Orang

Source:

<http://my.opera.com/jaimana/bl>



Figure 3 Wayang Golek

Source:

<http://www.jabarprov.go.id/index.>

Previously, Wayang was used as an education media in religious diffusion and moral education. But, this method just use in informal school because formal school wasn't a common thing in Indonesia on colonial era. So, people in that era using Wayang to educate their children.

Wayang as a Learning Method in Formal School



Figure 4 Eco-campaign by Using Wayang

Source: Himasiera documents (2011)

Every region in Indonesia there is a local content lesson. The aim of local content lesson is to learn about the culture of each region. But these lessons are usually only filled with learning the local language. In fact, there is potential to learn and introduce the Wayang in this lesson. Wayang is not just an ordinary Wayang but Wayang has its own chemistry with different philosophies within a community. As mentioned before, the first Wayang

used in informal education. With the various advantages of Wayang, from unique form to the values contained in the Wayang, it can be used as a learning media in formal school.



Figure 5 Introducing Wayang Characters to Student

Source: Nurmayanti AW, Hafizhoh A,

Wayangeers and Wayang Wayangs

played with various characters. The messages of environment campaign were delivered without sounding patronizing. And the result, students interested and continued to follow the storyline Wayang. It can be proved with the student is required to play the Wayang and recounted the story, they were be able to retelling the story. It means that the use of Wayang can be the learning media that can help students remembering the lesson.

The use of Wayang as learning media had also been carried out in a Student Creativity Program Community Development (PKM-M) entitled "Innovative Concepts 'Garbage Bank' To Develop Creative Studio Practice-Based Multimedia Environment Nuanced Wayang People" (Nurmayanti, AW et al., 2011). In this program, students use the Wayang as a medium for eco-action campaign to the students. Based on the results of the report indicated that the use of Wayang as a media campaign to attract the attention of students, as well as be able to help students understand the material presented.

Wayang to Build Moral and Character of Students

The use of Wayang as a learning media in formal school can also serve as a moral teaching to students. The stories in a Wayang are very diverse with different figures include protagonist and antagonist figures. Wayang figures can serve as role models to act and behave in life because every character has a different personality. By introducing the Wayang characters gradually, the students will feel having Wayang as their own. Furtehermore,

A student movement at Bogor Agricultural University did an environment campaign at Cihideung Ilir government elementary school. The campaign was not done with one way communication, such as lecture method. However, the campaign presented in two-ways communication which make the students interesting and want to learn more by using Wayang. Some students became

Wayangeers and Wayang Wayangs played with various characters. The messages of environment campaign were delivered without sounding patronizing. And the result, students interested and continued to follow the storyline Wayang. It can be proved with the student is required to play the Wayang and recounted the story, they were be able to retelling the story. It means that the use of Wayang can be the learning media that can help students remembering the lesson.

Indonesian cultur issues can be resolved and the problem of low achievement in education can be resolved.

Using Wayang as a teaching method not only will helps students to understand and remember the subject matter that presented by the teachers, it also can be the media to build moral education for students. With various kinds of Wayang, characters and different stories which is owned by the various ethnic groups in Indonesia, Wayang have a philosophy that can teach about morals to students. According to Doni Koesoema in Zuhryah H (2010), character education is an anthropological structure that focused on the development process continuously to improve himself as a major human with actualize values such as perseverance, responsibility, generosity, and others.

Using Wayang as a teaching method can be applied to all of the students, especially the early childhood or preschool and elementary school. According to Hastuti W (2009), moral parenting to children can be done since an early age, even the concept of good and bad, right and wrong is the first lesson about the moral should be given to children because it is considered effective in implanting moral and spiritual children. Giving of moral education should be implanted early in order to attach the individual child to adult children, so children are able to overcome these problems as adults. According to Ericson in Hastuti (2009), childhood should be implanted to the moral parenting of children as this would be firmly attached and is more easily done.

Philosophy of wayang stories contained the culture of each region in Indonesia. Stories of wayang are delivered to the students provide a lesson about the many positive things such as the planting of the value of honesty, modesty, shame, devout worship, filial to parents, etc. These positive characters are now urgently needed by the young generation of Indonesia to rebuild the nation's moral. Starting from little things like honesty can lead to solve a larger problem, such as corruption.

Moral problem that occurred in Indonesia almost found at various ages, from children to adults, and from mild to severe levels of crime. At the age of the children for example, found children who smoke, steal, etc. Besides moral damages in the teenage years such as fighting, drug consumption by sex, whereas in the adult age levels of corruption encountered. People

who have had no shame and no fear of the God will be more willing to commit a crime. Therefore, character education must be applied early by using a Wayang through the philosophy of the story.

According to Astuti (n.d), moral and character education is a dynamic capability of sustainable development of human to hold the internalization of values to produce an active disposition, stability within the individual. Character education that provided to students is closely related to the concept of holistic education. According to Zuhariyah (2009), holistic education is an education that develops the potential of phyco-emotional, social, crativitu, and spiritual concept of child. This concept illustrates that the education given to children are not just limited to education through the usual text taught in schools and is only concerned with cognitive aspects. It should concern with affective and psychomotor aspect too.

The concept of holistic education is what can be found in the stories of the Wayang through the philosophy contained in it. The moral messages that are conveyed to students can teach various positive nature and also the students can more easily understand and remembering the lesson if it conveyed in form of story. The use of Wayang stories can build the imagination of students. Usually students have an interest against a figure of his idol. Figures contained in the Wayang can be an idol for students because of the positive nature, uniqueness that wayang has. Thus the use of Wayang can be a reference to students in a positive act. Besides, the use of Wayang as a teaching method can help to preserve the national culture that has begun to erode.

CONCLUSION

It can be concluded that Wayang has high potency to be an alternative learning method to be applied to students, especially for kindergarten students and elementary school. Wayang can make students more interested so that they can understand the lesson more. Wayang also provide a variety of teaching about the values contained in the Wayang story. Thus, the use of Wayang is able to overcome the problem of education in Indonesia which is still emphasis on cognitive aspects. Furthermore, Wayang will able to serve the media in educating the

character and moral of students so Indonesia will printed the generation that good in moral and character.

REFERENCES

- Ahira, A., n.d. Sejarah wayang: Bahan, cerita, dan manfaat wayang, [online] Available at:<www.anneahira.com/sejarah-wayang.htm> [Accessed 16 February 2012].
- Aje. 2008, Berita sore, *Era Globalisasi Jadi Ancaman*, [online]5 Agustus. Available at:<<http://beritasore.com/2008/08/05/era-globalisasi-jadi-ancaman/>> [Accessed 15 February 2012].
- Anonymous, n.d. Wayang kulit. [photograph]. Available at <<http://www.moreindonesia.com/wayang-kulit-shadow-puppets-cultural-heritage/wayang-kulit-shadow-puppets-3/>> [Accessed 20 February 2012].
- Anonymous, n.d. Wayang orang. [photograph]. Available at <http://my.opera.com/jaimana/blog/wayang-orang>> [Accessed 20 February 2012].
- Anonymous, n.d. Wayang golek Dunda. [photograph]. Available at [Accessed 20 February 2012].
- Anonymous, 2011. *Eco-champaign by using wayang*. [photograph]. (Himasiera's own private collection).
- Anonymous, 2012. Wayang, [online] Available at:<<http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayang>> [Accessed 15 February 2012].
- Astuti, Sl., n.d. *Pendekatan holistik dan kontekstual: Prinsip dalam mengatasi krisis karakter di Indonesia*, [online] Available at:<<http://staff.uny.ac.id/sites/default/files/penelitian/Siti%20Irene%20Astuti%20D,%20Dr/Makalah%20Pendekatan%20Holistik%20dan%20Kontekstual%20B.pdf>> [Accessed 18 February 2012].
- Hastuti, D, 2009. *Pengasuhan: Teori dan prinsip serta aplikasinya di Indonesia*. Bogor: Departemen Ilmu Keluarga dan Konsumen Institut Pertanian Bogor.
- Meli, L., Neti, H., 2009. *Dampak pendidikan holistik pada pembentukan karakter dan kecerdasan majemuk anak usia prasekolah*, [online] Available

at:<[http://repository.ipb.ac.id/bitstream/handle/123456789/40345/JURNAL%20ILMU%20KELUARGA%20DAN%20KONSUMEN%20VOLUME%202%20NOMOR%201%20\(4\).pdf](http://repository.ipb.ac.id/bitstream/handle/123456789/40345/JURNAL%20ILMU%20KELUARGA%20DAN%20KONSUMEN%20VOLUME%202%20NOMOR%201%20(4).pdf)> [Accessed 18 February 2012].

Nurmayanti, AW. et al., 2011. *Konsep inovatif “Bank Sampah” untuk pengembangan praktek sanggar kreatif bernuansa lingkungan hidup berbasis multimedia tokoh wayang.*

UNESCO, 2008. The Wayang Wayang Theatre, [online] Available at:<<http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/index.php?RL=00063>> [Accessed 15 February 2012].

Zuhriyah, H, 2010. *Pendidikan karakter (studi perbandingan antara konsep doni koesoema an ibnu miskawaih)*, [online] Available

at:<http://eprints.sunan-ampel.ac.id/229/1/HENI_ZUHRIYAH.pdf> [Accessed 18 February 2012].

Market, Religion and State: Religious Education and Secular Education in a Muslim Village of Northwest China

Hong Yanbi
University of Hong Kong
Email: hongyb@hku.hk

INTRODUCTION

For a long time, until fairly recently, Muslim societies are depicted as passive receptors of secular educational paradigms that were mainly imported from the West (Herrera 2004). In the post- 9/11 era, research on Muslim religious education dramatically increased, including studies on Middle East, Central Asia, Southeast Asia and even West, while relatively few of them pay attention on the population on the peripheries of Muslim world, especially those as non-migrant Muslim minorities in non-Muslim societies, who are with a long history of peaceful coexistence with non-Muslim majority and maintenance of their own Muslim identities.

The urge of modernization, effectively participating in the national even global economy, is juxtaposed in many societies with another urge to "preserve traditional life, resist cultural imperialism and Westernization, and maintain religiosity in daily life" (Boyle 2004: 129). In these two seems opposite missions, as a knowledge transmission institution, school doubtlessly plays a critical role. Moreover, school itself is "a multilevel institution oriented to many different, often contradictory goals" (Dougherty & Hammack 1990: 12). So the local knowledge of education and schools becomes essentially important for probing the dynamics of "clash" and integration of Muslims in the multiethnic societies, in particular, in the fast transforming China. The question posed by Nelson (2006) might exist in many Muslim societies: Market oriented reform will draw parents toward Islam or away from it? In order to answer this question and understand parents' educational choice, it is necessary to apprehend the institutions and contents of both education systems and their roles in the whole society.

In South Asia, Islamic schools, *Madrastas*, are prominent non-state education providers,

especially for those hard-to-reach children in Muslim communities (Bano 2010). However, if without the cooperation from the parents as demanders, education is no way to expand. In Tibetan areas, Gao Bingzhong (2001:250) finds out that send children to be lamas has threefold purposes: a form of family plan to eliminate the economic burden to establish a new family; a viable way for living other than school education; continuation of family career as the previous generation has produced at least one lama. And poverty plays a key role as well, since the monasteries provide better material conditions for those boys compared with their poor families (Mackerras 1999: 42). Xiaoyi Ma's (2009) research in Hui communities of Shandong province demonstrates that though the Hui people have convenient access to public education, they do not see the point of keeping their children in school when the economic rewards for their investment, and they think the public school teachers (Han) discriminate their children in classroom. In USA, for the black underclass children, Carter (2005: 20) found out that the main motivation behind the aspiration for college diploma and being a lawyer or a doctor was "getting paid" and making a lot of money.

But religious education also is far beyond this simple instrumental consideration. Based on his research on simplest and primitive religions, Durkheim (1965) discovered the profoundly lasting classification between sacred and profane things. For Islam, that Toynbee (1956: 20) thought was the most rational religion among the existed religions which were developed from Judaism, all the knowledge is divided into the divine religious knowledge and the profane earthly knowledge (Anzer 2003). Providing sacred knowledge or knowledge on sacred things, religious education also play great relevance with group's and individuals' identities. With the migration wave from the "core" area from Islamic world, most Muslims in Europe prefer their children to have an education that includes at least some religious instruction concerning morals and values (Daun & Arjmand 2005). In Calabar, Nigeria, the Ibo, more than Efik, regard education as a mean to a career, and Ibo believe work to be an important goal; while Efik, on the other hand, regard education as an end more than a means (Horowitz 1985: 112).

In this paper, we briefly introduce China's state policy on religious education and the local system of religious education of Muslim, in particular the *jingtang* education. In the

second section, the identity issue and related binary classification of the local world will be discussed. In the third section, how the market forces influence the local education perceptions will be examined. Finally, we summarize and discussion the implication on educational development for ethnic minorities.

STATE POLICY AND LOCAL MUSLIM EDUCATION SYSTEM

Han Chinese culture is generally considered secular. The traditional Confucian education system keep itself from religion, but for Tibetan and Muslims education is completely intertwined with religion¹ (Mackerras 1999: 25). Although sometimes the communist policy regards Islam as favorable to modernization, especially in struggling with drunkness and drug abuse which are strongly condemned in Koran (Mackerras 1999: 35)², the China state believes the modern secular education is more advanced, compared with religious education, and suffices to improve local socioeconomic development. This is by no means unique for Chinese state, but rather more a predominant global discourse which is also adopted by many international NGOs (Nelson 2006). So the state policy is "separation of religion and education" which is very close to the principle of France. The law states that only the youngster completed nine years basic education could study in religious schools. However, the reality is that religious schools enroll a large number of children who never attend public school or drop out after several years.

Gladney (1999) classified Chinese Muslim education system into three categories: first, the public schools; second, the state-sponsored Islamic schools; third, from that of the Muslims themselves, their self-representation and methods of Islamic education, most in or affiliated to mosques³. The third one, often called *jingtang* 经堂 education⁴, is the mainstream

¹ In some sense, for Tibetan Buddhism and Islam, the religion is supported by the education system (Mackerras 1999: 43).

² In the early 1980s, an investigation showed that the influence of Islam was still strong enough in its adherents' daily life behaviors (He Yanji 1991).

³ Mackerras divides the Islamic schools in China into two main types. "The first and most important one is those that aim to train further clergy (ahong). This category can itself be subdivided into the large Quranic or theological colleges (jingxueyuan) and the smaller schools attached to mosques. The second type is for teaching Muslim children Arabic, Islamic doctrine and the Quran" (Mackerras 1999: 43).

⁴ *Jingtang* education is the Chinese form of Islamic religious education which is similar with the madrasa in

form of Chinese Muslims' religious education that could be further divided into two forms: Koranic school (or *Maktab*) and Madrassa. The Koranic school is a place where Muslim children go to read and recite the Koran only, usually for lower level religious education; while the Madrassa refers to a bit more organized institutions with classrooms and teachers for different levels, providing more in-depth religious education (Anzer 2003).

In 2010 and 2011, the author conducted seven months' ethnographic fieldwork in Redstone village in Linxia Hui Autonomous Prefecture, in Gansu province of Northwest China. Linxia is considered one of the places with strong Islamic atmosphere in China, as it is called China's "little Mecca." In the village, there are 396 households with a population of 1850, among which about 16 percent are Han while others are Muslims. One primary school, one teaching spots and six mosques locate in the village. In May 2011, the school has 10 teachers among which only two are males, three are temporal teachers (*minban jiaoshi*), and two females are Muslim and others are Han.

In order to legitimate themselves, the religious institutions also have a set of formal regulations according state's ideology. However, those regulations only exist in the paper, not in the daily live. What function in fact is still the traditional forms. "The government does not allow the mosque to enroll too many students, so they cannot tell the real number to you. If too many, some have to quit. Those from Xinjiang are also not allowed to enroll here... Because of the rebellion of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. And there is always such a policy. In fact, when there was a government inspection, the mosque will let the students go home to have a holiday, and come back after the inspection" (DZM 2011/10/17). State requires the village leaders to register all the *ahongs* and *manlas*, particularly for those non-locals. The secretary of CCP village branch complained: "This is to prevent the strife between *ahongs*, but such registration is useless" (Ding 2011/10/12). In some inspection periods, the Muslim parents were also afraid to be fined or rested because they did not send school-aged children into public schools. But finally no parent was punished, since the policy was largely deterrent rather than to be practiced. So, the law and regulations are just a "rationalized myth", using John Meyer's (Meyer & Rowen 1977) concept which prefers institutionalized and

bureaucratic systems. Part of the reason may be that the state sometimes chose to turn a blind to the practices which are not allowed in paper, since these practices do not threaten the stability and the reign (Mackerras 1999: 44).

Jingtang Education

Jingtang education is primarily community-based, and affiliates to the mosques. "As is the case in majority of Madrassas all around the world, the teaching practices emphasize rote memorization and encourage very little critical thinking" (Anzer 2003: 17). It is not an exception in China. The purpose of the Koranic school is that all students should be able to read, more often even only pronounce, the Koran in Arabic, even if they do not understand the language itself. But "the memorization of key texts just as the Quran is memorized, is also the starting point for the mastery of the religious sciences" (Eickeman 1978: 489). Compared with public education, the Islamic education pays much attention on moral education, since "the purpose of Islamic education is giving meaning to life and enriching it with the light of the Islamic faith as outlined in the Koran" (Anzer 2003: 20).

The religious education, generally speaking, is free. Mackerras (1999: 45) reported that there are variations in the fees of the Islamic schools he visited. In the village, learning in the village mosques, including holiday school and full time school, no fee is charged, especially for those from the community. And free accommodation is provided. However, in the nearby great mosque in the township, a symbolic fee- 100 yuan for a month including accommodation- will be charged for holiday school. The village mosque along explains that because there are few outsiders come to this village mosque. Thus, most of the boys in the village go to the village mosque for the holiday Koranic school; while the girls under 9 years old also attend such schools to learn the basic Islamic beliefs and practices. All the boys in Koranic schools accommodate in the mosques.

The arrangement and timetable of religious education, especially in Koranic schools, is much flexible than the schedule in public schools (see table 1). The ahongs go back home in the Thursday afternoon, so the manlas have a day holiday until Friday afternoon when they

have to attend the *juma* (the congregation). It is a little different in the great mosque in the township. There were 12 teachers and more than 100 manlas. Before, there were about 200 manlas. According to their levels from high to low, all the manlas were classified into six classes from class 1 to class 6. Generally speaking, those in class 1 have all studied religious knowledge for 4-5 years. The first class begins at about 6am just after the first pray. The four classes in the morning continue until 10:30, each lasts 40-50 minutes. Then they can take a break, most of them go back to the bed. The afternoon class begin at 1pm, after one class they do the second pray, then have lunch after which there are still three classes waiting for them. They all said the time was very tight (ML 2011/04/30).

"This bowl of rice is not easy to eat. [We] can not discipline the students too harsh, or the parents will complain. This is very different from school teachers who can discipline [the students] very strictly or even beat them. The teachers meet the parents only once a year in the teacher-parent meeting, but very few encounters in daily life. It's different for us. We will go to their home to eat, and they will come to the mosque to pray. If they are unpleasant with you, they may do not talk to you, then it is a little in trouble" (MHM2010/07/24).

The ahong is very kind-hearted, discipline the students much looser than the teachers in school, and try to get them to learn scriptures. Ahong will buy fruits from the city for them in order to get them to study, and also give them money sometimes. (JPXF 2011/10/22)

Table 1. Timetable of Koranic School

	Summer (2010/07/24)	Winter (2011/10/22)
Wake up	5: 00	5: 30
The first pray	5: 30*	6: 00
Breakfast	7: 00	7: 30
Classes**	8: 00-11: 00	--
Break	11: 00-13: 00	10: 00- 13: 00
The second pary	14: 00*	13: 00
Lunch	14: 30	13: 30
Classes	15: 00-17 : 30	14: 00-16: 00
The third pray	17: 30*	16: 00
Supper	19: 00	--
Reading after fourth pray	20: 30	--

The fifth pray	21: 30*	--
Sleep	22: 30	22: 00

* The pray time changes according to the time of rise and set of sun.

** One class lasts for 45 minutes.

IDENTITY AND EDUCATION: A BINARY WORLD

Islam divides the knowledge into religious (sacred) knowledge and earthly (secular) knowledge (Anzer 2003). Furthermore, such distinction does not only exist in the realm of knowledge, but also in Muslims' daily life world. Durkheim (1965: 52) argued that the division of profane and sacred things was the essential element of religious thoughts, and such distinction was sustained throughout the whole human history. He further divided religious phenomena into two fundamental categories: beliefs and rites. "The first are states of opinion, and consist in representations; the second are determined modes of action" (Durkheim 1965: 51).

In Redstone village, Muslims' perceptions about education and learning also present a binary and dichotomous classification, including the names, the youngster, and knowledgeability. Most local Muslims, especially the younger generation, have two names. One is Chinese name, and the other is Arabic name. The first one is called school name 学名 or official name 官名 which is often used in school and in any state related documents; while its counterpart is called scriptural name 经名 or home name 家名 as it is adopted from religious scriptures and usually used at home⁵. Currently, Hui Muslims' scriptural names are very limited. Males mainly use the 25 prophets' names, while female mainly adopt the names of Prophet Muhamud's wives and daughters, so both sexes' names are no more than 40 (Ding Shiren 2011)⁶. Very similar is the situation of school name. The characters used in school names are also very limited. Two, or even more, students have the same school name is often occurred in the village school.

Different names function in different contexts. During the fieldwork, out of the school, I seldom observed that children use their school names or be used. Some parents I interviewed even cannot remember their children's school names. One father said he did not know his

⁵ The alhong gives an Arabic name from the scripture to a child after several days of one's birth.

⁶ Therefore, Ding (2011) edited the book of Muslim names to provide more options for the Hui Muslims.

son's school name since it was given by school teacher⁷. In contrast, the school teachers only know students' school names which are used in the class and written in the cover of their textbooks.

Islam is more often considered a text-based religion. However, the texts themselves are silent; "they become socially relevant through their enunciation, through citation, through acts of reading, reference, and interpretation" (Lambek 1990: 23). Furthermore, "the classification of things reproduces the classification of men" (Durkheim & Mauss 1963: 12). The classification of physical world extends its pattern into human world, and vice versa. The local Muslims distinguish youngster into only two groups: students and *manla* 满拉. The term *manla* usually refers to the children and youths who attend religious education institutions. All the youths who do not currently attend public schools are called "*manla*," although one may not be a student either in public school or mosque. A 10 years old boy who worked as waiter in a restaurant could be called little *manla*, but never a student, since he obviously was a drop-out. Therefore, it is not over-simplified to say that *manla* equal with non-student out of public schools. This term extension from religious learners to all non-students implicitly affirms the perceptions of "we" and "other" in local Muslim community.

Blind Man or "No Culture"?

Why the local Muslims bother to have two names? Or why they need a Chinese name in the school and society? One of the reasons may lie in that most teachers in the school are Han who could not remember those Arabic names which are pointless for them⁸. Nevertheless, many of those school names also follow a Han Chinese tradition in which for those who belong to the same generation of one extended family, there is one same character in their names. Hence, with a Chinese name is far beyond temporal convenience.

In the Muslims population of Northwest China, those who did not attend any religious schools to learn the scriptures are called "blind man" (*xiahan* 瞎汉) in order to differ them

⁷ But not all the Chinese names are given by teachers, many are given by the family members.

⁸ This reminds me that many Chinese students who attend West universities will have a English name, one of the common reasons is that it is hard for westerners to pronounce and remember a Chinese name.

from those who learned (Zhang Chengzhi 2002: 52)⁹. Such distinction corresponds with the division between religious knowledge and other science and social science knowledge. However, Gladney (1999) met a Hui Haiji who said he "had no culture" (没有文化), though he had lived in the Middle East for 12 years, and was fluent in Persian and Arabic and was a expert of Islamic Natural Sciences. In this case, "culture" means education level of Chinese.

The concept of "blind man" penetrates into local Muslims' minds, including both parents and children. Though the educational decision makings are mainly made by parents, the children still have their own sayings. A student in grade six expressed his willingness to learn scriptures, "My dad asks me to finish junior secondary school first, then go to learn scriptures... If I always study in public school, do not learn scriptures, it will be very hard for me in the future" (MZ 2011/10/26). One mother told the researcher that if she did not send the younger son to Koranic school after junior secondary school, he would blame her in the future, since her elder son attended Koranic schools for several years, and may become a ahong in the future. So she tried to treat the two sons equally (MJFM 2011/10/26). When recalling her arranged marriage, a young lady said the young man the matchmaker introduced was then learning scriptures, "according to our Islamic tradition, we like these people very much. My father agreed acknowledged that he was learning scripture and his family condition was not bad" (MMLY 2010/10/17). One 11 years old boy who was in grade four then and planned to turn to religious education after primary school, spoke out the core element that "It is a *guilty* if you do not learn scripture" (不念经有罪) (MHF 2010/07/24). This resonates what said by one ahong Ma Liyan interviewed, "Something you don't understand, learning scriptures is useful in the after world ah" (Ma 2009: 35).

Moreover, for many parents, religious learning is far more important than public schooling. One boy told the research that if he did badly in school, it was OK; however, if he could not memorize the verses of Koran, his father would beat him sometimes. Then those who disregard religious education inevitably will bear great community pressures. One family argues that their children could turn to study religious knowledge by themselves when they grow up and it will be much easier for them to learn, so they shall spend the golden youth

⁹ Though to be one of most prominent Hui Muslim writer, Zhang (2002) still identifies himself as a "blind man."

time on public education. Finally, their son successfully passed the national university entrance examination and was admitted by a university in 2010. Nevertheless, they were once condemned by their neighbors for ignoring religious education. In a study of Xinjiang in early 1980s, He (1991: 227-228) also reported that more than 80 percent of the interviewed secondary students from Uyghur and Hazakh confirm a person's soul lives on after death, and nonbelievers were put under spiritual pressures because of exclusion by other community members.

It is no doubt that nobody denies the essential importance of religious education, at least not publicly. At the same time, many families also try to avoid their children to be with "no culture."

A retired teacher from the village school was also a "loyal adherent to Islam." He highlights the public education as well as religion. When he taught in the village school, he also prays five times a day. With two sons, he sent the younger son to *jingtang* who now is a ahong, and the other to continue public education who finally entered into a primary medicine college¹⁰ (ZHCL 2010/10/06; MRH 2010/09/23). Such family strategy is not unique for Chinese Muslims. In some Tibetan families that did business with Muslims, one son may convert to Islam, sharing the family with a brother who was a lama (Lipman 1998: 19).

"Both public schooling and religious education are important, only can read Koran but illiterate and without culture is no good, but for our Muslim cannot read Koran either is no good. Moreover, [one] only can learn Koran better if he learned more characters" (MGHG 2010/05/01). For the Hui Muslims in Yunnan, Wang Jianping describes the binary role of language in the way that "using Chinese helped them to communicate with each other and with the Chinese society at large; and using Arabic and Persian words and texts helped them to preserve their Islamic tradition and to practice their religious rituals; and keeping a partly Persian-Turkic way of life manifested their migrant identity" (Wang 1996: 87). Language is rather a metaphor of education.

Therefore, the binary classification of the education world reflects essentially the effort of local Muslims to create a meaningful world in which to sustain their Islamic identity, and

¹⁰ But sadly his elder son died with leukemia after one year in the college.

adjust with and integrate into the large Chinese society as well. Lipman traced the history of Muslims in Northwest China, and finally asserted that it was "a history of becoming and then being Chinese while remaining Muslim, of the evolution of a sense of home" (Lipman 1998: xxxvi). Durkheim cautioned that there was no direct correspondence between ideology and existing social structure, since ideology was a historical product (Durkheim 1965: 15). However, from the interaction between ideology and social structure, a pattern of the real life is plausible to be explored and a comprehension is to be obtained. Furthermore, the ideology dimension, including value and identity here, is hardly separated with instrumental rational actions, but rather are deeply intermingled.

MARKET FORCES

In a township of Guyuan county in south Ningxia, Gladney (1996: 125-126) found that only 12 of 104 school-age children enrolled into school in 1985, while 27 of those not in school were studying the Koran in mosques, because of parents are not convinced of the value of learning Chinese or mathematics, but prefer them to learn the Koran, Arabic, and Persian. However, in nowadays Redstone village, all the Muslims recognize the importance of literacy and mathematics. A young manla who just married, explained to the researcher that a literate wife could take care the family and the children better, and "she will know the medicine name and buy the right one" (Ma Rulong 2010/09/27). As mentioned above, in a binary world, for local Muslims, public schooling is only a way to achieve a good life, in a very instrumental rational way. Nevertheless, religious education does not only function in the after world, but also in this world.

In parents' decision making on education, money frequently confirms its existence in an explicit or implicit way, even in religious education. The financial costs of public education and religious education differ greatly. In religious education, the village mosques provide the free accommodation; while the public schools still asked for tuition fee before 2006. So the teachers said after 2006, the enrollment rate sharply increased, especially in low grades. Some parents even sent 4 or 5 years old children into school in which they can transfer part of the

caring responsibility to teachers¹¹. However, not all the religious education is free. Concerned with summer holiday schools, which usually last one month, the township great mosque charged 100 yuan while the village mosque was free. Therefore, most of the children enrolled the village mosque rather than the great one. For *manlas*, the great mosque charges 400 yuan a semester, including accommodation fee¹². Hence, as one *manla* said "our main support is from the community where the mosque locates" (2011/04/30).

Learning scripture is not only religious beneficial, but sometimes also financial attractive. A father with two sons send the older one, who is now 14 and dropped out after grade three in village school two years ago, into a mosque in Lanzhou. He told the researcher that his son could get about 700-800 yuan per month from the *Niyyah* (*nietie* 乜贴) which is donated by the adherents in different kinds of ceremonies his son participated¹³ (DLX 2011/11/03). In local area, this is definitely a high income for a boy and do not require his family to support him financially any more. His family adheres to one of the old Sufi sects (门宦) in which its adherents donate more financial resources to the mosques and clergies. For those from the new sect (*Ikhwan*, *yihewani* 伊赫瓦尼), *manla*'s income is much less, but still they get some money from *Niyyah* (乜贴).

Also, for students, more other things besides religiosity attract them into religious schools. Ma concludes four factors that attract children into the religious education in mosques: the equal and harmonious relationships between peers; learning religious knowledge is the way to the happiness in the after world; the nice attitude of the teachers in mosques, no corporal punishments; and reasonable timetable and less pressure in mosques (Ma Liyan 2009: 41). The latter three factors are confirmed in this research. Moreover, the local socioeconomic contexts' influences might not be neglected. *Hafiz-e-Koran* refers the one who memorizes the Koran fully, and *Qari* is the one who can recite the Koran with good pronunciation and in a melodic tone. Some *manla* in the village mosque said if you became a

¹¹ The school principal was also pleasant to see this since the government financial funding was invested according to the student number.

¹² Ma Liyan (2009: 35) reports that, in 2008, one mosque in another county of Linxia charged 400-900 yuan for one academic year and differs in accordance of students' levels.

¹³ *Niyyah* is one part of the alms.

Hafiz-e-Koran, you could get a wife for free (without brideprice)¹⁴. One student hoped to be *ahong* because *ahong* could eat meat every day¹⁵.

"Ethnic groups often have distinctly preferred occupational paths that are related to the structure of opportunities and to differences of culture and history" (Horowitz 1985: 111). Many drop-out students throw themselves into money making to support the family and their own marriage soon or later, whereas, in many cases, they will spend a time in mosques. *Jingtang*, in some sense, becomes a buffer for some local children and youths in the transition from public school students to migrant workers. Grasping some basic religious education, they might be able to enter into the complicated and changeable society as Muslims.

Musa was a 13-years-old boy who dropped out after grade three, and then went to learn scriptures in one of the village mosques which is supported by less than 30 households. Musa's parents left home for several months because of fighting with his grandfather, so after that he lived with his grandfather. The *ahong* there explained that "He is the only student here. Actually, he won't get much religious knowledge here. Reasonably, as a school age boy, he now should be in school. He just spend several years here, then go to the society to work when arrive the age of 15 or 16. Even if he went to the school, he still will go to work at that age. Now the situation is that even you graduate from school, you also chose to be a migrant worker" (AH2 2010/11/13). Stay in the mosque, at least he won't hang out with other bad boys.

In 2011 May, three boys in grade six dropped out to follow their fathers to dig caterpillar fungus which is a high valuable traditional Tibetan and Chinese medicine that only grows in Tibetan Plateau. One month later, back from the Tibetan areas, they turned to mosques to be a *manla*. In 2011 fall, one boy dropped out from grade 8 and entered into Koranic school in the village mosque. He confessed that originally he planned to go out to make money immediately after dropping out, but his mother did not let him go as she thought he was still too young, so kept him to learn scriptures for a time first.

¹⁴ Whereas some others disagreed, argued it was not the case any more. In the great mosque, the researcher did meet a *manla* who was from Ningxia province and married a local girl arranged by the *ahong*. However, this is a uxori-local marriage in which the groom family does not need to pay brideprice.

¹⁵ Once for 140 days, as there are about 140 households in the mosque community, each household has to provide a decent square meal to the *ahong* and *manla* in the morning, which includes mutton, beef, chicken, and other dishes. Similar meals should also be provided in any family ceremonies *ahong* attended.

Therefore, ahongs are not optimistic about the future of local religious education. The village ahong disappointedly told the researcher that all the students in the mosque were incapable to become a ahong, because they were not wise neither worked hard enough. They noted that most of the children be sent to mosques were those who did not perform well in schools both in academic and behavior. The teachers and their parents could not discipline them well, so sent them into the mosques. Ahongs often lamented about the shrinking enrollment population in religious education. Ahong Ibrahimaha pointed out: "The biggest mosque in the Redstone village is supported by about 150 households, but only with less than 10 manlas¹⁶. However, when I was in another township many years ago, there were 15 manlas in my mosque which was supported only by 15 households" (MZX 2011/05/07). Furthermore, ahong Ibrahimaha also realized the impacts of market economy and the incentives to make money, because "a manla get less than 10 yuan a month from *Niyyah*, if he could attend 10 funeral ceremonies" (MZX 2011/05/07), so many youth would rather go out to be a migrant worker, rather than to be a manla.

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

Is there only one way of modernization? How to keep the ethnic and religious identity and move toward "modernizations" simultaneously?

This study implies that, for local Muslims, religious education and public education play significantly different roles in their lives. The former one concerns their identities, while the latter one can only be reached in the sense of instrumental rationality. The failed rural education discouraged local Muslim parents' passion to adopting public schooling to achieve social mobility. So they turn to religious education, and then to migrant work. Ironically, the low enrollment rate in public school does not necessarily indicate more children in Koranic schools and *madrassas* in mosques. Both of the education systems are increasingly eroding by the irresistible market forces. In south Morocco, Houtsonen (1994) also reports that the goals and significance of modern education seem to be instrumental in encouraging individualism

¹⁶ Actually there were 12 *manlas* then in the mosque mentioned.

and competition; whereas the goals and significance of Qur'anic education seem to be expressive and normative in encouraging a common identity and beliefs.

However, some other students seem to be more pessimistic. Anzer points out that one of the purposes of Islamic education is “strengthening and advancing human societies. Over the years however, the underlying attempt of Islamic education to strengthen and advance human societies has failed to achieve its goal” (Anzer 2003: 20). Chinese scholars also argue that while religious education could play a constructive role in carrying forward ethnic cultural traditions, and to some extent in training ethnic talents, religious education alone cannot suffice in a highly technologised society with dramatic social transformation (Yang & Wu 2009).

Is multicultural education a way out? Or we can transform the question into that whether multicultural education can substitute religious education. Postiglione (1999) expressed his positive attitudes on multicultural education. While the answer from this study seems to be a little gloomy, as the former require to treat religious knowledge equal with other knowledges; while the latter one teach religion as a belief, even if not more important than other knowledges. In Germany, the efforts of integrating Islamic religious education into public schools are not rare, aiming to either cut off fundamentalist madrassas or achieve equality with Christian education (Weibe 2010). However, Weibe’s (2010) question is challengeable: “integration in our society through increased separation in our schools - how is that supposed to work?”

REFERENCES

- Ali, S.H., 2009. *Islam and Education: Conflict and Conformity in Pakistan's Madrassahs*. Oxford; Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Anzer, U., 2003. *Islamic Education: A Brief History of Madrassas with Comments on Curricula and Current Pedagogical Practices*. Unpublished work.
- Bano, M., 2010. Madrasas as Partners in Education Provision: The South Asian Experience. *Development in Practice*, 20, pp.554-566.
- Daun, H. and Arjmand, R. 2005. Education in Europe and Muslim Demands for Competitive and Moral Education. *International Review of Education*, 51, pp.403-426.
- Ding, S. [丁士仁], eds., 2011. *Collection of Muslim Beautiful Names* [穆斯林美名薈萃]. Lanzhou: Gansu renmin chubanshe. [in Chinese]
- Durkheim, E., 1965. *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*. Translated by J. W. Swain. New York: Free Press.
- Durkheim, E., 1985. *Readings from Emile Durkheim*. Edited by Kenneth Thompson, Chichester: Horwood.
- Durkheim, E. and Mauss, M., 1963. *Primitive Classification*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Eickelman, D.F., 1978. The Art of Memory: Islamic Education and Its Social Reproduction. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 20, pp.485-516.
- Eickelman, D.F., 1982. The Study of Islam in Local Contexts. *Contributions to Asian Studies*, 17, pp.1-16.
- Gao, B.Z. [高丙中]. 2001. A Study in Ethnic Tu Areas in Huzhu and Minhe counties in Qinghai Province [青海互助縣和民和縣土族地區調查]. In: R. Ma, N.G. Pan and X. Zhou, eds. *Community Development Studies on Ethnic Minorities in China* [中國民族社區發展研究]. Beijing: Peking University Press, pp.216-291.
- Gladney, D.C., 1994. Representing Nationality in China: Refiguring Majority/Minority Identities. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 53, pp.92-123.
- Gladney, D.C., 1999. Making Muslims in China: Education, Islamicization and

- Representation. In: G.A. Postiglione, ed. *China's National Minority Education: Culture, Schooling, and Development*. New York; London: Falmer Press, pp.55-94.
- He, Y.J., 1991. Adapting Islam to Chinese Socialist Practice in Xinjiang. In: Z.L., Armonk, ed. *Religion under Socialism in China*. N.Y. & London: M. E. Sharpe, pp.224-231.
- Herrera, L., 2004. Education, Islam, and Modernity: Beyond Westernization and Centralization. *Comparative Education Review*, 48, pp.318-326.
- Ho, W.Y., 2008. Teaching Islam to Educate Multiethnic and Multicultural Literacy: Seeking Alternative Discourse and Global Pedagogies in the Chinese Context. *Asian Ethnicity*, 9, pp.77-95.
- Houtsonen, J., 1994. Traditional Quranic Education in a Southern Moroccan Village. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 26, pp.489-500.
- Jeldtoft, N., 2011. Lived Islam: religious identity with 'non-organized' Muslim minorities. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 34, pp.1134-1151.
- Levy, G. and Massalha, M., 2010. Yaffa: a school of their choice? *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, 31, pp.171-183.
- Lipman, J.N., 1998. *Familiar Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
- Luo, C.F., 1991. *Religion under Socialism in China*. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.
- Ma, L.Y. [馬麗燕], 2009. *The Impacts of Religion on School Education: The Case of Linxia Hui Autonomous Prefecture of Gansu*[宗教对学校教育的影响研究：以甘肅臨夏回族自治州為個案]. Northwest Normal University, Master Thesis. [in Chinese]
- Ma, X.Y., 2009. The Relationship between the Trade Culture of a Hui Community and State Schooling: A Case Study of the Hui Community in Chaocheng, Shandong Province. In: Zhou, M.L. and Hill, A.M., eds. *Affirmative Action in China and the U.S*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 167-177.
- Mackerras, C., 1999. Religion and the Education of China's Minorities. In: G.A. Postiglione, ed. *China's National Minority Education*. New York; London: Falmer.
- Malik, Ja., ed., 2008. *Madrasas in South Asia: Teaching Terror?* London; New York: Routledge, pp. 23-54.

- Meyer, J.W. and Rowan, B., 1977. Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 83, pp.340-363.
- Nelson, M.J., 2006. Muslims, Markets, and the Meaning of a "Good" Education in Pakistan. *Asian Survey*, 46, pp.699-720.
- Postiglione, G.A., ed, 1999. *China's National Minority Education: Culture, Schooling, and Development*. New York: Falmer Press.
- Steiner, K., 2011. *Madrasah* in Singapore: Tradition and modernity in religious education. *Intellectual Discourse*, 19, pp.41-70.
- Thobani, S., 2007. The Dilemma of Islam as School Knowledge in Muslim Education. *Asia Pacific Journal of Education*, 27, pp.11-25.
- Toynbee, A.J., 1956. *An Historian's Approach to Religion: Based on Gifford Lectures Delivered in the University of Edinburgh in the Years 1952 and 1953*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Wang, J.P., 1996. *Concord and Conflict: The Hui Communities in Yunnan Society in a Historical Perspective*. Lund: Studentlitteratur.
- Sen, A.K., 2006. *Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
- Zhang, C.Z. [張承志], 2002. The Academic Research in Mosques [寺裡的學術]. *Northwest Minorities Research [西北民族研究]*, (4), pp.52-63. [in Chinese]
- Zhou, M.L. and Hill, A.M., 2009. *Affirmative Action in China and the U.S.: A Dialogue on Inequality and Minority Education*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Effects of Gender Differences on Communication Strategy Use among ESL Learners

Rushita Ismail

Universiti Teknologi MARA Penang

Email: rushita@ppinang.uitm.edu.my

Suzana Ab. Rahim

Universiti Teknologi MARA Penang

Email: suzana.arahim@ppinang.uitm.edu.my

Farina Nozakiah Takjizan

Universiti Teknologi MARA Penang

Email: farina762@ppinang.uitm.edu.my

INTRODUCTION

There has been a considerable number of research which claims that second language learners are often encountered with communication breakdowns due to their limited knowledge of the target language. Managing these situations in a number of ways, learners may convey the content of their messages through the use of certain words which may imply or describe the meaning of the intended target lexical item or structures. At times, they may request help from the others for the accurate lexical item or when everything else fails they may switch to their first language. All these attempts to compensate for the deficiency of the linguistic problems are communication strategies (CSs henceforth).

Communication strategies are the alternative means of expression that allows the learner and the interlocutor work to achieve an agreement on meaning as they are in the pursuit of a successful communication. It was Tarone (1981) who initiated the notion of strategic communication when she claims that it is a “mutual attempt of both interlocutors to agree on meaning where the requisite meaning structures do not seem to be shared” (Tarone, 1981:288). This was further enhanced by Yule and Tarone (1991: 169) to “look at both sides of the pages” when they suggested that the use of CSs and negotiation of meaning are to be merged. Strategic communication is considered as strategic attempts made by the speaker to

communicate the initially intended message through an alternative means of expression and negotiations take place interactively and mutual comprehension of meaning is finally achieved.

There are several factors that are known to have influenced the use of CSs among language learners. They are proficiency level (Liskin- Gasparro, 1996; Jourdain, 2000), personality (Haastrop and Phillipson, 1983), cognitive-style (Littlemore 2001), native language (Chen, 1990) and cultural background (Wongsawang, 2001).

In recent years, research has broadened its scope to focus on the influence of CS use and gender when O'Malley and Chamot (1990) reported on the different usage of strategies between male and female students which prompt other researchers to find out if the use of CS would have any impact on gender (Kocoglu, 1997; Zhao, 1999). Thus, this paper attempts to examine the issue on CS and gender use among Malaysian ESL learners at tertiary level in order to find out whether gender has an impact on the use of CSs.

BRIEF OF LITERATURE REVIEW

The use of CS was initially viewed by Selinker (1972) as one of the processes affecting second language acquisition. Since then, there have been numerous significant contributions made that have broadened the scope of CS which has made it one of the controversial issues in this field. There are two main approaches highlighted to the study of CS. First is the study of CSs from psycholinguistic view which is related to cognitive or processing basis to the study (Bailystok, 1990; Poullisse, 1990; Faerch and Kasper, 1983). The second is the study that involves linguistic basis (Tarone, 1977, 1980).

From the psycholinguistic perspective, CSs are viewed as “cognitive processes involved in the use of the L2 in reception and production” (Ellis 1994: 396). More specifically, CSs are conceived as “mental plans implemented by the L2 learner in response to an internal signal of an imminent problem, a form of self-help that did not have to engage the interlocutor’s support for resolution” (Kasper and Kellerman, 1997:2) and located within cognitive models of speech production. Drawing on cognitive models of speech production,

CSs are considered as internal and individual mental plans in reaching a particular communicative goal. This approach has been taken by authors such as Faerch and Kasper (1980, 1983a, 1983b), Bialystok (1990), Poullisse et al. (1990), Poullisse (1993, 1997), and Kellerman and Bialystok (1997).

Interactionist researchers, however, following Varadi (1973), Tarone (1981) and Corder (1978) have treated CSs as elements of discourse and focused their attention on the linguistic realization of CSs. According to Ellis, CSs are viewed as “discourse strategies that are evident in interaction involving learners” (1994:396). They result from the “negotiation of an agreement on meaning” between two interlocutors” (Tarone, 1981: 288) and therefore, the discussion concerning CS use is considered to belong to the study of learner interaction. On this basis, interactionist researchers have focused their studies on the analysis of variability in linguistic performance. Researchers adopting an interactional perspective, such as Hyde (1982), Paribkaht (1985), Williams et al. (1997), Wagner and Firth (1997), and more recently Normah Abdullah (2001) and Fariza M. Nor (2008) have generally drawn on Tarone’s (1980, 1981) definition of the concept of CS for their empirical analyses.

COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES ADOPTED IN THIS STUDY

The use of language is strategic when it is used for a purpose. In this study I consider that the use of CS is strategic and communication involves the roles played by the interlocutors for a successful communication of meaning. In this study, the analyses has been restricted to lexical problems which may possibly be at the situations of the lack of knowledge of the second language lexical items the learner expects to communicate.

This definition employed in this study is based on Tarone’s (1981) definition of CSs that accounts for the role played by the interlocutor in the strategic communication process. It is “a mutual attempt of two interlocutors to agree on a meaning in situations where requisite meaning structures do not seem to be shared” Tarone, 1981: 288). According to this scholar, CSs have an interactional function as they are used to negotiate an agreement on a meaning between two interlocutors and, in this way “ensure that both of them are talking about the

same thing” (Tarone, 1981: 288).

Based on Tarone’s (1983) description of CSs, taking account of the interactional approach adopted in this study, the authors propose the following criteria to characterize CSs:

1. The speaker desires to communicate meaning x to a listener.
2. The speaker believes the linguistic or sociolinguistic structure desired to communicate meaning is unavailable or is not shared with the listener; thus
3. The speaker chooses to
 - a) avoid –not attempt to communicate the meaning x -or
 - b) attempt alternative means to communicate meaning x. The speaker stops trying alternatives when it seems clear to the speaker that there is a shared meaning.

(Tarone, 1983: 65)

Following Tarone’s (1983) interactional approach and classifications of the conceptualizations and definitions, the linguistic CS types below are to be considered.

1. Avoidance

- a) Topic avoidance- The learner simply does not talk about concepts for which the vocabulary is unknown
- b) Message abandonment- The learner begins to talk about a concept but is unable to continue and begins a new sentence (e.g. ‘the water (mumble)’ for ‘the water spills’)

2. Paraphrase

- a) Approximation- The learner uses a single target language vocabulary item or structure, which they know is not correct, but which shares enough semantic features with the desired item to satisfy the learner (e.g. ‘worm’ for ‘silkworm’)
- b) Word coinage- The learner makes up a new word in order to communicate a desired concept (e.g. ‘person worm’ to refer to ‘an animated caterpillar’)

c) Circumlocution- The learner describes the characteristics or elements of the object or action instead of using the appropriate target language structure (e.g. ‘I don’t know what’s its name. that’s uh, Persian, and we use in Turkey, a lot of’ to describe ‘a waterpipe’)

3. Conscious transfer

a) Literal translation- The learner translates word for word from the native language (e.g. ‘he invites him to drink’ in place of ‘they toast one another’)

b) Language switch- The learner simply uses the native language term without bothering to translate (e.g. ‘balon’ for ‘balloon’)

4. Appeal for assistance- The learner asks for the correct term: asks the experimenter, any NS, or even refers to a dictionary (e.g. ‘what is this? what called?’)

5. Mime- The learner uses a nonverbal device to refer to an object or event (e.g. ‘and everybody says [clap hands]’)

PRESENT STUDY

The main goal of this paper lies in the study of the gender differences on CS use among Malaysian learners while interacting with another ESL Malaysian learner. It also examines the effect of gender on the use of CS when they encounter communication problems due to their limited linguistic knowledge. The study thus, aims to answer the following questions:

1. What types of CSs do male and female Malaysian ESL learners use when they interact with another male and female Malay ESL learner?
2. Are there any similarities and/or differences between the male and female Malay ESL learners in the use of CSs regardless of the gender of the interlocutor?

METHODOLOGY

There were 24 participants in this study, which were paired in four different groups of 3 male- male (P1,P3, P5), 3 female-female (P2,P4,P6), 3 male-female (P7,P9,P11) and 3 female-male (P8,P10,P12). At the time of the study all the subjects were undergraduate students at Applied Language Studies program in UiTM, Shah Alam, Malaysia. They are at the intermediate English level of proficiency. They had learned English in an instructional setting for the past 15 years and they can be categorized as learners who only speak English when they are required to in certain context.

Seated across the table with a low barrier used as separation, two versions of picture-story narration tasks were given to each member of the pair. Learner A was given a complete picture of the picture-story narration while learner B was given a version with 32 missing items. Without looking at each other's picture, learner A had to describe as accurately as possible the objects that are missing from the learner B's picture.

The 32 missing objects and actions to be described by learner A to the learner B were – feather, hat, black neck tie, puddle, handle bar moustache, puddle, humming, bus-stop sign, barking, speed hump, speeding, manhole cover, approaching, fire hydrant, streetlight, knocks, sidewalk, post-box, zebra-crossing, traffic-lights, bent, dented, glasses, sling-bag, striped, suspenders, pimples, shocked, bonnet, siren light, flashing and shoe off.

The session was recorded and the oral data was transcribed. Instances of types of CSs were identified and analysed. In this study, the authors compare the different strategic behaviors of the genders on the use of communication strategies as they communicate the same set of pre-selected referents.

DATA ANALYSIS

Initially the data was examined and studied in search for lexical difficulties on the 32 target objects and actions. When they were identified, the data were subsequently classified to Tarone's (1977, 1981) taxonomy.

1. Avoidance. There are two types of avoidance strategies where both are generally are the

techniques where the learner, lacking the necessary target language item to convey the originally intended message, does not make reference to it.

a) *Topic avoidance*- The learner, lacking the necessary vocabulary to refer to the an object, action or idea, avoids any kind of reference to it.

1) “so the shoes, one of the shoes:: the left shoe.. is on the road” (shoe off).

b) *Message abandonment*- The learner begins to talk about a concept, but feeling unable to continue, stops before reaching the communicative goal.

2) “=what about a : r (...) he’s he’s cycling(...) not on th: : : e” (sidewalk).

The distinctions between topic avoidance and message abandonment could be identified through the learner’s hesitation devices and retrospective interview.

2. *Paraphrase*. The learner develops an alternative means of expression to convey the original message through his or her resources of the target language. There are three different ways that the learner can do:

a) *Approximation*- The learner substitutes the intended unavailable target language item with a new one which is inaccurate but shares enough semantic features.

3) “and you know the lamp, the lamp.. on the ..the police car” (siren light).

b) *Word coinage*- The learner creates a new word following the target language rules of derivation and composition.

4) “waterhole...” . (manhole cover)

c) *Circumlocution*- The learner describes an object or action instead of using the appropriate target language.

5) “then he is wearing (..) a: : what they call that like a: : (...) you see the movie “Spreadlight”?”. (suspenders).

3. *Conscious transfer*. The learner communicates the intended meaning transferring items from his/her first language or any language that he/she knows. This is done in two ways:

a) *Literal translation*- The learner uses his/her first language item or structure modified in accordance with features of the target language.

6) “.....at the corridor of the road o: :r on the road? (sidewalk).

b) Language switch- The learner uses the first language item with no modification at all.

7) “..... there is a: : something like em: : (...) pili bomba?=” (fire hydrant).

4. *Appeal for assistance*- The learner asks the interlocutor for help.

8) “{lamp the TNB one} is it lamp do we call it lamp?” (streetlight).

5. *Mime*- The learner uses a gesture or any paralinguistic form to refer to an event. For speed hump, gestures accompanied the verbal data.

9) “maybe it’s a zebra cross or it is something {you know like where the ca: : r”

{A’s LH lifts and shows a motion

like going over a hump }

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

In comparison of the use of CSs among the four different groups, a frequency count of the number used by each pair (P1-P12) was carried out. The results based on Table 1 and Table 2 reveal that there is some impact on the use of CS in both same and cross –gender dyads.

Based on the oral production of the 12 pairs of same gender interactions (male -male, female –female) and cross gender interaction (male-female and female-male) samples, a total of 585 instances of communication strategies were identified in the picture story narration task. Table 1 shows the frequency counts of CSs used by the same gender interaction in the task, while Table 2 shows the frequency counts of CSs used by the cross gender interaction.

Table 1. Male- male and female- female dyads interaction on the use of CSs

Types of CSs	P1 (M)	P2 (F)	P3 (M)	P4 (F)	P5 (M)	P6 (F)	Total	
							M	F
Topic Avoidance			1	1	1	2	2	3
Message abandonment					1		1	
Approximation	5	3	10	12	18	11	33	26
Word Coinage		2	4	1	6	5	10	8
Circumlocution	8	15	11	13	19	10	38	38
Literal translation	4	2			2		6	2
Language switch		1		1				2
Appeal for assistance	3	15	6		7	1	16	16
Mime	7	15	5	13	15	14	27	42
Total	27	53	37	41	69	43	133	137

Table 1 shows that there seems to be slightly more CS usage among the female dyads as compared to the male dyads. There is no significant difference between these two different genders in their frequency and strategy use. The result of this simple frequency count does not support the previous claim made by Macro's (2000) and Sheorey's (1999) study on female learners in the usage of more number of CSs use as compared to males. Thus, the use of CSs among Malaysian female dyads is about the same number as the male dyads.

Generally, it has been found that the total number of CSs instances used by same gender dyad is 270 while in cross gender dyads, there are 315 instances. There seems to be more interaction going on when the learners are paired in opposite gender as compared to the same gender. These results agree with Kocoglu's (1997) and Wang's (1993) study on role of gender and CS use which supports Kocoglu's (1997) conclusion that communication success depends on pairing. Eckes and Trautner (2000) also asserted that in mixed group gender, male learners were found to be more talkative than female learners. This could imply that types of pairing may have a role in the interlanguage process.

Comparing these two tables, in terms of types of CSs used among these two groups of dyads, it could be revealed that circumlocution outstands in this study as it is perceived to be

the most frequent CS used among Malaysian ESL learners irrespective of the gender differences with the exception of the female-female dyads. Among the latter dyads, mime tends to be the most frequent CS used. The use of miming is regular among the female learners as they are known to have the tendency of using more body language (Benziger, 1993) as compared to the male counterparts. The use of nonverbal communication has been noticed to be consistently diverse among the two genders (Glass, 1992).

The result of circumlocution being the most frequent CS type in this study coincides with the study of Rushita and Muria (2006) on CS use among Malaysian learners. It however differs with Ting and Kho's (2009) study on the use of CS among gender and cross gender interactions as approximation CS has been found to be the most frequently used. The task used in the study would have some influence on the types of CS use.

In regards to the second most frequent CS used, there is a difference among the same and cross –gender dyads. Approximation is the next most frequent CS to circumlocution among the same gender dyads while for the cross gender dyads; mime is the second in rank instead. This implies that among different genders, learners prefer to use nonverbal strategy as compared to learners of the same gender. This shows that cross gender dyads use CSs in combination at an utterance more than the same gender dyads.

Table 2. Male- female and female- male dyads interaction on the use of CSs

Types of CSs	P7 (M-F)	P8 (F-M)	P9 (M-F)	P10 (F-M)	P11 (M-F)	P12 (F-M)	Total	
							M-F	F-M
Topic Avoidance					1		1	
Message abandonment	1		1			3	2	3
Approximation	6		7		13	16	26	16
Word Coinage	1	4	2	17	4		7	21
Circumlocution	12	15	11	8	24	20	47	43
Literal translation		3	1	8	2	3	3	14
Language switch		1	2	1		3	2	5
Appeal for	5	10	1	3	11	15	17	28

assistance								
Mime	23	15	6	8	10	18	39	41
Total	48	48	31	45	65	78	144	171

The least frequent CS used among these two groups of dyads differs. The same gender dyads used message abandonment CS the least while the cross gender dyads used topic avoidance CS the least. This shows that same gender dyads prefer to avoid the topic more than abandoning the message and the cross gender dyads tend to abandon the message more than avoiding the topic. The infrequent use of these two reduction CSs reveals that Malaysian ESL students are achievement oriented and tend to put a lot of effort for the successful accomplishment of the task given.

CONCLUSIONS

The results and findings of this study allow us to conclude that the gender of the Malaysian ESL learner in both same and cross gender dyads had an impact on the use of CSs in terms of frequency and choice of CS types. When learners encounter lexical problems and a CS needed to be used, cross gender dyads learner used more CSs in their oral interaction because they tend to collaborate more as compared to same gender dyads. Moreover, among the CS categories in Tarone's taxonomy, cross gender dyads tend to use more CSs than the same gender dyads. Circumlocution was the most frequent CSs used by both groups of dyads but for the least frequent CS used, avoidance was the most uncommonly used among the cross gender dyads and topic avoidance was the most unusual CS used among same gender dyads. Previous studies indicated that the type of pairing, particularly cross in gender dyads may have a role in the interlanguage process as there was more interactive participation among learners which brought to communication success.

The findings of this study are based on the analyses of a limited amount of data collected from a highly controlled picture-story narration task and it cannot be generalized to other different types of contexts. However, much further research is to be carried out to examine the use of CSs among gender differences in different tasks, levels of proficiency,

cultural backgrounds and personality types of learners which may provide us with a comprehensive understanding of the impact of gender differences on CSs use.

The results and the conclusion reached so far however, allow us to identify some pedagogical implications for ESL classroom language teaching and learning. Strategy training on the frequent achievement CSs used and pairing learners in cross gender will have more positive outcome as they have been found to overcome breakdowns and facilitate oral face-to-face interaction. Thus, successful communication will eventually be achieved.

REFERENCES

- Abdullah, N., 2001. *The Oral Communication Strategies of Malaysian L2 Learners*. Unpublished Phd Thesis: U of Birmingham. UK.
- Benziger, K., 1999. *Personality Assessment, Thinking and Working Styles*. [online] Available at: <<http://www.businessballs.com/benzigerpersonalityassessment.htm>> [Accessed: 31 August 2011].
- Bialystok, E., 1990. *Communication strategies: A psychological analysis of second-language use*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd.
- Chen, S.-Q., 1990. A study of communication strategies in interlanguage production by Chinese EFL learners. *Language Learning*, 40 , pp.155-187.
- Corder, P.S., 1978. Language-learner language. In: J. C. Richard. *Understanding Second and Foreign Language Learning*. Rowley, Mass.: Newbury House, pp. 17-91.
- Eckes, T. and Trautner, H.M., 2000. *The Developmental Social Psychology of Gender*. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Ellis, R., 1994. *The Study of Second Language Acquisition*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 395-396.
- Faerch, C. and Kasper, G., 1983a. *Strategies in Interlanguage Communication*. New York, NY: Longman
- , 1983b. Plans and strategies in foreign language communication. In: C. Faerch and G. Kasper. *Strategies in Interlanguage Communication*. New York, NY: Longman, pp. 20-60.
- , 1983c. On identifying communication strategies in interlanguage. In: C. Faerch and G. Kasper, *Strategies in Interlanguage Communication*. New York, NY: Longman, pp. 210-238.
- Fariza M.N., 2008. *Communication Strategies in ESL interaction*. Unpublished Phd Thesis: University of Malaya.
- Glass, L., 1992. *He says, she says; closing the communication gap between the sexes*. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons.

- Haastrup, K. and Phillipson, R., 1983. Achievement strategies in learner/native speaker interaction. In C. Faerch and G. Kasper, *Strategies in Interlanguage Communication*. New York: Longman, pp.140-158.
- Hyde, J., 1982. The identification of communication strategies in the interlanguage of Spanish speakers of English. *Anglo-American Studies*, 2, pp.13-30.
- Ismail, R. and Musa, M.K., 2006. *An Investigation Into the Communication Strategies Employed by the ESL Malay learners at Malaysian Universities*. Penang: UiTM BRC grant Research.
- Kasper, G. and Kellerman, E., 1997. *Communication Strategies Psycholinguistic and Sociolinguistic Perspectives*. New York, NY: Longman.
- Kellerman, E.. and Bialystok, E., 1997. On psychological plausibility in the study of communication strategies. In: G. Kasper and E. Kellerman, *Communication Strategies: Psycholinguistic and Sociolinguistic Perspective*. New York, NY: Longman, pp. 31-48.
- Kocoglu, Z., 1997. The Role of Gender on communication Strategy Use. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Teachers to Speakers of Other Languages. March 11-15.
- Macro, E., 2000. Strategies of language learning and using: Revising the theoretical framework. *The Modern Language Journal*, 90, pp.320-337.
- Paribakht, T., 1985. Strategic competence and language proficiency. *Applied Linguistics*, 6, pp.132-146.
- Poullise, N., 1990. Variation in learners' use of communication strategies. In: R. Duda and P. Riley, *Learning Styles*. Nancy, France: University of Nancy, pp. 77-87.
- Poullisse, N., Kellerman, E., Ammerlaan, T. and Bongaerts, T., 1990. System and hierarchy in L2 compensatory strategies. In: R.C. Scarcella, E.S. Andersen and S. D. Krashen. *In Developing Communicative Competence*. New York: Newbury House, pp. 163-178.
- Poullise, N., 1993. A theoretical account of lexical communication strategies. In: R. Schreuder and B. Weltens, *The Bilingual Lexicon*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, pp. 157-189.

- Poullise, N., 1997. Compensatory strategies and the principles of clarity and economy. In: G. Kasper and E. Kellerman. *Communication Strategies: Psycholinguistic and Sociolinguistic Perspectives*. New York: Longman, pp. 49-64.
- Jourdain, S., 2000. A native-like ability to circumlocute. *The Modern Language Journal*, 84, pp.185-195.
- Liskin-Gasparro, J.E., 1996. Circumlocution, communication strategies and the ACTFL proficiency guidelines: An analysis of student discourse. *Foreign Language Annals*, 29, pp.317-30.
- Littlemore, J., 2001. An empirical study of the relationship between cognitive style and the use of communication strategy. *Applied Linguistics*, 22, pp.241-265.
- O'Malley, J.M. and Chamot, A., 1990. *Learning strategies in SLA*. Cambridge: CUP.
- Sheorey, R., 1999. An Examination of Language Learning Strategy Use in the Setting of an Indigenized Variety of English." (1999). *System: A Journal of Educational Technology and Applied Linguistics*, 27, pp.173-190.
- Tarone, E., 1983. Some thoughts on the notion of 'communication strategy'. In: C. Faerch and K. Gabrielle, *Strategies in Interlanguage Communication*. London: Longman, pp. 61-74.
- Tarone, E., 1977. Conscious communication strategies in interlanguage: A progress report. In: D. Brown, C. Yorio and R. H. Crymes. *On TESOL' 77: Teaching and Learning ESL*. Washington D.C.: TESOL, pp. 194-203.
- Tarone, E., 1980. Communication strategies, foreigner talk, and repair in interlanguage. *Language Learning*, 30, pp.417-431.
- Tarone, E., 1981. Some thoughts on the notion of communication strategy. *TESOL Quarterly*, 15, pp.285-295.
- Ting, S.H. and Kho, T.P., 2009. Gender and Communication Strategy Use in Learning English as a Second Language. *International Journal of Applied Linguistics*, 157, pp. 93-1080.
- Varadi, T., 1973. Strategies of target language learner communication:message adjustment. *International Review of Applied Linguistics*, 18, pp.59-72.
- Wagner, J. and Firth, A., 1997. Communication strategies at work. In: G. Kasper and E.

- Kellerman. *Communication Strategies: Psycholinguistic and Sociolinguistic Perspectives*. New York: Longman, pp. 323-344.
- Wang, H.S., 1993. The role of gender in interactional learner communication strategies. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis. The University of Wisconsin – Madison.
- Wongsawang, P., 2001. Culture-specific notions in L2 communication strategies. *Second Language Studies*, 19 , pp.111-135.
- Williams, J., Inscoc, R. and Tasker, T., 1997. Communication strategies in an interactional context: The mutual achievement of comprehension. In: K. Gabriele and E. Kellerman. *Communication Strategies: Psycholinguistic and Sociolinguistic Perspectives*. New York: Longman, pp. 304-344.
- Yule, G. and Tarone, E., 1991. The other side of the page: Integrating the study of communication strategies and negotiated input in SLA. In: R. Phillipson, E. Kellerman, L. Selinker, M. Sharwood Smith and M. Swain. *Foreign/Second Language Pedagogy Research Foreign/Second Language Pedagogy Research: A Commemorative Volume for Claus Færch*. Clevedon, England: Multilingual Matters, pp. 49-65.
- Zhao, R., 1999. A Survey on the Studies of Gender Differences in Language Use. *Foreign Language Research*, 3, pp.25-29.

Bad Words Hurt Us Quicker: An Investigation on the Processing of Emotional Words in Bilingual Speakers

Yuen-Lai Chan
Hong Kong Shue Yan University

Lap-Yan Lo
Hong Kong Shue Yan University
Email: lylo@hksyu.edu

INTRODUCTION

Research on emotional words processing has suggested that there were speed difference between processing emotional words and neutral words. For example, Carretie, et al. (2007) conducted lexical decision task with three types of word stimuli, which were insults, compliments, and neutral adjectives and found that participants responded the fastest to compliments, but the slowest to insults among those three types. Similar results have been obtained in the studies conducted by Kuchinke and his colleagues (2005) and Schacht and Sommer (2009). Both studies found that positive words or phrases were responded faster than negative and neutral words, though negative and neutral words did not differ in response speed significantly. Yet Schacht and Sommer (2009) revealed that positive and negative verbs were responded faster than neutral verbs. Though no conclusive result on the processing speed of positive, negative and neutral words can be established yet, emotional words are processed either faster or slower than neutral words. On the other hand, the word stimuli adopted in the reviewed studies were expressed in the first language of the participants, this adds our interest to question whether the language would be a factor that influences the processing speed within a bilingual speaker.

According to the Dual-System Hypothesis, which suggests that meaning of a single concept when being expressed in two different languages is separately kept in the mind of bilingual speakers (De Houwer, 1995), a new research quest has therefore been initiated by studying the reaction difference to emotional and neutral words which are presented in either

first language (L1) or second language (L2) to the bilingual participants. Bond and Lai (1986) recruited 48 Chinese female undergraduate students who were asked to discuss embarrassing or neutral topics either in their native language (i.e., Cantonese) or second language (i.e., English). The neutral topics were about money system and education system in Hong Kong, while the embarrassing topics were about sex attitudes and personal embarrassing experiences. The results showed that students spent more time in discussing embarrassing questions in L2 than in L1 (Bond & Lai, 1986). Bond and Lai (1986) suggested that people speaking in L1 are more able to express psychological feelings than in L2 which can keep a distant from the core feelings. In the case of discussing embarrassing issues, people would experience a stronger (negative) emotional impact when speaking in L1, compared to L2. And therefore, people might feel less unpleasant to express negative emotions in L2 than L1 as the embarrassing experiences seemed to be detached from the speakers when he or she was speaking in L2, but not L1. Similar results were obtained from the study conducted by Marian and Kaushanskaya (2008) in which 47 Russian-English bilingual were invited to share their immigration experiences. It was found that participants switched more often to L2 (i.e., English) than L1 (i.e., Russian) when talking about their negative immigration experiences.

Harris et al. (2003) recruited 32 Turkish-English Bilinguals to examine autonomic reactivity to emotional expression in Turkish (L1) and English (L2) by measuring the skin conductivity responses (SCRs). Participants were self rated as being proficient in both L1 and L2. The emotional expressions adopted in the study included neutral words, positive words, aversive words, taboo words and reprimands which were either presented in either L1 or L2 auditorily or visually. Emotional words, as expected, yielded stronger SCRs compared to the neutral words. Whereas stronger SCRs were found when participants were shown, reprimands and taboo words in L1 than L2, when the words were presented auditorily.

Studies on the linguistic switch (Bond & Lai, 1986; Marian and Kaushanskaya, 2008) and SCRs (Harris et al., 2003) have indicated a stronger emotional impact is resulted when emotional words are presented in L1, compared to in L2. Continuing with these results, it is possible to further investigate whether a stronger emotional impact also implies a shorter

processing time. With regard to the processing speed of languages, Eilola, Havelka, and Sharma (2007) conducted an emotional Stroop task, in which emotional words, including positive, negative, taboo and neutral words, written in different colors were presented in either Finnish or English. The Finnish-English bilingual participants were required to ignore the meaning of words and report the ink color. Taboo words and negative words were responded slower than the neutral words. Whereas there was no significant reaction time difference between reacting to positive words and neutral words. Moreover, the results did not show any significant reaction time different between words presented in Finnish and in English.

Based on Global Resource Theory of emotion and attention, the authors suggested when a threatening event was detected, people would temporary freezing that explained a slower response time to negative words (Algom, Chajut and Lev, 2004 as cited in Eilola, et al., 2007). However, the design and the stimuli adopted in their study were less certain in provoking a sense of threatening towards the participants that implies Global Resource Theory may not be fully appropriate in explaining the slow reaction time to the negative stimuli. On the other hand, when people are facing unpleasant stimulus, they may try to get away from it as quickly as possible, i.e. Walter Cannon's theory of fight or flight response (Taylor, 1991; Jacobs, 2001). When animals and humans encounter negative events, they would have physiological changes and ready to fight the threat or to flee from it (Taylor, 1991). The physiological changes include the increase of sympathetic nervous system activity, central nervous system arousal and skeletal-muscle activity (Jacobs, 2001). Those changes may result in "reduced blood flow to the gut and extremities during fight or flight; increased blood flow to the muscles, heart, and lungs to aid in fighting or fleeing; and increased blood sugars among many other changes" (Cannon, 1932 as cited in Jacobs, 2001). Therefore, it suggests that when people are facing unpleasant stimulus, they would be highly alerted and react faster than when they are facing positive or neutral stimulus. This explanation also complies with the rationale of defense mechanism. When people encounter unfavorable issues, they would try to escape from them as to reduce the strength of the unpleasant impulse, or the duration of experiencing the unpleasant impulse (Hjelle & Ziegler, 1992).

On the other hand, Eilola, et al. (2007) did not find the difference of processing speed

between L1 and L2, which is not compatible to the previous findings that indicates processing difference between L1 and L2 (e.g., Bond & Lai, 1986; Harris et al., 2003; Marian and Kaushanskaya, 2008). Eilola and his colleagues explained that all participants in their study were proficient in both languages and therefore the word stimuli should be similarly processed no matter they were presented in Finnish or English. Nevertheless the impact of the stimuli should be inversely proportional to the reaction time, i.e., the stronger the stimuli is, the quicker the response should be. The insignificant difference between L1 and L2 may therefore be due to the choice of the stimuli in the study of Eilola, et al. (2007). Their results indicated that participants reacted differently to emotional words and neutral words. Yet it is still a chance that the adopted emotional single-word stimuli might not be strong enough that the participants would show an even faster response when the stimuli were shown in L1, i.e., Finnish, than in English. It is possible to evoke a strong emotional impact with single word stimuli, including foul language or erotic words (Dixon, 1981). But these words were not adopted in Eilola et al.'s study. On the other hand, phrases that target to the reader (e.g., I hate You) would be more capable to trigger a stronger emotional impact, than single word stimuli (e.g., hate).

Based on the discussion on the previous findings, the current study aimed at verifies the theory of fight or flight response and the response time to emotional words in bilingual speakers. It is hypothesized that negative words are processed faster than positive and neutral phrases and there are difference in the processing speeds of L1 (i.e. Chinese) and L2 (i.e. English).

METHODOLOGY

Examining the word processing speed on syntax level, a Syntax Decision Task (SDT) was conducted to collect the data of reaction time by asking participants to make decision directly referring to sentences stimuli.

Participants

Twenty-eight college students from Hong Kong Shue Yan University were participated in this study. There are seven men and twenty-one women, aged from 17 to 23 ($M = 19.68$, $SD = 1.42$). They all are Chinese, speaking Cantonese is their mother language, and speaking English is their second language. Twenty-three participants received two credits as they were currently enrolled in an introductory psychology course. The remaining participants were voluntarily participated in this study.

Stimuli

The stimuli are divided into three categories: 1) 22 emotional sentences (11 negative sentences, 11 positive sentences), 2) 11 neutral sentences and 3) 33 ungrammatical sentences. Every sentence is embedded either a target emotional or neutral word, which are selected from the Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW) database (Bradley & Lang, 1999). The words were selected in accord with the valence (ranging from pleasant to unpleasant) and arousal (ranging from calm to excite). The negative emotion words were selected if the arousal score is above 6 and the valence score is below 4. The positive emotion words were selected if the scores of arousal and valence level are above 6. The neutral words were selected if the arousal score is below 4 and the valence score is around 5.

To select the target words from those words fit the criterion, five students studying local university were invited to rate the familiarity of the words. This was done for standardizing the familiarity level to ensure the words were all familiar for the participants. The rating scale was scoring from 1 to 5, 1 was totally unfamiliar, 5 was totally comprehensive. After selecting the target words, English sentences were constructed, which are simple and short that contained 3 to 5 words. Moreover, a volunteer who obtained a Bachelor Degree of English was invited to translate the English sentences to Chinese sentences, in which contain 3 to 8 characters, but no more than 4 words. Completing the translation, another familiarity rating of the sentences was done by 5 more college students from local universities using

5-point scale. The mean score of the familiarity of each category of sentences is shown in table 1. Fortunately, the familiarity level of all sentences was high enough and can be adopted in this study. There are the examples of the sentences: “I hate you.”, “我恨你。”; “I kiss you.”, “我吻你。”; “I eat salad.”, “我吃沙津。”.

Table 1. The rating of familiarity level of the sentences stimuli.

Sentences Category	<u>English</u>		<u>Chinese</u>	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Negative (N = 11)	4.78	0.30	4.78	0.21
Positive (N = 11)	4.6	0.38	4.76	0.12
Neutral (N = 11)	4.87	0.21	4.89	0.16

*The scale of Familiarity was a 5-point scale.

On the other hand, the ungrammatical sentences were constructed according to the grammatical ones. In each sentence, regardless of the Chinese or English one, the sequence of words or characters consisted was changed randomly to make it be ungrammatical. For example, “You terrible are”, “很恐怖你。”.

Syntax Decision Task

The Syntax Decision Task (STD) was designed to measure the reaction time that participants responded to stimuli. It was developed by using E-prime Version 2.0 which is constructed by Psychology Software Tools, Inc. It helps to collect reaction time and accuracy rate (e.g. Rosenkranz, et al., 2005; Pine, et al., 2005). The LTD was administered on a computer (Processor: Intel ® Core ™ 2 Duo CPU, E6750@2.66GHz; RAM: 2GB) using Window XP Pro operating system, with a 17” monitor. The LTD composed two blocks: a block with Chinese stimuli and a block with English stimuli. The test order of Chinese block and English block was counter balanced among the participants. Both blocks included 11 negative sentences, 11 positive sentences, 11 neutral sentences, and 33 ungrammatical sentences. The stimuli were presented in black, 18-point, Times New Roman (English) or

MingLiU (Chinese) font and were shown in the center of the monitor with white background. The sentences were presented randomly within each block by E-prime for each participant.

Procedure

The experiment was conducted in the Cognitive Psychology Laboratory of Shue Yan University. All participants did the task individually. After participants were briefed and they signed the consent form, they were asked to sit in front of a 17" LCD Monitor computer individually, and started the Syntax Decision Task (SDT).

During the SDT, participants were provided a practice before doing the actual task, which was to ensure that they understand how to do it. When they had no problems, the actual task would start.

During the SDT, the participant was asked to decide whether the showed shown sentences was grammatically correct or not as quickly as and as accurately as possible. The decisions were made by pressing an "A" or a "L" button of a computer keyboard to indicate whether the shown stimulus was grammatically correct or not. The "A" and "L" buttons represented "yes" and "no" respectively.

The instruction of the SDT was:

English:

You will see an English sentence on the screen in each trial.

After reading the sentence, you have to decide whether or not the sentence is grammatically correct.

If it is grammatically CORRECT, press A.

If it is grammatically INCORRECT, press L.

Remember to make the decision as quickly and as accurately as possible after reading each sentence.

If you are ready, press space bar to start the experiment.

Chinese:

你將會見到不同的中文句子顯示在螢光幕上，你需要準確及快速地決定該句子的語法是否正確。

如句子語法正確，按 A。

如句子語法不正確，按 L。

如果你準備好，請按空白鍵開始進行該實驗。

When the participants completed a block, there was a break before moving to another block. Finishing all the blocks, the screen would show “The experiment is end, thank you for participation! 實驗已結束，多謝參與!”. After the completion of STD, there was a debriefing session.

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

As the Syntax Decision Task (SDT) includes both grammatical and ungrammatical sentences, whereas the ungrammatical sentences are syntactic, it was planned to analyze the data of grammatical and ungrammatical sentences separately. In order to confirm the difference of processing speed of syntax and lexical levels, an independent T-test was conducted. The result showed that there is significant difference of the reaction time that participants responded to the grammatical and ungrammatical sentences ($t(322) = -5.661, p < 0.05$). This finding further supports the claim that the two levels of word processing, i.e. lexicon and syntax.

Grammatical Sentences

Table 2 shows the descriptive data of the grammatical sentences. The accuracy rates of the SDT were above 90%, revealed that participants were familiar with the stimuli and they were really seriously doing the task. By looking at the mean reaction times (RT), it is obviously that the Chinese sentences (L1) were responded faster than the English sentences

(L2), while for both languages, the mean RTs of negative sentences were the fastest. To be more accurate, a 2 (Languages: Chinese and English) x 3 (Emotional sentences: negative, positive and neutral) ANOVA was conducted. The results revealed that there was no interaction effect ($F(2, 156) = 2.165, p > 0.05$). However, there were main effects of languages ($F(1, 156) = 31.25, p < 0.05$) and emotional sentences ($F(2, 156) = 4.87, p < 0.05$). The main effect of languages indicated that Chinese sentences were responded faster than English sentences.

Moreover, with regard to the main effect of emotional sentences, a post-hoc test (Tukey HSD) was conducted to see the differences among the three emotion categories. It showed that sentences embedded negative words were responded significantly faster than sentences embedded positive words ($p < 0.05$) and neutral words ($p < 0.05$). However, the positive ones did not yield a significant result to the neutral ones ($p > 0.05$).

Table 2. The Means and Standard Deviations of Reaction Time, and Accuracy Rate of Grammatical Sentences

Stimuli	Mean RT in ms (SD)	Accuracy in % (SD)
Chinese Sentences		
Negative	998.03 (305.49)	99.33 (2.43)
Positive	1035.72 (273.18)	99.33 (2.43)
Neutral	1118.22 (338.58)	97.31 (4.92)
English Sentences		
Negative	1168.34 (237.58)	100 (-)
Positive	1486.63 (532.84)	97.98 (4.6)
Neutral	1420.71 (338.10)	98.99 (3.21)

Ungrammatical Sentences

The descriptive data of the ungrammatical sentences is summarized on table 3. The accuracy rates of the SDT were also above 90%, which revealed that the data was reliable. By looking at the mean RTs, of which the Chinese sentences were shorter than the English sentences, and the negative sentences were the shortest in both languages. However, when a 2 x 3 ANOVA on languages and emotional sentences was conducted, only a main effect of languages ($F(1, 156) = 8.88, p < 0.05$) was found. There were no main effect of emotional sentences ($F(2, 156) = 4.43, p > 0.05$) and no interaction effect ($F(2, 156) = 0.19, p > 0.05$).

Table 3. The Means and Standard Deviations of Reaction Time, and Accuracy Rate of Ungrammatical Sentences

Stimuli	Mean RT in ms (SD)	Accuracy in % (SD)
Chinese Sentences		
Negative	1279.81 (551.83)	95.96 (6.35)
Positive	1376.58 (770.04)	92.62 (6.68)
Neutral	1569.32 (976.53)	96.3 (6.31)
English Sentences		
Negative	1634.02 (683.87)	95.96 (7.28)
Positive	1798.76 (714.64)	95.96 (6.34)
Neutral	1750.74 (668.1)	93.27 (9.96)

DISCUSSION

The current study found that the participants responded faster to negative sentences than positive and neutral sentences, which supports the theory of fight or flight response, as well as our first hypothesis. According to the sentence superiority effect, words embedded in a context can help participants to perceive them (Sternberg, 2009). It implies that sentences are

more constraint and participants can be more focused on the target words, so that the emotion meanings are more salient. Thus, the emotions are believed to be triggered fast and directly.

Besides the sentence-stimuli mattered, another recent research suggests that avoidance response also explains the faster respond rate of negative stimuli. The research conducted an emotional Stroop test that required the participants either to approach (step forward) or to avoid (step backward) to report the ink color of stimuli (Chajut, Mama, Levy and Algom, 2010). There were four colors presented in total, “two colors were assigned an approach response, and the remaining two were assigned an avoidance response”. It found that for approach response, the mean reaction time of negative words was slower than neutral words, however, for avoidance response, the effect reversed. That means, when people face negative stimulus, they reacted faster to escape from it.

With regard to the first and second languages difference, we found the processing speed of L1 was faster than L2. This result does not a matter of the language proficiency as the stimuli in the present study were ensured to be highly familiar. Therefore, we attribute the difference is due to the dual system of languages.

To illustrate the separate system of L1 and L2, the hierarchical model of bilingual mental lexicons were proposed, which suggests that there are two levels: a lexical level and conceptual level (Blanc & Hamers, 2000). For a bilingual, the languages have separate lexical storages but a shared conceptual storage (Blanc & Hamers, 2000). Kroll and Stewart (1994 as cited in Kroll & Tokowicz, 2005) further proposed a revised version, i.e. Revised Hierarchical Model (RHM) that suggests an asymmetric connection between the lexical level and conceptual level of bilinguals' languages. There are two assumptions; one is L1 words are connected stronger to concepts than L2 words, another is L2 is connected stronger to L1 (i.e. backward translation) than that L1 to L2 (i.e. forward translation) when translation should be done (Kroll & Tokowicz, 2005; Dong, Gui and Macwhinney, 2005; Heredia, 1997). Kroll & Tokowicz (2005) indicated that the weaker connection of transferring from L2 to L1 is suggested to be enhanced by the increased proficiency of L2, as people “develop the ability to directly conceptually process L2 words.” However, they claimed that “the connections

between words and concepts are assumed to remain stronger for L1 than for L2 for all but the most balanced bilinguals”.

The study of Cheung and Chen (1998) supported the model by conducting a picture naming and a word translation task (experiment 1), as well as a category-matching task (experiment 3), in which Proficient Chinese-English bilinguals were participated. In experiment 1, they found that L2 (i.e. English) picture naming and forward translation were slower than that in L1 (i.e. Chinese), suggesting a weaker conceptual path of L2. Moreover, the result also showed that “L1 picture naming was faster than backward translation”, due to a stronger conceptual path of L1 and the backward translation “involved a lexical path that was of lesser strength” (Cheung & Chen, 1998). In additions, the category names matching task indicated that L1 has a stronger link to the conceptual store than L2, since participants matched L1 items to category names faster than matched L2 items. In the view of the stronger conceptual linkage for L1 than for L2, the speed of semantic activation of L1 will be quicker than the L2 activation (Cheung & Chen, 1998). Consistent to the previous reviewed findings, the results in the present study contribute another direct evidence to support the Revised Hierarchical Model by showing the reaction time difference when people react to the emotional phrases that is expressed in L1 and L2.

REFERENCES

- Algom, D., Chajut, E. and Lev, S., 2004. A rational look at the emotional Stroop phenomenon: A generic slowdown, not a Stroop effect. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, 133, pp.323-338.
- Blanc, M. and Hamers, J., 2000. *Bilinguality & bilingualism*, 2nd ed. Port Chester, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
- Bond, M.H. and Lai, T., 1986. Embarrassment and code-switching into a second language. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 126, pp.179-186.
- Bradley, M. M., & Lang, P. J. 1999. *Affective norms for English words (ANEW): Stimuli, instruction manual and affective ratings*. Technical report C-1. Gainesville, FL: The Center for Research in Psychophysiology, University of Florida.
- Carretie, L., Hinojosa, J.A., Albert, J., López-Martín, S., De La Gándara, B.S., Igoa, J. M. and Sotillo, M., 2008. Modulation of ongoing cognitive processes by emotionally intense words. *Psychophysiology*, 45, pp.188-196.
- Chajut, E., Mama, Y., Levy, L. and Algom, D., 2010. Avoiding the approach trap: A response bias theory of emotional Stroop effect. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition*. Advance online publication. doi: 10.1037/a0020710.
- Cheung, H. and Chen, H.C., 1998. Lexical and conceptual processing in Chinese-English bilinguals: Further evidence for asymmetry. *Memory & Cognition*, 26, pp.1002-1013.
- De Houwer, A., 1995. Bilingual language acquisition. In: P. Fletcher and B. MacWhinney, eds. *The handbook of child language*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Dixon, N., 1981. *Preconscious Processing*. Great Britain: St Edmundsbury Press Ltd.
- Dong, Y.P., Gui, S.C. and Macwhinney, B., 2005. Shared and separate meanings in the bilingual mental lexicon. *Bilingualism: Language and Cognition*, 8, pp.221-238.
- Eilola, T.M., Havelka, J. and Sharma, D., 2007. Emotional activation in the first and second language. *Cognition and Emotion*, 21, pp.1064-1076.

- Harris, C.L., Aycicegi, A. and Gleason, J.B., 2003. Taboo words and reprimands elicit greater autonomic reactivity in a first than in a second language. *Applied Psycholinguistics*, 4, pp.561-578.
- Heredia, R.R., 1997. Bilingual memory and hierarchical models: A case for language dominance. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 6, pp.34-38.
- Hjelle, L .A. and Ziegler, D. J., 1992. *Personality theories*. Singapore: McGraw-Hill, Inc.
- Jacobs, G. D. 2001. The physiology of mind-body interactions: The stress response and the relaxation response. *The Journal of Alternative and Complementary Medicine*, 7, pp.83-92.
- Kroll, J.F. and Tokowicz, N., 2005. Models of bilingual representation and processing: Look back and to the future. In: J. F. Kroll, Ed. *Handbook of Bilingualism : Psycholinguistic Approaches*. Cary, NC, USA: Oxford University Press, pp. 531-554.
- Kuchinke, L., Jacobs, A.M., Grubich, C., Võ, M.H., Conrad, M. and Herrmann, M., 2005. Incidental effects of emotional valence in single word processing: An fMRI study. *NeuroImage*, 28, pp.1022-1032.
- Marian, V. and Kaushanskaya M., 2008. Words, feelings, and bilingualism: Cross-linguistic differences in emotionality of autobiographical memories. *The Mental Lexicon*, 3, pp.72-90.
- Pine, D. S., Mogg, K., Bradley, B. P., Montgomery, L., Monk, C. S., McClure, E., and ... Kaufman, J. 2005. Attention Bias to Threat in Maltreated Children: Implications for Vulnerability to Stress-Related Psychopathology. *American Journal of Psychiatry*, 162, pp.291-296.
- Rosenkranz, M. A., Busse, W. W., Johnstone, T., Swenson, C. A., Crisafi, G. M., Jackson, M. M., and ...Davidson, R. J. 2005. Neural circuitry underlying the interaction between emotion and asthma symptom exacerbation. *PNAS Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, 102, pp.13319-13324.
- Schacht, A. and Sommer, W., 2009. Time course and task dependence of emotion effects in word processing. *Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience*, 9, pp.28-43.
- Sternberg, R.J., 2009. *Cognitive psychology*, 5th ed. US: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning.

Taylor, S.E., 1991. Asymmetrical effects of positive and negative events: The mobilization-minimization hypothesis. *Psychological Bulletin*, 110, pp.67–85.

APPENDIX A

Grammatical Stimulus used in the Syntax Decision Task (SDT)

Emotion categories	English	Chinese
Negative Sentences	I hate you.	我恨你。
	You are angry.	你很生氣。
	You are terrible.	你很恐怖。
	You are confused.	你感到迷惑。
	You are under stress.	你處於壓力下。
	You are in danger.	你處於危險之中。
	You are a killer.	你是一個殺手。
	You have cancer.	你得了癌症。
	You have a nightmare.	你造了一個惡夢。
	You feel guilty.	你感到內疚。
	You destroy my effort.	你破壞我的心血。
Positive Sentences	I kiss you.	我吻你。
	You are lucky.	你很幸運。
	You are confident.	你有自信。
	You are surprised.	你感到驚喜。
	You are in power.	你掌有權力。
	Your work is in progress.	你的工作有進展。
	You are a leader.	你是一個領袖。
	You earn a profit.	你賺到利潤。
	You have a victory.	你得到勝利。
	You feel happy.	你感到高興。
	You treasure your family.	你珍惜你的家庭。
Neutral Sentences	I eat salad.	我吃沙拉。
	You are quiet.	你很安靜。
	This is a bathroom.	這是浴室。
	The door is closed.	門被關上了。
	You are in a building.	它在儲物櫃內。
	It is inside a locker.	你在一棟建築物內。
	This is a horse.	這是一匹馬。
	You have an item.	你有一個物品。
	You have a machine.	你有一部機器。
	You draw a circle.	你畫了一個圓圈。
	You closed the window.	你關上了窗。

APPENDIX B

Ungrammatical Stimulus used in the Syntax Decision Task (SDT)

	You I hate.	你我恨。
	Angry are you.	很你生氣。
	You terrible are.	很恐怖你。
	Are confused you.	迷惑你感到。
	Are under stress you.	你壓力處於下。
	In you danger are.	之中處於危險你。
	Are killer a you.	殺手你是一個。
	Cancer you have.	得了你癌症。
	You nightmare have a.	你惡夢一個造了。
	Guilty you feel.	你內疚感到。
	My effort you destroy.	心血你我的破壞。
	You I kiss.	我你吻。
	You lucky are.	你幸運很。
	Confident are you.	很自信你。
	Surprised you are.	驚喜你感到。
	Power are you in.	掌有權力你。
	Progress your work in is.	你的進展有工作。
	Are a leader you.	你領袖一個是。
	Earn profit you a.	利潤賺到你。
	You a have victory.	勝利你得到。
	Happy feel you.	感到高興你。
	Family you my treasure.	珍惜你家庭你的。
	Salad I eat.	吃沙拉我。
	Are quiet you.	你安靜很。
	This is bathroom a.	這浴室是。
	The is door closed.	了關上門被。
	Building are in a you.	它內放儲物櫃。
	Inside locker is a it.	你內在建築物一棟。
	Is a this horse.	馬這是一匹。
	Have an you item.	有物件你一個。
	You have machine a.	有一部機器你。
	Circle a you draw.	畫你了圓圈一個。
	The he window closed.	關上了窗你。

The Language Attitudes of Nepalese Adolescents in a Hong Kong Secondary School

Eden S.H. Li,
Open University of Hong Kong
Email: shli@ouhk.edu.hk

Michael C.M. Ng
Open University of Hong Kong
Email: cmng@ouhk.edu.hk

Kathryn N.K. Wong
Open University of Hong Kong
Email: cat_wongnk@hotmail.com

INTRODUCTION

‘Language – both code and content – is a complicated dance between internal and external interpretations of our identity’ (Gibson 2004:1). Language is claimed to be a ‘marker’ of social identity – a means for the speaker to present one’s own notion of ‘who s/he is’. It is also believed to be a tool of constructing one’s ethnic and national identity (Eastman 1985; Giles, Bourhis and Taylor, 1977; Giles and Johnson, 1981; 1987). Language and identity are in fact ‘ultimately inseparable’ (Joseph 2004:13). Anzaldúa (1987:59) concluded that ‘ethnic identity is twin skin to linguistic identity – I am my language.’

According to Chambers (1995:251), linguistic markers of adolescence are motivated ‘partly by the need of young people to differentiate themselves from adults’ and also ‘to extricate themselves progressively from familial dependence in order to take on adult roles.’ However, language variations at the social level are not confined to gender and age, they are also markers of social class and ethnicity. At the community level, we learnt that every individual is a ‘social man’, not ‘an isolated island’. Chambers (1995) points out that as social beings, we have an instinct to establish and maintain social identity. We have a profound need to show we belong somewhere, and to define ourselves, sometimes narrowly and sometimes generally. Chambers (1995:250) further claims that:

It is not enough to mark our territory as belong to us by name tags, mailboxes, fences, hedges, and walls. We must also mark ourselves as belonging to the territory, and one of the most convincing markers is by speaking like the people who lived there.

Patri and Pennington (1998) investigated the language attitudes of Indian secondary school students in Hong Kong and concluded that the subjects sought to both enhance and attenuate their ethnic and social identification in comparison to their Chinese counterparts. In Hong Kong, Indian represents the largest and comparatively wealthy minority group. There are a number of other smaller minority groups in Hong Kong, although we have little knowledge of their language attitudes. This paper presents our study on Nepalese – a comparatively smaller and less affluent minority group in Hong Kong. This study focuses on the language attitudes of Nepalese adolescents in Hong Kong as reflected by a group of Nepalese students in a secondary school.

NEPALESE PEOPLE IN HONG KONG

The Nepalese in Hong Kong represent a small ethnic minority group in our community. The 2001, 2006 and 2011 censuses indicate that their population is only 0.2% of the total Hong Kong population, though their total number increased from 12,564 in 2006 to 16,518 in 2011. They began to come to Hong Kong in the 1970s, as part of the Gurkha brigade of the British Army, and were allowed to stay after the handover in 1997. They have Hong Kong Identity cards but their nationality remains Nepalese.

After 1997, many second or younger Nepalese generations work as security guards, construction workers, and other kinds of labourer. Many of them live in the Yau Tsim Mong area of Kowloon and in Yuen Long; however, their communities are spreading out to more districts nowadays. Being influenced by their religion and culture, they prefer staying together so they mainly live in tenement houses instead of in public housing. However, according to a survey conducted by the census and statistics department from June to August in 2008 entitled

‘Thematic Household Survey Report No.39’, the Nepalese may face some discrimination in Hong Kong: Chinese landlords rate ‘other ethnic groups’ the least acceptable group for leasing their premises, and Chinese neighbours rate ‘other ethnic groups’ the least acceptable group ‘living in the next door with whom could communicate verbally’.

The Nepalese in Hong Kong have different dialects. Nepalese children learn their own dialects before they learn the unified Nepali. Apart from their first language, they speak English and Cantonese but their Cantonese proficiency is low. In 1997, the government MOI (Medium of Instruction) policy led to a dramatic fall in the number of English medium of instruction (EMI) schools. As a consequence, the student places in the remaining 141 EMI schools became both highly sought after and comparatively more expensive. In 2006, the Hong Kong Government invited schools which admitted a large number of non-Chinese students to become “designated schools” and provided these schools with “focused” support to enhance the learning and teaching. The number of “designated schools” has increased from 15 in the 2006/7 school year to 26 (17 primary schools and 9 secondary schools) in the 2009/10 school year. English is the MOI in these schools and they can tailor make their own Chinese Language curriculum.

According to a report by Hong Kong Unison entitled “Response to the Consultation Paper on Developing a ‘Supplementary Guide to the Chinese Language Curriculum for Non-Chinese Speaking Students’ in 2008, most of the non-Chinese students, including Nepalese students, came from families which are not well-off. In fact, owing to their limited Chinese language proficiency, the ethnic minority communities in Hong Kong have suffered from direct and indirect discrimination and they face unnecessary obstacles in employment and further studies. In ‘Thematic Household Survey Report No.39’, when asked to imagine that they were employers, the Chinese aged 15 or over who rated it acceptable for offering a job to a candidate of Chinese, Caucasian, Japanese/Korean, and other ethnic groups who fulfils the employment requirements are 98.9%, 93.1%, 89.9% and 76.3%-85.2% respectively. In addition, when taking the role as parents, Chinese aged 15 or over who rated it acceptable for choosing for their child a prestigious school with the majority of students of Chinese, Caucasian, Japanese/Korean, and other ethnic groups are 99.1%, 87.9%, 81.1% and

55.5%-66.8% respectively.

PREVIOUS STUDIES ON HONG KONG STUDENTS' LANGUAGE ATTITUDE

Numerous previous studies have reported on the relationship between learners' language attitude/motivation and language learning (Baker 1992; Littlewood and Liu 1996; Yang and Lau 2003 to name just a few). In their research to investigate the relationship between English language attainment and attitudes towards English among Chinese-speaking secondary school students in Hong Kong, Pierson, Fu and Lee (1980) observed that while the participating secondary school students had a strong desire to speak better English, they felt uneasy and lacked confidence when speaking English. They did not only find any approbation for using English, but saw using English as a threat to their Chinese identity. Pierson, Fu and Lee (1980:292) concluded that '[the] results seem to reflect a tension within the Ss between needing and wanting to use English, while at the same time maintaining their identity as Chinese, in a Chinese society.' Table 1 shows the means and standard deviation of the direct attitude questions about language use in Pierson, Fu and Lee (1980). Subjects were asked to indicate the degree of their agreement with each of the statements using the following five-point scale: 1 = absolutely agree, 2 = quite agree, 3 = no opinion, 4 = quite disagree, 5 = absolutely disagree.

Table 1: Language attitudes toward English in Pierson, Fu and Lee (1980)

Item	Statement	Mean	Rank	SD
1	It is a good thing to have English as the main official language in Hong Kong.	3.3	17	1.1
2	English is the mark of an educated person.	3.9	23	1.3
3	When using English, I do not feel that I am Chinese any more.	1.5	4	0.9
4	If I use English, I will be praised and approved of by my family, relatives, and friends.	3.7	21	1.3
5	At times I fear that by using English I will become like a foreigner.	1.4	2.5	0.7
6	I should not be forced to learn English.	2.7	11.5	1.4
7	To read English magazines is a kind of enjoyment.	3.1	15.5	1.1

8	I do not feel awkward when using English.	2.2	8	1.1
9	I love conversing with Westerners in English.	2.4	9.5	1.1
10	The Cantonese language is superior to English.	3.4	18	1.2
11	I like to see English-speaking films.	2.7	11.5	1.1
12	If I use English, it means that I am not patriotic.	1.3	1	0.6
13	If I use English, my status is raised.	3.8	22	1.3
14	I feel uncomfortable when hearing one Chinese speaking to another in English.	3.5	19	1.4
15	My history, geography, and mathematics textbooks should be written or translated into Chinese.	2.8	13.5	1.1
16	I wish that I could speak fluent and accurate English.	1.4	2.5	0.9
17	I feel uneasy and lack confidence when speaking English.	3.6	20	1.2
18	The use of English is one of the most crucial factors which have contributed to the success of Hong Kong's prosperity and development today.	3.1	15.5	1.2
19	The English language sounds very nice.	2.8	13.5	1.0
20	I would take English even if it were not a compulsory subject in school.	1.9	7	1.0
21	I feel uneasy when hearing a Chinese speaking English.	2.4	9.5	1.1
22	English should not be a medium of instruction in schools in Hong Kong.	1.8	6	1.0
23	The command of English is very helpful in understanding foreigners and their cultures.	1.6	2	1.0

Pennington and Yue (1994) modified and applied Pierson, Fu and Lee's (1980) questionnaire to conduct a survey to investigate the language attitudes of secondary school students in Hong Kong. In their survey, the participating secondary school students, (like those in Pierson, Fu and Lee's (1980) study), expressed their wish that they could speak fluent and accurate English. However, they no longer saw using English as a threat to their ethnolinguistic identity, and they were not in favor of abolishing the use of English in schools. Based on Pennington and Yue (1994), Axler, Yang and Stevens (1998) also modified and applied Pierson, Fu and Lee's (1980) questionnaire to conduct another survey and obtained results which are consistent with Pennington and Yue (1994). In addition, both Pennington and Yue (1994) and Axler, Yang and Stevens (1998) found that in comparison with the secondary school students' language attitudes in Pierson, Fu and Lee (1980), the secondary school participants had much more positive orientation towards English and associated

English as a mark of education.

While the above studies are concerned with the language attitudes of Chinese secondary school students, Patri and Pennington (1998) investigated the language attitudes of Indian secondary school students in Hong Kong and concluded that the subjects sought to both enhance and attenuate their ethnic and social identification in comparison to their Chinese counterpart. Apart from the Indian secondary school students, we have little knowledge of the language attitudes of the other ethnic minority groups in Hong Kong. The present paper presents our study on Nepalese. This study focuses on the language attitudes of Nepalese adolescents in Hong Kong as reflected by a group of Nepalese secondary students in a secondary school. The present paper discusses their attitudes toward the official status of English, their personal commitment to English, their intrinsic motivation toward learning English, their confidence in using English as well as their attitude toward their ethnic identity. Comparison will be made with the language attitudes of Indian secondary school students reflected in Patri and Pennington (1998) and the language attitudes of Chinese secondary school students in Li and Luk (2012).

METHODOLOGY

In order to make our findings comparable to the previous studies, the questionnaire of this study is a modified version previously employed by Pierson, Fu and Lee (1980) and adopted by Patri and Pennington (1998) and Li and Luk (2012). It consisted of the 23 items measuring the direct attitudes as part of their original questionnaire below:

Table 2: Questionnaire of this study (a modified version previously employed by Pierson, Fu and Lee (1980))

Item	Statement
1	It is a good thing to have English as the main official language in Hong Kong.
2	English is the mark of an educated person.
3	When using English, I do not feel that I am Nepalese any more.
4	If I use English, I will be praised and approved of by my family, relatives, and friends.
5	At times I fear that by using English I will become like a foreigner.

- 6 I should not be forced to learn English.
 - 7 To read English magazines is a kind of enjoyment.
 - 8 I do not feel awkward when using English.
 - 9 I love conversing with Westerners in English.
 - 10 The Nepali language is superior to English.
 - 11 I like to see English-speaking films.
 - 12 If I use English, it means that I am not patriotic.
 - 13 If I use English, my status is raised.
 - 14 I feel uncomfortable when hearing one Nepalese speaking to another in English.
 - 15 My history, geography, and mathematics textbooks should be written or translated into Nepali.
 - 16 I wish that I could speak fluent and accurate English.
 - 17 I feel uneasy and lack confidence when speaking English.
 - 18 The use of English is one of the most crucial factors which have contributed to the success of Hong Kong's prosperity and development today.
 - 19 The English language sounds very nice.
 - 20 I would take English even if it were not a compulsory subject in school.
 - 21 I feel uneasy when hearing a Nepalese speaking English.
 - 22 English should not be a medium of instruction in schools in Hong Kong.
 - 23 The command of English is very helpful in understanding foreigners and their cultures.
-

In the questionnaire, the answer choices were on a Likert scale ranging from strong agreement to strong disagreement. However, in order to be comparable to Patri and Pennington (1998) and Li and Luk (2012), the scale was reduced to four alternatives: strongly agree, agree, disagree and strongly disagree. The midpoint choice 'no opinion' was eliminated.

Subjects

The participants of the present study came from a government co-educational secondary school. It is one of the designated schools in Hong Kong which mainly receive students from non-Chinese speaking ethnic minority communities. According to the 2006 by-census report, it is observed that there was considerable clustering in terms of place of study for ethnic groups. For instance, a higher proportion of Pakistanis (27%) studying full-time courses had

their schools in Sham Shui Po, 18.5% of Indonesians had their schools in Sai Kung, and 17% of Indians had their schools in Kowloon City. For Nepalese full-time students, a large proportion of them study in Yuen Long (24.6%) – most of these are Primary students - and Yau Tsim Mong (24.0%). The present research thus chooses the designated school in Yau Tsim Mong because this school admits more Nepalese students than any other designated school in Hong Kong.

English is the medium of instruction for all subjects in this school. Apart from English, the other language subjects taught include Putonghua, Cantonese, Hindu, Urdu and French. The ethnicity of the students includes: Nepalese 20%, Indian 11%, Pakistani 14%, Filipino 16%, Chinese 34% and others 5% and there are approximately 900 students currently studying in this school. There were 64 Nepalese students participating in this study, approximately 35.5% of the total Nepalese population in the school. They are studying from F.1 (year 7) to F.6 (year 12).

Procedure

The subjects were asked to fill out the questionnaire in their own schools. The mean and standard deviation of each item were calculated and all items were ranked according to the mean.

In the present study, comparisons are made between the language attitudes of Nepalese secondary school students and Indian secondary school students as shown in Patri and Pennington (1998) as well Chinese secondary school students in Li and Luk (2012). A Mann-Whitney Test is computed to test whether the differences of rankings in the three studies are statistically significant. Mann-Whitney Test aims to determine whether two independent samples came from equivalent populations. This test is based on the average of ranks. The data are ranked as if the observations were part of a single sample. If the null hypothesis is true, then the ranks will be roughly evenly distributed between the two samples, and the average of the ranks for the two samples will be about the same. This means the low, medium, and high ranks should be about equally divided between the two samples. If the

alternate hypothesis is true, one of the samples will have more of the lower ranks and, thus, a smaller rank average. The other sample will have more of the higher ranks and, therefore, a larger average. In addition, the 23 items of direct language attitudes are classified into the six categories as in Patri and Pennington (1998) to facilitate the discussion of the patterns which occur independently in the three studies.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Nepalese students' attitudes toward English

In this study, the first step of analysis was to calculate the mean and standard deviation of each of the 23 items. Based on the mean, the 23 items were ranked. The findings are tabulated in Table 3.

Table 3: Nepalese students' language attitudes toward English

Item	Statement	Mean	Rank	SD
1	It is a good thing to have English as the main official language in Hong Kong.	1.39	1	0.6
2	English is the mark of an educated person.	1.67	7	0.7
3	When using English, I do not feel that I am Nepalese any more.	2.86	20	0.8
4	If I use English, I will be praised and approved of by my family, relatives, and friends.	2.05	12	0.8
5	At times I fear that by using English I will become like a foreigner.	2.85	19	0.9
6	I should not be forced to learn English.	2.55	14	1.0
7	To read English magazines is a kind of enjoyment.	1.84	10	0.8
8	I do not feel awkward when using English.	1.71	8	1.0
9	I love conversing with Westerners in English.	1.81	9	0.8
10	My own language is superior to English.	2.60	16	0.9
11	I like to see English-speaking films.	1.66	6	0.8
12	If I use English, it means that I am not patriotic.	2.56	15	0.9
13	If I use English, my status is raised.	2.16	13	0.9
14	I feel uncomfortable when hearing one Nepalese speaking to another in English.	2.98	21	0.9.
15	My history, geography, and mathematics textbooks	3.30	23	0.8

	should be written or translated into my own language.			
16	I wish that I could speak fluent and accurate English.	1.44	3	0.6
17	I feel uneasy and lack confidence when speaking English.	2.77	18	0.8
18	The use of English is one of the most crucial factors which have contributed to the success of Hong Kong's prosperity and development today.	1.89	11	0.8
19	The English language sounds very nice.	1.54	5	0.7
20	I would take English even if it were not a compulsory subject in school.	1.51	4	0.7
21	I feel uneasy when hearing a Nepalese speaking English.	3.08	22	0.7
22	English should not be a medium of instruction in schools in Hong Kong.	2.70	17	0.9
23	The command of English is very helpful in understanding foreigners and their cultures.	1.43	2	0.6

Note: Subjects were asked to indicate the degree of their agreement with each of the statements using the following four-point scale: 1 = strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 = disagree, 4 = strongly disagree.

According to the data, the participating secondary school students had the strongest agreement on the following five items in descending order:

1. It is a good thing to have English as the main official language in Hong Kong.
23. The command of English is very helpful in understanding foreigners and their cultures.
16. I wish that I could speak fluent and accurate English.
20. I would take English even if it were not a compulsory subject in school.
5. The English language sounds very nice.

The data of the present study indicate that Nepalese secondary students in Hong Kong have very positive instrumental and intrinsic attitudes toward English. They are very supportive to the official status of English in Hong Kong (item 1) and they have strong intrinsic motivation regarding English language and culture (items 5 and 23). Thus, they have a strong desire to speak fluent and accurate English (item 16) and would be willing to take English even if it were not a compulsory subject in school (item 20).

The participating secondary school students had the least agreement on the following five items in descending order:

15. My history, geography, and mathematics textbooks should be written or translated into Nepali.
21. I feel uneasy when hearing a Nepalese speaking English.
14. I feel uncomfortable when hearing one Nepalese speaking to another in English.
20. When using English, I do not feel that I am Nepalese any more.
19. At times I fear that by using English I will become like a foreigner.

The data also show that their strong positive view towards English language and culture is consistently reflected in their strong disagreement to having their history, geography, and mathematics textbooks translated into their own language (item 15). In addition, they do not perceive using English as a threat to their ethnolinguistic identity. They strongly disagreed to the statement that they feel uneasy when hearing a Nepalese speaking English (item 21) and when hearing one Nepalese speaking to another in English (item 14). They also do not fear that by using English they will become like a foreigner (item 5).

Comparing Nepalese, Indian and Chinese students' attitudes toward English

The Mann-Whitney U Tests show that the rankings differential of Patri and Pennington (1998) and Li and Luk (2012); Li and Luk (2012) and the present study; and also Patri and Pennington (1998) and the present study are not statistically different from each other. In other words, if the three surveys were taken as one and the rankings of the 23 items in each survey were put into the same pool to re-rank again, comparing the average rankings of the 23 items in each survey with each other does not show significant difference in statistical terms. The results are shown in the following table. The discussion is thus comparing the weighting of these items in terms of their ranking in each separate survey instead of their means because

the averages of the mean of the 23 items in the three surveys are not the same. The results are shown in Table 4.

Table 4: Mann-Whitney Tests of the three studies

	Mann-Whitney U	Wilcoxon W	Z	Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
Patri & Pennington (1998) vs Li & Luk (2012)	250	526	-0.319	0.75
Patri & Pennington (1998) vs The present study	213	489	-1.131	0.258
Li & Luk (2012) vs The present study	209.5	485.5	-1.208	0.227

Patri and Pennington (1998:352) classified the 23 items of the Indian secondary school students' language attitudes into the following six categories:

- support of official status of English, including items 1, 6, 15, 18 and 22
- personal commitment to English, including items 20 and 16
- intrinsic/integrative motivation, including items 7, 9, 11, 19 and 23
- confidence in using English, including items 8 and 17
- association of English with education, including items 2, 4 and 13
- ethnic identity, including items 3, 5, 10, 12, 14 and 21

In the following discussion, the findings of the present study are compared with those in Patri and Pennington (1998) and Li and Luk (2012).

(A) Support of official status of English

This cluster of items associates with instrumental attitudes toward English, referring to the desire to gain social recognition or economic advantages through the knowledge of the

language (Gardner & Lambert 1972). They show an orientation of English for education, for language policy and for economic success in the surveys.

Table 5: Support of official status of English

Items	Patri & Pennington (1998)		Li & Luk (2012)		The present study	
	mean rank		mean rank		mean rank	
1. It is a good thing to have English as the main official language in Hong Kong.	1.43	2	1.71	1	1.39	1
18. The use of English is one of the most crucial factors which have contributed to the success of Hong Kong's prosperity and development today.	2.20	11	2.32	8	1.89	11
6. I should not be forced to learn English.	2.92	15	2.36	9	2.55	14
22. English should not be a medium of instruction in schools in Hong Kong.	3.35	16	2.73	20	2.70	17
15. My history, geography, and mathematics textbooks should be written or translated into (Hindu/Nepalese/Chinese).	3.45	18.5	2.58	15	3.30	21

Note: The modified wordings of questionnaire items are followed by the original terms in the previous studies separated by a slash mark.

Overall the subjects' responses to this cluster of items are similar to each other, particularly the responses of the Nepalese and the Indian subjects. Nepalese secondary students in Hong Kong, just like the majority Chinese students and the minority ethnic Indian students, are very supportive of the official status of English (item 1). Both Nepalese and Indian students have a somewhat positive view on the contribution of English to the success of Hong Kong's prosperity and development today (item 18), suggesting that they consider English has instrumental value. But the weighting of their view, in terms of ranking, is not as strong as Chinese students. They are, therefore, supportive of English as the medium of instruction and strongly disagree with having their textbooks translated into their first language (item 15). Among the three groups, Chinese students are, on the one hand, more supportive of English as the medium of instruction, but on the other hand, least opposing to the translated textbook – a practice which has been especially used for the technical terms and

difficult vocabulary in Hong Kong in the past decades. Furthermore, Chinese students have a stronger opposition to being forced to learn English (item 6). This leads us to a discussion of the Nepalese, Indian and Chinese students' personal commitment to English and their views on learning English at school.

(B) Personal commitment to English

Items 16 and 20 in the questionnaire measure the personal commitment of the subjects to English. Table 6 tabulates the subjects' responses in the three studies.

Table 6: Personal commitment to English

Items	Patri & Pennington (1998)		Li & Luk (2012)		The present study	
16. I wish that I could speak fluent and accurate English.	1.8	7	1.92	5	1.44	3
20. I would take English even if it were not a compulsory subject in school.	1.55	5.5	2.57	14	1.51	4

All three groups of students have a strong desire to speak fluent and accurate English (item 16), but Nepalese students have a comparatively stronger desire than Chinese and Indian students. This finding is consistent with the finding that Nepalese students have a stronger commitment than Chinese students to learning English even if it were not a compulsory subject in school (item 20). The commitment of learning English among Nepalese students is thus stronger not only at the level of desire but also at the level of putting it into practice. In the context of Hong Kong, English serves as the lingua franca for Nepalese and Indian students once they communicate with someone outside their ethnic group. According to the government census in 2011, 93.6% of the population is Chinese and only 0.4% and 0.2% are Indian and Nepalese respectively.

(C) Intrinsic motivation

While the cluster of items in section A suggest that the three groups consider English has instrumental value, items here associate with intrinsic motivation to English language and

culture, i.e. learning and using of English for its own sake instead of for the instrumental purposes. Table 7 tabulates the subjects' responses in the three studies.

Table 7: Intrinsic/integrative motivation

Items	Patri & Pennington (1998)		Li & Luk (2012)		The present study	
23. The command of English is very helpful in understanding foreigners and their cultures.	1.38	1	2.15	6	1.43	2
19. The English language sounds very nice.	1.85	9	1.87	3	1.54	5
11. I like to see English-speaking films.	1.53	4	1.87	3	1.66	6
9. I love conversing with Westerners in English.	1.83	8	2.68	19	1.81	9
7. To read English magazines is a kind of enjoyment.	1.55	5.5	1.87	3	1.84	10

Nepalese secondary students, like Chinese students, generally have a very positive intrinsic view toward English (item 23). Indian students, on the other hand, are the least positive among the three groups. Both Nepalese and Indian students strongly believe that the command of English is a good tool for understanding foreigners and their cultures (item 23). In contrast, Chinese students are less convinced of this.

Though intrinsically motivated to English, Nepalese students seem to be the least committed to put their motivation into practice in terms of watching English-speaking films (item 11) and reading English magazines (item 7). In contrast, their responses to item 9 “I love conversing with Westerners in English” ranked similar to the Indian subjects and much higher than the Chinese subjects.

(D) Confidence in using English

Items 8 and 17 in the questionnaire are related to the subjects' confidence in using English. However, the subjects' responses to item 8 “I do not feel awkward when using English” may be read as the result of their increasing confidence in their English ability as shown in item 17 or of their increasing integrative attitudes toward English as discussed in the previous section.

Table 8: Confidence in using English

Items	Patri & Pennington (1998)		Li & Luk (2012)		The present study	
8. I do not feel awkward when using English.	1.50	3	2.24	7	1.71	8
17. I feel uneasy and lack confidence when speaking English.	3.45	18.5	2.53	13	2.77	18

Nepalese and Indian students in Hong Kong show stronger disagreement to the statement that they feel uneasy and lack confidence when speaking English (item 17) than Chinese students. However, Nepalese students' response to item 8 "I do not feel awkward when using English" is closer to the response of Chinese students. Both groups express weaker agreement than Indian students. As Nepalese students have similar level of confidence in using English as Indian, this leads our discussion to the following two sections.

(E) Association of English with education

The cluster of items here associates English with education, social status and praise and approval from others. Table 9 tabulates the subjects' responses in the three studies.

Table 9: Association of English with education

Items	Patri & Pennington (1998)		Li & Luk (2012)		The present study	
2. English is the mark of an educated person.	2.15	10	2.50	11	1.67	7
13. If I use English, my status is raised.	2.60	14	2.65	18	2.16	13
4. If I use English, I will be praised and approved of by my family, relatives, and friends.	2.47	13	2.50	12	2.05	12

Among the three groups of subjects, Nepalese students believe most strongly that there is a close relationship between English and education (item 2). In addition, both Nepalese and Indian students have a stronger belief than Chinese students that their status is raised if they use English (item 13). The findings of this item will be further discussed in the section on ethnic identity. All three groups indicate that if they use English, they will be praised and approved of by their family, relatives and friends (item 4).

(F) Ethnic identity

The cluster of items here is related to the issue of ethnolinguistic identity, measuring the conflict, if there is any, between the use of English and the students' perception of their own ethnicity.

Table 10: Ethnic identity

Items	Patri & Pennington (1998)		Li & Luk (2012)		The present study	
12. If I use English, it means that I am not patriotic.	3.60	20	3.06	23	2.56	15
10. My first language is superior to English.	2.23	12	2.78	21	2.60	16
5. At times I fear that by using English I will become like a foreigner.	3.43	17	2.65	17	2.85	19
3. When using English, I do not feel that I am Nepalese/ Indian/ Chinese any more.	3.65	22	2.80	22	2.86	20
14. I feel uncomfortable when hearing one Nepalese/Indian/Chinese speaking to another in English.	3.63	21	2.64	16	2.98	21
21. I feel uneasy when hearing a Nepalese/Indian/Chinese speaking English.	3.78	23	2.49	10	3.08	22

All three groups of subjects do not see using English as a threat to their ethnolinguistic identity. They strongly disagree on the statement that when using English, they do not feel that they are Nepalese/Indian/Chinese any more (item 3), nor do they really fear that by using English, they will become like a foreigner (item 5). However, it is noted that Nepalese students' response to item 12 "If I use English, it means that I am not patriotic" ranks higher than Indian students, which in turns ranks higher than Chinese students. For Chinese students, English has long been the official language in the colonial history of Hong Kong. It was only as recently as 1974 when the British colonial government passed The Official Languages Ordinance, which recognized for the first time the status of Chinese as a co-official language of government and law. After the change of sovereignty from the British Government to the Peoples' Republic of China in 1997, English continues to enjoy the status of co-official language, which is stipulated in Article 9 of Hong Kong Basic Law (1992). In addition,

code-switching, especially code-mixing, has long been a widely observed phenomenon in Hong Kong (Gibbons 1979, 1983, 1987; Luke 1984/1998; Bauer 1988; Yau 1993; Li 1996, 1999; to name just a few). English has become another marker of Hongkonger (Lai 2001) and in fact 'part and parcel of the Hong Kong identity' (Chan 2002:281). Among the three groups, Chinese subjects are the group which expresses strongest disagreement with the idea that the Chinese language is superior to English. As for the Indian group, Patri & Pennington (1998) notes that the Indian subjects in their study all come from economically wealthy families and Indians in Hong Kong maintain strong cultural in-group ties. They are less likely to perceive English as a threat to their native language. The data, in fact, show that among the three groups, Indian students have a much stronger opinion towards the superiority of their own language.

Unlike Chinese students, both Nepalese and India students strongly disagreed with the statements that they feel uncomfortable or uneasy when hearing their own ethnic people speaking English (item 21) and when hearing their own ethnic people speaking to another in English (item 14).

CONCLUSION

Nepalese secondary students in Hong Kong have positive instrumental and intrinsic attitudes toward English. In terms of instrumental attitudes, Nepalese students are very supportive of the official status of English and have a somewhat positive view on the contribution of English to the success of Hong Kong's prosperity and development today. They are supportive of English as the medium of instruction and strongly disagree with having their textbooks translated into their first language. Concerning intrinsic view, they strongly believe that having a good command of English is beneficial to understanding foreigners and their cultures. However, while they are committed to conversing with Westerners in English, they are less committed to watching English-speaking films and reading English magazines. The reason(s) for their lack of commitment is an issue to be explored in order to find out whether it is a case of preference or a case of affordability.

Nepalese students express that a strong relationship exists between English and education and they believe that their status is raised if they use English. They also have the support from their families, relatives and friends when they use English. They do not feel uncomfortable or uneasy when hearing their own ethnic people speaking English nor when hearing their own ethnic people speaking to another in English. However, they also show a strong concern that if they use English, it means that they are not patriotic. This is another issue which needs further investigation.

Finally, their positive view on the instrumental and intrinsic value towards English would certainly motivate them in the learning of English. At the same time, their language attitudes towards Chinese – Putonghua and Cantonese – also needs to be explored because it has been noted that their limited Chinese language proficiency may make them an easy target of direct and indirect discrimination and may also become an unnecessary obstacle in their employment and further studies.

REFERENCES

- Anzaldúa, G., 1987. *Borderlands: the new Mestiza = La Frontera*. San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books.
- Axler, M., Yang, A. and Stevens, T., 1998. Current Language Attitudes of Hong Kong Chinese Adolescents and Young Adults. In: M. C. Pennington, ed., 1998. *Language in Hong Kong at Century's End*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
- Baker, C., 1992. Attitudes and language. *Multilingual Matters* 83. Clevedon, Avon, England: Multilingual Matters.
- Bauer, R.S., 1988. Written Cantonese of Hong Kong. *Cahiers de Linguistique Asie Orientale*, 17, pp.245-93.
- Chambers, J.K., 1995. *Sociolinguistic Theory*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Chan, E., 2002. Beyond Pedagogy: Language and Identity in Post-colonial Hong Kong. *British Journal of Sociology of Education* 23(2), pp.271-285.
- Eastman, C.M., 1985. Establishing social identity through language use. *Journal of Language and Social Psychology*, 4, pp.1-20.
- Gardner, R. and Lambert, W., 1972. *Attitudes and Motivation in Second Language Learning*. Rowley, Mass.: Newbury House.
- Gibbons, J., 1983. Attitudes towards languages and code-mixing in Hong Kong. *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development*, 4, pp.129-147.
- Gibbons, J., 1987. *Code-mixing and code choice: a Hong Kong case study*. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.
- Giles, H., Bourhis, R.Y. and Taylor, D.M., 1977. Towards a theory of language in ethnic group relations. In: H. Giles, ed., *Language, ethnicity and intergroup relations*. London: Edward Arnold, pp.307-348.
- Giles, H. and Johnson, P., 1981. The role of language in ethnic group relations. In J. Turner and H. Giles, eds., *Intergroup behaviour*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp.199-243.
- Giles, H. and Johnson, P., 1987. Ethnolinguistic identity theory: A social psychological approach to language maintain. *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, 68,

pp.69-99.

Joseph, J.E., 2004. *Language and Identity*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Lai, M.L., 2001. Hong Kong students' attitudes towards Cantonese, Putonghua and English after the change of sovereignty. *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development*, 22(2), pp.112-133.

Li, D.C.S., 1996. *Issues in Bilingualism and Biculturalism: A Hong Kong Case Study*. New York: Peter Lang.

Li, D.C.S., 1999. The functions and status of English in Hong Kong: A post-1997 update. *English World-Wide*, 20(1), pp.67-110.

Li, E.S.H. and Luk, G. N.Y., 2012. The changing language attitudes towards English of Chinese secondary school students in Hong Kong. Paper presented in the 7th Annual Conference of the ASAHK, Sociology Department, Hong Kong Shue Yan University, Hong Kong.

Littlewood, W. and Liu, N.F., 1996. *Hong Kong Students and Their English*. Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong/Macmillan.

Luke, K.K., 1984/1998. Why two languages might be better than one: Motivaions of language mixing in Hong Kong. In: M. C. Pennington, ed., *Language in Hong Kong at Century's End*, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, pp. 145-59. First published as Luke, K.K. 1984. Expedient and orientational language mixing in Hong Kong. *York Papers in Linguistics*, 11, pp.191-201.

Patri, M. and Pennington, M.C., 1998. Acculturation to English by Ethnic Minority: The Language Attitudes of Indian Adolescents in a Hong Kong International School. In: M. C. Pennington, Ed., *Language in Hong Kong at Century's End*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.

Pierson, H.D., Fu, G.S. and Lee, S.Y., 1980. An analysis of the relationship between language attitudes and English attainment of secondary school students in Hong Kong. *Language Learning* 30, pp.289-316.

Yang, A. and Lau, L., 2003. Student attitudes to the learning of English at the secondary and tertiary level. *System*, 31, pp.107-123.

Yau, M.S., 1993. Functions of two codes in Hong Kong Chinese. *World Englishes*, 12(1), pp.25-33.

The Changing Language Attitudes towards English of Chinese Secondary Students in Hong Kong

Eden S.H. Li
Open University of Hong Kong
Email: shli@ouhk.edu.hk

Gladys N.Y. Luk
Open University of Hong Kong
Email: nyluk@ouhk.edu.hk

INTRODUCTION

Language is claimed not only to be a ‘marker’ of social identity but also believed to be a tool of constructing national identity. Anzaldúa (1987:59) concluded that ‘ethnic identity is twin skin to linguistic identity – I am my language.’ Hong Kong has always been a community where the majority of the population is native Cantonese speakers. However, for much of its history, English enjoyed a much higher status than Chinese. English was the only official language from 1842 (when it became British colony). One of the first moves to improve the status of Chinese was the issue of General Circular 13/68 by the Colonial Secretariat in 1968, requiring government departments to use Chinese in written communication with members of the public ‘who may not understand English’. A far more significant development was the enactment — after a community-wide campaign in the early 1970s — of the Official Languages Ordinance in 1974, Chinese was first recognized as a ‘co-official language’. The ‘Official Languages Ordinance’ stated that:

- (1) The English and Chinese languages are declared to be the official languages of Hong Kong for the purposes of communication between the Government or any public officer and members of the public.
- (2) The official languages possess equal status and, subject to the provision of this Ordinance, enjoy equality of use for the purposes set out in subsection

(1). (Hong Kong Government [1974]1998, Section 3)

Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, Chinese began to be increasingly used by legislators and civil servants. In 1992, the Chinese Government published 'The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR)', which contains the 'mini-constitution' of the Hong Kong SAR. With the publication of The Basic Law, the status of Chinese as an official language was further strengthened by Article 9, which stated that:

In addition to the Chinese language, English may also be used as an official language by the executive authorities, legislative and judicial organs of the Hong Kong Administrative Region (Chinese Government 1992:7).

In other words, even after the handover in 1997, English continues to enjoy the status of official language.

In a research to investigate the relationship between English language attainment and attitude towards English among Chinese-speaking secondary school students in Hong Kong, Pierson, Fu and Lee (1980) found that Hong Kong secondary school students had more positive views on using Chinese than on using English when they had a choice. Furthermore, they saw using English as a threat to their Chinese identity. Pennington and Yue (1994) and then Axler, Yang and Stevens (1998) modified and applied Pierson, Fu and Lee's (1980) questionnaire to conduct two surveys before and after the handover in 1997 respectively. Both studies found that the secondary school students participated in both studies showed a strong motivation to learn English and they did not feel that the use of English was a threat to their Chinese identity. Pennington and Yue (1994) explained the changes partly due to the research methodology and partly due to the historical developments in Hong Kong. Among the developments, the dominant issue was the handover of sovereignty from the British Government to the Peoples' Republic of China.

Nowadays, China becomes a rising star both politically and economically. Hong Kong is drifting closer and closer to Mainland; but on the other hand, Hong Kong people are well

aware of the importance for Hong Kong to remain as an international city. The present study thus investigates the language attitude towards English, and the changes, if there is any, among Hong Kong people.

PREVIOUS STUDIES ON HONG KONG STUDENTS' LANGUAGE ATTITUDE

Numerous previous studies have reported on the relationship between learners' language attitude (or motivation) and language learning (Baker 1992; Littlewood and Liu 1996; Yang and Lau 2003 to name just a few). In a research to investigate the relationship between English language attainment and attitude towards English among Chinese-speaking secondary school students in Hong Kong, Pierson, Fu and Lee (1980) found that while Hong Kong secondary school students wanted to speak better English, 'they are also ambivalent about actually using it.' They did not only find any approbation for using English, but also saw using English as a threat to their Chinese identity. Pierson et al. concluded that '[t]he results seem to reflect a tension within the Ss between needing and wanting to use English, while at the same time maintaining their identity as Chinese, in a Chinese society.' (Pierson, Fu and Lee, 1980: 292)

Pennington and Yue (1994) modified and applied Pierson, Fu and Lee's (1980) questionnaire to conduct a survey three years before the handover in 1997. In their study, Pennington et al. found that the subjects in their study indicated a strong motivation to learn English as in Pierson, Fu and Lee (1980); however, they no longer saw using English as a threat to their ethnolinguistic identity. To explain the differences, Pennington and Yue (1994) acknowledged that the changes might due to the research methodology. However, they might also due to the historical developments in Hong Kong, especially the handover of sovereignty from the British Government to the Peoples' Republic of China in 1997.

Based on Pennington and Yue (1994), Axler, Yang and Stevens (1998) also modified and applied Pierson, Fu and Lee's (1980) questionnaire to conduct a survey right after the handover. Axler et al. obtained results which are consistent with the Pennington and Yue (1994). Furthermore, Axler, Yang and Stevens (1998) saw a pattern of their subjects

associating English as a marker of education.

Adopting another set of questionnaire, Lai (2005) investigated Form 4 (Year 10) Chinese students' language attitudes toward Cantonese, Putonghua and English. Lai (2005) found that both English and Putonghua received positive instrumental attitudes among Chinese students. In addition, Cantonese received highest positive integrative attitudes, English somewhat positive, but Putonghua negative.

Fifteen years went after the handover. People in Hong Kong have well experienced the rule under the 'one nation, two systems' for one and a half decade. China becomes a strong and influential developing country both politically and economically. Hong Kong is drifting closer and closer to Mainland; but on the other hand, Hong Kong people are well aware of the importance for Hong Kong to remain as an international city, and the competition of other Chinese cities such as Shanghai and Guangzhou. Hong Kong people have also experienced a closer contact with the mainlanders and their cultures and values. The authors believe that it is high time to investigate the language attitudes towards the three languages – Cantonese, Putonghua and English – among the people in Hong Kong. The present paper focuses on the language attitude toward English among the Chinese secondary school student. It aims to examine the changes of their language attitude through a series of comparisons with the previous studies.

METHODOLOGY

The present research investigates the secondary students' language attitude towards English, and the changes, if there is any. To trace the changes, comparisons are made with the findings in the study of Hong Kong Chinese secondary students by Pierson, Fu and Lee (1980), Pennington and Yue (1994), and Axler, Yang and Stevens (1998). In order to make our findings comparable to the previous studies, the questionnaire of this study is a modified version previously employed by Pierson, Fu and Lee (1980) and adopted by the later studies. It consisted of the 23 items measuring the direct attitudes part of their original questionnaire as below:

Table 1: Questionnaire of this study (a modified version previously employed by Pierson, Fu and Lee (1980))

Item	Statement
1	It is a good thing to have English as the main official language in Hong Kong.
2	English is the mark of an educated person.
3	When using English, I do not feel that I am Chinese any more.
4	If I use English, I will be praised and approved of by my family, relatives, and friends.
5	At times I fear that by using English I will become like a foreigner.
6	I should not be forced to learn English.
7	To read English magazines is a kind of enjoyment.
8	I do not feel awkward when using English.
9	I love conversing with Westerners in English.
10	The Cantonese language is superior to English.
11	I like to see English-speaking films.
12	If I use English, it means that I am not patriotic.
13	If I use English, my status is raised.
14	I feel uncomfortable when hearing one Chinese speaking to another in English.
15	My history, geography, and mathematics textbooks should be written or translated into Chinese.
16	I wish that I could speak fluent and accurate English.
17	I feel uneasy and lack confidence when speaking English.
18	The use of English is one of the most crucial factors which have contributed to the success of Hong Kong's prosperity and development today.
19	The English language sounds very nice.
20	I would take English even if it were not a compulsory subject in school.
21	I feel uneasy when hearing a Chinese speaking English.
22	English should not be a medium of instruction in schools in Hong Kong.
23	The command of English is very helpful in understanding foreigners and their cultures.

In the questionnaire, the answer choices were on a Likert scale ranging from strong agreement to strong disagreement. However, in order to be comparable to Pennington & Yue (1994) and Axler, Yang & Stevens (1998), the scale was reduced to four alternatives: strongly agree, agree, disagree and strongly disagree. The midpoint choice 'no opinion' was eliminated.

Apart from the direct measure of the students' language attitudes, there were questions about their personal background such as form level, gender, age, first language, nationality, place of birth, and number of years that they have been in Hong Kong. Other questions

included how often their parents speak English, the language they used in speaking with their parents and siblings.

Subjects

There are 182 Hong Kong secondary students participated in this study. They are studying in Forms 4-7 (equivalent to grades 10-13), ranging in age from 14 to 18 years old. These participants come from 4 secondary schools. The selection of schools attempted to obtain a broadly representative group of students.

Among these 4 schools, one is an EMI school in a housing estate in a district in the New Territories. EMI schools in Hong Kong are band 1 schools which adopt English as the medium of instruction. They are regarded as elite schools and are popular among parents. Most of the students in this EMI school come from the middle class families.

Another participated school is a DSS (Direct Subsidized Scheme) school in a district in Kowloon. DSS schools in Hong Kong are private schools which receive subsidies from the government. They are considered to be an alternative for parents who want to have a choice for their children and they are often from more well-off families. Most DSS schools adopt English as the medium of instruction.

The third school is a top band 2 school. It is single-sexed and has a very long history. Under the fine-tuning language policy, English is adopted as the medium of instruction for Integrated Science and Geography and students who are more capable will learn more subjects in English.

The last school is a subsidized CMI school in a newly developed district in the New Territories. CMI schools have to adopt Chinese as the medium of instruction. Many new immigrants live in the district. Students in this school are comparatively less motivated and their language ability, English in particular, is comparatively lower.

Procedure

Subjects were asked to fill out the questionnaire in their own schools under the supervision of their own teachers. Mean and standard deviation of each item were calculated and all items were ranked according to the mean.

In the present study, comparisons are made with the findings in the study of Hong Kong Chinese secondary students by Pierson, Fu and Lee (1980), Pennington and Yue (1994), and Axler, Yang and Stevens (1998). Apart from the rank of the 23 items, Axler, Yang and Stevens (1998) does not provide the mean and standard deviation of the items. A Mann-Whitney Test is computed to test whether the differences of rankings in the rest of the four studies are statistically significant. Mann-Whitney Test aims to determine whether two independent samples came from equivalent populations. This test is based on the average of ranks. The data are ranked as if the observations were part of a single sample. If the null hypothesis is true, then the ranks will be about evenly distributed between the two samples, and the average of the ranks for the two samples will be about the same. That is, the low, medium, and high ranks should be about equally divided between the two samples. If the alternate hypothesis is true, one of the samples will have more of the lower ranks and, thus, a smaller rank average. The other sample will have more of the higher ranks and, therefore, a larger average.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

In this study, the first step of analysis was to calculate the mean and standard deviation of each of the 23 items. Based on the mean, the 23 items were ranked. The findings are tabulated in Table 2.

Table 2: Chinese students' direct attitude questions about language use

Item	Statement	Mean	Rank	SD
1	It is a good thing to have English as the main official language in Hong Kong.	1.71	1	0.7
2	English is the mark of an educated person.	2.50	11	0.8
3	When using English, I do not feel that I am Chinese any more.	2.80	22	0.8
4	If I use English, I will be praised and approved of by my family, relatives, and friends.	2.53	12	0.7
5	At times I fear that by using English I will become like a foreigner.	2.65	17	0.9
6	I should not be forced to learn English.	2.36	9	0.8
7	To read English magazines is a kind of enjoyment.	1.87	3.5	0.7
8	I do not feel awkward when using English.	2.24	7	0.8
9	I love conversing with Westerners in English.	2.68	19	0.8
10	The Cantonese language is superior to English.	2.78	21	0.8
11	I like to see English-speaking films.	1.87	3.5	0.6
12	If I use English, it means that I am not patriotic.	3.06	23	0.7
13	If I use English, my status is raised.	2.65	18	0.8
14	I feel uncomfortable when hearing one Chinese speaking to another in English.	2.64	16	0.8
15	My history, geography, and mathematics textbooks should be written or translated into Chinese.	2.58	15	0.9
16	I wish that I could speak fluent and accurate English.	1.92	5	0.8
17	I feel uneasy and lack confidence when speaking English.	2.53	13	0.8
18	The use of English is one of the most crucial factors which have contributed to the success of Hong Kong's prosperity and development today.	2.32	8	0.7
19	The English language sounds very nice.	1.87	2	0.6
20	I would take English even if it were not a compulsory subject in school.	2.57	14	0.9
21	I feel uneasy when hearing a Chinese speaking English.	2.49	10	0.8
22	English should not be a medium of instruction in schools in Hong Kong.	2.73	20	0.8
23	The command of English is very helpful in understanding foreigners and their cultures.	2.15	6	0.8

According to the data, the participated secondary school students had the strongest agreement on the following five items in descending order:

1. It is a good thing to have English as the main official language in Hong Kong.

- 19. The English language sounds very nice.
- 11. I like to see English-speaking films.
- 7. To read English magazines is a kind of enjoyment.
- 16. I wish that I could speak fluent and accurate English.

The present study shows that Chinese secondary students in Hong Kong have a very positive view to English. The data show that they are very supportive to the official status of English (item 1) and they have strong intrinsic and integrative motivation to English language and culture (items 7, 11 and 19). Thus, they have strong desire to speak fluent and accurate English (item 16).

The participated secondary school students had the least agreement on the following five items in descending order:

- 12. If I use English, it means that I am not patriotic.
- 3. When using English, I do not feel that I am Chinese any more.
- 10. The Cantonese language is superior to English.
- 22. English should not be a medium of instruction in schools in Hong Kong.
- 9. I love conversing with Westerners in English.

The data also suggest that Chinese secondary students in Hong Kong are less likely to perceive English as a threat to their ethnolinguistic identity. This is reflected on their responses which show that they are strongly disagreed to the statements that if they use English, it means that they are not patriot (item 12); that when they use English, they do not feel that they are Chinese any more (item 3); and that the Cantonese language is superior to English (item 10). They are supportive to the function of English as the MOI in schools (item 22). However, they express less than desire to converse with Westerners in English (item 9). This may due to their lack of confidence in speaking English (item 17). In short, they have strong intrinsic and integrative motivation to English language and culture (items 7, 11 and 19), and they have strong desire to speak fluent and accurate English (item 16). They support

the function of English as the MOI in schools. But they are not too eager to converse with Westerners in English. We are not sure if it is due to their shy personality. However, it is certain that they are lack of confidence in speaking English.

Changing Chinese students' attitude toward English

The Mann-Whitney U Tests show that the rankings differential of Pierson, Fu and Lee (1980) and Pennington and Yue (1994); Pierson, Fu and Lee (1980) and the present study; and also Pennington and Yue (1994) and the present study are not statistically different from each other. In other words, if the three surveys were taken as one and the rankings of the 23 items in each survey were put into the same pool to re-rank again, comparing the rankings of the 23 items in each survey with each other does not show significant difference in statistical terms. The results are shown in the following table. The discussion is thus comparing the weighting of these items in terms of their ranking in each separate survey instead of their means because the averages of the mean of the 23 items in the three surveys are not the same.

Table 3: Test Statistics of Pierson, Fu and Lee (1980), Pennington and Yue (1994) and the present study

	Pierson, Fu & Lee Vs Pennington and Yue	Pierson, Fu & Lee Vs Li & Luk	Pennington and Yue Vs Li & Luk
Mann-Whitney U	239.000	212.000	226.000
Wilcoxon W	515.000	488.000	502.000
Z	-.560	-1.154	-.846
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.575	.249	.397

Table 5 compares the ranking of the 23 items on direct attitude about language used between Pierson, Fu and Lee (1980), Pennington and Yue (1994) and Axler, Yang and Stevens (1998), and the present study.

Table 4: Comparison of the five studies on Chinese students' language attitudes toward English

	Pierson, Fu & Lee (1980)	Pennington & Yue (1994)	Axler, Yang & Stevens (1998)	Li & Luk (2012)
No. of subjects	466	285	250	182
Item	rank	rank	rank	rank
1	17	5	7	1
2	23	14	13	11
3	4	21	22	22
4	21	15	15	12
5	2.5	22	20	17
6	11.5	18	13	9
7	15.5	16	10	3.5
8	8	3	4	7
9	9.5	9	5	19
10	18	10	12	21
11	11.5	11	6	3.5
12	1	23	23	23
13	22	17	16	18
14	19	13	14	16
15	13.5	12	18	15
16	2.5	1	1	5
17	20	7	11	13
18	15.5	6	9	8
19	13.5	8	8	2
20	7	4	3	14
21	9.5	19	17	10
22	6	20	19	20
23	2	2	2	6

The discussion in the following section will revolve around the instrumental, intrinsic and integrative attitudes of the subjects towards English. To investigate the changing attitudes, if there is any, comparisons are made between the findings of the present study and those of the three previous studies.

(G) Instrumental attitudes

Instrumental attitudes toward a language are reflected on the desire to gain social recognition or economic advantages through the knowledge of it (Gardner & Lambert, 1972). They reveal a positive view or inclination for pragmatic reasons.

Table 5: Instrumental attitudes toward English

Items	Pierson et al (1980)	Pennington et al(1994)	Axler et al (1998)	Li et al (2012)
1. It is a good thing to have English as the main official language in Hong Kong.	17	5	7	1
18. The use of English is one of the most crucial factors which have contributed to the success of Hong Kong's prosperity and development today.	15.5	6	9	8
2. English is the mark of an educated person.	23	14	13	11
4. If I use English, I will be praised and approved of by my family, relatives, and friends.	21	15	15	12
13. If I use English, my status is raised.	22	17	16	18

The data indicate that fifteen years after the handover, Chinese secondary school students in Hong Kong become more supportive to the official status of English than those in the previous three studies (item 1) and they continue to retain a somewhat positive view on the contribution of English to the success of Hong Kong's prosperity and development today (item 18). Furthermore, Chinese students nowadays opine more strongly that English is the mark of an education person (item 2) and that their using of English will be praised and approved of by their family, relatives and friends. However, they disagree with the statement that their status is raised if they use English. This disagreement, though not as strong as the one shown in Pierson, Fu and Lee (1980), is consistent with Pennington and Yue (1994), and Axler, Yang and Stevens (1998).

(H) Integrative attitudes (ethnolinguistic identity)

An integrative attitude refers to 'a favourable inclination toward a language in order to become a value member of a given community' (Lai, 2005). It concerns the social and interpersonal orientation and conceptual links with the need for ethnolinguistic identity. It cannot be considered as an exclusive notion from the notion of instrumental attitudes that we have discussed in the previous section. However, it bears an important association with the

language and ethnic identity in a community and thus it is discussed in a separate section.

Table 6: Integrative attitudes toward English

Items	Pierson et al (1980)	Pennington et al(1994)	Axler et al (1998)	Li et al (2012)
12. If I use English, it means that I am not patriotic.	1	23	23	23
3. When using English, I do not feel that I am Chinese any more.	4	21	22	22
5. At times I fear that by using English I will become like a foreigner.	2.5	22	20	17
14. I feel uncomfortable when hearing one Chinese speaking to another in English.	19	13	14	16
21. I feel uneasy when hearing a Chinese speaking English.	9.5	10	17	10

Subjects' responses to this cluster of items indicate their ethnolinguistic identity. In general, there is consistency between the findings of Pennington and Yue (1994), Axler, Yang and Stevens (1998) and the present paper, which are in sharp contrast to the findings of Pierson, Fu and Lee (1980). Chinese students nowadays do not consider the use of English a risk to their Chinese identity.

To explain the differences, Pennington and Yue (1994) acknowledged that the changes might due to the research methodology. However, they might also due to the historical developments in Hong Kong. Among the developments, the dominant issue was the handover of sovereignty from the British Government to the Peoples' Republic of China. Based on the previous studies in 80s such as Bickley, 1990; Bond, 1985; Bond and Yang, 1982; Gibbons, 1983, 1987; Lyczak et al., 1976; Pierson and Bond, 1982; Yang and Bond, 1980; Young et al., 1986; and Young et al., 1984), Pennington and Yue (1994:6) argued that Hong Kong Cantonese-speaking students in the 1970s and early 1980s, on the one hand, had a positive value to the knowledge of English but on the other hand, they held some negative views about the use of English and the Western cultural values. These mixed feelings were coupled with concerns about the attributes and relative status of Cantonese and code-switching between

Cantonese and English. These feelings were further mixed with their pride in Chinese culture and need of solidarity, which ‘tended to be asserted more strongly in circumstances where Chinese identity was at issue.’ The language attitudes changed after 1984 when the relative status of English in Hong Kong was perceived to be lower and the knowledge of English was seen as a means to the ‘material benefits of the Western world’. With the approaching of handover, there was less of ‘a social, cultural, or political need to assert Chinese ethnolinguistic identity’ (Pennington and Yue, 1994:20).

After 1997, Hong Kong as a society is facing a dilemma: Should Hong Kong regard itself as another Chinese city or an international city? There was recently a row between the conception of distinction between our identity of Chinese, Hong Kong Chinese, Hong Kong people and the like. As mentioned by Alex Fong, the chief executive of the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce, in an article entitled “Dual personality: Should Hong Kong regard itself as an international city or Chinese? It is both and must remain so” in the *South China Morning Post*, it is important for Hong Kong to maintain its position as an international centre for finance, trade and logistics, and to develop a closer cooperation with the mainland. Fifteen years after the change of sovereignty, the findings of the present study suggest that the use of English no longer poses a risk to their Chinese identity. In this respect, the present study is consistent with the findings of Pennington and Yue (1994), Axler, Yang and Stevens (1998). However, at the same time, the present study also found that Chinese secondary students are less disagreed with the statement in item 5 “At times I fear that by using English I will become like a foreigner”, and they are more disagreed with the statement in item 14 “I feel uncomfortable when hearing one Chinese speaking to another in English”. If the findings are in fact indicating a trend, Chinese secondary schools are less fear of risking their Chinese identity in using English and thus they feel less uneasy to hear other Chinese speaking in English.

(I) Intrinsic attitudes

Intrinsic attitudes toward a language refer to the learning and using of a language for its own sake instead of for the instrumental purposes discussed in section A.

Table 7: Intrinsic attitudes toward English

Items	Pierson et al (1980)	Pennington et al(1994)	Axler et al (1998)	Li et al (2012)
19. The English language sounds very nice.	13.5	8	8	2
7. To read English magazines is a kind of enjoyment.	15.5	16	10	3.5
11. I like to see English-speaking films.	11.5	11	6	3.5
23. The command of English is very helpful in understanding foreigners and their cultures.	2	2	2	6
9. I love conversing with Westerners in English.	9.5	9	5	19
10. My first language is superior to English.	18	10	12	21

The findings of the present study suggest that while Chinese students continue to retain a positive view on the instrumental view of English, their intrinsic attitudes are somewhat ambivalent. Comparing with the three previous studies, there is a trend that do they have a more and more positive view not only toward the English language (item 19), but also toward their fondness of reading English magazines and watching English films (items 7 and 11). They strongly disagree to the statement (item 10) that Chinese is superior to English. On the other hand, Chinese secondary school students nowadays show a much stronger psychologically detachment from both the Western culture and the English speakers (items 9 and 23). This leads us to the discussion of their personal commitment to English and their view on the learning of English at school.

Table 8: Personal commitment to English

Items	Pierson et al (1980)	Pennington et al(1994)	Axler et al (1998)	Li et al (2012)
16. I wish that I could speak fluent and accurate English.	2.5	1	1	5
20. I would take English even if it were not a compulsory subject in school.	7	4	3	14

Comparing with the previous study, Chinese secondary school students' personal commitment to English is much weaker than in the past. This is shown in the ranking of their desire to speak fluent and accurate English (item 16) and to take English even if it was not a compulsory subject in school (item 20).

Table 9: Confidence in using English

Items	Pierson et al (1980)	Pennington et al(1994)	Axler et al (1998)	Li et al (2012)
17. I feel uneasy and lack confidence when speaking English.	20	7	11	13
8. I do not feel awkward when using English.	8	3	4	7

In comparison with Pennington and Yue (1994), and Axler, Yang and Stevens (1998), the present study finds that Chinese secondary school students express stronger confidence in their speaking English (items 17). Furthermore, they also indicate that they are less agreed on item 8 "I do not feel awkward when using English". It is noted that such finding may be read as the result of their increasing confidence in their English ability as shown in item 17 or of their increasing intrinsic attitudes toward English as discussed in the previous section.

Table 10: Learning and using English in school

Items	Pierson et al (1980)	Pennington et al(1994)	Axler et al (1998)	Li et al (2012)
22. English should not be a medium of instruction in schools in Hong Kong.	6	20	19	20
6. I should not be forced to learn English.	11.5	18	13	9
15. My history, geography, and mathematics textbooks should be written or translated into Chinese.	13.5	12	18	15

In contrast with Pierson, Fu and Lee (1980), but in consistent with Pennington and Yue (1994), and Axler, Yang and Stevens (1998), Chinese secondary school students in the present study show a supportive attitude towards using English as a MOI in schools (item 22).

However, they also show a stronger opinion of item 6 “I should not be forced to learn English”. They are positive toward the instrumental attitudes toward English, and they become more positive toward the intrinsic attitudes toward the language, and they strongly support the function of English in schools, but as their confidence in their English capability increases, and Hon Kong becomes part of mainland China, they have a weaker commitment toward English and stronger opinion toward not being forced to learn English.

CONCLUSION

The present paper presented the changing language attitude towards English among Chinese secondary students in Hong Kong. Comparisons were made with the findings in Pierson, Fu and Lee (1980), Pennington and Yue (1994), and Axler, Yang and Stevens (1998). It is found that Chinese secondary school students nowadays continue to retain a somewhat positive view on the instrumental view of English towards the Hong Kong economy; their intrinsic attitudes toward the English language and their fondness of reading English magazines and watching English films are growing. At the same time, they show a much stronger psychologically detachment from both the Western culture and the English speakers. Furthermore, their personal commitment to English is getting weaker. Their desire to speak fluent and accurate English remains strong but not as strong as in the past, and their willingness to take English if it was not a compulsory subject in school is dropping. In addition, while they strongly support the function of English in schools and their confidence in their English capability increases, they have a stronger opinion against being forced to learn English.

REFERENCES

- Anzaldúa, G., 1987. *Borderlands: the new Mestiza = La Frontera*. San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books.
- Axler, M., Yang, A. and Stevens, T., 1998. Current Language Attitudes of Hong Kong Chinese Adolescents and Young Adults. In: M. C. Pennington, ed., 1998. *Language in Hong Kong at Century's End*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
- Baker, C., 1992. Attitudes and language. *Multilingual Matters* 83. Clevedon, Avon, England: Multilingual Matters.
- Bickley, G., 1990. Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose: Attitudes towards English language learning in Hong Kong – Frederick Stewart's evidence. *World Englishes*, 9 (3), pp.289-300.
- Bond, M.H. and Yang, K., 1982. Ethnic affirmation versus cross-cultural accommodation. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 13, pp.169-185.
- Bond, M.K., 1985. Language as a carrier of ethnic stereotypes in Hong Kong. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 25 (1), pp.53-62.
- Garden, R.C. and Lambert, W.E., 1972. *Attitudes and motivation in second language teaching*. Rowley, MA: Newbury House.
- Gibbons, J., 1983. Attitudes towards languages and code-mixing in Hong Kong. *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development*, 4, pp.129-147.
- Gibbons, J., 1987. *Code-mixing and code choice: a Hong Kong case study*. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.
- Lai, M.L., 2005. Language attitudes of the first postcolonial generation in Hong Kong secondary schools. *Language in Society*, 34(3), pp.363-388.
- Littlewood, W. and Liu, N.F., 1996. *Hong Kong Students and Their English*. Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong/Macmillan.
- Lyczak, R., Fu, G.S. and Ho, A., 1976. Attitudes of Hong Kong bilinguals toward English and Chinese speakers. *Journal of Cross-cultural Psychology*, 7, pp.425-436.
- Pennington, M.C. and Yue, F., 1994. English and Chinese in Hong Kong: Pre-1997 language

- attitudes. *World Englishes*, 13, pp.1-20.
- Pierson, H.D., Fu, G.S. and Lee, S.Y., 1980. An analysis of the relationship between language attitudes and English attainment of secondary school students in Hong Kong. *Language Learning*, 30, pp. 289-316.
- Yang, K. and Bond, M.H., 1980. Ethnic Affirmation by Chinese Bilinguals. *Journal of Cross-cultural Psychology*, 11(4), pp.411-425.
- Yang, A. and Lau, L., 2003. Student attitudes to the learning of English at the secondary and tertiary level. *System*, 31, pp.107-123.
- Young, L., Giles, H. and Pierson, H., 1986. Socio-political change and perceived vitality. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 10, pp.459-469.

Contacting and Enacting “Self for being Ethical”: A Model for Psychotherapy Practiced in Taiwan¹

Wei-lun Lee

National Dong Hwa University

Email: wllee@mail.ndhu.edu.tw

INTRODUCTION: THE INDIGENOUS APPROACH IN THE PRESENT STUDY

“As a psychotherapist, how can I behave ethically in front of a person who is suffering?” Such a question is for a psychotherapist like myself, growing up in Taiwan and having my professional education in America, to find a starting point for rethinking the enterprise of psychotherapy to be practiced in the non-western society of Taiwan. There are three parameters suggested by this questioning. First, the target phenomena for study are the encounters between the two parties in the therapy rather than just the patient. Second, what is called “ethical” denotes the construction of interpersonal ordering, for what is ethical is always concerning how people themselves relate together. And third, the understanding to be found by this questioning is about therapeutic acts, that is, about the therapist as an acting agent who aims at establishing an ethical encounter with the patient. As a result, my inquiry is thus directed away from ways of psychological functioning, be they cognitive or behavioral, but toward ways of being, especially being with others.

Taken as an event about ways of being, psychotherapy can thus be returned to its locality, its situatedness in life in the world. This “returning to the locality” is the meaning I adopt for “being indigenous.” Most indigenous psychological studies in cross-cultural contexts take some prominent cultural features as the marks of cultural differences, and therefore focus themselves on the exclusive characters of one culture from others. In this sense, indigenous psychology is almost inevitably presented as “psychology of the exotic,” concerning the “differences” from the findings of western mainstream psychology, and being

¹ This paper is first published in Cheung, C. F. and Yu, C. C. eds., 2007. *Phenomenology 2005, Vol. I, Selected Essays from Asia*. Bucharest: Zeta Books, pp.477-495.

trapped into an epistemological dichotomy of “universality vs. particularity.” Yet in the sense of being indigenous defined above, I am able to avoid stepping into the idea of cultural differences, i.e., taking cultural features as the explanatory factors for human phenomena, before clarification. It is then possible to see universality through particularity, i.e., to understand human ways of being in terms of local manifestations. An indigenous approach to psychotherapy can thus be defined as follows: given an understanding that human existence is always situated existence, local modes of suffering and healing are not taken as limited by or examples of some particular conditions but indigenous manifestations of the originality of human ways of being.

This paper thus contains four parts in order to introduce my findings and their significance. The first is a brief discussion on the assumption of the individuality of the most dominant theories of psychotherapy. This portion of discussion works as a suspension of the dominate theories of psychotherapy in order not to take them as the starting framework for the exploration of the indigenous phenomena. This suspension, however, is not to deny those theories but to block their being taken-for-granted and to acquire a chance to see the assumptions grounding them. The indigenous phenomena can thus be maintained even while facing the dominant theories. I will point out that psychotherapy concerning individual’s independence and autonomy appears to focus itself on targeting the “self for functioning,” i.e., on cultivating individual ego strength. I will not, however, go into a thorough analysis on this matter because the discussion here is to serve as a contrast for my further presentation. The second section is to present a framework of “ethical care,” indicating the primary structure of healing activities in Taiwan emphasizing people’s suffering in their ethical predicaments and, therefore, finding ways to re-order the interpersonal constellations. An illustration of how ethical care can serve as a framework for psychotherapy is presented in the third section. Finally, the significance of ethical care/psychotherapy then can be described as attending to “self for being ethical” as the target for the healing operation. I intend to conclude that psychotherapy as ethical care provides a comprehensive framework to see therapeutic encounters not just as the business of one-person or two-person but as embedded in the project of being ethical for both the patient and the therapist. With this conclusion, collectivity

is brought forth into individualized psychotherapy and the latter is transformed from the business about inner psychic functioning to the living of interpersonal ordering.

THE ASSUMPTION OF INDIVIDUALITY AND THE SELF FOR FUNCTIONING

Most psychotherapies are derived from the focus on psychological changes within an individual. Whether Freudian “making the unconscious conscious” or Rogerian “becoming,” all place emphasis on individual completeness. This preference for the individual can not be separated from the thought of individualism. According to Webster’s New World Dictionary (1989, 3rd college ed.), individualism indicates the belief on an individual’s freedom and interest, that is, personal freedom and interest should not be sacrificed to governmental or social regulations. As the legitimacy of personal rights is installed with such a belief, the ego is at the same time held responsible for personal happiness. It is then an “ego problem” if one is depressed and unable to manage one’s own life. The improvement of “ego function” then is logically to be the direction of psychotherapy.

No individual, however, is an isolated ego; every individual lives within its own collective life. When we begin to let go as taken-for-granted the framework of individualism, we also see that in psychotherapy the collective aspect of human life has been devalued for a long time. Speaking further, the core of collective life is the ethical situatedness involving the interpersonal ordering and the agents acting in it. To characterize the “I” of an agent in an ethical predicament in terms of a “functioning ego” is to damage the phenomena of such kind of suffering from the very beginning. The “I” manifesting here is close to what Yee (2001) described, in his article discussing the conception of the Chinese self, as the “I for self-grounding,” an “I” in the project of growing itself within interpersonal ordering. That is to say, with the consideration of human collectivity, what is individual appears to be deeply embedded within what is collective.

This discussion between individuality and collectivity is not necessary to be taken as the opposition of “the West/ individualism vs. the East/ collectivism.” The value of individualism and collectivism may appear to be emphasized differently from one culture to another, but

collectivity and individuality should not be seen as two incompatible conceptions. The two should be understood as two significant facets of human life. This study begins with a suspension of the idea of cultural difference but does not deny it after clarification. It is undeniable that the Chinese societies are rich in the phenomena concerning the operations of collective life (Kim, Triandis, Kagitcibasi, Choi, and Yoon, 1994; Triandis, 1995; Triandis, Bontempo, Villiareal, Asial, and Lucca, 1988; Yang, 1993). To study the phenomena of suffering and healing in Chinese societies is, however, not only for understanding the lives of people living in them, but also for disclosing the psychological operations of human collectivity.

HEALING AS ETHICAL CARE

In contrast to the value and direction of psychotherapy concerning individuality, I will now present an understanding of healing as ethical care derived from an examination of the phenomena and literatures of suffering and healing in Taiwan. Ethical care can be described as the healing process that emphasizes people's suffering in their interpersonal predicaments and, therefore, finding ways to re-order the interpersonal constellations in which the suffering ones are situated. The issues or phenomena examined in this study include the strategy of life-cultivation employed by Chinese intellectuals in history (Yee, 2001), the newly widowed women's predicament within the family-in-law (Yee, Lee, and Hsu, 2003; Yu, 2003b), and folk healing operations in religious contexts (Lin, 1996; Pan and Chen, 1993; Yee and Liu, 2003). Figure 1 is an illustrative presentation of the operation structure of ethical care.




Figure1: The directives of ethical care

As shown in Figure 1, suffering always points to a thwarted communication between a person's pondering, the calculation of one's own appearing in front of others, and the interpersonal constellation this person is situated in (the $B \rightarrow \leftarrow A$ confrontation). As one fits in well within the surrounding interpersonal constellation, one does not suffer even with some difficult conditions: even though one is hurt in an accident, for example, he/she may not feel suffering if he/she is well supported and understood by people around him/her. However, when the interpersonal situation is thematized as what one has to deal with rather than what supports one's personal activities, one will come to experience a "pondering space" full with unspoken calculations. For example, with a dying husband, a young Taiwanese woman may be doubted by her parents-in-law because of the possibility of her leaving the family in order to remarry. On the other hand, this woman may start to wonder about her continuous relationship with the husband's family and her own possible future. In both cases a pondering space would grow in the woman's experience and a differentiation of "inside" (unspoken pondering) and "outside" (the interpersonal realm) would be established (Yee, Lee, and Hsu, 2003). The family connections are still there but they are not the same as before. Those family

ties have to be taken into consideration “inside” before any words to be spoken. When this dealing with the surrounding relationships begins, the more compelling the tie, such as the nurturing relationship, the stronger the self in individualization is experienced. On the contrary, in a less compelling relationship, such as that with a non-related companion who lacks significance to become a target to be dealt with, one may have a chance to channel one’s situated state of mind, i.e., to speak out one’s feelings and pondering, into an interpersonal connection (the $B \rightarrow D$ movement).

Facing the experience of being expelled from the interpersonal constellation in which one is situated, Chinese intellectuals in history have shown a pathway other than maintaining the $B \rightarrow \leftarrow A$ mode of thwarted communication (Yee, 2001). The Xin Xue (“the discipline of heart”) tradition taught Chinese intellectuals, as they tried to contribute themselves in public service but were misunderstood by the governor or the public, to turn away from the entangled conflicts and to practice life-cultivation exercises for themselves. In other words, for a person suffering from obstructed communications within an unsettled interpersonal constellation, confrontation is not the only way to dissolve the predicaments. Leaping upward from the level of thwarted communication, broadening oneself to build contacts with a higher spirit for self-grounding (the $B \rightarrow C$ movement), and then returning to the difficult circumstances for further life-cultivation (the $C \rightarrow A$ movement), constitute pathways of healing. I should point out here that the $B \rightarrow C$ movement seems to be a kind of avoidance to the problematic realities and it really may be so. Therefore, the $C \rightarrow A$ movement appears as significant in that, with this return to realities, the upward leap from the difficult circumstances can be differentiated from a withdrawal fantasy.

The $B \rightarrow C \rightarrow A$ movement of healing is not exclusive only for people with good education. In Taiwan, the folk religious healing activities appear to have a similar $B \rightarrow D(C) \rightarrow A$ detour for people to gain self-grounding and dissolve suffering (Lin, 1996; Pan and Chen, 1993; Yee and Liu, 2003; Yee and Peng, 2003; Yu, 2003a). What is different is that, in the Xin Xue tradition the upward leap is the exercise of life-cultivation, but in the folk religious healing the detour is by way of a concrete relationship (with gods or religious agents) to develop an experience of channeling the thwarted feelings into an outside realm. The

“helper” in this kind of folk helping system is usually a disciple, a psychic, or a soothsayer who is able to access “the mystery” and mediates a kind of channeling connection with the one asking for help. The connection built here is not an ordinary social interaction but one that can have the sufferer feel touched. In this new kind of interpersonal space, the person develops a sense of belonging which then turns to be a foundation for the person to reconsider his/her life predicaments.

In terms of this operation of ethical care, we see that the predicament of A-B obstruction can be bypassed with the upward direction of B-D(C), generating new modes of interpersonal connection that allow one’s situated state of mind to be channeled. This operation is different from the forceful effort to go from B to A directly. The $B \rightarrow A$ movement may be an immediate and intuitive response when one senses oneself disconnected from the surrounding interpersonal realm, but as long as the conditions of disconnection persistent, this struggle for going back directly would turn out to be a resentful demand.

Speaking further, in accordance with the different interpersonal constellations experienced within the horizontal move of $B \rightarrow A$ and the vertical moves such as $B \rightarrow D$, the modes of self-consideration are experienced differently too. This difference is indicated in Figure 1 concerning the two modes of “self-in-individualization” and “self-in-channeling.” The self-in-individualization asks for self-preservation and deals with interpersonal demands in terms of defensive or aggressive confrontation; while the self-in-channeling is pulled out to participate in a new relationship. Besides, the “helper” indicated in Figure 1 does not mean a particular identity or profession but a person who steps into the position D and then become a helping agent. This definition of helper makes clear that, psychotherapists or any other helping professionals can accomplish a B-D connection and facilitate the experience of channeling, but they may also fall into the repetition of the B-A thwarted communication. The latter appears to be incapable to generate the movement for healing.

AN ILLUSTRATION OF ETHICAL CARE WITHIN A PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC SITUATION

An example would be helpful to demonstrate how the movement of ethical care can inspire psychotherapeutic interaction. The key is the “who” the therapist wants to bring out in the therapeutic interaction: the self-in-individualization or the self-in-channeling. That is to say, according to the movements shown in Figure 1, a “self” is not an entity with fixed characteristics but a product dependent on the modes of relational interaction. Let us consider the following example:

This is my second appointment with JW who did not show up at the scheduled time last week. I have tried to make contact with him since then, and after several times of failure, I finally made an agreement with him about the time to meet this week. JW came to my office on time. He is a skinny young man not yet 20, with a baseball cap on. I wondered if he used the cap to cover his loss of hair because I know JW had gone through several courses of chemotherapy for leukemia. With his skinny cheeks and sharp chin, JW’s eyes appeared to be big and sharp. Moreover, the oversized clothes made him look like he had been ill for a long time. As I met JW outside of the therapy room, he told me that he only had a half hour for therapy today. In the beginning of our meeting, I said to him: “you did not show up last time.” JW responded immediately: “I attempted suicide.” This simple reply stopped my questioning to the matter of his absence last week, and made me concerned with the event of his suicide. JW did not say much about it but simply said that “I was rescued” with no further information. (Lee, W.L., Therapy Record No. JW20020905)

A young man with cancer is always a shock not just for the patient him/herself and the family, but also for anyone who contacts with the patient, because it is hard for people to relate a young life together with death. We tend to imagine the bitterness the person

experiences; we feel sympathetic with this person. In the example above, however, these images were not what the therapist first encountered. The therapist did not first encounter a person suffering from cancer but a “gesture” manifesting itself in the absence to a scheduled meeting, in the difficulty for being contacted, and in the statement of only having a half hour for the therapy. This gesture generated a special tone of mutual demanding in JW’s encounter with the therapist. To the therapist’s intention to discuss JW’s previous absence, the words “I committed suicide” gave an effect of, I would call, “astonishingness” and easily stopped the possible inquiry. That is to say, JW used the effect of astonishingness, an effect coming out from confronting death, to stop the inquiry that is experienced as intrusive to him. Confronting people with one’s own death, however, also revealed a kind of sadness. JW presented himself in this interpersonal encounter as “astonishing” and made the therapist silent, but his being astonishing is not from a personal pride but from the hopelessness of terminal illness.

Here an example of thwarted communication is presented. First, on the issue of meeting time, the therapist and JW fell into a game of mutual demanding. The therapist’s words “you did not show up last time” turned to be a confrontation and were then stopped by JW’s astonishing response “I attempted suicide.” On the other hand, “I attempted suicide” did indicate a situation of suffering. This revealing of suffering, however, might be overlooked if the therapist felt frustrated by JW’s response and if JW felt victorious over the therapist in their seeming power struggle. In other words, JW’s victory is at the cost of stopping other’s approaching, and no bitterness of his can thus be understood.

And second, if the therapist was concerned with the event of suicide and placed emphasis on JW’s bitterness, the therapist seemed to have himself on JW’s side. In such a situation, however, the two did not really leave the A-B mode of confrontation where the individualized self resided. The therapist just moved himself from the position being blamed to that of blaming. The therapist then appeared to identify him/herself with the sadness of the individualized self. Sadness experienced in this way, however, often triggers blame toward others, in this case maybe the family, rather than links to others.

This simple example demonstrates a difficulty within the interpersonal ordering, a

difficulty that has been named as an ethical predicament in this study. A weak and severely ill person does feel bitter, but the experience of an individualized self can also grow in this person and become wild and resentful. It is almost impossible for us not to take care of this individualized self: how can we not be concerned with a cancer patient with suicidal intention? In light of the framework of ethical care, however, the therapist being trapped into dealing with the individualized self is not only unable to reach the suffering one but further reinforces the experience of thwarted communication.

An ironical situation is also revealed in the above example: what is called “social support” may contribute to the experience of thwarted communication rather than a solution to it. That is to say, a thwarted communication does not indicate that a person is isolated with no company; it is precisely within a seemingly normal interpersonal relationship that a person experiences being thwarted in his/her expression. With this understanding in mind, we come to see that what matters is not just to increase “social support” for the suffering one but to find a particular mode of interpersonal ordering in which the experience of one’s own most state of mind being channeled becomes possible.

CONTACTING AND ENACTING THE “SELF FOR BEING ETHICAL”

The above discussion also clarifies that what is ethical in ethical care should not be considered in terms of normative ethics. Normative ethics concern what is right or wrong for the normative social ordering. In the framework of ethical care, however, it is precisely the normative “should” or “should-not” that serve as important elements for the thwarted communication. Ethical care then defines its task as contacting and enacting the agent who is frustrated and thwarted in the face of normative interpersonal ordering but longing for other ways to have him/herself settled in. This is an agent looks for what is ethical for him/herself. I would name this agent the “self for being ethical.” Psychotherapy as ethical care can thus be described as that, for those suffering from ethical predicaments, there is need for psychological help that, by contacting and enacting the self for being ethical, can dissolve the constraints from normative ethics and send the persons onto a path of interpersonal

re-ordering.

In order to further characterize psychotherapy as ethical care, a contrast between self for being ethical and self for functioning would be helpful to clarify its difference and significance from individualism-based psychotherapy. This contrast, however, should not be taken as either a denial of the latter or a conflict between two psychological entities. It is only for the purpose of conceptualization. Besides, in the discussion of this study, both self for being ethical and self for functioning are described as experienced within particular modes of interpersonal encounter; they are not stable psychological entities.

Professional ethics and therapeutic relationships, two important issues in psychotherapy, concern how the therapist makes contact with the client. This seems to indicate the similarity between the existing psychotherapies and my proposal of ethical care. With the differentiation between self for being ethical and self for functioning, however, we are able to see the two issues concerning exclusive with self for functioning rather than self for being ethical. The General Principles of *Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct* (The American Psychological Association, 2002) emphasize “beneficence and nonmaleficence,” “fidelity and responsibility,” “integrity,” “justice,” and “respect for people’s rights and dignity.” Within this structuring, the client is seen as or expected to be an individual who is independent and capable of exercising democratic values, an individual with good ego function. Next, therapeutic relationship is mostly taken as a tool for gaining alliance with the client or a stage for fostering the client’s ego function. The agents to be brought out in the therapeutic relationships of individualism-based psychotherapy and ethical care are totally different. Figure 2.1 and 2.2 are illustrations of the differences between psychotherapy for ego function and for ethical care.

Four features can be summarized explicitly for advancing the significance of psychotherapy as ethical care.

First, *inner topology vs. ethical topology*. The psychology that has individual as its focus would try to explain conflict or suffering from the viewpoint of mechanisms within the individual. Either the Freudian id, ego, and superego, or the trio of cognition, emotion, and behavior in cognitive-behavioral therapy, are mechanical components within an individual.

This kind of division into components can be called inner topology. On the contrary, self for being ethical concerns the interpersonal constellation in which the person is situated. An ethical topology, therefore, becomes the scope for ethical care. Ethical topology can not be reduced to inner topology, and it can neither be understood as the physical environment around the person. Ethical topology is the experienced world in which the person lives his/her live.




Figure 2.1: Psychotherapy aims at self for functioning




Figure 2.2: Psychotherapy aims at self for being ethical

Second, *individual completeness vs. ethical completeness as the direction for dissolving suffering*. When the inner topology is seen as the locus of psychological conflicts, the goal of psychotherapy is naturally directed at completing the deficient or integrating the incompatible, i.e., letting in the discarded ideas or emotions. This indicates an inner reconciliation. On the other hand, in ethical topology, the completion is not just about interpersonal reconciliation but, more importantly, about regaining paths and orders in the ethical space in which the person is situated. It is the re-ordering the disordered interpersonal realm that gives the person the ways to reach out and behave accordingly.

Third, *the sustaining of suffering: fixation of inner structure or repetition of*

interpersonal scenarios. The fixation of inner structure is an explanation for the sustaining of suffering when psychotherapy takes as its aim the self for functioning. The conception of inner fixation implies a kind of causality in linear temporality: the continuation of a mental state assumes an unchanged faculty as its ground. With a view focusing on the self for being ethical, however, thwarted communication and interpersonal conflict do not necessarily involve unchanged inner structure. A more straightforward understanding can be described as the happenings of similar scenarios. The various aspects of “I” always manifest within various coupling relationships rather than appear to be unchanged faculties. They are moments of experience. A child, for example, can behave in one manner with a therapist while changing to another as soon as his/her parents join him/her. It is not the fixation of inner structure but the repetition of a similar scenario as the actors gather together. What is repeated is not inner dynamics but the acts and the lines of an actor. Although the screenplay is old, however, every repetition is a new and different happening rather than an identical continuation.

And fourth, *fostering the self for functioning vs. contacting and enacting the self for being ethical*. As ego function is the focus of psychotherapy, the therapist’s task is to understand what damages or inhibits the functioning and to find ways to remove the cause or foster the functioning. While in psychotherapy aiming at self for being ethical, the therapist would try to, together with the client, establish a new mode of relatedness, a new scenario in which both of them can act and talk differently so that the thwarted pondering can be channeled and dissolved. Let us go back to Figure 1, we can see that the self in channeling and the self in individuation are two ways of experiencing after the discrepancy happens between the person and the surrounding interpersonal realm. Contacting and enacting the self for being ethical is the exercise to dissolve the self in individuation and bring out the self in channeling. The therapist should, first, understand the acts and lines in the scenario of thwarted communication in order not to be trapped in it, and second, develop a new way of relating, a new scenario in which different lines and acts can be practiced. This means that the speech/acts and their constituting force in therapeutic conversation become more significant than inner pathology for the practice of psychotherapy.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, I present a framework for psychotherapy that is derived from the healing activities in Taiwan, a society noticeably inclined to collective values for interpersonal life. By calling it ethical care, I argue that its significance should be distinguished from the models of psychotherapy developed within the view of caring individual ego function. Accordingly, I also argue that there are two different modes of selves on the patient side that should be differentiated in the practice of psychotherapy. While psychotherapy for ego function appears to foster the self for functioning, psychotherapy as ethical care aims at taking care of the self for being ethical, that is, a self that looks for a kind of interpersonal relatedness in which it's situated state of mind can be channeled. Contacting and enacting self for being ethical is then described as the main actions for a therapist identifying him/herself with ethical care. With the proposal of the framework of psychotherapy as ethical care, it is not my purpose, however, to claim a cultural difference or an incompatibility between individuality and collectivity. What I intend to show is how an indigenous study can grasp human originality through local manifestations.

In terms of ethical care, what the local modes of healing in Taiwan provide is not just some conditioned exotic phenomena, but the importance of being aware of the modes of coupling happening in psychotherapy. I also show that, with an example of an encounter with a young cancer patient, the modes of the therapist and the patient coupling together are constituted in the speech and acts coming out between the two. The tenets of ethical care then appear to be not just theoretical conceptualizations but also practically meaningful guidelines. Psychotherapy as ethical care provides a comprehensive framework for therapeutic encounters to be lived through not just as the business of one-person or two-person, but as embedded in the project of being ethical for both the patient and the therapist.

REFERENCES

- Kim, U., Triandis, H.C., Kagitcibasi, C., Choi, S.C., Yoon, G., ed., 1994. *Individualism and collectivism: Theory, method, and applications*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Lin, A.W., 1996. *Chinese religions and the therapeutics of meaning*. Taipei: Wen Hai Foundation for Culture and Education. (in Chinese)
- Pan, I.H. and Chen, Y.F., 1993. The five-elements and the practice of Chinese psychological healing. *Indigenous psychological research in Chinese societies (Taiwan)*, 2, pp.36-92. (in Chinese)
- The American Psychological Association., 2002. *Ethical principles of psychologists and code of conduct*. Washington, DC: The American Psychological Association.
- Triandis H.C., 1995. *Individualism and collectivism*. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- _____, Bontempo, P., Villiareal, M.J., Asial, M., and Lucca, N., 1988 . Individualism and collectivism: Cross-cultural perspectives on self-ingroup relationships. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 54, pp.323-338.
- Webster's New World Dictionaries., 1989. *Webster's new world dictionary*. 3rd college ed. New York: Webster's New World Dictionaries.
- Yang, K.S., 1993. Chinese social orientation: An integrative analysis. In: L.Y. Cheng, F. Cheung, and C.N. Chen, eds. *Psychotherapy for the Chinese*. Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, pp.19-56.
- Yee, D.H., 2001. Xin Xue: The development of a psychology of the Chinese Self. *Indigenous psychological research in Chinese societies (Taiwan)*, 15, pp. 271-303. (in Chinese)
- Yee, D.H. and Liu, M.Y., 2004. The inspiration of conventional wisdom for the ethical/spiritual well-being in Taiwanese folk belief system. *New century religion study (Taiwan)*, 2(4), pp.72-117. (in Chinese)
- Yee, D.H. and Peng, R.B., 2003. Social ethos of Chien-Won in Taiwanese shamanism. In: A.B. Yu, ed. *Sentiment, desire, and culture*. Taipei: Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, pp.109-150. (in Chinese)
- Yee, D.H., Lee, W.L. and Hsu, M.T., 2003. The collective process manifested in the recovery

- of widow's family. Final report for "*In Search of Excellence for Chinese indigenous Psychological Research, Project 5.3.1*" (89-H-FA-01-2-4-5). Taipei: Ministry of Education. (in Chinese)
- Yu, A.B., 2003a. The helping networking for grief healing in Taiwanese society. Final report for "*In Search of Excellence for Chinese indigenous Psychological Research, Project 5.3.3*" (89-H-FA-01-2-4-5). Taipei: Ministry of Education. (in Chinese)
- _____, 2003b. The interpretation of widow's affectionate world: a cultural psychological perspective. In: A.B. Yu, ed. *Sentiment, Desire, and Culture*. (151-223). Taipei: Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica. (in Chinese)

The Coverage of Madam President: The News Coverage of Megawati Soekarnoputri in the 2009 Presidential Election

Lily Yulianti

University of Melbourne

Email: l.yulianti@student.unimelb.edu.au

This research examines the coverage of Megawati Soekarnoputri as a candidate in 2009 Presidential Elections, focusing on news coverage during the campaign weeks held from June 2 until July 4, 2011. I argue that Megawati gendered herself during the campaigns and this situation made difficult for the mainstream media to be more gender-neutral in framing the only female candidate on their presidential election coverage. Megawati also received less coverage than other male candidates, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla, including her own vice-presidential candidate, Prabowo Subianto, despite her efforts to be more open and accessible to media.¹

Meitzner (2009) argues that Megawati had made a stunning comeback in 2009 elections as the popularity of Yudhoyono as the incumbent remained unstable since mid 2008 (p. 147). For instance, in a survey undertaken in May 2008 by Lembaga Survey Nasional (*National Survey Institute*), Megawati's popularity (16,7 per cent) was slightly higher than Yudhoyono (16,4 per cent)². Although the difference in this survey was less significant, it triggered speculations on Megawati's fresh strategy as an opposition leader to challenge the incumbent in the forthcoming election. While Yudhoyono had tried his best to be re-elected in 2009 election, "Megawati had nevertheless re-established herself on the political map, whose presidency between 2001 and 2004 had been widely viewed as a period of stagnation and uninspiring leadership." (Meitzner, 2009:147). However, some Indonesian political observers believed that the increase of Megawati's popularity towards 2009 elections was not because

¹ Megawati was criticized as an arrogant and aloof during 1999 and 2004 elections and these characters were widely believed by commentators as the reason why Megawati's media campaigns were not achieved the best results (Lesmana, 2009). However, in a special interview with morning Daily KOMPAS on June 29, 2009 edition, entitled "Menyusun Pertarungan dari Bawah" (Building the fighting from the bottom) Megawati explained that she was more open to press.

² Inilah.com newportal. 5 June 2008, "Popularitas Megawati Naik" (Megawati's popularity increases"). www.inilah.com/read/detail/31774/lsn-popularitas-megawati-naik/

her ability to boost her public image or her leadership quality, but merely because there were no inspiring leaders that could be chosen by voters, let alone the incumbent president with his unpopular policies such as to increase the fuel price.³

I attempt to answer two research questions : (1) How was Megawati Soekarnoputri covered in the 2009 presidential campaign, particularly in terms of strategy frames, issues frames and personal trait/life frames?; (2) Was Megawati as a female presidential candidate covered differently by KOMPAS and REPUBLIKA when compared to male presidential and vice presidential candidates?

I limit my research by looking at the coverage of 2009 presidential election published in national newspaper KOMPAS and REPUBLIKA accessed via South East Asian Collection at Monash University Library, Melbourne, from June 4, 2009 until July 4, 2009. The third national newspaper which I include in my research, JAWA POS will not discuss in this sample of chapter as its print editions (hard copies) are not available at the library.

The main argument that I mention elsewhere in this thesis explains that mainstream newsprint media in Indonesia framed and portrayed Megawati differently in three post-Suharto elections as in each election Megawati played a different role amid the continuous change of political landscape and environment. As a female political leader and as a daughter of Indonesia's founding father, Megawati could be easily framed by media using her gender and place her as "an ordinary homemaker who just happened to become a daughter of Sukarno and having some privileges to enter elite political circle using her father's popularity". I argue, however, that in 1999 election, Megawati enjoyed outgrowing popularity as the most potent symbol of defiance against Suharto's regime, and this factor lead the mainstream media to place Megawati as a symbol of the new hope for the new democratic Indonesia during the 1999 elections with a somewhat gender-neutral coverage, despite criticisms on her aloofness and silence policy.

Meanwhile in 2004 elections, where for the first time Indonesian citizens voted their presidential candidates in a direct presidential election, Megawati tried to get some benefits

³ Hendra Sugiantoro, Media Indonesia 9 Juli 2008. "Kenapa Popularitas Megawati Naik?" (Why Did Megawati Popularity Increase?)

from her position as the incumbent. I argue, despite her privileges as the incumbent who can easily use media to disseminate various achievements under her administration, mainstream media in Indonesia put her under scrutiny due to her stagnant and uninspiring leadership as a president (2001-2004)⁴ as she failed to build a strong government to push some crucial reform agendas⁵. In discussing her failure to govern, I argue that mainstream newsprint media gendered Megawati on their coverage, with some coverage “blaming” her ability as a female leader who never moves outside her comfort-zone as a daughter of the founding father, Soekarno.⁶ In this very first direct presidential election, Megawati defeated in a run-off election, by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a retired general who served as a minister in her cabinets but later resigned and founded a political party, The Democratic Party, as his vehicle to contest in 2004 elections.

As for the 2009 elections, I argue that Megawati was portrayed and framed as an opposition leader where a gendered-lens in covering her political activities was quite significant in some media⁷, although in other media she was framed in a quite gender-neutral approach.

This paper is divided into five sections. In first section I will discuss the context of 2009 presidential elections, its results, problems and shortcomings. The second section looks at Megawati’s position as a presidential candidate, her strategies and challenges to win the election and also briefly discuss the representation of Indonesian women in politics. In the third section I will briefly explain the media landscape during the 2009 elections and the booming of commercial ads, where according to observers and media commentators media, televisions in particular, had become the main source for the voters to gain information about candidates and political parties. The fourth section will present some case studies based on my

⁴ Megawati was elected as the vice president in the 1999 indirect president-vice president elections in the parliament, and later in July 2001 she was sworn as the fifth’s Indonesian president after Abdurrahman Wahid, the incumbent was dismissed by parliament.

⁵ For instances, she was criticized as she gave her support to an army general in Jakarta Gubernatorial Election, the general who has given a task of coordinating attack on Megawati’s party’s headquarter in 1996 under Suharto regime.

⁶ Angus McIntyre’s work, “The Indonesian Presidency” The Shift From Personal Toward Constitutional Rule (2005) provides insights on this father-daughter relations and their implications to Megawati leadership.

⁷ For instance, REPUBLIKA, a Muslim affiliated newspaper preferred to quote commentators who criticized Megawati rather than providing quotations or statements on her campaigns. But this hypothesis should be tested in my research.

early examination on KOMPAS and REPUBLIKA's coverage on Megawati during the campaign weeks and discuss three issues which I think relevant to Megawati's position as a female presidential candidate : Megawati, Islam and Female Leadership; Policy Issues and Gender Herself: Mother of Nation, Daughter of the founding father. Lastly, in the fifth section I discuss my findings and raise some suggestions.⁸

THE 2009 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN CONTEXT

The 2009 elections was the third election held after the collapse of Suharto's repressive regime in 1998. According to Qodari (2010, p. 122), the event marked a new stage in Indonesian electoral politics for several reasons. It was for the first time voters were able to elect the legislatures directly as the new Election Laws introduced an open party list system. In previous elections, the voters chose the party they preferred and it was a candidate's place on the party list that determined whether or not the candidate was elected. As Qodari clearly explains, "In 2009 elections, if a party gains enough votes in a particular electoral district to win a seat, it is the candidate from that party with the highest number of individual votes gets the seat." (Qodari, 2010: 122). As a consequence of the new regulations, Qodari argues that the change brought dramatic change in electioneering and campaign strategies, throwing the political spotlight onto individual candidates in campaigning at all levels. He states, "The mass media and image building by candidates have become all-important." (Qodari, 2010: 122).

Although the elections –both legislative and presidential elections- were regarded to be free and fair by international election standards, observers and media criticized Koalisi Pemilihan Umum (*Elections Commission, KPU*) for worse administrative and technical defects than any previous post-Suharto elections (Harun, 2009; Aspinall and Mietzner, 2010; Schmidt, 2010; Sukma, 2010,).

While much of the blame for the KPU's performance has been put on the incompetence

⁸ In this a sample of writing, I will limit my method by selecting several news which relevant to three issues I mentioned above. In my research I will conduct a complete content, framing and discourse analysis.

of its members, there were also institutional reasons for the decline in the quality of electoral management. Meitzner (2009) suggests that, “Problems also caused by a faulty appointment process for KPU members as overseen by the president; a significant reduction in the budget for the elections as implemented by then-Vice President Jusuf Kalla; limitation imposed on the organizational authority of the KPU as decreed by Parliament.” (Meitzner, 2009: 186).

The elections were held in two rounds. On April 9, 2009 legislative elections were held to elect member of national and regional parliaments. According to Sukma (2010: 56) the result confirmed a slow but steady change in Indonesia’s electoral politics, with some parties gaining significantly in support and others declining, but with overall pattern of a fragmented multi-party system remaining intact.

Table 1. Legislative Election Results, 2004 and 2009

Political Party	2004		2009	
	Vote(%)	Seats	Vote(%)	Seats
PD (Democratic Party)	7.5	55	20.85	148
Golkar	21.58		129	14.45
106				
PDIP (Indonesian Democratic Party	18.53	109	14.03	94
Of Struggle				
PKS (Prosperous Justice Party)	7.34	45	7.88	
57				
PAN (National Mandate Party)	6.40	53	6.01	
45				
PPP (United Development Party)	8.15	58	5.33	
38				
PKB (National Awakening Party)			10.57	52
4.94	28			
Gerindra (Great Indonesia Movement)	---	---	4.46	
26				
Hanura (People’s Conscience Party)			---	---
3.77	18			

Source: KPU, Jakarta in Sukma (2010, p 56) in Aspinall and Meitzner, (2010)

On July 8, 2009 the first round of direct presidential elections was held, the second such

elections since Suharto's fall in 1998. There were three president and vice president candidates bid for the highest office: Megawati-Prabowo; Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono – Boediono; Jusuf Kalla – Wiranto. A second-round presidential election, planned for September, proved unnecessary because of a landslide victory by the incumbent, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and his vice presidential candidate Boediono, in which they won 60.8 per cent of the vote, followed by Megawati and her vice presidential candidate, Prabowo gained 26.79 per cent of the vote, and Jusuf Kalla – Wiranto ended on the third place by securing only 12.41 per cent of the vote.⁹

As with the legislative election, the results of the presidential election were contested. Both Megawati and Kalla complained that the election had been marred by 'massive and systemic fraud', and challenged the result in the Constitutional Court. However, after a long dispute and media frenzy on the election results, the Constitutional Court rejected their lawsuits and the National Election Commission officially announced that Yudhoyono – Boediono were the winner of the presidential election.¹⁰

Table 2 Results of the 2009 Presidential Election

Candidates	Votes	%
Megawati-Prabowo	35,548,105	26.79
Yudhoyono-Boediono	73,874,562	60.80
Kalla-Wiranto	15,081,814	12.41
<i>Total</i>	121,504,481	100

Source: data obtained from KPU in Sukma (2010, p 56) in Aspinall and Meitzner, 2010)

Meitzner (2010, p. 188) argues that, "Yudhoyono's landslide victory profited from the absence of credible challengers from within the other parties. Former President and PDI-P Chairwoman, Megawati Sukarnoputri was widely viewed as beyond her prime, as were Golkar Chairman, Jusuf Kalla and former military commander Wiranto, who had founded Hanura. Meanwhile former Suharto son-in-law Prabowo Subianto, leader of the new party,

⁹ Source: KPU, www.kpu.go.id, summary of 2009 presidential election result.

¹⁰ All media in Indonesia reported about the other candidates' rejection of 2009 presidential election results, for instance www.vivanews.com, www.detik.com, www.kompas.com, etc.
http://us.nasional.vivanews.com/news/read/77742-mega_prabowo_kembalikan_sk_penetapan_hasil

Gerindra, was popular in some circles but too controversial to recruit voters from the political mainstream.” Although in his earlier study on Yudhyono’s effort to be re-elected, Meitzner (2009) previously argued that the comeback of Megawati in 2009 election could be “dangerous” to Yudhyono, as the incumbent experienced lows in the opinion polls in mid-2008, his popularity subsequently rising to unassailability by early 2009. According to Meitzner, “most responsible for this turnaround was a US 42 billion dollar welfare program introduced in mid-2008, which allowed Indonesia’s lower classes to endure the economic crisis.” (2010, p. 188)

THE CONTEXT FOR MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI IN 2009 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Megawati Soekarnputri decided to run for the highest office in 2009 presidential election after her party, the PDIP (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) declared her as the only president candidate during the party’s national convention in 2008¹¹. This decision made her the only president candidate seeking the highest position in the country in three elections consecutively.

Ten year earlier, in 1999 general election, although Megawati’s party garnered the largest vote, her moves to reach the presidential palace was blocked by the indirect presidential election system where according to Indonesian Constitution at that time, a president was elected by newly elected members of parliament. Megawati was “betrayed” by other political leaders during the parliament plenary session which happened to be male who formed a political coalition called the Central Axis consisting of four Islamic parties. The Central Axis nominated Abdurrahman Wahid of National Awakening Party for the presidency and in the voting during the plenary session on October 20, Wahid won the presidential election by 373 votes to Megawati’s 313, leaving Megawati and her supporters in a vulnerable situation. The following day, she competed again for the vice presidential position where she

¹¹ Gatra, 29 May 2009, “Megawati Capres Pemilu 2009”, http://www.gatra.com/2008-05-29/versi_cetak.php?id=115120 date accessed 4 April 2011.

defeated Hamzah Haz of PPP for this position by 396 votes to 284 (McIntyre, 2005: 217).

Wahid's administration has faced an endless turmoil since the very first day in power. In just less than two years after he was sworn as a president, a political movement brought him down from the office through an impeachment by parliament based on the allegation of corruption in National Logistic Bureau. Megawati was sworn as Indonesia's fifth president for 2002 – 2004, for as stipulated by Indonesian Constitution, the vice president is automatically will replace the president, when he or she is stepped-down (McIntyre 2005: 234-235).

THE MOTHER IN POLITICAL ARENA

In 1999 election, as the presidential and vice presidential election was elected by major vote in the assembly as stipulated by Indonesian constitution, this was the moment for Megawati to face a serious challenge to win the highest office and to survive in a male-dominated political landscape. Her political opponents used her gender and Islamic conservative doctrine that a female is not allowed to become a leader. White and Anshor states:

The first indication of the extent to which gender would be a significant site of contestation in the *reformasi* period came in 1999, when Megawati Sukarnoputri was the front running presidential candidate in the first post-Suharto election campaign... It was clear in 1999, and it is even clearer now, that not all those who opposed Megawati's presidency did so based on ideological or religious grounds.

(White and Anshor 2009: 138)

Criticism against her aloofness and silence in the middle of political battles had mounted as she kept maintaining her position as the winner of the legislative elections, she naively belief that she was entitled to the presidency. McIntyre asserts:

Megawati's pride was well suited to the late Suharto years in that it gave her the wherewithal to stand up to him and enjoined a style of politics that wads dignified

and self-contained; but it did not seem well suited to the open and competitive form of electoral politics that emerged in Indonesia in the latter half of 1998. In addition to limiting her ability to respond effectively to the likes of the aggressive and extroverted Saefuddin¹², it led people to regard her aloof and to find her long, smiling silence no longer eloquent but simply exasperating.

(McIntyre, 2005 : 202)

I argue that Megawati deliberately using her gender and stressing her maternal quality, and as the result, the media could not avoid the gendered-lens approach in covering her activities as a political leader. For instance, in her acceptance speech as a vice president, which was televised live in 1999, she heavily played her role as the mother of the nation, which to observers proved a desire of Megawati to approach national leadership in Indonesia differently, by replacing the security approach with care and respect. This approach commonly used by news media to call Megawati as “Ibu” (Mother) or “Keibuan” (having a quality of motherhood):

I ask my children throughout the fatherland to resume your activities with an honest heart, and because you can see your mother (ibu) standing at this podium there is no need for you to behave emotionally.¹³

She positioned herself as “mother” who suggested the children (her fanatic supporters) to stop the riots in several cities as they protested the result of presidential election on the day before. Megawati used this approach repeatedly in various circumstances, for example when speaking in front of people of Aceh troubled region, she called herself “Cut”, Acehnese terms for “female”. She says:

¹² AM Saefuddin, the minister for food and horticulture in the Habibie government and a candidate for the leadership of the Development and Unity Party openly attacked Megawati by saying, “Indonesian president must be Moslem and not woman.

¹³ Transcript of Megawati’s acceptance speech as a vice president on October 20, 1999, accessed at <http://www.mpr.go.id>

Especially to my brothers and sisters in Aceh, I say, “be patient”. Later when your *Cut* is running the country, she will not allow one drop of blood to be spilled of the people whose achievements were so great in the struggle for Indonesian independence. To you I give you my love..¹⁴

However, during her presidency (2001-2004), Megawati political communication had been criticized by observers and scholars as not friendly, silence, cold, aloof, not showing eagerness, willingness, capability to solve nation’s problems (Lesmana, 2009, p. 243, McIntyre, 2005, p. 241, Chakrabarty, 2001, p. 3440,). In contrast with Western female politicians who tried their bid to achieve the highest office by showing their qualities and capabilities in outspoken and aggressive ways¹⁵, Megawati played a role as a symbol of quite courage in the face of the immense pressure from the New Order regime (Chakrabarty, 2001, p.3440). As an Indonesian citizen and journalist growing up under repressive regime, I experienced how people were not free to express their opposition to the ruling government, scared of various sanctions and punishments, and silence was an effective weapon. As a political leader, Megawati played this strategy. In 1996, she become a major political leader when she was deposed as a leader of the (the government-sanctioned) PDI-P by the Suharto regime. Outgrowing her role as a symbol of her father, Sukarno, she appeared self-sacrificing and strong in the face of immense pressure from Suharto. McIntyre (2005) and Chakrabarty (2001) both agreed that Megawati maternal qualities, which she made no attempt to deny, enhanced her appeal, especially to the young and to the poor in rural areas in Java.

Despite the remarkable achievements in gender equality and more opportunities for women to enter national and local political competitions, there is very limited research focusing on gender, politics and media in contemporary Indonesian context, particularly research on how a female presidential candidate covered by mainstream media. Although Megawati Sukarnoputri candidacies in three post-Suharto elections had attracted researchers in politics and gender studies to scrutinize her political steps and various factors attributed to

¹⁴ Megawati’s victory speech after her party gained the largest number of votes in the 1999 legislative elections.

¹⁵ Hillary Rodham Clinton is one of example of a female presidential candidate in the US who was presented by news media as an outspoken and a high quality candidate.

her political career, most research neglected media role in covering Megawati. One of a few extensive studies which provided insight about Megawati published in a book entitled *The Indonesian Presidency, The Shift From Personal Toward Constitutional Rule* by Angus McIntyre launched in 2005. McIntyre's study on Megawati which is provided in 8 out of 16 chapters in the book could be seen to a certain degree, as one of the most comprehensive studies of the fifth Indonesia's president in the form of a political biography. Although McIntyre referred to plentiful of media interviews, analysis and comments, he limited his study by not providing a gender analysis on how Megawati was portrayed by mass media in her role as an icon of democracy and the opposition to Suharto repressive regime in 1997 – 1998, as the front runner in the first free and democratic election in 1999, as a Vice-President and later installed as a President in 2001 and as the only female presidential candidate in three post-Suharto elections.

In 2004, the first direct presidential election was held. Megawati as the incumbent chose Hasyim Muzadi, a respected Moslem leader as her vice presidential candidate. It was the second time for Megawati to try her bid for the highest office, but this time through a direct election system. News coverage on her lack of ability as a leader when she served as a president in 2002-2004 continued during 2004 election where more gendered political lenses used by media on their coverage on Megawati, where media tend to link her with feminine traits, appearance, family, her father charisma and other non-policy issues. Meanwhile the rising star candidate, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a retired general who had served as a minister in both Wahid and Megawati's administration enjoyed more positive coverage as he was framed as a new hope and a new leader for 2004, given a fact that he has an excellent public speaking skills and media persona. Yudhoyono and his vice presidential candidate, Jusuf Kalla won the presidential election, in a run-off election against Megawati-Hasyim.

Meanwhile, in discussing the 2009 elections, Aspinall and Mietzner (2010) highlighted women participation in politics, looking at the increase of female legislative members in national parliament which marked the highest number in Indonesian history (Aspinall and Mietzner, 2010: 14). Bessell (2010, p.219) explains that in legislative elections in April 2009 women gained more seats in the national parliament than in any election in Indonesia's history.

Women now make up 17.8 per cent of the parliament, falling just short global average of 18.8 per cent. The number shows an increase of 6.5 per cent over the 11.3 per cent achieved in 2004 and a rise of 4.8 per cent over the previous high of 13 per cent in 1987. Bessel clearly puts it as, “This is a notable success, if not the historic leap witnessed in some countries.” (2010: 220).

There have been some genuine efforts to increase women’s political participation in Indonesia since the beginning of the democratic transition in 1998. At the national level, these have included the introduction of a 30 per cent quota for female legislative candidates in 2004 and the adoption of ‘zipper’ system for candidacy lists in 2009. Under the zipper system, political parties has to include at least one woman among the three candidates they placed at the top of their lists, thus giving women candidates a real chance of being elected. These efforts have produced a slight improvement in women’s representation in the national legislature, the DPR or *People’s Representative Council* (Satriyo 2010, p. 243).

Women participation in politics also can be discussed in a context of presidential elections. In the presidential election in July 2009, there was Megawati Soekarnoputri, the only female candidate, the Chairwoman of PDI-P, who running for third time and made her the only candidate contested in three post-Suharto elections consecutively. However, I find that Megawati’s position is paradoxical when I try to relate her with women’s movements in Indonesia. For instance, while woman activists with a strong support from then then minister for Women’s Empowerment Khofifah Indar Parawansa tirelessly promote the quota, Megawati openly opposed the idea, called it as “bringing about the ‘pseudo-advancement of women (Bessel 2010, p. 228) Furthermore, Bessell describes that although not many political parties support the quotas, however, Megawati’s party was among parties which later adopted internal quotas, “With the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDIP) – somewhat ironically, Megawati’s party – requiring one woman representative for every five men sitting on local executive board (Bessel, 2010: 228).

Similar to Bessell, Chakrabarty (2001) suggests the paradoxical role played Megawati when one relates her with women’s empowerment movement in Indonesia. She argues that

although Megawati's ascent to president may have boosted the political role of women in Muslim-dominated Indonesia, at the same time, activists have expressed some disappointment that Megawati does not seem to consistently espouse women's issues (2001, p. 3440).

In 2009 election, Megawati decided to run for the third time amid a dramatic change of media landscape in Indonesia, where more media outlets were established, both print and electronic with a fierce competition to get more commercial ads to boost their profits. As election is always a good moment to get more ads from the candidates and political parties, it was inevitable that during 2009 elections, candidates tried to spend more money for ads and news coverage. At this time, Megawati had to compete not only against other male candidates but against her own vice presidential candidate, in order to get media attention. When Megawati was confirmed to run for the third time in 2009 presidential elections, most observers questioning her chance to win the election due to her aloofness and the decline of her popularity in various polls after Yudhoyono successfully re-boost his popularity in early 2009 (Lesmana, 2009; Meitzner, 2009; Sukma, 2010).

In her special interview with morning daily KOMPAS, Megawati promised to become more open and more accessible to the press¹⁶, but according to my personal observation not many media were interested to explore her candidacy, views and profiles. In contrast, media were more interested to put her vice-presidential candidate, a retired General Prabowo Subianto, on the spotlight. The former son-in-law of Suharto, who established Gerindra Party, attracted public and media attention as he spent huge amount of money for campaigns and media relations to mark his comeback in Indonesian political arena, more than a decade after the collapse of Suharto regime. I observe that Prabowo politic ads were carefully designed and a professional team was set up since 1997-1998 to prepare his comeback. With unlimited capital it was not difficult for Prabowo's team to boost his profile where according to Sukma (2010), personal popularity remains as the most significant factor to win the elections.

¹⁶ Kompas 29 June 2009 edition. "Membangun Kekuatan dari Bawah"

THE MEDIA LANDSCAPE IN 2009 ELECTIONS

The role of media in 2009 elections had become more significant than before as all political parties and candidates share a similar belief that voters will look at the personal popularity as for the first time the open list system in legislative elections was introduced. Scholars dubbed the election as “a beauty contest” and media open their doors to receive more ads from political parties and candidates.

Before the introduction of direct elections, the most important actors in election campaigns were the party machines, which had organisations that stretched down the grassroots. The chief method of communicating with voters was face to face. In direct elections, by contrast, victory is determined by the candidate’s performance, the issues he or she raises, and how the person looks in advertisements (Nimmo 1976 in Qodari, 2010, p. 123).

As a result, the role of the mass media and advertising in Indonesian elections has increased massively. In the 1999 elections, parties spent about \$10 million on advertising. After ten years the sum had gone up tenfold. During the 2009 legislative elections, total expenditure on advertising by parties was about \$117 million according to AGB Nielsen Media Research 2009. A survey conducted by national morning daily *KOMPAS* in June 2008 showed that 49.3 per cent of respondents would vote on the basis of a candidate’s personal charisma (Qodari, 2010, p.123-124). Toward the first direct election in 2004, Yudhoyono had realized how he should maintain his public appearance relying on the politics of image building and media management. Sukma (2010) argues that he is Indonesia’s first truly modern politician, well adapted to a contemporary political landscape dominated by the electronic media.

In evaluating the 2009 elections, Schmidt (2010, p.109-110) summarizes that despite the worse quality in election managements and logistics, there were several achievements that should be highlighted. By and large, the political parties and candidates participating in the 2009 elections were able to practice their right to speak freely, distribute literature and perform other campaign-related activities. With 38 political parties competing at the national

level and an additional six local parties competing in Aceh, Indonesian voters enjoyed a multitude of choices. Schmidt argues, political parties and their candidates presented the public with a range of agendas, platforms and objectives, even if these were widely criticised of their vagueness and lack of distinctiveness.

Indonesia's election laws require the media to provide equitable and unbiased coverage of the full range of certified political parties for the legislative elections and of the primary candidates for the presidential election. As Indonesians received the vast majority of their news and political reporting from non-government media – 90 per cent of citizens cited television as their main source of information (IFES and KPU 2008) – the non-state broadcasters and print organs were the most powerful medium in shaping political views. In 2009, two of leading private television networks, *Metro TV* owned by Surya Paloh and *TVOne* owned by Aburizal Bakrie - creating some concerns about their neutrality. The owners of these TV stations were high officials of Golkar Party, one of the major parties. However, the two men were known to be bitter rivals who had fought each other for the party leadership and they supported different presidential candidates. Despite the concerns, during the elections their channels presented a wide variety of views.

Schmidt (2010, p. 111) furthermore elaborates that Indonesia's highly dynamic media landscape gave voters ample opportunity to access non-biased information. "Around a dozen national television channels covered the elections, reporting on both the government and opposition parties. The incumbent naturally enjoyed an advantage in that the media continued to report on official state events and government members' activities throughout the campaign period".

However, Schmidt's argument could be challenged if one examines the characteristic of media development in Indonesia where there are news media which openly affiliated with certain political parties or camps. Based on my observation, a Jakarta-based national daily RAKYAT MERDEKA openly supports Megawati's party, PDI-P and strongly opposes the ruling government's stance while JURNAL NASIONAL which is founded by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and publicly known as "Mr. President's Newspaper".¹⁷ What might

¹⁷ Based on author personal observation.

Schmidt highlighted in the context of the 2009 elections that Indonesian media had freedom in broadcasting and publishing all election-related news and information, as Indonesian media has enjoyed more freedom since 1999, without any pressure from the ruling government as experienced under Suharto authoritarian regime.

Indonesian media had experienced euphoria in a free press system after the collapse of Suharto regime. Nevertheless, under a free media environment, several studies on the performance of the Indonesian media during the *Reformasi* era showed an increase in partisan tendencies in reporting important political events. For instance, Nugroho et. al (1999) studied three national dailies in Jakarta on some political events during President Habibie government (1998-1999). The study indicated strong partisanship at REPUBLIKA for the government and MERDEKA for the opposition. Meanwhile KOMPAS was assessed as having been impartial during their reportage of the political controversies.

According to Takatori (2006, p.5), these studies show that media partisanship is a matter of concern for those who are interested in the Indonesian media. He asserts that partisanship has been a tradition in Indonesian media. Throughout their history of the national Indonesian media since 1945 until the end of the New Order, the Indonesian media had been partisan either to political parties in Guided Democracy in 1960s or to the government in New Order period from 1966 to 1997. The only exception might be the period of “liberal democracy period” in 1950s when media enjoyed freedom to the extent that “led some western observers to be amazed at the lack of Government control” (Lee 1971, p.52). But even during that time, media were serving as tools for political forces and thus “reflecting the struggle for power among factions of the political elite.” (Lee 1971, p. 156). Press’s involvement in politics in this country might really date back to the beginning of twentieth century when newspapers were agitating national independence from colonial rule. As Sen and Hill correctly describe, “ the notion of a non-partisan Fourth Estate has never held complete sway in Indonesian” (2000, p.52).

In ideal terms, the mass media is expected to report political events in a way that contributes to national political debates by the public, facilitating the formation of “public opinion” (McNair 2000, p.21). But in reality, some Indonesian media reported those events

from their partisan standpoints, and failed to provide independent accounts of social and political realities – not just partisan views (Hidayat 1999, p. 182).

COVERING MEGAWATI IN 2009 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

A review of the scholarly literature related to news media coverage of female presidential hopefuls highlights several noteworthy observations. First, the body of knowledge on gender stereotypes indicates that people do, in fact, make gender-based personal trait, issue position, and ideology inferences when assessing female and male political candidates. Second, the political communication theories of framing and second-level agenda setting content that the news media impact citizens' understanding of political issues and events, such as campaigns and elections. Third, the stream of research focused specifically on news media coverage of female political candidates indicates that the news media, at least to some extent, do cover female candidates differently than male candidates (Gidengil and Everitt, , 2000; Devit, James, 2002; Cantrell, and Bachmann, 2008).

In this sample of chapter I limit my examination on KOMPAS and REPUBLIKA's coverage of Megawati during the 2009 presidential campaigns held from June 2 until July 4, 2009. Although for my project research I will apply a content analysis and then discuss the findings with discourse analysis framework, in this section I select and discuss articles that could demonstrate gender-lens using by media on their coverage of Megawati's campaigns. The sample articles are selected from the first page story and special section in each newspaper.

Campaign weeks for the 2009 presidential election began on June 2 until July 4, 2009 or three days before the Election Day which was held on July 8, 2009. Indonesian press provided extensive coverage on the event, creating an unprecedented collaboration with polling organisations, political consultant or commentators, providing updated analysis and news. While electronic and online media provide 24/7 news coverage, featured program and talk-shows, print media, on the other hand, creatively offered insights about all-election related issues. Morning daily KOMPAS launched its special section called *Mandat Rakyat*

(People's Mandate), a-3 page section dedicated to presidential election, while Muslim affiliated newspaper REPUBLIKA, launched its presidential election special coverage on a-2 page section called *Koran Pemilu* (The Elections Newspaper).

MEGAWATI, ISLAM AND FEMALE LEADERSHIP

Unlike in 1999 elections where female leadership was fiercely debated as Megawati's party won the legislative elections and she was one step ahead to reach the highest office position through indirect presidential election in the parliament, in 2004 and 2009 elections the issue did not appear as one of substantial issues in relation to Megawati's candidacy.¹⁸ There are several explanations on why this issue was not viewed as a relevant one. Megawati had served as the fifth's president after she was sworn to replace the dismissed then president, AbdurrahmanWahid and media openly covered the pragmatic political deals behind the dismissal. Hamzah Haz, one of the muslim political leaders who strongly opposed a female leader to become president based on a conservative Islamic interpretation of a verse in Holy Quran, was elected as Megawati's vice president.¹⁹

According to Blackburn et al (2008), Megawati's position was paradoxical because it demonstrated the possibility of women to become leaders, yet those who opposed those because she was a woman only reinforced dominant gendered religious ideologies about women's roles in society and religion. The issue of Megawati related not only to Islamic views of female leadership but more broadly to the strongly held gender ideology in Indonesian concerning "kodrat" or the natural destiny of women (as opposed to men). Kodrat is a case where some Islamic beliefs reinforce existing Indonesian cultural notion that men are natural leaders of the nation, family and religion. (2008, p. 10).

Islamic identity and other Islamic-related issues are substantial during elections, as Indonesia is known as the most populated Muslim country and traditionally voters' behaviour

¹⁸ See for example Hefner (1997) and Robinson (2008) for further discussion on gender, Islam and politics and how media conveyed the debates on Islam. Some hardliners and muslim parties use an Islamic conservative doctrine which stipulates that a woman is not allowed to become a leader and this issue became one of a stumbling block for Megawati in 1999.

¹⁹ Hamzah Haz quoted by the press saying, "Only Moslem male eligible to be a president.", Detik.com, MediaIndonesia, Kompas.com, SuaraMerdeka.com, Juli 199.

are influenced by religious and ethnicity of the candidates. However, during the campaign weeks, I only found one headline in morning daily REPUBLIKA which discussed Megawati's religious affiliation. In its June 5, 2009 edition, REPUBLIKA run a special coverage on Islam and politics to each candidate. It was a first-page story, with the incumbent, Yudhoyono quoted in its title: "SBY demands that religion should be placed above the politics". The paper provided most news-space for Yudhoyono whose explanations highlighted his stance as a moderate devoted Muslim, while Megawati was quoted only in one last paragraph, explaining about her Islamic identity. She dismissed the assumption that she is not a Muslim.

20

When Megawati served as a vice president (1999-2001) she went to Mecca for Hajj pilgrimage as an effort to increase her profile as a devoted Muslim (McIntyre 2005, p. 224). I argue that the decision to undertake the pilgrimage can be seen as an anti-climax on the debate about Megawati's religion and indeed she improved her standing among Muslim devout. Later in 2004 elections the debate on female leadership was not relevant as Megawati as the incumbent chose a respected Muslim leader, Hasyim Muzadi of Nahdlatul Ulama (one of the largest Muslim organisation in Indonesia) as her vice-presidential candidate in a hope to secure votes from the organisation's members and Muslim voters.

REPUBLIKA's decision to raise the issue of Islam and politics is understandable as one can clearly see its affiliation with its Muslim readers. However, as I argue that the issue was not strong enough to challenge Megawati's position in 2009 elections as it was in 1999 elections, the issue failed to grow as a main topic during the campaign weeks.

On the other hand, KOMPAS as a national secular newspaper with a historic affiliation with Catholic party in the 1960s²¹ did not specifically created a special topic to discuss about Megawati's position as a female presidential candidate and its relations to Islam. I did not find any single coverage during the campaign weeks where Megawati's candidacy and debate on gender and Islam were published. If there was any interesting finding, although this was an implicit one, was Megawati's picture in KOMPAS's special coverage on each candidate on

²⁰ REPUBLIKA, June 5, 2009. "SBY Meminta Agama Diletakkan di Atas Politik"

²¹ Although KOMPAS's management repeatedly explained that it is now an independent newspaper, but most people/readers in Indonesia still affiliate it with Catholic camp.

June 29, 2009.²² KOMPAS place a large size of Megawati's picture wearing a white *kerudung* or a loose headscarf to symbolize her Islamic appearance.

In discussing what so called as an Islamic appearance during the elections, it is noteworthy to further examine how women (in this case female candidate and wives of male candidates) were subjected to a certain standard of Islamic dressed to attract Muslim voters. Campaign team for presidential and vice presidential candidates, Jusuf Kalla and Wiranto, for example, openly claimed that the wives of the candidates who wore *jilbab* (Islamic headscarf) could attract Muslim voters²³.



Source: okezone.com, 5 Juni 2009. The wives of Jusuf Kalla and Wiranto wearing jilbab (headscarf) and triggering debate on Islamic dress and Muslim devote voters.

POLICY ISSUES

In this section I select news which related to policy issues to test arguments from previous research that female presidential candidate receive more coverage on her personal traits than policy issues. In the case where reporters or media ask questions on policies, there is a tendency to stereotyping the candidate by asking “feminine policy issues such as welfare

²² KOMPAS, June 29, 2009. “Megawati Soekarnoputri: Menyusun Pertarungan dari Bawah”

²³ Detik, June 2, 2009. “Mufidah Kalla dan Uga Wiranto Borong Jilbab di Tanah Abang”

and education policies (Gidengil and Everitt, 2000; Devit, James, 2002; Cantrell, and Bachmann, 2008).

Despite her experiences as a senior politician, opposition leader, vice president and president, during the 2009 presidential campaigns, however, Megawati did not show a high standard of skills and self-confidence in explaining substantial issues such as defence, security, military equipments, economics and international policies. In three public debates with other candidates televised nationally, Megawati proofed the audience that she had a great passion and better answers for welfare-related issues and consistently repeat her will to keep the unity of the Republic of Indonesia as her father's legacy.



Source: Kompas, June 3, 2009. Three candidates in the last debate on June 2, 2009. Megawati received less coverage during the debate compared to other candidates.

When KOMPAS decided in its June 8, 2009 edition to put the security issue as a headline and compiling comments from all candidates about security issues and how the candidates will improve the quality of military equipment and social welfare of families of military members the newspaper quoted Prabowo Subianto instead of asking for Megawati's opinions on the issues.²⁴ There is no further explanation of why KOMPAS failed to put Megawati's comments over this security issue. A week later, in reporting Megawati's

²⁴ KOMPAS, 8 June 2009, "Bagaimana Menyelamatkan Alutista Kita"

campaign, KOMPAS selected her speech on the military equipment. She was quoted in a sentence, “Megawati also promised to revitalise the old military equipment. She said that she was concerned with the condition of the families military officers, specially the children and the wives, for losing their father or husbands who died because (using) a very low quality military equipment.”²⁵

One can see the different between the first news, where the news created based on an issue journalist or editor decided who will be interviewed as their sources, while on the second news, the journalist covered an event and later decided which part of the event he or she will be written as news. In compiling comments from all candidates on the military equipment, journalist or editor decided to quote comments from Prabowo Subianto, Megawati’s vice presidential candidate, as well as comment from other presidential candidates, Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla. One might ask why Megawati was not interviewed on this issue? Was that because she was perceived as less capable in dealing with security issue?

Another example I take from REPUBLIKA in covering Megawati’s performance in presidential candidates’ public debate. As stipulated by the new elections laws, during the campaign weeks, Electoral Commission organized 3 public debates for presidential candidates and 2 public debates for vice presidential candidates. All debates were aired live by national TV stations. In its July 3, 2009 edition, REPUBLIKA published a headline first page on the last debate. Instead of reporting the debate, the newspaper preferred to put comments from scholars and political commentators. The comments quoted on this news strongly criticized Megawati’s performance as too normative in explaining her ideas about democracy, regional autonomy and the unity of Republic of Indonesia.

Meanwhile KOMPAS, in reporting the same event, the final presidential debate, provided a somewhat gender-neutral coverage, however, Megawati was quoted less than two other presidential candidates, Yudhyono and Jusuf Kalla during the debate. In relation to the debate, in summarize the debates on the last day of campaign weeks, KOMPAS quoted

²⁵ Kompas, June 14, 2009. “Mega-Prabowo Janji Hapus UN”

Prabowo Subianto, asking about his impressions after attending the debates.²⁶

GENDERING HERSELF, THE MOTHER OF NATION AND THE DAUGHTER OF FOUNDING FATHER

In this section I select news both from KOMPAS and REPUBLIKA which demonstrated Megawati's position as a female, a mother or a daughter of Indonesia's founding father, Soekarno. I argue that Megawati continued gender herself during the campaign weeks and this situation created a difficulty for the media to provide a gender-neutral coverage.

For instance, Kompas in its June 10, 2009 edition, quoted Megawati:

“I am the daughter of Soekarno. Of course I will implement the ideology that he created, known as Pancasila. Without Pancasila, Indonesia would not exist because Pancasila is our nation's philosophy.”²⁷

Before the campaign began, *Kompas* in its June 1, 2009 edition quoted Prabowo as saying, “Megawati is the mother of poor people”²⁸

In another campaign, Megawati again emphasized her position as the daughter of Soekarno.

“As the daughter of Soekarno, I would never betray things that my father fight for. He freed us from the colonization...”²⁹

McIntyre (2005) and Chakrabarty (2001) argue that Megawati never denies her maternal quality which attracts her fanatic supporters, mainly the lower class in Java, and I find that it is not difficult to find news both in KOMPAS and REPUBLIKA where Megawati demonstrated her appeal as a mother who care and love her people and nation.

²⁶ Kompas, July 5, 2009. Debat Berit Nilai Tambah Kampanye”.

²⁷ Kompas, June 10, 2009. “Megawati Jalankan Pancasila, Aparat dan Budaya Hukum Harus Dibangun Bersama”

²⁸ Kompas, June 1, 2009. “Manuver Capres, Untuk Mereka yang Setia”

²⁹ Kompas, June 21, 2009. “Pemilu Presiden: Forum Lintas Agama, Kaum Tani dan Perajin Dukung Mega-Prabowo

REPUBLIKA, for instance, quoted Megawati's comment, "... the person who initiated to build the bridge was me, *Ibu* (madam) president Megawati," claimed Megawati on a development of the longest bridge in Indonesian, in East Java province.³⁰

Another example demonstrated in KOMPAS coverage on the launching of Megawati and Prabowo campaign cars, where Megawati was quoted as saying to the drivers, "Do not forget to have your meals and take care your health."³¹ The statement demonstrated Megawati maternal quality where she showed that as a woman and a mother she did care on small and personal things of the others.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

After examining KOMPAS and REPUBLIKA news coverage during the campaign weeks, from June 2, 2009 until July 4, 2009, a general overview can be seen in a table below

Newspaper	Coverage on Megawati's campaigns	News space For Megawati's campaign	Sentence expression refer to Megawati's physical appearance	Sentence/ expression refer to Megawati's gender
KOMPAS	Everyday except June 5, 2009	Provides a somewhat equal space for each candidate	Found in two news	Found in many news
REPULIKA	Not everyday	Less space for Megawati	Found in three news	Found in many new

KOMPAS dispatched its reporters to follow all presidential and vice presidential candidates and the editors who in-charge to decide the news for tomorrow's edition prepared three permanent spaces on *Mandat Rakyat* special section for each Presidential-Vice Presidential Candidates. The permanent space could be easily found under a subtitle using

³⁰ REPUBLIKA, June 15, 2009. "Capres Saling Serang"

³¹ Kompas June 12, 2009. "Mega-Prabowo Luncurkan Mobil "Kotak Ajaib"

candidates' names, which are consistently printed in red and located on page 4 or 5, on its Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday edition.³²(see picture below)



Source: Kompas, 16 June 2009 page 4

MEGAWATI-PRABOWO

A Promise to Save the Traditional Market³³

The words of Megawati-Prabowo refer to the event covered by KOMPAS which was campaign of presidential candidate Megawati and/or vice presidential candidate, Prabowo Subianto.

I examined 45 articles dedicated to Megawati-Prabowo in KOMPAS during the campaign periods and there are several interesting findings. First, among the 45 articles, only two featured article which openly referred to Megawati's gender and physical appearance. One of the article goes as follows:

Megawati Soekarnoputri -the only female presidential candidate- was busy wiping her sweat with a facial tissue. During commercial breaks, a fan was in her hand.³⁴

³² Interview with Kompas' editor, Andi Suruji via email 18 March 2011.

³³ Kompas, 16 June 2009.

³⁴ KOMPAS, 20 June 2009, "Panggung Kampanye: Sisa Cerita dari Debat Capres"

Second, in most articles, Megawati statements' were always gendering herself and showing her femininity by using expressions such as "As a mother, I..", "As a daughter of Soekarno.." Further investigations are needed to reveal whether in those events, the journalists treated this kind of statements as the only news-worthy words came from Megawati's mouth or the journalists and the editor just simply operated different mind-set when covering a female politician. As Takatori (2006, p. 14) argues that journalist do not transparently report events, but select and reproduce them before presenting the stories to the public. This selection and reproduction process called media framing, involves evaluations of various kinds.

Entmant defines a frame or framing as "selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution" (2004, p.5). In other words, frames define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgement and suggest remedies. Similarly, Pan and Kosicki (1993) define news frames as "tools for newsmakers to use in composing or constructing news discourse as well as psychological stimuli for audiences to process" (p.59). Therefore, in discussing this findings and to answer whether Megawati was treated and framed differently, further interviews on editorial policies are needed.

In discussing Megawati's different approach as a female leader, it is interesting to see how Megawati gendering herself as she continued to define her relationship to the citizens of Indonesia in maternal terms (McIntyre 2005: 214). Since the very first time she step on political arena in 1993, she consistently placed herself as "the mother" for its nation. On a visit to East Timor in 1999, undertaken to persuade the local inhabitants to remain part of Indonesia, she declared, "I am always mindful; indeed, I never forget the land of East Timor which I love. Although you are distant, I hold your close in my heart, I am your mother."³⁵

To understand Megawati's approach as the daughter of Soekarno, one can see similar trend emerged in other Asian countries. Female political leaders have occasionally emerged in postcolonial Asia who are the daughter of "founding father" of their countries. As such, they have sought political power to protect or redeem what they see to be their father's reputations

³⁵ "Megawati kepada Warga Timtim; Pilih Sesuai Nurani," Kompas Cyber Media, August 10. 1999

and achievements or to avenge their ill treatment at the hand of others (McIntyre, 2005). As for Megawati, suppose she was not the daughter of Sukarno, she wouldn't be any one at all: only a housewife with simple thoughts”³⁶

Third, Megawati's real contender in stealing media attention was her very own vice president, Prabowo Subianto. As a retired general, a former son in law of Suharto and a wealthy businessman with international businesses in many countries, who founded a new party, GERINDRA, as his vehicle for the 2009 elections. With huge amount of money spent to build his image as a new inspiring leader, Prabowo's pictures and political ads dominated all forms of news media since 1998. He promotes Ekonomi Kerakyatan (Economic Development for People), he tried to impersonate Sukarno's physical appearance by wearing a-Sukarno-liked wardrobe and as the results, in many campaign events, journalists asked more questions to Prabowo, editors in the newsroom found that Prabowo's statements were far more intriguing and sometimes controversial (which was of course make the newsroom people were happy to quote him), leaving Megawati looked like an expiring politician with her general, formative and monotonous statements. One of important findings in previous research on gender, politics and mass media reveals that female candidates receive less coverage than male candidates, perfectly fits the situation faced by Megawati in dealing with her own vice presidential candidate.

Fourth, despite her experiences as a senior politician, opposition leader, vice president and president, during the 2009 presidential campaigns, Megawati did not show a high standard of skills and self-confidence in explaining substantial issues such as defence, security, military equipments, economics and international policies. In three public debates with other candidates televised nationally, commentators criticizing Megawati as too general and failed to provide strong arguments on issues such as governance, regional autonomy and economics. When KOMPAS interviewed all candidates about security issues and how the candidates will improve the quality of military equipments and social welfare of families of military members on its 8 June 2009 edition, the newspaper quoted Prabowo Subianto instead of asking for

³⁶ Quoted in Goenawan Mohamad, “Mega, Mega,” *Suara Independen*, June 1996, 2

Megawati's opinions on the issues.³⁷

Criticisms on Megawati's performance in three presidential candidate debates were not in line with her own promise to boost her profile, image and leadership quality. In a special interview with KOMPAS 29 June 2009, Megawati was described as:

Megawati has tried to improve her capabilities, particularly in her communication style. If she used to known as a person with a very few words and aloof, now Megawati doing more public activities to meet the poor people.. She is now much easier to be interviewed [by the press] and is more relax in answering any question.³⁸



Source: Kompas, 16 June 2009, in a short interview, Megawati explaining her third bid for the highest office as “to fight for my unfinished duty”

Megawati in REPUBLIKA: There is No Enough Space, Madam!

Although REPUBLIKA launched a special section in its daily editions in covering the 2009 presidential elections, unlike KOMPAS which provided separate news-space for each presidential-vice presidential candidates, REPUBLIKA provided single news which summarise all candidates activities in the previous day. By combining all campaign events in

³⁷ KOMPAS, 8 June 2009, “Bagaimana Menyelematkan Alutista Kita”

³⁸ KOMPAS 29 June 2009, page 33, Megawati Soekarnoputri: Menyusun Pertarungan dari Bawah

one news section and under one title, one might easily track down the editors' preferential on particular candidates. I selected 43 news articles from the special edition of the 2009 elections coverage during the campaign period which started from June 2 until July 4, 2009.

On its June 4, 2009 editions, REPUBLIKA published a 2 paragraph news about political attacks toward Megawati, quoting a former PDI-P elite member who founded a new political party as he believed that Megawati had betrayed her own promises in fighting for democracy.³⁹ This article appeared on a small size daily column called "Elections in Briefs".

Interesting finding related to the coverage of Megawati in REPUBLIKA is that she received less coverage than to male presidential candidates. For example, in its June 7, 2009 edition, REPUBLIKA wrote a headline news entitled: "Jusuf Kalla: Do Not Victimize Our People". The news itself was a combined coverage from various campaign events across Indonesia, however, the editor selected Jusuf Kalla as the headline, while putting one last paragraph on Megawati's campaign and the signatory of Political Contract between Megawati-Prabowo with labours' representatives.⁴⁰

REPUBLIKA also did not publish Megawati's activities everyday although on the same day her vice presidential candidate, Prabowo Subianto's activities was covered. REPUBLIKA did not provide any news on Megawati's activities on 6, 9 and 10, 16 and 23 of June 2009.

After examining KOMPAS and REPUBLIKA coverage on Megawati's campaigns I contend both newspaper framed Megawati differently compared to male candidates. Megawati received less coverage in REPUBLIKA with in several days during the campaign weeks the newspaper failed to published Megawati's campaign activities. Journalists and editors preferred to put gendered statements from Megawati, although I must admit that both KOMPAS and REPUBLIKA did not frequently mentioned about Megawati's physical appearance which showed a god sign in providing a more gender neutral coverage. Similar to my findings, in other study conducted by Takatori (2006), he found that KOMPAS and REPUBLIKA engaged in the frame contests during Abdurrahman Wahid presidency over various issues. In other words one can conclude that there was a difference in media ideology,

³⁹ REPUBLIKA, June 4, 2009, "Koalisi Demokrat Serang Megawati."

⁴⁰ During the presidential campaigns, Megawati-Prabowo initiated what they called as Political Contract with their voters, stipulating all of their promises, and signed by the candidates and voters' representatives.

agenda setting and editorial policies which contributed in the news framing. According to Takatori (2006), the act of framing news itself is something that the mass media cannot avoid. What matters is whether the media maintain fairness in constructing frames. One need to examine what political, economic factors influenced the frames of the two newspapers. In a similar vein, McCombs reminds that in choosing and displaying news, editors, newsroom staff, and broadcasts play an important in shaping political reality. Readers learn not only about a given issue, but also how much importance to attach to that issues from the amount of information in a news story and its position. (McCombs, 2004, p. 4).

In conclusion, I suggest a further examination is needed to provide a profound explanation on Megawati's coverage in three elections. This kind of study will certainly contribute to promote fair and balanced media coverage in the context of gender. Literatures on how media cover female politicians, in this context a female presidential candidate, are still very limited in Indonesia. It is useful to refer to McIntyre's argument that most female leaders in Asian entering political arena under a circumstance and in some cases they had enjoyed privileges from their fathers as the founding fathers in their country. While female leaders in Western countries need to fight for a position in a political party, facing fierce competition to secure a ticket to join their party's presidential candidature recruitment and working around the clock to get media attention, female leaders in Asia crafting their political career differently. Studies on Megawati's political careers and how media portraying her as a major political leader are definitely important to fill in the gap in the literature on the coverage of female presidential candidates, in Asian context, particularly in Indonesia. (*)

REFERENCES

- Aspinall, E., 2005. *Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance and Regime Change in Indonesia*. Stanford California: Stanford University Press.
- Aspinall, E. and Mietzner, M., eds, 2010. *Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia: elections, institutions and society*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Atkenson, L.R. and Krebs, T.B., 2008. Press Coverage of Mayoral Candidates: The Role of Gender in News Reporting and Campaign Issue Speech. *Political Research Quarterly*, 61(2), pp.239-252.
- Barton, G., 2002. Abdurrahman Wahid: Muslim democrat, Indonesian president: a view from the inside. Sydney: UNSW Press.
- Bassel, S., 2010. Increasing the Proportion of Women in the National Parliament: Opportunities, Barriers and Challenges. In: E. Aspinall and M. Mietzner, eds. *Problems of Democratization in Indonesia*. Canberra: The Australian National University, pp. 219-242.
- Benhabib, S., 1994. Models of public space: Hannah Arendt, the liberal tradition and Jurgen Habermas. In: C. Calhoun, ed. *Habermas and the Public Sphere*. Boston, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
- Best, D. and Williams, J., 1990. *Measuring Sex Stereotypes: a thirty-nation study*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Byerly, C.M. and Ross, K., 2004. *Women and media: International Perspectives*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Byerly, C.M. and Ross, K., 2006. *Women and media: a critical introduction*. Carolyn and Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Cantrell, T.H. and Bachmann, I., 2008. Who Is the Lady in the Window?. *Journalism Studies*, 9(3), pp.429-446.
- Carter, C. and Steiner, L., eds, 2004. *Critical readings: media and gender*. Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2004.
- Devit, J., 2002. Framing Gender on the Campaign Trail: female gubernatorial candidates and

- the press. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, 79(2), pp.445-463.
- Dickerson, D.L., 2003. Framing "Political Correctness": The New York Times' tale of two professors. In: S.D. Reese, O.H. Gandy Jr and A.E. Grant, eds. *Framing Public Life*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, pp.163-174.
- Gallagher, M., 2004. *Gender setting: new media agendas for monitoring and advocacy*. New York: Zed Books.
- Gamson, W.A., 1989. News as framing: Comments on Graber. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 33(2), pp.157-161.
- Gidengil, E. and Everitt, J., 2000. Filtering the Female: television news coverage of the 1993 Canadian leaders' debates. *Women and Politics*, 21(4), pp.105-31.
- Heffner, R.W., 1997. Print Islam: Mass Media and Ideological Rivalries Among Indonesian Muslims. *Indonesian Journal*, 64, pp.77-103.
- Heldman, C., Carroll, S.J. and Olson, S., 2005. She Brought Only a Skirt: print media coverage of Elizabeth Dole's bid for the republican presidential nomination. *Political Communication*, 22(3), pp.315-335.
- Hidayat, D.N., 1999. Mass Media: Between the Palace and The Market. In: R.W. Baker, ed. *Indonesia, the Challenge of Change*. Singapore: ISEAS Publications.
- Huddy, L. and Terkildsen, N., 1993a. Gender Stereotypes and the Perception of Male and Female Candidates. *American Journal of Political Science*, 47(1), pp.119-147.
- Huddy, L. and Terkildsen, N., 1993b. The Consequences of Gender Stereotypes for Women Candidates at Different Levels and Types of Office. *Political Research Quarterly*, 46(3), pp.503-525.
- Huyssen, A., 1986. *Mass culture as woman, After the Great Divide*. London: Macmillan.
- Inilah.com, 2009. LSN: *Popularitas Megawati Naik*. [online] Available at: <<http://www.inilah.com/read/detail/31744/lsn-popularitas-megawati-naik/>> [Accessed 3 April 2011].
- Lee, O.H., 1971. *Indonesian Government and Press During Guided Democracy*. Switzerland: Inter Documentation Company.
- Kahn, K.F., 1994a. Does Gender Make a Difference? An Experimental examination of sex

- stereotypes and press patterns in statewide campaigns. *American Journal of Political Science*, 38(1), pp.162-191.
- Kahn, K.F., 1994b. The Distorted Mirror: press coverage of women candidates for statewide office. *Journal of Politics*, 54(1), pp.154-173.
- Kahn, K.F. and Goldenberg, E.N., 1991. Women Candidates in the News: an examination of gender differences in U.S Senate campaign coverage. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 55(2), pp.180-199.
- Kitzinger, J., 2004. Media Coverage of Sexual Violence Against Women and Children. In K. Ross and C.M. Byerly, eds. *Women and Media: international perspectives*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- KPU Official Website. [online] Available on: <www.kpu.or.id> [Accessed 2 March 2011].
- Lan, M., 2002. *Pers, negara, & perempuan: refleksi atas praktik jurnalisme gender pada masa Orde Baru*. Yogyakarta: Kalika.
- Lind, R.R., 2004. *Race, Gender,Media: considering diversity across audiences, content and producers*. Boston: Pearson/Allyn and Bacon.
- Mietzner, M., 2009. Indonesia in 2008: Yudhoyono's Struggle for Reelection. *Asian Survey*, 49(1), pp.146-155.
- Mietzner, M., 2010. Indonesia in 2009: Electoral Contestation and Economic Resilience. *Asian Survey*, 50(1), pp. 185-194.
- MPR Official website. [online] Available on: <www.mpr.or.id> [Accessed 3 March 2011].
- Norris, P, ed, 1997. *Women, Media and Politics*. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Richardson, D. and Robinson, V., ed, 2008. *Introducing gender and women's studies*. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Lesmana, T., 2008. *Dari Soekarno Sampai SBY: Intrik dan Lobi Politik Para Penguasa*. Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama.
- McIntyre, A., 2005. *The Indonesian Presidency: The Shift from Personal Toward Constitutional Rule*. Lanha, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- McNair, B., 2003. *An Introduction to Political Communication*. New York: Routledge.
- McCombs, M., 2004. *Setting the agenda: the mass media and public opinion*. Oxford: Polity.

- Major, L.H. and Coleman, R., 2008. The Intersection of Race and Gender in Election Coverage: What Happens When the Candidates Don't Fit the Stereotypes?. *Howard Journal of Communication*, 19(4), pp.315-333.
- Niven, D. and Zilber, J., 2001. Do Women and Men in Congress Cultivate Different Images? Evidence from congressional web sites. *Political Communication*, 18(4), pp.395-405.
- Nugroho, B.E. and Surdiasis, F., 1999. Politik Media Mengemas Berita (Media Politics Packing the News). Jakarta: Institut Studi Arus Informasi.
- Okezone.com, 2009. *Pemilu Kacau Balau, Pemilu Banyak Kekurangan*. 13 August 2009 edition. [online] Available at: <<http://www.okezone.com/>>.
- Pan, Z and Kosicki, G.M., 2001. Framing as A Strategic Action in Public Deliberation. In: S.D. Rens, D.H. Gandy and A.E. Grant, eds. *Framing Public Life*. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
- Pan, Z. and Kosicki, G.M., 1993. Framing Analysis: An Approach to News Discourse. *Political Communication*, 10, pp.55-75.
- Qodari, M., 2010. The Professionalisation of Politics: The Growing Role of Polling Organisations and Political Consultants. In: E. Aspinall and M. Mietzner, eds. *Problems of Democratization in Indonesia*. Canberra: The Australian National University, pp.122-140.
- Robinson, K., 2004. Islam, Gender and Politics in Indonesia. In: V.M. Hooker and A. Saikal, eds. *Islamic Perspectives on the New Millennium*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp.183-196.
- Satriyo, H.A., 2010. Pushing the boundaries: Women in Direct Local Elections and Local Government. In: E. Aspinall and M. Mietzner, eds. *Problems of Democratization in Indonesia*. Canberra: The Australian National University, pp.243-263.
- Schmidt, A., 2010. Indonesia's 2009 Elections: Performance Challenges and Negative Precedents. In: E. Aspinall and M. Mietzner, eds. *Problems of Democratization in Indonesia*. Canberra: The Australian National University, pp.100-121.
- Sen, K. and Hill, D.T., 2000. *Media, Culture and Politics in Indonesia*. Melbourne: Oxford University Press.

- Sukma, R., 2010. Indonesia's 2009 elections: Defective System, Resilient Democracy. In: E. Aspinall and M. Mietzner, eds. *Problems of Democratization in Indonesia*. Canberra. The Australian National University, pp.53-74.
- Siahaan, H.M., 2001. *Pers Yang Gamang*. Jakarta: Lembaga Studi Perubahan Sosial.
- Takatori, S., 2006. *Mass Media in the Post New Order Era Indonesia*. Unpublished thesis, Asian Studies, the University of Melbourne.
- Van Zoonen, L., 1994. *Feminist Media Studies*. London: Sage.
- White and Anshor., 2008. Islam and Gender in Contemporary Indonesia: Public Discourse on Duties, Rights and Morality. In: G. Fealey and S. White, eds. *Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp.137-158.

Body and Social Memory in Hong Kong School Trips for National Identity

Chan Wing-Hoi

Hong Kong Institute of Education

Email: winghoi@ied.edu.hk/ 7ivvv5@gmail.com

This paper investigates history field trips conducted locally in Hong Kong for schools, to understand how the trips allowed students' dispositions to interact with the sites and other trip elements to foster particular kinds of national identity or otherwise. Conceptually the project is to compare the applicability of the Foucaultian approach to museum as discipline and Paul Connerton's perspective on body and performance as major elements of social memory.

Connerton (1989) develops Halbwachs' idea of socially constituted memory bringing in notions made familiar by Bourdieu and others (1990, 1991). He singles out for specific comment the way in which recollection was at work in two areas of social activity, i.e. commemorative ceremonies and bodily practices. Connerton is far from belittling "repeating behavior without reflection" as the opposite of rule-governed behavior, which latter is related to reflection. Even with language or analogical practices, knowledge of the rule or the code gives only imperfect mastery for application and execution. What is also needed is habitual skills built from accumulative practice. An interesting strand of Connerton's exploration is the performative aspects of commemoration, especially when such acts remember not only the events or persons being commemorated but also who are commemorating persons are, or indeed make the participants become performatively. Sharing an emphasis on embodiment is the Foucaultian approach to museum exemplified by Tony Bennet (1995). The title of his book *The Birth of the Museum*, reminiscent of Foucault's *Birth of the Museum*, is obviously hinting at the similarity between museums and prisons, especially their shared status as modern technologies of power or discipline. The surveillance practices in museums, justified by the need to safeguard objects, and the design for sequential view of displays etc. provided mechanisms of discipline that is reinforcing and reinforced by graphical and textual contents

to form new subjects. Although Bennett sees in later developments a return to museum as chambers of wonders (cf. Hooper-Greenhill 1999), the transformative potential of museum is a more relevant strand that has to be explored here in the context of attempts to turn young colonial subjects into patriots in transitional and post-1997 Hong Kong (Chow et al 2002, Mathews et al. 2008, Vickers 2002). Bringing Connerton to bear on museum discipline as depicted by Bennett, one should ask how the transformative forces of museums, disciplinary or otherwise, might be undermined by pre-existing embodied memories.

The research methods used in this study, owing to access restrictions and resource limits, are observations, collection of worksheets selected and released by organizer and schools (as exemplary), supplemented by independent sources, and textual analysis of the materials. The limitation of the selection are not as serious as it might seem as there are numerous gaps between the “exemplary” works and the organizer’s stated objectives, and field observations confirm many of the characteristics of student experiences revealed in the documents.

The trips took place in 2009 and 2010. Parts of completed worksheets of 30 students from 19 schools were published as outstanding specimens on the organizer’s website. Data collection included observation of trips organized by the previously identified major organizer, collection of materials distributed to students, and transcription of released worksheets completed by a few dozen students. Brief discussions with tourist guides, teachers and other personnel who led or facilitate the trips were done at various times though interviews could not be arranged during the most suitable months. Other materials collected and annotated include photographic and other record of the trips published online, some by schools themselves. A few student accounts of comparable trip to a mainland destination using mainland tourist guides provide useful contrast.

Despite the stated purpose of national identity education, the trips tended to reinforce students’ pre-existing attitudes such as high priority for bodily comfort, bodily efficacy, and academic successes, while giving very little attention to political participation, civil society or patriotic resistance to British colonization even when relevant opportunities are provided by the museum and other sites visited.

The Foucaultian approaches does not seem to fit the case in any straightforward manner

as in many trips there is considerable freedom (e.g. of movement) yet the autonomy seems severely constrained by students' dispositions. The most striking feature is the extent to which bodily experiences and performances became major sources of meaning, although performances of political nature were minimized (the most ceremonial being taking a picture together in front of a monument for martyrs). The bodily experiences feature has been somewhat similarly reported by some other researcher on field trips, so the prominent use of tourist guides in the trips did not seem to have made a big difference. But the students' interpretation of the experience in terms of identity, an issue transcending the difference between Connerton and those like Sahlins he critiqued, cannot be sidestepped. There is also an evident gap between the tasks of observations and students' background "Chinese" knowledge (esp. in the area of religion and ritual, but also in arts and crafts). As a result, the interpretation often led away from commemoration or promotion of Chinese identity, while more consistently reinforced existing priorities (of academic success, comfort and "appreciation" of status-quo instead of active political participation).

THE TRIPS

Trips were offered for three "routes," in the Central-Western district of Hong Kong Island, the Pingshan district of the New Territories, and another involving Saikung and Taiipo.

The Taiipo-Saikung route begins with the Martyrs Monument Garden in Saikung. The garden, in honour of locals who participated in fighting against the Japanese in various ways, is apparently a collaboration between the colonial district office and locals with mainland connections before 1997. Quite prominent is the tribute to overseas Chinese. Also notable is a monument or replica of token of thanks from a former British military officer for assistance provided him during World War Two and therefore has elements that transcend national identities. The routine continues to Taiipo locations beginning with an old ancestral that was probably meant to represent the pre-British period. The "King Law School"/Ancestral Hall. This was followed by a visit to the Former District Office of New Territories North, which stands for the beginning of colonial rule in the New Territories. A stop at the nearby Centre of

the organizer is probably a regular feature. Concluding the route is a tour of the Taipo Seafront Park's Tower of Commemoration of Reunion with the Mainland [English official name being Spiral Lookout Tower], which links the 1997 handover the villager's initial resistance to British colonial rule. It seems that narration by tour guides were essential to interpret the significance of the District Office and its connection with resistance. The Tower too, has design features that cannot be readily "decoded."

The Central-Western route involves the Sun Yat-sen Museum ("memorial hall" in Chinese), a heritage route on Sun and his close associates in the nationalist revolution. The museum is complicated by its origin as a stately home of a Eurasian comprador and more recent use by the Mormons, with the latter leaving one prominent interior feature that confused students despite the likelihood that tour guides provided relevant explanations. The museum showed photographs of Sun from different periods at the entrance level, and at upper levels an exhibition on the comprador home in its former glory, an exhibition Sun's revolutionary career and another on aspects of Hong Kong that made it important to the revolutionaries. This latter part, emphasizing aspects of Hong Kong's institutions that inspired the revolutionaries or allowed the development of their ideas and the planning of their actions, could help position colonial Hong Kong favorably in a nationalist narrative. Judging from one observed trip and relevant records, this is however, not given much attention by the tours. Sun's revolution, being against a Chinese regime in terms of the current official position, and involving efforts to overthrow the government of the time, could also raise interesting questions about national identity and political participation. But those questions were not explored by the participants as far as can be determined. The rest of the route include the nearby Sun Yatsen Trail, where little is left of traces of the past and meaning is mostly provided by rather new signs for locations where his group were active. One exception might be Baizi Li (Hundred Sons Lane?), a narrow entrance between building that leads to another street, where the current features seem consistent with its use as an escape route by the revolutionaries. Another part of the route, covering parts of Central and Wanchai, mostly sites in Central connected with resistance to the Japanese and transfer of sovereignty to Beijing in 1997. It seems that the coverage of Central pays attention to monuments in honour of Chinese

and foreigners who died in the two world wars, built in the name of the Britain and colonial governments. There seems to be some variation in the sequence of the different parts of the trip, with the Golden Bauhinia Square sometimes covered first and sometimes last.

The remaining route covers the Ping Shan Heritage Trail that has been the subject of a few studies by Sidney Cheung (1999, cf. Ren 1998), starting with a recently opened Tang Clan Heritage Centre converted from the former police station built by the British early in the colonial period for surveillance of what was perceived as a disobedient area. The Centre also features elements that raise serious questions about identity, especially a display on the (British) naturalization of a Qing military degree holder. In fact, even the history of the Centre building (related to tension between the colonial power and local people) is not given much attention. Perhaps on the rest of the Ping Shan heritage trail occasional references were made about the conflict between the British and the locals (notably in relation to canon stands and a building with only its front room surviving.) But on the whole the emphasis seems to be Ping Shan as a remnant of traditional China.

Of the three routes, the Saikung-Taipo route appears to be more heavily invested with patriotism but that is complicated by the monument garden's inclusion of overseas and British connection and the Taipo District Office and Reunion commemoration tower's need for interpretative intervention. The Western-Central route has elements that allow for challenges to the political centre and affirmation of the colonial legacy of Hong Kong (cf. Chow et al 2002). The Ping Shan part seems largely similar to pre-colonial approaches to Hong Kong that place the New Territories in a vague Chinese past. These issues mean that the trips could not be seen straightforward tools for imparting a national identity.

The worksheet answers give occasional glimpses of the roles of guides, who worked for a tourist agency with considerably involvement in trips for schools generally. One fifth grader has much praise for the tour guide, a young woman who provides "in-depth explanation" that made the trip light-hearted, pleasurable and informative especially about buildings and especially their origins, functions and features. A fifth grader (s22) reports how the guide enlivened the coach trip with a riddle unknown to all of the students. The tour guides seem to be an important source of content crucial to nationalist interpretation too. A certain *daoshi*

instructor, most probably a tour guide, is reported by one student (s2) as the one who explained the Golden Bauhinia Square, where is shown an enlarged version of the Golden Bauhinia presented by the Central Government. But the guides seem to have emphasized more the Japanese occupation, aspects of which are not shown by many structures or objects. According to one Form Three student (s12) the tour guide talked about the Japanese's forceful capture of women for their "comfort houses" in Wanchai, to avoid which misfortune many women disguise themselves as beggars or ugly women. On the whole, the guides seem to replicate less contested ideas of Hong Kong's past and avoided portraying the British as villains. The guides' role in telling stories about Yeung Kui-wan and in the half-believed academic magic with the pagoda will be explore later. Suffice it is to say here that their intervention is mostly reinforcing mainstream Hong Kong values rather than promoting a clearly "pro-China" nationalism.

Teachers and sometimes social workers attached to the school accompany students on the trip. But they tend to play less important roles than the tour guides, attending to discipline issues and very occasionally getting students involved in learning.

THE STUDY HANDBOOK AND WORKSHEET

For each route there is a Chinese handbook, A5 or similar in size, with about 4 pages of text before a brief worksheet. The brief preface lists the objectives as follows: "to allow students to personally set foot on historical sites and feel the change in history, in order to strengthen their knowledge of history and elevate their national identity ... " The rest of the text is on the itinerary, with about one paragraph on each stop. If the Ping Shan example is representative, only a small portion of the description is explicitly covering national identity. In the paragraph on the Tang Clan Heritage Centre, a sentence mentions villagers' several armed conflicts with the British troops in the beginning of colonial rule, without relating the building's connection with British enhancement of surveillance of the area soon after as a strategic response. Corroboration for the very limited coverage of political issues can be found in half a page of the text for the Island trip and impression from the other

Saikung-Taipo handbook.

The descriptions are followed by a worksheet consisting of about six or seven questions to answer on about three lines.

Some of the questions are very open-ended (cf. Kisel 2003). In each worksheet (for each of the routes), there are the following questions at the end:

- “After visiting all the scenic spots (sic.) which one leaves you with the strongest impression? Why?” (ref. noes. q15, q25, q34)
- “Junior reporter’s note: write down what you saw or heard on this trip, such as the experience (*guocheng*) interesting anecdotes, and share with fellow students.” (ref. noes. q17, q27, q36)

Another question, shared by two of the three routes, is very open ended too although seriously keyed as it asks for a review of the trip for “your expectations and goals.” (q16, q26, q35)

The remaining three or four questions for each trip, constituting about half of the worksheet, specifies a location or structure (sometimes with examples of aspects), and sometimes an attribute. Some are more seriously framed than others. In their order of specificity:

- After visiting Kan Ting Study Hall, what is your deeper understanding (*tihui*) (q12, q21 similar)
- In the Tang Clan Heritage Centre, which exhibit interests you most? Why? (q11)
- The architecture of the Tang ancestral hall has special features. Which one are you most curious about (q14, q22 similar)
- In visiting the Dr Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall [i.e. the museum], you can understand Dr Sun’s life and walk on the area where he lived in Hong Kong. For which stop do you feel most strongly about? (q 31)

One question names a specific attribute and seems to be designed to direct student to observe closely. It is in the Ping Shan worksheet, about Shuet Hing Study Hall's front room, naming four parts that are well decorated and asks which (of the four or perhaps others) are most lavish or extravagant. (q 12).

Even the harshest critic could find only a small fraction of the questions, mostly for the Saikung-Taipo and Hong Kong Island trips, as suggesting answers from a specific political perspective:

- ... what do you feel about the sacrifices the martyrs made in defending their home towns (*jiangxiang*) [against the Japanese] (q23)
- The Tower of Commemoration of Reunion with the Mainland [English official name being Spiral Lookout Tower] is an important landmark (in commemoration of) Hong Kong's transfer and return to China. What is your understanding (*tihui*) after visiting?¹
- The Conventions and Exhibitions Centre, the Golden Bauhinia Square and the PLA Hong Kong Building are witnesses to Hong Kong's transfer of sovereignty and return to the motherland, what are your understanding (*tihui*) after visiting these places?

Therefore, in the document, the statement of objectives, esp. to “elevate their national identity,” might have played a more significant role in framing the experience and interpretation than most of the questions.

EXPERIENCES AND PERCEPTIONS

For answers, the data cover mostly about half of the worksheets completed by 30 students and chosen by the organizers. Therefore, the data might be biased towards the objectives of the organizers. However, the bias is probably very limited as answers indicative

¹This is also a question for which some students seem to have copied their answer from the handbook.

of misunderstanding are included and similar experiences were expressed by other students through other channels.

For example, regarding the baptistery in the museum (“memorial hall”) building, left by the church that had occupied the building before its conversion into a museum, one 4th grader (s17) wrote for question q31 (see above, my numbering here and after) “I feel most strongly about the big bath tub in the Dr Sun Yat Sen Memorial Hall, because there is the biggest bath tub I have ever seen). A Form Two student (s2) included in her answer a similar observation in her answer to question 36: “second stop, Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall ... where he took bath is as big as a quarter of a classroom ...” A more accurate description is provided by a Form Three student (s13): “[I] saw a large baptistery inside. But from my angle it looked more like a bath tub than a baptistery. There are lavish objects on display, indicating how extravagant the former occupants are.”

The organizer or teacher involved in selecting the illustrious worksheets did not edit out the problem. Quite clearly, many students were unable to subtly separate the initial occupants, the church that used the building before the museum, and the historical figure who is the focus of the museum. The complex relationship between these three “histories” in the experience is partly to blame.

But the attention to luxury and comfort is not accidental. It is corroborated by an extended “junior reporter’s note” by another student [s12] for the same site, where one of the highlights is the “large balcony” (as *yangtai*, with *yang* being “Western” instead of “sun”) described as “spacious and comfortable, a good place for laps and reading. How much I can stay there for the whole day.” Another student [s9] observes in the same part of the worksheet, “after lunch we went to Sun Yat Sen Memorial Hall and were immediately energized upon seeing the luxurious Ho Kom-tong Residence [this is now memorial hall/museum building].”

Leaving equally strong but negative impressions to other student are some aspects of Ping Shan. A Form One student (s1) wrote in his “Junior reporter’s note,” “When we were sitting around the old water well there were many ants, and [we are] very restless [*fanzaao*].” If this might be attributed to the natural environment, a six grader (s27) observes about Kan Ting Study Hall, “I realized that bathrooms [*yushi*] in the old days were so crude.” A fourth

grader (s16) observes about the same place, “I think it was very hard being a student in the past, having to study in a place so hot.” According to Government Observatory records, the temperature on the day is 23.3 to 26.9 degrees Celsius. Also related to the issue of warmth is an answer to the architectural question (s22) for the Saikung-Taipo trip by a Form Two student (s4), who singled out the large and beautiful windows of the former [British] District Officer’s Office for attention, attributing it to “foreigners of the past who has aversion to heat.” While this has come from outside of the Pingshan trip, it can be used to underscore the fact that “we” have become more like the foreigners and have difficulty coping with traditional Chinese “standards” as seen in the Ping Shan trip.

The above illustrates how previously formed bodily habits could affect field trips for experiencing the Chinese past. Bodily and other “performativity” are also important aspects of the trips. For the Sun Hall, one of the students mentioned above [s12] observes that she and many others eagerly obtain a stamp partly “for a symbol of having been there.” The creation of a personal narrative on the site is even more elaborate in the account of a Form Three student (s9).

When walking on the Dr Sun Yat-sen Heritage Trail, we are all much happier than before [we saw the Lavishness of the Ho Residence and shopping at the Souvenir counter of Hall.] Three other students and pretended to be the Four Bandits [Sun and his associates] and have a photo taken. It was so funny.

However, the identification with the revolutionary is presented there in a playful frame.

In another case, identification with a historical figure is more serious, but the focus is not what might be expected. A Form Two student refers to revolutionary Yeung Kui-wan, relaying the tour guide’s story of the revolutionary who was assassinated by the Qing government, especially how he used to work at a shipyard, stopped after an accident, and assisted Sun Yat-sen in the revolution, in doing so learned English. The personal implication for the student is that “I feel that if I ... work hard I can learn well too.” This emphasis on the education of the revolutionary, though not echoed in all relevant worksheets, is echoed by one

other student's (s11) concentration on Sun's schooling when describing the stop of the trip that she felt most strongly about: "where he went to school, where he graduated with a bachelor's degree."

Doing well in school is even given explicit ritual expression with the help of the tour guides in the trip to Ping Shan. To one Form Three student (s6) and most impressive stop is the Pagoda, which is so partly because it is said to have an (a positive) influence on academic scores if one walks around it three times ...” Another student (s#?) from the same school is more detailed: “Upon hearing that, our whole class kept walking around the pagoda, disregarding the objects inside that have to do with history.” The same experiences are reported by a few primary students (s19, s20, s28, s29) from three different schools and there on different dates.

To follow up on the presence of this ritualistic element, the performative aspects of trips might be considered here. The invitation to join the local trips are sometimes based on the student's merit and in some organizer documents presented as training for assisting teachers on national identity education in the future. Therefore, performativity in the aspect of roles in the school might be present. But it should also be pointed out that in the worksheets or other collected material for these local trips one cannot find acts of commemoration comparable to some local school's visits to mainland site such as presentation flower to monuments in honour of martyrs. Perhaps the trip performs good students rather than good nationals or at least place the experience firmly within a school frame.

CONCLUSIONS

The encounter with harsher conditions on the rural heritage trail is sometimes bravely interpreted as inspiration, either for “treasuring what we have now” (s21) or “persistence in difficult circumstances” (s30). However, based on more anecdotal evidence on some mainland trips, similar consideration affected school and family trips to the mainland. The use of “squatting” toilets instead of toilet seats, and the dirty street surfaces in contemporary China cause concerns to many school children that discourages them from taking trips there. It

seems likely that embodied dispositions would often add to the distance from the nation past or present. The bodily experiences or performances seem likely to be interpreted using the dichotomy of modern versus traditional, Western versus Chinese, Hong Kong versus mainland that students have already “learned” through various channels. Interpretation calls for the transcendence of the cognition/habit or cognition/affect dichotomy (cf. Connerton 1989 etc.).

The extent to which that trips accommodates such dispositions also mean that in the local urban trips opportunities of reflective engagement offered by the sites are not utilized. Instead of attending to the tensions between nationalism and revolution, civil society or internationalism, students seem to be occupied with luxury and comfort. Even the performance aspect is limited as commemorative acts as limited to taking photographs in front of monuments. Students are finding refuge in the familiar if not always comfortable world of academic successes, through hard work plus a light dose of newly invented traditional Chinese magic.

In these ways, the kind of embodied memories stressed by Connerton appears to serve as a shield against the inculcation of new social memories represented by the use of history trips for national identity unless the concentration on comfort and academic success is the actual aim. While Bennett’s observations about museums’ return to chambers of wonders might be a factor here, the dispositions of the visitors played an important part.

REFERENCE

- Bennett, T., 1995. *The Birth of the Museum: History, Theory, Politics*. London: Routledge.
- Bourdieu, P., and Thompson, J.B., 1991. *Language and Symbolic Power*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Bourdieu, P., 1990. *The Logic of Practice*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Cheung, S.C.H., 1999. The Meanings of a Heritage Trail in Hong Kong. *Annals of Tourism Research*, 26(3), pp.570-588.
- Chow, C.S. and Elizabeth K.T., 2002. *Heritage, Identity and the (Re)Construction of Culture in Post-Colonial Hong Kong*. Hong Kong: CURS, Hong Kong Baptist University.
- Connerton, P., 1989. *How Societies Remember*. Cambridge. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Mathews, G., Ma, E.K.W. and Lui, T.L., 2008. *Hong Kong, China: learning to belong to a nation*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Hooper-Greenhill, E., 1999. Museum Learners as Active Postmodernists: Contextualising Constructivism. In E. Hooper-Greenhill, ed. *The Educational Role of the Museum*. 2nd. London : Routledge. Ch 5.
- Kisiel, J.F., 2003. Teachers, museums and worksheets: A closer look at a learning experience. *Journal of Science Teacher Education*, 14(1), pp.3-21.
- Ren, H., 1998. *Economies of culture: theme parks, museums, and capital accumulation in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan*. Ph. D. University of Washington.
- Vickers, E., 2002. *In Search of an Identity: the politics of history as a school subject in Hong Kong, 1960s-2002*. New York: Routledge.

我們的地方？我們的時間？香港文化保育和都市發展再探

楊健文

香港中文大學

電郵：fatheryeung@hotmail.com

前言

自二零零六年天星碼頭及二零零七年皇后碼頭拆卸的爭議。當時政府按着中環填海計劃發展，展開對天星和皇后碼頭的清拆工程。社會上出現保留的聲音，引起社會大眾對土地發展及其上生活空間的關注。政府與民間社會出現不同的論調，對土地的運用持有不同的看法。同時對政府對都市規劃的運作作出反思，從中亦引起大眾對政府於都市發展的關注。整個文化保育運動中民間社會與傳媒的論述，以及政府所持不同的論述之爭，使土地及都市發展處於政府與民間論述之間的角力中。本文嘗試從香港獨特的處境，從宏觀的社會處境理解都市發展下的土地。同時從保育參與者的集體抗爭作為出發點，配合政府及傳媒的不同論述，分析發展運動的緣起因由。以土地的空間意義作為主線，討論市民如何運用其自身的身份去作出對土地運用的抉擇，透過保育推動時間與空間的延續，以檢視出文化保育以及都市發展的狀況。透過理解土地的獨特性，及對都市發展的路向，引申至參與規劃可能性的訴求。

香港的發展處境

土地是政治、經濟的產品，亦是追塑身份的途徑。香港過去的發展，影響市民對土地意義的理解，而同時引導都市發展的方向。隨着公民社會的興起，原有對土地發展的意識有所轉變，以致天星與皇后碼頭的文化保育事件。首先要理解香港過往土地發展的影響因素，繼而進一步理解社會運動指出對土地意義的衝突，如何改變都市發展的路向。

土地規劃與經濟處境

香港本是中國領土之一，經過鴉片戰爭後，割讓給予英國管治，成為英國殖民地。於殖民統治下，香港是「借來的地方」、「借來的時間」，政府接管土地及決定土地發展的路向，以滿足利益的需要。於佔領初期，殖民政府按商貿需要，把香港定為自由海港：

1841年6月，港英當局正式宣佈香港為自由港，並首次以拍賣方式出讓港島北部濱海土地的使用權。〔劉蜀永，2009：62〕

由於商業活動漸趨頻密，沿海一帶有利洋行的業務發展，故不少購入土地，興建貨倉與

船塢。經商銀錢兌換生意，因而得以獲利。管治香港能夠打開與中國接觸的門口，以滿足貿易需求。越戰時期，美國對中國實施禁運，香港於此地緣政治的處境下，成為主要的運口港。

香港島給割讓後，英國為了保障其在中國的商業利益及加強軍事威脅，即在港島設軍營及讓英商建民房、貨倉和碼頭，其他的便都任由其衍生，並沒有刻意地為城市發展而制定政策〔王賡武，1997：213〕

1970年代，政府實施的不干預政策，以自由市場作為治港方針，跟隨着新自由主義模式，讓地產商能夠透過土地建設，推動房屋的供應，以滿足住屋需要。土地成為賺取利潤的工具，以滿足經濟需求。於都市發展過程中，城市的建設，亦為配合發展而作出調整，而城市規劃便遵從經濟利益作為出發點。

身份認同與政治處境

香港的政治處境，亦不斷塑造市民對自身的身份認同，改變對歷史與土地的觀感。從人口結構而言，香港是由內地移民所組成，及至抵壘政策出現後，「香港人」的身份才漸漸得到認同。土生土長的一輩，已不如以往以中國作為自己的鄉土。活於此時此刻，落土生根就在於腳下。自一九九七年以來，香港的主權已由殖民的身分，回歸至中國的掌控，政治環境進進行「五十年不變」。

香港身份的建構，從來不是一束就成的，而是連結於不同的社會事件，也正在經歷轉變。香港身份，受到中國與全球化的影響，而建構出獨特的面貌。張炳良（2011：10）指出北京賦予香港經濟發展及着重國家利益愛國主義的身分，與香港的民主化訴求，形成關係上緊張的張力。這種張力驅使香港人重新訂立自我身分，去處理社會發展的議題。由於在《基本法》下，香港實行「一國兩制」的管治，期望擁有更大的政治空間，議論發展的進程，而非殖民地管治般缺乏決策權。香港已由順從的殖民地變為當家作主的特區，自然會對根在本土的關注，及對香港身份的積極意義有所訴求（張炳良，2011：10）。歷史是建立身份認同的途徑，於脫離殖民身份的過渡下，有學者認為香港處於重構身份的「後殖民」的處境。

都市規劃下的土地意義與抗爭

社會運動的轉變

英高赫（Inglehart，1977）提出後物質主義，指出先進的工業地方裏，新舊社會的轉變，揭示舊社會強調的經濟發展，而新社會於資源較充裕下，轉為追求經濟物質之外的價值。隨着現代化的進程，社會價值觀從物質主義，往後物質主義轉移（蕭新煌、尹寶珊，2004）。新社會運動亦由以往着重利益，轉向社會價值的追求。特別對於政府發展着重經濟利益的論述，就都市的發展方向有另一層見解。

公民社會的興起

於殖民時期，香港社會沒有「發展出一個能與殖民政權相抗衡的公民社會。在文化現代性計畫的缺席底下，香港只能選擇性地和片面發展它的現代性。」（羅永生，2008）。政府為了減低對當權政權的社運，以行政機制將反對聲音，成為政府行政架構之內，以「行政吸納政治」（King，1972）。劉兆佳（Lau，1982）認為殖民政府為「低度整合的社會政治體系」，指出社會中缺乏「仲介組織」，以動員市民參與政治。時至今日，不同政黨及團體的出現，逐漸填補「仲介組織」的空缺，但建制外發起的反對聲音，亦難以吸納（經濟日報，1月7日）。現今不少聲音透過建制之外的途徑，爭取公眾的認同，從公共空間營造對政府的壓力。自二零零三年起發動的七一遊行，公民對政府政策的不滿，透過公開表達渠道，把民意向政府施壓，效果看似理想，令到政府所推行的二十三條立法暫時擱置。隨之而來，「七一」成為遊行的時間指標，把民間混雜的訴求，於公共空間發表，同時遊行示威的情況，亦透過傳媒報道，於公眾間討論，公民社會漸漸建立起來。唯面對日積月累的示威遊行的社會運動，不少人覺得政府仍缺乏吸引民意訴求的意向，以政黨為社會運動的主導牽引者，亦避免成效的質疑。不少保育人士及民間團體，特別是對於空間議題的關注，透過有別於政黨與傳媒對空間的論述，透過公共空間表達意見。不少成員都參與其他空間議題的行動，有一定的組織力與聯繫網絡，往往透過不同的公眾活動，以民主自由參與的方式，去重新定義空間的意義。甚至有透過直接行動方式，以表達對空間關注的訴求。整個保育運動的過程，透過土地的獨特性，聯結身分的建構，透過爭取公民參與都市發展，對抗與經濟主導，及具殖民性的都市發展路徑。

對抗土地的資本性延續

殖民體制對華人經濟組織的管治方式港依仗着殖民權力，建立起有利於商業貿易的法治體制（羅永生，2008）。為了避免民間社會對政府的挑戰，政府透過控制土地供應，奉行高地價政策，成為殖民政府維持低稅制及高福利的最主要方法，藉此保持政府的認受性。因此，土地政策成為港英政府維持政治及經濟穩定的重要政策，土地所附帶的政經利益，也因此被擴大（陳智遠，李祖喬，2008）。這些龐大而且關係緊密的政治經濟力量主宰我們的都市規劃制度和保育政策，並以「進步發展」之名威脅本地的文化傳承和城市面貌」。（陳家洛，《明報》，2007年8月13日）。

處於全球經濟下，各大城市都出現都市化的現象。資本集中於商業中心地帶，令土地買賣變得有其價值。於資本主義社會中，時間、空間、金錢是可互相轉換的（Harvey，1990：226）。這使土地成為經濟資本的載體，能夠透過外顯的空間呈現出其資本性。Gottdiener（1986，1995）提出房屋及商廈的符號，組織成為消費社會。這樣所呈現出來的城市形象，可以吸投資者在港消費。土地的用途是經由資本主義所構成的，房至及商場可以量化來用作資本投資的交易，同時透過都市規劃，制造消費的空間，從中賺取利潤。為配合經濟發展，不少地方都運用作為配套。不少地方是經過刻意的建設，中環漸變成商業城市。國際貿易金融中心的商業群，以及附近銀行林立的局面，以呈現一個整體的印象，形成一商業核心的印象。中環的印象已漸漸變成商業化，以經濟主導的都市發展模式發展，使土地隨着資本主義的需要發展。

由於這能夠帶動土地的價值，故此空間是由個體與資本主義系統生產（Gottidener

1985)。在都市規劃的同時，其實是將資本主義繼續複製，當中存在的資本家與勞動階層的剝削性關係，得以從都市發展中延續。「基於經濟邏輯的都市規劃，不再旨在改善社會福利、建立公平社會，而全球化更催化城市中的社會二分化。在後工業化的全球性城市，低技術勞工人需求減少，高技術職位則增多。這擴大了收入和貧富差距」。這種剝削性的關係亦於規劃過程當中呈現，市民與土地的擁在及使用之間是分裂的，政府擁有規劃土地用途的權力，而土地使用可以與市民生活分裂出來。因此，土地與生活在其上的市民，由本來生活體驗依附於土地的關係，開始變得抽離。鄒崇銘(2011: 232-233)指出「人，生活在土地上面，每天二十四小時各自以不同的方式跟土地進行對話，土地絕對不止是只供買賣流轉的「空間」(Space)，而更是被灌注了個人意義的「地方」(Place)。這指出生活其實與土地是息息相關的，難以抽離的處理社會問題。對於土地的意義以及都市發展，保育人士亦對政府把市民的生活經濟邊緣化作出抗辯。

土地的社會關係性

金融海瀾過後，不少市民對於自由市場的經濟發展模式產生疑問。龍炳頤(1997)認為香港的情況是開埠至今一直運用各種方法發展城市，以滿足社會及經濟發展的需求，只是種種規劃，根本沒有靈魂，缺整體發展目標和意識形態，只有功利目的而沒有社會理想和文化取向。政府的發展策略，以經濟為主導，追求利益卻欠缺文化遠景，着重全球競爭卻忽略本土視角，着眼未來而忽視歷史(Ku, Tsui, 2008)。對於政府的土地用途，特別對於關心香港發展方向的保育人士和民間團體，提出另一種的論述，對土地意義有另一番的理解。強調保留的學者與社會人士則認為社會應以人為本，社會發展需着重人的生活體驗，而都市發展是一個持續不斷的過程。天皇與皇后碼頭具有不可取替的意義，非單從經濟發展所能取代。社會關係隱含(embedded)於空間之中(Giddens, 1984)，空間中可引發的活動本質會與日常生活的人際關係互相影響。Pierre Bourdieu 指出社會空間與物質空間存在二元同體(dialectic)的關係，Habitus 是聯合兩者的中介調節物。(Nikolaus Fogle 2011)，透過不斷的接觸空間，社會空間與物質空間會於個體體驗中，建構中生活的方式。不同生活的片段，能夠把其中的社會關係，於經驗中透過與空間的接觸，而變得實在。甚至能夠作出相應的行動，對地方中容許的活動得以定下界限。在土地中有秩序的社會關係，就是不斷的建立社會結構。社會結構就是重覆行動的中介和結果。(Giddens, 1984; Bryant and Jary, 2001: 12)，是由規則與資源組成。規則是對行為構成的意義，或是對其制止的媒體。資源是把社會衍生性恆常化的權力實踐的媒介(Giddens, 1984: 16)。透過不同的活動，影響空間的社會結構，使其他人能夠習慣整套意義的系統，能夠建立共識，互相使用。在土地以上生活者縱使有不同的生活體驗，都因着自身的身分以及生活經驗，對共同生活的土地，能夠按着集體所建構的社會結構，以連繫於一起。

由殖民管治的刻意去政治化，市民對生活的需求，轉而從普及生活文化當中建立其身份。以需要自身家庭的經濟需要，為生活的目標，對政治事務沒有多大的意見。土地正正提供了生活空間給予市民，穩定其生活的需要。Henri Lefebvre (1991)提出「社會空間」包括三重意義。管治者以意識形態理想的規劃空間(the representations of space)，第二個是日常表達所呈現的實體空間(the spaces of representation)，第三個是日常生活經驗而成的實踐空間(Spatial practice)。中環海岸線經歷數次的填海，碼頭曾經歷多番變遷。於規劃時，天星碼頭連接九龍與香港的渡輪航線，為配合市民的交通的

需要。皇后碼頭則作為皇族人員上岸之用，為皇室禮典專用，有獨特的殖民色彩。這是原先理想中所的規劃空間。但隨後於生活上發生的事，成為經驗所得的實踐空間。1966年天星小輪加價，引發本土運動，對碼頭的意義，產生變化。當時蘇守忠絕食抗議，開始了社會運動史上一個重要的本土抗爭事件，為抗爭當時殖民地管治。皇后碼頭及後開放予公眾使用，對於下階層來說，成為於密集生活地區中是不可多得的公共空間。透過日常生活呈現出來的空間，每天來往使用渡輪的市民，重新定義其生活空間於自己的意義。這種需要經過長期的歷史，才能建立得到。

土地的文化意義與身份認同

不同形式的抗爭活動，讓市民從經歷空間的轉變。從空間的角色切入，保育運動透過意義的重提，去重新塑造本土的身份認同。人的意識構成是依賴於身處的四圍環境及建築物，從而建立歷史感（陳景輝，2008：52-54）。土地能夠透過建立空間的歷史感和共同想像，成為集體身份的實體。Kleniewski（2002）提出社會空間（socio-spatial）角度強調人民對空間的認識，本土文化於不同的地方透過不同的象徵符號呈現出其意義。透過生活不斷的行動，改變於空間中的符號，而產生出意義。而建立這個集體意義的過程，就是把生活實體與社會產物關係秩序化的結果，而產生共同的空間想像（Low 2008）。透過空間置入（spacing）與綜合（synthesis），於特定的空間產生社會活動。空間置入是指建立及定住，把具備社會意義的事件，於空間中呈現出來。綜合是指透過認知、構想和回憶，將市民與社會產物連結而成為空間，把歷史和生活體驗，連結於集體記憶中。參與空間其中的群體成員，各自以自身經驗為據，從過去演繹、提取出可供共享的情感記憶，並通過各種文化符號如周期性慶典儀式更新傳承，從而強化群體連結，建構及鞏固群體身分。集體記憶作為身分建構工程，不僅在緬懷過去，還以「過去」作資產，不斷製造新的文化意義（潘國靈 2007.04.30）。文化保育成為本土意識議題，就是為的是保存本土的空間和歷史中的共同文化意義，這亦突顯本土身份的認同。谷淑美（2011）指出，新一浪潮的文化保育運動不單提供抵禦發展主義的抗衡論述，更開拓建構香港身份的另類空間。董啟章（2011）指出人和地的關係，在私人的層面，稱為家園；在公共的層面，稱為社區。不同的社區情感匯集在一起，就是對我城的歸屬感，就是香港人身分認同的基礎。葉蔭聰（2008：46-49）認為要保育香港的歷史便會與殖民有關連，但保留殖民連結的地方，平民百姓會從生活經驗中重新賦予意義。由於每天生活存在不同的經驗，對於地方的關連，成為經驗保存的方法。對於社區發展中土地的意義，需要透過保育的方法保存下來。行動參與者把天星碼頭、皇后碼頭、香港大會堂及愛丁堡廣場視為一個整體複合空間，並重新闡釋為現代香港公民身份的搖籃（葉蔭聰，2010）。故此，保育土地是保留能夠提供文化構想的空間，以致能夠與土地進行身份認同的對話。對於富有文化價值的土地資源，保育人士認為政府從未有考慮，香港不應只依從經驗效用處理土地，而應注意土地中人群的生活內容及文化。

空間除了是可見的地方，是靜態的呈現之外，同時它的存在和意義是不斷變化的，由其上生活的市民付予意義。Michel de Certeau 提出日常生活的實踐在既有制度、大策略下，普通平民百姓會透過權宜之計，對有制度作出無處不在而微妙的反抗，創造合自己的生活方式（Michel，2011）。市民透過不同的方式，為空間注入新的社會關意義，不斷的改變其中的意義，呈現出不同的空間想像。「本土行動沒有採用國家或民族本位的框架。他們為皇后碼頭作出不同的詮釋，並引入參與式民主、直接行動及人民空間等

新思維，注入在「人民空間」的論述裏。這套對抗 論述藉連串詮釋及象徵性實踐，描述香港歷史及身份的文化框架，並把與這些新思維相關的抗爭脈絡置入其中」(谷淑美，2011)。Gottdiener (2011: 19)認為市民與空間存在雙重(Dual)關係。一方面市民按空間而決定社會因素的應對，例如性別、階級、種族、年齡、地位。另一方面，市民透過創造或轉換空間去表達他們的需要和渴求。為了營合生活所需，市民會因時際遇地創造出適合他們的空間。除舉行研討會及論壇外，本土行動亦組織文藝演出及音樂表演去傳達自由使用公共空間的訊息。這是藉創造「承載」(affordances)的空間，讓價值及意義透過行動讓人們從日常的環境中親身感受」(Urry, 2000)。在這個空間裏，他們舉辦各種展覽、音樂會、公眾講座和論壇；提出的議題，亦愈來愈多與香港政府諮詢政治、古蹟政策、人權、警察暴力、本土文化、規劃等有關 (葉蔭聰，2007)。透過不同的活動，改變社會大眾對「地方」的理解，形成一種「香港本土」的生活型態(陳景輝，2008: 36-39)。保育人士「組織工作坊，讓市民參與規劃中區海傍，特別是達成原址保留皇后碼頭的目標。在民主派政黨的協助下，一些專業建築師及規劃師，做出一些另類方案及技術解決方案，與政府官員展開許多討論，以至於在立法會的辯論… 對大部份 運動參與者及一般民眾，有機會開放這個公共空間的多元使用…」(葉蔭聰，2007)。同樣為了讓市民從歷史的共同經驗下解放出來，本土行動的成員進行一些富政治及象徵意義的行動。2007年1月20日，他們籌劃了一場「人民登陸」儀式，表示從歷史及回憶伸延至此時此地，以及從國家本位轉移到強調公民權利(谷淑美，2011)。就這樣，空間的建造由不同的論述與活動，而影響對其中意義的詮釋，從而影響市民對空間的觀感。

對政府都市發展諮詢的疑問

保育運動透過重提參與市規劃的認同感，亦引起公民社會的身份認同，決定誰是決策土地意義，與掌控都市發展的主角。隨着都市發展，土地的運用成為爭論的焦點。有甚麼地方留下，有甚麼地方需要取替，不是自然而然的過程，需要人的抉擇。土地是社會所共同產生而成的，市民對於土地的想象，亦非自然而得的事，而是透過不同的生活接觸，以及不同的論述而構成的。對於土地的界限，成為一個想像的社區。而作為香港的主體性的出現，令集體關注公共空間的運用，特別是對於土地的規劃。

土地運用一直是由政府全權掌控，以往於殖民時代，透過成立不同的委員去商議問題，至回歸後亦一直沿用。天星碼頭的清拆，不少官員均指出政府已充分諮詢民意。曾蔭權(《中國新聞社》，2006年12月13日)認為「天星碼頭已經過多年廣泛諮詢，徵詢過立法會，區議會，古物諮詢委員會及社會各界，取得社會共識。」孫明揚(2008: 24-25)亦認為「清拆及搬遷安排是經過多年和充分的公眾諮詢及根據有關法定程序才訂定」。同時亦指出政府已就「天星碼頭和鐘樓，以及中環填海計劃廣泛諮詢各界(中國新聞社，2006年12月13日)。他重申，在落實計劃前，曾考慮了所有的不同方案，包括原址重置的建議。現時的計劃充分考慮了各方的意見」。信報財經新聞(2006年12月15日)，亦指出「城規會曾考慮天星碼頭標誌的歷史意義和作為旅遊景點的重要性… 結果政府接納了天星小輪的建議，採用富歷史文物特色的設計方案」。由於中區填海計劃已經完成了兩期，天星碼頭拆卸與中區填海計劃方面有關的工程有連貫性，是不能分割的，整個遷拆工程勢在必行(中國新聞社，2006年12月13日)。於討論皇后碼頭的遷拆問題，政府官員有同樣的反應。林鄭月娥(2008: 55-58)亦指出「古物諮詢委員會考慮過該調查報告後，並不認為有必要或有理由作出原址保留皇后碼頭，或把碼頭遷

移至其他地點保存的建議」。兩項經過政府諮詢的計劃，過社會討論後，仍照原定方向而行。

不少學者與反對人士，透過公眾的廣播以及論壇，引起社會大眾的關注。這不但讓公眾更投入參與公共事務的討論，對政府的措施作出回應，甚至對政府的諮詢過程提出質疑。梁啟智（2008： 26-27）指出「請願者成功帶起了議題，引發大眾追問諮詢過程期間的種種漏洞」，相繼不少社會人士指出政府的漏洞。陸恭蕙（2008： 40-42）指出「政府錯誤詮釋保護海港條例，誤導公眾及城市規劃委員會（城規會）所應該運用的正確測試準則」，亦有人質疑政府的諮詢工作，其實有誤導公眾之處。明報（2006 年 12 月 12 日）更顯示出於網上供公眾查閱的報告的一份支持保留的顧問方案未被披露，令大眾誤以為沒有支持聲音，而陸恭蕙（2008： 40-42）質疑政府於公諮詢程序中，向公眾傳達錯誤信息，令公眾以為政府已配合所有的法律準則。

就政府於諮詢討論的資訊，難以讓社會大眾參與討論。不少學者指出政府諮詢民意繼續沿用以往殖民時代的方法，面對回歸後的民意，其實成為管治香港的困難。陳允中（《明報》，2007年4月28日）認為「官員沒有壓力要把手中的權力下放給社區及民眾。因此「假諮詢」成為香港官員們最熟悉的「行政慣性」（如果操縱至精就變成「行政暴力」）…為了控制諮詢的結果，香港政府提供給民眾的資訊是片面及選擇性的。在沒有「資訊自由法」的保護下，政府不需要提供足夠的資訊，民眾只能在政府定好的框架中做很有限的選擇」。於這個情況之下，雖然政府所知道的民意對其推行的政策，於既有的框架內較少遇到極大的阻力，但整個以行政主導行政框架逐漸受到挑戰。張炳良（2007： 50）亦提出「香港脫殖回歸中國卻強調高度的管治體制延續性，一切不變」，並須保留前朝的規章政策及行事－包括以官僚政理性為本的決策程序及利益與意見吸納模式。港英時期物質經濟與「吊機經濟」的硬發展思維，也一直主導着這座城市的規劃，令人文萎縮」。特別是回歸後的香港，雖然實行「一個兩制」的管治，但社會民主的訴求，於嚴緊的行政架構下其殖民地管治的方式久揮不去，面對突如其來的衝擊難以應對。皇后碼頭在古物古蹟委員會評定為一級建築，卻沒有阻止其清拆的步伐，發展局局長林鄭汝樺亦有出席皇后碼頭的公眾論壇，但未有回應保育人士的聲音。陳景輝（2008： 52-54）認為「記憶皇后也是為了抗拒殖民主義於我城借屍還魂，更進一步，就是要在回歸後開展一場遲來的解殖運動」。梁啟智（2008： 26-27）指城市應是透過公眾參與而發展的，抗爭者正要突顯不公義的城市發展模式。

公民參與的都市規劃

在討論土地去留的同時，民間與政府對土地發展的方向出現不同的論述，亦引起本土身分對於土地規劃的再。官方和主流傳媒把這件事說成是「發展與保育的矛盾」，實際上卻表現出特區一元的「發展」邏輯思維，狹窄地把「發展」界定為經濟增長，把「美好家園」建於純粹的物質基礎上（梁文道，盧思騁，2007.09.18）。於二元對立的論述當中，發展與保育成為選擇的兩端，引起極大爭議。對於追求發展者而言，保育自然是阻止發展的：

在香港彈丸之地我們現在更迫切需要的是文明城市的持續發展、持續創建，過分強調文化遺產集體回憶的重要性而忽略民生基本所需的迫切性，非智者之舉…文明發展與文化保育，若兩者不可兼得，寧棄後者，千古皆然！拆遷

皇后碼頭，智者所為，不失為發展和保育並重的最佳做法。(陳百里2007.08.09)

但保育運動強調的是透過保育，能夠建立與發展論調不同的都市發展空間。於過去不少的示威、遊行，不少學者與社會人士認為政府的施政漠視所表達的民意，保育運動就是對政府施政失誤的回應。陳景輝（2008：36-39）認為「這場運動要扭轉的是香港根深柢固的功利觀念…社會已經轉變，只是我們唯利是圖的管治的規劃模式依然故我…闖進工地的年輕人是阻止本土社群文化沒有承擔的政府會繼續毀壞香港」。顯然而見，政府以往以行政汲納民意的諮詢方法，受到多年來社會各界的反應，令不少對香港社會抱有熱誠的人士，需要尋找到發展有利的方向。不少社會運動的出現，甚至是要透過激烈的「直接行動」方法表達出來（葉蔭聰，2010）。文化保育運動正要衝擊此種城市發展模式。於都市發展整個諮詢過程中，由於土地是屬於社會的，是政府與民間之間的平衡，公民社會對於土地的發展，指示對政府諮詢過程的不滿。公民社會對都市規劃的期望，是透過參與式規劃，讓土地能夠兼顧人文意義。陳景輝（2008：52-54）亦指出現今的社會傾向發現成「國際大都會」的同時，把本土文化、社區生活及情感需要的重要意義淹沒，保留皇后碼頭正是「還政於民」的表現。社會是由市民不同的生活片段所組成的，社區的發展其實是市民生活期望的延伸。對於屬於自己的社區，其發展的方向需要透過集體的認同而決定的。這是關於公民的土地，是由公民負責定義其發展，能夠有機會參與規劃土地的用途，甚至有使用土地的權利。

我們要求城規與市建部門透明化、民主化，讓市民能參與，使香港的空間規劃設計，更具市民的真實需要。(九個民間團體聯署聲明)

「在爭取代議民主的同時，必須強調在地的政治權力，讓市民能夠接參與地方事務決策。」(朱凱迪，2008：111)

城市的空間是屬於人民的，其情感和經驗連結於空間之中。面對遷拆行動，從不同的論壇與社會運動，展示出對空間內涵的論述。隨著民主的社會進程，空間的意義是由市民所共同決定，而整個對都市規劃討論過程，亦是公民可以參與的。

結語

過去經濟發展確實讓香港成為世界上首屈一指的都市，值得自豪。這提供很多資源，以發展市民的文化素質。政府的管治無疑能夠透過政策與計劃，把資源好好利用，能夠發展與市民生活有利的都市面貌與社區生活。保育運動對抗的是對土地的資本性抗爭，亦是對政府的都市發展的諮詢架構提出質疑，重申強化人民與土地的關係，透過不同的活動，使市民對土地能夠產生更強烈的歸屬感，重新塑造香港的身份認同。對於社會的發展方向，各人雖有不同的理解，但希望透過持續不斷的抗爭與策劃，能達成對社會有利的共識。隨着不同的運動，對於地方的意義不斷反思，讓市民尋索身分，去理解香港是否我們的地方？我們的時間？

參考書目

- 王月華 2008, '拆天星, 政府已履行所有法律要求', 載陳健民、伍瑞瑜(編), *眾聲喧嘩*, 頁 43-45, 上書局, 香港
- 王賡武編 1997, *香港史新編*, 三聯書店(香港)有限公司, 香港
- 王賡武編 2007, *香港史新編*, 三聯書店(香港)有限公司, 香港
- 葉蔭聰 2008, '元朗屏山警署與皇后碼頭', 載陳健民、伍瑞瑜(編), *眾聲喧嘩*, 頁 46-49, 上書局, 香港
- 葉蔭聰 2008, '香港文化保育制度與後殖民狀況', 載葉蔭聰, *為當下懷舊: 文化保育的前世今生*, 香港中文大學香港亞太研究所, 香港
- 葉蔭聰 2010, *直接行動*, 進一步媒體, 香港
- 林鄭月娥 2008, '暫別皇后碼頭, 平衡保育發展', 載陳健民、伍瑞瑜(編), *眾聲喧嘩*, 頁 55-58, 上書局, 香港
- 張在元, 劉少瑜編 1997, *香港中環城市形象*, 中國計劃出版社, 北京
- 張炳良 2011, '香港身份: 本土性、國族性與全班性的交織', 載呂大樂等(編), *香港·生活·文化*, 頁 1-20, 香港大學出版社, 香港
- 蕭新煌, 尹寶珊 2004, '後物質主義的浮現? 香港與台北的比較', 載劉兆佳等(編), *香港社會政治的延續與變遷*, 頁 243-273, 香港中文大學香港亞太研究所, 香港
- 龍炳頤 1997, '香港的城市發展和建築', 載王賡武編, *香港史新編 - 上冊*, 三聯書店(香港)有限公司, 香港
- 馬國明 2007, *全面都市化的社會*, 進一步媒體, 香港
- 羅永生 2008, '向具主體性的本土性', 載本土論述委員會等(編), *本土論述 2008*, 頁 165-178, 上書局, 香港
- 孫明揚 2008, '着眼發展, 兼容懷舊' - 遷移天星碼頭的回顧與前瞻', 載陳健民、伍瑞瑜(編), *眾聲喧嘩*, 頁 24-25, 上書局, 香港
- 梁啟智 2008a, '請聽天星請願者說幾句話', 載陳健民、伍瑞瑜(編), *眾聲喧嘩*, 頁 26-27, 上書局, 香港
- 梁啟智 2008b, '城市發展與本土論述', 載本土論述委員會等(編), *本土論述 2008*, 上書局, 香港
- 梁文道, 盧思騁 2007, '解放「發展」, 人人有權', *明報*, 9月18日
- 陳景輝 2008, '從天星保衛運動到本土文化政治', 載陳健民、伍瑞瑜(編), *眾聲喧嘩*, 頁 36-39, 上書局, 香港
- 陳景輝 2008, '為何不告別? 一個皇后碼頭守衛者的自白', 載陳健民、伍瑞瑜(編), *眾聲喧嘩*, 頁 52-54, 上書局, 香港
- 陳志豪, 莫卓琛 2007, '皇后碼頭的未來需符合香港的發展', *文匯報*, 6月12日
- 陳百里 2007, '城市發展與文化保育', *文匯報*, 8月9日
- 陳百里 2007, '理性對待文化保育', *大公報*, 8月14日
- 陳允中 2007, '政府真的諮詢了皇后?', *明報*, 4月28日
- 陳家洛 2007, '當「本土行動」遇上「進步發展觀」', *明報*, 8月13日
- 陳智遠, 李祖喬 2008, '當「都市」成為一種論述 - 香港後殖民的空間政治反思', 載本土論述委員會等(編), *本土論述 2008*, 頁 14-21, 上書局, 香港
- 陳健民, 伍瑞瑜編 2008, *眾聲喧嘩*, 上書局, 香港

- 陳和順，張炳良編 2007，*十年回歸·十年盤點*，上書局，香港
- 陸恭蕙 2008，‘拆天星，政府已履行所有法律要求？’，載陳健民、伍瑞瑜（編），*眾聲喧嘩*，頁40-42，上書局，香港
- 劉蜀永 2009，*簡明香港史*，三聯書店(香港)有限公司，香港
- 谷淑美，徐匡慈 2009，‘一場新社區運動帶來的啓迪 - 從忽然文化說起’，載馬傑偉等（編），*香港文化政治*，香港大學出版社，香港
- 谷淑美 2011，‘香港城市保育運動的文化政治’，載呂大樂等（編），*香港·生活·文化*，頁 89-103，香港大學出版社，香港
- 董啟章 2011，‘土地，就在我們的腳下 - 反高鐵苦行者給我們的啟示’，載黃培烽等（編），*80 前後：超越社運、論述與世代的想像*，頁 255-259，圓桌精英出版社，香港
- 鄒崇銘 2011，‘關於空間的時間詮釋 - 從中環價值、保育運動與無殼蝸牛’，載黃培烽等（編），*80前後：超越社運、論述與世代的想像*，頁223-236，圓桌精英出版社，香港
- 明報 2006，‘網上供公眾查閱環評附錄「獨缺」一份，政府被指隱瞞挺鐘樓報告’，12月12日
- 中國新聞社 2006，‘曾蔭權指拆天星碼頭是經廣泛諮詢所獲社會共識’，12月13日
- 信報財經新聞 2006，‘民粹議員事後孔明’，12月15日
- 九個民間團體聯署 2007，‘原地保留皇后碼頭 落實「文化保育、以民為本」的發展方向聲明’，3月27日
- 潘國靈 2007，‘香港集體記憶的扭曲’，*星島日報*，4月30日
- 成報 2007，‘中環灣仔發展必須即時上馬’，5月11日
- 香港經濟日報，2010，‘「80後」困局 難被建制吸納·早年社運分子·多成學者商界高層’，1月7日
- Bryant, C.G.A. and Jary, D., 2001. *The Contemporary Giddens: Social Theory in a Globalizing Age*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- De Certeau,., 2011. *“The Practice of Everyday Life”*. USA:University of California Press.
- Fogle, N., 2011. *The Spatial Logic of Social Struggle: A Bourdieuan Topology*. UK: Lexington Books.
- Gottdiener, M., 1985. *The Social Production of Urban Space*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- _____, 1995. *Postmodern Semiotics: Material Culture and the Forms of Modern Life*. New York: Blackwell.
- Gottdiener, M. and Hutchison, R., 2011. *The New Urban Sociology*. USA: Westview Press.
- Gottdiener, M., and Lagopoulos, A., 1986. *The City and the Sign: Introduction to Urban Semiotics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Giddens, A., 1984. *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Harvey, D., 1990. *The Condition of Postmodernity*. Cambridge and Oxford: Blackwell.
- Inglehart, R., 1977. *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics*. N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- King, A.Y.C., 1972. Administrative absorption of politics in Hong Kong. *Asian Survey*, 15(5).
- Kleniewski, N., 2002. *Cities, Change and Conflict*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing.

- Ku, S.M.A. and Tsui, H.C.C., 2008. The 'Global City' as a Cultural Project – The Case of West Kowloon Cultural District. In: H.F. Siu and A.S. Ku, eds. *Hong Kong Mobile*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
- Lau, S.K., 1982. *Society and politics in Hong Kong*. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press.
- Lefèbvre, H., 1991. *The Production of Space*. Cambridge and Oxford: Blackwell.
- Low, M., 2008. The Constitution of Space: The Structuration of Spaces Through Simultaneity of Effect and Perception. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 11, p.25.

The Politics of Festival in Postcolonial Hong Kong: Resettlement Plan and the Temple of Identities in Ngautaukok, East Kowloon¹

Vito Yu
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Email: vitoyu@gmail.com

INTRODUCTION

This paper aims to explore the relationship between resettlement and the issue of identities in an urban setting. I argue that the question of urban renewal and its affiliated problems on resource allocation are highly political, in terms of regional dynamics. In Ngautaukok, the dominant ethnic group Chaozhou (Chiukiu, or *Teokio*) has played important roles in various domains, such as acquired seats in district council and in many advisory committees. Their representative organization Chiukiu Industrial and Commercial Association 潮僑工商聯誼會 (CICA) holds a community-wide festival called Yuelan 盂蘭 at No. 8 Playground 八號球場, which is at the estate center, the first week in every Seventh Moon. The Ngautaukok Industrial and Commercial Association 牛頭角工商聯誼會 (NICA), which claims to represent the Kaifong 街坊 (or sometime, *fongchung* 坊眾) runs another Yuelan in the latter half of the month.

In the essay, I tried to demonstrate how these festivities serve as effective mobilizing strategy for their ethnic event. And with a resettlement plan introduced by the government in late 1990s, the local order was being re-arranged to form a new compromise between the two groups. The CICA was traditionally standing for the interests of Chaozhou, and is highly being utilized as a tool for the pro-Establishment camp (e.g. DAB) to gain support while NICA was loosely attached to any social parties. In the resettlement process, the latter was attracted to contribute their efforts in the political manipulation in Ngautaukok and in return, a re-definition of ethnic makeup was introduced through the representation in the festival

¹ In this paper, all the names are in pseudonyms unless they are public figures.

Yuelan. Recently, NICA, controlled by the less dominant group of Hailufeng, started to accept their festival as part of the Chaozhou's branch activity in East Kowloon under the umbrella of the pro-Establishment camp.

This paper serves as an ethnographic record on the interaction between the two groups in ethnic oligopoly in the area of Ngautaukok. I do not include too many discussion on theories in ethnicity not because they are not important but the priority of this paper is to point out the fact that festival could be understood in a few more social dimensions in Hong Kong.

The story begins with an introduction of the government's resettlement plan and I will explain the ethnic composition of the area as a basis for the festival activity. Then, followed with the cultural split of the two ethnic groups while drawing on some observations on the regional political tensions. Finally, I suggest that the new plan in construction of a temple for the Hailufeng is political, and it is an extension of the early resettlement plan so that series of issues are interconnected. I hope, with my case, I can bring future research's attention to understand local festivals in, at least, two additional perspectives: *politics* and *ethnicity*.

GOVERNMENT'S RESETTLEMENT PLAN


In 1988, the Hong Kong Housing Authority (HKHA) launched a Comprehensive Redevelopment Programme aiming at improving "the standard of living for residents in older estates," and meanwhile, "to ensure that facilities and benefits do not lag too far behind the newer estates."² The plan covered a total number of 57 public estates with more than 566 blocks built before 1973 were to be demolished for redevelopment by 2005, according to the schedule.

The former Ngautaukok Estate was built in the 1960s as a resettlement estate, designated for those who lost their homes under natural disasters or those who were affected by any urban renewal schemes. The Hong Kong government, then, decided to establish an administration called the HKHA to manage Ngautaukok Estate. The Estate was, thus, divided

² See "Comprehensive Redevelopment Programme:"
http://www.housingauthority.gov.hk/arpt9900/eng/quality/quality_crp.html. Accessed at February 17, 2012.

into three sections: *Upper* and *Lower*, with the latter further cut into two Zones (I and II). And the whole community was included in the foresaid redevelopment programme in late 1990s, while the first two sections (Upper, and Lower Ngautaukok Estate Zone I) were completely demolished in 2003.

Lower Ngautaukok Estate Zone II (around 5,406 households) was mainly inhabited with the elderly that has dwelled in the area for more than four decades, since 1967. The previous redevelopment plan was to relocate these senior residents to the other districts' public housings. But in October 2000, Sheng Kui Hui Community Development Center 聖公會社區發展中心 at Ngautaukok set up a Concern Group 關注組 advocating a reconsideration of settling the residents within the Ngautaukok area. According to the Concern Group, they turned to Planning Department instead of Housing Department to initiate an amendment to the land use of nearby areas to fulfill their need. The two Departments formerly decided to construct towers for Home Ownership Scheme at the upper estate site. However, with an economic downturn after 2000, the government had announced to halt the Home Ownership Scheme leading to the opportunity to relocate the Lower Zone II residents to upper area (at Phase II and III). Strategic Planning Committee of Hong Kong Housing Authority, then, passed the notion, in June 7, 2002, to postpone the demolishment of Lower Ngautaukok Estate Zone II (Tower 8 to 14) to as late as 2009 while promising to lodge all the residents who intended to stay at Upper Ngautaukok Estate. Since the deity of *siε-dzin gong-ma* 聖人公媽 is located at the corner of Tower 13 and 14 (see Map 1), the postponement was also applied to the deity office. It was under these circumstances that the festival organizer Ngautaukok Commercial and Industrial Association (NICA), which was and is still dominated by the Hailufeng, was able to grab time in negotiating for a site to house their deity.




Map 1 - Layout plan of Lower Ngau Tau Kok Estate Zone II.
(source: Civic Exchange.)

ETHNICITY IN NGAUTAUOKOK

It is useful here to distinguish between Chaozhou (Chiu Chau) and Hailufeng (Hok Luk Fung or Hoi Lok Fong). The Chaozhou is usually defined by their geographical boundary of the imperial time in Guangdong Province (see Map 2). The Chaozhou Prefecture previously consisted of eight counties (*ba-yi* 八邑),³ and the concept of being a Chaozhou was more of a territory-based identity. In my interviews, many Chaozhou folks suggested that before the Communist takeover, being a Chaozhou was never solely depended on the dialect spoken. As an example quoted by my informants, Chow Man-wai Raymond 鄒文懷 (1927-) is a famous film producer in Hong Kong who came from Dapu 大埔 County, which was formerly administered under the Chaozhou Prefecture. In the media, Chow had also shown his sense of identity of being a Chaozhou but to date, the concept of *Chaozhouness* becomes more of a cultural idea which mainly bases on dialectal difference. And in recent years, Chow seldom proclaims himself a Chaozhou, but a Hakka.

³ Eight counties included Chao'an 潮安, Chaoyang 潮陽, Jieyang 揭陽, Raoping 饒平, Chenghai 澄海, Huilai 惠來, Pu'ning 普寧, Fengshun 豐順.



Map 2 - Chaozhou Region in Guangdong Province, China.

Hailufeng, in contrast, had long been administered under the Huizhou 惠州 Prefecture. Hailufeng is a combined term for the Counties of Haifeng and Lufeng in east Huizhou. With a closer economic ties with Chaozhou Prefecture, the Hailufeng speaks a similar accent of Chaozhou which makes them usually being perceived as Chaozhous in the eyes of the Hong Kong Cantonese (*punti gwongfu yen* 本地廣府人). I have previously sketched the linguistic difference among the Hailufeng and the Chaozhou counties, and is not intended to repeat here.⁴ The aforesaid perception might not be wrong in a sense that, to many of the Chaozhous the Hailufeng or other Hokkien-speakers are *hiā-ti* 兄弟 (co-Chaozhou brothers), or still "They are *ka-ki-lang* 自己人 (the Selves)." In the festivals they usually have shared customs but in many occasions there're still some cultural distances between the two groups, such as food or rituals. And it is mainly due to these little variations they decided to hold separate Yuelan ceremonies at Ngautaukok.

⁴ See Vito Yu, "Nasal Endings in Southern Min Dialects along Chaozhou Coast: nasalization and its historical implications." Paper presented at the seminar on *Language and Evolution* held at HKUST, 2010.

ETHNICITY AND MIGRATION

For a brief sketch of social history of Ngautaukok, James Hayes (1977) has connected the area with the adjacent Anderson Hill's quarry work. In his account, Hayes (1977: 151-158) suggested that the early settlers in Ngautaukok Village was mostly stonecutters, with Hakka origins. The village, according to some senior residents, was located at the present day Jordan Valley, which was still a squatter area in the 1990s.

In November 1951, a fire at Tung Tau Village in Diamond Hill, where Alan Smart (1992) conducted his early field study, led to an influx of dwellers into the Ngautaukok Village. The squatter huts were constructed in a rapid rate to accommodate their needs.⁵ In his three volumes of ethnography, Tanaka Issei (1981) gave detailed record of 1980's Yuelan in which he verified that the festival of NICA is a joint celebration of different ethnic groups, at least included the Hailufeng and the Hakkas.

<u>year \ area</u>	<u>Ngautaukok</u>	<u>Kowloon in total</u>
1968	27,134	751,043
1969	35,524	788,097
1970	53,941	823,981
1971	54,410	835,317
1972	54,722	865,398
1973	54,930	887,641

Table 1 - No. of residents in resettlement housings, 1968-1973.

(source: Resettlement Department, *various years*.)

And in 1960s, residents in squatter areas were said to have reached 600,000; the government had started the plan to house these dwellers into public resettlement housings and it marked the start of the festival with increasing number of residents into the resettlement housing (see Table 1).

In February 1963, Mrs Elsie Elliott (a.k.a. Mrs Elsie Tu), candidate of elected member of the Urban Council, visited the squatter area on the slope of Ngau Tau Kok and saw residents of torn down huts, weeping and trembling in the northerly gale. The issue aroused

⁵ See the *Seventh Annual Report* of Ngau Tau Kok Kaifong Welfare Association, 1965, p.11.

public concerns leading to a release of a new housing policy in 1964. It gave higher priority to resettlement for residents from endangered squatters in the nearby areas, such as those in the squatter huts at Ngautaukok. With completion of Ngautaukok Estate in 1967, most of the stonecutters were relocated onto the towers. And with the Chaozhous, mainly resided in Diamond Hill or Wong Tai Sin squatter areas, they filled the towers mostly after the 1970s, especially in the Lower Zone II structures. This history of moving in contributed to different towers with varied composition of ethnic members.

ETHNICITY AND FESTIVALS

Jean Tang, a senior member of NICA and a former sergeant at the Royal Hong Kong Police Force at Ngautaukok, had told me the towers that housed the most number of Hailufengs, as well as the Chaozhous. With this pattern of ethnic distribution, the festival organizers could successfully raise donations from their fellows by going through the corridors tower by tower.

However, 2009 served as the last year for this kind of "floor-sweeping" (*sei-lou* 洗樓) strategy because most of the residents had been relocated into other estates. The amount of donations dropped significantly in the following years, of 2010, 2011, and 2012. Morris Wan, the director-general hopes that with the completion of constructing new towers in the coming years, the amount of donations would become higher and higher. But now, the two Associations turned to the businessmen within the region for donations. It is by this occasion, Sherman Ngor the secretary told me, that the Chiukiu discovers that "We have a lot of business fellows, in the wet market."

The full list of donors can be retrieved every year outside the red plate of sheet at the entrance of the festival ground. The Chiukiu has a list with more widespread ethnic members, from Choi Hung 彩虹 to Kwuntong 觀塘 while the Hailufeng NICA has their donations more concentrated within the Ngautaukok economic zone. The organizing committee has, once and again, emphasized to me that their festival was longer in history and more inclusive in the region - compared with the Chaozhou (Chiukiu or *Teokio*).

James Hayes (1977), in his book, has described the Yuelan festival as follows:

"The Ngau Tau Kok villagers maintained a separate identity through a religious celebration performed in the Seventh Moon (the Yue Lan Festival). From at least the early days of the 20th century this was confined to the residents of Ngau Tau Kok village and was confined to the residents and was organized by its own leaders. For one day and two nights there were religious ceremonies and accompanying entertainment by a puppet troupe for village people."

Obviously, this is not true anymore, at least, the participants do not confined to the residents of Ngautaukok in recent years. But this change would possibly be a result of the resettlement plan, which could somehow dissolve the ethnic community in the area. And I will come back to explain the dissolution through the latter passages in discussion of regional politics.

The Hailufeng setup their Yuelan as early as in 1967 and two years after, followed by the Chaozhou, in 1969. Both the Yuelans were held under the name of *gongsheung luenyiwui* 聯誼會 (Industrial and Commercial Association), but with different prefixes: *ngaitaukok k^hui*- 牛頭角區工商 (Ngau Tau Kok District; a.k.a. NICA) and *ngautaukok k^hui chiukiu*- 牛頭角區潮僑 (Ngau Tau Kok District Chaozhou sojourners'; a.k.a. CICA). A senior member of the former shared with me his memory in the 1960s that:

"We, first, had included all the ethnic [groups]. But the Chaozhou (*Teokio*) was so, so exclusive. We invited them to join ours; but they did not invite us to join theirs. We had, at the beginning, invited them to the event and to participate, happily (*huāhilaaijo^h* 歡喜來做)! However, a few years later, they withdrawn and started their own [festival]."⁶

During my study, the Chaozhou had offered their version as a supplement to this split:

⁶ Interview with Peter Ko (pseudonym), a secretary at NICA, August 2008.

"The Association (*goh-wui* 個會), or the festival, was dominated by the Hoklos 福佬. And we have no chance to become leaders in the *wui* 會 (the group)."⁷

And in the following week after the chat, I turned to Jean Tang, whose father was the founder of NICA to clarify this dispute and he added:

"How come they were not included? One of them, or two, were the Chaozhou (*Teokio*). And it's a *haaklao-gai-wui* 福佬的會 (Hoklos' association), they are part of the leadership!"

In these *discourses* we see two different interpretations of groups, or the term *Hoklo*. The Chaozhou (para. 2) do not consider themselves Hoklo and they are of different group *vis-à-vis* the "Hoklo" (origin of counties other than the Chaozhou Prefecture) while the Hailufeng (para. 1 and 3) consider the Chaozhou, together with them, as part of a larger conceptual group of Hoklo, despite any places of origin.

VARIATIONS OF THE TWO GROUPS

Though the two groups have incorporated as two limited companies in the 1970s and somehow, in collaboration they have then, "make-up" with different versions of origin of these Yuelans.

The origin of Yuelan festival, in a brochure published by the Chaozhou (*Teokio*) association, is highly related to their history of migration to the Hong Kong territory:

"The Chaozhou (*chiuchauyen*), came [to Hong Kong] alone, and worked as blue collar, without any family caring. Their afterlife was even worse, and more lonely, as wandering ghosts, that nobody paid respects nor burnt them any incense."⁸

⁷ Interview with a senior member of Chiukiu, August 2011.

⁸ See *Zhongyuan Festival: the Intangible Cultural Heritage in China*, p.34 para. 1.

The brochure, included 39 Yuelans on Kowloon Peninsula, suggests that Ngautaukok's CICA is one of its branch festival organizers which shares the same myth.

Contrastingly, NICA has another myth of origin that highlights more of the locality in Ngautaukok (and Jordan Valley):

"Around 1951, after the liberation (Communist takeover) [in Mainland China], a mass of Huizhou and Hailufeng fled into the territory and were homeless. The British Hong Kong (*kongying* 港英) administration allocated them with a few tens of square feet living space in squatter huts along the slopes at Shaukeiwan and Chai Wan.

"But, who knows, these slopes were mass graves, with deceased remains beneath. It felt like living 'on' the dead, and with the dead...

"A few elderly packed the remains and buried them with care. The tablet was made of wood in a collective sense, named as *sie-dzin gong-ma* 聖人公媽 (Common Parents the Saints). The dwellers gathered to hold religious rituals to settle down their mental unrests with regards to these terrible remains, and it became an annual event of the Yuelan."

The slope in the myth was said to have built a large public housing called Hing Wah Estate 興華邨 and the Hailufengs were relocated to Ngautaukok Estates. The wooden tablet was also moved to the rooftop of Tower 5 in Lower Zone I, till demolition of the estate in 2003.

In the myth, the Hailufengs have no temples at the beginning, and till now, and those were the "faults" of the colonial regime, in which they hope the SAR's District Office would do some corrections.

ETHNICITY AND POLITICAL DIVIDE

The notion in the former mythological discussion is that the previous colonial government, which had long been, inclining to the Chaozhou (Chiu Chau) instead of the Hailufeng.⁹ At least, in Ngautaukok area, the regime was dominated by the Chaozhous for decades. The former Ngautaukok Estate, as divided into Upper, Lower Zone I, and Lower Zone II was under three sub-districts according to the electoral divisions as: Upper NTK, Mid NTK, and Lower NTK. And before the remake of these divisions from three into two in 1999, the Mid Ngautaukok 中牛頭角 was seated by Chan Kam-lam 陳鑑林 for DAB, the pro-Establishment camp. At the same time, Lower Ngautaukok division was by Chan Kwok-wah Ben 陳國華, also for DAB while Upper NTK was by Hau Shui-pui 侯瑞培, a so-called independent candidate but has a strong ties with *kwuntong manluenwui* 觀塘民聯會 (Kwun Tong Resident Association) which has a tight connection with DAB (see Table 2). And more importantly, all of them are Chaozhou and maintain collaborative positions in the Chaozhou associations.

<u><i>Electoral divisions</i></u>	<u><i>District Councilors</i></u>	<u><i>Affiliations</i></u>
Upper NTK 上	Hau Shui-pui	Kwun Tong Resident Association
Mid NTK 中	Chan Kam-lam	DAB
Lower NTK 下	Chan Kwok-wah Ben	DAB

Table 2 - Regime leaders in former Ngautaukok area, before 1999.

(by Author.)

Though this paper aims at investigating postcolonial dynamics in the local level, some background information of Ngautaukok contributing to the current makeup should not be neglected. Attention to some background facts before the handover would somehow give hints to the situation of Ngautaukok in recent years. By retrieving some figures from the 1996 *By-census*, done in the year before the handover (see Table 3), I endeavor to show that the concentration of Chaozhou- or Hokkien-speaking group is of a higher density than the other

⁹ The group is usually referred to as Hoklos by indigenous scholars, but this term is not appropriate in describing the Hailufeng at all. Because the term Hoklo, according to C. Fred Blake (1981), was usually referred to the Hokkien-speakers on Hong Kong waters instead of solely the people from Hailufeng in postwar times.

zones in the territory of Hong Kong.

<i>Areas \ Figures</i>	<i>Chiu Chau</i>	<i>Hokkien</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Percentage of pop.</i>
The Whole Territory	65,934	112,111	6,217,556	2.86%
Kwun Tong District	12,750	10,819	587,071	4.01%
TPU 2.9.1	1,617	693	78,190	2.95%
TPU 2.9.2	1,209	413	60,412	2.68%
TPU 2.9.4	5,350	7,476	203,055	6.31%

Table 3 - Percentage of "Chiu Chau/Hokkien" as usual languages in 1996 By-census.

(source: 1996 Population By-census by Tertiary Planning Units;
1996 Population By-census by District Boards.)

Ngautaukok, abbreviated as "TPU 2.9.4,"¹⁰ includes the formerly said three electoral divisions (Upper, Mid, and Lower) had shown a population of 6.31% in speaking Chaozhou (Chiu Chau) or Hokkien which was far above the Hong Kong average, which was only 2.86%. The census had excluded those bilingual population who speaks also Cantonese into the mainstream category (of Cantonese). This means the actual figure should be higher. And according to a compiled figures (see Table 4) done by Helen F. Siu (2008), Kwun Tong and Kowloon City were the two districts of third highest number of PMRs - *Persons from the Mainland having Resided in Hong Kong for less than 7 years* - while among these PMRs, the highest percentage of migrants were from the four municipalities of Chaozhou.

Rank	District Council District	Proportion of PMRs
1	Yau Tsim Mong	7.90%
2	Shamshuipo	7.30%
3	Kowloon City	4.80%
4	Kwun Tong	4.80%
5	North	4.70%

Table 4 - Proportion of PMRs in District Council Districts.

(source: Census and Statistics Department 2002; c.f. Siu 2008: 122.)

But with a detailed examination of these figures we may find that the number of migrants from Hailufeng (Shanwei 汕尾, in the figures) was higher than the total sum of other Chaozhou areas (municipalities of Jieyang 揭陽, Chaozhou 潮州, and Shantou 汕頭).

¹⁰ TPU stands for tertiary planning unit.


This experience seems echoing with Alan Smart's (1992) study in Wong Tai Sin District, the nearby second highest densely populated district of Chaozhous in Hong Kong, that government census, seems intended to, not differentiate between people from Chaozhou (Chiu Chau) and Hailufeng (Hoi Luk Fong). In Smart's (1992: 88-89) account, almost all (except one) the households in Diamond Hill's squatter area were of Hailufeng origin instead of Chaozhou. But the government's *1981 Hong Kong Census* has solely listed them as "Chiu Chau."

The key issue here is that politics of identity in post-handover time relates highly to the ethnic residue in colonial era. The above figures showed us that the census was trying to categorize the Hailufengs into either *Chaozhou* (geographically) or *Hokkien* (linguistically). And it led to their powerlessness to gather as a group to fight for certain rights in colonial times. In Ngautaukok, the deity temple is a good example to sketch this.

NEGOTIATE FOR A TEMPLE

To build a temple in public space, the group normally should have obtained the approval from the Home Affairs Department and before so, this group should have attained communal agreement with enough folk supporters in the area. The Hailufeng was not gathered together with a state apparatus (such as census), like the Chaozhous, and could hardly get even a piece of land to place their deity.

Previously, all the temples (two in total) erected in Ngautaukok was in favor to the Chaozhou group (see Map 3), all of them were controlled by the Chaozhou folks. But with a resettlement scheme, rounds of negotiation with the government and the other interest groups allowed rooms for the erection of a third one, as advocated by the Hailufengs.



Map 3 - Locations of existing temples in Ngautaukok area.

(source: Wong Kwok-hing Dominic 2004.)

The map (see above) shows a brief setting of two Fook Tak 福德 Temples, which house the Chaozhou deity of *tieti-bemo* 天地父母 (Parents of Heaven and Earth). The permanent one was built in the early days when the residents were still living in squatter huts in Jordan Valley; while the small one, was a previous negotiation with the Housing Department by the Chaozhous when they moved into the Lower towers. The Hailufengs only had their deity placed, firstly, on the rooftop of Tower 5 in Lower Zone I and later on, moving to an open space area at the corner of Tower 13 and 14. This has long been a controversial issue among the Hailufengs, the Chaozhous, and the Housing Department.

In a letter to the District Office, the Association representing the Hailufeng wrote,

"The Huizhou and Hailufeng are of a race (*j^huk* 族) that work hard, and not distracted from work. Their economic situation becomes better and better, in addition [to the hardwork], came along with the blessings from *sie-dzin gong-ma* 聖人公媽. That's why every year we meet with rituals, with unity, and energy... The deity tablet on the rooftop of Tower 5, had only metallic cover. The Housing Department should have record on this.

"With the blessings of *siε-dzin gong-ma* 聖人公媽, we live happily and gained economic prosperity. NICA was established as a limited company in 1973, with a premise at Tower 3, shop no. 19. The company is non-profitable aiming at serving our *race* and Kaifongs...

"..., the Department of History at CUHK should have recorded our contributions through interviews.

"But since 2000, the Housing Department redevelops Lower Estate. Tower 1 to 7 was demolished in 2003. The residents were dispersed, but the deity *siε-dzin gong-ma* 聖人公媽, now, became homeless. Hence, we temporary place it in open space at Tower 13, for worshippers to pray. However, this is not allowed by the Housing Department. It is very urgent to find a permanent *home* (*kwai-suk* 歸宿) for *siε-dzin gong-ma* 聖人公媽.

"This year's Yuelan is coming. We have sent letters to various government departments for the rituals. These departments include Leisure and Cultural Services, Home Affairs, Police Public Relations, Housing Department, and Land Department, etc. Since 1969, this never ceased. To hold the Yuelan activity is to *memorize* (*gei-lim* 紀念) *siε-dzin gong-ma* 聖人公媽 and its spirit of the dead. Deity *siε-dzin gong-ma* 聖人公媽 is the god of our race. Yuelan is to pray to the gods and ghosts, and to memorize *siε-dzin gong-ma* 聖人公媽. For the good climate, and for peace in our land."

With in-depth discussions with the leaders of NICA, they showed me some documents submitted to various levels of government officials for the approval of land lease to build a new temple. And in this process, the biggest obstacle was not the government itself but the reactionary forces from the dominant group Chaozhou.

"They keep on referring us as *hiā-ti* 兄弟 (co-Chaozhou brothers), but not allowing us to join [their festivals] nor allowing us to take part in the regime [*chamyee guaanlei* 參與管理, in a heavily Hokkien accent Cantonese] such as the regional advisory board."

The complicated meetings are to be skipped here, but a few important figures should be mentioned. They are Chan Kam-lam (legislative councilor), Chan Kwok-wah Ben (district councilor) and Deacan Liu¹¹ (district councilor), who worked out a compromising plan for the "*reconstruction*" of the temple. Here, I put the term in quotation marks because the temple of Hailufeng's deity had never existed. But with the help of these key regime leaders, the deity was told to have resided in the permanent Fook Tak Temple (see Map 3) for as long as the Estate built. In the festival, since then, the Chaozhou deity of *tieti-bemo* 天地父母 was also included (but not all the tablets)¹². The government, thus in 2009, had granted a garden space, slightly smaller than the Chaozhous' at the corner of Ngau Tau Kok Road and Kwun Tong By-pass, to the Hailufengs. And the administrative rights was also given to NICA.

The issue seems to have been successfully solved and in 2009. It was the last year that the NICA Yuelan organizing committee held their banquet at Super Star Seafood Restaurant in Amoy Garden, Ngautaukok. It is a restaurant run with Chaozhou capital and is said to have the most elaborated dining hall. Sherman Ngor, the secretary-general at the Association told me that they decided to put it there only because they want to show their economic power to the Chiukiu, since it's very expensive [for a table]. "We are *gum gou gum dai* 咁高咁大 (as tall as, and as fit as [the Chiukiu]) here, in Ngautaukok." And only in those years when they house the banquet at that Restaurant they invited also the Chiukiu to attend. By the end of 2009, the Home Affairs Bureau had finally agreed to relocate the deity of *siε-dzin gong-ma* 聖人公媽 to a proposed temple garden at the intersection of Ngau Tau Kok Road and Kwun Tong Bypass. The site previously granted to the Chiukiu is now assigned to build a temple that belongs to NICA as well, the representative group of the Hailufeng in Ngautaukok. The

¹¹ This is a pseudonym, with special request from the District Councilor.

¹² I have noted down each time they picked put which tablet to pray with.

issue becomes a more internal one that mainly challenge the financial capability of the Association.

The success of claiming a temple space should also merit the efforts made by the Concern Group, started by Sheng Kui Hui Community Development Center. Their work in postponing the redevelopment schedule bought time for NICA to negotiate their stakes with the regime, including that with the Chaozhou (*Teokio*).

REMAINING ETHNIC QUESTIONS

In the process of negotiation, the Hailufengs were also persuaded to give up their religious rituals by replacing it with the Chaozhou Buddhist tradition. However, the Chaozhous did not admit that this has anything to do with the temple issue; and they suggest that it is solely a matter of whether to include the Yuelan of NICA into the proposal to be submitted to the State Council for candidate item in the National Catalog of Intangible Cultural Heritage. The discussions among the stakeholders were told to be confidential by my informants, and I am not intended to put it here. The only thing I stress here is the result that NICA had not adopted the idea after the entitlement application.

To NICA, having a new temple is more important than any other issues at all. In September 17, 2009, a celebration dinner was arranged at Super Star Seafood Restaurant in Amoy Garden (as aforesaid, the last year). The dinner, with more than 30 tables, was arranged to invite all the relevant parties that has contributed their efforts in the Yuelan held a week earlier, from September 5 to 9. The organizing committee assigned two tables at the front to the Chiukiu and its affiliates. Besides the core members of Chiukiu at Ngautaukok the seats were filled with most of the DAB district councilors in the nearby sub-districts. And during the banquet, DAB LegCo member Chan Kam-lam went onto the stage and sang a Chiu Chau song: *ngo loi ji Chiuchau* 我來自潮州 ("I came from Chiu Chau") and spoke in Cantonese, calling the NICA in a wrong name - as "*ngautaukok gaifong luenyiwui*" (Ngautaukok Kaifong Association). After the show, Chan left before 9pm, in which the banquet had just started for half an hour. He thanked all the Kaifong for their supports and urged everyone to "support"

(vote) for the party members in future.

The stage was then passed on to the organizing committee, with one of the directors going up delivering a few Canto-pop songs to the guests. He, in a song called *youyi maansui* 友誼萬歲 ("Friendship forever"), invited a district councilor Betty Lau¹³ to stage with him. But during the performance, the DAB district councilors went around to greet and made use of the opportunity to send out their name cards. The banquet was an annual event to gather all the Hailufeng folks within Kwuntong area, and a few of the members of NICA had a bad feeling that the Chiukiu (including the Chiu Chau folks in the DAB camp) was making foul play on their Yuelan.¹⁴

This kind of sentiments was seriously discussed among a few members during the dinner and later on, Edwin Tong, the former inspector-in-chief of Lower Ngautaukok Estate who served at the HKHA for more than thirty years, stepped on the stage and sing a series of classical Canto-pop. With a little drunk, he suggested that the name of NICA should be changed in order to make everyone knows (in Hong Kong Island and Kowloon) so that nobody will ever call it wrongly. This ignited a blame from Jean Tang, a member of the organizing committee, to openly criticize the guests who did "irrelevant business" in the banquet hall. At midnight, the banquet dismissed but the organizing committee was still in the hall discussing these issues, as well as the bill. The director-general spoke in an angry tone and suggested that every members should declare their *Hokloness* and made clear claim of whether or not they are Chiu Chau. He pointed to a few young members and urged them to "go home and rethink if they submit to the Chiu Chau identity instead of the Hoklos'."

In July 2011, Morris Wan the director-general of NICA announced in their monthly meeting that the festival they held was enlisted in the National Catalog of Intangible Cultural Heritage,¹⁵ as proposed by the Kowloon East Chaoren Association (Kowloon East Association of Chiu Chau Fellows) in late 2009. Members at the meeting had consistently

¹³ This is a pseudonym, with special request from the District Councilor.

¹⁴ The Yuelan does not only compose of the 5 days but also all the events that happen in the Seventh Lunar month. Thus, the organizing committee considers the *hinggongyin* 慶功宴 (celebration dinner) as part of the Yuelan and is even as important as the main days. Interviewed with Morris Wan, September 17, 2009 at Super Star Seafood Restaurant.

¹⁵ According to the Hong Kong Heritage Museum's website, the enlisted item is called "Yu Lan Festival of Hong Kong Chiu Chow Community." See: <http://www.heritagemuseum.gov.hk/engtxt/cultural/cultural.aspx>. Accessed at February 17, 2012.

reflect that they should have gained certain degree of convenience in arranging the future Yuelan in negotiation with the government departments.¹⁶ But whether or not they are Chaozhou or Hailufeng is of no importance. Meanwhile, NICA members tried to draw votes from their ethnic mass in the following District Council election, in late 2011. The poll result, as shown in Appendix II, reflects a higher coverage of pro-Establishment camp in the sub-districts that surround the festival.

CONCLUSION

The point I argue here is that the postcolonial government, and its subsidiary regime, is continue maintaining, and remaking, the local order through the manipulation of these cultural identity (either Chaozhou or Hailufeng). And among all, festivals and temples are both the keys to ethnic attachments in Ngautaukok. I do not intend to go deep into details on the colonial administrations, which should have been covered in my thesis. The audience's attention should be drawn to the festivals in this sub-district, as well as in the other urban zones. Festivals gather and mobilize the urban mass effectively in an ethnic sense. Meanwhile, the territory-based associations have established their authority through the use of these festivities. This phenomenon should be universal in downtown Hong Kong, at least, in Kowloon Peninsula. But in Ngautaukok, the Resettlement Plan hinged a good excuse to the remake of ethnic sentiments in the area and gave rise to a communal fight for a temple in the redevelopment scheme.

¹⁶ Yu, Vito. Unpublished field notes, July 16, 2011.

APPENDIX I

Images of Ngau Tau Kok Estate.



image. Lower Ngau Tau Kok Estate Zone II in 2009
(source: Hong Kong Housing Authority, 2009)



image. Lower Ngau Tau Kok Estate Zone I and II in 1970
(source: Hong Kong Housing Authority, 2009)

APPENDIX II

Distribution of seats in District Council around the festival area

<i>sub-districts \ by year</i>	<i>1999</i>	<i>2003</i>	<i>2007</i>	<i>2011</i>
Kowloon Bay 九龍灣	PWC	PWC	PWC	PWC
Kai Yip 啟業	AYH (DP)	AYH (DP)	SLH (DAB)	SLH (DAB)
Lai Ching 麗晶	PCY (DAB)	PCY (DAB)	PCY (DAB)	PCY (DAB)
Ping Shek 坪石	CKL (DAB)	CKL (DAB)	CPL (DAB)	CPL (DAB)
Sheung Choi 雙彩 ^(a)	--	--	--	TSC (DAB)
<i>Jordan Valley</i> 佐敦谷 ^(b)	LNA (DP)	LNA (DP)	WWT (DP)	NMY (DAB)
<i>To Tai</i> 淘大	YHK	YHK	YHK	YHK
<i>Ngautaukok</i> 牛頭角 ^{(c)(d)}	CKW (DAB)	CKW (DAB)	CKW (DAB)	CKW (DAB)
<i>(Upper NTK)</i> ^(e)	HSP ^(f)	--	--	--

Table X - Turnout of DC Elections in 8 sub-districts in Ngautaukok. ^(g)
(source: "Kwun Tong District Council" website; accessed at February 15, 2012.)

Notes

- (a) Sheung Choi 雙彩 sub-district was created in 2011's election for the geographical constituency of two newly built estates up on the previous larger zone of Ping Shek 坪石 sub-district.
- (b) Jordan Valley is a Home Ownership Scheme sub-district, and Chan Kam-por (for DAB) had tried to challenge the Democratic Party candidate before the taking over of the seat by DAB in 2011.
- (c) Ngau Tau Kok sub-district was divided into Upper and Lower sections in 1999 election, and had been merged into one in 2003.
- (d) Chan Kwok-wah Ben was the district councilor for Lower NTK sub-district in 1999, and continued to be the councilor for Ngau Tau Kok sub-district after the merger.
- (e) Besides "Upper Ngau Tau Kok," there was also "Mid Ngau Tau Kok" in previous DC sessions till 1999. And was canceled in 2003.
- (f) Hau Shui-pui declared as independent, but was president of the Ngau Tau Kok Kaifong Welfare Association.
- (g) The nearby three sub-districts of the festival is bold in *italic*.

abbreviations, with surnames in capital letters

- AYH AU Yuk-har Grace, for Democratic Party.
- CKL CHAN Kam-lam, for DAB.
- CKW CHAN Kwok-wah Ben, for DAB.
- CPL CHAN Pak-li Bernald, for DAB.
- HSP HAU Shui-pui.
- LNA LEE Ning Alice, for Democratic Party.
- NMY NGAN Man-yu, for DAB.
- PCY POON Chun-yuen, for DAB.
- PWC POON YAM Wai-chun Winnie.

SLH	SZE Lun-hung, <i>for</i> DAB.
TSC	TAM Siu-cheuk, <i>for</i> DAB.
WWT	WONG Wai-tag, <i>for</i> Democratic Party.
YHK	YIP Hing-kwok.

REFERENCES

- Anon, n.d. *Annual Departmental Report by the Commissioner for Resettlement*. Hong Kong: Resettlement Department.
- Anon, 1965. *The Seventh Annual Report of Ngau Tau Kok Kaifong Welfare Association*. n.p.
- Anon, 2011. *Zhongyuan jie* (Zhongyuan Festival: the Intangible Cultural Heritage in China). Hong Kong: Federation of Hong Kong Chiu Chow Community Organizations.
- Blake, C.F., 1981. *Ethnic Groups and Change in a Chinese Market Town*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
- Census and Statistics Department. 1997. *1996 Population By-census by Tertiary Planning Units*. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
- Census and Statistics Department. 1997. *1996 Population By-census by District Boards*. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
- Census and Statistics Department. 2002. *2001 Population Census: Thematic Report - Persons from the Mainland Having Resided in Hong Kong for Less than 7 Years*. Hong Kong: Census and Statistics Department.
- Hayes, J., 1977. *The Hong Kong Region, 1850-1911: institutions and leadership in town and countryside*. Imprint Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books.
- Issei, T., 1981. *Ritual Theatres in China*. Tokyo: Institute of Oriental Studies.
- Sinn, E. and Wong, W.L., 2005. Place, identity and immigrant communities: The organisation of the Yulan Festival in post-war Hong Kong. *Asia Pacific Viewpoint*, 46(3), pp.295-306.
- Siu, H.F., 2008. Positioning 'Hongkongers' and 'New Immigrants'. In: H.F. Siu and A.S. Ku, eds. *Hong Kong Mobile: making a global population*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
- Smart, A., 1992. *Making Room: Squatter Clearance in Hong Kong*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
- Wong, K.H.D., 2004. *Sustaining the Intangible Cultural Heritage: The Traditions of Yue Lan Festival in the Redevelopment of Ngau Tau Kok Estate*. M.Sc. thesis (The University of

Hong Kong).

Yip, Y.Y., 2003. *Clean Ngau Tau Kok Pilot Project - Final Report*. Hong Kong: Civic Exchange.

Yu, V., 2010 Nasal Endings in Southern Min Dialects along Chaozhou Coast: nasalization and its historical implications. Paper presented at the seminar on *Language and Evolution* held at HKUST.

Why the (Freudian) Unconscious was not Discovered in China?

Other and Desire in Hong Kong

Diego Busiol

City University of Hong Kong

Email: diegobusiol@gmail.com

I want to expose here some reflections which I encountered during my research about Psychoanalysis and Hong Kong culture. I want to say that my title is a little bit provoking, because to most of Hong Kong people the words Psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud (佛洛伊德), and Unconscious (潛意識) are meaningless. So, we could either ask how was possible for Freud to invent such unconscious in Europe, more than a hundred years ago, and how is possible that the Chinese culture, still at today, didn't meet anything like the Freudian unconscious? Not only in the past, but even today.

I find relevant and interesting that the Chinese thought has never encountered, that has never theorized the question of the Other, the unconscious. A rather radical question could be: would it be possible to “discover” the unconscious out of the Western discourse?

WHAT IS THE (FREUDIAN) UNCONSCIOUS?

This term was already being used by many others before Freud, but always in a phenomenological, descriptive manner. Freud came imagine and describe what we now know as the Unconscious in particular through the study of dreams, neuroses, and all those elements of the psychopathology of everyday life: oversights, blunders, lapses, omission. The discovery, or even the invention of the unconscious, marked the beginning of Psychoanalysis. For Freud the *psyche* was not simply a unified entity, coincident with the consciousness of the person. On the contrary, the “I” represented just a small part of it. “the conventional equation of the psychical with the conscious is totally inexpedient” (The Unconscious). The unconscious was then the submerged part, and psychoanalysis then became the study of the depth.

“The unconscious comprises, on the one hand, acts which are merely latent,

temporally unconscious, but which differ in no other respect from conscious ones and, on the other hand, processes such as repressed ones, which if they were to become conscious would be bound to stand out in the crudest contrast to the rest of the conscious processes.” (The Unconscious, 1915)

Freud proposed two model of the unconscious. The first is called the topographic model of the mind, and consisted of Conscious (Cs), Preconscious (Pcs), Unconscious (Ucs). In this case the very unconscious was a name, thus an entity itself. Unconscious was a purely descriptive term, which referred to what is temporarily dormant. The distinction between what was conscious and what unconscious was clear:

The unconscious is not 'just a second conscience; is not a matter of elements belonging to two different fields, whose conscience would turn either (because of a splitting). These two instances are qualitatively different, and governed by very different principles: "what is proved is not the Existence of a second consciousness in us, but the Existence of psychical acts lack consciousness. We Shall Also be right in rejecting the term 'subconsciousness' as incorrect and misleading "(the unconscious)

And what was the principle organizing the psychic materials between the different instances?
The repression, which answered to a simple principle:

“the motive and purpose of repression has nothing else than the avoidance of unpleasure” (Repression, 1915)

The dynamic conception of the process of repression, however, rendered necessary to give a systematic meaning, so that the unconscious was equated with the repressed:

“Repressed is a dynamic expression, which takes account of the interplay of

mental forces; it implies that there is a force present which is seeking to bring about all kinds of psychical effects, including that of becoming conscious, but that there is also an opposing force which is able to obstruct some of these psychical effects, once more including that of becoming conscious. The mark of something repressed is precisely that in spite of its intensity it is unable to enter consciousness.” (Freud, *Delusions and Dreams in Jensen’s Gradiva*)

But in the second model, the Structural model from 1923, the psyche was divided into Id, Ego and Superego, and such new model didn’t just overlap the previous one. Though the Id was described as being in large part unconscious, the Ego and the Superego were partially conscious and partially unconscious. Unconscious thus became an adjective. The experience has shown that there is not simply the repressed unconscious on the one hand, and the ego with the preconscious on the other. Two facts shown that even in the ego there is an unconscious that behaves dynamically in the same way as the repressed unconscious: they are a resistance that proceeds from the ego during analysis and an unconscious sense of guilt.

Anyway, few characteristics of the Unconscious remained the same independently by the model:


“The nucleus of the Ucs. Consists of instinctual representatives which seek to discharge their cathexis; that is to say, it consists of wishful impulses.” The main characteristics of the Ucs. system are four. First, “there are in this system no negation, no doubt, no degree of certainty [...] Negation is a substitute, at a higher level, for repression.”. Second, the Unconscious proceeds by *displacement* (one idea may surrender to another its whole quota of cathexis), or by *condensation* (one idea may appropriate the whole cathexis of several other ideas). Third, “the processes of the system Ucs. are timeless; i.e. they are not ordered temporally, are not altered by the passage of time; they have no reference to time at all”. And fourth “the Ucs. processes pay just as little regard to reality. They are subject to the pleasure principle; their fate depends only on how strong they are and on

whether they fulfill the demands of the pleasure-unpleasure regulation”. (The Unconscious, 1915).

How does Freud intend to give voice to the Unconscious, and therefore to those desires seemingly unspeakable, that for this reason still continue to insist? Through what Freud calls the main technique of psychoanalysis, the one that more than others would be able to circumvent the censorship: the free associations. So, Freud proposed something innovative, because he suggested that the answer could come from the patient, even though the patient him or herself had no idea how to access this very knowledge. The hypothesis of Freud was that what is repressed is not erased, but still insists on another level, and it is possible to access this speech.

Then, the Unconscious is not simply what we don't know. Unconscious is more radically *what we do not know to know*.

Freud's model of personality structure



IS THE UNCONSCIOUS NEGLECTED IN HONG KONG AT TODAY?

In a previous research I interviewed a number of students about the way they normally deal with problems. What the answers from the students proofed me is that generally what belongs to the sphere of emotions and feelings tend to be labeled as not important, not a priority. Of course this is not the case, emotions are as important here as anywhere else. But, probably because of the local culture, it is not as encouraged the expression and the admittance of some inner feeling as a very important issue. Most of my respondents were for example attributing great importance to financial problems, or to practical difficulties as the need to find a job, or the difficulty in choosing the right school, rather than emotional, or psychological problems. This was quite surprising for me, as I was giving for granted that emotions and feelings are what really matter. Only later I realized that we give problems different names. My findings seem absolutely on line with what reported by Hsu (1971b), who in fact also argues that the Chinese consider bigger problems what affect the family, the clan, rather than the individual, and by Kleinman (1980) and his assistant, in Taiwan. Furthermore Hsu supports the basic idea that for example the Americans have a reversed scale of values than the Chinese, where the former perceive intrapsychic problems as relatively more stressful than family or financial problems.

As a result, there is probably less habit in dealing with emotions, and expressing inner feelings. To some western eyes, this different attitude can probably even appear as a kind of immaturity, a lack of experience, a lack of practice in expressing with words what come from the “inside”.

A different disposition in expressing is also confirmed by the important literature showing how the Chinese tend to manifest symptoms differently by other populations. For example, it has been shown that somatization is quite frequently medium of expression for symptoms in Chinese societies, which is probably consequent to a certain repression and in general to a low importance attributed to the act of speaking by the Chinese.

What Hong Kong people generally mention is rather a desire to “forget” the problem, just overcome it, go further. “Don’t think too much” is a common statement uttered by

Hongkonghers. Hong Kong Chinese have been described as more prone to give help, than to receive it, which is something that I have noticed too. “I don’t want to bother others” I have often been told. Whether this is true, or is it just an excuse, the result is that often desires and feeling are easily repressed. People might prefer a “quick fix”, rather than running the risk to open to the unknown. “Solving problems” is far way preferred to “talking about problems”. In psychoanalysis generally one starts presenting a problem, a symptom, and often we see that the speech follows its route, the symptom is forgotten for a while, the telling proceeds on its way. There is a tendency to talk, which is eradicated from longer time. Europe has probably experienced from longer time the benefits of catharsis; but in Hong Kong, it seems that it has to be discovered yet. Is catharsis a concept popular among the counselors in Hong Kong? I think so. It seems that Hong Kong is still discovering the benefits of the very act of talking. Catharsis is frequently mentioned in the counseling classes, while it is something that is more likely given for granted in Europe: if you have something inside, you should better talk, because the very act of talking free you from a heavy weight.

But, at today, for important that catharsis may be, it is antecedent to what we call psychoanalysis. And this might explain the reasons for the success of the very notion of “Counseling” in Hong Kong. Not Psychoanalysis, not Psychotherapy, but Counseling, which as the etymology indicates refers to giving advices, guidance. Thus, more likely answers rather than questions.

The Other as dangerous

Hong Kong is one of the safest cities in the world. It is rare to assist some scene of violence, or even to feel in danger walking in the streets. Even late in the night it is quite safe for a woman to walk outside. Aggressive behaviors in general are difficult to notice. Aggressivity is not just absent, of course, but it is well repressed and transposed elsewhere. For example at home, as the spouse battering is for example quite a big issue. But aggressivity is also largely projected to the external, for example in movies. According to ... Hong Kong cinema is even more violent than Japanese cinema. I personally noticed how Hong Kong

movies can be violent; for example lots of movies are about the eternal battle between cops and criminals, about corruption, the activities of the triads, drugs and prostitutions. All of this is surely present also in Hong Kong, just like in any other place in the world. But what I find surprising is that the quantity of this kind of movies produced in Hong Kong, absolutely does not match the reality of Hong Kong. The violence expressed in the Hong Kong movies is at least exaggerated if compared to the violence that is possible to find in the city. More likely, the violence expressed in the movies is the violence repressed, and then projected on the screen, as a fantasy that needs to come out.

Another way to project the repressed aggressivity is on what is external to Hong Kong. Hong Kong people feel often very nervous and very insecure whenever they (or someone close to them) have to travel to a foreign country. Not just any country. There is general tendency to consider possibly dangerous everything that is unknown. Then, for example, most of the non-English speaking countries are dangerous and possible source of problems. Not to mention places like Mainland China, or other countries from the South-east Asia. I personally have been reported the worst (and most absurd) stories of brutal homicide occurred to people who naively have visited those places, any sort of urban legends that by the way during the years I have heard a propos of different countries. What is this fear of the other? Is it racism? Is it paranoid? Or is some form of repressed aggressivity that suddenly comes out as inverted projection (I don't hate him; it's him who attempt at my health)? If this is the content of the feeling which are being repressed, and thus projected on the big Other, then it is not surprising that people might prefer not to investigate the unconscious. If the unconscious, the Other, is experienced as the place of the fears and the most unspeakable desires, then it dealing with the unconscious is perceived as something potentially dangerous, something that might lead to "discover" the bad person in us.

THE DESIRE IS THE DESIRE OF THE OTHER

We use to say that the desire is the desire of the Other. We could read this in at least two ways. But interestingly, here in Hong Kong one meaning seems to prevail, as if was the only

acceptable: the desire “which belongs to” the Other. The other possible meaning (desiring the Other) is apparently removed, as if socially improper. And in fact in Hong Kong (and in Chinese society in general) it is not good being seen by others as “desiring”; there is a great decency in front of others, a great sense of shame covers any expression of desire. And at the same time great attention is given to the desire coming from the Other. Whatever finds in position of Other has to be desiring, and *his desire has to be strong, continuous, reliable, without uncertainties or intermittences*.

It looks like as only the Other is called to define what is desirable; as if it could only be possible to desire what the Other desires, where his desire is oriented. So I read the fascination that I often perceive for the West, or for Japan, those countries that more easily occupy the position of the Other. The Other can be extremely fascinating, everything that comes from the Other (from the West?) is good and attractive, while formally the individual cannot show to be desiring, cannot show to be oriented by his own desire, this dimension still lacks completely.

As a consequence, the more the question of the Other is neglected, the more it emerges, and the desire is represented and projected all over objects, goods, and idealized lifestyles.

What 's the then price of not listening to the unconscious?

The production, meaning the culture of the work not as a pleasure, but as the only meritorious activity also to fill the gap on the Other; and the enjoyment (like shopping) as drive satisfaction, as a remedy even compulsive who must go to bridge this gap, this fault, this chasm that sometimes threatens to open up.

Failing to articulating the desire, many people try to find satisfaction collecting the “goods of desires” (this is also the name of a famous chain store in Hong Kong), so that the shopping became a sort of tentative of auto-therapy, a substitution, even a symptom. By this point of view the people pursue what they perceive as a fulfillment of desire not less than elsewhere. But we know that the unconscious desire has not a specific object. And for what concern the expression and the articulation of the own desire, Hong Kong people often demonstrate some difficulties.

INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM

The cultural variation between Chinese and Western societies is normally described recalling the distinction between *individualism* and *collectivism*. In particular the “Self” of Westerners is often described as “independent”, as opposite to the Self of the Chinese, which is more “interdependent”. (And for example a very stereotypical conception of Psychoanalysis leads someone to say that Psychoanalysis is good for Westerners but not suitable for the Chinese, because it aims at enhancing the individualization, the cultivation of one’s own desire, the independence, which are opposite to Chinese values).

Even though a general agreement that in Western societies the individualism is more spread, while in Chinese societies the collectivism is dominant, we are still reasoning in terms of quantity, in terms of “more or less”.

“Self in the Confucian sense is defined by a person’s surrounding relations, which often are derived from kinship network and supported by cultural values such as filial piety, loyalty, dignity. Given that, traditionally, the Chinese self involves multiple layers of relations with others, a person in this relational networks tend to be sensitive to his or her position as being above, below or equal to others. [...] In essence, a person can never separate him or herself from obligations to others”.

(Gao, 1996)

But who is the collective, and how large is it? We can say the notion of *self* has rather opposite meanings: while in the West it indicates someone who differentiates from others, in China it refers to someone who become like the community he belongs to, meaning not being distinct by the rest:

“The other-orientation thus is the key to an interdependent self. Congruous with the notion of an interdependent self, the Chinese self also needs to be recognized, defined, and completed by others. The self’s orientation to others’ needs, wishes,

and expectations is essential to the development of the Chinese self” (Gao, 1996)

But can we really say that the Chinese are *selfless*? (Hall & Ames). Or, on the contrary can we ask if a sense of *Self* is not even empowered by this societal structure?

“the Chinese sense of identity comes from the notion of the greater self (*da wo*), and from the necessity of sacrificing the smaller self (*xiao wo*) to fulfill the greater self.” (Pye, p. 59, 60)

The small self can be sacrificed for the big self, but still central is the self, only it is present at another level. In Chinese society one can sacrifice for his clan, one can devote to the others, because the system of mutual obligations also reassure him that he will get something. Expectances are high, it is not simply that one loses something and don't get anything back. The individual is just apparently watered down, while in reality its own place is preserved. Everyone contribute to make the group, and the group will sustain everyone.

The group is not the alternative to the individualism. In fact, within groups the hierarchy is quite strong, and individualism still finds its place, it only appears to be regulated differently. So, the group can also constitute a different strategy for preserving the individuality, an ultimate strategy for regulating and deferring the individuality, rather than overcoming it. So, for example one can accept to be in a submissive position because s/he knows that one day s/he will finally get access to a higher position and will receive the same treatment by others.

INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM AS DIFFERENT STRATEGIES FOR AVOIDING THE UNCONSCIOUS

The Freudian discovery is something more radical. Freud himself placed his discovery along the line of Copernicus and Darwin. While Copernicus showed that the man is not at the center of the universe, and Darwin showed that the man is not the center of the creation,

Freud finally showed that Freud showed that the “The ego is not master in his own home”.

He then showed that there is nothing like an individual, as something opposed to the group, to the community. In Latin *individuum* meant "an atom, indivisible particle". But the individual himself doesn't really exist, there is nothing which is indivisible, as everything arises in a field Other. If we can find something like the Freudian unconscious, it is because the individual is not originary; we all are inhabited by something else, a radical and inexhaustible otherness (that preceeds the individual): the unconscious, which at the same time belongs to us, and goes beyond us. The discovery of Freud is that the unconscious comes first. And if the unconscious comes first, the distinction between individual and collective is not originary. In fact, also Freud described the collective phenomena not necessarily as qualitatively different to the individual phenomena. Quite on the contrary, the social structures are more likely strategies that humanity find for overcoming the Unconscious, for regulating, for stemming the Unconscious under the reality principle. In this sense, the very success of Confucianism in Chinese society can also be read as a defense from the Unconscious: a rigid social structure, with a strong hierarchy seems what is best needed for containing the effects that could derive by a free expression of the Unconscious. Sacrificing a (small?) part of each one, for living in harmony(?) all together.

But on the other side, also the so called individualism (just as its opposite altruism) probably do not escape a representation of the Other. Individualism is the triumph of the reasoning, the triumph of the “I” (the Freudian “Ego”, the top of the iceberg that tries to overcome, to control the Unconscious). The individual says: “I do what I want”, while the experience of Psychoanalysis shows exactly that no one can simply do what s/he wants, as the Ego is under the primacy of the Unconscious, which is something internal and external at the same time.

THE SUBJECT: HIGHWAY TO THE OTHER

Could it be possible to invent the Freudian Unconscious out of the Western discourse? Probably not, and probably this is one reason why still, at today, it is apparently not successful

in Hong Kong.

One possible point is that the Chinese thought has never theorized anything similar to the unconscious because it has never developed a conception of the *subject* similar to the western one: only supposing a subject of *free will* one could see its limitation and inconsistency. Only assuming the (specious) idea of a subject fully master of his actions, one could discover the Other. This step was possible in Western discourse precisely as a *subversion* of the discourse itself. So, paradoxically it is also possible that exacerbating the individualism has led to see its inconsistency, accessing finally the Unconscious.

Furthermore, Chinese thought has never made a distinction between body and mind. The West did it, and this has represented at the same time a limit and a chance for further elaborations. Probably it is only assuming the separation between something like a mind and a body, *and locating the subject in the mind*, that it has been possible to theorize the unconscious.

Not that I am neglecting the theoretical and societal relevance of the concept of subject. On the contrary, it should deserve further attention. It has had some fundamental consequences, for example at a societal and political level (becoming autonomous subjects means that there are no longer masters and slaves, but individual with same rights and dignity); but the subject, as theorized within the western discourse, is in my opinion one of the greatest source of confusion and origin of problems; and I argue that most of the clinical manifestations that we can observe, and most of the symptoms, are related to a precise idea and representation of the so called subject (also the notion of personality descent by the subject, and it is not a case that Chinese thought has never developed any theory of personality).

I believe that the Chinese thought has never had the chance to thinking anything really radical on this regard. The Chinese tradition has always put at the first place the society, the community, and doing so it has always had a clear (because physically present, countable) other to the individual. As Chad Hansen wrote: “the difference between China and the West is that the first put the subject in the world, and the second in the mind”. What does this implies? *In Chinese tradition the individual has to face the rules and the law of the humans*; on the

contrary, in the West the person is not in relation to many others, he can even forget the others. What really matters is something radical, absolute, something “inward”.

THE TRANSCENDENT AND THE RELATIONAL

Confucianism thus emphasized the *relational dimension*, and we can say that it has neglected the dimension of transcendence, which instead was significant in the European culture, thanks to Christianity. “When Confucians were contemplating the ontology of the universe, they did not conceive a transcendent creator as Christians did” (Hwang, 2009). And this, apart from the religious aspect, defined a completely different type of relation. Relationships are regulated by strong hierarchy, and people could address their demands to their significant others (parents, teachers, ministers) and expect an answer from them. But for example one of the principles of the Bible is that all men are created equal before God, meaning all men experience and share the same finitude toward something transcending. There is something going beyond the register of the human reasoning, there is an absolute that the man cannot master. There is something that goes farther any possible human comprehension. So, the question should be addressed to this transcendent creator, who indeed answers in a very mysterious way. For those who are religious, this significant Other is of course God. But those who don’t believe have found the transcendent, this radical otherness elsewhere.

This represents something radical for people. Being confronted with something transcendent means also being confronted with one’s own *solitude*. If all men are equal before God, it means that no one else can give us the solution, as no one else has better access to any supposed universal knowledge. On the contrary, there is not knowledge which is universal at all. The knowledge is for everyone singular, and personal. Everyone is then confronted with his own personal question, and the way is for everyone different. Not the same way that others are walking, but most likely a way largely unknown. Probably, putting aside for a while the society, the others, western philosophy had the chance to face some more radical question.

And I don’t refer to religion, which is something interesting but still represents in my

opinion a tentative (too anthropomorphic) to localize, to give a place and a name to such otherness. When we mention the question of the Other, of the unconscious, in background is always the question of the word. If we didn't consider that is the word to be originary, we would reduce everything to ontology. What is really radically Other, what cannot be localized, or quantified is only the language (the mind is another invention for identifying a site of the language): all humans, as people speaking, we all are born within the language and structured by the language. We all were born within something bigger than us, something that makes at the same time all the humans equals and subjected to a law they cannot escape, the law of the language. All humans are subject to the law of language, and it has nothing to do with any moral code, or expected norms of behavior. It is structural, radical, not depending by any human will; it is experience of the limit. The West could experience the limit, and what was beyond the subject; on the contrary the Chinese thought located this otherness outside, finding many small others, instead of the (big) Other discovered by psychoanalysis.¹

THE POWER OF THOUGHT AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

Starting with the Greek philosophy, European thought has focused heavily on the thought, on the power of the reasoning, the critical thinking, the profession of the doubt, the speculation. On the contrary, Asian societies developed techniques and meditation practices, which appears aiming at diluting, diverting, containing, quieting the thought.

¹Yes, also in Chinese thought there is something above the humans, the *Tian*, the sky, or heaven. But I read the Tian as a tentative to representing the Other. The Tian is something the individual has to deal with; surely, also in Chinese tradition the man is not fully master of his acts; he doesn't simply do what he *feels* or *want* to do; the sky lies above the individuals, and it is tied to him in a one-way (top-down) relation. For example, Confucius claimed that "Heaven has given birth to virtues that are in me"; and Mozi said that the Heaven has its will, which humans must follow. But the Heaven, which is not only the origin of the world but probably the world itself, is more the site of the natural and moral order, expression of the good and the bad, kind of a code the individuals should respect. Morality then, rather than ethics.

On the other side the *Xin* (the heart) is at the same time the organ for thinking and the seat for thought and emotions. The heart, and not the brain. No division between affects and cognitions: the *xin* guides action, but not via beliefs and desires. It takes input from the world and guides action in light of it (Chad Hansen). There are not (personal) beliefs, because the path should be clear to everyone, as indicated by the sky, by societal norms, by conventions. And there are not desires, because in Chinese thought the desire is generally evil, as something to avoid in any case. So the action should be in accordance with what is good, what is right, then with morality.

“The Chinese *xin* is not so much an arousing factor as a stabilizing medium. A premodern exegesis of the term *qing*, which means ‘emotions’ or ‘affect’ equates it with *jing*: ‘quietude’. The modern sage Liang Shuming says: The human mind-heart (*xin*) is capable of quietude; what is contrary to quietude is emotional impulse. Emotional impulse is a state of the body (*shen*)” (Sun, 1991).

Psychoanalysis is alternative to both. It doesn’t simply ignore the thoughts, it doesn’t simply aims at overcoming the saying, it doesn’t simply redirect the attention to an emptiness. Psychoanalysis aims at a different listening, meaning to listen differently what is being said, with another accent. It is not simply rejecting what is said, or what is thought; it is rather a subversion of the utterance, of the statement, for retracing the singularity of each one in his saying.

The Other is at the same time inside and outside me. It opens to the infinite: time and space are no longer the traditional categories. The Unconscious is timeless, and it cannot be confined in a given space. It is not in me, or in you, or between us. It is collective in the way it concerns everyone. It is a radically other dimension, which cannot be inscribed in any philosophical category. It is not simply the non-conscious (Wu Yishi 无意识), it is not just a void (Zhong Kong 中空), and is not simply what lies under the conscious, not simply what we are not aware of (潜意识 Chim Yee Sik, Subconscious). The Unconscious is, by definition, what can never be said all, what can never be fully grasped.

The unconscious is not just the opposite of the conscious. It is not just its negative, nor is its negation. The unconscious is not emptiness; it is rather a lack. The unconscious is not like the white canvas of the Chinese painter, which is then crossed by the painter's brush. The unconscious is already material, color, words; and it cannot be fixed, it changes, it evolves.

MEDITATION AND THE IDEA OF HEALING THE THOUGHT

In the Greek-Christian tradition the thought has always been considered the only way that leads to gain the knowledge, and the truth. In particular, from Plato on, men thought that

making radical questions was the sign of the degree of civilization achieved. The intellect became then the main instance for investigating the world, and the argumentation, and the question the basis for any speculation. This is probably not the same way indicated by Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism, which instead underlined the uselessness of any question for knowing the world. Most western thought insisted in the research of the truth, universal or singular as it can be declined. And still, even facing the inconsistency of any explanation, still the question insisted as practice for accessing, or we could say for inventing, the world:

“The way and the truth: in the West, truth is a knowledge of what is real and what That Represents reality. For the Chinese, knowledge is not abstract, but concrete, it is not representational, but performative and participatory, it is not discursive, but is, as a knowledge of the way, a kind of know-how.” (Thinking from the Han p.104)

While in Europe the thought has radicalized (not only with Descartes: "I think, therefore I am", but already 'with many others before and after him), and turned into creative thinking, critical thinking, absolute thinking, weak thinking, etc... on the contrary China has met silence and meditation. In particular, the Chinese way is never been extreme, radical, absolute, but rather median. China (Zhong Guo, 中国, the Middle Country), the median void (Zhong Kong, 中空), and the middle way (中庸 Zhōng Yōng):

"The middle way is really a journey and a path, exactly because it is, and wants to be, the way that leads to the realization and not mere rumination. It is not only a midpoint between two horizontal way, is not only between the opposite poles of two contrasting opinions, but it is the middle because it soberly stops between two extremes, and it is not intended to lead us up to a limit, which is projection our mind "(The Silence of the Buddha, p. 256)

While the West focused on rhetoric and logic, as premises for the correct and effective art of argumentation and practice of speech (and then insisted in formulating questions), meditation seems rather to assume that no answer can be found through the formulation of a question. As to say that the question sets at the same time the limits for its answer, hence its uselessness.

THE VOID AND MEDITATION

The void of the Taoism apparently expresses the necessity to neutralize the different drives². Repression of desires, and annihilation of the Ego. This “void” recalls an emptiness, rather than a lack, a subjective division introduced by the Unconscious, and as such structural. Quite on the contrary, the void of the Taoist is a void that follows an action: still, it is the subject who can decide whether to be wise or not, whether to create or not this void. Such void appears then as a refusal of the knowledge, rather than as subversion of the knowledge given. The point is to remove the negative, the unnecessary, and the distracting thoughts from what is set as a priority. Literally, it is to empty the space, to empty the “trash bin”, to put it aside. Take a deep breathe: empty the interior space and take breathe that blends the ying and the yang. The void as what makes the things proceeding, Techniques, exercise, practice, this is required; and some annihilation.

Can we retrace echoes of this annihilation in the everyday life in Hong Kong? Could it be this the way for standing this omnipresent Other? Hong Kong is one of the city with the highest rate of population density in the world. Often, three generations share the same small apartment. In the street, in the MTR, thousands of people walk next to each other, sometime stepping on the feet or bumping against other. There are no boundaries, no physical boundaries, and (to the Western eyes) a quite limited concept of the privacy. Not surprisingly, given this pervasive Other, we assist to several manifestations which apparently suggest this idea of the void as strategy for recreating an inner space, another dimension. For example, we

² The “median-void,” or the French “vide-médian,” translates the Chinese 冲氣 (or 中氣, according to the 馬王堆甲本 of the *Lao-zi*) in the line 萬物負陰而抱陽, 冲氣以為和 from section 42 of the *Laozi*. The phrase means literally “neutralize (or moderate, or blend) the *qi* (breath or air, of *yin* and *yang*).” The line may be translated as “ten thousand things [that is, everything in the universe] carry *yin* on their backs and embrace *yang* in their arms and are harmonized by the blending of the breath (of *yin* and *yang*).”

see an uncountable number of young guys who walk around, in the street, in the underground, in the malls, even at university, with the earplugs for the music. Majority of the people in the underground are constantly on the mobile phone, some texting friends, some others playing videogames, and some even watching movies. Another emerging phenomenon in Hong Kong is defined by a Japanese word: Hikikomori, which refers to the young people who withdrawn from the external life, and are capable to live for weeks or months in their own room, having contacts with the external only through internet. So, far from reading these manifestations just as disorders, can we say that these forms of isolation aims at recreating a new dimension, even more critical, more creative than what society offers? Again, the idea of recreating a distance, a space around oneself, and at the same time an internal void, the emptiness. A rather physical distance then, not just the distance *within* the word, which is for example what we retrace in the work of the unconscious (as we said, the Unconscious is timeless, and neither can be localized in a space). This idea of the void, as expressed for example through these phenomena of isolation, is not the same of the unconscious. The paradox of the Unconscious is that when we are talking it is no longer unconscious, but at the same time it can never become empty. The Unconscious cannot come to compromise, as it is not in the opposition individual Vs society. If there is a disposition to listen to the unconscious, there is nothing like an alternative between the will of the individual, and the will of the group, for example. There is loneliness, or isolation, as opposition to the group. Maybe there is the solitude, which is what everyone can experience even between many others. The solitude is precisely the fact that the journey is for everyone singular (not individual), meaning different from the path that others may walk. The solitude is the fact the nobody else can guarantee for your speech, that no group, and no other individual or professional can talk in your place.

CHINESE THOUGHT AT ITS EXTREME CONSEQUENCES

If we look at the history of the Chinese thought, we can see that in different times different schools and orientations were prevailing. Some schools even shared similar positions as the Greeks philosophers. However, probably because of societal reasons, Taoism and

Confucianism finally overcame the others, and shaped the Chinese thought.

While the Western discourse focused on the substance, Chinese philosophy has emphasized the form. The social structure of Chinese societies has perhaps favored conformity, and thus conformism, rather than critical thinking; practical attitude and concrete thinking, rather than theorization and abstraction (and maybe even to pragmatism); the technique to the theory, the solution to the analysis.

It is the Western thought that tried to go “in-depth”, “to the bottom”. Quite on the contrary, the Chinese thought limited the use of the speech, it has reduce it often to a tool for communicating:

“In contrast to Western cultures, where communication is often seen as an expression of ‘self’, Chinese cultures treat ‘communication’ as a means of reaffirming the communicator as a member of society and of maintaining existing relationships, social harmony and status differentials. If communication is seen as a ‘tool’ for Americans to express an authentic ‘self’ – so that individual differences are likely to be acknowledged or even emphasized – Chinese social harmony is an effort to reaffirm the importance of the collectivity.” (Chang, 2001).

I personally interviewed a number of students, and I have found that majority of them don't feel comfortable talking too much about personal issues (especially with strangers). As a consequence many people wish an immediate understanding, meaning not mediated by words. The fear of losing face remains stronger than the possible benefit given by talking about problems. The very notion of ‘problem’ has probably a very different meaning. But probably there is a tendency to remain at the surface, to not investigate the personal question, to not investigate the crisis. There is a general unconcern, that we probably can read also as a resistance, to the Unconscious. There is this idea (which is indeed a strategy) to empty the trash bin of the feelings, when some unease emerges. As if the equilibrium, the balance should be preserved at any cost. A balance that obviously the unconscious does not consider.

Where lodges the desire

Precisely, further elaboration of the desire is what Chinese thought lacks more (to be clear, for us *the desire is unconscious*, then out of the sphere of morality; neglecting the desire it is difficult to theorize the unconscious, and vice versa). The desire plays in the background, I would say; it is neglected, or most likely removed. But of course, when something is meant to be removed it plays even a greater pressure.

As said, the Chinese thought doesn't seem to be oriented to give listening to the unconscious. What is of the order of the desire, and therefore also of its symptomatic manifestations, is perhaps seen as something imaginary, and thus to something less important. Like if being imaginary meant been untrue, wrong, thus as something that should not be taken into account. The tendency to focus on practical, and concrete things, automatically puts thoughts and feeling in background. Furthermore, the Chinese thought interprets the behavior as a direct result of thinking. Each word must then follow the appropriate behavior. In other words: think before you do. Is it really possible to simply avoid the matters of the desire and the unconscious? What does it mean, and what consequences can have to theorize or not the subject (divided), recognize or neglect the question of the desire, consider or not the unconscious, etc...? How does it reflect on everyday life? And what way the unconscious finds for giving expression to the desire? And how, for example, does it shape the expression of symptoms? So I read the Hongkongese society: there is a very low habit (consequently a low ability) in listening the own desire. Desire is often repressed, it cannot be named (I argue it is both a social norm and a general difficulty in expressing it), but of course this doesn't mean that it doesn't have a weight.

REFERENCES

- Berry, J.W., Segall, M.H. and Kagitçibasi, C., 1997. *Handbook of Cross-cultural Psychology: Social behavior and applications*. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
- Chang, C., 2001. Harmony as performance: the turbulence under Chinese interpersonal communication. *Discourse Studies*, 3(2), pp.155-179.
- Hsu, F., 1971. Psychological homeostasis and Jen: conceptual tools for advancing psychological anthropology. *American Anthropologist*, 73, pp.23-44.
- Hwang, K.K., 2009. The development of indigenous counseling in contemporary Confucian communities. *The Counseling Psychologist*, 37(7), pp.930-943, DOI: 10.1177/0011000009336241.
- Kleinman, A., 1988. *Patients and healers in the context of culture*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Pye, L., 1968. *The Spirit of Chinese Politics*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Documentary Film and Political Changes in Indonesia (1900-2011)

Ade Suryani
Esa Unggul University
Email: ade.suryani@esaunggul.ac.id

INTRODUCTION

The culture of watching and producing film has been existed in Indonesia since 1900. The first entry of film in Indonesia could not be separated from the Dutch colonial influence, who introduced the film and spectatorship to the local communities in early 20th century. Since that day, the development of Indonesian documentary film has been going up and down as well as its political climate and the growth of the nation. If in the beginning era documentary film took an important role in colonial activity, war and propaganda, nowadays the influence is expanding into several aspects such as economy, politic, social and cultural, both locally and globally.

This research was conducted to see how the political changes in Indonesia influencing the development of its documentary film. The analysis is categorized based on the span of significant political changes that has been occurred in Indonesia. The time spans are: The Netherland Occupation Era (1900-1942), The Japan Occupation Era (1942-1945), The Old Order era (1946-1965), The New Order era (1966-1998) and the Post New Order era (1999-present). The data was collected with the historical study, by using in-depth interview technique and the analysis of several important documents. The result is presented chronologically based on the time spans mentioned before.

THE NETHERLAND OCCUPATION ERA (1900-1942)

In the first 45 years of its introduction to the technology called film, Indonesia was still under the occupation of Netherland and Japan. However, this research found out that these

nations gave different influences and impressions to the development of Indonesian documentary film on each era. The introduction of film to Indonesia began on December 4, 1900. On that day, The *Bintang Betawi* newspaper advertised about the movie spectacle which was held for the first time in East India (former name of Indonesia). The advertisement mentioned that:

“Nederlandsche Bioscope Maatschappij, The Nederland owned bioscope, starting from December 5 will held a great spectacle that open every night from 7 PM in a house at Tanah Abang Kebondjae (Manage) beside the train factory Maatschappij Fuchss’ (Jauhari 1992).

Specifically, Sasono (2009) explains about the root of Indonesian film history:

“Actually, the earliest film came to Indonesia was brought by Netherland, even though some people say that shadow puppet is an ancient form of cinema, or called *protocinema*. Before it became a cinema, shadow puppet has met the basic requirements of cinema; there were projection, screen, and actors. Those are 3 important elements. Animators might say shadow puppet is an animation. Filmmaker might also say it is a film. But the basic thing is the screen and the projection has already known in its first form. But however, film is the extension of photography, according to its history, never been mentioned as the extension of traditional art. Therefore, when it arrived in Indonesia, film was recognized as how it was known in Europe and America, especially in France.”

The first movie shown in Indonesia was about the visit of King and Queen of Netherland. It is clear enough that the entry of this film is because it was brought by Dutch people in that colonial era. Netherland which occupied Indonesia for about three-and-a-half centuries must had an important role in the early stage of Indonesian introduction to film. Only 5 years after the birth of the first film in the tiny café in France, Indonesian could also

enjoy the magical moving image phenomenon, or as the natives said '*gambar idoe*' (living image). But for sure, at that moment no one could describe or classify what kind of film it is, whether it's a fiction or a documentary.

While fiction film production just about to begin in 1926, documentary film has already earned its success. Before 1925, several documentary films have been published and most of it were capturing about The East India. Among the themes that usually explored were natural beauty (e.g. *Een apenkolonie in een natuurbosch op Java*, *Apenkolonie in een natuurbos op Java*, *Panoramische beelden G.G Idenburg*), agriculture (e.g. *De Rijsbouw op droge velden bij de Karo Bataks*), plantation (e.g. *Tabakscultuur in Deli*, *Het zoeken van eetbare vogelnestjes te Karang Bolong*), or the visit of colonial governor to some areas in East India (e.g. *Reis Willem I – Djokdja, Lijn Weltevreden - Meester Cornelis*), and some other themes.

In the regulation aspect, the first ordinance that existed in this occupation era was an ordinance of censorship. Jauhari (1992) explains that this screening censorship was made because the imported films from Europe and America were considered spreading negative messages to the natives. The colonial government thought that this message would create the negative image about them and threaten their image as a nation (invader) which more educated compared to natives (the colonized).

In more detail, Jauhari (1992) explains that the censorship ordinance came into effect in 1916. The rules are listed in *Ordonansi Bioscope 1916* which was recorded on *Staadshad van Nederlands Indie*, No. 276 about Spectatorship Control and No. 277 about Spectatorship Control in Batavia (former name of Jakarta), Semarang and Surabaya. These were the main cities where a lot of "Dutch Meneer" went to the cinema. Due to this ordinance, a responsible commission was established to control the cinema and the film spectatorship, called Film Censorship Commission. This commission was established in 4 main cities in East India; Batavia, Semarang, Surabaya and Medan (Lembaga Sensor Film 2005).

This ordinance also gave an inspection right to the commission whom the committees are elected by the Governor-General. Basically this ordinance still gave the opportunity to the cinemas to grow and import the favourable movies. It is because this regulation is more about controlling on the licence system before the film is shown. There was no clear determination

about which film was allowed and which one was prohibited, so most people thought that this ordinance is just concerned about the import film and spectatorship excise. Realizing the bad influence of films in cinemas, especially the one that considered would ruin the image of government in the colony, The 1916 Ordinance has been amended many times, as listed on Statue 1919 No. 337, Statue 1919 No. 742 and also on Statue 1922 No. 668. But none of those amendments specifically mentioned about the determination of allowed or prohibited film.

Those earlier ordinance were then amended again in the Statue No. 507 in 1940. This ordinance explained about what film means, the film spectatorship, the remedy, the mechanism of local and imported film inspection, also about the penalties of violations. The Film Commission was also given the great power. But in running the duty, this commission was required to consider the feeling that came from the political, religion or ethnicity point of view. Sasono (2009) considers that from this ordinance we can see how the colonial government wanted to take a part politically in a film and cinema matter. We can feel that there was a huge fear about the film influence in the stable social and politic situation of this colony at that time.

The East Indian government fully understood about the importance of the documentary film production. So that on April 17, 1925 the King's Decision about the establishment of *NV Nederlandsch Indische Film Maatschappij* (National Film Company) was published. That was the first national owned film company which specially established to produce the documentary film. This significant effort in developing local documentary film industry was intended to introduce its colony to the Dutch people in the motherland. Besides, it was also intended to cover up their shame on German which already made a film about East India and successfully published in German before (Jauhari, 1992).

Documentary film in this Netherland Occupation era was more functioned as the documentation instrument or the audio visual report about the East India. Imanjaya (2009) explains "...at that time, the aim was not propaganda, but it was the tool to record the colony to be sent to its motherland. It was something like the audio visual report. Indonesia is exotic and they (invader) were looking for something like that."

Prakosa's research (2008) supports this finding that film in the Netherland occupation era mostly intended to spread the knowledge about the East India, and also to eliminate the wrong image about the colony in the motherland. Those documentary films was showed for public who wanted to know about the East India, for the students, for trade and agricultural purposes, for the Christians and Catholics who did the missionary work for the church, and especially for the investors, so they would love to invest in East India.

Besides exploring about the natural beauty, agriculture and plantation, some documentaries were also produced to educate and change the East Indian's perception in several aspects, such as documentaries about health and disease, transmigration recommendation, government archive, government program like highway construction, and other activities which were secretly intended to be semi-propaganda. Most of the source for filmmaking at that era was also owned by the colonial government. There was no single private film company at that time. Therefore, the documentary film was used to meet the benefit of Netherland, either for propaganda or just archiving. The technology was also fully controlled by the invader, whilst the native was still uneducated. As a result, the involvement of natives in the film production was very little. Although being involved, they were just as the blue-collar worker who was not participated in decision making process. Every important role was fully taken by Netherlands so that the East Indians had no opportunity to learn more about filmmaking.

In the cinema spectatorship, the native was always put in the third class. It was the lowest level after the Europeans and the Chinese, so the native was prohibited to watch in the first class cinema. This position lasted long enough until Japan occupied East India. On March 8, 1942, Netherland officially handed over the occupation of East India to Japan. The time span of Japan occupation was 'only' three-and-a-half years, way shorter than three-and-a-half centuries of Netherlands occupation, but the influence of Japan in the documentary film in Indonesia was very obvious compared to Netherlands.

THE JAPAN OCCUPATION ERA (1942-1945)

The first thing Japan did when occupied Indonesia was closing all the film company existed, including 2 most productive Chinese owned film company, JIF and TAN'S Film. All of the equipments of those studios were confiscated to be used for the newsreel film production. The film activity suddenly switched from *Multifilm* studio to *Jawa Eiga Kosha* (Java's Film Company) which started from April 1943 known as *Nippon Eiga Sha* (Abdullah et.al, 1993). Japan seems really understood about the power of this media to influence and drive people, so it must be controlled as soon as possible.

Along the Japan occupation era, film still did not move from its propagandist function. Japan even could maximize this audio visual power as the main tool in promoting their "Triple A" slogan: "Japan the light of Asia, Japan the leader of Asia, and Japan the protector of Asia." A lot of documentary films were produced in this era and the main aim was obviously propaganda. Hastuti (1992) explains the propaganda film as mentioned before was the slides about the glory of Japan's army which was played before the main (fiction) film played in the cinema. The main purpose was of course to show to the Indonesian about how big and powerful their army in the battlefield is, thus the Indonesian would be psychologically influenced by this documentary film. Japan also did the propaganda to the elementary school students, which the cinemas were specially provided by Japan government. Five cinemas in Jakarta, for instance, specifically asked to play the newsreel and documentary film about Japan's culture. This fact shows us that the propaganda and the power of Japan in the film industry was so great, even tried to get into the children education system.

Sasono (2009) also explains that "...All of Japan's film was propaganda, just like what Hitler and Mussolini did. The propaganda about The Great East Kingdom is victorious, triumphant, glorious, etc. That's it." Among the films made in Japan occupation era were some short documentaries about neighbourhood system (*Tonarigumi*), a bamboo using Japanese-style battle tactics (*Pemakaian Tombak Bambu*), youth activity and *Heiho* soldiers (*Djagalah Tanah Djawa, Hari Pertemoean dengan Keloearga, Pendjagaan Di Oetara*), and stories about the role of Japan's army in Indonesia. It was all propaganda (Abdullah et.al,

1993).

Since occupied Indonesia in 1942, Japan once published an enactment (*Eiga Ho*) about film in Indonesia. It was published by The Ministry of Home Affairs in Tokyo on July 1938 and was amended on October 1939. This enactment listed about the scope of government supervision on Film Company. It was also explained that Film Company and organization was required to eliminate the Western individualist ideas, hold the spirit of Japan and the spirit of fight for the nation, mass educating, eliminate the 'easy-going' attitude, and respect the elderly (Hastuti, 1992)

Sendenbu (Propaganda Department) established on August 1942 also supervised other organizations, such as *Jawa Hokokai*. But this department considered being less successful, so that the Japan government made another institution named *Keimin Bunka Shidoso* (Cultural Centre) on October 1942. Under this body, there was a single film company named *Jawa Eiga Kosha* (Java's Film Company) chaired by Soetji Oya, a Japanese writer. After that, on April, 1st 1943 some other film institutions were established; e.g. *Nippon Eiga Sha* which the main duty was to monopoly film distribution and also *Djawa* film studio which specifically produced documentary film.

This research also finds out that there were some other enactments published by Japan government, for instance, the prohibition to watch the European and American film, the eliminations of Chinese involvement in film production, raising up the grade of the natives in the cinema, and maximizing the documentary film production for the propaganda purpose. Positively, in this propaganda film production era, Indonesian finally got a chance to be involved as a crew in film production, thus they could learn how to make a good film (Imanjaya, 2009). During the occupation, Japan did not produce fiction film much, even close to nothing. From the very beginning, Japan only produced newsreels and information films (Abdullah et.al, 1993). But in the film management aspects, Japan gave more opportunity to Indonesian to learn about filmmaking so that they understood the production process systematically, from pre to postproduction steps. Started from April 1943, film production was supervised by a *Bunjin Kurata* (director). Here, some early Indonesian filmmakers such as R.M. Soetarto, Rustam Sutan Palindih, Inu Perbatasari and Rd. Arifin learned to assist

(Abdullah et.al, 1993). That was the very first time for Indonesian learnt how to use the camera, read some film books, and actively involved in filmmaking. Those names were people who, at the time Indonesia gained the independence, work unbelievable hard in developing Indonesia's film industry.

One of positive impact of Japan occupation in Indonesia was the raising up of Indonesian spirit of unity and nationhood. The utilization of foreign (western) languages was prohibited while Bahasa Indonesia (Indonesian national language) was used as the mandatory language. Besides, the Indonesian intellectuals began to realize that film is one of the most powerful media to influence people, to propagandize, to raise the morale and revolution spirit to Indonesian. As the Indonesia's film pioneer, Usmar Ismail, said "...started from Japanese occupation era, people began to realize about social communication function of film... There was a more apparent tendency to get closer to the nationhood...." (Abdullah et.al, 1993).

One of the most impactful films in this era was *Indonesia Raya (The Great Indonesia)*, a cultural film which was produced on September 1944. On that month, Japan promised to give independence to Indonesian. This film taught how to sing *Indonesia Raya*, a song which was legally admitted as Indonesia's national anthem. The song was played along the film, with some youth carnivals, the Borobudur temple, mosques, PETA base camp, and the view of crowd when Japan announced the promise of independence as the film background (Abdullah et.al 1993). This film was so influential that Indonesian was fostering their spirit greater than before to gain the independence. On August 1945, Japan surrendered to the allies in World War II, and without waiting any longer, Soekarno and Hatta, on behalf of Indonesian, proclaimed the Indonesian independence on August 17, 1945. Soekarno elected to be the first Indonesia's president, and started from here, the Old Order Era began.

THE OLD ORDER ERA (1946-1965)

Just a moment after Indonesia's independence proclaimed, the filmmaker worked under the *Nippon Eiga Sha*, -lead by R.M. Soetarto- seized *Nippon Eiga Sha* by force. Then the *Berita Film Indonesia* (Indonesian News Reel) was born as the first Indonesian owned

documentary film company. On October 6, 1945, *Nippon Eiga Sha* studio was officially handed over by Ishimoto to Indonesian government, represented by R.M. Soetarto, and witnessed by Indonesian Minister of Information, Mr. Amir Syarifuddin.

The Indonesian News Reel, at the beginning of its development era, successfully captured some crucial independence moment such as the Legalization of Indonesia's Law of Principal, and the inauguration of President and Vice President. This news reel was not only published to all of Indonesian everywhere, but also sent to some other countries like Australia, America, England, and India. The newsreel sent to America even exhibited on the United Nations council (Prakosa, 2008). The aim of this newsreel was not only to construct the image of Indonesian revolution to some international leaders, but also surely to strengthen the sovereignty of Indonesia as the newly independent nation.

This research met the fact that in the beginning of independence era, BFI also produced some of documentary films about important moment in the country. But on November 20, 1945 BFI's studio was attacked by Netherland. A month after, the BFI's studio was moved to Solo, Central Java then to Yogyakarta as well as the capital city officially been moved from Jakarta to Yogyakarta since January 1946. In this crucial era, there was a single documentary film produced which was very helpful in announcing the independence of Indonesia, entitled *Indonesia Calling; 1945* by Joris Ivens. He was a Dutch documentary film director but made this film from Australia (Prakosa, 2008). Ivens who loved to produce documentary film about Indonesia, showed his support to Indonesian government. His work, however, has delivered Indonesian voices not only to Netherland but also to some other countries.

In 1950, after Netherland admitted Indonesia's sovereignty, documentary and newsreel filmmaking works was handed over to a new institution named *Perusahaan Film Negara* (National Film Company). Besides producing news reels and documentaries, this company practically produced some fiction films too. But started from 1962, PFN no longer produced it and focused on news reel and documentary only. For more specific, it played a part in informing national development and governmental activities. This kind of film mostly played in all cinemas in the country, or in the public opens screening (*layar tancep*) from one to

another village before the main feature film was played. *Layar tancep* is a kind of traditional spectacle in the open field, played in the evening, and always moving to some villages from time to time. The governmental propaganda film that usually played in this era was known as *Gelora Pembangunan*.

Hastuti's research (1992) mentioned that in this era, government had a bold concern on film power that could influence the people. This concern made Indonesian government in Yogyakarta held a national conference with *Pusat Peredaran Pilm Indonesia* (PPPI) or Indonesian Film Distribution Centre on January 9, 1946. The conference concerned about 2 main topics; the stand point of PPPI in the independence era and the relationship between PPPI and the government. On that occasion, Mr. Ali Sastroamidjojo as the Minister of Information explained that films must be the healthy educational instrument for people to broaden the social understanding, not as the economical commodity per se, but also as the supporting component of the struggle.

In 1964, the film position was strengthened by the inauguration of Presidential Decree No.1/1964 on March 5, 1964. This was the first jurisdiction the Indonesian government made to supervise and manage the local film industry. This decree also mentioned that film is not the trade commodity per se, but also an education, information, and entertainment instrument.

Entering the year of 1964, political climate in Indonesia started to be unpredictable. It was getting worse when *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (Indonesian Communist Party), which at that time was one of the big four parties, started to inflame the communist ideology. The conflict between PKI and the army was undeniable. This atmosphere, for sure gave an impact for film industry, either directly or not. The documentary film only ran its informational function for the people. Some of film institutions were even infiltrated by political intentioned persons, and some of the filmmaker was just swept away. At the same time, the anti-AMPAI (*American Motion Pictures Producers Association of Indonesia*) campaign was started. It refused the entry of Hollywood film to Indonesia (Bento and Bintang, 1992).

A few months after that, in 1965, the Soekarno regime fell down and was replaced by Lieutenant General Soeharto, the highest leader of Indonesian National Army. Thus, this

moment marked as the end of Old Order Era and the beginning of New Order Era.

THE NEW ORDER ERA (1966-1997)

The New Order Era means that since the change of president in 1966, Indonesia began to enter the new level of governmental. Soekarno fell down and the communist was vanished. Indonesia began to develop both physical and social mentality. The New Order government was more focusing on the national development, with the economic development and foreign investment as the main targets (Kurnia, 2005).

This research finds the fact that since 1962, national film company only produced some news reels and documentary films, and took an important role in informing about national development to the whole Indonesian. Prakosa (2008) thought that it was adapted with the condition of the country on that era. The development happened at everywhere, and must be informed even to the villagers, for the sake of nationhood in this huge country. With some government regulations, film was also used for the revolution instrument that was very important for the nation building and the character building, besides to construct and to develop the national culture.

In the 60's and 70's, documentary film in Indonesia was mostly in journalist style, reporting the governmental activity or national events and was specially broadcasted in national channel (TVRI). Just like before the New Order era, in this time span documentary film was also used as the propaganda media by the government. It delivered the messages about the success of the development program, influenced public opinion, and the most important thing; it was still fully controlled by one vision of political ideology.

In this new Order Era, the government also issued a film enactment. Compared to President Decree No.1/1964, this enactment specifically mentioned about film function as the education, information and entertainment instrument, also as the economic commodity. This research also finds out that, in the development of documentary film in 80's, several different themes were explored, such as culture and anthropology. But still, documentary film was fully functioned as the ruler ideology's speaker, and tried very hard to get a chance to be a

commercial spectacle, moreover got some income from the advertisement. This condition lasted for about 32 years, until the great riot that suddenly change Indonesian political situation happened in 1998, known as The Reform.

POST NEW ORDER ERA (1998-PRESENT)

In 1998, the great riot occurred and caused the fell of New Order regime, which has ruled Indonesia for more than 3 decades. This riot was caused by the Indonesian unsatisfaction about the corrupt government and the political suppression in the last 32 years. Positively, this incident finally opened the freedom of speech for Indonesian. Mass media was getting fenceless, political chances were widely opened, and some issues that was prohibited before, could freely discussed in every forum in the society. Indonesian calls these changes as The Reform.

This research also finds out that this era brought some impact for the documentary film development. The filmmaker could freely created their film, more vocal and brave in exploring different themes and sensitive issues, more reflective in the sense of telling the truth about the real situation in the society. The themes were also more informative, even braver to discuss about prohibited issues before, such as politic, state violence, the violation of human rights, communism, governmental critics, social critics, and some other issues that on the Old Order and New Order Era was impossible to be discussed, threatened the national security and social stability, and considered as against the law. We can see these themes were explored in some documentary films produced after 1998. Imanjaya (2009) fully agreed with this and said that:

“...the filmmaker is getting free and explorative. Finally there was an exploration to the themes that was prohibited like communist party, the state violence, Aceh case, Papua case. *Lukas Moment* (2005) a film by Ario Danusiri for example. That is the first point. The second is, those ideas were also freely executed. It was difficult if, in the very beginning it was already suppressed by the government.

But I have a greater expectation in the political documentary film, because there was some evident of strong films, not only in politic, actually, but also in social critics.”

In the film management aspects, this research meets the fact that the development of documentary film after the New Order era has been no longer dominated by the ruler. But unfortunately, the government concern is considered less in supporting national documentary film industry. Therefore, most of documentary filmmaker made an effort in their own way, for instance, growing up some independent film communities or organizations in sporadically. Most of this organization are private-owned or non-government organization. However, the development of documentary film in this post new order era is more promising since we can find the rich diversity in themes and techniques explored.

CONCLUSION

The entry of documentary film in Indonesia was started in 1912 because of the Netherland occupation and after that, Netherland kept developing it until early 40's. Documentary film that was produced in this era mostly explored about East India and was used as the audio visual report about its colony to the motherland. Besides, it was also functioned as the propaganda media to strengthen their power of the natives. Between 1942 and 1945, Japan Occupied Indonesia, and documentary film was fully used as the war instrument and propaganda media. But in this era, Indonesian started to learn about filmmaking and got involved in some documentary film productions, which was very useful for the early independence era. After gained the independence in 1945, Indonesia was ruled by the Old Order regime, and documentary film was still functioned as the revolution instrument. It was also used to inform the news about several crucial moments in Indonesia which could inflame the spirit of nationhood. In the 60's when New Order regime began to rule documentary film was functioned as the development and information devices. It delivered messages about the success of the development program, influenced public opinion,

and still fully controlled by one vision of political ideology. Just after The New Order era, Indonesian documentary filmmaker was more critical in exploring social and political issues occurred in Indonesia. Documentary film has grown so fast as the freedom of speech widely opened. This study finally conclude that in each period, documentary film has become an effective medium of political communication not only to strengthened the power of ruler at the time, but also acts as a medium of public political opinion, as well as recording the history of political change in Indonesia.

REFERENCES

- Abdullah, T., Biran, M.Y. and Ardan, S.M. *Film Indonesia bagian I (1900-1950)*. Jakarta: Dewan Film Nasional.
- Bento, M. and Bintang, I., 1992. Masa-masa sulit. in. Haris Jauhari. *Layar perak; 90 tahun bioskop Indonesia*. Jakarta: PT.Gramedia Pustaka Utama & Dewan Film Nasional (DFN)
- Hastuti, R.S., 1992. Berjuang di garis belakang. in. Haris Jauhari. *Layar perak; 90 tahun bioskop Indonesia*. Jakarta: PT.Gramedia Pustaka Utama & Dewan Film Nasional (DFN)
- Imanjaya, Ekky. 2009. In-depth interview. Jakarta.
- Jauhari, H., ed.,1992. *Layar perak; 90 tahun bioskop Indonesia*. Jakarta: PT.Gramedia Pustaka Utama dan Dewan Film Nasional (DFN)
- Kurnia, N., 2005. *Industri perfilman Indonesia: analisis ekonomi politik terhadap industri perfilman Indonesia dalam perspektif world system theory*. Postgraduate thesis. Jakarta: University of Indonesia.
- Lembaga Sensor Film. 2005. *Sejarah LSF*. [Film] Available at:
<http://www.lsf.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=52:jejak&catid=38:kami&Itemid=55> [Accessed 3 April 2009].
- Prakosa, G., 2008. *Film pinggiran; Antologi film pendek, film eksperimental, dan film dokumenter*. 2nd ed. Jakarta: Yayasan Seni Visual Indonesia (YSVI) dan Koperasi Sinematografi IKJ.
- Sasono, E., 2009. In-depth interview. Jakarta.

State Policy and Its Implementation for Imported Buyout Films in Mainland China

Bingting Liu¹

University of East Anglia

Email: b.liu@uea.ac.uk

INTRODUCTION

The Chinese Government's restricted regulations regarding films released in Mainland China have been widely debated. When it comes to the case of foreign films, it becomes more complicated because of the additional import process and the impact of foreign policy. This entire series of policies related to foreign film imported and released have been criticised by many scholars including Peter Goderie and Brian M. Yecies (2010, p.5), who argued that current policies regarding the annual quota of foreign films would be over restricted for the Mainland Chinese audience's fast-developing demands for foreign films. These policies, therefore, are also widely believed to be the original cause behind the proliferation of film piracy and its related consequences in Mainland China. Since this limited number of foreign films could not fulfil Chinese audiences' demands on film consumption while state policy for the management of cultural products is still underdeveloped, the market space of these unfulfilled demands has been filled by on-line pirate films and DVDs into the market. According to the current regulations for the import of foreign films, the annual quota of the total film imports for cinema screening is 50 which includes 30 buyout (licensed) films and 20 revenue sharing films with a maximum number of 16 from the US major studio

¹ I would like to express my deepest appreciation to my supervisors Mr. Peter Kramer and Mr. Mark Rimmer, who have always encouraged me in my research, providing a lot of useful assistance for my academic writing and giving me professional suggestions to finish this paper. Without their guidance and persistent help, this paper would not have been possible. I would also like to thank the School of Film and Television Studies, the University of East Anglia for funding my trip to the 7th Annual Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Hong Kong. In addition, I would like to thank my Ph. D classmate Edward Vollans, who has covered my shift as an associate tutor while I was away for the conference, Francis Dyson and Nick Crown, who helped me by proofreading this paper.

productions (The White House Office of Public Liaison, 1999).

Despite the wide range of criticisms regarding the failure of protecting film copyright in Mainland China, foreign films have taken on average 45% of the market annually since 2006. However, it is worth mentioning that more than 80% of these foreign box office receipts were taken by revenue sharing films while the remaining 20% were occupied by other foreign licensed films (China Film Distribution and Exhibition Association, 2011). This phenomenon itself is worth studying since foreign film's popularity in Mainland China was largely decided by their imported methods, while the influence of foreign film's genre, cultural connection, and its international reception seemed less related. The above figure also indicates that these policies have to a large extent successfully restricted the effects of imported revenue-sharing films to the Chinese film market. Imported buyout movies which occupied 60% of the general quota annually only received an average 20% of the total foreign films' box office receipts. This figure indicates that the main barrier between the imported buyout films and the Chinese audiences is the film's popularity rather than its accessibility to cinema. To develop some further understanding of these issues, this article will focus on the role of imported buyout films in the Mainland Chinese market and the current restrictions on its development. This article consists of four sections: research backgrounds, historical development of imported buyout films, recent changes for imported buyout films, and current restrictions for imported buyout films.

RESEARCH BACKGROUNDS

Imported buyout films in this paper refer to films imported from outside Mainland China with a buyout price, rather than those imported under revenue sharing agreements, which is the current popular method of international film trading. The term itself is actually directly translated from Chinese (进口买断片) and its history can be traced back to the late 1970s when the Economic Reform movement started in Mainland China. Later from 1994, the State changed the policy and allowed foreign films to be imported under revenue sharing arrangements. Imported buyout movies, which used to be the only format of film imports, had

gradually withdrawn from the major market since the adoption of the revenue sharing agreement. In recent years, the market share of foreign buyout films in Mainland China has increased sharply; the latest box office record of imported buyout films (see table 2) shows that by the end of November 2011, there were 22 imported buyout movies screening in Mainland China with an approximate total box office of US\$ 123 million, which were nearly three times higher than the figure in 2009 (US\$ 42.44). This large box office figure gives the impression to the media that imported buyout movies could potentially break the monopoly of imported revenue sharing films and domestic movies in the general Mainland Chinese Market. According to Chinese media sources there has been a radical change in recent years due to the growing popularity of foreign films: *Sina.com* (2009) and *Yahoo.com* (2012) both consider this sudden, unexpected change a trend indicative of future development. The huge box office success of these imported buyout films in 2011 received attention not only from the public, but also raised concerns of the relationship between its sudden success in recent years and past developments in the last 40 years.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF IMPORTED BUYOUT FILMS

Imported Buyout films before 1993 – the only method of film imports

Being the only format of film imports from the Economic Reform in 1978 to 1993, imported buyout films were known as Imported Batch Films (translated from Chinese 批片) in this period. The Chinese Economic Reform is generally known as the contract responsibility system (CRS) and is patterned after successful experiments in the Province of Sichuan. Under the system, peasants contract to produce and sell to the state certain quantities of commodities at a low official price (Koo, 1990). They are then free to sell on the free market anything produced over the contracted amount. At this time, the China Film Group Corporation (“CFGCC”) was formerly known as the China Film Company and was the only authorised company permitted to import foreign films into Mainland China and export Chinese films to other countries. In other words, the entire international film trade was

processed through the CFGC exclusively. According to the writer's interview with Mr. Liu Hongpeng (2011), who is the former Distribution Manager of the CFGC and currently the General Manager of Beijing Film Company: being a state-owned enterprise at that time, the CFGC did not have the budget to purchase updated foreign films, therefore, it tended to import comparatively old but classic foreign movies such as *Eight and a Half* (Italia, 1963), *City Lights* (US, 1931), *The Third Man* (UK, 1949), or *Sandakan 8* (Japan, 1974). In most cases, the CFGC was forced to import these outdated foreign films in a batch of three or more from the same foreign film distributor in order to purchase more films with the same budget. Sometimes when the budget was extremely tight, the CFGC had to sell the rights of a batch of Chinese films released in foreign countries in order to trade the rights of a batch of foreign films released in Mainland China (China movie news, 2006). This is also why imported buyout film was called Imported Batch Films at that time. Although there was no quota on the numbers of foreign movies that could be imported annually, the number of imported films was always less than 30 per year because the budget which the CFGC received from the government to purchase foreign films was too tight to purchase over 30 films per year. As the calculating system for film box office was underdeveloped at the beginning of the Economic Reform, box office data during this period is unreliable to use for the analysis of these films' popularity.

Buyout films from 1994 to 2000 – the appearance of competitive rival

The revenue sharing agreement has been applied to film imports in Mainland China by the State of Administration of Radio, Film, and Television ("SARFT") since 1994, and the annual quota of 10 imported revenue sharing films is one part of the agreement (SARFT, 1993). Different from former foreign films in Mainland China, those revenue sharing foreign films were no longer outdated small productions, but tended to be Hollywood-type big updated films such as *The Fugitive* (1993), *True Lies* (1994), *Forrest Gump* (1993), *The Lion King* (1994), *Titanic* (1997). The introduction of imported revenue sharing films largely changed the film market share in Mainland China: imported revenue sharing films, to a large

extent, replaced the role of imported buyout films and became the major foreign film source for Chinese audiences. On the other hand, the introduction of revenue sharing films in 1994 was also the first time that Chinese audiences got the chance to watch updated Hollywood movies since the Cultural Revolution in 1966 (Wang, 2006). Later the box office record of revenue sharing films indicated that these annual ten imported revenue sharing films had putting huge market pressure on Chinese domestic movies. In 1995, the general box office of foreign film imports reached 280.5 millions RMB (approximate to 48.4 millions USD), which accounted for 80% of the annual box office receipt in Mainland China (China Film Archive, 2002). Compared to imported buyout films, which were mainly small productions, the Hollywood-type imported revenue sharing films were more marketing-competitive. Although the new development of foreign film policy did not require the CFGC to put revenue sharing films as a priority, undeveloped cinema chains and limited cinema screens have marginalised imported buyout films. When the CFGC started to lose control of exclusive distribution rights for domestic films, it became more concerned about its financial situation and focused more on the distribution of imported revenue sharing films. Additionally, the huge success of updated Hollywood films in Mainland China since 1994 meant most of the buyout films during this period were English background, and the CFGC attempted to advertise them as Hollywood movies in order to attract more audiences to the cinema.

Imported buyout films since 2001 – being ignored by the CFGC and HFDC

After China's accession to the WTO in 2001, the annual quota of revenue sharing films and buyout films increased to 20 and 30 respectively (The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, 2002), which attracted a large number of private investors starting to set foot into the business of foreign film imports. However the CFGC's monopoly over film imports had not changed, meaning that all film imports whether they are imported under revenue sharing agreements or buyout agreements could only be imported by the CFGC. Since the Huaxia Film Distribution Co Ltd. (HFDC) gained authorisation from the State in 2003 for distributing foreign films in Mainland China

region, foreign buyout films then could be distributed by both the CFGC and HFDC (Huaxia Film Distribution Co Ltd., 2012). Because of the contradiction between the restricted annual quota for revenue sharing films and the huge profit potential of foreign films for Chinese audiences, foreign films imported under the buyout agreement became an alternative method to overcome restrictions from the annual quota of revenue sharing films. Also, apart from the CFGC and HFDC, other Chinese film companies would not have the authority to be involved in the process of film imports. However in the actual practice, they have taken part in the cooperative relationship with the CFGC and HFDC and run the screening of foreign buyout films after their release. According to the interview from Mr. Liu Hongpeng (2011), during the implementation, the huge workload of importing and distributing those 20 revenue sharing films meant the CFGC and HFDC did not always have enough concern for foreign buyout movies. As a result, the whole process of importation and release for buyout films often happened between foreign film sellers and the Chinese independent film companies authorised by the CFGC and/or HFDC. When two of the negotiating parties made the deal, the Chinese independent film companies applied for the quota from the CFGC or HFDC under the relationship of cooperative-distributing. During this whole process of importation and release, the CFGC and HFDC played the role of selling quota to other Chinese independent film companies with a fixed price, and the film company who got the quota from the CFGC or HFDC would have to take the responsibility for all cost of buying the film and all expenses for the film release in Mainland China area. It means that after the deal was made, all the responsibility and risk for revenue receipts would be taken by the Chinese film company who got the cooperative distribution partnership from the CFGC or/and HFDC. Also, this cooperative distribution partnership indicates that the CFGC and HFDC have the priority right to choose whether they would like to distribute a foreign buyout film independently or cooperatively, while other Chinese film company can only passively accept the films which have been picked left from the CFGC and HFDC.

RECENT CHANGES FOR IMPORTED BUYOUT FILMS

Latest development of buyout films since 2010

Similar to previous years, imported buyout films' box office receipts in 2010 were comparative low and most of these films were screening during unpopular schedules. As can be displayed in Table 1(see page 16), there were 35 buyout films released in Mainland China in 2010 and more than half of these buyout films' box offices were lower than US\$ 1 million. What is even worse, only three film's box office receipts were over US\$ 8 million. Since the average copyright price for imported buyout movie in 2010 was between US\$ 0.5 and US\$ 1 million, most of these films made losses after the deduction of other promotion expenses and other costs (China News, 2011). Unlike these non-profit films, US action movie *The Spy Next Door*, starring the Chinese Kungfu movie pop star Jackie Chan, became the first released buyout film in 2010 and gained a box office of US\$ 9.9 million in total during the Chinese New Year schedule. Within the next seven months, no other imported buyout movie's box office receipts came close to *The Spy Next Door*, despite the fact that these buyout films covered a wide range of regions; some of these films were US Hollywood-type production while some of them were not; some of them were actually screening in the holiday schedule such as *Detective Conan: The Raven Chaser*, *Short Of Love* and *Skate Or Die*. These figures seemed to prove that compared to imported revenue sharing films, the imported buyout film's box office revenue was less affected by film's region, production scale and screening. However, *The Extraordinary Adventures of Adèle Blanc-Sec*, which is directed by Luc Besson, was released on 3rd August 2010 in Mainland China and broke a long term downside of buyout film's box office. Later, *The Expendables* was introduced and released exclusively by the CFGC with a buyout cost of less than US\$ 0.5 million for its copyright. Besides other expenses, the CFGC has spent approximately US\$1.2 million for this film's importation and release in Mainland China, but the surprisingly high box office revenue has brought a total profit of US\$12 million to the CFGC at the end (Beijing News, 2011). Although there were no buyout films in 2011 (see table 2 in page 17) breaking the box office record of *The*

Expendables in 2010, a set of successful movies such as *Sanctum* (box office US\$ 17.42 million), *Immortals* (box office US\$ 11.33 million), *Source Code* (box office US\$ 10.69 million), *Drive Angry* (box office US\$ 9.22 million) and *Skyline* (box office US\$ 8.38 million) were impressive enough for being an foreign buyout movie.

Possible reasons for imported buyout film's success since 2010

The success of *The Spy Next Door* could be largely decided by the fact that the film is starring by Jackie Chan and it is actually a foreign movie starring by a Chinese actor, thus to some extent, it could not be counted as an typical case of the success for a pure foreign movie. However later the high box office record of *The Extraordinary Adventures of Adèle Blanc-Sec* and *The Expendables* indicates that foreign movies from a complete different cultural background and imported under buyout agreement could be as successful as imported revenue sharing films. However it is undeniable that these successful buyout films are Hollywood-type big productions, which are similar to the type of imported revenue sharing movies. The altering of small production art films to a more market competitive Hollywood-type production must be one of the main factors causing the Chinese audience's preference for imported buyout films. The success of *The Extraordinary Adventures of Adèle Blanc-Sec* and *The Expendables* was a watershed moment for a new period of the imported buyout films, while this significant change can be caused by the change of imported buyout film's origins and production team. Within the buyout film market in 2010, most of the films were from France, Spain, Germany and Japan. Even though there were some buyouts coming from the US, they were actually some small independent productions with less international popularity. However in the year 2011, most of the imported buyout films were made by Hollywood-type production team, except a few buyout films from Europe and Japan. In other words, the quality of these buyout films is closed to the revenue sharing films. Furthermore, unlike previous years, many of the films released in 2011 were imported in the same year rather than in previous years, which largely shortened the time difference between their release date in the home country and in Mainland China. For example, *Immortals* was

released in China on the same date as it was in the US, unlike the regular release mode of imported buyout films, while more similar to the release mode of imported revenue sharing films regardless of its quality, release date or popularity.

The Expendables Effects

After the success of *The Expendables*, an increasing number of Chinese domestic film investors were attracted to invest in this cooperative released relationship with the CFGC and HFDC, with the intention of searching for another '*The Expendables*' in the international film market. Some public media referred it as the major factor for the large flow of private investments into the importing business of buyout films. According to The Beijing News (2011), the huge success of *The Expendables* and the low price of its copyright have attracted a large amount of Chinese film companies getting involved in this business and competing for foreign film's copyright in Mainland China. This therefore resulted in foreign films' copyright holders increased the film's price from the average level between US\$ 0.5 million and US\$ 1 million to the standard of more than US\$ 2 million. For example, *The Expendables 2* was finally sold to the CFGC in the price of US\$ 4.5 million. Although the price of this film's copyright has increased by nine fold since the first film, it will remain profitable if its box office receipts match those of the first film in 2010. On the other hand, the sudden success of imported buyout films in 2010 has also caused the consequence that some experienced buyout film distributors pulled out of this business. This was because the sharp increasing copyright price for imported buyout films is now even higher than the box office receipts of a similar film before 2010. Logically speaking, no matter how good the expectation for the imported buyout film market is, investors are unlikely to buy a film if the price is higher than its expected revenue. In addition, when more Chinese buyers are holding the copyright of foreign movies, the competition for the release quota from the CFGC and HFDC are more severe and it is more difficult than before to finally get the imported buyout film screened. Therefore, when more new investors were getting into the imported buyout films business because of the attraction of huge profits, some experienced investors were leaving because of the rapid

increase in the cost of acquiring the rights to films.

CURRENT RESTRICTIONS FOR IMPORTED BUYOUT FILMS

Limited authority for cooperative film distributors

Although, theoretically speaking, any film company in China has the right to distribute buyout films cooperatively with the CFGC and HFDC, the copyright of imported films are actually held by the CFGC and HFDC. Since the quota of these 20 to 30 buyout films are controlled by the CFGC and HFDC, other film companies who want to introduce a foreign buyout movie, have to apply for the screening quota from the CFGC and HFDC. In other words, if a Chinese film company has already bought the copyright of a foreign film without getting the screening quota, this film would not reach Chinese audiences in cinemas. As a result, copyright holders of these foreign films can only get the profit back by selling their related video products, to web sites providing online film watching. That is why every foreign buyout film buyer takes a very high risk to buy the film's copyright before the film is confirmed to be received a quota by the CFGC or HFDC. On the other hand, the CFGC and HFDC, in most of the case, prefer a fixed fee from the cooperative film distributor before the film is released, than share the film's revenue with them. It means that if a quota is finally allocated to a buyout film by the CFGC or HFDC, the rest of the process is carried out by the cooperative distributor, but not the CFGC or HFDC. In other words, the 'real' film distributor who process the translating, dubbing, copy printing and promotions does not hold the copyright of the film, while the company who has the copyright of the film does not implement these distributing duties apart from selling the quota. Under this system, the CFGC and HFDC have optimum flexibility for the release of foreign buyout films. Since the CFGC and HFDC have the priority right to choose whether they would like to distribute a foreign buyout film independently or cooperatively while the cooperative distributor can only passively choose the films which the CFGC and/or HFDC give away.

Combined effects of complicated censorship and imported buyout films' inappropriate trading mode

Since any movie which aims to screen in cinemas must pass censorship by the SARFT, there is no exception for the CFGC, the HFDC or any other Chinese film distributor who wants to release a foreign buyout film in cinema by no matter exclusive or cooperative release. Unlike the imported revenue sharing films which the deal was made before the production commenced and then participating parties worked together through the whole process, the foreign buyout film buyers are unlikely to make the decision before the film came out. The complicated censorship and the imported buyout films' inappropriate trading mode largely delayed their screening time, pushing these films into a worse position on receiving box office than revenue sharing films. Unlike the imported buyout films, the negotiation between revenue sharing parties is in most of the case happened beforehand, so that simultaneous release of a film can easily happen in different places. The longer of the time difference between a film's home release date and its foreign releases date, the higher possibility pirate DVDs appear to satisfy audience's needs, at the same time the larger market is shared by piracy illegally.

Complicated censorship and imported buyout films' inappropriate trading mode also caused another severe problem for buyout films - unpopular screening schedule. When most of the revenue sharing movies and Chinese domestic films are negotiating with cinema chains for screening schedule beforehand, imported buyout movies in the same period are still waiting for buyers. For all the imported movies produced in the same period, revenue sharing films are in a better position on getting popular screening schedules because the CFGC and HFDC are able to negotiate with different cinema chains before the film is completed. Unlike revenue sharing films, Chinese buyers of imported films can only confirm the screening schedule with cinema owners when the screening quota is confirmed to be received from the CFGC or HFDC. This, in most of the case, is after the film is been made or even released in home country. In other words, buyout film's importing mode enabled it to get better screening schedules than other types of movies in Mainland China. Table 1 and Table 2 show that March

and April 2010 and 2011 were the worst seasons for releasing films due to the lack of official holidays. What was even worse, some of the buyout films got the imported quota and passed the censorship, but never reached the screening slot from the cinema before their expiry date. For example, the *Broken Embraces*, which was imported by the CFGC and passed the censorship from the SARFT, ultimately failed to get the screening schedule within its expiry date issued by the SARFT. It eventually failed to get any profits from exhibition, plus there was no legal DVD released in Mainland China, it therefore became a non-profit imported buyout film in Mainland China in 2011 (Beijing News, 2010). This case also, to a large extent, gives a reasonable explanation for the question why a large amount of buyout films were released during March and April: these schedules maybe the last chance for those buyout films to screen in cinema before their expiry date.

High cinema ticket price

High cinema ticket prices, not only negatively affect the buyout film's box office, but also the entire film market in Mainland China. In the last 25 years, the average ticket price has increased 800 times from ¥ 0.045 RMB (\$ 0.007 USD) to ¥ 36.38 RMB (\$ 5.8 USD), which is equivalent to 2.5% of the current monthly Disposable Personal Income (“DPI”) of urban Chinese residents. This figure is significantly 5 times higher than the figure in developed countries (0.5%) (Guangming Daily, 2012). In other words, watching movies, which is supposed to be a comparatively cheap and popular entertainment, becomes an expensive entertainment in Mainland China. Also because of this, cinemas lose a large number of audiences who can not afford the film ticket and tend to watch pirate DVDs because of its cheaper price and easy accessibility. The average price of a pirate DVD in major cities like Beijing and Guangzhou is now around \$1 USD, which is 20% of the cinema ticket price in the same city (Liu, 2011). The average price of a pirate DVD is also 0.5% of the average DPI of urban Chinese citizens, which is the same as the percentage figure between the average cinema ticket price and the PDI in the developed countries. In other words, the price level of pirate DVDs in Mainland China is the same as a cinema ticket in countries like the UK and

the US. In other words, going to cinema in Mainland China is 5 times more expensive than going to cinema in developed countries. It is difficult to imagine that if the average cinema ticket price in the UK increases by 5 times, how many audiences would stop going to cinema? It is also worth mentioning that according to the writer's research in Beijing and Guangzhou, most pirate DVD sellers claimed that more than 90% their pirate DVDs were sold while the film was being shown in cinema. It means that Chinese audiences, to a large extent, are satisfied with the selections of foreign films screened in cinema, but dissatisfied with the ticket prices. This, on the other hand, also indicates that increasing the import quota of foreign films would not be an effective way to resolve the severe problem of film piracy in Mainland China.

CONCLUSIONS

Compared to Chinese domestic films, the function of imported buyout films is similar to imported revenue sharing films, which serve as supplementary films for the Chinese audience. However when it comes to the market share in Mainland China, the domestic movies and imported revenue sharing films, to a large extent, still play the mainstream role while imported buyout movies continue to be marginalised. Some scholars believe that the current annual quota for imported films is too restricted, so it is not suitable for the Chinese audiences' demands on consuming foreign films. However, data in previous years indicates that the restriction from the foreign film policy in Mainland China was only applied to revenue sharing film productions, especially US major studio films. Regarding the foreign buyout films, evidence from the box office records shows that the quota of 30 is sufficient for foreign films from non-US origins. It can be said that current restrictions from the Chinese film market, the CFGC-HFDC-dominated cooperative distribution-ship, unregulated piracy issues and comparatively high cinema ticket prices are, to a large extent, restricting foreign film's development in the Mainland China. On the other hand, it is true that the box office of imported buyout films is becoming an increasingly large part of the entire film market share in Mainland China. It remains difficult to predict whether the mode of half-half market share

in Mainland China will be broken into an oligopoly by imported revenue sharing films, Chinese domestic movies and imported buyout films.

One thing for sure is that these fast developing imported buyout films will bring more opportunities for the development of current film markets in Mainland China than before. Also, it remains difficult to define the suitability of current importing quota for the Chinese audience's demands on foreign film consumption as a whole, especially when it comes to the case of different types of film imports. Regarding the negative impacts of import quota, there is less evidence that this annual quota of foreign films has caused the problem of film piracy in Mainland China. In general, buyout film imports have existed since Mainland China started to import foreign films, and it used to dominate the whole market of foreign films before the appearance of imported revenue sharing films in 1994. Despite the fact that the film import and release system in Mainland China is still undeveloped, imported buyout films have come back to the spotlight of the market in recent years as a result of the causes discussed above. As Charles Dickens said in his book *A Tale of Two Cities*: it was the best of times, it was the worst of times, a fitting allegory for current relations between China and the outside world: many benefits but also many drawbacks.

APPENDIX

Tables:

NO	Name of film	Distributor China	Origin	Release date China	box office\$ million
1	The Spy Next Door	CFGC	US	15 th Jan	9.90
2	Detective Conan: The Raven Chaser	HFDC	Japan	18 th Jan	1.42
3	Short Of Love	Local	Hong Kong	19 th Jan	0.32
4	Fermat's Room	CFGC	Spain	04 th Mar	N/A
5	Back In Time	CFGC/Local	Russia	05 th Mar	1.60
6	My Girlfriend Is an Agent	CFGC	South Korea	05 th Mar	2.42
7	Don't Look Back	HFDC/Local	France	06 th Mar	1.43
8	More Than a Game	CFGC	US	09 th Mar	N/A
9	The Candidate	HFDC	Denmark	12 th Mar	0.66
10	K-20: Legend of the Mask	CFGC/Local	Japan	12 th Mar	1.30
11	Gamer	CFGC	US	19 th Mar	2.12
12	Crossing Hennessy	CFGC/Local	Hong Kong	02 nd Apr	2.64
13	Direct Contact	CFGC	Germany	08 th Apr	0.50
14	Fire	HFDC	Germany	09 th Apr	N/A
15	Ballistic	HFDC	Hong Kong	09 th Apr	N/A
16	The Orphanage	CFGC/Local	Spain	16 th Apr	2.01
17	Skate Or Die	HFDC	France	01 st May	0.28
18	Echelon Conspiracy	HFDC/Local	US	14 th May	2.51
19	In the Name of the King: A dungeon Siege Tale	HFDC	Canada	18 th May	0.75
20	Largo Winch	CFGC	France	21 st May	1.02
21	Step Up 2: The Streets	HFDC	US	21 st	N/A

				May	
22	Vitus	HFDC	Sweden	28 th May	N/A
23	Beyond a Reasonable Doubt	CFGC	US	03 rd Jun	0.81
24	My Mom's New Boyfriend	HFDC/Local	US	04 th Jun	1.45
25	Coco Chanel & Igor Stravinsky	CFGC	France	12 th Jun	0.38
26	The Extraordinary Adventures of Adèle Blanc-Sec	CFGC	France	03 rd Aug	8.05
27	The Expendables	CFGC	US	20 th Aug	31.19
28	Ice Kaong Puppy Love	Local	Malaysia	09 th Sep	0.23
29	The Charlemagne Code	HFDC/Local	Germany	01 st Oct	1.16
30	Notturmo Bus	CFGC	Italy	02 nd Oct	N/A
31	Pandemic	CFGC/Local	Japan	04 th Oct	0.26
32	Jerry Cotton	CFGC/Local	Germany	12 th Oct	0.51
33	Heartbreaker	HFDC	France	19 th Oct	0.31
34	Righteous Kill	CFGC	US	30 th Nov	1.08
35	Dance Subaru	CFGC	Japan	03 rd Dec	N/A

Table 1. Buyout films in Mainland China in 2010.

source from: China Film Distribution and Exhibition Association (CFDEA), (2011). Chinese Film Market Review 2010 (Chinese name: 2010 中国电影市场报告). Box office data for Films with a box office receipts lower than RMB 1 million (approximate to US\$ 0.15 million) are unavailable in this table.

NO	Name of film	Distributor China	Origin	Release date China	box office\$ million
1	Kiss Me Again	CFGC/Local	Italy	4 th Feb	0.45
2	Beneath Hill 60	CFGC/Local	Australia	11 th Mar	0.81
3	Killers	CFGC	US	22 nd Mar	3.35
4	Sucker Punch	HFDC	US	01 st Apr	6.94
5	Red	CFGC	US	01 st Apr	4.66
6	Armored	HFDC	US	12 th Apr	2.25
7	The Next Three Days	HFDC	US	29 th Apr	3.42
8	The Eagle	CFGC	US/UK	29 th Apr	1.27
9	Ultraman	Local	Japan	13 th May	4.69
10	Na igre 2	CFGC/Local	Russia	01 st Jun	2.01
11	Skyline	CFGC	US	03 rd Jun	8.38
12	Unthinkable	HFDC/Local	US	01 st Jul	4.39
13	Coursier	HFDC	France	03 rd Jul	3.10
14	Source Code	CFGC/ Local	US	03 rd Aug	10.69
15	Season of the Witch	CFGC/HFD C	US	18 th Aug	5.56
16	Sanctum	CFGC	US/Australi a	09 th Sep	17.42
17	Drive Angry	CFGC	US	15 th Sep	9.22
18	Quarter of Silence	CFGC/Local	Japan	04 th Nov	4.44
19	Immortals	HFDC/Local	US	11 th Nov	11.33
20	Elite Squad 2	Local	Brazil	25 th Nov	1.43

Table 2. Buyout films in Mainland China in 2011 up to November (uncompleted data).

Source collected from: Entgroup Official web site: <http://m.entgroup.cn/boxoffice/cn/>

REFERENCES

- Beijing News, 2010. *The adjustment of screening date of Broken Embraces. Release date postponed indefinitely* [《破碎的拥抱》上映调整 因技术原因无限期推迟]. [online] 29 December. Available at: <<http://www.m1905.com/news/20101229/411311.shtml>>.
- Beijing News, 2011. *Fate Fire: Not every buyout films are 'The Expendables'* [虚火：不是多有批片都是《敢死队》]. [online] 17 June. Available at: <http://epaper.bjnews.com.cn/html/2011-06/17/content_243773.htm?div=-1>.
- China Film Distribution and Exhibition Association (CFDEA), 2011. *Chinese Film Market Review 2010* [2010 中国电影市场报告].
- China Film Distribution and Exhibition Association (CFDEA). *Chinese Film Market Review 2006 - 2010* [2006 - 2010 中国电影市场报告].
- China Movie News [中国电影报], 2006. *Imported buyout films: promoting the market diversity* [进口买断片：促进市场多样化]. *China Movie News* [中国电影报], January Issue, p.BF6A(014).
- China News, 2011. *The rise of buyout film market, low cost brings high profits* [中国电影市场“批片”崛起，低成本带来暴利]. [online] 30 August. Available at: <<http://www.chinanews.com/cul/2011/08-30/3292127.shtml>>.
- Entgroup Official web site. [online] Available at: <<http://m.entgroup.cn/boxoffice/cn/>>.
- Goderie, P. and Yecies, B., 2010. Cultural Flowers Beneath Death Note: Catching the Wave of Popular Japanese Culture in China. *Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, August Issue, p.5.
- Huaxia Film Distribution Co., Ltd. - Company Profile [华夏电影发行有限责任公司_公司简介]. [online] Available at: <http://www.hxfilm.com/About_HX.asp?menu=1&id=2>.
- Interview with Mr. Liu Hongpeng - General Manager of Beijing Film Company. Beijing, China. 9th March, 2011.
- Koo, Y., 1990. The Contract Responsibility System: Transition from a Planned to a Market Economy. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 38(4), pp.797-820.
- Liu, B., 2011. Field work in Beijing.

- Liu, B., 2012. Face-to-face talk with pirate DVD sellers in Guangzhou.
- The SARFT, 1993. *Suggestions for deepening the reform of the film industry*. [关于当前深化电影行业机制改革的若干意见] [online] Available at: <<http://baike.baidu.com/view/1921.htm>>.
- Sina.com. *Buyout films are expecting positive development* [进口买断片期待良性发展]. Available at: <<http://ent.sina.com.cn/r/m/2009-11-30/16112791768.shtml>>.
- The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, 2002. *The Legal Documents for China joining the World Trade Organization in the Chinese version - the 'Annex 9: Article 2: Schedule of Specific Commitments on Services for most-favoured nation (674-728)*. [online] Beijing: The central publish of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China. Available at: <<http://www.china-zs.com/COMM/link/qita4.htm>>.
- Wang, Y., 2006. An Analysis of the Contradictions between Young and Old Teachers in the Departments of History of the Colleges and Universities before the "Cultural Revolution": Also on the Social Origin of the "Cultural Revolution". *Journal of Chinese Communist Party History Studies*, 11-1675/D (1003-3815).
- The White House Office of Public Liaison, November 17, 1999. *Briefing on the Clinton administration agenda for the World Trade Organization material: Summary of U.S. – China Bilateral WTO Agreement*.
- Yahoo.com. *55 foreign movie's preview: buyout film's overall increase* [55 部海外新作抢先看：买断片全面崛起]. [online] Available at: <<http://ent.cn.yahoo.com/newspic/ent/45620/40/>>.
- Yang, L., 2012. The Chinese cinema ticket increased 800 times in the last 25 years/ Tickets should be acceptable for the audiences [中国电影票价 25 年涨了 800 倍 票价切莫“傲视”观众]. *Guangming Daily*, [online] 22 March. Available at: <http://www.ce.cn/culture/gd/201203/22/t20120322_23177993.shtml>.

Representations of Sexuality in *Winds of September*

Wang Changsong¹

Universiti Sains Malaysia

Email: chanson_wang@hotmail.com

INTRODUCTION

When I heard from Ru-Shou Robert Chen, the associate professor of the National Chengchi University (Taiwan), that the related domestic academic circles would look down on the academic discussion in terms of Taiwanese youth cinema, I was a bit astonished and a little bit suspicious that the domestic academic circles prefer to some serious issue and, that naturally arises my curiosity. Taiwanese youth cinema, however, portrays a fresh perspective and unique voice of Chinese youth, and a typical example is the latest film *Na Xie Nian Yi Qi Zhui De Nv Hai/You Are the Apple of my Eye* (directed by Giddens Ko in 2011) that achieve box office success¹ in the Chinese communities including Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Malaysia. Taiwanese youth cinema maintains its stable position as average in the domestic film industry, as the amount of youth films (see *table 1*) indicates this specific cultural phenomenon. This part will discuss the status of Taiwanese youth cinema between the years 2005-2010, as well as some trends appeared in Taiwanese youth film industry. This part, significantly, argues that Taiwanese youth cinema obscures the link between Nietzsche's nihilism and today's Taiwanese youth culture, in respect that: youth culture and the domestic youngsters' *Re Xue*² distinctiveness appears largely resolvable in the terms local teens and young adults have develops so far and, when treated it in this way, add significantly to their understanding of social responsibility, especially after the 921 earthquake³; And at the same time those

¹ The study is part of a research project financially supported by the School of Communication, Universiti Sains Malaysia. The project is called "A Study on the Representations of Sexuality in Chinese Youth Cinema", and involves supervisors from the School of Communication, Universiti Sains Malaysia.

² *Re Xue*. Literally translation: warm-blooded. It describes a perceptual feeling. Generally speaking, the righteous ardour promotes the individual to behave and act with energy and emotion. The individual usually shows himself/herself this feeling with the influence of the relevant surroundings such as an athletic competition, a battle and etc. It also refers to the sympathetic response due to a certain event/situation, such as a speech that has an electric effect on the crowd.

³ *The 921 Earthquake*, also known as Jiji earthquake, was a 7.3 Ms or 7.6 Mw earthquake which occurred at 1:47:12 am local time (17:47:12 UTC on September 20, 1999) in Jiji (Chichi, 集集), Nantou County, Taiwan.

filmmakers who are involving youth cinema lean towards more lighthearted subject in recent decade. The further facts will be provided in the following discussions.

Table 1: The amounts of youth films permitted to release in Taiwan (2005-2010)

Year	Sum Total	Amount of youth films	Percent
2005	40	7	17.5%
2006	27	9	33.33%
2007	42	8	19.04
2008	36	11	30.56%
2009	48	10	20.83%
2010	44	14	31.82%

For this essay, *Jiu Jiang Feng/Winds of September* (Lin Shu-Yu, 2008) is selected to study the issues that are mentioned in the previous paragraph. *Winds of September*, as is remarked by *Xiao Ye*—the Taiwanese writer and *Dian Ying Ren* ⁴, —it is indeed a typical *Guo Pian* (national film) worthy of academic studies. On the other hand, this study will attempt to shed more light on this, which is why these youth films in particular portray high school life with some accuracy. The “*New Taiwan Cinema*” in 1980s is deemed to build up its independent characters through portraying the cultural and historical differences in concepts of self and their former territories, and in the meantime, suffers the impact of the foreign films after Taiwan’s joining WTO in 2002. “*Dian Ying Chan Ye Diao Cha/Film Industry Report*” (Taiwan, 2009) (see *table 2*) stated that domestic major studios would purchase from the overseas, especially Hollywood, due to its large production of films as well as the assured return on investment although typically high purchase cost. The Taiwanese filmmakers, however, are always struggling to re-boom *Guo Pian* (Taiwanese national film), and the

2,415 people were killed, 11,305 injured, and NT\$300 billion (US\$10 billion) worth of damage was done. It was the second-deadliest quake in recorded history in Taiwan, after the 1935 Hsinchu-Taichung earthquake.

⁴ *Dian Ying Ren*, in particularly, refers to those people who involve the making of films such as film director, actor, and actress; it also generally indicates all the screw including the film cutter, the dubbing specialist, the projectionist and etc.

popular terms—“*Ai Tai Wan*”⁵ (love Taiwan) exactly indicate this sort of endeavor. Further, the concept of narratives can partly be analysed in the terms of national emotions, and accordingly the research question will be equally answered in the studies.

Table 2: The amounts of the films permitted to release in Taiwan (2005-2009)

Year	Taiwan		Mainland China & Hong Kong		Overseas	
	Amount	Percent	Amount	Percent	Amount	Percent
2005	40	9.83%	58	14.25%	309	75.92%
2006	27	7.26%	43	11.56%	302	81.18%
2007	42	10.10%	32	7.69%	342	82.21%
2008	36	8.61%	31	7.42%	351	83.97%
2009	48	11.41%	35	8.12%	348	80.74%

Taiwanese youth idol dramas also influence the making of youth film. A certain group of Taiwanese producers contribute their effort and good will to youth film and drama, take the producer of the latest Taiwanese youth film *You Are the Apple of My Eye* (2011) for instance, Angie Chai is the very popular producer for Taiwanese dramas; one of her popular works, *Meteor Garden* (2001), was a hit success when it was aired then; the film *You Are the Apple of My Eye* is her first film after ten years experience in youth idol drama, and exactly, it is a youth film; Xiao Ye commented that this film follows the changes of Taiwanese audiences' behavior in the first decade of this century⁶. This study will argue that any discussion of Taiwanese youth cinema cannot ignore the influence of youth idol drama in Taiwan, nor can any discussion of youth idol drama ignore the development of Taiwanese youth cinema.

⁵ *Ai Tai Wan*, is referred to as a core concept of Taiwanese film industry, such as a discussion entitled with “The Relationship between ‘*Ai Tai Wan*’ and the Renaissance of Taiwanese National Cinema” (literally translation) appeared in the latest book “*Fan Gun Ba, Taiwan Dian Ying/Jump! Taiwan Cinema*” (Xiao Ye, October 2011).

⁶ Xiao Ye, and SUNTV. 2011. *Fan Gun Ba, Taiwan Dian Ying/Jump! Taiwan Cinema*. Taiwan: Mai-Tian Press.

MELODRAMA: WINDS OF SEPTEMBER (DIRECTED BY LIN SHU-YU, 2008)

The film director Lin Shu-Yu has won the prize in Taipei Film Festival 2006 for his short film *Hai Xun Jian Bing/The Pain of the Others* (2005), and *Winds of September* is his first feature film. The latter one focuses on a gang of teenage boys and girls, and the relationships between them, which set in 1997 in Hsinchu. The story is based upon Lin's personal experiences. In an interview ⁷, Lin mentioned that the story of *Winds of September* is autobiography detailing his high school life.

Before opening up considerations of some significant topics embodied within the whole story of the film *Winds of September*, I am firstly perhaps approaching the opening scene in exactly the way it most immediately presents itself to many cinema-goers, as it determines the basic elements and tunes of the story. The blue high-school uniform and a box marked "Ri Hsin sports shop" tells that the characters are high school youths and implies the connection between the characters and 'sports'. And definitely, the story proves it. The most interesting and revealing scene is happened at the baseball field where a group of young boys wearing the blue high-school uniform is cheering for their baseball team and ballplayers, where the group of young boys shows their discontent to the umpires, where a Eurasian boy firstly throws his hot dog in an arc high into the baseball field, also, where the typical Taiwanese-look chubby boy's shoe is throwing away by his buddy. All the details portrayed in the opening scene indicate youth culture, and social facts in Taiwan society, for example, 'the discontent to the umpires', on the surface, expresses the youths' strong emotional reaction but represents their attitudes towards the adult world. Both the structure and the substance of my arguments here are therefore conditioned by these kinds of facts that this is a mapping of the research questions, an outline of potential discussions in terms of Taiwanese youth cinema, of question that might be raised, approaches which might be taken.

The story of the film *Winds of September* is intense due to the isolation, muteness of the characters as well as the slow narrative pace. What, then, is the relationship between 'youth'

⁷ Mao, Ya Feng. 2010. *Zhen Cang Mei Hao, Yu Gan Shang/The Treasure of Glory and Sentiment* (literal translation), *The Voice of Taiwan Cinema* edited by Lin Wen-Qi and Wang Yu-Yan, Taiwan: Bookman Books Co., Ltd..

and narrative discourse in this film? This begs two further questions: in what sense may 'youth' be regarded as victims, virtuous and heroic characters or suffering protagonists? And what kind of relationship of narrative style might a notion of 'Taiwanese youth' as a signifier suggest? Much of the discussion in the present part concerning the melodrama's characteristics of dominant Taiwanese youth cinema may, because of its emphasis on the simple dramatic conflicts and stock characters, seem overly formalistic. However, it is perhaps worth repeating a point that was made earlier in the introduction: it perfectly embraces the typical concepts of Taiwanese youth cinema, that it sheds light on the ideological operation of Taiwanese youth cinema. It is important to remember that characters functions largely as 'a liminal space between the real and language which finds representation within film and inter-textual forms' ⁸. What a discussion of narrative pace and narrative structures in *Winds of Septembers* suggest is that they are linked to the hysterical and phenomenological mimesis that is at stake in relation to melodrama and film viewing in Taiwan. The implications of the fundamental facts for the questions above will be examined in the following paragraph.

In considering the relationship between the nine characters in the film, the psychoanalytic work has drawn upon a particular model of the teenage as constituted by unconscious process: curl up and disappear (see *figure 1*). The TV news covering the Taiwan Major League is referred to as narration, which seems only be interested by the group of gang, actually provides the symbols, and resources through which we constitute an understanding of the developments of the relationships among the teenagers. In other words, there is something in common between the developing process of the Taiwan Major League and the changes in the relationships among the characters. After the opening scene, the first shot in which all the seven boys stand together is when they are given an admonitory talk by the drillmaster, and following shot portrays that the seven boys gather around a tree, outside the school, where they make jokes to each other in terms of the punishments from the drillmaster. These two scenes along with the following scene of the group skinny dipping, obviously indicate the solid relationships among them as they stick together through thick and thin. One of the

⁸ Campbell, Jan. 2005. *Film and Cinema Spectatorship: Melodrama and Mimesis*. UK: Polity Press.

arguments put forward by Robert, Herbert and Scott suggest that:

from the historical, comparative, and contemporary literature on youth gangs, two elements appear to be necessary preconditions to the formation of true youth gangs, ... : critical mass and social disorganization⁹.

In looking at the change and development of each character in the whole story, the two ‘elements’ influence the persistence and disintegration of the youth gang. In addition, the story becomes intense because of this isolation, muteness of the characters, and the relationship between *Yen* (played by Rhydian Vanghan) and *Tang* (played by Chang Chea), for example, becomes destructive after *Yen* leading their buddies to play a trick on *Tang* by displaying a tumble of bottles on *Tang*’s desk, that look like the same shape as the one breaking *Tang*’s head by those street gang whose girlfriend actually has an affair with *Yen*. It means that, *Tang* acts a whipping boy for *Yen*.




Figure 1: curl up and disappear

It’s a small incident that touches off a big one. *Tang* becomes isolated from the group. However, it includes distinct facts that lead the disintegration of the gang: *Tang*’s ‘disintegration’ behaviour represents that he dislikes *Yen*’s behaviours and attitude towards *Yen*’s current affection with *Yun*; the scene of *Tang*’s masturbation indicates he has sex fantasies for *Yun* (*Yen*’s girlfriend); *Tang* firstly has no any objection to *Yen*’s ‘playboy’

⁹ Franzese, Robert J., Herbet C. Covey, and Scott Menard. 2006. *Youth Gang*. Springfield: Charles C Thomas Publisher LTD.

behaviour until *Yen*'s joke, but not until his heating by the street gang. Before proceeding to an examination of some approaches to and examples of these youths' 'disintegration' and isolation, therefore, I will briefly look at the scene of *Tang*'s masturbation, which may embrace further explored themes for understanding the disintegration of the gang. The scene of *Tang*'s masturbation, where is well larded with *Tang*'s imaging sex with *Yun* - *Yen*'s girlfriend, shows his sexual fantasies, but, obviously, this simple scene also might explain *Tang*'s falling out. As the subject of sexual fantasy is *Yun*, *Tang* mentally rehearses the sorts of possibilities. Janet Shibley Hyde and John D. DeLamater state:

Sexual fantasy can play a variety of functions for the person doing the fantasizing. These include enhancing self-esteem and attractiveness, increasing one's own sexual arousal (e.g., during masturbation or partnered sex), and facilitating orgasm. A very role is enabling the person to mentally rehearse future possibilities. Such rehearsal may enable the person to change behavior, initiate communication with a partner, or change partners.¹⁰

It indeed changes *Tang*'s behaviour exactly as portraying he rejects to join their group activities including watching their favourite baseball team's game. In the film, each character has his/her own intense stories, such as *Yen* ends his life in an accident; *Sheng* and *Hsing* are expelled from the school; and all of the seven boys do not gather together as a gang any more. The fates of some characters, in the perspective of melodrama, will be elaborated in the following paragraphs.

A model for the second question relevant to melodrama narrative style is provided in the following analysis in which the entire story is subjected to a kind of cognition towards the notion of 'Taiwanese youth' again and a highly detailed *reading*. *Winds of September* is a typical Taiwanese youth film, and also a typical Taiwanese melodrama, as this film 'both overlaps and competes with realism and tragedy, maintaining complex historical relations

¹⁰ Hyde, Janet Shibley and John D. DeLamater. 2000. *Understanding Human Sexuality* (Seventh Edition). Whitehouse Station: McGraw-Hill.

with them’¹¹. In the film, those young boys have their own ways of having fun either inside or outside the school—such as, they have lunch together at the building roof of the school, they play jokes, romp, roughhouse, show off, and whoop it up at their specific ‘gathering point’, where it is only belonging to them. In the meantime, this specific place, ultimately, symbolises the disintegration of the gang. Mise-en-scene, however, exactly indicates that it is the world where no any adult interrupt them. ‘Building roof’ is also narrated in another two versions of *Winds-of-September* stories that are directed by the filmmakers in Mainland China and Hong Kong respectively. In this context the heterogeneity of the melodrama aesthetic facilitates conflict and negotiation between cultural identities. At issue from an analytical perspective is the degree to which the melodramatic text works both on an imaginary level - internal to fictional production, and on a realist level, which refers to the world outside the text. This film, as a melodrama, feeds the demand for significances unavailable within the constraints of socially legitimate discourse but for which there is no other language, it invests in highly symbolised characters, events, relations and mise-en-scene as well. But equally, it conforms to realism’s ever shifting criteria of relevance and credibility, for it expresses the ‘power’ through portraying a recognizable, socially constructed Taiwanese world. These figures of high-school boys, which have served in the whole story as the challenging-adult-world symbols, are also the ‘generator’ of Taiwanese youth discourses drawn from the social realities—discourses that negotiate a space within and frequently resist patriarchal domination. There are countable close-up shots for the figures of adults, and interestingly, in the film, besides the only one adult-figure—‘drillmaster’—which obviously symbolises the regulations and rules of the adult world. The conflict between the drillmaster and the ‘problem boys’ definitely produces a struggle between teenager’s and adult’s voices: the symbol cannot be owned, but is contested. The use of Todorov (1977)’s ‘equilibrium formula’ (see *table 3*) indicates that: the narrative shows equilibrium more rather than the state of disequilibrium; and the characters’ resolutions are linked to ‘tragedy’.

¹¹ Gledhill, Christine [edited]. 1987. *Home is Where the Heart is: Studies in Melodrama and the Woman’s Film*. UK: BFI Publishing.

Table 3: The Model of Ideological Strategies in Genre Production

	Order
	<i>(drama film)</i>
Hero	male dominant
Setting	contested (ideological unstable)
Conflict	arbitrariness (externalized)
Resolution	death/expelled/isolated
Thematics	young manhood macho code utopia-as-promise

Winds of September strongly represents a trend of film narrative in Taiwanese youth cinema and marks the influences by Taiwan 'New Wave Cinema' for its embracing the unique cultural identity and new mode of collaboration in the context of Greater China. Nonetheless, the narrative itself will be an important consideration in another analysis.

Furthermore, *Winds of September* dramatically embraces the brotherhood of high school boys, and the parents/adults are portrayed as unimportant, and void of credibility, as the homosociality is a primarily male phenomenon, particularly common among young Taiwanese guys in social life, and in the meantime, the research¹² in terms of family education in Taiwan reliably indicate that Taiwanese parents spend minor time on children's non-academic supplementary education. Once a notion of 'homosociality' as an active cinematic element is adopted by Taiwanese youth cinema, the distinction between films that embody an internal criticism, and films are completely ideologically complicit becomes redundant. This film sought to portray brotherhood as part of the Taiwanese youths' life and as a culture not distinct from the popular culture—according to the story the teenagers do not make any serious troubles to the society by group but they bonds with each other either by sharing their after-school time together or by behaving with loyalty to their 'brothers'.

¹² Ho, Hsuan-fu, and Hsiao-lan lee. 2010. "Great Expectations: Family Educational Expenditure in Taiwan vs China". *European Journal of Social Sciences*.17: 628-637.

Michael Flood ¹³ states that:

Male-male social bonds have a powerful influence on the sexual relations of some young heterosexual men.

For this group of gang, male-male friendships take priority over male-female relations, that's why *Yen's* facial expression, in the opening part, indicates a bit embarrassed while *Yen's* girlfriends requests him to follow her back after school time, in front of all his 'brothers'. And, interestingly, one of his 'brothers' called his girlfriend as "*Ma Tze*" which is a popular cant among gangs. Actually, *Ma Tze*, is somewhat a derogatory slang. On the other hand, it indirect indicates this sort of priority over male-female relationship.

The point of discussing the formation of Taiwanese youths' brotherhood also raises the question of Taiwanese family education, or the parental education, to signification. Consequently, it also poses the issue of the Taiwanese parents' contribution to children's behaviours and attitudes regarding 'brotherhood' as a subject. The answers to the numerous questions raised by this issue might well in effect force a transformation of the very perspective in which the questions are posed. My discussion of these questions is focused around two interrelated issues, which has been implied within the film text: communication between parents and teenagers on the other hand, and the power of adult/parents and what this might mean for teenagers. The scene, in which *Yen's* Eurasian-look mother attempts to scold her son due to his ignorance for their family-run sports shop, is a good example, as the filmmaker apparently suggests his explanatory code to the two issues. *Yen's* typical perfunctory attitude of such a child when communicating with the mother would also be analysed from the cinematic perspective. The spectators might only recognise roughly *Yen's* mom is not a typical Taiwanese but a Eurasian, or an immigrant, and as a mother figure, this character is out-of-focus from the beginning to the end in the sequence, but, on the contrary, *Yen* is always in-the-focus. The conversation between mother and son is not face-to-face, but

¹³ Flood, Micheal. 2008. "Men, Sex, and Homosociality: How Bonds between Men Shape Their Sexual Relations with Women". *Men and Masculinities*.10: 339-359.

both of them facing the lens. Not only the dialogue shows *Yen*'s perfunctory attitude, but also his moves have been strongly embodied the habits that make for highly ineffective communication, such as talking back. Ultimately, the power of a mother, in this film, is represented as unimportant. The mother figure only appears twice in the whole film. And, it's the only sequence the spectators hear her voice. Interestingly, it is reasonable to believe, in the story, that *Yen* has a Eurasian look because of his 'immigrant' mother.

Moreover, 'the Eurasian looks' in the film *Winds of September* act as the 'leaders', such as the Rhydian Vanghan plays the role of the leader of the gang—*Yen*, and Jennifer Chu plays the role of the class monitor. On an institutional level, the reasons include: Eurasian looks, from the perspective of film marketing strategies, satisfy the domestic audiences' needs towards film aesthetic; and some of 'the Eurasian looks', in Taiwanese society, play the roles of leaders, and the current president of Taiwan—Ma Ying-jeou—is a good example. Without attempting to go into any of the complexities of this discussion here—a discussion that must ultimately relate to the status of Taiwanese youth cinema in the frame of sociology – fantasy predominates over the value of Eurasians in Taiwanese youth cinema. Rhydian Vanghan is not the first Eurasian look in Taiwanese entertainment, and also not the most successful idol in Taiwan, but he represents a typical Eurasian artist in Taiwan. As a matter of fact, there is a number of Eurasian-look artists and celebrities gained popularity in Chinese communities including Taiwan, Mainland China and Hong Kong. A short articles from the commercial electronic newspaper database, which is entitled "*the New Generation of Eurasian-look Artists in Entertainment: not just Eyecandy*"¹⁴, states that Eurasian-look artists and celebrities take the public by storm, and also cite some instances to support this: Rhydian Vanghan, Tiffany Xu, Hannah, and Anthony Neely. On the other hand, it indicates that the Eurasian-look actor and actress may catch the domestic spectators' fancy.

Finally, from this emerges the concept of 'typification': characters, in the film *Winds of September*, may be drawn as rounded individuals with their own traits of personality, but they also function as embodiments of social and historical characteristics. In this way, the

¹⁴ Lin, Wen Yin. 2011. "The New Generation of Eurasian-look Artisits in Entertainment: not just Eyecandy". 3 Oct. 2011 (179 words). Retrieved on 2012. Available: XINMSN.

characters become social ‘types’ as well as individuals. The representation of reality in 1990s Taiwan thus take place through fictional characters, who partly operate as types expressive of social groups, such as those teenagers who go after their favorite baseball player Liao Min-Hsiung ¹⁵. Actually this is the fundamental difference between social realism and the realism of Taiwanese melodrama. In the latter, identifications by the spectators with central characters occur predominantly at the level of individual traits of personality set up by the narrative. The narrative of this film offers a vision of tragedy, but also aims to be grounded rather than utopian. The optimism is rendered in the development of one of the central characters - *Tang* – who represents ‘heroic’ in the course of the development: the ‘positive hero’ of reality, as the non-intense ending only involves this specific character. However, “in socialist realism ..., identification at the level of individual personality traits also, and concomitantly, involves identification with the social-historical situation of the character’s ‘type’” ¹⁶. Hence, the discussions in terms of family education, youth culture, youth ideology and social facts in Taiwan are actually raised by the conflicts portrayed in this ‘melancholia’ film, and on the other hand, socialist realist narrative demands resolution and closure, this film gives a potential for the openness in socialist realism that does not exist in classic realism.

¹⁵ Liao Ming-Hsiung is a Taiwanese professional baseball player (position: outfielder) in 1990s.

¹⁶ Kuhn, Annette. 1994. *Women's pictures: Feminism and cinema*. UK: Verso.

REFERENCES

- Campbell, J., 2005. *Film and Cinema Spectatorship: Melodrama and Mimesis*. UK: Polity Press.
- Flood, M., 2008. Men, Sex, and Homosociality: How Bonds between Men Shape Their Sexual Relations with Women. *Men and Masculinities*, 10, pp.339-359.
- Franzese, R.J., Herbet, C.C. and Menard, Scott., 2006. *Youth Gang*. Springfield: Charles C Thomas Publisher LTD.
- Gledhill, C., ed., 1987. *Home is Where the Heart is: Studies in Melodrama and the Woman's Film*. UK: BFI Publishing.
- Ho, H.F. and Lee, H.L., 2010. Great Expectations: Family Educational Expenditure in Taiwan vs China. *European Journal of Social Sciences*, 17, pp.628-637.
- Hyde, J.S. and DeLamater, J.D., 2000. *Understanding Human Sexuality*, 7th ed. Whitehouse Station: McGraw-Hill.
- Kuhn, A., 1994. *Women's pictures: Feminism and cinema*. UK: Verso.
- Lin, W.Y., 2011. The New Generation of Eurasian-look Artisits in Entertainment: not just Eyecandy. 3 Oct. 2011 (179 words). Retrieved on 2012. Available: XINMSN.
- Xiao Ye, and SUNTV, 2011. *Fan Gun Ba, Taiwan Dian Ying/Jump! Taiwan Cinema*. Taiwan: Mai-Tian Press.

Love Story between Teacher and Student as Metaphor: A Textual Analysis of *July Rhapsody*, *Thirteen Princess Trees* and *Cape No. 7*

Huo Shengxia

City University of Hong Kong

Email: houshengxia@gmail.com

Love story between teacher and student is a common topic in films.¹ As a taboo in ordinary life, this topic is given more room and freedom to talk about in imaginal space such as films. It is an interesting entrance to explore problems such as desire and repression of individual, openness and conservation of society, space and boundary of culture, and so on. In this article, I will focus on three Chinese-language films on this topic, which were all published in the first ten years of new millennium. They are *July Rhapsody* by Ann Hui (2001, Hong Kong), *Thirteen Princess Trees* by Lv Yue (2006, Mainland), and *Cape No. 7* by Wei Te Sheng (2008, Taiwan). There are several reasons that I choose these three films. Firstly, these three films are from three different regions of China——Hong Kong, Mainland and Taiwan. I really hope to analyze their similarities and differences when they talk about the same taboo topic. Secondly, all of these three directors are independent filmmakers or filmmakers with independent spirit. Ann Hui is one of the main members in Hong Kong New Wave. She could always deliver her independent thinking even in some commercial films such as *July Rhapsody*. Lv Yue is famous as a cameraman in Zhang Yimou's and Feng Xiaogang's films. But in the independent films directed by himself, very different content and style are manifested. *Thirteen Princess Trees* is one of models. Wei Te Sheng has directed two features by now, both of which are independent films. In these three films, maybe some special and deep thinking of the taboo topic could be represented, which are different from both western films and mainstream commercial films in the east on the same topic.

Though these three love stories in films took place in very different social and historical

¹ No matter in the west or in the east, there are a lot of films on this topic, such as *Outside the Window* (Taiwan, 1973), *White Wedding* (France, 1989), *All Things Fair* (Denmark, Sweden, 1995), *Made in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong, 1997), *First Love and Other Pains* (Hong Kong, 1999), *The Piano Teacher* (France, 2001), *Loving Annabelle* (America, 2003), *La, Melodie d'Helene* (Taiwan, 2004), *Summer's Tail* (Taiwan, 2004), and so on.

contexts, I find that all of them share a similar characteristic. These three directors all take romance as a metaphor. It means that rather than talking about the love story between teacher and student itself and relative theme about it, all of these three directors' real interests lie on something else. Then, what are their real interests? And how do they represent them through a love story between teacher and student? In the following I will analyze them separately.

MIDLIFE CRISIS: ROMANCE IN *JULY RHAPSODY*

Once a time when Ann Hui accepted an interview and talked about one of her films *Ordinary Hero*, she said that “ it is not a love story, ...I hope to talk about love at a level of the meaning of life. It is not a political story either.....I don't want to talk about the ‘political life’ of the protagonists. I want to talk about their ‘life’.”² Not just in *Ordinary Hero*, “life” is a common theme in her oeuvre. Ann Hui could always abstract from some specific issues, such as political, historical and romantic ones, into an understanding of living condition. There is no exception for *July Rhapsody*. *July Rhapsody*'s Chinese title is nanren sishi, which means a man who is 40 years old. In traditional ideas of Chinese, 40 years old is a sign that a person is middle-aged. Just as some critiques pointed out, the theme of this film is actually the “living condition”³ of middle-aged people. Then the question is: what is the living condition of a middle-aged person in Ann Hui's film? And what is the foundation of the romance between teacher and student in this living condition?

The scenes at the beginning of the film could give us rich information. It began with a setting on sand bank. The whole scene was in a yellow color—— yellow sky, yellow sea, yellow sand, and yellow beach umbrella. The yellow color emphasized that it was in the afternoon. Why did the director emphasize the time “afternoon”? I think that there is a direct relationship between the time in a day and the age of a person. There is a proverb in China that “when a person is 40 years old, it is just like the time comes to the afternoon.”(ren guo sishi tian guo wu) The day will come to night very soon, just like a person will become old

² Ann Hui on Ann Hui, Kwong Powai, eds., P96, Evergrowing(HK).Limited, 2009.

³ Wu Yueren, *Conditions and Ideas: July Rhapsody, Popular Cinema*, 2003,2.

very soon. The theme of “midlife crisis” has been implied at the beginning. Then there was a dialog between the son On Yin and the father Lam Yiu Kwok. The first topic they talked about is the father had a presbyopia and could not read very quickly. This symptom manifested that there had been a sign of slowing up when a person was 40 years old. Then the second topic they talked about was a new phrase the father learned from his student. The son said that this phrase had been “outdated” and nobody used it nowadays. The word “outdated” repeated many times in this film, which showed that Lam Yiu Kwok’s ideas were behind the times in the new generation’s point of view. The two topics represented that Lam Yiu Kwok had a “midlife crisis” both physically and mentally. Then the scene focused on an anchored boat on the sea which had not enough power to sail. Actually this image was a symbol of the man. The middle-aged man who had not enough energy to catch up with the times was just like the anchored boat which could not sail on the sea. The “midlife crisis” lied on that he was afraid to be discarded by the times and the new generation. It is not casual to use a narrative technology of flashback and insert the dialog between son and father at the beginning of the film, because one of the main contents in film is about “dialog”, about how a man with midlife crisis tried to communicate with the new generation.

Generally speaking, the dialogs took place in two spaces in the film and the narrative lines could be separated into two parts: one in family, which was about the dialog between father and son; and the other in school, which was about the dialog between teacher and student. In both of the two spaces and narrative lines, we could easily find a lot of details that Lam Yiu Kwok tried to understand, engage in and communicate with the new generation. For example in family, Lam Yiu Kwok told his own love story and his son’s parentage to On Yin, his older son; and tried to know whether his younger son liked the singer Ricky Martin. In school, he used many modern words to analyze classical literature.

Of course, the most important dialog took place in the love story between teacher and student, when Lam Yiu Kwok began a close relationship with Wu Choy Lam. Then what was the result of the dialog between two different generations? And what was the influence of the romance to his living condition? It is obvious that there were a lot of contrary characteristics between Wu and Lam. Wu was self-confident, while Lam was not; Wu was active, while Lam

was passive; And the last but not the least, Wu lived with a untrammelled and free attitude, while Lam was well-behaved and responsible to play every social roles in his life——good student, good teacher, good husband, good father and so on. From these comparisons we could easily find that the director took a positive attitude to the younger generation. If Lam was a teacher in school, he is the student of Wu when out of school. It was Wu that took Lam to the third spaces except family and school——shopping mall, cinema, public garden, bar and so on. In these spaces Lam could escape from his social roles for a short while. Wu's living attitude also influenced Lam to rethink about his own living condition and life pattern. At the end of the film, Lam made two important decisions: one was separating with his wife, and the other was making a journey to Yangtze River. Both of the two decisions showed that Lam refused to continue his ordered and boring life, and began to take a much more active living attitude. It was obvious that Wu contributed a lot to this change of Lam. Then when we go back to see the assignment written by Wu about Double Ninth Festival, we could find a different level of meaning. In this essay named *Essay on Double Ninth Festival* (chongyangjie oushi), Wu wrote:

“What is Double Ninth Festival? Double Ninth Festival is a happy festival time for the dead. White bones stretch themselves under the earth: Oh, who disturbs my dream?

What is essay? Essay is the words of the dead. It has stopped its breath and pulse and set in. When the Double Ninth Festival comes, oh my God, the zombie revives!”

Actually we could also take the romance as a Double Ninth Festival for Lam Yiu Kwok. When he had gotten used to living an ordered and boring life day by day, he was actually a “zombie” to some extend. And the romance gave him an opportunity to “revive”, to rethink about his own living condition.

On the whole, the main content of *July Rhapsody* is about the living condition of a middle-aged person. When he is faced with midlife crisis, which means he has not enough

energy to catch up with the times and is afraid of being discarded by the new generation, what could he do? The director provides an outlet by describing a love story between teacher and student. The middle-aged person could keep an open mind to the new generation. By learning from them maybe the middle-aged person could rethink their own lives and find some new opportunities in their living space.

REPRESSION IN SYSTEM: ROMANCE IN *THIRTEEN PRINCESS TREES*

Lv Yue is always taken as a member in “The Fifth Generation”, and famous as a cameraman in Zhang Yimou’s and Feng Xiaogang’s films. As a director, he has directed five features since 1998, including *Mr. Zhao* (1998), *The Foliage* (2003), *Thirteen Princess Trees* (2006), *Shan Xiang Shu Ji* (2006) and *The Obscure* (2007). Among these films, only *The Foliage* was published in China, and the rest of them did not pass the censorship of State Film Bureaucrats. When most of the directors in the Fifth Generation engage into the commercial film industry, Lv Yue looks a little special. When we focus on the theme and aesthetic style in his works, we could also find that he has a complex relationship with the Fifth Generation. Tracing his films, there is a common theme in most of his works——repression of desire. The protagonists, no matter man or woman, all repress their desire in a strict cultural system. Actually this is a popular theme in the films of the Fifth Generation, but Lv Yue use a different aesthetic style to represent it. When most of the directors in the Fifth Generation put their stories in an imaginal space in the past, Lv Yue is likely to use a social realistic style. In *Shan Xiang Shu Ji* and *The Obscure*, he even inserted footage of documentary into the features. So the films of Lv Yue could give the audience a strong sense of reality. This makes Lv Yue different from the Fifth Generation. This characteristic may be attributed to his own character⁴ and his co-working experience with Ivens, a famous documentary director.⁵

Thirteen Princess Trees is a model that represents the common theme and aesthetic style in Lv Yue’s films. It was directed in 2006 and won the “Special Jury Prize” on the 19th Tokyo

⁴ <http://jishi.cntv.cn/people/dianyingrenwu/classpage/video/20101001/100469.shtml>

⁵ Lv Yue co-worked with Ivens in the documentary *A Tale of the Wind*.

International Film Festival. It tells a story in Princess Tree High School in Sichuan from the point of view of a problem girl He Feng. He Feng had a boyfriend named Tao Tao, who was also her classmate. He was very brave in He Feng's eyes and was a leader in a group of students. But He and Tao separated because of some reason and Tao began a close relationship with their class advisor Song Xiaodou. There were very little scenes to manifest this relationship between teacher and student, so we could get very little details about it. But according to information given from the film, we could guess why Tao Tao began this relationship. Before this relationship began, there were two important things taking place to Tao Tao. One was a transfer student Bao Jingsheng came to the class and posed a threat to the leader status of Tao Tao. The other was Tao Tao's father was put in prison because of corruption. Both of these two things made Tao Tao feel unsafe and he wanted to get protection from the power. At this time the class advisor Song Xiaodou, who had the highest power in class, became the subject he took refuge with. So rather than a pure romance, it was a power game between teacher and student. Of course it was not a fair play, because the teacher had initiative and power while the student not. Therefore, while Tao Tao got protection from the teacher, he lost his individuality and courage at the same time. For example, there was a manifest comparison of Tao Tao before and after this romance. Tao Tao had a friend A Li, who was always put upon by other students. At first, Tao Tao fought for him. But later, especially after he began relationship with Song, he gave up protecting him.

Actually the relationship between Tao and Song was a metaphor of the relationship between student and teacher in school. In school, teachers had the power while student not. The high school principle, who did not appear himself, was the highest ruler in school and controlled every student's destiny. Then, the school was a metaphor too. The strict system in school was a metaphor of that in society. So there were hierarchically nested structures in the film:

student → teacher → school → society

In every structure there was a strict power relationship between the two sides. There

was no room for young people to keep their individuality. No matter how brave and unique they were, the only choice left for them at last is to be obedient to the system. Even He Feng, who was not obedient to the educational system in school, had to change herself when she went into the society. There was a manifest comparison of He Feng before and after she grew up. When she was in school, she wore T-shirt and jeans, just like a boy. But when she grew up, she wore shirt and skirt, just like a polite lady. Moreover, she spoke in Sichuan dialect in school, but in Putonghua when she grew up. Actually dialect is a sign full of personality while Putonghua is a uniform language with no character. Therefore, the director seems very pessimistic and critic to the system which represses the growth of young people. This critic attitude could also be represented from the name of the film. “Princess tree” means useless person in Sichuan dialect, because the characteristic of this tree is very soft and hard to be used. Through the image of “princess tree”, Lv Yue criticizes the strict system in society which represses the healthy growth of young people and made them useless.

COMPROMISE: ROMANCE IN *CAPE NO.7*

Cape No.7 is Wei Te Sheng’s first feature. This film was a big success in box office in 2008 and had gotten a lot of critiques from then on. It tells a story that A Ga, a frustrated rock musician, came home and became a postman. He opened a letter packet by accident and found that there was a romantic story between a Japanese teacher and a Taiwanese girl 60 years ago when Taiwan was recovered from Japan. Similarly, A Ga also began a love story with a Japanese girl in reality. Actually love story between Japanese teacher and Taiwanese student is not the creation of Wei Te Sheng. This narrative model could be traced back to *Sayon No Kane* directed by Shimizu Hiroshi in 1943. This film was made with a manifest political purpose to maintain the colonial system in Taiwan. Then what is the purpose of Wei Te Sheng? Why did he describe a love story between Japanese teacher and Taiwanese student? Once a time when Wei Te Sheng received an interview after he had directed his second feature *Seedip Bale*, he said that: “no matter in *Cape No.7*, or in *Seedip Bale*, or even in the films I will direct

in the future, one thing I always hope to do is to describe a process of compromise”⁶. Why is this theme so important for a Taiwanese director? It is relative to the colonial history of Taiwan. Wei Te Sheng said that because of the history, “the Taiwanese lived too hard. They could not balance between love and hate.” But “the history has passed for a long time. As the third generation, it is time for us to face it with a much more objective and macroscopic attitude.”⁷ That is why the director always wants to tell a process of compromise in his films. Then the question is how to get the compromise? I think there is a strategy that Wei Te Sheng continues to use from *Cape No.7* to *Seedip Bale*: looking at the history from an individual perspective. When Wei received an interview, he said that “we should look back the history from an individual perspective rather than the national or ethical perspective. After all when a person lived in a big history, there were a lot of things he could not control.”⁸ I think that is why Wei chose to tell the relationship between Japanese and Taiwanese from a love story between teacher and student. Romance between teacher and student is a very personal event and love letter is a very private object. The director wanted the audience to understand Japanese as an individual who had exuberant feelings rather than an abstract concept. In the love letter, the Japanese also said that “I am nothing but a poor teacher. Why should I be the scapegoat? I have nothing to do with the war. I am but a poor teacher.”

If the identity of teacher and the angle of narrative are helpful to reach a compromise between the Japanese protagonist and the Taiwanese audience, then the love story itself is a model of compromise. From the seven letters, we could find there was pure love based on respect and appreciate between the two persons, which overstepped the differences of nation, culture, identity and age. For example, in the second letter the Japanese wrote:

“You are a student from the sunny South, while I am a teacher from the snowy North. We are so different. But why do we love each other so much? I miss the sunshine and the warm winds. I remember you were upset by the ants. I know I shouldn’t laugh at you. But the way you stamped on the ants, it fascinated me. It is


⁶ <http://life.fhl.net/Movies/MovieProphet/Wei01.htm>

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ http://ent.ifeng.com/movie/news/hk/detail_2012_03/20/13324352_2.shtml

as if you were dancing with anger and airing joyfulness. That is when I fell in love with you.”

Actually this romantic love provides a possibility that people could cross differences and reach compromise. It existed in the film as a symbol and ideal which guided the people in the present. Every time when the soliloquy of the teacher appeared, the setting would be very peaceful, either at the sea or in the rain, and the background music would go on with a slow melody, both of which made people calm down and forget the contradictions and injuries in ordinary life. It was also the love letters that guided the Taiwanese guy A Ga and the Japanese girl Tomoko cross their differences in culture and values and come together at last. Actually not only the relationship between the two protagonists A Ga and Tomoko, other relationships in the films also had a process from contradiction to compromise. We could represent them in a diagram as follows:



From this diagram we could see that most of the relationships in the film were in tense at first. But with the increase of communication, all of the characters built much more harmonious relationships at last. In the end of the film when the concert began, it's actually a Carnival for them to celebrate the harmonious relationships.

LOVE STORY BETWEEN TEACHER AND STUDENT AS METAPHOR

Through the analysis above we could find that all of these three directors take the love story between teacher and student as a metaphor. Rather than talking about the romance itself,

they are all interested in something else. Of course because of the difference in character and cultural context, the directors deal with the metaphor in different ways. For Ann Hui, she focused on the living condition of middle-aged people. For Lv Yue, he focused on the social system in Mainland China. For Wei Te Sheng, he focused on the attitude to the history of Taiwan. Then, there are two questions left here. The first question is, since the real interests of directors lied on something else rather than the romance, why did they still tell a love story at first? The second question is, why could all of them represent their own themes through the love story between teacher and student? What is the characteristic of this topic?

It is easier to answer the first question. As a taboo in society, the love story between teacher and student could attract the interests of audiences. So we could look at it as a strategy in commercial industry. The real interests of these three directors, no matter on life, society or history, are not commercial enough from the perspective of market. None of them could be a guarantee of the box office. Therefore, telling a love story and taking it as a metaphor is a balance between the market and the independence of director.

About the second question, I think the theory of Freud could give us an answer. In Freud's opinion, because children are taken care by their parents, they have sexual impulses towards their parents, which are named Oedipus Complex or Electra Complex. But these impulses must be overcome. "As these plainly incestuous phantasies are overcome and repudiated, one of the most significant, but also one of the most painful, psychical achievements of the pubertal period is completed: detachment from parental authority, a process that alone makes possible the opposition, which is so important for the progress of civilization, between the new generation and the old."⁹ However, it does not mean that the Complex would not influence them when they grow up and become adolescents. The "echo" will appear when "a young man falls in love seriously for the first time with a mature woman, or a girl with an elderly man in a position of authority"¹⁰. Though Freud didn't mention the romance between teacher and student, it is manifest that it belongs to this "echo". When adolescents study in school, teachers are the "mature woman" or "elderly man" they could get

⁹ Sigmund Freud, *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, P 93, New York: Basic Books, Publishers, 1962.

¹⁰ Ibid, P94.

in touch with frequently. Actually another psychologist E.B.Hurlock's opinion is very similar to Freud. He believes that there is a phase in heterosexual behavior of adolescents named "crushes and hero worship"¹¹. It means "a strong affectional attachment for an older individual with whom the adolescent has personal contacts" and "admires from afar"¹². But it will not last for a long time in Hurlock's opinion, because they will come to the next phase "puppy love" very soon, which means "the adolescent shows affection for someone approximately his own age"¹³. It is very easy to understand. Just as the young people should detach from the authority of their parents, they should detach from the authority of the elder people too. Romance between teacher and student is only a transient experience when the adolescent grow up and become independence.

From the theory of Freud and Hurlock, we could find the love relationship between teacher and student is very dynamic. With the development of independence of student, there is a trial of power between teacher and student. In different relationships, the power contrast may be different. Even in the relationship of the same couple, the power contrast could change from time to time. The complexity and unstability of this relationship provides a lot of possibilities to directors. That is one of the reasons that these three directors choose this topic. Ann Hui, Lv Yue and Wei Te Sheng actually provided three different possibilities of the love story. For Ann Hui, the student is more powerful than the teacher and could influence and change the teacher's attitude. For Lv Yue, the teacher is the authority and there is no room left for the student to develop their own independence. For Wei Te Sheng, the relationship between teacher and student is very equal, which is based on respect and understanding with each other. It is the complexity of this relationship itself provides rich resource for directors to explore.

METAPHOR AS AESTHETIC STYLE

Though telling a love story between teacher and student and taking it as a metaphor

¹¹ E. B. Hurlock, *Adolescent Development*, P281, McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1973.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

seem a compromise between directors and commercial industry, actually this strategy constructs a special aesthetic style in the films, which is different from a lot of commercial films in the west and east. In a lot of western films, directors are likely to describe the desire and psychology in the romance between teacher and student, such as *All Things Fair*, *The Piano Teacher*, *White Wedding* and so on. In many eastern films, they are likely to take the romance between teacher and student as abnormal or pure love to satisfy the audiences' different imagine of love, such as *High School Teacher*, *Outside the Window*, *La, Melodie d'Helene*, and so on. The similarity of these films is they all focus on love itself. For Ann Hui, Lv Yue and Wei Te Sheng, their narrative and aesthetic style are very different.

Firstly, there are lots of gaps in narrative. Directors have no interests to describe the whole process of the love story. For example, in *July Rhapsody*, director did not tell us why the student Wu would love the teacher Lam, who was neither rich nor handsome. It just happened. Ann Hui also omitted the scene that they made love in Shenzhen, which may be highlighted in many other commercial films. In *Thirteen Princess Trees*, the whole story was from the perspective of He Feng, who was not very clear about the relationship between her ex-boyfriend Tao Tao and the teacher Song Xiaodou, so it was reasonable that most of the details about this relationship were not mentioned in the film. It is similar in the *Cape No.7*. Because the love story between teacher and student happened 60 years ago, we could only learn something of it from the voiceover of the seven love letters. Actually the information was very limited. And cooperating with the limited information from the voiceover, the visual language was controlled strictly at the same time. Most of the scenes of the Japanese teacher were represented with long shoots. And the audience could only see the back and silhouette of the teacher from the beginning to the end. Actually all of the gaps in these three films make the audiences keep a distance from the love story. Because the limitation of information, they could not input themselves totally into the romance but keeping an eye on something else.

Secondly, there are multiple space-time structures in these films. When the meanings of romance itself is limited because of the narrative of gap, how are other levels of meanings activated? In my opinion, multiple space-time structures are very helpful in all of there three films. In *July Rhapsody*, for example, the love story is about the teacher Lam and the student.

But with the centre of Lam, Ann Hui represented a lot of other issues surrounding him. His wife, sons, friend and coworkers were all mentioned. The love story was put into a larger space and provided the audiences more angles to understand it. Except the multiple space structure, there were multiple time structures too. Through the memory of Lam, audience could compare this love story to his experience in the past, and understand its meaning from a different way. It is similar in *Thirteen Princess Trees*. The love story is about He Feng's ex-boyfriend Tao Tao and Song Xiaodou, but the director spent a lot of time to tell many other issues with the centre of He Feng and Tao Tao, such as the families of He Feng and Tao Tao, the work of He Feng's father, and so on. These all open more spaces to the audience and push them to think about the relationship between these issues and the love story between teacher and student. Many different levels of meanings may be activated through this process. In *Cape No.7*, Wei Te Sheng juxtaposed the voiceover of the teacher in the past and the image in the current. Two different space and time interacted with each other and made audience think about what is the meaning of a love story happened 60 years ago to the people living in the present.

On the whole, corresponding to the contents in the films, the narratives were also very special. On the one hand, the gaps in narrative move the interests of audience away from the love story itself. On the other hand, the multiple space-time structures provide more room for audiences to think about other levels of meaning of the love story. Through these two narrative strategies, the foundation of the love story as a metaphor is completed. Though these narrative strategies are used because of the limit in commercial industry, a special aesthetic style is constructed through it. All of these three films are much more implicit, cairn, and ambiguous than many other commercial films. I think this is an illumination to many directors who feel puzzled between commercial market and their own independence. Through the strategy of metaphor, they actually could take consideration of the two things at the same time.

CONCLUSION

1. Metaphor is a characteristic of three films on the topic of love story between teacher and student, directed by three directors with independent spirit. It means rather than talking the romance itself, they are all interested in something else. For Ann Hui, it is the living condition of middle-aged people; for Lv Yue, it is the strict and repressive system in society; for Wei Te Sheng, it is an attitude of compromise to look at the history of Taiwan.
2. The reason that they could represent different themes through the same topic is that the love relationship between teacher and student is very dynamic. There are many possibilities between teacher and student which provide the directors enough room to express their own theme.
3. Though the strategy of metaphor is a compromise between commercial market and independence, a special aesthetic style is constructed through it. With the narrative methods of gap and multiple space-time structures, the films are all very implicit, cairn, and ambiguous. Therefore, metaphor may be a useful strategy for directors who want to keep their independence in the commercial industry.

REFERENCES

- Ann Hui on Ann Hui*, Kwong Powai, eds., Evergrowing (HK). Limited, 2009.
- Freud, S., 1962. *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*. New York: Basic Books, Publishers.
- Hurlock, E. B., 1973. *Adolescent Development*. McGraw-Hill, Inc.

從金錢的構形閱讀都市——以《新舊上海》為例

楊妍

新加坡國立大學

電郵：a0036580@nus.edu.sg

一、引言

都市研究是近年來漢學研究的熱門話題，無論是都市的文化史、社會史，還是文學電影中的都市圖景，海內外學者都把注意力聚焦在“都市”，從不同角度，以不同切入點進行了深入的討論。在中國電影研究的領域，張英進（1996）曾出版一本專著分析中國電影中的都市論述，他以空間、時間、性別的構形為切入點，對中國現代文學和電影中的城市形象進行了討論。本文將提出一個新的切入點：金錢。在不少都市主題的電影中，金錢成為故事的核心。影片圍繞金錢展開了對都市的想像，在都市中的金錢體驗成為表現都市幻象的比喻之一。而通過金錢話語來解析都市的這種現象，在1935年前後這一時間段的電影中表現得尤其明顯。這時期完成的劇本如《新舊上海》（1935）、《壓歲錢》（1935）、《都市風光》（1935）、《夢裡乾坤》（1937）和《社會之花》（1937）等，都把金錢形容為都市的靈魂，金錢體驗當成是都市生活的代名詞。銀幕這一風潮，與1934年上海遭遇的經濟大蕭條有關。與國際市場接軌，加上現代工商業和金融業的發展，使得上海這座現代化都市不同于傳統意識中的中國地方。而這場經濟衝擊更是都市現代化發展帶來的直接後果，它使得生活在上海的都市人切膚地感受到由金錢經濟引起的生活動盪，體驗了現代都市中的不確定性、安全感缺失等。因此在這個時間點，金錢就成了電影人進行都市論述的切入點，能夠激起都市觀眾的共鳴，引起社會對都市的反思。

一批左翼電影人就選擇以批判性的眼光審視都市，把都市中的金錢描述為罪惡之源，通過表現圍繞金錢產生的矛盾糾紛，來揭露都市的黑暗和腐朽。這一類代表有袁牧之、夏衍、沈西苓等。以夏衍1935年創作的《壓歲錢》為例，影片圍繞著一枚作為壓歲錢的銀元在都市輾轉流動的過程，串聯起都市中的各色人等，揭示了各個層面的都市生活。在夏衍建構的銀幕都市中，善惡、好壞、窮富等極端對比格外分明，人性和金錢直接掛鉤，窮人是好人，富人就被刻畫成偽善的惡人，而金錢是將人腐蝕、使人變壞的主謀。和該片風格類似的還有《都市風光》等。在這一類的都市論述中，金錢是都市的主角，是都市人變得虛偽貪婪的主因，是都市成為欺騙、危險、動盪的罪惡之都的禍首。但值得注意的是，這種批判性的都市論述並沒有壟斷整個銀幕。同時期還有另一些電影人同樣從金錢的角度建構都市，卻展現出了不同的都市圖景，如現實主義流派的洪深。

本文就以洪深編劇、程步高導演、明星影片公司製作，1936年上映的有聲片《新舊上海》為例，觀察影片如何從金錢的構形來閱讀都市，以都市小市民的金錢體驗來完成對都市的敘述。影片講述了上海一個弄堂裡六家房客的日常生活。故事沒有明確交代發生時間，但從市場不景氣、絲廠倒閉、錢莊破產等細節中，可以估計為上海發生經濟危機的1934-1935年。故事的主人公都是弄堂裡的小市民。《新舊上海》就通過表現小市民在上海大蕭條中的金錢體驗——圍繞著金錢的喜怒哀樂，真實具象地建構起了對上海的都市想像。

正文將從對都市和都市人的宏觀描述，和對市民金錢體驗的微觀表現這兩個層面來

解析。下一節，文章將展示都市的新舊形象如何與金錢經濟直接對應，再分析金錢怎樣被塑造成一種都市問題，以及都市中的金錢關係對原有的傳統人際關係的取代；第三節中，文章將從三個具體問題來探討小市民的具體金錢體驗：金錢對都市人意味著什麼，如何獲得金錢，金錢被如何使用。從這些有關金錢的論述中，我們將能發掘出洪深和程步高建構出的上海都市。

二、金錢籠罩的都市

本節將具體分析《新舊上海》中對金錢經濟的表現，來探討三個概括性的都市論述：一，通過金錢經濟的好壞來反映都市形象的新舊；二，都市中的所有問題都圍繞著金錢展開；三，都市中的金錢關係代替了原有的傳統人際關係。

首先，我們來看編導們如何聯繫《新舊上海》的片名和畫面內容，用金錢經濟來表現都市形象。片名強調了影片的核心：上海這座都市和新舊的對比。舊上海是什麼樣子？新上海又有什麼區別呢？這種新舊差異的分水嶺發生在什麼時候？影片就以上海經濟形勢的好壞來區分都市的新和舊，以 1934-1935 發生的經濟大蕭條作為新舊上海的分界點，將市場不景氣的上海形容為舊上海，把經濟恢復之後的上海刻畫成新上海。

導演程步高通過電影的畫面語言，將都市形象的新舊與上海經濟的好壞進行了直接對應。先看影片開場的第一幕，洪深稱之為迂緩的開場方法，用來介紹重要的地方背景，歷史和環境。前四個鏡頭就將大蕭條時期的上海以冷清、破敗的形象呈現了出來。第一個鏡頭是黃浦江邊的江海關大樓上當時東亞最大的時鐘，這一時鐘代表了上海，點明了上海這座城市是故事發生的空間背景，也指出了時間是早上六點整。第二個鏡頭轉向了遠處的百老匯大廈，這座大廈於 1934 年剛剛完工，但卻沒有一絲生機，孤零零靜悄悄地聳立著。近處則擋著一顆大樹的陰影，而大樓在陽光的照映下也產生了部分陰影，更增添了畫面的頹敗感。下一個鏡頭也強調了蕭條的氣氛，大樹的枝杈沒有樹葉，彷彿冬天一般。陽光也還沒有照耀到這個地方，還像在黑夜中。故事就從這個鏡頭轉向了順德里弄堂——主人公們居住的地方。和一般描寫上海都市風光的電影不同，在《新舊上海》中，上海不再是燈火通明、流光溢彩、夜夜笙歌的夜上海，而是單調枯燥、肅靜蕭條、只有雞叫聲的，早晨六點的上海。在視覺和聽覺上，這部電影對上海都市的塑造都強調了不景氣的境況，顛覆了以往都市的繁華印象。而在鏡頭的處理上，對比《都市風光》等主流電影中快速切換、流動的快鏡頭，《新舊上海》的開場全部是靜止的遠景鏡頭，每個畫面停留四秒。這樣的鏡頭運用很明顯地讓觀眾感受到一個不同的上海，一個不景氣的都市。

而影片的最後則與開頭進行了鮮明的對比，呈現出一個勃勃生氣的新上海。和影片開頭呼應，螢幕上又出現了四幕以固定鏡頭拍攝的遠景，每一幕停留四秒左右。但這四幕和開頭靜謐的畫面不同，每幕中都有動態發展，聲音也十分嘈雜。其中一幕，火車頭噴出陣陣煙霧，背景聲音中嘈雜的鳴號聲響個不停。接著又出現了更黑更濃的煙，從工廠的煙囪中快速地噴出來。緊接著，畫面上出現了大批的人潮推搡著湧向工廠（大成絲廠）。每一畫面都有動態發展，配有嘈雜的背景聲音，凸顯出盎然的生機。將這兩個片段進行對比，就能看出導演刻意表現出的差異：過去上海是不景氣的，蕭條頹敗。而隨著經濟的恢復，市場形勢的好轉，一個充滿活力的新上海呈現出來。開動的火車隱喻了經濟運輸的啟動，工廠開工，工人勞作，標誌著經濟復蘇，人們又能自力更生，洋溢著一股積極向上的力量。而這樣的新上海活力，是屬於工人階級的，帶著白天的光明，

不同於《都市風光》等影片中呈現的紙醉金迷、歌舞昇平的夜上海。可見，《新舊上海》中的新上海儘管仍被金錢經濟左右，但更呈現出一種積極的正面力量，是人們通過辛勤勞作賺錢，主動去爭取屬於自己的生活希望。

除了在宏觀背景上用經濟的好壞來敘述上海的新舊形象之外，都市的問題也被體現為金錢主導的問題。洪深（1936）解釋劇本構思說，“《新舊上海》描寫了中下階級的民眾在生活的重壓下的掙扎慘況，得失的喜怒哀樂；劇中的主人翁有工商界的小職員，有舞女，有汽車夫，有寄生蟲，……在現社會中擇取這幾種最典型的人物，將他們罩在不景氣的網下，痛快地反映現實生活的不安和不合理社會行將沒落的前宵。”在洪深看來，此時上海的都市環境中，最典型的特徵就是經濟問題：市場不景氣，每個人都缺錢。因此，影片就通過不同主角之口以及多個電影鏡頭，講述了大同小異的時代悲劇——

“在世界經濟的恐慌下，在列強的儘量吸搜下的全中國民眾的生活，誰不在鬧窮，農工業相繼破產，失業的群眾數字日增，誰不被不景氣逼迫得連氣都透不過來？誰不在生活的重壓下淒慘的呻吟著？”（洪深1936）

這種不景氣的經濟氛圍就波及了都市中的各個行業，給市民的生活帶來了直接或間接的影響。影片中，無論是二房東呂太太和她的兒子女兒，住在樓上統廂房的絲廠會計袁瑞三和太太吳美中，客堂樓上住的舞女姐妹孫如梅和俞連珠，住在閣樓的小學教師陳先生，住在亭子間的汽車夫根泰和根泰嫂，以及樓下統廂房住的木器店跑街范先生和范太太；還是大街小巷的停業店鋪，茶館裡的失業民眾，所有人都被籠罩在不景氣的都市氛圍中，每人的口中都出現這樣的字眼——“市面真是不景氣”，共出現了十一次。缺錢被塑造成都市人共同面對的一個問題。而這一問題是因為大環境對都市的衝擊引起的。經濟大蕭條使得絲廠等輕工業、房地產業、金融業等都市中的現代化產業受到衝擊，因此導致了絲廠工作的袁先生失業，類似於房地產仲介的二房東太太收不到租，錢莊倒閉使得袁太太損失了五千塊錢。因為經濟不景氣，使得舞場、出版報社、商店等都市中的現代化場所都面臨不景氣的問題，導致舞女姐妹沒有生意，靠稿費賺錢的陳先生投不中稿，賣木器的范先生產品推銷不出去。而當都市中存在金錢問題的時候，農村則被塑造成不需要錢、也沒有錢的地方。舞女俞連珠在上海賺不到錢難以生存，因此回到鄉下。范先生去農村沒有借到錢。這兩個細節從金錢的角度突出了農村和都市的差別，顯示出金錢問題只是一種都市問題，不會發生在農村。兩者相比，就更突顯出都市中的問題——缺錢，表現出都市易受衝擊的脆弱一面。

通過金錢來建構都市的手段還體現在如何表述都市人際關係。作為故事主要人物的六戶人家，他們之間的關係除了弄堂的都市空間聯繫，更能從金錢關係的角度來解釋，這也體現了都市人際關係的另一種可能——通過金錢利益將所有人聯繫起來。有一幕將這種聯繫表現得十分明顯。小學老師陳先生經常給報紙投稿，為的是能賺得稿費（勞資關係），而這一稿費則為了給二房東太太交房租（租憑關係）。而二房東太太剛剛收到一塊錢的房租，就立即被自己的兒子借去投機了（借貸關係）。類似這樣的金錢關係連接了這部電影中的所有人物，如五戶房客和二房東太太的租憑關係，二房東太太和未曾露面的大房東的租憑關係，作為鄰居的范先生一家和袁先生一家的借貸關係，袁先生和生意場上的好友黃貞達的借貸關係，黃貞達和袁太太之間建立起的投資收益關係（袁太太把錢存到了黃的錢莊裡），導致袁太太最後追著和袁先生要債（錢莊倒閉，袁太太責怪袁先生），將夫妻關係呈現為一種債務關係。而袁先生和房東太太的女兒都在工廠做工，和絲廠是勞資關係。袁先生和幾個朋友之前也存在著利益關係。舞女姐姐和情人小章也存在金錢交易……原有的人際關係，如夫妻、母子、朋友、愛人等，全部變成了以金錢為中心的利益關係。金錢就像那位隱身的大房東，操縱著都市中的所有。而這種

傳統人際關係的轉變，也就隱喻了傳統道德倫理的摧毀，如袁先生袁太太因為五千塊錢而夫妻反目，呂太太不肯借錢給女兒，原本是朋友的黃貞達背棄袁先生攜款潛逃等。這種傳統道德的蕩然無存也符合了上海都市想像的主流風格。傳統人際倫理的三綱五常被都市中的金錢借貸關係取代的這一現象，也就勾勒出上海與傳統文化脫離、與金錢為表徵的西方資本主義掛鉤的都市形象。

三、都市人的金錢體驗

這一節將聚焦在影片中的小市民身上，通過分析其圍繞著金錢的各種掙扎和得失，來解讀洪深呈現出的都市生活。對於這些都市中的個體而言，金錢意味著什麼，誰通過什麼管道獲得金錢，怎樣在都市中使用金錢？《新舊上海》對這些問題作出了生動細緻的描述，敘述了都市市民各有不同的金錢體驗。

首先，我們來看都市人對金錢作用的不同認知。對於小康人家的袁先生袁太太而言，金錢和都市物質消費緊密掛鉤，有了錢，才能買紅燒蹄膀，買化妝品，燙頭髮，買綢緞。其中一幕，袁太太燙好了新式的頭髮，問根泰嫂好不好看，根泰嫂笑稱很像她看到的電影明星，袁太太笑著自豪地說“那麼我像個電影明星了”。這一細節，體現了袁太太的金錢觀：都市的一切似乎都能被金錢化，用錢來購買。只要有錢，就能改變外貌，甚至能變相地改變一個人的身份和命運，變成電影明星。和這種消費意識的金錢觀作對比的是，窮困潦倒的范先生需要治病的緊急救命錢。影片中有一幕相襯的十分鮮明：范先生家裡有三個病人，需要錢救人命。范先生向袁先生借到了二十塊錢後走下樓，高興地走路都走不穩。就在這個一上一下的樓梯拐角處，袁太太和范先生相遇，得知丈夫借錢給別人後，立刻氣急敗壞地飛奔上樓，路也走不穩。一上一下，一怒一喜的鮮明對比，更加凸顯出兩人金錢意識的對比。袁太太手捧著紅燒蹄膀，用金錢交換買來的（體現為紅燒蹄膀和金錢的兩個畫面的化入，Dissolve）；范先生手上的二十塊錢，用來治病救人。同樣是金錢，前者是生活的奢侈品，是個人欲望得以滿足的物件；後者卻成了生活必須的救命稻草，是被都市生活所迫，因為失業之後沒有錢看病。這種對照，沒有將金錢妖魔化，也沒有嚴肅地批判金錢或熱烈地鼓吹拜金主義，因此被當時的電影人伊明（1936）批評為“沒有深刻地揭示社會問題的政治經濟方面的潛在動因”。但卻正如導演程步高（1936）所言，“這是許多人跟社會發生的事件，是社會上的一個普遍情形。”

都市人的金錢意識還有另一層面的內涵——人們對金錢實體的認識，也就是金錢表現出的載體形象。金錢作為都市生活的符號之一，在時局動盪、經濟紊亂的近代上海有幾種不同的實體形式——銀幣（洋錢）、鈔票（紙幣）、外幣（美元、法郎）和收條（票據）等。《新舊上海》中出現了馬大洋（馬占山大銀票），法幣和收條。房東太太存著的，通過收房租得來的是法幣——中國銀行發行的印有孫中山頭像的一元紙幣。而根泰嫂去商場買籃子時使用的卻是已被勒令停用的馬大洋。而在聚風益錢莊，從夥計口袋中掉出來的則是當舖的貳角收條。袁太太得到的航空獎券五千塊也是一張收條。三種實體形式共存，被禁止流通的貨幣仍能在市場上使用，這些現象都說明了1930年代上海貨幣系統的混亂。這種金錢亂象更使得都市中的金錢有了多變、飄忽無常的形象，電影中都市人對金錢難以掌握，視金錢為欲望的對象，卻得不到的挫敗感也就類似於現代文學中新感覺派作家描述的關於摩登女郎和時間等的都市現代性體驗。無獨有偶，這種金錢實體的混亂也反映在同時期的另兩部電影《壓歲錢》（1935）和《馬路天使》（1937）。影片都出現了洋錢被禁止使用，轉而改用法幣的情節。《壓歲錢》中，通過報紙新聞交

代了“現銀被收回國有”的環境背景，又出現了違法使用洋錢，被警方稽查的畫面。這樣的論述牽扯到了政府權力對經濟的操控，引入了政權和經濟的聯繫。在現代化的都市空間中，政權更具滲透力，通過對金錢實體的法律規定影響了人們的日常生活，如影片中所示，國家有權利掌控貨幣體系，並以法律作為權力執行的輔助工具。值得注意的是，金錢實體的意識在這一時期的影片中不約而同地成為了被關注的焦點。由此可見，在這樣一段經濟動盪的時期，都市市民對於金錢實體的認識和使用時的體驗，幫助完成了對都市中現代政治經濟的理解。

再來關注都市金錢體驗的第二個重要問題：如何獲得金錢，即金錢在都市中的來源。都市想像往往通過“娼妓與投機”（張英進 1996）這兩種途徑來概括都市中的金錢世界。這兩種方式在《新舊上海》中都有生動細緻的展現。娼妓可看為通過出賣肉體來換取金錢，影片中的舞女姐妹就是這樣的典型，如影片中姐妹對話：“虧是小章來了。買了五塊錢的票子給我，又給了我五塊錢現錢。”投機則反映在袁太太中了航空獎券，袁先生要投資房地產等情節上。影片中的一幕非常精彩地展示了都市男女對金錢獲得方式的評價。當袁太太突然大方起來，買了白玫瑰酒，做了紅燒蹄膀的時候，袁先生非常好奇，便問妻子：“快說，你到底是從哪來的錢？”袁太太不肯說，袁先生便誤會袁太太去當舞女，指責她是骯髒錢，說“你這個錢來的太容易了。”這就印證了都市金錢的來源之一，肉體的交換。這種獲得方式被視為是一種容易又骯髒的手段。袁太太不甘示弱，反駁先生的觀點，解釋了自己獲得金錢的管道：“是我中到的航空獎券。”她更向袁先生道出了都市女性的心聲：“我的錢與你無關。我的錢為什麼要給你花啊？好像女人是不會有錢的，女人除了問丈夫要錢，自個兒是不應該有錢的。女人買了航空獎券也不會中獎的。”這一片段點出了關於都市女性金錢體驗的兩個要點：一，女人能否在都市中獲得金錢？這引申到都市女性能否經濟獨立；二，都市女性如何獲得金錢？通過投機，與性的交換或是婚姻（另一種形式的性交易）等管道。顯然，影片中的女性都通過各種管道獲得了金錢，而相較之下，男性反而沒能得到金錢。大蕭條發生後，絲廠倒閉，男性（袁先生）失業了賺不到錢，而女性（袁太太）反而將自己的東西典當了拿錢回家，又中了航空獎券給家庭帶來了財富。大蕭條時期的上海都市，女性反常地成為了金錢來源的主力。但這些錢卻交給了男性來處置，男性仍然在都市中把握著經濟主導權，而女性還是沒能獨立。這一交給男性處置的行為在象徵層面而言，也就修復了父權的法則，回歸了都市原本的秩序和安全。

再看性別與金錢獲得管道的聯繫。影片中袁太太的錢原本一直由袁先生提供，這種通過婚姻關係獲取金錢的管道成了理所當然——女人除了問丈夫要錢，自個兒是不應該有錢的。和這一管道類似，舞女姐姐孫如梅最後答應和客人小章結婚，從而使她能夠在都市里生活下去。而沒有這種婚姻羈絆的舞女妹妹俞連珠最後因為沒錢只好離開了上海。這一姐妹之間的對比更加能夠凸顯出，以婚姻作為金錢的來源是都市女性普遍的生存之道。這一獲得金錢的方式是合理並且被社會認為是正常的。這也就意味著都市女性並不能經濟獨立。然而，袁太太卻突然發了橫財，這讓原本在經濟來源中佔據主要地位的男性袁先生感到了威脅。於是，袁先生以高高在上的態度訓斥並質問了袁太太。影片通過攝影角度的改變，顯示出了兩人地位的轉變和雙方關係的變化。兩人的位置從原先並排出現在鏡頭前，變成了袁先生正面對著鏡頭，而袁太太背對鏡頭和觀眾。從一開始的平等交流變成了光明正大的袁先生對背影示人的袁太太的質問。這種突變，意味著女性從別的管道（投機）獲得金錢顯然打亂了之前的秩序，使得兩人的地位、夫妻關係等都呈現出失衡的狀態，這就隱喻了經濟大蕭條時期的上海處於一種失常的狀態，而這種失常是由金錢引起的。不過，被威脅的感覺很快就轉變成了得到金錢的喜悅，這種情緒的轉

變建立在原本的家庭經濟狀態得到了恢復之後。當袁太太交代了金錢的來源並把五千塊錢的收條拿給袁先生時，這個給的動作也就意味著袁太太的這筆錢不再是私房錢，而是交給了袁先生這位掌握家庭經濟的主人，恢復到了之前的家庭生活中金錢屬於男性的狀態，於是袁先生帶著微笑結束了這一爭執說道，“夫妻之間還分什麼彼此呢？”這也體現在影片中兩人在鏡頭前的位置又回到了之前的狀態如之前，又並排出現在畫面裡。而這筆錢，也可視為袁先生的意外之財，當他通過工作賺錢這一正常管道不能獲得金錢的時候，另一反常的金錢獲得方式出現了。不同于傳統家庭經濟中男性給女性金錢，在這個特殊時期的上海，男性的金錢反而通過女性獲得。而作為女性的袁太太通過買彩票來賺錢，其實是一種投機行為，這在都市背景中才有可能發生，卻不是常態。

但這兩種在都市中獲得金錢的管道在大蕭條時期都成了絕路，更凸顯出都市人的絕望和不安。當舞女的生意競爭激烈，市場不景氣。袁太太的另一次投機也面臨了失敗——中獎的五千塊錢投資在錢莊裡而錢莊倒閉。這兩種賺錢的管道在經濟大蕭條時期的上海都行不通，那都市市民究竟如何才能生存？影片最後給出了一絲希望，袁先生說“近來的生絲出口很有起色，我想大約不久各絲廠就要開工了。”於是他找到工作，每天清早到工廠裡去，恢復到之前的都市工薪階層的尋常生活，又成為了家庭經濟來源的主力承擔者。這種賺錢途徑是最現實的，在小市民的生活中是最正常的生錢之道，但卻建立在整個市場經濟良好的前提條件上。這樣的前提條件，是小市民不能控制的，與外在力量（生絲出口），國際貿易等外在經濟環境相關。可見，都市中的金錢是難以掌控的，不屬於任何人。都市人只有被金錢操縱的機會。

除了金錢意識和金錢來源之外，在上海這座城市如何使用金錢也是都市金錢體驗的一部分。影片中，金錢的使用和性別掛上了關聯，由男性來決定如何處置大筆金錢，而女性只能決定小數目金額的使用，並且片中的男性將錢作為了投資用途，而女性被認定用金錢進行物質消費。以影片中的一幕為例，男女使用金錢時的對立狀態尤為明顯。袁太太當了家裡的首飾，換得了四十塊錢，回家後把三十八塊六毛錢交給了袁先生，袁先生拿著錢反復數了兩遍，質問袁太太剩下的一塊四毛錢哪去了，畫面立刻從數錢的特寫轉換到袁太太指著自己的頭髮，“燙了頭髮了”。從男性手握較多的金錢，切換到女性用金錢換來的物質表像（頭髮），兩種對立的情況表現鮮明。袁先生責罵她浪費錢，“電燙的效果一個星期就沒有了，仍然是從前那個鬼樣子。”而袁太太反駁道“在很多摩登小姐都是那個鬼樣。”這一對白更說明了都市男女的差別，袁先生的錢是有正經用途的，用來還債以便能借更多錢投資。而袁太太則是用錢裝飾外表，進行物質消費，還指出都市女性都有這一行為。從金額大小來看，袁先生掌控的金錢數目大大超過了袁太太花費的錢，並且甚至連一塊四毛錢的使用也要被袁先生責罵，沒有了使用金錢的自由。男女使用金錢的差別還體現在這對夫婦中獎的時候。袁太太中的獎券分為兩個部分：二獎五千塊和二獎的副獎一百塊。袁太太只對二獎的副獎一百塊有支配權，她買了白玫瑰酒和紅燒雞肉。相對更大數目的五千塊的收條，袁太太象徵性地交給了袁先生，由袁先生按著他的想法，存進了朋友的錢莊進行投資，以得到更多的收益，卻被騙得一文不剩。由此可見，性別與都市中金錢的使用，掌控金錢的多少有了直接的聯繫，呈現出一種對立的狀態。諷刺的是，當有宏圖偉略的男性袁先生不恥袁太太花錢時，掌握著大筆金額的他白白浪費了金錢，試圖操縱金錢卻失敗。而被認為目光短淺的女性袁太太做了最現實的決定，充分利用了到手的金錢進行物質享受，成功地支配了手中的金錢。這種反差更體現了金錢的難以捉摸和都市人被金錢左右的無奈。

男女使用金錢的差異對比還體現在另外兩個場景。一幕在茶館，所有在場人物都是男性的背景中，大家熱烈討論如何進行金錢投資。對比另外幾幕全是女性的畫面，如袁

太太向二房東太太和根泰嫂炫耀自己燙的頭髮，根泰嫂向二房東太太和范太太展示自己新買的籃子時，這些差別都將都市男女對金錢的使用，和對金錢的掌握度進行了直接掛鉤，將女性塑造成追崇日常物質享受，花小錢的形象。而男性則具有對大筆金錢的掌控能力，但他們對金錢的投資更被形容為“投機”，因為他們並不懂得如何用智慧來掌控金錢，而是被金錢所操縱，只能在都市中拼命地瞎找投資的機會，接受外在力量——市面是否景氣的影響。這一解釋也通過二房東太太之口暗示了出來。她的兒子問她借錢說“要去做一個會”，而二房東太太一語揭穿他“拿著錢又去賭”。兒子表示自己要進行投資賺大錢。而他媽媽道破他是賭錢這種投機行為。從這個例子可見，男性被塑造成都市的投機者，嘗試掌控金錢但卻沒有能力，於是投機失敗，一無所有，如袁先生發現錢莊倒閉而陷入了焦慮，面臨了金錢損失，回家又被妻子斥責追債的雙重困境。畫面處理時，袁先生作為唯一面朝鏡頭的人物，迥異於其他背景人物，凸顯他孤立無援的處境。也正因為面對鏡頭，他的焦慮痛苦完全暴露在觀眾面前，這一被觀看的狀態也讓他的處境顯得更為被動。

袁先生的這場悲劇更象徵了上海這座都市所經歷的一場悲劇。袁先生得而復失的金錢，就像上海從經濟虛高轉向蕭條的突變。這一比喻可從故事情節和影片畫面兩個層面來解讀。從情節結構來看，袁氏夫婦從沒錢到有錢再回到沒錢，完成了A-B-A的結構迴圈。這和洪深另外一部劇本創作《夢裡乾坤》的劇情結構類似。《夢裡乾坤》明確地指出了那是一場夢，而在《新舊上海》裡，袁太太的這場中獎風波則被暗喻為一場都市白日夢。中獎之前，兩人為了避免鄰居發現他們鬧窮，一個勁地擺闊。袁先生喝豆漿吃蹄膀，借錢給范先生。袁太太不肯去當舖，卻用錢來燙頭髮買衣服。這樣的生活狀態在中獎之後發生了突變，變成了徹底和之前相反——兩人拼命裝窮，袁先生“一生一世頭一次說不要吃紅燒蹄膀了”，不肯借錢給鄰居。他和袁太太還爭著假裝去當舖，故意做樣子給鄰居看等等。這種行為的反常可以理解為在夢中發生的事情，和平日的正常行為完全相反。待到失去了飛來橫財的五千塊錢之後，兩人又恢復到了之前擺闊的行為：繼續吃豆腐漿，借錢給鄰居等等。一系列行為的轉變分為了“中五千塊前——中五千塊後——失去五千塊”三個階段，等同於做夢前——夢中——夢醒後。不過夢醒了，失去了五千塊錢後，兩人行為儘管恢復到了之前，但心理狀態卻發生了調整，從擺闊變成了豁達。袁先生和袁太太借錢給鄰居不再不甘心不情願，而是表示“再多一點也損失了，何況這五塊錢呢。”再看拍攝畫面，袁先生和袁太太得知中獎後的晚上，兩人激動地躺在床上睡覺，怎麼都睡不著，激烈地討論了如何使用這筆金錢。這場長達三分多種的床上對話，由一個擺在床前上方的攝影機通過一個長鏡頭全程收錄，而床這個道具和夢能夠聯繫起來，隱喻著這場中獎五千塊就是他們的一場夢。如一開始，袁太太閉著眼睛睡覺卻笑醒了，這一情形可用上海一句俗語“做夢都要笑醒了”來形容。而每次袁先生要袁太太快點閉嘴睡覺，但袁先生自己卻又主動提出話題，要求繼續對話。袁太太如若要求袁先生閉嘴，自己就又開始說個不停。這些言行不一的行為都可視為因為在夢中，所以說什麼和做什麼完全相反。而這場夢終究有要醒的時候。當袁先生希望用投機的錢再進行投機時，諷刺的一幕出現了，投機失敗，袁氏夫婦又回到了做夢之前的經濟狀態。

這場悲劇的都市投機夢暗喻了上海這座都市所經歷的這場經濟大蕭條，金融危機產生的原因是因為人們對金錢的欲望不斷膨脹，從而進行各種投機活動，加上外來白銀的大量流入，使得金融泡沫最終被擠爆，造成了經濟大蕭條的慘狀。這正如袁先生得到了外來的橫財，進行投機，卻最終錢財落空。而夢醒之後，上海的經濟終於恢復了正常，袁先生也恢復了在絲廠的工作。但經歷了這場夢的影響，都市小市民如袁先生等的心態都發生了改變。從獲得投機財富的開始，袁氏夫婦由擺闊的偽善人變成了吝嗇的惡人，

但失去這筆財富，相反卻讓他們變成了真正的善人。這種改變也和上海這座都市顯示出的變化類似。從影片最初沒有生氣的建築，到影片最後幾幕經濟得以恢復的鏡頭呈現出的城市勃勃生氣的氛圍，這座都市從靜態轉為動態，宛若從沉睡的夢中蘇醒。人們也重新開始勞動工作，恢復了之前的賺錢管道，但心態更加積極，臉上充滿了笑容。而城市中的人際關係儘管依然圍繞著金錢，但卻更有溫情，出現了心甘情願借錢的感人場面。畫面中的袁太太面帶微笑站在了袁先生身後，象徵著支持袁先生的做法，袁先生成為了畫面的主角，得到了大家的關注和擁護。而相比之前借錢引起的夫妻不和的畫面相比，袁太太和袁先生處於對峙狀態，袁太太站著，目光從上而下地質問著袁先生，而袁先生也愁眉苦臉，微駭著背，表現地相對理虧。因此，這部電影不僅敘述了小市民的金錢夢，也暗喻了上海這座都市所經歷的一場關於經濟大蕭條的夢。金錢不僅控制著都市小市民，也衝擊了都市。做夢的不只是小市民，連上海這座都市也大夢初醒，發生了內在的改變。

綜合以上關於都市金錢的敘述，正如飾演袁太太的演員顧梅君（1936）形容這部電影說，“報告了一些社會情形，指出一個當前正待解決的問題，說明那處在這個社會中，面對這個問題的一群人的反應，描寫他們的被已往生活經驗所決定了的解決這個問題的行為。”當鬧窮成為了經濟大蕭條時期上海的特定社會情形，洪深通過真實具象地反映都市里發生的變化和都市人的行為體驗，呈現出以金錢為主體的都市想像。

四、結語

李道新（2006）曾對 1905-1937 年間中國電影中的上海形象作了總結——“上海成為一個與傳統的家庭生活、靜穆的鄉村圖景和親切的本土文化截然不同的異域，一個遍佈妓院、煙館和跳舞場的墮落之地，一個充滿拆白黨、作惡匪徒和紈袴子弟的罪惡之都……一個階級分化和社會黑暗的集散地，展現著不平等、不合理的時代病痛，吞噬著一切受侮辱受迫害的弱小生命。”而《新舊上海》不同於這些銀幕形象。在洪深和程步高的合作下，上海成為了一個通過金錢構形出的都市，由金錢主導一切。金錢經濟決定了都市的形象，成為其核心問題，金錢關係代替了原有的都市人際關係，金錢體現為投機、物質享受、與性的交換等具體的都市體驗。當一切都被金錢操控時，金錢又像一個出人意料的都市幻象，幻化成一場夢，讓現代都市人獲得了“充滿吃驚、焦慮、幻滅以及狂喜、興奮、沉醉的都市體驗”（張英進 1996）。

這種從金錢構形都市的方式也出現在另一個時代——20 世紀 90 年代。當鄧小平 1992 年南巡肯定了深圳特區的經濟發展路線後，中國的城市又開始經歷一次翻天覆地的變革。這場變革和 30 年代的大蕭條有著相通之處，兩者都是經濟主導，以金錢為焦點，兩場經濟變革下，都市人的生活和思維都發生了改變。有學者認為，新中國現代意義上的城市起步於 20 世紀 90 年代。1992 年以後，中國人丟掉了觀念的包袱，市場經濟、商品經濟這些往日的禁語，頓時成為中國人實現強國夢想的利器，人的欲望開始膨脹，個人希望在城市中獲得更好的生活條件，官員們希望在城市發展中獲得政績，從個人到政府都要拼經濟。（王海洲 2006）因此在這個時代，從金錢經濟的角度書寫都市和都市人，再次成為了都市想像的一種突出方式。

2001 年上映的電影《橫豎橫》（王光利導演）就體現了新時代的都市如何用金錢的構形來表述。影片講述了 1990 年代上海六個小市民的金錢糾葛。六位主角都受到了上海 90 年代初國企改革的影響，從原屬的國企單位下崗失業。在男主角張寶忠的號召下，六人下海做生意，開建築材料店，再負責承包裝潢工程，但辛苦創業卻沒有成功，生意

沒有起色。隨著 1995 年上海福利彩票的發行，張寶忠再次號召大家一起買彩票。和《新舊上海》巧合的是，同樣是女主角——張寶忠的好拍檔周玉華中了彩票，獎值四十萬元。比《新舊上海》的現實意味更濃，《橫豎橫》的劇情是真人真事，影片中的六位主角由親自經歷了這些事件的本人用上海方言本色出演。不過不同於《新舊上海》，彩票中獎沒有被形容為一場轉瞬即逝的夢，張寶忠用中獎的四十萬元做善事，捐贈給養老院，並為上海其他下崗工人的創業提供無息貸款。但六人卻因為如何處理錢財，從原本的團結變成了分道揚鑣，共患難卻不能共享福，這就暗示了中國因經濟暴富而引起的自私自利的都市心態，人們在經濟改革得到財富後，無法再進行原有的社會主義平均分配。而買彩票發財的投機行為就象徵了中國城市經歷的這場經濟改革——儘管給人們帶來發財致富的機會，但其本質是一場靠運氣的投機活動，難以用理智來控制，也並不靠聰明才智或者勤勞等美德來決定勝利。而這種投機甚至牽扯到了法律和道德，這體現在影片最後一幕，六人中又有一人中了彩票，但彩票卻粘在了他們為別人裝修的房子的門上。中獎者半夜偷偷潛入別人家中，將門拆下去領獎。為了中獎不擇手段的犯罪行為，暗喻了這場經濟改革帶來的道德缺失和法律失控。但影片到這裡戛然而止，這一開放式的結尾也就意味著這場經濟改革將繼續進行下去，寓意了沒有人明確知道這場經濟改革將來的發展會如何。如同片名“橫豎橫”¹暗示，下崗的都市人沒有退路，只能豁出去做生意，買彩票碰運氣。這也暗喻了此時走社會主義路線遇到瓶頸的中國，只能豁出去在都市試行經濟改革，參與如彩票這類帶有資本主義色彩的投機行為，而這場經濟改革目前來看非常成功，使上海呈現出一副繁華景象，但在長遠意義而言，成敗還是未知數，是一場豁出去的戰役。而作為這場經濟改革的主要參與者，上海這座都市就如同搭上了一列高速發展的經濟快車，橫豎橫地冲向未知的目的地。

相隔近 70 年，上海依然作為中國都市的典型之一，被電影人在不同時代，從金錢的構形進行了不同的都市想像。值得注意的是，這些影片都選擇以喜劇的形式來呈現艱辛生活的悲劇題材。洪深（1936）表示，“過去寫窮的戲多數是悲劇，而結果也多數是非常淒慘，若要推陳出新，除非用喜劇的方式；但再回過頭想一想，若走喜劇這條路，也不十分妥切的；思之再三，方才決定了用悲劇的題材，而以喜劇的形式演出，目的是要使觀眾感到可笑，同時也使觀眾感到可悲。”而金錢這把雙刃劍帶來的喜怒哀樂，能夠成功地引出悲喜交加的感觸，為身處都市經歷著苦難或迷茫時代的觀眾帶來一絲希望。

¹ 橫豎橫是上海俗語，意為不管三七二十一，豁出去做了。

參考書目

- 楊遠嬰主編 2006, *中國電影專業史研究——電影文化卷*, 中國電影出版社, 北京
- 顧梅君 1936, ‘偶感’, *明星*, 5 卷, 2 期
- 洪深 1936, ‘新舊上海編劇者言’, *明星*, 5 卷, 2 期
- 程步高 1936, ‘為新舊上海說幾句話’, *明星*, 5 卷, 2 期
- 伊明 1936, ‘新舊上海’, *民報·影譚*, 5 月
- Tomoko, S, 2008. *China During the Great Depression: Market, State and the World Economy 1929-1937*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
- Zhang, Yingjin, 1996. *the City in Modern Chinese Literature and Film: Configurations of Space, Time, and Gender*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Gender and Environment in an Ethnic Quarter: A Case Study of Local Community Activities in Yokohama Chinatown

Elim Yee Lam Wong
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Email: elimylwong@gmail.com

Tai Wei Lim
The Chinese University of Hong Kong

INTRODUCTION

As an ethnic quarter, the Yokohama Chinatown has a rich history as one of the landmark historical icons of local community history. It was established in 1859, after 150 years of history, the community is now resided by 3,000 ethnic Chinese people (Hayashi 2010a, p.90).¹ Although Chinatown itself does not have the longest history among the three Chinatowns in Japan, it has the first overseas Chinese school and the oldest overseas Chinese women's association in Japan. In social functions and facilities like schools and education, the city of Yokohama remains significant as it has been cited by the local authorities as the birthplace of Japan's passage into modernity and in this process, acting as Japan's first global city receiving peoples, cultures and ideas from the rest of the globe (Hayashi 2010b, p.4). Since then, new social issues such as environmentalism and demographic changes have emerged and Yokohama continues to stay at the forefront of cutting-edge ideas.

Perhaps, one visible similarity amongst newly-emerging issues such as provision of education for ethnic migrants and environmental care/preservation in the local community is that both public functions can be considered as no-detriments items. If implemented for the denizens of Yokohama, they are often seen as only leading to positive development with very little harmful effects if any, minimizing contentious political or economic resources issues.

¹ The number of overseas Chinese living in Yokohama Chinatown is according to Hayashi Kensei. Reference and year of publish of the source were not written in the book.

There is also a trend of localizing the two issues. In the field of the environment, local communities and civil groups are increasingly given more responsibilities over their own local resources.

Some of them are given powers to control access by other stakeholders to these resources; other members of civil society and non-governmental groups are considered by other stakeholders (such as the government and local authorities) to have better local knowledge of local resources. Such developments are not without their criticisms. A prominent criticism of this system is that local and national authorities seems to have outsourced these functions to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society groups when they should bear the responsibility for these public functions. This paper does not argue nor advocate local community access over public good provision but highlights the fact that all three (national authorities, local authorities and civil society/NGOs) are equally contributive and important to managing local community resources.

In the field of education, the idea of a win-win situation applies – that local community groups may serve the needs of the community due to local area knowledge. In the case study of a local women's association and its contributions to the local community's education for the migrant population in an ethnic quarter, the idea of local knowledge strength seems to apply even more. Demographic changes, manpower shortage, globalization, the fluidity of human talents and liberalization of immigration procedures/laws seems to have contributed to the invigoration of the ethnic quarter of Yokohama Chinatown. Historically fraught with challenges and political-economic issues, ethnic self-help groups have emerged in Japan's early modernity to adapt to political circumstances that include factionalization, financial constraints and lack of manpower resources. These groups overcame the practical difficulties through volunteerism, community mobilization and gender empowerment to overcome marginalization.

This is a preliminary scope paper intended as a comparative study of two community organizations in Yokohama Chinatown: a women's self-help association and a capacity-building NGO Chikyunoki based in Yokohama. The first part of the paper discusses the ethnic quarter in Yokohama - its Chinatown - through the case study of the Yokohama

Overseas Chinese Women's Association (YOCWA). It is interested to see how these Chinese women, who are the second or the third generations in Yokohama, contribute to overseas Chinese education in the community. As a non-profit and non-governmental organization, YOCWA has a long history in the ethnic quarter of Chinatown and has become an important contributor to educating human capital and cultural resources in that area.

The second part of the paper examines Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) and local community group participation in environmental issues in Yokohama through the case study of the group Chikyunoki. Chikyunoki's contributions appear to complement Yokohama's construction as a green, eco-friendly space. In terms of primary documents, the paper intends to survey the main tenets of an environmental primary document – the blueprint for the city is inked by its Promotion Division, Urban Development Bureau City of Yokohama titled *Toward an Advanced Urban Environment Minato Mirai 21* published in 2010. While not part of Minatomirai 21, Chikyunoki and its activities reflect certain values and principles in the blueprint.

FIRST EMPIRICAL CASE STUDY: NGO AND MIGRANT EDUCATION – A WOMEN'S SELF-HELP ASSOCIATION – THE YOKOHAMA OVERSEAS CHINESE WOMEN'S ASSOCIATION (YOCWA)

Introduction to Overseas Chinese Education in Yokohama Chinatown

One of the most important functions of YOCWA is establishing centers for overseas Chinese education in Japan in Yokohama Chinatown in 1897. Revolutionaries such as Chan Siu-bak and Feng Zi-you saw the importance of education for ethnic Chinese children, who resided in Yokohama after the opening of Yokohama port in 1859. With the support of Sun Yat-sen, they started the first overseas Chinese school Yokohama Daitong School in 1897 (Hengbin Shanshou Zhonghua Zuexiao Bainian Xiaozhi Bianjiweiyuanhui 2005, pp.47-67). After over fifty years of development, the school was divided into two main factions in accordance with the contesting regimes in the Chinese civil war that broke out in 1949. The

Yokohama Yamate Chinese School (YYCS) is run by the overseas Chinese with mainland Chinese origin and the other Chinese school, the Yokohama Overseas Chinese School (YOCS) welcomes students with Taiwanese nationality. This section of the paper focuses on discussion on YYCS where field work was carried out.

YOCWA and its role in Yokohama Yamate Chinese School (YYCS)

One of the greatest significance of how overseas Chinese women in Yokohama Chinatown contribute to overseas Chinese education can be traced back to the formation of YOCWA. Between 1951 to 1952, due to political confrontations arising from different political affiliations of groups within the Chinatown community, the Chinese women in the community mobilized themselves and started homeschooling facilities for the expelled students with People's Republic of China (PRC) nationality. They donated money for building a new Chinese school as well as educate mainland Chinese people living in Japan, which is the forerunner for the Yokohama Yamate Chinese School (YYCS) today. According to the school record, 21% of the donors who donated money for YYCS in 1952 were mainland Chinese women (Mitani 2008, p.52). These women later set up an organization that aimed to advocate and promote overseas Chinese education in Yokohama Chinatown. That was how YOCWA got started in 1953. The school principal of YYCS, Pan Min-sheng (2011) explained how he viewed these members of YOCWA in the School Incident: "These women [founders of YOCWA] were great supporter to YYCS because many of them were the parents of the affected students in the School Incident in 1951, they could understand easily the problems the school was facing."

Principal Pan saw the members of YOCWA as important contributors to the establishment of YYCS in 1953. They were not only residents of Yokohama Chinatown who cared about what happened on overseas Chinese school, these women were the mothers of students from the school. Before the School Incident, these overseas Chinese women were only housewives who took care of their family in the Chinatown. Liang Bao-zhen, the fourth chairperson of YOCWA, recalled the reason that drove her to join YOCWA was that she

wanted to help the expelled students, including her son who went to kindergarten at that time, because these students were innocent and they should not get involved in political issues in the Chinatown (Yokohama Kakyo Fujokai Henshu Iikai 2004, p.86).

Members of YOCWA focused on young overseas Chinese children education. During the time of homeschooling, the first chairperson of YOCWA, Zhang Xiao-e used her home as a makeshift classroom for kindergarten students (Hengbin Shanshou Zhonghua Zuexiao Bainian Xiaozhi Bianjiweiyuanhui 2005, p.113). Many members of YOCWA volunteered to teach at Zhang's home. While homeschooling lasted for only a year, it sowed the seeds for the later formation of Xiao Hung Nursery, which was the nursery managed by YOCWA in the 1960s. With regards to the formation history of YOCWA, advocating overseas Chinese education has been the first priority of the organization's agenda, and even today, overseas Chinese women of YOCWA was still playing an important role in YYCS.

Although it is unnecessary to homeschool students from YYCS after the establishment of temporary campus of YYCS in 1952, YOCWA continued to support the school through donations. In 1965, YYCS built a new campus in order to meet the growing population of overseas Chinese students in Yokohama. YOCWA donated 70 thousand yen to YYCS as to support the school since it spent a large amount of 80 millions yen on construction work (Hengbin Shanshou Zhonghua Zuexiao Bainian Xiaozhi Bianjiweiyuanhui 2005, p.327). YOCWA also donated 1 million yen on buying bond provided by YYCS in 1977 and another 1 million yen in 1993 as to support the school to buy a larger land for new campus and better facilities for the students (Hengbin Shanshou Zhonghua Zuexiao Bainian Xiaozhi Bianjiweiyuanhui 2005, pp.333 & 335). The amount of money donated to the school might not be the largest among the other organizations in Yokohama Chinatown, but what make this contribution significant is that YOCWA is not neither a commercial organization nor an organization funded by local government of Yokohama (Wang 2008, p.214),² the organization is self-financed. The sixth chairperson of YOCWA, Liu Yan-xue (2011) expressed her worry on the financial situation of YOCWA: "YOCWA is funded by all the

² YOCWA is registered as *Nini Dantai* (任意団体), the Japanese word which means "private organization". It is neither controlled nor protected by law but appear as a legal organization in Japan.

members. We do not receive complement from the Yokohama local government. We have a difficult financial situation.”

Liu further mentioned that most of the operation expenses came from membership fee of the members, and the organization may get funding from the Yokohama Overseas Chinese Association irregularly, or from the rental fee of the activity hall in YOCWA building. However, it is not easy for 150 overseas Chinese women, with over 10% of them are over 80 years old and mostly retired or have been housewives for years, to donated amount like 1 million to YYCS. Moreover, the donations mentioned on above were only donated on behalf of YOCWA, individual donations of these 150 members of YOCWA were not counted (Hengbin Shanshou Zhonghua Xuexiao Bainian Xiaozhi Bianjiweiyuanhui 2005, pp.339-341).³ This makes a strong evidence that YOCWA is a great supporter, as suggested by principal Pan of YYCS, to the school not only because the organization was set up to cater to homeschooling the expelled PRC’s students during the School Incident, the organization and its members devoted their money, which is more than the organization could afford, to YYCS in order to meet with the aim of the organization in avocation of overseas Chinese education in Yokohama Chinatown.

The Formation of Xiao Hung Nursery (XHN)

YOCWA set up the first overseas Chinese nursery operated by an overseas Chinese women’s association in Japan. Xiao Hung Nursery was found in April 1967. It first started with three founders, who were also the members of YOCWA. Between 1965 and 1966, these three overseas Chinese women wanted to go back to workplace after giving birth to their children, so they set up a nursery founding organization, which contained of 20 members, and discussed the establishment of a nursery. A year later, a nursery named Xiao Hung Nursery started in one of the rooms from YYCS student dormitory with 5 students (Hengbin Huaqiao Xiaohungzhahui 2003, p.28). Within only a year, the number of students doubled and the

³ From the list of special donators of YYCS (1970-2004) recorded in *Hengbin Shanshou Zhonghua Xuexiao Bainian Xiaozhi 1898-2004*, more than 10 members of YOCWA are named in the list.

nursery had to move to a bigger place inside the YOCWA building in 1968.

XHN has two important roles in the local community. The first role is being a Chinese culture inheritance. It can be first explained by the meaning of the name of nursery. According to one of the founders of XHN, Liu Yan-xue (who is also a former chairperson of YOCWA from 2004-2010) (2011) explained that Xiao Hung (red color in Chinese characters) represents the color of China because we all love this color as being an ethnic Chinese. Traditional Chinese culture is an important part of the school curriculum. Liu (2011) continue introduced what exactly did XHN teach everyday:

“Most of our students are born and raised in Japan. Therefore, these Chinese children have to adapt to Japanese style of living. We [teachers of Xiao Hung Nursery] teach them Japanese language and Japanese songs. However, the mission of XHN is to preserve [Chinese] tradition. So we also teach them Chinese language, Chinese stories and Chinese dance, the lion dance. Our students like lion dance very much. Whenever there are festivals or performance in school, the children played lion dance and they enjoyed a lot.”

Liu argued that language training in XHN can help to preserve Chinese tradition. XHN has a bilingual curriculum that enables overseas Chinese students to establish a sense of identity. Since some of them might not have the opportunity to speak Chinese at home, as their parents were the third or fourth generation and were assimilated with the Japanese society, the experience in XHN would be the first step for them to understand their ethnicity.

The second important role of XHN is that it promotes Chinese culture to the Japanese in Yokohama area as well. XHN does not cater only to ethnic Chinese students, although the majority of them have the mainland China origin, the nursery welcomes children with different nationality at the same time. Starting from the 1990s, there were Japanese children and Japanese-Chinese mixed children entered XHN to study traditional Chinese culture with ethnic Chinese children. Hayashi Makiko's daughter was one of the mixed children entered the nursery in 1990.

As an ethnic Japanese mother, Hayashi married to an ethnic Chinese man and moved to Yokohama Chinatown. She once confused about her daughter education since she was new to the community, especially to a Chinese community. But later she was glad that her daughter had studied in XHN since the education provided, including traditional Chinese culture classes, gave her children a lot of precious experience (Hengbin Huaqiao Xiaohungzhihui 2003, p.22). Hayashi, too, became friends with many ethnic Chinese mothers and teachers of XHN and she learnt more about Chinese culture. She is now a member of YOCWA and an active member who often volunteer in the Xiao Hung Club.⁴ XHN welcomed 25 students, including two ethnic Japanese children, in 2011 (Chen, 2011). In the future, the nursery is hoping to receive more children with different nationality to create an international environment in the local community and continue to promote traditional Chinese culture to students with diversity of nationality in Yokohama.

Private Schooling in Yokohama Chinatown

Private schooling is not new to Yokohama Chinatown. It can be traced back to the 1870s when an ethnic Chinese man Liu Lian-fu taught the ethnic Chinese children in the Chinatown in private schooling basis.⁵ Since the established of Yokohama Daitong School in 1897, private schooling was less important in the local community. Today, ethnic Chinese students can learn Chinese language and traditional Chinese culture from schools that operated by overseas Chinese organizations, such as XHN, YYCS and YOCS (overseas Chinese school with majority of Taiwanese students). Therefore, the nature of private schooling should not be similar to the one in 1870s while there was an urgent need of ethnic Chinese students to learn the culture of their homeland in a foreign country.

A core member of YOCWA, Fu Shun-he, started private schooling in 2004. She named the private institution *Terakoya* (寺子屋), which means private educational institutions that

⁴ Xiao Hung Club is the PTA of XHN. According to the interview with Chen Bi-Lian, the chairperson of Xiao Hung Club, Chen told the author that the Xiao Hung Club has 87 members (as of November 2011) and half of them are ethnic Japanese parents of the students.

⁵ The syllabus Liu taught to the ethnic Chinese students was similar to the syllabus of Chinese education in China at that time.

taught writing and reading to the children of Japanese commoners in the Edo period. Fu is an experienced and professional education because she was a teacher in YYCS since 1976 and after she retired in 2003, she decided to start a private school in Yokohama Chinatown. Fu explained how she started the school in an interview recorded in the newsletter of YOCWA:

“After I quitted my job in YYCS in 2004, I want to continue educating overseas Chinese children. I used an empty flat owned by my sister in Yokohama Chinatown as classroom. *Terakoya* started on 12 June 2004. It is a private homeschooling to overseas Chinese children study in overseas Chinese schools in Yokohama area. I read their homework and correct them. I also teach them if they have difficulties on any subject.” (Yokohama Overseas Chinese Women’s Association, 2011)

Moreover, *Terakoya* is not limited to overseas Chinese students who go to overseas Chinese schools in Yokohama but also serves the needs of overseas Chinese students who go to ordinary Japanese schools. According to Fu, most of the students in *Terakoya* are from Yokohama Yamate Chinese School (YYCS), and some of them are from YOCS, and public schools in Yokohama, such as Motomachi Elementary School, Minamiyoshida Elementary School and Yoshida Junior High School (Yokohama Overseas Chinese Women’s Association 2011). As for those who go to ordinary Japanese school may have difficulties on study because Japanese might not be a language familiar to them, especially to those new comers to Yokohama Chinatown, Fu therefore organized a special session of Japanese language on Saturday morning for students studied in ordinary Japanese schools.

Terakoya provides a difficult kind of overseas Chinese education in Yokohama Chinatown: to normal understanding, overseas Chinese education in a Chinatown means to promote and advocate the teaching of Chinese language and culture. *Terakoya* does more than that. It helps overseas Chinese students to adapt to the Japanese society by teaching them Japanese language, and at the same time, it maintains the sense of ethnic Chinese identity of the students by reviewing Chinese language and culture they learnt from overseas Chinese

schools.

SECOND EMPIRICAL CASE STUDY: NGO AND ENVIRONMENTALISM – YOKOHAMA AS ENVIRONMENTAL SHOWCASE

The second case study is based on NGO capacity-building group related to the environment. Under the initiative of Mayor Fumiko Hayashi of Yokohama city, the city is installing different methodologies of cutting down carbon emissions with the specific aim of being a showcase model for other cities to learn from (Minatomirai 21 Promotion Division 2010, p.1). According to the blueprint *Minatomirai 21 ECO Information*, Yokohama's plans for green environmentalism is comprehensive and involved installation of technologies like wind mills, campaigns to reduce use of electrical power, green belts, solar energy collectors, reusing natural resources, advocating the use of eco-friendly vehicles, integration of green spaces into architectural designs, biking facilities, systemic regulation of building temperatures, etc.

But, along with technological installations and public infrastructure, another important element for success in environmental activities and the propagation of Yokohama and its people infrastructure as a showcase for other state/cities are the activities of civil society, grassroots groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Only one was explicitly mentioned in the plan: a non-profit organization (NPO) working on upgrading water standards by harvesting *wakame* in the maritime areas near Minato Mirai 21. The blueprint, however, does not name the group nor provide more details. If and when funding becomes available, the authors hope to conduct further research into this environmental activity as a case study of the space, position and conceptualization of NGOs in Yokohama's environmental plans.

As an alternative, the author Wong has decided to interview Chikyunoki. Although not explicitly part of the Minatomirai21 project, Chikyunoki is a capacity-building civil society group that has goals which resonate with Minatomirai21. They include the intention to showcase Japan's environmental management amongst other developmental activities to foreign groups. Started in 1991, the group celebrated its 20th anniversary at the time of the

interview and claim that they are the largest in Kanagawa prefecture with 900 members. Their activities include reducing the use of chemicals in food products, peace projects, advocating an end to the use of Genetically-Modified products, etc. The gender connection between Chikyunoki and YOCWA is that both work on issues in which women are considered to have a personalized interest. For example, Chikyunoki representative Ms. Marutani Shizuko argues that women have better content knowledge about lifestyle patterns of households including laundry needs and consumption of food resources because they are more intimate with such activities due to housework.

Internally, within Japan, one aspect that links Chikyunoki's work with YOCWA is that both organizations help to form cultural bridges with migrant communities in Yokohama (as well as the larger region of Kanagawa in the case of Chikyunoki). Marutani notes that there is a growing population of Chinese and Korean migrant populations in Kanagawa (more than 100,000). Chikyunoki tries to encourage greater harmony with the local resident Japanese population but hosting environmental events such as Earth Fest which welcome and experience the participation of foreigners. According to Marutani, working across different ethnic groups and nationalities and sharing the common respect and love of Mother Earth with groups from North and South Korea, China and Chinese Taipei, Chinese and Taiwanese women appear to dissolve boundaries and encourage permeability of ideas and exchanges.

There is also an external side to Chikyunoki related to Minatomirai21's principles. In terms of showcasing their achievements, so far, the group has worked with Cambodia, Philippine, Laos, Nepal and an ongoing program with the Philippines at the time of the interview in supporting their rural agricultural communities through micro-projects related to the immediate environments. These activities include recognition of natural resources and how to manage them, forest protection, sustainable extraction of food resources from the forests, teaching kits for agricultural resources like banana. Two newsletters dated 1 September 2011 and 25 November/December 2011 were collected from Chikyunoki during field work carried out by author Wong on 29 November 2012. Page Two of the November/December newsletter carried features on Laos' forestry management programs and visuals of Laotian mountain tribes selling agricultural products extracted from the forests at

an open market.

CONCLUSION

For its concluding section, the essay draws upon Jeff Kingston's important work on Japan's civil society where he makes the argument that changes and dynamics in Japan's civil society tends to be slow, gradualist and professionalized (adopting business models) (Kingston 2004, p.3). YOCWA's transformation was slow and gradualist, slowly adapting to external historical stimuli that included the formation of ethnic quarters, surviving its factionalism and purges and slowly evolving into a self-help group for exiled membership before becoming a cultural diffuser and transmitter of tradition going beyond original target groups to embrace Japanese interested parties.

Even its membership makeup evolved slowly with a traditionally formerly marginalized gender coming to the forefront to play significant roles in the leadership of public services and functions like education for children. Along with the evolution of its management and leadership, the organizational professionalism also empowered the organization to start running nurseries, Chinese schools with important social functions in the immediate community. This marks the professionalization phase of what used to be a makeshift self-help group made up of volunteers to adapt to the needs of expelled factions denied politically access to public services such as education.

Chikyunoki revealed that their peak membership (at one time 2000 members) was achieved near the bubble period when budgets were relatively more generous but now has to work with leaner budgets corresponding with the external economic conditions. The shrinking budget is a main reason for non-government, civil society and non-profit groups to professionalize their operations and gradually run them like public corporations accountable to stakeholders. Marutani also revealed that her group needs to work harder than before for soliciting funds by being more "reliable". The National Taxes Department is another reason for the professionalization of Chikyunoki as it runs through the accounting and financial matters of the NPO, similar to the private sector.

Slow incremental changes described by Kingston can be detected in these two case studies. The Cabinet Office Government of Japan's edited publication *Highlighting Japan* noted that local areas such as Yokohama's Chinatown had "served as a bridge between the past and future"(Cabinet Office 2010, p.27) since Yokohama was opened up for trade in 1859. YOCWA is testimony to the growth of the ethnic quarter and its expanding needs for public services like education. Slow and incremental changes are likely to characterized Yokohama's dream to be an "environmental model city" and "a leading city for its efforts to address global environmental issues" conceptualized by the Cabinet Office Government of Japan (Cabinet Office 2010, p.27). NGOs, civil society groups and NPOs like Chikyunoki are likely to work with the national and local authorities to be part of this slow transformation towards an environmentally-friendly model city by diffusing environmental practices internally (e.g. to migrant groups) and externally (to other Asian countries as Chikyunoki is doing).

REFERENCE

- Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2010. APEC in Yokohama. *Highlighting Japan*, 4(6), p.27.
- Chen, B.L., 2011. First Interview with YOCWA. Interviewed by Wong, Yee Lam Elim. [tape record] Yokohama and 28 November 2011.
- Hayashi, F. (Mayor of Yokohama), 2010b. Welcome Message. In: *APEC Voices of the Future 2010*. Japan: APEC Japan 2010 Voices of the Future APEC Japan 2010.
- Hayashi, K., 2010. *Naze, Yokohama Chukagai ni hito ga atsumaru noka なぜ、横浜中華街に人が集まるのか (Why Do People Gather in Yokohama Chinatown)*. Tokyo: Shodensha.
- Hengbin Huaqiao Xiaohungzhihui, 2003. *Baoyuyuan Xiaohung Sheli Sanshiwuzhounian Jinianwenji 保育園小紅設立三十五周年記念文集 (Memorial of the 35th Anniversary of Xiao Hung Nursery)*. Yokohama: Hengbin Huaqiao Xiaohungzhihui.
- Hengbin Shanshou Zhonghua Xuexiao Bainian Xiaozhi Bianjiweiyuanhui, 2005. *Hengbin Shanshou Zhonghua Xuexiao Bainian Xiaozhi 1898-2004 横浜山手中華学校百年校志 1898-2004 (The Hundred Year of History of Yokohama Yamate Chinese School 1898-2004)*. Yokohama, Yokohama Yamate Chuka Gakuin.
- Kingston, J., 2004. *Japan's Quiet Transformation*. London and NY: RoutledgeCurzon.
- Liu Y.X., 2011. First Interview with YOCWA. Interviewed by Wong, Yee Lam Elim. [tape record] Yokohama and 28 November 2011.
- Marutani, S., 2011. First Interview with Chikyunoki. Interviewed by Wong, Yee Lam Elim. [tape record] Yokohama and 29 November 2011.
- Minatomirai 21 Promotion Division, Urban Development Bureau, City of Yokohama, 2010. *Toward an Advanced Urban Environment Minato Mirai 21*. Japan: MinatoMirai 21 ECO Information Promotion Division, Urban Development Bureau, City of Yokohama.
- Mitani, K., 2008. *Esunikku baundari-no Soushutu: Yokohama Chukagai ni okeru Kakyojoseishi エスニックバウンダリーの「創出」：横浜中華街における華僑女性史 (Creation of Ethnic Boundary: Overseas Chinese Women's History in Chinatown)*.

- Yokohama*). Tokyo: Duan Press.
- Pan, M.S., 2011. First Interview with YYCS. Interviewed by Wong, Yee Lam Elim. [tape record] Yokohama and 27 November 2011.
- Wang, D.H. and Zhou, Y.X., 2008. *The 30th Anniversary of Friendly Sino-Japanese Communication (1978-2008): Cultural, Educational and Folk Communication*. Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press.
- Yokohama Kakyō Fujokai Henshu Iikai, 2004. *Yokohama Kakyō Fujokai Gojyunenshi 横浜華僑婦女会五十年史 (The Fifty Years of History of Yokohama Overseas Chinese Women's Association)*. Yokohama, Arp Company Limited.
- Yokohama Overseas Chinese Women's Association. no date. *Xinfengcailu* 48. [Online] Available at: <<http://www.yokohama-chinese.gr.jp/yc/tx11-2.html#a>> [Accessed 9 February 2012].

Sojourn as an Intercultural Experience:

Study on Indonesian Migrant Workers in Malaysia

Melly Ridaryanthi
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia
Email: melly.ridaryanthi@yahoo.com

INTRODUCTION

Migration across borders is not a new phenomenon, let alone in this globalized era where people are moving from West to East and vis a vis for so various purposes; study, work or travel. When globalization phenomena has brought numerous benefits through trading and capital flows in economic sectors, then migration occur (Ridaryanthi 2011: 1).

The international migration phenomenon is important as every country will experience the affect of people's movement (Raharto 2007), either the sender country or the receiving country. People are moving to catch opportunities for a better job, better salary, better life as well as pursue their dreams. This movement, addressed as sojourn, is when two or more cultures meet in interactions among people where communication takes place. Cultural differences between home and host country have created series of culture shocks among sojourners.

Therefore, Migration may increase and enrich someone's intercultural awareness and experience since they will do contact with other culture during their sojourn in the form of sharing cultural believe at the same circumstance in the host country. Van Oudenhoven et al (2006) stated that globalization, migration and increasing cultural diversity within nations have resulted in a growing need to understand and enhance intercultural relations in plural societies (pp.637).

In addition, globalization has influenced some cultural issues as identity, acculturation and intergroup relations which are evoking changes in the life and options of immigrants and their receiving societies (Van Oudenhoven et al 2006: 647). Hence, international migration, again, may produce new sets of life experience in the form of intercultural aspects.

Why should Indonesian migrant workers in Malaysia? Since Malaysia is considered as the biggest employer of migrant workers in South East Asia (Nina Widyawati 2005: 222), meanwhile Indonesia is considered as an important labour-sending country in Southeast Asia (Raharto 2007: 219). Besides, Malaysia is one of the most targeted countries for Indonesian migrant workers' movement in so many reasons as the proximity, culture as well as job opportunity. The purpose of this paper is to reveal intercultural experience among Indonesian migrant workers in Malaysia in the process of adaptation in the host country.

The big picture of globalization, migration and cultural exchanged that affect people's intercultural experience will be discussed on this paper, especially in the case of Indonesian Migrant workers in Malaysia.

COMMUNICATION ACROSS CULTURE: COLLECTIVE CULTURES

Living in one country with certain cultural background has bring us into cultural implementation in our daily activity as norms or traditions that have been applied since we were child. Hence, when people are moving from their place of origin to another, they will automatically face a brand new culture that might hinder their daily activity either on their work life or their interaction with home-friends or host-friends.

People who are moving from West to East and vice versa will find that cultural background in both places are different that may lead to some adjustment among the people. West countries are considered as Individualist culture, according to Hofstede's Cultural Dimensions (1984), where people more focus on inner experience and goals; e.g. European countries. Meanwhile Indonesia is considered as collectivist culture and it is theoretically has similar culture as Malaysia since both lay a long Southeast Asia region with Malay culture as the basic cultural background. People may believe that Indonesian Migrant Workers should adapt more easily to Malaysian culture due to similar culture (Nina Widyawati 2005: 222), but then, are those two countries are really the same?

When two cultures meet, contact among individuals will affect people's interactions.

Contact between individuals from different cultures is related to uncertainty (Samochowiec & Florack 2010: 507), this occur among people who have different understandings about culture and norms applied among them. Moreover, individuals' social identities can be based upon ethnicity , nationality, age, gender, and organizational membership among others (Lee & Gudykunst 2001: 374). Every group of people have their own cultures to apply on every single day interaction, and the migrant workers on their host country reciprocally. Therefore, the interethnic interaction might face uncertainties pertaining many aspects of life.

The distance between cultural values of the host country and that of the immigrant might affect of intercultural communication stress (Redmond 2000: 152), here where the gap between community groups occur. Redmond on his study investigated the effect of cultural distance on the communication competence among students attending a US university (2000: 151). Meanwhile, Weishaar (2008) faced difficulties in doing Focus Group Discussion toward Polish migrant workers in Scotland since some of the workers he met do not really speak English, this condition has made barrier on the migrants communication activity during their sojourn in the host country. Interaction need communication as a tool, somehow communication need language, signs or symbols to convey meaning. When the circumstances faced difficulties in bringing up the similar idea of communication, then how would they communicate and interact?

When we relate those studies with the migration of Indonesian migrant workers to Malaysia, we may assume that communication conflicts might arise due to cultural differences and problems of adapting to Malaysia culture (Nina Widyawati 2005: 222). Here is the situation where intercultural communication takes place between different cultural members (Dong Dai 2009: 1) where interaction and communication occur in the society. How hard the situation, we might not tell until we observe the actual events.

CULTURE SHOCK: WHEN TWO CULTURES MEET

The proximity of one culture to another becomes one of the top reasons why people choose certain country to migrate. When people move from one country to another, they have

to face some differences culture; norm and customs. Many studies in Intercultural Communication focused on the adaptation process among sojourn people in different cultural background countries, where scholar might see that there are some barriers pertaining to culture faced by the immigrant, called as cultural dimensions initiated by Hofstede (1984).

The difference in culture may trigger stress for immigrant to adapt with the local society as well as working atmosphere. Uncertainty, feeling like an alien or being discriminated might arise as the major issue at the first time of living. As on Weishaar's study in 2008 found that Polish migrant workers in Scotland find difficulties to adjust with foreign culture and society and it was very stressful for them during the days (pp. 1255). Moreover, many of the immigrants feel so lonely for they really missed their family and very struggle to get close with the local society in Scotland.

SOJOURN AS INTERCULTURAL EXPERIENCE: THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

This study was conducted by using Cross-cultural Adaptation Theory initiated by Kim (1988) pertaining adaptation process among sojourners in their host country. The theory conceptualize the stress adaptation growth dynamic of intercultural adaptation experience among immigrant during their sojourn. This theory helps to reveal on how immigrant get through day by day in the host country and adapt with the situation there.

The theory implemented in this study to explore how migration may give such an intercultural experience toward immigrant in the process of their adaptation to the host culture and society. By using group level approach, this research tried to reveal the sojourn experience among Indonesian migrant workers in Malaysia and associate it with Intercultural Communication studies. Cognitive and affective competencies shown by every group of discussion are considered as the understanding process toward adaptation.

In order to acquire proper in depth data from the group of Indonesian migrant worker, therefore Focus group discussion were set toward 10 people; 5 people from construction field and another 5 people from factory field. Snowball sampling was implemented in order to get informants who fit the characteristics. Informants in this study are all living in Klang Valley

area in Malaysia. Series of characteristics were determined as gender, age, length of stay and location; details as follows:

Informant Characteristics Table 1

Construction Field N=5		Factory Field N=5	
Gender	Male	Gender	Female
Age	25-35	Age	25-35
Length of stay	≥ 3 years	Length of stay	≥ 3 years

Questions raised on the discussion were built based on Life episodes categories; Pre-Departure, Arrival, Early living, and Three years of living. The episodes later on guided by thematic questions as Motivation & expectations, Culture shock, Cultural understanding, Intercultural communication and interaction. Focus groups were held around 60 minutes, data were transcribed verbatim and analysis were done manually by using coding sheet.

DISCUSSION: INDONESIAN MIGRANT WORKERS' EXPERIENCE IN MALAYSIA

Motivations for migration

Every individual who moves has their own reasons for moving. In this case, Indonesian migrant workers moved to Malaysia based on a very basic reason; money. The fact that they found difficulties in getting a good job as well as salary, therefore they used the opportunity of going abroad as a way out for a better income and better life.

“...saya ingin mencari uang yang banyak, buat mencari modal yang banyak untuk usaha”

“...I want to earn more money, collecting some fund to hold a business”

“...kalau di Indonesia penghasilan kurang, cari kerja susah, jadi ke sini karena penukaran uang oke, pekerjaan banyak”

“...I got less money while in Indonesia, it was very difficult for me to find a job,

but here I...the money has good currency and there are a lot of vacancy”

“...untuk mencari uang”

“...to earn money”

“...untuk membantu keluarga, tahu sendiri kan ekonomi di Indonesia susah”

“...to help my family, you know that economical condition in Indonesia is pretty bad”

“...untuk membantu orang tua, memperbaiki ekonomi lah”

“...to help my parents, to get better economic condition”

The strong motivation of having a better life have brought them crossing the border of these two Malay cultural based countries, Indonesia and Malaysia. With the help of employment agencies, they get through the documentation process such as passport and visa. Are those documents free of charge? No, of course not. The workers either have to pay in advance for their documents or pay it later on after they get their first salary and pay it by installment to the agent.

Pre departure preparation

They did not do any specific preparation before departing to Malaysia, only documents that they concerned about. Preparation in the form of stuffs/things to be packed were just the basic needs such as clothes. They did not have mentally prepared for they simply think that Malaysia is just the same as Indonesia in term of culture, people, society, food and even weather. What happened when they first coming to Malaysia? They find difficulties in some ways to understand and adapt with the host cultures.

“...pertama kali datang ya susah, macam mau adaptasi itu susah, lihat film di sini

aja macam nahan ketawa gitu, bahasanya aneh”

“...when I came here for the first time, I felt difficult to adapt, when I watch the movie, I did not even understand the language”

“...bahasa pertama”

“...language”

“...kami tidak suka kari, tidak makan kari di sini”

“...we do not like curry, I do not eat curry here”

“...ada bawa makanan dari Indonesia, dikirim”

“...I brought some Indonesian food, my family send it to Malaysia”

Language was the first thing they mentioned in discussion as something difficult to adapt with. Most of the informants are coming from Java island where vernacular is used as daily language. Besides, they have never heard any words in Malay before so that they face some trouble in understanding what people say. Since the supervisor are originally from Malaysia, so they have to be able to communicate in Malay to facilitate the interaction. The first three months were difficult to tell, how they were very confused on what language they are using. After the first three months, they begin to understand how to speak by using Malay.

Food was the other thing that they faced quite difficult to adapt since the spices used in Malay food pretty different from what they have in their home country. To overcome such a condition, they prefer to cook their own food rather than buy from the restaurant or food stalls. But somehow, after months living in Malaysia, they get to like several kind of foods especially the snacks.

Social interaction

In the case of interaction among Indonesian migrant workers and local citizen, they formerly found that some of Malaysian are not friendly enough. They experienced that the

locals were not willing to speak or closely know them. But later on, they have realized that perhaps it was just the way people get to know strangers in their surrounding.

“...orang sini kadang susah, kadang kita mau senyum dia sangka kita ini mau apa”

“...sometime I feel difficult to interact with local people, if I smile, then they think that I will do harm”

“...aku datang ke sini untuk bekerja, so aku tidak pikir yang lain selain bekerja”

“...I came here for working, so I do not think about any other else”

“...kalau dia tanya duluan baru saya mau ngomong sama dia, bukan jual mahal, segan saja”

“...if they say hi at first, then I will do the same. It is just because I feel hesitate”

Indonesian migrant workers who are working in the factory and construction field are living in group. Group here means that they live together with friends from Indonesia as a group of workers. Besides, they tend to keep on with their enclave that make them seen as an exclusive group and separated from the group of local community.

Here we may see that difficulties on how people speak, eat and behave are different in these two cultures. They never knew it before until they see it and experience it. They admitted that the first three months were tough for them. Feeling of missing home and family have always bother the days. But later on, they are trying to survive by going back to their first objective: earning money to help the family.

They are no longer taking the culture for granted and try to understand the similarity and difference between Indonesia and Malaysia. They try to apply Malay language on their daily conversation with local people, eventhough they sometimes mixed it up with Bahasa Indonesia, yet the Javanese accent is still there. Here we can see that the attempt to acculturate themselves with the new cultural situation is there, but they unconsciously preserve their own

identity as Javanese, as Indonesian.

During working, they do not have much time to interact or having a chit chat with other people, even with the peer at work. They have to fulfill the daily target, so they just focus on what they do. When they coming home, tiredness are covering all over the feeling for they cannot do anything else except get rest.

As we refer to their main motivation to sojourn, the informants in this study convinced that they do not really bother whether local community want to interact with them or not. As long as they can work, get paid and can send money to home, that are more than enough. So that, even they found difficulties to interact with local people, but they, eventually, do not take it as a serious thing. With time, they can face all the situation and understand the condition in the circumstances.

Place to live

Apart from the fact that they are placed at one roof with another migrant workers by their bosses/employers, they eventually creating their own enclaves to live. Some of the migrant workers are provided shelter in the form of dorm or rented houses. But still, some others are looking for their own place to live since the employers do not provide it. When they have to live separately from the other friends at work, they try to figure out the place where Indonesian migrant workers live. Mostly, they find the place where Indonesian migrant workers who are originally from their hometown live. So that, they will stay pleasurably.

Some of the factory workers are living in dorms, some of them rentend houses. At the first coming, actually the company/employers provided them a place to stay in the form of dorms which share with the other migrant workers from the Philippines and so forth. Later on, when they are getting married or no longer comfortable to live in the dormitory, they will leave the dorms and rented a house nearby the factory.

The different situation experienced by the construction workers. They can be staying at rented houses or “rumah kongsi”. *Rumah kongsi* is a temporary bulding made by plywoods nearby the constructed building. In certain area, *rumah kongsi* are allowed to be built, but any

other certain places such as Putrajaya and Kuala Lumpur, *rumah kongsi* are forbidden due to maintain the comfort of the city. *Rumah kongsi* is the place where they live during doing the construction. While the contract is over, then they will move to another places and live in a new *rumah kongsi*.

However, not all the construction workers are living in *rumah kongsi*. Most of them are given a place to live by the contractor or by their *toke*/bosses. Just like what I have found, the informants in this study are living in an empty shops with one bath room and kitchen. They live altogether in amount fo 22 people in one place. Sleep on the mattress that pun on the floor, or just sleeping on the floor just like that. They not only share the place but also the food, life and fortune.

Among the construction workers, they usually living and working with persons who originally from the same hometown. In this study, the informants are from Pamulang. Next on their home, there is a home where construction workers from Madura live. This condition automatically create a new cluster of people on a migration, migrant workers are living on their enclave. The good things are they can share the experience, less uncertainty, able to handle any difficulties if any and so forth. The other sides, they might be seen as an exclusive group of migrants who are assumed not merge with the society. But then, when we relate this situation with the theory of adaptation, we might say true that living in our own enclave may hinder from uncertainty, feeling of discrimination and so forth.

Living in a country with similar cultural background was assumed as something easy, at first. However, the relationship and interactions among migrants and local community are not merely smooth due to several migrant workers' issues constructed as underpaid, undocumented, abuse, criminal even pertaining culture, attitude and so forth have become the barrier for them to interact. Basically, they aware that the adaptation process is going on and they have faced it as challenges. Three years is not a short period for individual to live in other culture as a marginal group. Yet, they are fully conscious that what they have been through are part of intercultural lessons. They now even feel very rich in term of experience and culture. Being proud of living and working abroad has increased their self-confidence as a person and as an Indonesian.

LIMITATIONS

This paper presents a small part of pilot study on my dissertation pertaining Intercultural interaction on migration with Indonesian migrant workers in Malaysia as the research subject. Therefore, the data used on this paper are limited, by only the part that needed to be discussed. Nonetheless, this study may further develop with larger scale of subjects and more in-depth data analysis.

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Migration has put the people who are moving in a condition where they have to face new culture apart from what they have implemented on their life before. Way of living, speaking, eating and even behavior may be confusing and stressful for the new comer on the block. The three first months were the most difficult time of period when they found that there are so many new things in their new life in host country. Later on, day by day has given lesson for them on how to know, understand and apply the new culture in order to adapt and interact with the local community. These experiences are taken as an intercultural lesson that may enrich them in term of values, not merely money. The migrants workers from Indonesia realize that they have to face the situation where differences are all over their circumstance. They try to understand, and survive with the situation. They take the experiences as learning process that enrich them with new knowledge and skills.

REFERENCES

- Hofstede, G., 1984. *Culture's Consequences International Differences in Work-related values*. United States of America: Sage Publication.
- Kim, Y.Y., 1988a. *Communication and Cross-cultural Adaptation: an Integrative Theory*. England: Multilingual Matters Ltd.
- Lee, C.M. and Gudykunst, W.B. 2001. Attraction in initial interethnic interactions. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 25(4), pp.373-387.
- Raharto, A., 2007. Indonesian Labour Migration: Issues and challenges. *International Journal on Multicultural Societies*, 9(2), pp.219-235.
- Redmond, M.V., 2000. Cultural Distance as a Mediating factor between Stress and Intercultural Competence. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 24(1), pp.151-159.
- Ridaryanthi, M., 2011. *Social Distance in the Host Country: Adaptation Experience among Indonesian Migrant Workers in Malaysia*. Paper was presented at Simposium Kebudayaan Indonesia-Malaysia in Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Malaysia.
- Samochowiec, J. and Florack, A., 2010. Intercultural contact under uncertainty: The impact of predictability and anxiety on the willingness to interact with a member from an unknown cultural group. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 34(5), pp.507-515.
- Van Oudenhoven, J.P., Ward, C. and Masgoret, A., 2006. Patterns of relations between immigrants and host societies. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 30(6), pp.637-651.
- Weishaar, H.B., 2008. Consequences of international migration: A qualitative study on stress among Polish migrant workers in Scotland. *Public Health Journal*, 122(11), pp.1250-1256.
- Widyawati, N., 2005. *Are We Up tp the Challenge?: Current Crises and the Asian Intellectual Community*. The Work of the 2005/2006 API Fellows.

Re-Integration of Cultural and Religious Identities in Central Asian Societies, the Challenges and the Promising Prospects for Regional Cooperation and Good Neighborhood (including China)

Sunatullo Jonboboev

University of Central Asia

Email: sunatullo.jonboboev@ucentralasia.org

INTRODUCTION

Current Central Asian states are practicing ethno-nationalism as a form of consolidation of nations already for 20 years replacing former communist ideology. Obviously it is not easy process itself; it contains and creates many challenges that face the countries for the last years of their independencies. Particularly, often it causes endemic conflicts and clashes horizontally (between the ethnic groups) and vertically (between the visions and ideologies): the ethnic clash in Osh (the south part of Kyrgyzstan) in 2010 was just one example. Another challenge comes from the long time process of re-integration of the cultural and religious forms of identities in Central Asia [pre-Islamic, like Zoroastrianism, believe on Tengri etc., Islamic and Soviet secular traditions]. It is comforting to mention that modern Tajikistan's 'pioneering' experience of peaceful coexistence of secular and religious approaches is unique among all post-Soviet countries in Central Asia and is reflected in a series of public debates regarding religion and social life. The peaceful coexistence resulted from the reconciliation of 1997a the end of five years of a brutal civil war between so called 'Secularist' and 'Islamists'. The ideological debate at the origin of the conflict – which started in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, was between secularist (with communists background) and Islamists. In post-war situation the debate moved on towards the divide views between traditional Islam and new trends of Islamic movement, like Salafies (fundamentalists). Today the debate is between traditionalist holding official status and the same traditionalists groups (popular religious families) who became outsiders after losing their official power. These two groups are now blaming each other again (1) on supporting Salafism (new trends coming

from Saudis) and (2) Shiism (the branch of Islam practicing in modern Iran).

Central Asians have long history and experience of integration and absorbing knowledge with completely different origins, and following this long tradition of the aboriginal people the Aga Khan Humanities Project currently for more than 12 years is moving towards revival and integration of such indigenous store of knowledge cultivating diverse intellectual, educational approaches and concepts in region, trying to avoid attempts to narrow public and intellectual space for rational discourse and emerging political and educational projects in Central Asia. To save the new generation of Central Asians from possible politics of isolationism and marginalization, to prepare them to appreciate diverse knowledge coming from outside, to encourage creative approaches currently seems to be very important. To move forward without rethinking of the past, the new interpretation of past is impossible. Namely it was basic condition for program to support Central Asians in reaching into their past for inspiration, and seek assistance in drawing upon the traditions of their societies to foster tolerance, ethics and civic virtues in their current lives. The message was not to 'live in the past' statically, but take from the past important values, resources for inspiring social transformation. The Aga Khan Humanities Project was as a response to the need for making bridge between the past, the present and future during the very dramatic time, collapse of the Soviet Union and emerging new independent countries in early nineties. It was the need to avoid the fragmentation of memory, time and history during the formation of new identities.

There mainly two poles of the culture of education in Central Asia actually are fixed, but they were not in severe mutual confrontation, although there was always a particular competition between both. Moreover the culture of pluralism or multiculturalism existed in Central Asia for the centuries. It was active during Islamic ages, it was distorted and reshaped during the Soviet time in result of forceful cultivation of atheism, but even at that time it went through Soviet modernization toward '*internationalization*' (namely westernization and Russification) and now has some perspectives because of Western culture and educational standards are flourishing in the region through the joining Central Asian universities to Bologna system of education. So, since the region was always in crossroad of history,

Central Asian cultures were not in static, they were heterogeneous by nature, but presenting one symbiotic Persian-Turko-Persian culture based on Islam. The problem is that today not all people engaging in Central Asian issues want to see that diversity of Central Asia and always try to bring this diversity into superficial “unity” on behalf of all different cultural and political projects, but the unity based on just one of its component.

In reality both mentioned poles of the cultural and educational components were negotiating in this region for centuries. Regarding this few words about the methodology to address the mentioned here phenomena. It is important to verify the application and contextualization of some constructivist, and post-structuralist, neomarxist epistemological, political, philosophical, cultural and religious studies theories, including developed by J. Habermass theory of communicative action, the role of rational discourses for social and political issues, discussions on truth and objectivity (Habermas), sociology of knowledge, co relationship of knowledge and the power suggested by Foucault, Karl Mannheim, Sarrah Amsler, Chad Thompson etc. For understanding nature of nation and nationalism we tried to involve the shattered resumptions about a primordial original identity initiated by B. Anderson, his theory of ‘imagined identities’, etc. And in dealing with fundamentalism it is worth to assess the findings of some western scholars specialized on Islam, like Bernard Louis etc., and modern Islamic intellectuals, like Muhammad Arkoun (on *Rethinking Islam*), Abdurhaim Soroush (on correlation of *Reason, Democracy and Islam*), Riza Aslan (on the role of *rationality and pluralism in Islam*) etc. Finally, in order to touch upon the issues of globalism and anti-globalism it is healthy to examine the theory of domination of Edward Said, the theory of isolation, alienation developed by Michail Foucault, and the issues of “Inclusion of the Others” by Habermas.

Of course, the application of different theories developed in the particular socio-cultural environment (mainly in Europe, USA and Middle East) into the social, political and cultural lives of Central Asia is problematic as always: not all findings of classical or regional theories are relevant and applicable, some suggested paradigms are limited within the time and space, some of them can lead to the reduction of the phenomenal cases by the demand of imposing the old paradigms on new cases etc. Nevertheless, the useful adoption of some concepts from

different theories does not obstruct further findings, the chosen integrated approach even allow us to show some complexities of the problems we are facing in implementation of integrated curriculum in Central Asia.¹

1. INTEGRATED NATIONAL IDENTITIES: THE CHALLENGES OF ETHNO-NATIONALISM IN CENTRAL ASIA

The opposition (among) people takes place because of names,
Peace occurs when they go to the real meaning....
Parable of Rumi: Grapes²

Integrative approach need to be implemented more broadly. Nowadays the issue of nation and nationalism is always in the center of discussions and debates organized by the program, no matter would be this main topic or not. After the collapse of communism nationalism became the only “panacea” for consolidation of the people and the main disease of the time. Obviously as a multicultural program Aga Khan Humanities Project (AKHP) of University of Central Asia (UCA) wants to moderate the extreme forms of national self-expressing. It is the nature of nationalism that people have some concerns about diversity and pluralism perceiving them as a threat to national culture, able to weaken the national feelings and bring ‘uninviting’ cosmopolitanism to the minds. One minister of Education in Central Asia suggested to produce Humanities exclusively devoted to that nation. In opposite side the dean of the Institute of Oriental Cultures and Languages in Kyrgyzstan ‘challenged’ the Project because there were “not enough” representatives of Kyrgyzstan: “*Your project is much focused on Tajikistan and lacks names of Kyrgyz authors*”. Another participant of

¹ This paper based on the experience of Aga Khan Humanities Project as a part of University of Central Asia and personal observation and analysis of the author during long time activities within this project as a senior program manager of faculty development and curriculum development program, his feedbacks from dozen trainings/workshops. It reflects the summaries of the survey done by the author on the conditions of Humanities in Central Asia as well. The author is thankful for the faculties and instructors from the universities throughout of Central Asia participated at this survey and interviews, sharing their thoughts and concerns.

² Rumi: Quarreling over names//University of Central Asia, the AGA KHAN HUMANITIES PROJECT: INTRODUCTION TO HUMANITIES, Bishkek- Dushanbe-Almaty, 2008; pp.52-53

workshop suspected the University of Central Asia with distorting the “original” Kyrgyz culture preserved in Narin province where the University of Central Asia is going to establish one of its main campuses concerning to save the “*original Kyrgyz traditions with pure Kyrgyz tradition from globalized projects*”. Some reproofs on AKHP curriculum put in Kazakhstan as well: “why you didn’t include more texts from Kazakh history, why the text of Al Farabi, the “Kazakh philosopher”ⁱ is absent in your books?” As one can see there are so diverse opinions among people in Central Asia mainly have their ‘special’ concerns with the issue of national (in reality, ethnic) interest in curriculum. To some participants of the workshops the national issue even not debatable, sometimes this topic is close to taboo...! The result of our survey on the condition of teaching and researching humanities in Central Asia shows that many of our colleagues, respondents noted that the issues of nation and nationalism are still in the top priority for the scholar in Central Asia doing research on Humanities and Social Sciences. Although some of them mentioned that there is huge misunderstanding of nationalism and ethno-nationalism among the scholar in Central Asia. Only few of our respondents mentioned that multicultural and interdisciplinary approaches have to be developed in region as well³.

No doubt national building in Central Asia is important for national unity, for the integration of people living on particular territory, but some serious problems are disturbing it. National idea and nation state building become an important step for newly independent states, but at the same time ‘nationalization’ of universities curriculum in extreme forms is really the big concern for Humanities. Instead of Communist ideology the ideology of particular ethnics groups, so called ‘titular nations’ were brought up to date.ⁱⁱ They force to rewrite all cultural heritages according to the mode of the ruling groups and classes; The result are now so many ‘histories’ of Central Asia that the reader can completely be confused. The recent clash between Kyrgyzs and Uzbeks in Osh city of Kyrgyzstan is the symbolic sign that ‘thin’ understanding of nationalism in Central Asia is prospering. If we remember that it was not the first ‘national’ based disaster- such accidents happened in this area 20 years ago at the same place, between the same ethnics. Before it was also clash between Uzbeks and Meskheteans

³ Answers to the questionnaires: from Bishkek, Tashkent and Astana.

Turksⁱⁱⁱ in Fergana with the brutal killings of innocent people. For this reason Humanities Project provides important readings devoted to nationalism, the writings of B. Anderson, E. Hobsbawn, Edward Said, Adib Khalid, Farid Zakarriya etc. It is extremely important nowadays to organize some kind of debates and discourses within Central Asian societies, not necessarily as a state promoted curriculum^{iv}, and to provide wider, global platform for interpretations as a part of Central Asian intellectual Forum.

Benedict Anderson, one of the theorists of nation and nationalism calls nation as “imagined communities”⁴ and connect it with the (1) end of sacred status of monarchy, (2) lack of access to important scripts (Latin), (3) developing printing technology and (4) rising capitalism. There are different experiences of nationalism in Europe: France went to nationalism through establishing state, as noted by Eric Hobsbawn: “*French state made French nation, but not nationalism*”. Germany came to the establishing state through developing nationalism; The European principle “*one state and one nation*” was taken by the Soviet into the grant for implementation. Ethnicity was the main ‘ball’ for playing politic game. So, the Central Asian concept of nationalism is special: it started with ethnicity, and ethnic nationalism was always exclusive, not inclusive, so that minorities remained there as “outsiders”, just as it was before in case with Jews and Gypsy in France^v. Even the Jadids, the Central Asian modernists came back from Europe and Turkey to their homeland with Romanized French and Turkish idea of “*one nation and one state*” borrowed from the revolutions there: that ‘there should be no diversity in Central Asia; ‘we have to create one Turkestan!’. In this project there was no place for Tajiks, all them identified as a ‘Persified Turks’. Thus the focus was excepted ethnicity excluding other local ethnicities.

To debate and discuss on identities in Central Asia is not easy task, it creates strong resistance among the academic communities in Central Asia. Exclusivist approaches do not allow Central Asians to analyze very openly and objectively issues of identities in the class without well-spread prejudices and stereotypes. In 2008 during the regular AKHP workshop at Arabaev University in Bishkek sharp debate raised between faculties representing Northern

⁴ B. Anderson (1996), *Imagined Communities, Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London-New York, 224p.

and Southern parts of Kyrgyzstan, the ‘original Kyrgyzs’ and ‘Sarts’^{vi}, definitely the discussion moved into emotional rather rational discourses. They couldn’t come to consensus even within one ‘national’ concept in Kyrgyzstan. It is not a single case. The same happened five years ago at Khorog State University (Tajikistan) in 2005, when we started to analysis texts on Islam and Communist past as parts of national identities.^{vii} The two cases are typical: not so many people in Central Asia want to revisit and reinterpret their past, traditions and ‘imagined’ history, everything should be accepted without the doubt! Presumably, it seems that the reason of such type of attitude is not well integrated components of identities, the weakness of rethinking on identities. Taking defensive position they don’t want to go for critical analysis of Soviet legacy, not speaking about Islamic heritage or the ethnic component of national identity. So, the existing identities are in competitive environment, or even in real conflict within themselves. They are not integrated, since not intellectually absorbed and politically cemented.

According to survey conducted by one AKHP partner-teachers from Kazakhstan there are mainly two types of identities developing in Central Asia: (1) one is cultural identity which is primordial and appeals mainly to the past, and which is not acceptable from modern perspective; and the (2) second is political identity which is rationalistic and based on state culture and appeals to the future. She thinks that Tajikistan is the state for which the cultural is more preferable, for Kazakhstan the political identity is much powerful, but Uzbekistan is holding the parity between both. One of her respondents from Tajikistan suggested “to implement more sacred symbols, including mythologized image of the state leader’ for the time of transition”. According to the respondent irrational component of culture is important for this society and you are not able to change it simply through the law, but it should be taken into the grand”. For the respondent from Uzbekistan the stability, economic prosperity is more important, but his permanent reference to spiritual revival of Uzbekistan and importance of traditional institute of “*mahalla*” (community) make this balance fragile. Though the efficiency of national ideas can be to assess through the pragmatic point of view, the economy – he noted. Although the author confirms that the modernist model of identity of Kazakhstan is much promising than in two others, there are still some turbulences among the

population concerning the national identity, the balance between two types of identities or even two components of national identity even in Kazakhstan can be changed.⁵

For deeper understanding of the modern issues of identities in Central Asia we need some historical excursion. How can we define this region, was it monolithic entity or diverse? What is the reason for domination of one type of identity over another: cultural versus political in particular country? Yuri Bregel, one of the leading researchers of Central Asian history notes: “Central Asia can be defined as the western, Turko-Iranian, part of the Inner Asian heartland, whose indigenous population consisted of various Iranian peoples, most of whom have been by now Turkicized, and whose growing Turkic population has to various degrees assimilated its indigenous Iranian cultures”⁶ As we can see there are mainly two forms of identities, two main ethnicities, but always collaborating and negotiating during the centuries. In ancient time and middle Ages the Central Asia civilization and culture were deeply rooted in Iran, considered as Eastern Iran, but for the religious legitimacy referred to Bagdad, and for the few recent centuries (16-19c.) its cultural center moved to the Persified India, the Delhi sultanate. By the end of 19 to 20 centuries due to colonization policy the colonizing center moved to Russia and colonized nations in Central Asia controlled by Russian Tatars. Now not many people know that the term of “Turkestan” was brought to the former **Mawera' n-Nahr**⁷ and Khorasan from Russia. “After the Russian annexation of a greater part of the Central Asian territory, completed by 1885, “Central Asia” in Russian usage became associated with the Russian possessions in Central Asia, alternatively called “Turkestan”⁸. It happened mainly because of lack of knowledge on Central Asia in Imperial Russia and the mediated role of Tatars. The origin of the term “Turkestan” is well explained by W. Barthold: “Strictly speaking, “Russian Turkestan” as a political term was limited to the territory of the governorate-general of Turkestan and included neither khanates of Bukhara and Khiva, nor the Kazakh...”⁹. The main part of Central Asia was always Turko-Iranian

⁵ Medeuova, K. (2010), On political identity through the prism of culture: on the material of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan/in Russian. (draft version kindly shared with author);

⁶ Yuri Bregel. Notes on the study of Central Asia. Bloomington, Indiana, 1996, p.6.

⁷ The modern Central Asia heartland, now it is the territory of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and sough Kyrgyzstan together.

⁸ Ibid, pp. 2.

⁹ W.Barthodl, in EI, vol. 4, 1934, s.v. „Turkistan“//Yuri Bregel. Ibid, pp. 2.

cultural and historical entity, sharing both settled urban in its centers, nomad civilization in its peripheries.

Using mainly three basic elements: *territory*, *language* and *ethnicity* Soviet authorities started the delimitation of Central Asia into *nation-state* structures, transforming the region from the 'logic of empire' to the 'logic of nation state'. In reality the work was done in such an awful way that the border between the 'states' sometimes comes across the streets and neighborhoods (for example, in Fergana valley). It seems that for authorities of that time "dividing the existing entities and artificial creation of the new national entities" (Oliver Roy) was more important: so, the goal was revolutionary and simplistic - to get rid of existing, to create new identities! This division based on political and strategic logic: there was the need for political re-composition and reshaping old identities, - to cut the Islamic, Persian and even Persified Turkish roots, to cut "everything that might attach it to any broader area of civilization"; in addition Soviet "attempted for deculturation of particular nations. For example, in case of Tajikistan: by cutting of the new country its urban parts (for example, Samarqand and Bukhara), elites, and its Persian past", Soviet 'helped' to "ethnisation of Tajiks which resulted in their 'folklorization', regionalism" and "to prevent the crystallization of a Tajiks". The same procedure was done for Turks: one Turki language was divided into the four "national" languages in order to avoid so called 'Pan-Turkism' planned by Ottoman Turks. It is worth to mention good practice of multilingualism, the symbiosis of Persian-Turkic which existed in this region for the centuries and which was diminished. Finally the links with the learning centers for Sunni Muslims which was now not Persia, but India, again was canceled already 'thanks' to Great Games of Russian and Great Britain. Soviets "successfully" replaced old elites by recruited poor elements, and this policy was called "*korenizatsia*" of 'bolshevizm', which means indigenization.¹⁰ In sum, all Central Asians went through modernization and new nations were "created" basing on ethnicity. And that is one of the main circumstances which brought now problems for all nations in the region, and rooted on the notion of "*titular nation*", contradicting notion created by Soviets.

It is clear that this notion is very exclusivist. To the request on commenting the letter of

¹⁰ Oliver Roy. The New Central Asia. The Creation of Nation, pp. 102

Uzbek women from Osh trying to find justice from the world leaders one of our colleagues expressed her regret for failing to find non-violent way of solving the existing problems between two branches of nation. And at the same time she acknowledged that “Kyrgyz people do not allow anyone to separate the country or to take their lands!” In reality perhaps none of the Uzbeks were demanding the separation, possibly they were just expressing their wish for cultural autonomy, wanted to be treated equally in political life.^{viii} Why it happened so that *titular nation* has more rights for this land comparing to others? Currently Kyrgyz society is divided into two fractions based on the concept of ethnicity: the Kyrgyz intellectual are supportive for Kyrgyz ethnos, and Uzbeks for Uzbek ethnicity. The mayor of Osh became ‘national hero’ for Kyrgyz living in the South, promoting their fight for “space for life”¹¹. People forget about their centuries old historical and cultural commonalities, they were just brainwashed. Some of participants of the AKHP workshops inspired by *theory of Orientalism*, *the domination* of West suggested by Edward Said start to view the modern situation with labor migrant in Russia as manifestation of racism (the case with skinheads), post-colonial policy implemented by the weak government toward Central Asian people¹². Unfortunately even Russia is not successful in its multiculturalism.

It should be taken into consideration that so called concept of “*nation-states*” in modern post-Soviet space, particularly in Central Asia are democratic by title, but totalitarian by their origins and nature. Many scholars call it precisely as quasi-democratic¹³ rule. The reasons for such ‘transformation’ of democracy are many: some see them in a traditional culture or religion of Islam, but many see this in the heritage of Bolshevik revolution in Russia. As noted by Carlo Harry, bolshevism was the first ideological revolution within the nation-state building, happened in XX century, which soon followed by another ideological revolution, and surprisingly, the second was Fascism in Germany. Bolshevism in Russia imitating Revolution in France wanted to integrate the working class into state apparatuses, the Fascism tried to do the same for the German ‘Arian’ nation, to find the form of integrating,

¹¹ М.Кабылбеков: Столкновение узбекской и кыргызской идентичностей, //the clash of Uzbek and Kyrgyz identities- <http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1282226580>; The author admits that the ‘titular’ nation in Kyrgyzstan used their ‘instinctive right for expanding space for life’...

¹² Workshop in Khujand State University, 30 April - of May, 2009, Tajikistan.

¹³ Abdullaev Kamoludin (1998), Current Local Government Policy Situation in Tajikistan.

consolidating and mobilizing power of one nation. Although, Benedict Anderson suggested finding the links between racism and class ideologies, since racism exists not across the national borders, but within them.¹⁴ So, both these movements were totalitarian by nature. And it is not the fault of Central Asian states, instead it is their tragedy that they didn't have the practice of the third revolution - the *democratic revolution*, which happened only after the second World War in Europe as an outcome of defeating the German Nazism¹⁵. USA was the main subsidizer for the cultivation of democracy in Europe at that time. Since in Central Asia we didn't practice and subsidizer for such democracy we do not have that political culture to maintain borrowed constitution and democratic laws. The specific peculiarity of the last European democratic revolution is that it created *social national state*; it gave the people not just constitutional rights to take part at real political life, but also the right for economical prosperity. It gave them *pluralistic platform for political parties, different cultures for self-expressing*, created conditions promoting minimization and exclusion of conflicts between different social classes and national groups of society and suggesting ways for compromises.

The lack of practicing political, cultural and economical freedoms of expression by Central Asian people brought to the clashes, ethnic conflicts, and even ethnic cleansing. The case recently happened in Kyrgyzstan is not the only one among those which happened after the collapse of Soviets. The problem is that not only democratic values were not practiced, but problem is with education: they even were not taught properly by the states at schools and universities. The dominant theory was ethnocentrism, not citizenship. Such cases make the work of Aga Khan Humanities Project with more tolerant, integrated, cosmopolitan value system, extremely important in this region. In this regard, participants of workshops organized by Aga Khan Humanities Project mentioned that practice of *deliberative democracy* which was practicing by Kyrgyz society during the last decades was promising (even, if not always successful!). But tribe-clan-family domination and recent ethnic clashes showed the

¹⁴ B. Anderson (1996), *Imagined Communities*, pp.149, 150; the origin of racism in ideologies of class he shows through the claims to divinity among the rules, the 'blue' or 'white' blood and 'breeding' among aristocracies.

¹⁵ Карло Гарри. Национальное государство в глобальную эпоху// «Россия в глобальной политике», №5, Сентябрь-Октябрь 2009. // <http://globalaffairs.ru/numbers/40/12759.html>

weaknesses of generally such a Soviet origin type of democracy. The goal of nation state was to create and provide regulated social-political space, where individuals are secured and engaged in economic, cultural activities, the things which is in fact very problematic in region. The economy mainly dominated by ruling class or just family members. These kinds of topics become the subjects for sharp debates or in contrary; they are taboo...

So, at the beginning of the 20th century there was a 'triumph of "nation-state"' in Soviet Central Asia, the regional emirates and khanates were replaced without any debates by national demarcations. After independency in 1991 it went again without deep discourse among the citizens. The territory should not be transferable now! But the case of Osh showed that absolute power of nation-state over national territory is also problematic when the situation comes to the ethnic cleansing, when security forces take the interest of one side in conflict, as reported by Human Right Watches¹⁶

Important to mention that currently the process of self-marginalizing and the politics of national isolation on the name of implementing of national state building are going on in all Central Asian states. It is already reflected on curriculum and made effect on the reform process. As it was mentioned, teaching national history in Central Asia, often in a propagandistic and mythologized versions of 'imagined' past is very confusing and controversial: in one side Arian theory developed by historians (R. Masov etc.) in Tajikistan calling Central Asia as motherland of European civilization and Tajikistan as Europe's cradle¹⁷, and on the other end Uzbek historians (A. Askarov and others) claim now that indigenous population on the territory of Uzbekistan was mostly Turkic, and Persian language was only a language of administration...."¹⁸. Calling Eastern Iranian and Farsi speaking nations as outsiders, these authors do not care about existing settled Sogdians, Khwarasmians,

¹⁶ Human Right Watch: Где справедливость? Межнациональные столкновения на юге Киргизии в июне 2010 г. Web Site: <http://www.hrw.org>. According to the report state troops withstanding Uzbeks didn't pay attention to pogrom-makers who were totally Kyrgyzs. *"Показано, как правительственные силы, по меньшей мере, отчасти, вольно или невольно способствовали нападениям на узбеков и уничтожению их имущества, а местные власти не могли или не хотели обеспечить узбекскому населению должную защиту"*.

¹⁷ Marlene Laruelle, The Return of the Arian Myth: Tajikistan in search of the Secularized National Ideology//Nationalities Papers, Vol. 35, No.1, March 2007.

¹⁸ Yuri Bregel. Notes on the study of Central Asia. Bloomington, Indiana, 1996, p.23

Parthians, who belong to very ancient civilizations very indigenous to this region, and surprisingly, all of them Iranian origins. So, the historical ethno geneses of the people became the main and real battlefield between the scholars in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in recent years.

The same does Kyrgyzstan, now trying to return pre-Islamic Tengrism¹⁹ and to follow the ‘spirit of Manas’, the Kazakhs searching their genes of descendants of Chingizid²⁰. Putting Zoroastrianism above all other cultural and historical components²¹ in Tajikistan is similar to what is happening to Tengrism in Kyrgyzstan, which is being suggested as ‘an alternative to Islam aiming to weaken social weight of Islamic movement and open the way for future conflict within the societies’²². In opposite, some historians from Tajikistan do not want share old history of Sogdians and other “Arians” in *Mawara’n-nahr* with always encountering and exchanging with them neighboring Turks, who had mixed with Sogdians.

According to theorists, the differences between racism and nationalism [by B. Anderson, 1996] is that “nationalism thinks in terms of historical destinies, while racism dreams of eternal contaminations, transmitted from the origins of time through an endless sequence of loathsome copulations: outside history”.²³ So, the historical concern for nationalism is more important, but not eternity. In reality, in its original meaning the term “Arian” speaks about the raising of settled civilization in Central Asia, because they became “free” from moving as a nomads and nothing more, it was the process of separation of intensive production (settled in particular lands) from extensive one (nomadic, moving from one corner of the world to another...), and mainly in agriculture, but it was not about ‘blood’ and ‘genes’ as it developed in 20 c..

Suppression of non-national elements including language prohibitions were used to accelerate adoption of national languages, thus declining languages of minorities^{ix}. Before nation-state, for the last few centuries in Central Asia, particularly in Bukhara emirate political space was dominated by one ethnic group, by royal house of “Chingizid” Manghit

¹⁹ Interview with partner-faculty in Almaty, 2009

²⁰ В поисках Потомков Чингисхана. Фундаментальная родословная казахстанских исследователей Г. Табулдина и А. Оловинцова// <http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1282796220>

²¹ In Tajikistan the strong supporters of this project are poets and some scholars, like Ziyi Abdullo, Komil Bekzoda etc. Some participants of workshops, the university teachers also support this idea.

²² Marlene Laruelle, The Return of the Arian Myth,

²³ B. Anderson, *ibid*, 149

tribe as they described themselves. However it was sharing policy for other ethnic groups including Tajiks, especially concerning the jobs at state apparatus, juridical system, education, religion etc. In contrast to all European ruling dynasties the language of the ruling Chingizid Manghits in Bukhara was Persian. In spite of Turkic or Mongol origin they didn't separate themselves from local, Central Asian traditional Persian culture and its past, since "the great majority of sedentary population, and especially of the urban population, even under the Timurids was still Persian-speaking or at least bilingual".^x It was not surprising that the imperial states had no problems with the languages and borders,- King Temur (Tamerlan)²⁴ and all the emirs in Bukhara wrote their diplomatic letters till 20th century in Farsi. Not may people in region wants even to remember the symbiotic, multicultural traditions, culture and the common past. Today borders between Central Asian countries already mine-strewn and ethno-cratic ruling became a serious issue for modern Central Asia.

Kazakhstan shows some hopes for understanding democracy facing the choice between the concepts of citizenship or ethnicity: "*we have chosen the first; the citizenship should be the foundation of stability and consent in this country*". In opposite, many 'national-patriots' including Mukhtar Shakhonov, one of the famous political figures and a writer claims that this concept approved by the president should be removed from the public discourse, otherwise.²⁵ Originally, for imagined concepts, such a notion as 'to die for the country or for nation' is typical. As the case explored by Benedict Anderson 'imagined, adapted and transformed nation' brings poets, musicians and other intellectuals to self-sacrificing love – this is the "cultural products of nationalism".²⁶

Workshops organized in the framework of AKHP show the simplification; reductionism and narrowing of concept of identity, which is not rare now in Central Asia. In Tajik society some teachers and old scholars, mainly philologists think that multilingualism and multiculturalism is the big threat for national culture and young generation in Tajikistan: no

²⁴ Temur, the imperior of 15 century was free the racial, ethnic feelings, in his autobiography confessed that he released 4000 Rumies (Bizantians Christians) and always protecting the lands of Turan and Movarannahr from the frequent raids of nomadic Uzbeks in order to support justice. Автобиография Темура. The Institute of Temur: :Электронная библиотека (с) 2004:<http://bookZ.ru:::>

²⁵ <http://news.nur.kz/politics/139046.html> Shakhonov: "- I will go on hunger strike. With accepting this concept we will become one nation as the Americans, and Kazakhs will remain a small ethnos among others: it is better to die than to see the death of the nation".

²⁶ B.Anderson, Imagined Communities, pp.142

other languages should be well presented in comparison with Tajik-Farsi, no bilingual schools to be encouraged²⁷. Some representatives of new generation of Tajiks, who are under influence of fundamentalism think that Tajik identity and curriculum should consist of mainly Islamic slice, since before Islam there was no such a nation as Tajiks, they were all separate ethnic groups, like Sogdians, Bactrians etc. Another opposing group belonging to intermeddle generation suggests to get rid of Islamic philosophy as an ideology of Arabs and Semitics, from Ismaili teaching as ‘racial’ Arab ideology and go back to the dualism of Iranian Zoroastrianism as a pure national philosophy. Currently there is big debate in media concerning this issue²⁸.

Thus debates between historians of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the promotion of Arian idea, the ethnic-centered concerns of some Kazakh intellectuals, the recent practical case of ethnic clashes between Kyrgyz and Uzbek obviously shows the weakness of ethnocentrism and existing ‘practice’ of democracy in Central Asia. The fragile, fragmented, of course, not integrated forms of identities do not allow solving social and economic problem, to settle normal democratic national states with normal concept of citizenship. In Central Asia, *“quasi-democratic rule is being built on a highly fragmented society with yet declared, but unable to protect civil liberties....The totality of political power and command over resources in Tajikistan belongs to a limited number of ruling elites who run governmental and legal institutions, as well as economy to serve their private interests”*²⁹. There is flourished personified patron-client connection between the government and local communities, the single system of power based on the institution of the presidency and the persons, like Islam Karimov, the centralized state with promoted nationalism and suppress system of all potential sources of opposition. The researchers studying the issues of identities in Central Asia think that the official model of mono-ethnic nation state is not successful even in Uzbekistan. “The official nationalism employed by the Uzbekistani authorities seems to be aiming on emulating the mono-ethnic nation-state model and so provides little space for non-Uzbeks. By exalting

²⁷ Muhammadjoni Shakurii Bukhoroi, Huwwiyati Tojiki va Jahongaroi/The Tajik identity and Globalism//Millat, #14, 11 October 2007.

²⁸ Komil Bekzoda. Are Tajiks have national philosophy?/oyo tojikon falsafai milli dorand?/ Millat, #12 (30), 30 March 2006

²⁹ Abdullaev Kamolkhon, //Tajikistan at a crossroad: the politics of decentralization.

the Uzbek nation, the state is in danger of excluding the other communities resident in Uzbekistan". The number of other minorities in the country is huge, but the most significant among all of them are Slavs and Tajiks. According to John Schoeberline-Engel (1996) and Neil J. Melvin (2000) the only pluralist model would be a more appropriate strategy for the country.³⁰ Recent information in media confirms existing suppress over ethnic minorities and tensions as its outcome. Uzbek government tries to persuade that it is 'the land which belongs to the Uzbeks'.³¹ It is sad to mention, but if during the Soviet the project of 'reshaping' of Central Asians was headed by Russians, (like Uspenskiy, who helped the musicians in 'purification' of Central Asian classical musical tradition of "Shash Maqam",^{xi} today American researchers are making contributions for 'ethnic' isolation of the nations in Central Asia, and the best example of it is the work of Edward A.Allworth, The Modern Uzbeks.³² Following some Pan-Turkic writers of the 1920s and ethno nationalist in 1990s, the author entirely ignores the fact of Farsi-Turki symbiosis in Central Asia³³. This kind of scholarships is in reality the main source for creating the black Others, and finding them not far, but in neighborhood. As it was noted by Yuri Bregel "most of the rewritings of Central Asian history, which is now going on in the republics of Central Asia, has actually nothing to do with historical research. Ethnogenesis and the "glorious past", the way they are treated now, belong to the realm of politics, and not history"³⁴. In reality it is not rewriting the history, but it is invention of 'national' mythology.

From other side marginalization, de-culturalisation, fragmentation of the Tajik identity started during the Soviet time went to that extent that some political scholars and ethnonogists in current Tajikistan in order to support and to promote the maintaining of one-person rule, (surprisingly!), suggest go back and choose as the most important element of existing **social capital** - the *clan relationship*, particularly, the institute of *awlod*. The following idea was noted recently by one of presenters at the conference on "The tradition and democratization

³⁰ John Schoeberline-Engel, The Prospects for Uzbek National Identity, Central Asia Monitor, no.2 (1996), pp.12-20; Neil J. Melvin (2000), Uzbekistan, the transition to authoritarianism on the Silk Road, harwood academic publishers.

³¹ Ташкент укрепляет межнациональное единство: <http://russian.eurasianet.org/node/31255>

³² Edward A.Allworth, (1990), The Modern Uzbeks, From the Fourteenth Century to the Present: A Cultural History, Stanford University.

³³ Yuri Bregel, p. 39, 41;

³⁴ Yuri Bregel, p. 23.

process in Tajikistan” in Dushanbe, the capital city of Tajikistan: “During the Soviet time the ruling elite in Tajikistan was the *awlod* of *Tura*³⁵, but now as independency has been established another *awlod* came to power, which is Said³⁶. According to the speaker “*awlod* structure can be the best resource for the national development in this country”.³⁷ It is shown that the idea find enough ‘supporters’ within the audience.^{xii}

The conclusion of this part is that nation building, democratic system and values in Central Asia remain as a proposed construction, but not the body with real flesh and blood. The same is the national state. The concept of nationalism is fragmented not only because of crude exclusion of other ethnic and cultural minorities from the political sphere, but also because of absence of solidarity within one nation, which is divided by regions, in fact there is not solid nation³⁸ We think that reason for this is absence of tie links between nation-state and democratic values. Basically it is because of the fact that democracy, the universal modern human values are not well presented in the university curriculum in Central Asia, the democracy did not become the existing culture as it noted. So, in sum, the exclusivist approaches, one ethic based concept of nationalism and one way composed curriculum reflecting imagined and mythologized visions of history and reality will put the stability of societies in region in danger. The connection between ethnicist and fascism is well exhibited in Germany before the Second World War. To avoid that there is the need all split fragments, ethnical, religious, linguistic and cultural minorities, all components of educational culture to be integrated, first at schools and university curriculum.

The second, educator, politicians and all intellectuals in Central Asia have to understand that emerging of the nation-state has historic origins; it was respond to the historical challenge to find form for social integration. Today the challenges of globalization (communication ties, economical productions, world financial crisis, technology, weapons, military risks, ecology etc) force all the nations to think about foundation of supranational political organizations

³⁵ *Tura*, the term used for the descendants of Mongol dynasty in order to legitimize the power in different forms;

³⁶ Said, the descendants of Prophet Muhammad who can claim the power based on spiritual belonging.

³⁷ Mamaminjonova Z. *Shuur va mentaliteti mardumi tojik: dar mas'alai tafakkuri an'anaparasti*/The consciousness and mentality of Tajik people: concerning the issue of the traditionalist thinking. The speech at the conference “The tradition and democratization process in Tajikistan” organized by the Center Strategic Studies under the President of Tajikistan, 21-22 June 2010, Dushanbe.

³⁸ John Schoeberline-Engel, Ibid, pp. 59. The author claim: “despite of the stress on the single Uzbek nation, Uzbek identity is far from consolidated, with areas such as the Fergana Valley causing concern within Tashkent”.

regionally and globally, which can put limits to the exaggerated national sovereignty³⁹.

2. RE-INTEGRATED RELIGIOUS IDENTITIES: The TIDES OF FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE POWER OF INTEGRATED CURRICULUM

“O Moses, wherefore have you driven my servant?
Your office is to reconcile my people with me, not to drive them
away from me.
Rumi: Moses and the Shepherd⁴⁰

Seems that Cold War projects transformed the socio-cultural mission of religions dramatically, it distorted their function for consolidation and reconciliation of human beings, without geographic, ethnic, or even confessional belonging, the ideal unity about which is speaking Jalaliddin Rumi in the poem above. The uniqueness of the power of religion for human unity is doubtless, this is fundamental for the religion. But speaking about Islamic fundamentalism we should be clear about the notion “fundamentalism”, which is originally, according to Bernard Lewis⁴¹, a Christian term and used by Protestant churches with literal divine origin to oppose the liberal, modernist theologians. In Islamic context fundamentalism, if we can accept it, raises mainly not within theologians, but within political implementation. John Esposito⁴² suggests using the term of ‘revivalism’ concerning the Islam; it is possible to speak about it also as Islamic activism, not fundamentalism. Although there are some scholars within Muslim context support the term of “fundamentalism” (as return to Islamic basics).

It is well known fact that the collapse of Soviet system brought Central Asians to the religious revival and nostalgic feelings about Islam which can be viewed as ‘natural’ form of development after decades of ideological repressions of religion: new mosques are opening, new religious schools are establishing.^{xiii} Some reports confirm that the most active role in radical revivalism and extreme form of fundamentalist interpretation of Islam is being

³⁹ Jurgen Habermas (1998), *The Inclusion of the Other*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, p.106. Habermas quotes Hegel that ‘every historic formation is condemned to decline once it has reached its maturity’.

⁴⁰ INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY, University of Central Asia, Aga Khan Humanities Project, Dushanbe, 2008, p.253;

⁴¹ Bernard Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), p.117, n.3.

⁴² John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1992)

practiced by Jamoat Tabliq with Salafi agenda. The Russian analyst Shustor confirms that currently there are “five or six thousand followers of this movement in Tajikistan”.⁴³

Though some leaders of Islamic moderate revivalism in Tajikistan (for example, Haji Akbar Turajonzade) reject radicalism among the followers of this movement and argue that they have just enlightenment mission, there is no concern about ‘the entire planet’. This opinion supported by Kadyr Malikov. He thinks that Tabliqi Jamaat is not radical; it is more close to esoteric teaching of Sufi Brotherhood with the mission of enlightenment⁴⁴. Nevertheless, some researchers’ thinks that the big challenge for humanities and social disciplines, moreover, for existing nation-state and democracy in Central Asia is fast growing fundamentalism, Islamic activism or extremism which, according to them, can be the next revolution within the nation state with connection to religion. Some others assume that in reality it can be understood just as some type of search to find guaranty for political identities because of the total domination of Western countries in Middle East and in the world. Some participants of workshops explaining the raise of religious extremism with new Great Games: they thinks that the super powers fighting the terrorism in parallel to different forms of assistance and investment for the maintaining the security, social infrastructure, business in developing countries, at the same time using hidden forms of domination in the region, initiating double game, including push for religious extremists: the real aim is to come close to the border of young Central Asian states. In spite of all different explanations the fact is that the fundamentalist blowing and trends are in the process and there is need to counter such development. In this regard it is important to see the role of integrated curriculum counteracting fundamentalism with the proposed courses and texts. As it was mentioned, the suggested anthologies containing diverse pieces of books on Islamic and non-Muslim authors with different views; concepts are presented to show diversity within Islamic and the world civilizations. This integrated curriculum is not composed either on one way interpretation, no in propaganda approach toward any forms of movement. Before challenging radical interpretation of Islam and Muslim culture the students have opportunity to read the original

⁴³ Georgian Daily Independent Voice,
http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=19822&Itemid=72

⁴⁴ <http://www.islamrf.ru/news/umma/islam-world/2218>

works of such movements, for example, the writing of Al Shaheed Sayyed Qutb (*who call the modern civilization as Jahiliyyah, the state of ignorance*), Abdullah Wahhab (*who rejects all innovation after Prophet Muhammad (s) as bid'a*) or Ahmad bin Hanbal (*who prohibited 'discussions and dialectical debates about the faith', 'no differences of opinion between the Prophet's associates'!*)⁴⁵, so the students will be aware of all argumentations suggested by them to justify their puritanical, radical or sometimes even intolerant positions and to react with their own answers.

In his article Dr.Rafique Keshawjee, [chapter on “Religious Innovations”⁴⁶], reviews the case of spreading fundamentalist views in Central Asia on example of preaching of the old Kyrgyz mullah under the tree, which he and his community think is sacred. Opposing the exclusivist view of radical Islamic movements, Rafique argues that worshiping to the natural objects and sources: trees, springs, the tombs, the stones etc. is the sign which manifest the idea of plurality in Islam, which gave access to sacredness, to divinity for all the people, no matter whether they are Arabs or Ajamis, without considering indicators like nation, age, gender or education, and not just the ones learned at madrasas and other religious schools, or who got special religious trainings. The author takes for granted the fact that pluralism was and is the part of Islamic religious practice and Islamic culture for centuries. Speculating around the idea of unity of Muslims, the fundamentalists want to end the practicing diversity within Islam hiding their real political agendas. The recent fundamentalist development has not pure religious, but political ends: they just want to categorize the people who is ‘good’ and who is ‘bad’ Muslims and ‘giving them new passports’⁴⁷ to take them under their control.

The pluralistic practice well-spread all over the world and it manifested in different spheres of Muslim's lives: philosophy, architecture, music, miniature etc. and generally it is the character of living Islam. This text is usually well accepted, but of course, there are some contentions as well: ‘*worshiping the trees, the stones, mazars etc. are not Islamic*’, - say some participants. Interactions with the university instructors, and on broader scales of societies in region show that this text raises different opinions among the people.^{xiv}

⁴⁵ Introduction to Humanities, p.105-107, 123-126, 131-135; Individual and Society, p. 57-62

⁴⁶ TRADITION AND CHANGE, University of Central Asia, the Aga Khan Humanities Project, Dushanbe, 2008

⁴⁷ Dr.Rafique Keshawjee, (2008), The Faith and Culture//Tradition and Change, ibid. p.115

As it was mentioned before, today the economic turbulence, the imbalance between the social strata's, increasing poverty, insufficient countermeasure initiated by the local states of the region open floor for increased number of supporters of extreme versions of interpretations of Islam finding Central Asia as favorable place for their activities. International Crisis Group reported in 2009 on the "steady growth of Islamic proselytizers inside the prison-cells of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. ...The report talks about the strong influence that the Islamists have over the prison-inmates, even petty criminals coming under their sway".⁴⁸

The recent publication in *New York Times*, and in McClatchy Newspapers⁴⁹ confirmed the some external reasons, the myopic policy of the West (USA) during the cold war supporting Wakhabi Jihadi movement in Pakistan in order to counteract Soviet invasion in Afghanistan (*to use of Islam against USSR*) instead of supporting diversity within Islam for more stable future peace. The author of the article in *New York Times* shows the lack of knowledge on Islam within the politicians and decision makers in the West, including the knowledge on esoteric teaching of Sufis preaching on love and tolerance among the people, and the role of intellectual Islam in the region⁵⁰.

There are many other internal socio-economic factors for increasing of the fundamentalism. One of them is that after the demise of the communist regime and collapse of Soviet Union the percentage of the urban population decreased, the industrial urban population left the countries, and instead huge numbers of peasants moved to the cities. Social guaranties disappeared, unemployment became a norm, the mentality changed – educational gap brought big nostalgia for the past, the 'lost traditions', including the religion of Islam considered as an alternative way for solving problems and returning social justice. The absence of well-thought strategic policy toward the religious revival, lack of equipping with modern tools how to treat the emerging movements, the state using strong repressive methods

⁴⁸ Uddipan Mukherjee, Islamic Fundamentalism in Central Asia: Possibility or Paranoia?
<http://www.globalpolitician.com/26196-central-asia>

⁴⁹ Маргарет Талев, "McClatchy Newspapers", 27 августа 2010 года:
<http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1283198820>

⁵⁰ Уильям Дэлримпл, Поклонники суфизма могут быть союзниками запада, "New York Times", 16 августа 2010 года. (- <http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1282249440>

plus well-spread “corruption at all levels, poor governance and dilapidated jail system”⁵¹ – all of these complicated the job.

According to some estimation the number of supporters of fundamentalist Islam in the region is increasing.^{xv 52} The current educational level remains weak. Some local scholars admit that now in Tajikistan “we have not intellectual Islam, well-educated intelligentsia with a modern clerical education”⁵³, but some educated in traditional madrassas, or ‘home made’ mullahs who pay much attention to the ritualistic Islam, but not to ‘thinking arsenals – a wealth of knowledge’. Marginalization of thinking on Islam from public sphere for several ages made great contribution to understanding of Islam in orthodox way. This is about the so called “closing the doors of Ijtihad”⁵⁴, the rationalistic discourse within the religion of Islam, which according to some schools of law accepted by many in Islam, but not by all. We can see the case of Belboev’s⁵⁵, the secularist instructor supporting fundamentalism.

Generally we can say that faculties and teachers face following problems: 1) There is lack of independent thinking concerning religious texts, also traditional authoritative approach to teaching texts; 2) Double standards: accepting pluralistic ideas theoretically, but not practically (problem with implementing ideas); 3) Lack of openness, when they don’t want to show their real face, but try to play with audience, especially, when they know what is the majority of people currently prefer; 3) Conformism, approaching pedagogy as ideology, readiness to replace communist ideology, which was in the past, with Islamic/nationalistic ideology of today; 4) Lack of knowledge on Modern Islam, especially last results of Islamic studies developed in Europe and in the West, and that are not known here; 5) The lack of skills of careful, systematic and critical reading of different texts or just unwillingness to do so; as Madeleine noted, “to prejudge the author’s position, to assume that the author agrees with those whom he is paraphrasing, attributing this particular position to the author (when in fact Lester was here paraphrasing another, revisionist, scholar), simply denounced the whole

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Interview from Asia Plus, July 14, 2010, A 7, www.asiaplus.tj/Boturkhon Gulomshoev, a thesis presented to the MA program of the OSCE Academy, Bishkek, August 2010.

⁵³ Islam in Tajikistan- Interview with Abdullo Hakim Rahnamo, Religioscope, 25 Apr. 2004: http://www.religion.info/english/interviews/article_34.shtml

⁵⁴ There are two forms of interpretations exist in Islamic theology concerning the sacred book: one is Taqlid, the imitation, the literary understanding of the text and second, the rational discourse, *Ijtihad*.

⁵⁵ These are coded-names. The real names changed.

text as “anti-Islamic”. The situation described above is only one case, demonstrating reading capacities of Islamic texts by faculties of this region.⁵⁶

It is clear that central point of them is the different ways of seeking the truth, the complicated relationship between reason and freedom. Some people were afraid of telling the truth, since it became dangerous, and they wanted to stay devoted to enforced truth. Actually it is that case when Abdokarim Soroush explains similar situation through the differences of two categories of reasons: (1) reason as storehouse of administered or enforced truth and another (2) is dynamic reason. Abdokarim Soroush’s concern is the use of “reason that serves as a dynamic faculty of thinking and seeking truth” in modern Islamic countries. Because the advocates of “administered truth need no room for questioning and doubts.”... “But in contrary, when we choose the dynamic vision of reason as our guiding light, we shall not fear errors as menace to freedom. No will we condemn freedom of thinking or the clash of ideas”.⁵⁷

Integrated curriculum wants to build thinking capacity in Central Asia, educating people on diversity of interpretations: literal, orthodox, liberal and radical interpretations.^{xvi} Fundamentalist form of interpretation is equal to radical one. Obviously, the faculties at Central Asian universities are not fundamentalists, but majority of them are just maintaining traditionalist approaches as a part of nostalgias feelings, cultivating the “administered truths” and lack of knowledge of current issues of Islam does not allow them to have clear position: to remain supporting reason as storehouse of enforced truths; or in this way keeping neutrality to support fundamentalist movements unwillingly, but not dynamic way of thinking.

It is clear that Modern scholarship in Islam, qualified modern Islamic studies now are

⁵⁶Feedback on the Training of Trainers Workshops, Madeleine Reeves, University of Cambridge, June 15, 2005]; Workshop for Khujand State University in Khujand, north part of Tajikistan, October 2-7, 2008; Workshop on *Introduction to Humanities and Individual & Society* courses in Khujand State University in English Language, 30 April - of May, 2009, Tajikistan; Отчет тренера Камаровой Рузии о проведении семинара по курсу «Введение в Человечествоведение», г.Алматы, колледж КазНПУ имени Абая., с 9 по 13 ноября 2009 г. ; Отчет о семинаре в Нарынском государственном университете (ноябрь, 2009г, тренер Шамбеталиева Хадича Маматбековна); Report on the Workshop for Qurgon-teppa State University, February 23-28, 2009 (by Ajamsho Kalonzod), - (AKHP UCA internal reports);

⁵⁷ Abdokarim Soroush (2000), *Reason, Freedom and Democracy in Islam*, Oxford University, p. 56

available in other foreign languages. But clearly, for some different socio-economic reasons, well-spread corruption at the state levels parts of societies; youth are at the moment supportive for increasing fundamentalist approaches. Observation the discussions during the workshops shows that for the participants two things concerning Islam are disturbing: 1) the individual interpretation of the sacred book and maintaining the sacred traditions; 2) fear on the historical approach to be implemented towards Islam and its sacred scripts. As we see further, these two characteristics of time can become solid foundation for fundamentalism.^{xvii}

Majority do not admit that there are other traditions within Islam which in opposite suggests that Qur'an has its own history being divine, but written scripts and one of them was Mu'tazilis school of Islam from 9 century, to which refer Toby Lester as well. Moreover, majority scholars in Central Asia now don't pay attention to the existing fact because of fear of fundamentalism and revivalism, but also because of absent the "honest scholarship in humanities" (Yuri Bregel). The line from Egyptian modernist Muhammad Abduh, writer and intellectual from Egypt Ahmad Amin (1936), the Pakistani scholar Fazlur Rahman (in 60th-80th of 20 c.), Ali Dashti (1979) and now by Nasr Abu Zaid and Muhammad Arkoun (Algeria, France) is totally ignored by majority of Muslims. There is ignorance on exact rationalistic potential; some Muslims reformist in early 20 century enthusiastically noted the big potential of Mutazilis for Muslim modernity (M. Abduh). They admitted that "the demise of Mutazilism was the greatest misfortune to have afflicted Muslims" (Ahmad Amin)⁵⁸. Religious revivalist tendency produces among intellectuals some blandness as well. Many faculties today do not imagine the existing tradition of reconciliation of the Faith with Reason⁵⁹. The interpretation of Islam by esoteric teaching like Rumi, Ibn Arabi and Nasafi⁶⁰ as diverse forms of understanding Islamic religion presented by the program at the workshops is also sometimes omitted by participants. Few participants now demand that Sufis are not representing "pure Islam"!⁶¹

Concerning the fundamentalism in Islam, modern theorists and already mentioned

⁵⁸ INTRODUCTION TO HUMANITIES, p. 100

⁵⁹ "It is wrong, it is impossible, Ibn Rushd is not right!"- noted one trainer (H.E) during the workshop and the interview; "Reconciling Science and Religion is not possible", -noted some scholar in Academy of Science in Tajikistan.

⁶⁰ Negotiating Human Nature, UCA, AKHP, 2008;

⁶¹ AKHP workshop in Dushanbe, 2010.

Muslim scholar Abdulkarim Sourush (1945, Iran, USA) categorizes the all affiliated with Islam movements, gives definition to the fundamentalist, notes that they are ‘*that group of people with totally traditionalist mentalities, but use modern tools*’.⁶² But the mentality is not the only important characteristic of fundamentalism; more precisely, it is also the lack on historic approach and method: so, it is “*the movement that has no understanding of historicity*’ – he notes. This is the main point connected our debates within the workshop with fundamentalist feelings. In this regards many participants of AKHP workshops including universities in Astana (Kazakhstan), after the reading and discussion on the article on Qur’an claimed that there is no place for Reason or Historical endeavors in religion, ‘it should be just Faith’⁶³ and that’s all.

The peculiarity of AKHP integrated curriculum is that, as we noted, you can find thesis and anti-thesis for these kinds of traditionalist and fundamentalist approaches directly from the same or another course books, the opinions, different interpretations of Qur’an are useful for challenging existing dogmatic interpretations of Islam in the region.

Reading the text of Muhammad Iqbal, supporting rational discourses within Islam, changed opinions of the participants during discussion, inspiring them to switch their mind, rethinking on rational capacity within Islam. It was strong argument of Iqbal that there were hundreds of theological schools interpreting Islam and Qur’an during the history. Muhammad Iqbal himself condemned dogmatism in Islam and considered the fatalistic interpretations of Islam as one of the main reasons and factors for decline of Muslim civilization together with exercising colonial politics. Another modern Muslim thinker is Muhammad Arkoun, who invites all sides of rethinking Islam and Islamic reason, successfully using methods of modern social sciences and humanities on studying Islam, like structuralism, constructivism, post-structuralism, semiotics, structural anthropology, discourse analysis for understanding Islam⁶⁴.

The experience of working in the field and feedbacks of workshop participants show

⁶² Democracy, Justice, Fundamentalism and Religious Intellectualism, An interview with Abdulkarim Sorush by Ali Asghar Seyyedaabadi, November 2005, at Participation Pront: Hanouz.com;

⁶³ Conversation with faculty of Philosophy (U.S.) in Astana, December, 2008

⁶⁴ Burhan Schawi, Mohammed Arkoun , A Modern Critic of Islamic Reason, Quanta de. 2005. These methods which successfully used by M. Arkoun.

that demand for rationalistic discourse among the scholars, faculties, not just on religions, but also on traditions and cultures in the region are tremendously important. During the trainings participants become supporters of modernist interpretations switching from dogmatic interpretations to moderate or liberal. One report on the workshop informs that the majority of participants, especially girls, were disagreeing with Toby Lester⁶⁵, but they agreed with other Muslim modernists. Some of them now think that different interpretations are very useful for our society. Knowledge on such skills of interpretation is presented for them for the first time⁶⁶. We think that narrow form of interpretation of religion does not allow such people to find justification for social activities within Muslim traditions following Hadiths from Prophet saying: *learning and teaching are more appreciated then praying*. Serving to people and contributing to society are equal to worshipping. The knowledgeable trainer, well equipped with new teaching methodology can persuade such participants that teaching students in nowadays is not less important than worshipping.

There can be plenty of topics for discussions on Islam during the workshops depending on the audiences. The issue of polygamy is also one of the topics for the debate usually brought by participants and people, who are interpreting the sources traditionally/literary think that polygamy accepted by Qur'an⁶⁷. Rizo Aslan (USA), the author of the book "*No God but God*" where he discusses the issue of polygamy in Islam as well, and where the author proves that logically polygamy is not allowed in Qur'an⁶⁸. Free from the ideological concerns researches are important for Central Asia, since there is direct link between Reason and Freedom which is well studied by modern scholar of Islam Abdukarim Souroush⁶⁹.

New era of the globalization brought two types of new knowledge to Central Asia: new concepts on Social Sciences and Humanities with new methodology of teaching as a part of humanities, and the new knowledge on Islam. Surprisingly currently both of these come from Western countries, although not always. In this term, integrated Curriculum allows faculties to break boundaries of the humanities discipline, inspire them for creating new knowledge by

⁶⁵ Because of lack of critical readings.

⁶⁶ Workshop in Khujand, April 30- May 5, 2009

⁶⁷ Workshop for Qurgon-teppa State University, February 23-28, 2009

⁶⁸ Reza Aslan (2005), *No God but God*, the origin, evolution and future of Islam, London.

⁶⁹ Adolkarim Soroush (2000), *Reason, Freedom and Democracy in Islam*, Oxford, University Press,

avoiding fragmentation of cultures and segregation of knowledge, and integrating people.

3. CONCLUSIONS: PROMISING PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION AND GOOD NEIGHBORHOOD

Central Asia extremely needs on cultivating of pluralistic models and multicultural programs. Of course, the program does not teach students to tolerate everything, even the extreme form of human expressing: first of all the program does not tolerate views that are not able to tolerate others. Sessions and all activities perform in a way of rationalistic discourse and the 'power of the best argument'⁷⁰ suggested by Habermas is the most preferable. The approach that established the program has trust on human development, as Habermas calls them '*homo democraticus*.' The communicative ethic and discourses are essential. Moreover, even inside of the particular topics of humanities and social sciences there are many visions, concepts and theories presenting different world wide views, including, for example: interpreting Space, Time, History, Self, Others etc. The skills of tolerance, accepting diversity and pluralism are currently very important for socio-economic development of the region as well.

Central Asian post-Soviet countries are in very closest neighbourhood and various forms of cooperations are increasing among them, including economy and culture. Let's see the last statistics for the smallest and biggest economy of Central Asian countries, namely Tajikistan and Kazakhstan: According to Sharif Said, the Chairman of Commerce Chamber (CCI) RT annual trade between China and the Republic of Tajikistan is more than \$ 1 billion. But According to Reuters (ALMATY, Feb 15) Kazakhstan's foreign trade surplus grew 72 percent to \$50 billion in 2011 from \$29.1 billion in 2010, the State Statistics Agency said on Wednesday. Exports, predominantly oil and metals, rose by 48 percent to \$88.1 billion in 2011. Imports rose by 25 percent to \$38.0.^{xviii}, see:⁷¹

⁷⁰ Habermas J. Moral consciousness and Communicative Action. Cambridge, Mass. 1993//Б. Флипберг (2000). Хабермас и Фуко- теоретики гражданского общества, стр. 128

⁷¹TABLE-Kazakhstan's 2011 trade surplus soars to \$50 bln, see:

<http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/15/kazakhstan-trade-idUSL5E8DF05N20120215>

Central Asian- China trade relations are important especially for the west parts of China. If we see the statistics regarding Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region according local government the foreign trade of northwest China grew about 33 percent year-on year in 2011. Xinjiang, the relatively undeveloped desert region due to the great push of the government of China since 2010 is transforming into a regional economic hub.⁷² It confirmed by recent statistics.^{xix}

It is well-known fact that every well-established economical and technological endeavour with the purpose of development fails, if it will not followed by education, inter-cultural cooperation, face to face human interaction. Cultural development will inspire and cement economical growth. Central Asia was the hub of ancient Silk Road in the past. Due to some historical reason it lost that strategic position for few resent years. But it should be again reintegrated to that universal global cultural and human interconnectedness.⁷³

There are also some new hopes for cultural and economic reintegration of Central Asian countries, including Tajikistan and Badakhshan with both sides, the Tajik and Afghan Badakhshans which AKDN is doing in close collaboration with two neighboring states and officials: "...Indeed such a investment would connect China to Kabul through Tajikistan, opening new trade corridors. That will inevitably have social and economic fall-out benefits for the communities and the country as a whole"⁷⁴. The creating of University of Central Asia initiated by the Presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and His Highness of Aga Khan also serves the purpose of regional cooperation and integration.^{xx} The overall process of integration and cross-border cooperation between two sides is under way. The same forms of activities are possible with the border areas and population of China.

The origin of such debate on the process of re-integration of different forms of identities is old: it is about how to maintain the local, traditional cultures in front of new trends of practicing faith. These new trends are getting much support due to geopolitical interests and lack of socio-economical opportunities among the youths and go against the ideas of diversity

⁷² Xinjiang foreign trade rises 33% in 2011, see:
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2012-02/09/content_14568305.htm

⁷³ For more please see: *Sunatullo Jonboboev*, Sharofat Mamadambarova. The term Silk Road: *chakhma.narod.ru/eng/silkroad/silkroad.htm*;

⁷⁴ His Highness the Aga Khan's Statement at the London Conference on Afghanistan (2009), See: Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) website.

and pluralistic culture as well as of tolerance in religious practices. In this paper we discussed and explained what are the political, economical, geo-strategic premises behind this increasing polarization and the reflect how new educational programs with intercultural and interdisciplinary approaches, suggested by University of Central Asia (UCA), can contribute to the process of avoiding such extreme, purist forms of social and cultural development. The strength of education can be to propose viable alternatives for the reorganization and development of societies. As response to the needs and willingness of local countries for new regional cooperation, revival of prototypes of old Silk Road the efforts civic organizations, like AKDN, the University of Central Asia and others for establishing platform for the development of regional economies, enhancing human resources establishing cross-border cooperation in education, health, trade, enterprises etc., now with the involvement of two countries Tajikistan and Afghanistan and in future for further cooperation, in case of possible connection of Afghanistan with China through Tajikistan etc., all of it can be promising in regards of promotion peace, stability and development in this region.

Referring to the theories we can say that today there is tensions between two concepts in modern world for foundation of civil society, and the role of civic education in it: one is to create it through consensus, and another is going through conflict. The first is presented by Habermas which is based on Kant's philosophy of moral, and another presented by Foucault based on the philosophy of real history of Nietzsche. Both these theories are oppositional; they have to be integrated and combined: we can agree with Habermas that people generally are '*homo democraticus*', which means 'democratic creations'. They can always come to any kind of agreement and consensus and act accordingly. But, unfortunately, in reality it is not always like that. Many things in this life depend on people, who are in power. Power, as Foucault thinks not always follows the rules, it breaks them constantly, and that is why your demand will not come to be true just through compromises. We see how complicated are the issues and even discussions on protection of the rights of cultural, ethnical, religious minorities, the gender discussions (the role of women in society), the issue of pluralism, exaggerated version of nationalism, fundamentalism and anti-globalism in Central Asia. Just

ignoring the conflicts will be not be productive nowadays; there is a need for real actions and trainings on interdisciplinary integrated humanities, help them to think for themselves, independently, prepare them for rich and diverse life.

Obviously, the democratic system has rather kind of declarative existing without wide support of public and population in the region. But for establishing good (civil) society there is a need for well developed thinking capacity in Central Asia, the Power of Rational Discourses and debates, including the areas and the topics which are for now considered as a 'taboo'. There is a belief among the intellectuals that you can integrate different views and test them for credibility through rational discourse. Strengthening analytical skills also can help to avoid created image of Dark Others (other ethnics, other religion, other nations, gender, races etc.) and radical forms of interpreting.

NOTES:

ⁱ The ethnic origin of Al Farabi still is debatable. First historical sources call him with Sogdian/Iranian origins, the later historian suggest his Turk origins. Even so, all his education which he got and life he spent were rooted in Bukhara, Bagdad, the center of Bagdad's khalifat and his entire books he wrote in Arabic. No nations with such names in Central Asia in that time, all of them were called as Muslims (Tajik and Turks).

ⁱⁱ During our meeting one rector of partner-university in Tajikistan even suggested AKHP to propagate the ideas, the speeches and the works of the ruling president.

ⁱⁱⁱ Meschetians, the ethnic group originally from the Georgia, but deported by Stalin during the Second World War) to Central Asia.

^{iv} 12 years of functioning of AKHP in Central Asia shows that the integration of suggested new curriculum into the state approved one is not easy job.

^v The problem of current deportation of Roma from France show the uncompleted work of nation-state in this country: they ignore the fact that European Union has a two-tier citizenship policy; US Jewish leader Rabbi Jonathan B. Freirich and Hindu statesman Rajan Zed are among those calling for sanctions against a policy they believe is both racist and an affront to human dignity: Collective deportations were blatant discrimination and smelled of xenophobia, racism, and intolerance, they continued, bitterly criticising the "military-style" bulldozing of Roma settlements// <http://www.ekklesia.co.uk/node/12984>

^{vi} Sarts - the common name for settled population (not nomads), mainly Tajiks and Uzbeks of Fergana valley before the Russian Revolution.

^{vii} Making very brief scanning of AKHP text-books, one during workshops came to conclusion that AKHP wants to "destroy local national heritages". According to him the national heritage of Tajiks in Badakhshan mainly consists of two mixed ideology: Islam and Communism! "We have no right to critic both Kur'an and Lenin"- pointed Sh., the linguist, scholar from Humanities Institute in Khorog. "If we do so, it means that we are destroying our history and traditions".^{vii}

^{viii} The notion to take the land is contradicting: The question sought as a stupid from the view of the past now is undoubted: to whom belongs the land? Naturally to both, Kyrgyzs and Uzbeks, since both of them are citizens of this country and sharing this land for centuries, also to Tajiks, the most settled nation in this region as well as others who come to this area recently?

^{ix} For example, using Tajik language in many places of Uzbekistan now officially or not prohibited even in market, to sing Tajik song at weddings etc., many visitors of Tashkent confirm. Sadly, this happens to the people which according to the some experts might be closer to six million: See: Neil J. Melvin (2000), *Uzbekistan, the transition to authoritarianism on the Silk Road*, Harwood academic publishers, pp. 49-50;

^x Temur, the imperior of 15 century was free the racial, ethnic feelings, in his autobiography confessed that he

released 4000 Rumies (Bizantians Christians) and always protecting the lands of Turan and Movarannahr from the frequent raids of nomadic Uzbeks (!) in order to support justice. See: Автобиография Темура. The Institute of Temur: :Электронная библиотека (с) 2004: <http://bookZ.ru/> (in Russian).

^{xi} Shash-Maqam, the traditional classic songs which were mainly consisted of Persian poets, like Hafiz, Rumi, with mixed some Turki Sufi poems, but in 20 c. they 'purified' them by replacing Turki poems only).

^{xii} As an example one the host person added: "Yes, it is normal; we have to get rid of Soviet maxim that each cook can rule the government. In future we would have family of the doctors, family of businessmen, the clan of publishers, the clan of farmers. The same we can observe even in the West where the power belongs to the strong clans and families". From the concluding speech by Suhrob Sharipov at the conference "*The tradition and democratization process in Tajikistan*" organized by the Center Strategic Studies under the President of Tajikistan, 21-22 June 2010, Dushanbe.

^{xiii} According to the data available in media, for instance, in Tajikistan now functioning 27 central mosques, 325 general mosques, and 3334 Friday mosques. If we calculate this statistics in another way Tajikistan with more than 7.5 million population has one mosque for each 2 thousand citizens.

^{xiv} Presentation of research finding conducted by some former AKHP partners with collaboration with TCF (the Christensen Foundation) on sacred places in Central Asia (2007) raises some fundamentalist feeling among the audience and discussants. Worshipping mazars is '*shirk*^{xiv} in Islam' - demanding others, usually Muslim clerks, madrasa instructors, students and the young supporters of Salafis and Vakhabis).

^{xv} From the interview: "Mr. Turajonzoda, some days ago there was a preach by you and your brother in which you asked young Tajik people to suppress the atheists and Kafirs, although you know that it is abandoned by the sacred book Koran. Why you and your brother (Nuriddinjon) do not ask the young generation to study the modern sciences more, but asking them to pray more? Are you preparing the people for an Islamic revolution?"

Turajonzoda:

- You understood us in a wrong way. Conversely, it is people who asked us permission to suppress and make Jihad against the atheists, but we did not let them doing so. We only want the government and others who may want to suppress us, not to violate the Islamic and Sunni values that are namaz, hijab, ruza, etc."

^{xvi} There are several forms of Interpretation: Literal – the meaning is restricted to the minimum; example: the picture of Rene Magritte: "*This is not pipe*". [just picture]; Orthodox – one accepted meaning, example, the interpretation of *Shariah* (law); nevertheless, some modernizers and Islamic countries implemented modified interpretations of *Shariah* law; Liberal interpretation – the meaning can be stretched further, for example: the French Declaration of Man: - such right should be extended to women as well. Radical interpretation – reinterpretation based on different values. Example, the use of burqa... (now the face is covered, it is not hijab, the call of Qur'an on modestly dressed women;

^{xvii} Belboev (the participant of workshop in Dushanbe, 2005): "*Toby Lester is cheating when he is talking about the finding of ancient Qur'anic text: "why they could find them now, but not before"*"

^{xviii} China was Kazakhstan's largest export market last year, accounting for 18.5 percent of export revenues. Italy was second, with 17.1 percent, and Russia third with 8.5 percent.

Russia accounted for 42.8 percent of all of Kazakhstan's imports in 2011, followed by China with 13.2 percent and Germany with 5.5 percent.

^{xix} "Xinjiang exported \$16.8 billion worth of goods last year, up nearly 30 percent from a year earlier while importing nearly \$6 billion worth of goods, rising 44 percent year-on-year, according to statistics released by the regional customs bureau. Kazakstan remained Xinjiang's largest trading partner last year, while trade with five central Asian states -- Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan -- accounted for 78 percent of Xinjiang's foreign trade in 2011, the data shows.

^{xx} The University includes 3 campuses in 3 sites which means 3 purpose-built residential campuses planning to be with modern facilities including international-class libraries, laboratories, and athletic facilities in following fields- Undergraduate School (incl. Preparatory), 2) Graduate School, 3) School of Professional and Continuing Education, 4) Central Asian Faculty Development, 5) Research and Humanities. All of them will be equipped

modern parks and with modern telecommunication and transportation infrastructure. Now UCA is implementing School of Professional and Continuing Education in three countries of Central Asia (SPCE), in Khorog, the Tajik city in Badakhshan and Cross-Border Vocational Education (CVEB) for Afghan Badakhshan, in the city of Faizabad. Statistics: 90 students from Afghan Badakhshan visited Khorog attending English, Computer technology and Vocational training in 2011. 270 Tajik Afghan students were attending such training inside of their country, in other side of Panj river (Amu-Darya) vocational training by University of Central Asia.

REFERENCES

- Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN), 2009. *His Highness the Aga Khan's Statement at the London Conference on Afghanistan*.
- Allworth, E.A., 1990. *The Modern Uzbeks, From the Fourteenth Century to the Present: A Cultural History*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press.
- Anderson, B., 1996. *Imagined Communities, Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London and New York: Verso.
- Aslan, R., 2005. *No God but God, the origin, evolution and future of Islam*. London: Rand House.
- Bregel, Y., 1996. *Notes on the study of Central Asia*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Esposito, J.L., 1992. *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* New York: Oxford University Press.
- Habermas, J., 1993. *Moral consciousness and Communicative Action*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Habermas, J., 1998. *The Inclusion of the Other*. Cambridge and Maldon: Polity Press.
- Human Right Watch. *Где справедливость? Межнациональные столкновения на юге Киргизии в июне 2010 г.* [online] Available at:
<<http://www.hrw.org/ru/reports/2010/08/16>> [Accessed 7 August 2012].
- Jonboboiev, S., 2011. Integrated Curriculum and the Tide of Anti-globalism in Central Asia: the Battle between “You” and “Me”. *Sino-US English Teaching*, 7(8), p.413-423.
- Keshawjee, R., 2008. The Faith and Culture: Tradition and Change. University of Central Asia, the Aga Khan Humanities Project, Dushanbe, p.115.
- Laruelle, M., 2007. The Return of the Arian Myth: Tajikistan in search of the Secularized National Ideology. *Nationalities Papers*, 35(1), pp.51-70.
- Lewis, B., 1988. *The Political Language of Islam*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Melvin, N.J., 2000. *Uzbekistan: the transition to authoritarianism on the Silk Road*. Amsterdam: Harwood academic publishers.
- Oliver Roy. The New Central Asia. The Creation of Nation, p. 102.
- Schoeberline-Engel, J., 1996. *The Prospects for Uzbek National Identity*. Washington, D.C.:

National Council for Soviet and East European Research.

Soroush, A., 2000. *Reason, Freedom and Democracy in Islam*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Soroush, A., 2005. *Democracy, Justice, Fundamentalism and Religious Intellectualism* Interviewed by Ali Asghar Seyyedaabadi. [online] Available at: <<http://nawaat.org/portail/2006/01/13/democracy-justice-fundamentalism-and-religious-intellectualism/>> [Accessed 17 August 2012].

Schawi, B. and Arkoun, M., 2005. A Modern Critic of Islamic Reason. *Quanta de*.

Доклад. Хроника насилия. *События июня 2010 г. на юге Кыргызстана*. [online] Available at: <<http://www.memo.ru/uploads/files/774.pdf>> [Accessed 17 August 2012].

Гарри, К., 2009. *Национальное государство в глобальную эпоху/ «Россия в глобальной политике», №5, Сентябрь-Октябрь 2009*. [online] Available at: <<http://globalaffairs.ru/numbers/40/12759.html>> Последнее обновление 14 ноября 2009, 16:26 [Accessed 17 August 2012].

Кабылбеков, М., 2010. *Столкновение узбекской и кыргызской идентичностей [The clash of Uzbek and Kyrgyz identities]*. [online] Available at: <<http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1282226580>> [Accessed 26 July 2010].

Флипберг, Б., 2000. Хабермас и Фуко- теоретики гражданского общества. [online] Available at: <<http://ecsocman.hse.ru/data/218/013/1220/015.FLYVBJERG.pd>> [Accessed 10 May 2010].

Comparative Analysis of the Image of the Stranger in Chinese and Russian Discourse

Anna Romanova
Astrakhan State University
Email: aromanova_mail@mail.ru

Olesia Yakushenkova
Astrakhan State University
Email: gensounohana@mail.ru

The Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China are two countries with one main with similar multiple ethnic populations. More than 170 ethnic groups live in Russia. There are 21 ethnic republics that is one forth of all administrative subjects of Russia. Besides that there are 5 autonomous okrugs and oblasts (autonomous regions). Though the main ethnic group in Russia is Russians, 20 % of all population of the Federations are different non-Russian ethnic groups. Among them there is a lot of groups of Turkish, Iranian, Slavonian and Finno-Ugrian origins. More than 190 languages are spoken in Russia. More than 50 minority languages are used in 1350 newspapers, 300 TV channels and 250 radio stations.

As we know the situation with China in this question is very similar. There are 91 % of the Han population in the People's Republic of China and 9 % constitutes different ethnic groups. The Chinese Government officially accepts 56 ethnic groups in the Republic. More than 230 languages are spoken on the territory of the People's Republic of China.

That's all makes our situation unique. Russia and China have to solve a very difficult situation of balancing between unity and multiplicity, between monoethnic state (with dominance of one ethnic group) and the existence of many different ethnic minorities that very often are not minorities at all. For example the number of the Tartars in the Russian Federation is more than 5,5 millions, that is more than a population of such states as Finland, Kyrgyzstan, Norway, Turkmenistan, Moldavia and many-many others. The Ukrainians living on the territory of Russia enumerate about 3 million, the Bashkir – 1.6 million, etc.

The situation with some Chinese minorities is even more vivid – many ethnic non-Han groups are very numerous. For example, the Zhuang people enumerate more than 16 million (2000), the Manchu – 10.6 million, the Hui – 9.8, the Miao – 8.9, etc. There is no need to explain that the number of these groups more than the population of many states in Europe.

There is also no need to explain that the population in both countries belongs to different races and anthropological types, the economic differences of those numerous groups also varies greatly: hunters, gathers, shepherds, gardeners, horticulturists, industrial workers, etc. Each group has its own traditions, religious beliefs, vestimental and alimental characteristics which differ this group from another.

It is very interesting to note that the Russian and Chinese history has a lot of similar moments especially in the fact of relations with many other ethnic groups. In the period of Middle Ages Russia (in the same mode as China) had to find some effective means for relations with some tribes that threatened them. The Russians and Chinese people had to elaborate special tactics to deal with such ethnic groups. As a rule many of these groups were considered to be barbarians and due to this fact our ancestors built special methods of communications with them: military attacks, collaborations (very often against other barbarians), dynasty marriages, commercial influences, gift-exchanges and many-many other methods to protect themselves from these groups. There is no need to mention that the Chinese even had to build the Great Wall to separate those people from Chinese territory. The grapheme “wall” we find even in the character of the word “State” (国) where the character “Treasure” (玉) or “King” (王) is closed within the squared territory. The self-identification as a center of the world and an appeal to some sacred symbol is equal to both our countries. The image of China as a center is expressed in its name Zhong Guo (中国) (Callahan 2010, 133-135) . In the Russian history we know a lot of times when the capital of Russia was looked at by the Russians as a center of the world, or the place of maximal sacredness. From time to time Moscow or the whole Russian country was defined as the Second Babylon or the Third Rome.

All these symbols had to make an impression about Moscow as a real center of the Christian World, a place that inherited the Christian principles and Christian rights to

enlighten other people.

In reality all these ideas reflected another idea of world dichotomy: civilization and barbarity. At the same time there are a lot of differences in the meaning and forms of this dichotomy. Some roots of this differences are hidden in Russian history when Russia was Christianized in the Xth Century. Discussing this moment the head of the Russian orthodox church patriarch Kirill, evaluating the contribution of saints Cyril and Methodius in the education of the Slaves explained in an interview to the television channel "Russia" on September 21, 2010: "But who were the Slavs?" – the patriarch asked himself and answered: "The barbarians, people talking in a strange language, they were the people of the second grade, they were almost beasts. And then the enlightened men came to them, gave them the light of the Christ's truth and did something very important - they began to speak with these barbarians in their language, they created the Slavic alphabet and Slavic grammar and translated the Word of God into their language"¹. Of course, the patriarch did not want to offend anybody, he even explained later, that, by inheriting the tradition of the saint Cyril and Methodius, the Russian Orthodox Church looks to all peoples as equal, without making any distinctions. But at the same time Christianity built a new world picture to new Christianized Russian. They learnt that before they had been barbarians but since that moment they became civilized. They learnt also that they were surrounded by barbarians. Before that moments many Russians Principles didn't look at other non-Russian ethnic groups as barbarians. An example of Igor Svyatoslavich the Brave's life (1151-1202) is a good example of such types of relations with some nomadic tribes that lived close to the borders of Russian Kingdom. His military company against the nomadic tribe of Turkish origin – the Cumans was described in a well known poem "The Song of Igor's Campaign". During his raid to Cuman territory the Igor's troops were surrounded by Cuman's army and destroyed. Igor and his son were captured and spent some time at the camp of his enemy Cuman Khan Konchac. The fact that Igor started his military campaign against the Cumans has nothing in common with the idea that Igor looked at them as barbarians. Igor's mother was the Cuman, when he was in

¹ 'An interview with the head of the Russian orthodox church patriarch Kirill to the television channel "Russia" on 21 September 2010' Viewed 29 June 2011, <<http://www.pravda-tv.ru/2010/12/02/5227>>

captivity he married his son with the daughter of the Cuman's Khan Konchak. That meant that his grand-sons were more Cumans than Russians. At the same time Konchak – the fathers of the Igor's daughter-in-law was a half-Cuman and a half-Georgian. Reading the Poem about the Igor's misfortune we don't find any words about the Cumans as barbarians or the Strangers. They were enemies, very often cruel and bloody but they were equal to Russians. But other Russian princes could be also enemies, and the Cumans became friends or even relatives.

Time passed and the idea of Moscow state as a civilized center surrounded by barbarians occupied the highest place in Russian minds. There were two causes of that. One of them was connected with the dichotomy we discussed already – Christianity/Paganism. The word 'pagan' (from latin. Paganos) got special meaning in Russian language and began to signify 'dirty', 'unclean', 'nasty', etc.

The second cause was very understandable to the Chinese people – the Russian State was occupied by the Mongolian Batu Khan. Many cities were destroyed and millions of Russian people killed. The Mongolians had been ruling Russia since 1237 till 1480. Since that time the Moscow kingdom began to grow and occupy the leading position among other Russian kingdoms. It is obvious that during this time the former Mongolian Oppression and the victory over them influenced self-identification of the new nation – Russia or Muscovy. Since that time the dichotomy between barbarians (Tartars, Mongols) began to play a leading role in Russian mentality. And after the fall of Constantinople – the capital of Byzantium Empire in 1453 brought to life an idea that the aim of the new Russian State was save Christianity in the world. By the year 1480 Russians succeeded in ending the long rule of Mongolian khans over Russian territory, the Great Russian Tsar Ivan the III ("gatherer of the Russian lands") could triple the Russian territory returning the lost Russian national spirit of self-esteem. Since that time the main marker of Russian identification became the idea of religious (Orthodox Christian) superiority over other people. Of course there was nothing extraordinary about that. The national superiority can be found in the history of many nations. We can mention the Manifest Destiny in the United States of American that should explain to Americans in the first half of the 19th century their right to occupy the territory of Native

American tribes or Mexican lands. The English Lord George Macartney, who led the British diplomatic mission to the Qing court in 1793, was granted the status of "a tributary from the English country". Any ambassador, who came to the Chinese emperor with gifts, was regarded as bringing tribute from vassal states. The fact that the British were perceived by the Chinese as barbarians, found its evidence not only in their pejorative name (Foreign Devils) (Lafayette De Mente 2000, p. 145), but also in emphasized declaration that China, being a great country, needed nothing: "Our Celestial Empire possesses all the necessary in abundance and does not need than anything within our borders. Therefore, there is no need to import barbaric goods in exchange for ours. But as tea, silk and porcelain are essential to European nations and to you, we allow you to export them through Canton in small quantities" (Russell 2007, p. 50). The final lines of the letter of the Chinese Emperor to George III indicated clearly that the Europeans to the Chinese were only subordinate barbarians: "Tremble and obey, without negligence, this further command!" (Ibid).

We could enumerate a lot of examples of such behavior and all they will demonstrate the same pattern.

But now we would like to discuss quite a different mode of mentality formed in Russia in the beginning of the 20th century. Suddenly the barbarians stopped to be looked at as enemies or strangers. They were identifies as Russians. The Scythians and the Huns in that time became the symbols of liberty and renovation.

The Silver Age of Russian culture was replete with a new symbol of a barbarian, which has positive connotations. Among them we can name the well-known Russian poets Vyacheslav Ivanov ("Nomads of Beauty", 1904), Valery Bryusov (The Coming Huns", 1905), Alexander Blok ("The Scythians", 1918). If a poem by Alexander Blok was drawn to the West, which was opposed to the "New Scythia", the poetic "manifesto" of V. Ivanov and V. Bryusov were a kind of an appeal to the barbarians:

And from your expanse
Ride your whirlwind hordes
On the Servitude on the fields,
Where a slave is proud with his yoke.
Trample down their paradise, Attila! -
And by the virgin soil of voids
Ascend thy heavenly bodies,
Thy flowers of the steppes.

Vyacheslav Ivanov. "Nomads of Beauty" (1993, p. 237)

Spiritual freedom and liberty of the nomads are opposed to a civilization of slavery. The Huns, as bearers of destructive forces, act in this verses as a creative force:

Where are you the coming Huns?
Who as a cloud hanging over the world!
I hear the sound of your iron steps
Over the undiscovered Pamir Mountain.
As a drunken horde you
Fall on us from dark camps -
Revive the decrepit body
By a wave of flaming blood.

V. Brusov. "The Coming Huns". (1961, p. 278)

It doesn't matter in what way we can interpret the metaphor of the Scythians and the Huns, one thing is clear: the barbarians in this case were not regarded in that period as a tragedy for Russia. To the contrary, both poets perceived nomads in the romantic style, accepting them as symbols of renewal, beauty and freedom. In this eschatological impulse the barbarians were delivered with the most important messianic task of destroying the old world and recreate the world of the new – with new axiological parameters:

Place, the slaves of the Will
Your Tents near the palaces, as it had been,
Grow a merry field
In the place of the throne rooms.
Throw the book into bonfires
Dance in their joyous lights,
Create your sins in the temple -
You are all innocent, like children!

V. Brusov. "The Coming Huns". (1961, p. 278)

The coming of Socialist Revolution changed the meaning of the Stranger, Barbarian or the Other. The ethnic identification was changed by social identification. The Bolsheviks brought with them a new slogan that destroying all previous patterns of national relation with the Stranger. The ethnic markers were changed by class (social) markers. This tendency made a very strange situation: from the one hand, the Bolsheviks had to substitute nationality or any ethnic markers by class markers, but from the other hand they had to combine the multi-ethnic state joining in territory many national republics where lived more than 100 ethnic groups. They proclaimed the development of each ethnic group and at the same time were building a new social-cultural unity – The Soviet People who should have no ethnic characteristics. But all that slogans and ideas couldn't destroy the image of the Stranger in Soviet discourse. After the Second World War it was constantly occupied by the image of the Fascists or any class enemy.

The Perestroika that began in the 80-s of the 20th century changed again the situation. The social structure of the Russian society changed greatly, many ethnic groups who were looked at as friends or aliens since that time became enemies. The social and economic instability brought to life a new image of the Stranger or the Barbarian. If in the previous period the Religion played no role in the Soviet life the Post-soviet period in Russia showed a great desire to identify themselves as Orthodox Christians. Of course it lead to some

destructive situations because the Christians were the most numerous group in Russia but not alone. There are still a lot of Muslims, Buddhists, etc. In this situation the Russian society found itself not ready to accept this multi-ethnic and multi-religious plurality.

Analyzing modern Chinese discourse we find quite a different situation. The religions had no meaning for the identification of Chineseness. What is more important in this situation: anthropological type, food, costume?

Being isolated from other/another world, the Chinese tried to realize their “Chineseness”, developing the idea of national identity, which included, from the point of view of the Confucian philosophy, the various categories. One of them was the level of culture which assumed knowledge of the Chinese writing, the ritual, compliance with the standards of morality, etc. One of the national markers met very often in many Chinese films is the Beijing opera.

It is very interesting that modern creators of artistic discourse define the opera as one of the key points and a main indicator of the “Chineseness”. Describing a barbarian or a Stranger Chinese directors very often emphasize in their films the impossibility of the Stranger to understand the greatness of the Chinese opera. In these films the opera is a marker that allows to distinguish the Chinaman from a barbarian. In the movie "Farewell my concubine" (1993 , directed by Chen Kaige), one of the characters, pronounce the following words: "If you are a man, you go to the opera. Pigs and dogs do not listen to the opera. If you don't go to the opera, you're not a man!". In the TV series "Seven swords" (2005-2006, directed by Clarence Fok Yiu-leung) one of the main characters (the Manchurian general), while killing an opera singer, says that the Chinese traditional opera is meaningless. The combination of his cruelty and impossibility to understand the highest level of culture vividly demonstrate to us the meaning of this national marker to the audience. On the same level the film producers put the General's bloodthirstiness and his impossibility to understand art. This can demonstrate only one thing that in this character we see not a human but a beast.

Returning to the Russian discourse we would like to tell that we couldn't find similar markers that would put the Russian high culture (art, literature, films, etc) on the level of national identification.

We hope that this short analysis will help us to understand better the roots of formation of these national models of identification.

REFERENCES

- ‘An interview with the head of the Russian orthodox church patriarch Kirill to the television channel "Russia" on 21 September 2010’ Viewed 29 June 2011, <<http://www.pravda-tv.ru/2010/12/02/5227>>.
- Callahan, W. A., 2010. *China: the pessimist nation*. Oxford University Press.
- Lafayette, De Mente B., 2000. *The Chinese Have a Word for It: The Complete Guide to Chinese Thought and Culture*. New York, McGraw-Hill.
- Russell, B., 2007. *The Problem of China*. New York: Cosimo, Inc.
- Valeriy, B., 1961. *Stihotvorenia I poemy*. Moscow: Sovetsky pisatel.
- Vyacheslav I., 1993. ‘Nomads of beauty’ in *Russkaya poezia serebryanogo veka, 1890-1917*. Moscow: Nauka.

European Entertainment Culture in the Concessions of Late Qing Dynasty

Christine Howald
Tsinghua University
Email: c.howald@gmx.de

INTRODUCTION

When Europeans came to China in the middle of 19th century, they brought along their own traditions of daily life and leisure activities, which were inspired by the new spirit of contemporary urban development in Europe. At the same time, they were confronted – often for the first time in their life – with foreign customs, culture and environment – Chinese as well as from other Western nationalities who shared with them work and life in the foreign concessions.

Most of the Europeans who came to China in that time were traders or representatives of foreign companies. Many others worked for the Chinese government or were part of the diplomatic corps of their country.¹ Robert Löbbecke, a German working for the Chinese military in Nanjing from 1895-1900, described his contemporaries as follows: “There are without exception men, whose exuberant urge for adventures did not fit into the limited German living conditions or even for whom the German soil had become to hot. (...) For all of them, the material interest in being in China is very obvious”.²

This paper will explore the daily life of the Europeans in 19th century China with a special focus on the question how they spent their leisure time. It is of historical significance from two perspectives: On the one hand, the way the foreigners lived their lives in China at that time shaped Chinese perceptions of the West until today. On the other hand, the

¹ Besides, many missionaries operated in the country, but this paper will not focus on them.

² Löbbecke (1982, p.89f.): “Es sind hier ausnahmslos Herren, für deren üppige Unternehmungslust die engen Verhältnisse in Deutschland nicht passend waren oder sogar, denen der deutsche Boden vielleicht zu heiß unter den Füßen geworden ist. (...) Für alle ist das materielle Interesse ein unangenehm berührender springender Punkt”.

experiences Europeans recorded in letters, books or articles shaped the view on China in their home countries. It was the first time that numerous and comprehensive reports about China reached Europe.

Taking the example of Tianjin and mainly based on the letters of Georg Baur, representative for the German company Krupp in China (railway) who first stayed in Tianjin from 1890 to 1893,³ the following questions will be explored: How did the Europeans structure and organize their leisure time? How did European traditions and visions change within the cultural environment of the concessions? How did the close cooperation and cohabitation of people from different European countries (and America) in the concessions lead to the emergence of a “western” culture in Asia? And what significance did the entertainment culture cultivated by the Europeans in China have for their socialisation abroad?

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONCESSIONS IN TIANJIN

By the end of the 19th century, the foreign concessions in China were in a permanent phase of growth, including the quantitative extension of the community as well as the moving in of other than the main treaty powers Britain, America and France. After the opening of five treaty ports according to the treaty of Nanjing after 1842 in Canton, Amoy (Xiamen), Fuzhou, Ningbo and Shanghai, more and more ports opened to foreigners.⁴ Tianjin was one of them.

The city has traditionally been the port of Beijing, located 120 km northwest of Tianjin and gained historical significance because of its strategic geopolitical position. It had to open its gates to foreign settlers in 1860. The establishment of the British and French concession

³ Georg Baur came back to China in 1895 as an associate of H. Mandl & Co, the Krupp agency in China. He lived in China as a merchant until 1906. He left a rich collection of letters, treasured at the *Historisches Archiv Krupp* in Germany. A considerable part of his letters has been published by Elisabeth Kaske (Baur, 2005).

⁴ John King Fairbank speaks about „eventually more than 80“ (Fairbank, 1998, p. 201). Elisabeth Kaske (Baur, 2005, p. 21) mentions 92 cities declared treaty ports until the beginning of the First World War. But only a part of them played an important role for the foreign trade and emerged as concessions (Ibid.: „Dass nicht alle der geöffneten Vertragshäfen tatsächlich eine wichtige Rolle für den Außenhandel spielten zeigt die Tatsache, dass es 1915 nur in 48 dieser Häfen eine Zollstation gab“.)

marked the starting point for the Westernization of Tianjin that included the construction of railway, telecommunication and the forming of a mining industry: “Tianjin [then] became a major international trading city with shipping connections to all parts of Asia”.⁵ Nevertheless – compared to Shanghai – it remained a small foreign settlement until the turn of the century when more and more nations founded concessions here and children and wives followed the men to build up a life abroad. After 1895, concessions were ceded to Germany, Russia and Japan and “even countries that did not yet hold concessions elsewhere in China such as Austria-Hungary, Italy and Belgium all succeeded in establishing self-contained concessions with their own prisons, schools (...) and hospitals”.⁶ By 1902, nine nations cohabitated in Tianjin: British, French, Germans, Portuguese, Belgians, Italians, Austrian-Hungarians besides Japanese and Americans (although an American concession never existed).⁷ This makes Tianjin unique among all foreign settlements in China and of special interest for a research on European culture.

Regarding the foreign population of Tianjin before 1900, it is difficult to find reliable statistics. According to Georg Baur, the city counted approximately 620 westerners in 1892 (less than 300 of them British, approximately 100 French and 40-50 German, most of them men). After the turn of the century, in 1920, the official figures indicated the presence of 5.914 Europeans and Americans, 4.000 Japanese and 1.200 newly arrived Russians.⁸

THE APPEARANCE OF LEISURE TIME

The leisure time of these Europeans was embedded in the social life and obligations of the community. Every newcomer had to be welcomed by a visit and it was common practice to integrate him (or her) to the social life of the community. How did people spend their leisure time and where did they meet?

⁵ Marinelli, 2009, p. 399f.

⁶ Ibid., p. 400.

⁷ Woodhead, 1938, p. 194ff.

⁸ O.D. Rasmussen doubts the total figure's accuracy (11.114), and suggests approximately 15.000 foreigners (excluding troops) as more realistic (Rasmussen, 1925, p. 263).

Private houses

The most common way of spending leisure time were private get-togethers. They dominated the social life of Europeans in China. Westerners usually arrived with a bunch of introductions that embedded them into a social network right from the start. This network was in general related to their business. In small communities such as Tianjin, private and official life were closely related. As the communities were small and socially homogeneous, almost everyone was a potential business partner and informant.

Private meetings could include joint meals (from breakfast, the very popular second breakfast *Tiffin*, and lunch to dinner), games⁹, music sessions¹⁰, joint horse rides, excursions or even long trips. The get-togethers were characterized by an extensive consumption of food and alcohol and the tendency to spend a considerable part of the income on it. “The whole society (...) is living beyond their means”, is what Georg Baur found out soon after his arrival in Tianjin in December 1890.¹¹

Clubs

Besides meeting in private houses, clubs served as main places for the daily get-togethers. Following the Anglo-Saxon tradition, the mainly British Tientsin Club had been founded in 1886, followed by the international Union Club five years later in 1891. The Union Club closed its doors in 1896. The same year, the German Club Concordia opened its doors.¹²

⁹ There was a strong leaning towards gambling for money in the concessions. See for example Baur, 2005, p. 75.

¹⁰ Music had a special significance in the life of the foreigners. As odours in China differed much from the one in Europe, music – besides the consumption of familiar food and beverages – was one possibility to obtain a native sensation and to tighten the national identity abroad. Usually, people played and sang together after dinner. Beyond, they enjoyed it very much to hear professional Chinese musicians playing Western music. In most of the concessions bands with Chinese musicians and (at least at the beginning) a foreign bandmaster were founded such as the Public Band in Tianjin in 1886 (Chinese Times from November 20th, 1886, according to Kaske in: Baur, 2005, p. 107).

¹¹ Baur (2005, p. 149): “Die ganze Gesellschaft (...) lebt weit über ihre Verhältnisse. Das Resultat lässt sich denken. Alles will oben hinaus, einer überbietet den anderen, wie wenn er zuvor zu Haus in Europa nie weniger als sieben Gänge zu Mittag gegessen hätte“.

¹² Beyond, the Country Club opened in 1893 on the ground of the Race Course (Baur, 2005, p. 761).

The clubs served as the main meeting point of fellow countrymen as Löbbbecke points out in a letter to his mother in 1896: “Of course I met at that time most of the Germans in the German Club [of Shanghai]”.¹³ They served as the platform for representation. Even if club life contributed to the high costs of living abroad, a subscription to the local club was one of the social obligations of a Western man in China. Here, newcomers were introduced into the society and networks were built up. It was a place for consulting European newspapers, meeting people and getting all kind of information while having dinner or playing poker.

Clubs were exclusive places and showed the tendency to keep national borders. A wider and international public met at places outside. Different seasons brought along different kinds of leisure time activities:

Season cycle

Spring and autumn were the times of the annual horse races. Very soon after the establishment of an international settlement, a racecourse was normally founded. In Shanghai it opened its gates in 1862, the second Tianjin racecourse operated since 1886. As a subscription to the club, the participation at the seasonal races belonged to the social obligations of the western society in China. During the three days of races, people used to stop work and even the shops were closed after 10 am.¹⁴

Winter brought along all kind of indoor entertainment: It was the time of theatre performances, concerts and balls. Mainly the British founded literature circles and amateur dramatic clubs and brought together people from all nations during their performances. Even if there were far more men than women in Tianjin before the end of the century, balls dominated the winter season (e.g. Dec. 1890, ball at the German consul: 11 women, 50 men)¹⁵. The closing ball of the racing days in November opened the season, followed by a series of fancy balls until March or April. The balls served as an international space, an occasion for people from all nations to meet and mix.

¹³ Löbbbecke, 1982, p. 106.

¹⁴ Baur, 2005, p. 281.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 157.

In summer, Tianjin usually saw less social events as it was the main business time in the area that was isolated from the world in winter when cold and ice did not permit ships to approach the city. Besides business, it was the time for all kind of walks and sports outside – mainly horse riding and tennis.

A CHANGE OF EUROPEAN TRADITIONS AND VISIONS?

Given the variety of nations, there were of course numerous ways and traditions of spending leisure time in Europe at the time, Europeans founded concessions in China. Depending on to which nation someone belonged to, from which social class and gender he or she was (many of them just started to have some leisure time) or if it was a city dweller or someone from the countryside, habits could much vary. Private meetings always had been part of the European leisure time activities. In the cities, rich people also met in concert halls, theatres or literary salons. In winter, balls were held both in the cities and the countryside where also amateur theatre performances tried to divert people during the cold months. In summer, folk festivals attracted all kind of people. Besides, new tendencies are obvious in 19th century Europe where – due to the ongoing industrialisation and urbanisation – the cities went through a process of extreme transformation. The feminist movement opened the public sphere to women, the abolition of slavery and rise in socialism as an intellectual paradigm included the masses as part of the society and the technological and economical advances that began in the late 19th century paved the way for the arts and entertainment to have more of a mass audience in the 20th century. As a consequence, concert halls and theatres became accessible for the wider public, museums and parks opened its doors for everyone and circuses and amusement parks started to spread.¹⁶

How did European traditions and visions change within the cultural environment of the concessions? When studying the European entertainment culture in the 19th century foreign settlements in China the following three tendencies can be outlined.

First, due to the local conditions, European entertainment culture in 19th century China

¹⁶ See amongst others: Becker/Littmann/Niedbalski, 2011.

relied very much to the classical kinds of European entertainment. Meeting in private houses or in clubs did not demand for a wider entertainment infrastructure. People did not spend much effort in creating an exciting entertainment culture during their first years in China, when they had to build up new settlements and lives. To speak with Georg Baur again: “What I miss most here is a mental flexibility. Despite the apparent variety of activities, all is the same to me”.¹⁷ It took some years and the moving in of people of all sex and different social classes until variety of entertainment could develop in China.

Second, every nation stuck on its own traditions and sometimes even followed them stricter than at home. The celebration of national holidays is one main example for this. Of course all main Christian feasts such as Christmas, Easter or Pentecost had been celebrated according to national traditions. Beyond that, the birthday of the British Queen, the German emperor or even the chief of staff of the Prussian army Moltke were celebrated with much more effort than at home.

Third, the European traditions did apparently not change under the Asian influence. The European community did not adapt much from its Chinese environment. The contact with Chinese people was generally limited to official banquettes and meetings. While at the beginning of their stay, the foreigners generally were still curious about the food and course of a banquette, they soon strongly felt the cultural gap between their own and the Chinese habits (food itself, noise, the way they got food from others by the use of their chopsticks) and were happy to avoid participating: “I wish for not having to attend another Chinese diner anymore”.¹⁸ This was what Georg Baur confessed to his family after a couple of month in Tianjin.

Other forms of Chinese entertainment (I am not talking about meeting the fair sex) were enjoyed very rarely. Only out of curiosity, almost everyone visited a Chinese theatre at least once during his stay in China. The experience they made here was very different from what they were used to. What they suffered from was the smoke, strange odour and noise. Beyond, it was hard for them to enjoy Chinese music and to follow a performance given in Chinese.

¹⁷ Baur, 2005, p. 275.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 213.

RISE OF A “WESTERN CULTURE”?

Did the close cooperation and cohabitation of people from different European countries (and America) in the concession lead to the emergence of a “western” culture in Asia? We previously learnt that – even if fellow countrymen showed the tendency to stay among each other – also international meeting points can be identified. Nations influenced each other and international spaces were created. In the smaller concessions, where the national communities were not big enough to afford their own spaces clubs, hotels and churches served as places where people from all nations met. In all concessions, racecourses and sport grounds were established as recreation grounds for the whole western community. Also, theatre performances and concerts were visited by all nations.

The leading nations were the Anglo-Saxons, bringing French, Germans and all the others in touch with their tradition of founding clubs and racecourses and forming literature circles and theatre groups. All western nations had in common that the European entertainment was an indicator for a change of lifestyle. Westerners lifted their standard of living dramatically while being in China.

One main indicator for this is the consumption of food. Food was of great importance to the Western community in China. Mutual invitations to common meals belonged to the daily routine. Mainly European meals were served at these occasions. The consumption of food and beverages differed much from the European tradition, not in the preparation of the food but in the quantity. The very popular second breakfast (Tiffin) for example could include: soup, fish, roast, poultry, sweets, cheese, fruit, champagne and all kind of wine.¹⁹ Many of the foods and most of the beverages were imports from Europe such as butter, cheese, some vegetables (asparagus in tins e.g.) as well as coffee, all sorts of wine, champagne, beer and even water.²⁰

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 72.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 173.

SIGNIFICANCE OF ENTERTAINMENT CULTURE

What significance did the entertainment culture have for the Europeans coming to China?

First, it was a way of creating a 'home abroad'. The community had to replace family and close friends (even if many Europeans missed real intimacy). This may explain the tendency of celebrating national holidays with more effort than at home.

Second, it was an important platform to create a new identity. Detached from family ties and social standing, a life abroad gave the chance of creating a new image and to do everything to 'be someone'. This may explain why, as Georg Baur observed, Westerners started to live like a lord once they arrived in Asia.²¹ The high expenses for food and the importance of exuberant meals can serve as an example for both phenomena: On one hand, food may have served as a way to reduce homesickness. The consumption of familiar food (and beverages) was one possibility to obtain a native sensation in a foreign environment and to tighten the national identity abroad. On the other hand, conspicuous consumption enhanced prestige. An exuberant meal showed that the host could afford a high level of living and belonged to the top of the society. Besides, the reason for an augmented consumption of food might be the fact that other (simple) amusements did not exist in early European communities in China.

CONCLUSION

When studying the European entertainment culture in 19th century Tianjin, we have to keep in mind that it can only serve as an example for western life in China at this time. Due to different local conditions, the daily life in every concession showed a different face. To speak with Robert Löbbecke again:

"It makes a big difference whether you live in a treaty port or deep inside China. Shanghai for example is the Paris of the East, there you can meet many people from your own

²¹ Ibid., p. 144.

country, there are clubs and you can find any kind of entertainment, schools and churches, well constructed streets, a police force, etc. The Chinese in Shanghai all know the Western culture and they know how to meet foreigners. All this is missing inside the country“.²²

Tianjin can only give us a glimpse of how daily life was in the European concessions in China. Nevertheless, some general conclusions can be drawn: First, China – which was not a colony with the presence of one foreign nation as a suppressor but had to be open to many nations – allowed the Europeans to form a very special kind of community. Second, to some extent, people from different nations mingled and developed an international, European or Western kind of entertainment. But in many ways, national borders were kept and some traditions even followed more strictly than at home. Third, everyday life of the – mainly male – Europeans living in China before the turn of the century was strongly influenced by their professional tasks and – related to this – a strong desire for representation. This manifested itself in very costly life styles, which shaped the image of rich Westerners in China until today. Fourth, this image as well as the picture Europeans got of China mostly had been created by social climbers that came to China because of financial interests and unfortunately not because they were much interested in the country itself.

²² Löbbbecke (1982, p. 56): "Es ist ein gewaltiger Unterschied, ob man in China in einem Freihafen oder im Innern des Landes wohnt. Shanghai z.B. ist das Paris des Ostens, dort findet man Verkehr mit Landsleuten, Klubs, gesellige Vergnügungen jeder Art, Schulen und Kirchen, ordentliche Wege, Polizei, etc. Die Shanghai-Chinesen sind im regen Verkehr mit den Ausländern alle mehr oder weniger mit der abendländischen Kultur bekannt. Alles dieses fehlt im Innern des Landes“.

REFERENCES

- Baur, G. 2005. *China um 1900. Aufzeichnungen eines Krupp-Direktors*. Edited by E. Kaske. Köln/Wien/Weimar: Böhlau.
- Becker, T., Littmann, A. and Niedbalski, J., eds, 2011. *Die tausend Freuden der Metropole: Vergnügungskultur um 1900*. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag.
- Bickers, R., 2011. *The Scramble for China. Foreign Devils in the Qing Empire 1832-1914*. London: Allen Lane.
- Brass, E., 1906. *Sturm und Drang in Tientsin und andere ostasiatische Küstengeschichten. Persönliche Erlebnisse*. Berlin: Korach.
- Grünfeld, E., 1913. *Hafenkolonien und kolonieähnliche Verhältnisse in China, Japan und Korea. Eine kolonialpolitische Studie*. Jena: Fischer.
- Fairbank, J.K., 1998. *China. A new history*. Cambridge / London: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press.
- Koberstein, F., 1906. *Tientsin und Umgebung*. Tianjin: Verlag der Brigade-Zeitung.
- Löbbecke, R., 1982. *Ein Westfale in China. Briefe und Fotografien 1895-1900*. Published by A. Bruns. Münster: Landschaftsverband Westfalen-Lippe, Westfälisches Archivamt.
- Marinelli, M., 2009. Making Concessions in Tianjin: Heterotopia and Italian Colonialism in Mainland China. *Urban History*, 36(3), pp.399–425.
- Rasmussen, O.D., 1925. *Tientsin: An illustrated outline history*. Tianjin: Tientsin Press Ltd.
- Woodhead, H.G.W., 1938. Tientsin's Foreign Concession. *Oriental Affairs*, 9(4), pp.194-197.

胡適與《文星雜誌》

黃克武¹

中央研究院近代史研究所

電郵：khuang@gate.sinica.edu.tw

一、前言

1957 年底創辦於台北的《文星雜誌》雖標榜為一文學、生活與藝術性質的刊物，然其歷史命運與台灣自由主義的發展息息相關，成為考察戒嚴時期台灣自由主義發展的重要史料。《文星雜誌》最重要的成就在於它成功實現了其辦刊之宗旨，通過介紹西方的文學、藝術和科學，為黨國體制下的青年學生與知識分子提供新知源泉，讓人們對自由、開放的理想社會產生了更強烈的期許。不容諱言，雜誌在思想內涵與行動上的表現十分精彩。無論是前期的迂迴溫和傾向，或是後期較激烈的衝撞體制，都表現出敢於爭取自由，捍衛憲法所賦予的權利。它所掀起的新文學、新藝術與其帶動的新思潮，都朝向一個自由、開放的民主社會。他們真心地希望讓戒嚴之下的台灣成為名符其實的「自由中國」。當 1960 年《自由中國》被查禁後，《文星雜誌》扛起了繼續宣傳自由思想的大旗，從思想批判與制度建言等方面持續對抗黨國的壓制。此後，至 1970 年代《大學雜誌》及其他黨外雜誌相繼湧現，一波接一波地在台灣社會，發揚自由主義精神，終能在 1980 年代開花結果。

曾參與黨外運動的《八十年代》出版社（由康寧祥任發行人），在 1979 年編輯《自由中國選集》之時，編者在序文中指出：「四十六年十一月，臺北創刊了一份『不按牌理出牌』的《文星》雜誌……在《自由中國》停刊後逐漸成為臺北文化圈的重要刊物，在六十年代掀起一陣風浪，成為五十年代《自由中國》時期與七十年代因應保釣而起的知識分子政治改革運動的一個過渡」，²這是一個非常準確的歷史論斷，也顯示出從《自由中國》到《文星雜誌》的思想遺產與黨外運動之間的密切關係。由此可見，臺灣社會今日能享有自由民主的累累果實，《文星雜誌》扮演接續《自由中國》並開啟後續黨外運動發展的重要角色。

《文星雜誌》在傳播自由思想之時，與當時公認自由主義的思想大家胡適之間有非常微妙的關係。過去少有學者注意到此一課題。³本文企圖透過分析胡適與《文星雜誌》之關係，來彰顯文星編輯群在追求自由理想之時所能汲取到之思想資源，及其所遭遇之困境。首先筆者將利用中央研究院胡適紀念館所藏的胡適與文星雜誌社往來信函，釐清胡適對《文星雜誌》之態度，其次則分析該雜誌之中與胡適相關的作品，及其所顯示的思想意涵。此一部份將特別討論：胡適所撰寫的〈科學發展所需要的社會改革〉；1962 年一月以胡適為封面的那一期雜誌、李敖所寫的〈播種者胡適〉一文；1962 年三月出版的「追思胡適之先生專號」等作品，並分析其影響，以及此一思想傳承在形塑台灣當代文化上所扮演的角色。

¹ 中央研究院近代史研究所研究員兼所長

² 編輯部 1979，「《自由中國選集》總序」，*自由中國選集*，八十年代出版社，臺北，頁 7。

³ 有關該雜誌有兩本碩士論文：張裕亮 1984，*文星雜誌有關中西文化論戰問題之言論分析—並論近代思想史關於中西文化問題之言論*，政治大學新聞研究所碩士論文，臺北；陳正然 1984，*台灣五〇年代知識份子的文化運動——以「文星」為例*，台灣大學社會學研究所碩士論文，臺北。

二、戒嚴時期的思想動員：《文星雜誌》、胡適與 1950-60 年代的台灣

1957 年底創辦的《文星雜誌》之主旨在傳播新思想、介紹新觀念，雜誌中刊登了大量文學、生活與藝術性質的文章，並透過這些文章傳遞出自由的理念。很多人認為該刊接續《自由中國》的政治理想，並將胡適與殷海光等自由主義者視為思想導師。在 1950-60 年代，台灣許多的年輕人均受到該刊自由、民主與法治思想以及中西文化論戰之啟發。

這樣一來，要論斷《文星》的歷史意義，須從 1949 年之後戒嚴體制下台灣自由主義發展來觀察。1949 年共產革命的成功象徵著二十世紀中國自由主義發展的一大挫敗，國民黨政權在戰敗之後退居台灣，跟隨著蔣氏赴台的人在思想上大致上包括三大類：三民主義信仰者、自由主義者與新儒家思想的支持者，其共同信念即是反共。遷台之後蔣介石痛定思痛，在台灣建立黨國體制，企圖反攻大陸。1949 年之後，在國際冷戰的格局之下，台灣屬於美國為首之自由、民主之陣營，號稱「自由中國」，以此對抗專制集權的共產政權，然自由主義思潮一直受到黨國體制的壓制與官方意識型態的批判，而在夾縫之中發展，是一個受到諸多禁錮的「自由中國」。難怪殷海光在寫《中國文化的展望》時要感嘆地說：「中國的自由主義者先天不足，後天失調」。⁴至於新儒家的支持者，則是蟄居於大學教書，並利用香港為英國殖民地的關係，創辦諸如《民主評論》之雜誌，宣揚儒家思想與自由民主之接軌，並針砭台灣時政。然而自由主義者與新儒家等兩個陣營所做的努力，只得到有限的成果。由於受到諸多思想與非思想因素的影響，台灣自由主義在思想論域與政治實踐之中屢遭挫敗。其後隨著經濟起飛、政治安定與傳播媒體的蓬勃發展，1980 年代以來臺灣自由主義與民主政治有較大的進展，政治、經濟與思想三種市場逐漸成型，民主體制亦漸趨成熟。很多人會同意今日的臺灣，大概是中國歷史上個人政治自由、思想自由的高峰，應可期待將來會展現出更多文化上的創造力。

自 1987 年解嚴到 1996 年總統直選，其後政黨輪替，台灣自由主義與民主政治在二十餘年之間有較充分的發展。這一個中國歷史上首次民主政治的出現不但因為執政者的開明作風、反對運動者前仆後繼的努力，也牽涉到自由思想的傳播，或有些學者所謂的「思想上的動員」(intellectual mobilization)。⁵其中特別重要的是 1950 年代後期至 60 年代後期台灣自由主義思想發展，此一發展對日後台灣從威權統治到民主政治的轉型有重要的貢獻。

討論 1950 年代之後台灣自由主義的發展，必須從《自由中國》談起。1950-60 年代在台灣以胡適、雷震、殷海光的《自由中國》雜誌社為中心，結合本土的反對運動，討論憲政改革、反對黨、地方自治等議題，自由理念在思想界得以傳播，至 1960 年《自由中國》因雷震案被迫停刊。⁶此後自由思想的宣揚由《文星雜誌》來接棒。

《文星雜誌》與《自由中國》有兩年左右的重疊時間。該刊由 1957 年 11 月至 1965 年 12 月，共 8 年，發行了 98 期，其間可分為兩個不同的階段。前 48 期是以林海音、何凡、陳立峰為首的開拓期；之後由陳立峰任主編，加入李敖，直到 1962 年 8 月 1 日刊登〈啟事〉說明：原發行人葉明勳與主編陳立峰亦自該月份同時離職。後 50 期則是以李敖、陸嘯釗為主導的階段，一直到該刊物與《自由中國》一樣，遭到

⁴ 殷海光 1981，*中國文化的展望*，大通書局，香港，頁 291。

⁵ Reinhard Bendix, p.253, 1978. *Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

⁶ 請參考薛化元 1996，『自由中國』與民主憲政(1949-1960)，稻鄉出版社，台北，以及任育德 1999，*雷震與台灣民主憲政的發展*，政大歷史系，台北等作品。

被禁的命運為止。前後的分期標示著《文星》迥異的兩種面貌，前 48 期屬溫和路線，後 50 期則採激進風格，正好顯示出兩世代主編的不同風貌。這也表現在該雜誌從一個「生活的、文學的、藝術的」雜誌，轉向討論新聞、學術、宗教自由，並進而觸及文化與政治、法律等的敏感議題。

《文星雜誌》的創立有很複雜的時代背景，並與黨國體制之間有所糾葛。⁷這一現象或許可以從該雜誌的發行人葉明勳的角色表現出來。葉明勳是該雜誌社社長蕭孟能之父蕭同茲在黨營中央通訊社的一位同事。蕭同茲與葉明勳均為國民黨的骨幹人物。⁸由此可見該雜誌的創辦人、經營者與國民黨關係之密切。在上述的情況之下，胡適與《文星雜誌》的關係就成為一個頗值得探究的議題。然一般研究《文星雜誌》的作品多關注中西文化論戰，而少有人省視胡適與《文星雜誌》的關係。這一方面是因為胡適在《文星雜誌》以他的名義中所發表的文章只有四、五篇，⁹與《自由中國》階段積極撰文有所不同，另一方面則由於胡適 1962 年初即過世，沒有參與他與李敖等人所引發的中西文化論戰。

《文星雜誌》中胡適形象主要不是由他自行撰文呈現，而是他人所型塑的。該雜誌中最為積極力捧胡適的人一是李敖、一是徐高阮。前者認為胡適的貢獻不在學術，而在自由民主思想的傳播；後者則認為代表中國近代思想史上的一個趨向，即是在肯定傳統文化之精華的前提下，學習西方近代文明。¹⁰這與《自由中國》時期，胡適本人積極參與、擔任發行人、直言敢諫（如 1954 年的「寧鳴而死，不默而生」、1956 年的〈述艾森豪總統的兩個小故事給蔣總統祝壽〉）並成為精神領袖的情況，形成鮮明對比。此一被動的立場涉及 1949 年至 1958 年之間胡適與當權者蔣介石之間關係的演變（請參考拙文有關 1949 年至 1956 年之間胡適與蔣介石之交往之討論），¹¹至 1958 年之時，胡適出任中央研究院院長一職，此一角色使他與反對威權統治之自由主義運動刻意地保持一定之距離。這樣的論斷與傅正等《自由中國》核心分子在 1958 年時對胡適的看法一致，認為胡適不肯「冒這種風險」來組反對黨、「不足以寄託擔當扭轉大局的希望」。¹²這也透露出胡適在雷震案發生之後所表現出的基本態度。不過胡適所代表的政治主張與文化關懷，卻因為《文星》的努力推廣，而發揮了其影響力。1962 年後《文星》由李敖接棒，轉向較激烈的政治批判，該雜誌成為五四傳統與《自由中國》的繼承者。這一轉型無疑地深受胡適思想之激勵。而從《自由中國》到《文星雜誌》所形成的思想傳統，在戒嚴時代發揮了傳播自由主義理念的「思想的動員」之作用，直接推動了台灣民主化的發展。

三、客於回應：胡適對《文星雜誌》之態度

文星的編輯者既然以傳播自由思想為職志，因此對從民初五四運動以來，執國內

⁷ 戒嚴時期台灣許多知識分子所創辦的刊物，包括《自由中國》、《大學雜誌》等都與國民黨有關，此外香港的《民主評論》也同樣受到國民黨之資助。李金銓指出，國民黨的新聞政策是在鎮壓與籠絡之間的收編模式，或是鎮壓或是拔擢。依順者可享受經濟利益，越矩者則遭到壓制。轉引自林淇瀾 2008，〈由「侍從」在側到「異議」於外：論《自由中國》與國民黨黨國機器的合與分〉，文人論政：民國知識份子與報刊，政大出版社，台北，頁 373。

⁸ 有關蕭同茲之生平可參見：馮志翔 1975，*蕭同茲傳*，傳記文學出版社，台北；葉明勳 1996「蕭同茲傳」，*國史擬傳第 6 輯*，國史館，台北，頁 317-328。

⁹ 這幾篇文章包括：胡適 1960，〈言論自由〉，*文星*，6 卷，4 期，8 月；胡適 1961，〈科學發展所需要的社會改革〉，*文星*，9 卷，2 期，12 月；胡適 1962，〈康南耳君傳〉（胡適先生最後校訂的遺作），*文星（追思胡適之先生專號）*，9 卷，5 期，3 月等。

¹⁰ 徐高阮 1974，*胡適和一個思想的趨向*，地平線出版社，台北。

¹¹ 見黃克武 2011，〈1950 年代胡適與蔣介石在思想上的一段交往〉，*廣東社會科學*，6 期，頁 14-19 討論胡適對蔣中正反共抗俄思想形成之影響。

¹² 詳見潘光哲 2011，*傅正《自由中國》時期日記選編*，中研院近史所，台北。

思想界之牛耳的自由主義大師胡適，一直寄予厚望，希望能得到他大力的支持。1957年底《文星》出刊之後到1958年4月8日胡適返台之前，該社都定期地將刊物寄給住在紐約的胡適。¹³因為胡適並未回信，同時在胡適日記之中也沒有提到這一件事，我們不確知他是否收到這幾期的雜誌。¹⁴一直到胡適返國之後，文星雜誌社仍然很熱烈地與胡適聯繫。1958.4.24，也是胡適返台約兩週之後，由葉明勳、蕭孟能與夏承楹三人聯名寫一封信給胡適，¹⁵說明該刊之編輯宗旨，「我們又深信智慧是創造人生的，知識是指導人生的，因此，我們希望這本刊物成為啟發智慧和供給知識的泉源，來豐富青年人的生活，指引青年人的前途」，¹⁶並希望胡適能賜稿，以示支持。同時，他們也再度寄了已出刊的六期雜誌給胡適。然而，胡適對此封充滿期待的來信仍無回應。

從1958年4月到12月，《文星雜誌》每次出刊之後都定期寄到中央研究院給擔任院長的胡適，可是這八個月來胡適也不曾回應。1958年12月3日，文星雜誌社等人或許按耐不住，再次以掛號信發出一封信函。信中提及前一封信（四月廿四日），也說明該社曾持續地將雜誌寄到南港給胡先生。同時，他們擔心或許雜誌寄丟了，因此再次地把已出刊的14期雜誌一併寄贈胡適。最後並說：「假如能獲得您的垂注並且給予指導，我們就雀躍萬丈了！」胡適收到這一封信之後終於有所回應，12月6日就由秘書胡頌平草擬了一封很簡短的信回覆，表示前後來信與贈書均收到，故致函「特別向諸位先生道謝。勿復」。¹⁷

由上述的信件往返可以顯示文星雜誌社一直很熱烈地想與胡適取得聯繫，然甫自美返國擔任中研院院長的胡適顯然對該刊之態度十分冷淡。當然如果我們考察一下1958年4月到12月之間，胡適的確很忙碌。他在六月、九月、十月三度赴美，同時研究、行政與邀約演講等使他的行程幾乎日日滿檔。他甚至忙到沒有時間寫日記，1958年四月之後，他只留下了幾天的紀錄。不過，工作忙碌不足以完全說明胡適對文星的冷淡，胡適吝於回應很應該有其他的原因。

胡適再次主動與文星雜誌社聯繫要到1961年，胡適向文星書店預約葉明勳之妻子嚴停雲（筆名華嚴）所著《智慧的燈》五部，來分贈友人。¹⁸胡適並於1961.10.18日致函葉明勳與嚴停雲。¹⁹嚴停雲於1961.10.20立即回信，並告知近況與希望親往拜謁。葉明勳也在同封信中向胡適致意，並寄贈葉氏的〈光復以來的台灣報業〉一文。²⁰10月28日，葉明勳與嚴停雲夫婦去南港看望了胡適，並在會面時談到李敖以及因匪諜案被捕的李敖的高中老師嚴僑等事情。²¹

至1961年底與1962年初，胡適才比較注意到此一雜誌。這是因為胡適的講詞〈科學發展所需要的社會改革〉之內容在報章上被摘述，全文之譯文又在《文星雜誌》（1961.12.1）發表後，引發爭議，受到徐復觀與廖維藩等人之嚴厲指責。下文將較深入地討論此一事件。文星雜誌社1962.1.7再度去函胡適希望他能正面地提出答

¹³ 文星雜誌社致胡適函，1958.4.24.

¹⁴ 胡適日記中只提到一次的《文星》，是在1962.2.5，提及：「徐君最近在《文星》雜誌上發表了一篇討論關於我與「西化」問題的文字，寫的很細密平和」。胡適2004，《胡適日記全集》，聯經，台北，冊9，頁816。該文為徐高阮所寫的「胡適之與「全盤西化」」。

¹⁵ 在這封自我介紹信裡對主要成員的簡介如下：發行人：葉明勳曾任中央通訊社台北分社主任、《中華日報》社社長、現任台灣省政府顧問；社長：蕭孟能文星書店經理；主編：夏承楹《國語日報》總主筆、作家、國語推行委員會委員。台北：胡適紀念館藏，《南港檔》，館藏號：HS-NK01-302-001。

¹⁶ 台北：胡適紀念館藏，《南港檔》，館藏號：HS-NK01-302-001。

¹⁷ 台北：胡適紀念館藏，《南港檔》，檔號：HS-NK01—302-004。

¹⁸ 其中有一本，胡適簽名之後送給李敖，後以一百萬賣給葉明勳、華嚴夫婦，義助慰安婦。李敖1999，《李敖快意恩仇錄》，中國友誼出版公司，北京，頁130-131。

¹⁹ 台北：胡適紀念館藏，《南港檔》，檔號：HS-NK01-165-004。

²⁰ 台北：胡適紀念館藏，《南港檔》，館藏號：HS-NK03-006-017。

²¹ 李敖1997，《李敖回憶錄》，商周出版，台北，頁160-161。

辯。此時胡適身體已經有一些狀況，由胡頌平代替回了一封信，表示徐高阮轉來諸位給胡適先生的信已收到：

胡先生在休養期間，徐復觀的文章沒有看見，廖維藩的質詢詞好像也沒有看見。……胡先生說，他不想寫什麼文字，醫生也不許他寫；將來就是看了廖維藩、徐復觀的文章，也不會寫什麼答辯的文字。胡先生要我謝謝你們幾位的好意。(1962.1.13)

胡適此時對《文星雜誌》之關注，也因為他成為 1962 年一月號《文星雜誌》之封面人物。這在《文星雜誌》歷史上很特別，《文星雜誌》的封面人物大多數都是外國人，以中國人為封面的只有四期，胡適是其中之一。²²這一期專號登載了李敖的文章〈播種者胡適〉，將胡適的貢獻定位在宣揚自由民主之上。此外還有居浩然的〈恭賀新禧〉與胡秋原的〈超越傳統派西化派俄化派而前進〉等文章。胡頌平記載胡適看到該文之後覺得這幾篇文章都太「輕薄」而不夠嚴謹：

這一期《文星雜誌》的封面是用先生的照片，其中有一篇李敖的〈播種者胡適〉，先生看見了。胡頌平問李敖的文章怎樣？先生說：「在我的年紀看起來，總感得不夠……他喜歡借題發揮。他對科學會不夠了解，何必談它。你要記得，作文章切莫要借題發揮！」(1962.1.2)²³

我本來想寫封很客氣的信給胡某的。他的文章太輕薄了。你要知道，寫文章的态度要嚴正，切不可流於輕薄。李某喜欲借題發揮，如他寫的「卻在吳稚暉筆下國故的臭東西上認真」，和「他們只會送他蟠龍的大瓶」這兩段，把許多人都罵進去了，也沒有道理。我想寫封信給他。²⁴

由此可見胡適對胡秋原、李敖兩人文章有所不滿。

不久胡適即過世，《文星雜誌》隨即推出紀念專號。由此可見從 1957 年底至 1962 年初，也就是胡適晚年返台出任中研院院長至過世之間的四年多的時間之內，胡適對《文星雜誌》多次的熱情來信，都吝於回應。這與胡適一向樂於助人、對提携後輩不遺餘力、致力推介新思想的作風很不相同。其中原因頗耐人尋味。

四、《文星雜誌》中的胡適

相對於胡適的冷漠，《文星雜誌》一直力捧胡適。其中 1961 年 12 月刊登胡適的一篇講稿，對思想界造成很大的衝擊，揭開「中西文化論戰」，成為六 O 年代台灣思想史上的重要事件。這是《文星雜誌》之中非常少數由胡適署名的一篇文章。

這一篇文章其實不是胡適專門為《文星雜誌》所撰寫的文字，而是一篇英文的演講稿的翻譯。該文是胡適 1961.11.6 在亞東科教會的演講詞〈科學發展所需要的社會改革〉(“Social Changes Necessary for the Growth of Science”)。演講次日，《徵信新聞報》(《中國時報》前身)就翻譯引述部份文字於報紙之上，此外《中國郵報》、《聯合報》也刊登了節譯稿。²⁵不過報紙上對該文的摘譯錯誤頗多，因此由毛子水與

²² 《文星雜誌》近百期的封面人物僅有四位中國人，分別是梅貽琦(第 43 期，1961)、胡適(第 51 期，1962)、蔣廷黻(第 72 期，1963.10)、李濟(第 73 期，1963.11)。

²³ 胡頌平 1985，《胡適之先生晚年談話錄》，聯經，台北，頁 280。

²⁴ 胡頌平 1984，《胡適之先生年譜長編初稿》，聯經，台北，冊 10，頁 3858-3859。

²⁵ 報紙自行翻譯引述的標題與文字是：「胡適在亞東科教會演說，強調科學並非唯物，具有真理和靈性」，我們須從這種不正當的驕傲中鑽出來，學著去承認在東方的文明中具有很少的靈性。1961，《徵信新聞報》，11 月 7 日，第二版。

姚從吾找了李敖與徐高阮兩人，將之譯為中文，再經胡適修改，全文刊登於 1961 年 12 月 1 日的《文星雜誌》。²⁶在這一篇文章中胡適首先強調科學不是物質文明，科學之中其實包含了精神文明的面向，其次現在是我們應該面對中國傳統文化之中，不是沒有就是少有靈性的問題。胡適說「現在正是我們東方人應當開始承認那些老文明中很少精神價值或完全沒有精神價值的時候」。上述觀點引起軒然大波。徐復觀因而在《民主評論》發表激烈文章痛罵胡適。²⁷立法委員廖維藩也在立法院第 28 會期第 20 次會議質詢此事，其標題為「本院委員廖維藩為中央研究院胡適院長在國際科學會議發表侮辱中華民族之言論特向政府提出質詢」。廖維藩認為胡適主張者乃「無病呻吟之全盤西化論」；「胡院長在演講中，對於中國文化傳統極盡錯估污蔑之能事」、「對於科學技術之觀念，亦極盡矛盾之能事」。²⁸

由此顯示該文讓人不滿意之處是胡適身為中央研究院的院長一方面提倡科學發展，覺得科學發展不但是物質的也是精神的，他又說我們應該是承認中國文化裡面少有靈性的部份，這也顯示中國傳統之中不具有發展科學所需要的精神價值。其中所謂的「靈性不夠」的話，引起了徐復觀等人的批判，認為這樣的說法是「東方人的恥辱」，也是「中國人的恥辱」。然而胡適並沒有看到徐、廖兩人的批判，也不願對這些攻擊做出回應。²⁹

《文星雜誌》顯然不只是提供一個議題討論的平台，而是較為傾向支持胡適的立場。隔年(1962) 1 月的第 51 期，就以胡適為封面，以李敖的文章來極力宣揚胡適的想法。³⁰該期之中李敖所寫的〈播種者胡適〉一文引起極大迴響，用李敖的話來說是：「引起各界的重視」，³¹並「帶來了大是非與大麻煩」。李敖說這一篇文章被外界視為是衛護胡適的文章，國民黨的刊物甚至推斷，「李敖與胡適之先生有深厚的世交關係」，或說李敖是「被胡適全心全力支持的西化太保」；另一方面李敖又說：這一篇文章三面不討好，「罵胡的人會說我捧胡，捧胡的人會說我罵胡，胡適本人也會對我不開心」。由此顯示李敖文章之爭議性，後來中西文化問題論戰的出現也與此文有關。³²

胡適那時候身體已經有點不大好（1961.11.26 胡適即因胸悶、氣喘，住進台大醫院共 45 天），³³讀完該文之後，他親筆寫了一封信給李敖。這封信一直沒有寄出去，而藏在中央研究院胡適紀念館。錢思亮在該信上用一個迴紋針夾了一個批註，他說這是一封胡先生沒有寫完的信，請妥為保存，因為這是胡先生人格偉大最好的一個證明。這一封信共四頁，是胡適看過了李敖寫〈播種者胡適〉一文後的一些想法。胡適說我要幫你澆澆冷水，你不要把我抬那麼高，接著他又說，裡面有一些地方寫錯了。³⁴這封信一直沒有寄出來，直到陶英惠先生當胡適紀念館主任的時候，因為陶先生跟李敖先生是台大歷史系同學，1998 年他將這封信影印送給李敖先生。李敖終於看到

²⁶ 台北：胡適紀念館藏，《南港檔》，館藏號：HS-NK01-018-014 (001-002)。該文在 1961 年 12 月 1 日的第 50 期登出，其內容經過胡適批改與認可。

²⁷ 徐復觀 1961，「中國人的恥辱，東方人的恥辱」，*民主評論*，12 卷，24 期，12 月，頁 617-619。楊金榮將徐復觀這一篇文章定位為「文化保守勢力」，並引用張忠棟的說法，認為徐復觀近乎謾罵的批評有「接受津貼，和政治權勢聯手打擊胡適」之嫌。楊金榮 2003，*角色與命運：胡適晚年的自由主義困境*，生活·讀書·新知三聯書店，北京，頁 344。

²⁸ 立法院秘書處編，《立法院公報》，第 28 會期，第 10 期（台北，1961），頁 49-52。

²⁹ 胡頌平 1984，*胡適之先生年譜長編初稿*，聯經，台北，冊 10，頁 3858。

³⁰ 徐高阮的信是 1962.1.10 發出，在之前的 1962.1.7《文星》編輯群有發信給胡適告知以其為封面並再度邀稿，應該是未獲回應，再請徐高阮繼續代邀。台北：胡適紀念館藏，《南港檔》，館藏號：HS-NK05-131-008 (001-002)。

³¹ 李敖 1997，*李敖回憶錄*，商周出版，台北，頁 171。

³² 李敖 1997，*李敖回憶錄*，商周出版，台北，頁 274-275。

³³ 胡適 2004，*胡適日記全集*，聯經，台北，冊 9，頁 813。

³⁴ 台北：胡適紀念館藏，《南港檔》，館藏號：HS-NK05-024-005 (001)。

了胡適生前寫給他卻沒有寄出的這封信。在回憶錄中李敖不但收錄了這一封信的全文，還說：

這封信是他死前不久寫的，那時他七十二歲。這封信，寫得又認真、又婉轉、又誠懇，足見此公高明光大的一面。不過他不知道我寫出的每一件，都是有所本的，都是印在別人的書裡的，不是我捏造的。只是有所本的資訊有問題，我也就跟著「不夠正確」了。³⁵

李敖的文章也引起葉青（任卓宣）與鄭學稼的批評，認為李敖把胡適捧得太過份了，簡直是「瞎捧」。³⁶

除了李敖之外，另一位為胡適辯護的人是當時任職於中研院史語所的徐高阮。³⁷他在《文星》52期（第9卷第4期，1962.2.1）發表了〈胡適之與「全盤西化」——一頁思想的歷史〉。徐高阮指出胡適不主張「全盤西化」，而是主張「充分世界化」。胡適認識到歷史的「繁複多方」，所以他的觀點與主張「全盤西化」的社會學家陳序經（1903-1967）很不相同。胡適讀了之後覺得寫的很「細密平和」。³⁸後來徐高阮將他對胡適思想的詮釋總結為上述《胡適與一個思想的趨向》一書。他認為胡適與曾國藩、康有為、孫中山有類似的想法，認為中西文明沒有根本的不同、孔子思想與西方近代新文明極為配合、中國的衰弱是近代歷史條件所造成的（包括精神的頹敗）、應積極採取西方近代文明的長處。相對來說，另一個更有勢力的趨向則認為東西文明有根本的差別、東方思想有根本的因素阻止科學的發達。³⁹徐高阮從這一個角度解釋的胡適思想似乎是得到了胡適的認可。他所提出的詮釋和李敖所謂啟蒙思想播種者（而非學術專業的努力），成為《文星》之上支持胡適思想的代表性的詮釋。

1962年2月24日胡適突然因心臟病過世，三月號的《文星》五十三期立刻刊出了一個胡適紀念專號。⁴⁰此一專號在台灣思想史上有其特殊的意義。胡適生前（與死後）中西文化論戰的兩派激烈爭論、水火不容，然而一旦胡適過世，讓當時激烈論爭的兩派人物，卻達成了一個共識，這個共識點就在胡適所宣揚的自由民主理念。在胡適死前支持胡適思想的人主要是李敖等所謂「西化派」的人物，但是胡適過世之後，支持傳統文化一派的人包括胡秋原、鄭學稼、徐復觀等人，都寫文章弔念，對胡適表達尊敬之意。文中表達出：胡適死了，胡適思想仍然活著，並認為這位倒在戰場上的老將軍，代表了中國的良心。由此可見，胡適生前在《文星》之中非常低調，但是另外一方面《文星雜誌》社包括李敖等人，卻很想將胡適抬出來，繼續發揚他所肯定的播種工作。不過一直到胡適死後，才使當時中西文化論戰的雙方都同時站出來，表揚及肯定胡適的貢獻。

胡秋原所寫的紀念文字就表達出這樣的想法。他的標題是：倒在戰場上的老將軍，敬弔胡適老先生。由此可見即使是像胡秋原這麼反對西化的一個人物，還是對於

³⁵ 李敖 1999，*李敖快意恩仇錄*，中國友誼出版公司，北京，頁133。

³⁶ 有關李敖文章所掀起有關胡適的討論，參見陳才生 2004，*李敖這個人*，新華出版社，北京，頁211-212。

³⁷ 徐高阮本來與李敖是好友，後來鬧翻了，徐公布了一封李敖寫給胡適的信，談到嚴復的孫子嚴僑，因而使李敖涉及匪諜案。陳才生 2004，*李敖這個人*，新華出版社，北京，頁282-285。徐高阮後來還控告王世杰、許倬雲、胡佛、李亦園等人為「費正清國際共產黨同路人」，見李亦園 2005，*李亦園先生訪問紀錄*，中研院近史所，台北，頁111-114。有關李敖對徐高阮的評價見李敖 1990，「千秋萬歲名，寂寞身後事」，*胡適與我*，李敖出版社，台北，頁146-147。

³⁸ 胡適 2004，*胡適日記全集*，聯經，台北，冊9，頁816。

³⁹ 徐高阮 1974，*胡適和一個思想的趨向*，地平線出版社，台北，頁2-3。

⁴⁰ 1962，*文星*，9卷5期，3月。據蕭孟能回憶，這一期刊物再版3次，每一版有5000冊，共發行4版，計有二萬冊之多。陳正然 1984，*台灣五〇年代知識份子的文化運動——以「文星」為例*，台灣大學社會學研究所碩士論文，臺北，頁81。

胡先生在文化思想上的貢獻，以及奮戰至死的精神，給予充分的肯定。《文星雜誌》也刊登出該社為胡適所寫的一個輓聯。這個輓聯非常精準地反映出《文星雜誌》渴望繼承胡適思想。該輓聯為：「科學民主是復興國家不二法門，願此後能實現此一理想，言論自由為促成進步必須手段，望大家莫忘這句名言」。這顯示出《文星雜誌》希望繼承的是胡適以來民主與科學的傳統以及言論自由精神。該社將此一輓聯與胡秋原文章的下角，同時憑弔此一偉人之凋零，也頗具有象徵的意義。

胡適死後，江冬秀又因為版權官司控告《文星雜誌》，雙方打了很多年官司。主要是《文星雜誌》繼續出版《胡適選集》，使江冬秀很不高興，所以她跟當時的遠東圖書公司合起來控告《文星雜誌》。蕭孟能最後刊登了啟示，聲明不再刊印《胡適選集》。江冬秀勝訴之後寫了一封公開信。其大意为：蕭孟能非法盜印胡適之有著作權的著作，歷時四年又十個月終於結案了。謹向海內外關心的朋友們致謝，并告慰朋友們，在有生之年將胡適散在海外的著作和文稿儘量集齊刊印，以完成應盡之責任。⁴¹胡適與《文星雜誌》的關係在他死後也因版權爭議而斷絕了。

胡適對《文星雜誌》最大的影響還是中西文化論戰。從胡適的〈科學發展所需要的社會改革〉與李敖的〈播種者胡適〉等文刊出之後，論戰文章一篇接著一篇刊出，由此可以看到傳統派與西化派的爭論過程。其中包括李敖寫的〈給談中西文化的人看看病〉，接著是徐復觀的回覆，這時後來任職中研院台史所的黃富三也加入，然後徐復觀又答黃富三，接著李敖再為播種者胡適翻舊帳，雙方就這樣一路論戰下來，成為當時台灣文壇的一大盛事，也是台灣六十年代以後對中西文化討論的一個高潮。這兩派人誰也不能完全說服誰，這成為台灣社會中非常重要的一個現象，此一現象反映出台灣文化的一個特點，即是五四與反五四的一個思想張力。這個張力是台灣當代文化具有豐富創造性的一個重要根源，也就是說在西化、反西化，傳統、反傳統的激盪之中，台灣文化才展現出既能批判傳統、又能以「繼往開來」之精神開創未來的新面貌。

五、結論

本文嘗試釐清胡適與《文星雜誌》之間的關係，來了解 1950-60 年代台灣思想界。簡單地說，《文星雜誌》一直希望得到胡適的支持，不過胡適或許因為返國之後工作忙碌，或許因為擔任中研院院長，並與蔣介石有較密切的關係，刻意與《文星》保持距離。這種被動之姿態與《自由中國》時期主動參與形成鮮明對比。這也是胡適從 1958 年開始，受到《自由中國》骨幹人物如傅正等人批評的原因。1958.4.9 胡適回國的第二天，傅正在日記上寫到：

胡適終於在昨天回到台灣了，看各報的報導情形，似乎大不如前兩次回來時那麼熱烈，胡先生自己似乎也相當的沉悶。據《聯合報》的報導，胡先生自從下機後，便絕口不談政治，而且希望記者不要把問題扯到政治上，但在合眾社記者逼著問他這是否表示否認由他出面組黨，他認為可以這麼說。其實，胡先生之為人，自為者多，為人者少，只是遭遇這樣一個時代，使他左右逢源而已！這種人在學術上固然能夠開風氣之先，但人格上並不夠完滿。他之不可能出來組織反對黨，是我早就料定了的，但假使反對黨已打開了相當好的局面，那時若再拉他出面領導時，倒可能會出來的。這些年來，因為是《自由中國》鼓吹反對黨最力，所以一談到組織反對黨，大家都認為非胡先生出來領導不可，這固然是由於他的偶像作用已經造

⁴¹ 台北：胡適紀念館藏，《南港檔》，館藏號：HS-NK05-372-014、HS-NK05-372-015、HS-NK05-372-016、HS-NK05-372-017、HS-NK05-372-018。

成，同時也由於大家未免太重視偶像。老實說，一個理想的反對黨，並不是以某一個偶像來號召，而是要以具體的政治主張和行動來號召。假使有志於反對黨活動的人，把一切希望寄托在一二人身上，那前途就太可悲了！當然，胡先生既已有他的偶像作用，假使他真願為反對黨而努力，不惜犧牲自己，以求能對苦難的中國人有所貢獻，站在有志於反對黨活動的人，固然是求之不得。但胡先生如果真不出我所料，而不肯冒這種風險，人各有志，也沒有什麼值得大驚小怪的。總之，一切還要靠每個有志於組織反對黨的人，去腳踏實地的一步一步努力，把一切希望寄托在自己的努力上，才是道理。⁴²

傅正的日記很清楚地反映出戒嚴體制之下的台灣在第一線的自由主義者對胡適返國之後的觀察，此種「不肯冒這種風險」的態度正是 1958-1962 年之間胡適立場的絕佳寫照。胡適過世之後，有志組織反對黨的人所採取的方向也正是傅正所說的「把一切希望寄托在自己的努力上」。傅正的意見並不是獨一無二的，最支持胡適的李敖，對胡適晚年思想也有類似的感受。他說：「在左右澎湃的浪潮下，他的聲音，已經淪為浪花餘沫，被夾擊得沒有多少還手之力。而他本人，也變得老獃而世故，與五四時代的胡適，不能倫比。這是胡適的悲劇，也是中國自由主義者的悲劇」。⁴³不過胡適晚年變得更為慎重、世故，不願與政府當局正面衝突，是否就像激進的傅正、李敖所說是一件可悲之事，仍有辯論的餘地。

在《文星雜誌》中的胡適形象主要是由李敖與徐高阮兩人積極營造的結果，因此胡適對文星的參與不是行動的參與，而是思想的參與以及精神的感召。他造成兩方面的影響，首先是胡適自由主義的批判精神，由李敖等人繼承，促成了《文星雜誌》後期風格的轉向，並對自由思想在台的傳布造成深遠的影響。就台灣自由民主運動來說，從胡適到李敖等所謂「外省知識分子」的努力，是一個不容忽略的貢獻。其次，胡適的文章引發中西文化論戰，激發了台灣思想的活力。此一論戰繼承了民初以來五四思想與反五四思想之激辯，其思想張力形成台灣文化的一個重要特色，即是不但繼承傳統，也批判傳統；不但肯定倫理，也要吸收民主與科學。胡適過世之後，中西文化論戰之雙方均撰文憑弔、肯定其貢獻，並非偶然。胡適的思想在他死後繼續在台灣思想界發酵、茁壯、成長。

徐復觀在胡適先生過世後，以〈一個偉大書生的悲劇〉（刊《文星雜誌》第 53 期）為題哀悼他，他寫到：「胡先生在五四運動時代，有兵有將，即是：有青年，有朋友。民國十四、五年以後，卻有將無兵；即是有朋友而無青年。今日在台灣，則既無兵，又無將，既是無青年，又無真正的朋友。」《文星雜誌》社同仁則在該刊同期上表示：「科學民主是復興國家不二法門，願此後能實現此一理想；言論自由為促成進步必須手段，望大家莫忘這句名言」。這一情境或許能部份地反映 1960 年代初期知識分子的困境與期望。不過此一時期的努力並未隨著胡適的過世而銷聲匿跡，反而持續發展，為 1970-80 年代之後台灣民主化奠定了重要的基礎。

⁴² 潘光哲 2011，*傅正《自由中國》時期日記選編*，中研院近史所，台北，頁 67-68。

⁴³ 李敖 1999，*李敖快意恩仇錄*，中國友誼出版公司，北京，頁 135。

參考書目

- 任育德 1999, *雷震與台灣民主憲政的發展*, 政大歷史系, 台北
- 李亦園 2005, *李亦園先生訪問紀錄*, 中研院近史所, 台北
- 李敖 1990, ‘千秋萬歲名, 寂寞身後事’, *胡適與我*, 李敖出版社, 台北
- 李敖 1997, *李敖回憶錄*, 商周出版, 台北
- 李敖 1999, *李敖快意恩仇錄*, 中國友誼出版公司, 北京
- 林淇瀟 2008, ‘由「侍從」在側到「異議」於外：論《自由中國》與國民黨黨國機器的合與分’, *文人論政：民國知識份子與報刊*, 政大出版社, 台北
- 胡頌平 1984, *胡適之先生年譜長編初稿*, 冊 10, 聯經, 台北
- 胡頌平 1985, *胡適之先生晚年談話錄*, 聯經, 台北
- 胡適 1960, ‘言論自由’, *文星*, 6 卷, 4 期, 8 月
- 胡適 1961, ‘科學發展所需要的社會改革’, *文星*, 9 卷, 2 期, 12 月
- 胡適 1962, ‘康南耳君傳’ (胡適先生最後校訂的遺作), *文星(追思胡適之先生專號)*, 9 卷, 5 期, 3 月
- 胡適 2004, *胡適日記全集*, 冊 9, 聯經, 台北
- 徐高阮 1974, *胡適和一個思想的趨向*, 地平線出版社, 台北
- 徐復觀 1961, ‘中國人的恥辱, 東方人的恥辱’, *民主評論*, 12 卷, 24 期, 12 月
- 殷海光 1981, *中國文化的展望*, 大通書局, 香港
- 張裕亮 1984, *文星雜誌有關中西文化論戰問題之言論分析——並論近代思想史關於中西文化問題之言論*, 政治大學新聞研究所碩士論文, 臺北
- 陳才生 2004, *李敖這個人*, 新華出版社, 北京
- 陳正然 1984, *台灣五〇年代知識分子的文化運動——以「文星」為例*, 台灣大學社會學研究所碩士論文, 臺北
- 馮志翔 1975, *蕭同茲傳*, 傳記文學出版社, 台北
- 楊金榮 2003, *角色與命運：胡適晚年的自由主義困境*, 生活・讀書・新知三聯書店, 北京
- 黃克武 2011, ‘1950 年代胡適與蔣介石在思想上的一段交往’, *廣東社會科學*, 6 期, 14-19 頁
- 葉明勳 1996, ‘蕭同茲傳’, *國史擬傳第 6 輯*, 國史館, 台北
- 潘光哲 2011, *傅正《自由中國》時期日記選編*, 中研院近史所, 台北
- 編輯部 1979, ‘《自由中國選集》總序’, *自由中國選集*, 八十年代出版社, 臺北
- 薛化元 1996, *『自由中國』與民主憲政(1949-1960)*, 稻鄉出版社, 台北
- 1961, *徵信新聞報*, 11 月 7 日, 第二版
- 立法院秘書處編, *《立法院公報》*, 第 28 會期, 第 10 期 (台北, 1961)
- 台北：胡適紀念館藏, *《南港檔》*, 館藏號：HS-NK01-302-001
- 台北：胡適紀念館藏, *《南港檔》*, 館藏號：HS-NK01-302-001
- 台北：胡適紀念館藏, *《南港檔》*, 檔號：HS-NK01—302-004
- 台北：胡適紀念館藏, *《南港檔》*, 檔號：HS-NK01-165-004
- 台北：胡適紀念館藏, *《南港檔》*, 館藏號：HS-NK03-006-017
- 台北：胡適紀念館藏, *《南港檔》*, 館藏號：HS-NK01-018-014 (001-002)
- 台北：胡適紀念館藏, *《南港檔》*, 館藏號：HS-NK05-131-008 (001-002)
- 台北：胡適紀念館藏, *《南港檔》*, 館藏號：HS-NK05-024-005 (001)
- 台北：胡適紀念館藏, *《南港檔》*, 館藏號：HS-NK05-372-014
- 台北：胡適紀念館藏, *《南港檔》*, 館藏號：HS-NK05-372-015
- 台北：胡適紀念館藏, *《南港檔》*, 館藏號：HS-NK05-372-017

台北：胡適紀念館藏，《南港檔》，館藏號：HS-NK05-372-016

台北：胡適紀念館藏，《南港檔》，館藏號：HS-NK05-372-018

Bendix, R., 1978. *Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

淺論 1950 年代美國在香港的反共宣傳手法：

以《四海》為探討對象

羅玉芬¹

香港樹仁大學

電郵：debhui@netvigator.com

前言

1948 年年底，有見中國共產黨將要成為國共內戰 (1946-1949) 的勝利者，美國政府開始重新修訂其對華政策。與此同時，美國國務院開始從中國大陸撤僑，以英國殖民地香港作為「中轉站」。另一方面，蔣介石的國民黨政府及國民軍亦陸續遷往台灣，繼續與中國共產黨作戰。1949 年 8 月初，中華人民共和國成立的一個多月前，美國國務院發表了《中美關係白皮書》，公開宣佈不干預、「放手」(Hands-off) 作為美國未來的對華政策。²(Department of State 1949b) 10 月下旬，美國總統簽署國家安全委員會 (the National Security Council) 的第 55/2 號文件 (NSC 55/2)，否定了香港在美國國家安全及全球策略中的價值。³(Department of State 1949a) 及至年終，美國就整個亞太地區制定了一套戰略性政策，主要論調是：離開亞洲大陸、把國家安全防衛線鞏固在太平洋的日本和菲律賓島嶼上、不插手華人事務。⁴(Department of State 1977) 這個策略是基於美國傳統「歐洲優先」(Europe-First) 的外交思維，需要把資源集中在歐洲用以圍堵蘇聯的擴張；同時，亞洲大陸對於美國國家利益的重要性遠遠不及其他歐洲殖民國家諸如英國、法國及荷蘭，甚至微不足道。而事實上，美國政府並不排除承認中華人民共和國的可能性。⁵(Donovan 1996) 所以，即使中國已成為共產主義國家，中國共產黨亦公開聲明了要從蔣介石手上「解放台灣」，「放手」仍然被視為是最恰當的對華政策。

然而，這個不干預華人事務的政策只維持了約一年的時間。隨着韓戰在 1950 年 6 月爆發，美國改變其放棄亞洲的政策。在聯合國的任命下，美國領導成員國的軍隊，以捍衛南韓、趕走共產北韓的侵略者為軍事目標。10 月下旬，中華人民共和國派遣中國人民志願軍加入戰爭，以「抗美援朝」的口號與美軍展開直接的軍事衝突。在這個形勢下，美國重新釐定它的對華政策。從韓戰直至 1956 年初，國家安全委員會制定了數個政策文件，分別是第 48/5 號文件 (NSC 48/5)、第 146 號文件系列 (the NSC 146 Series) 和第 166 號文件系列 (the NSC 166 Series)。一改韓戰前的方針，它們一致認為美國必須重返

¹本研究得香港樹仁大學學術研究委員會撥款資助，編號：Ref. No. 10034A，特此致意。

² Department of State, 1949b. *United States Relations with China: With Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949*. Washington, D.C.: GPO.

³ Department of State, 1949a. NSC 55/2: Views of the British Government Respecting Hong Kong, 17 October 1949. RG 237, *Records of the National Security Council: Policy Papers*, box 7, f: NSC 55. Maryland: National Archives and Records Administration II.

⁴ Department of State, 1977. Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, 30 December 1949 [NSC 48/2: The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia], *Foreign Relations of the United States*, vol. VII, *The Far East and Australasia*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, pt. 2, pp.1215-1220

⁵ Donovan, Robert J., 1996. *Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1949-1953*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, p. 86.

亞洲，以圍堵甚至消滅中國共產黨政權作為亞太地區的戰略目的。⁶(Department of State 1985a; Department of State 1985b; Executive Secretary of the National Security Council 1978) 由於香港特殊的地理和政治地位，及其社會人口結構，美國視這一块細小的港口為圍堵中華人民共和國的第一個「前哨站」(outpost)。

從《四海》看美國的宣傳手法及對華政策

在眾多圍堵中華人民共和國的措施之中，香港的主要功能是對全球華人進行宣傳戰，其他的包括情報收集、貿易制裁等等。香港的首要優勢是地理位置，處於中國大陸和東南亞之間的交通樞紐位置。英國更稱香港是圍堵共產主義向東南亞擴張的「第一據點」。⁷(Department of Great Britain 1949b) 其次，香港一向以來都是華人從大陸逃難出來的棲身之地和包容所。這些難民中，部份會隨着大陸的政治、經濟變得穩定而返回內地；部份則以香港為中途站移居海外，以東南亞地區為主要目的地。自中華人民共和國成立以來，大批華人以難民身份湧入香港。有別於以往，這批難民大部份都無意返回內地。除了少數幸運的可以移居海外，他們只得在香港落地生根，永久性居住。⁸(Hambro 1957; Mark 2007) 值得注意的是這些難民成為了美國反共宣傳之中最有力的「武器」。連同其背向大陸、面向東南亞甚至全球的地理位置，香港旋即成為聯繫中國大陸及海外華人的最佳「公關」。最後，香港在政治上是英國的殖民地；而在外交層面上，英美兩國有着「特殊的關係」(the “Special Relationship”)，為美國提供了一道方便之大門。

美國反共的宣傳戰是由設置於美國駐港領事館下的美國新聞處 (the United States Information Service, USIS) 全權負責。透過香港作為「資訊的發放中心」(the “center of the distribution of information”)，美國新聞處一方面是要聯繫及凝聚中國大陸內外的華人以打擊中國共產黨政權，使其失去認受性，甚至倒臺；另一方面是要遏止共產主義在全世界蔓延。在這多面，美國新聞處的宣傳渠道是多元化的。除了與英國倫敦政府及香港殖民政府合作、協調宣傳和資訊政策，美國新聞處亦單方面向大眾媒體、出版商、文人作家及教育機構入手，包括資訊及新聞稿的提供、金錢上的援助、以及文化商品的製作指導等等。⁹(Defty 2002; Harrington 1953; 趙稀方 2006) 在眾多美國新聞處所出版的和

⁶ Department of State, 1985a. Statement of Policy by the National Security Council, 6 November 1953 [NSC 146/2: United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Formosa and the National Government of China], *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, vol. XIV, *China and Japan*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, pp.294-299;307-330. Department of State, 1985b. Basic U.S. Objectives Toward Communist China by the National Security Council, 6 November 1953 [NSC 146/2: United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Formosa and the National Government of China], *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, vol. XIV, *China and Japan*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, pp.294-299. Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, 1978. Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay), 17 May 1951: NSC 48/5, United States Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951*, vol. VI, *Asia and the Pacific*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, pt. 1, pp.33-36.

⁷ Department of Great Britain, 1949b. Ministry of Defense to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, FO 371/75871, *Ministry of Defense*, 4 May, London: Public Record Office.

⁸ Hambro, E., 1957. “Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong,” *Phylon*, 18, pp.69-81.; and Mark, C.K., 2007. “The ‘Problem of People’: British Colonials, Cold War Powers, and the Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong, 1949-62,” *Modern Asian Studies*, 41, pp.1145-1181.

⁹ Defty, A., 2002. “‘Close and Continuous Liaison’: British Anti-Communist Propaganda and Cooperation with the United States, 1950-51,” *Intelligence and National Security*, 17, Winter Issue, pp.100-130; Harrington, J., 1953. Consulate General to Department of State. RG 84 Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Hong Kong, 1950-1955, box 1: f: 670, 6 June, Maryland: National Archives and Records Administration II; and 趙稀方 2006, ‘五十年代的美元文化與香港小說’，*二十一世紀雙月刊*，98期，12月，87-96頁。

贊助出版的刊物之中，《四海》畫報 (the *Four Seas Pictorial Monthly*) 可以說得上是美國政府的「口舌」(the mouth-piece)。雖然它沒有其他刊物諸如《今日世界》(the *World Today*) 和《自由陣線》(the *Freedom Front*) 般受到美國新聞處的大力資助和學者的關注，而且出版時間也只得五年多；但是它高調的反中共和親台灣的姿態卻引起了英國殖民地政府的不滿。這可以見到《四海》在美國的反中共宣傳戰之中的作用和價值是不容忽視的。

《四海》於 1951 年 9 月 10 日創刊，以畫報和月刊形式在香港發行。畫報以八開尺寸，每本平均二十四頁，售價定於每本六毫。除了香港，畫報更分銷到海外，遠至南非、美加等地。《四海》共出版了五十三期，最後一期於 1956 年 4 月發行。停刊原因多是因為財政壓力。根據刊物內的印刷及登記資料，《四海》是由一間名為四海圖書刊行社所發行的，經理為華人范基平。除了向香港政府註冊之外，《四海》還向台灣登記。在 1953 年 8 月出版的第二十二期，內頁首次印上「中華民國政府僑務委員會登記」的字句。¹⁰(《四海》編委會 1953) 事實上，《四海》是由美國新聞處贊助的，而 1953 年的《香港年報》清楚地公開了這一點。美國新聞處主要是負責「督導編輯、出版及分發」。它認為以美國新聞處的名義發行《四海》會「損害」刊物的「公信性」；故此，刊物從製作以至到零售都由「商業渠道」進行。¹¹(Hong Kong Government 1954; Hummel 1953) 也正因如此，《四海》被香港政府定性為「不能追尋其資料來源」(“the unattributed materials”) 的刊物。¹²(American Consul General (Hong Kong) 1953) 大抵是因為英美的同盟關係，美國新聞處未被要求停止出版《四海》。¹³(American Consul General (Hong Kong) 1953)

從包裝、設計到編輯路向

以《四海》作為刊物的名稱，並以中文書寫，這份刊物顧名思義是要聯繫全球的華人。在創刊號，編輯者寫道：

《四海》的刊行，便是想讓四海之內之自由人民，特別是遠離祖國的華僑兒女……多知道一些今日祖國，一方面臨怎麼樣一種災難，另一方面又怎麼樣艱苦卓絕的在堅強奮鬥……¹⁴(《四海》編委會 1951)

文中所提及的「災難」很明顯是指中國大陸已在中國共產黨手中的事實，而「自由人民」則是反對共產主義的，其中的海外華人更是《四海》的主要對象。

為了吸引普羅大眾，《四海》以畫報形式出版。封面與封底都以彩色印刷，內頁則是黑白色的。就封面而言，除了其中的三期是以小女孩為對象，所有的都以年輕、摩登的香港女性作為封面。這些「封面女郎」包括當時得令的女星如李麗華和林黛、「香江小姐」和名媛。至於封底，《四海》多以中國傳統藝術例如剪紙、壁畫和木刻等為題材。

¹⁰ 《四海》編委會 1953 丁，*四海*，8 月 1 日，1 頁。

¹¹ Hong Kong Government, 1954. *Hong Kong Annual Report, 1953*. Hong Kong: The Government Printer, pp.162; and Hummel, Arthur W. Jr., 1953. Hummel to Aldington, 30 September. Acquired through the Freedom of Information Act. Private possession.

¹² American Consul General (Hong Kong), 1953. Memorandum of Conversation, 7 April 1953, encl. American Consul General (Hong Kong), 25 April, acquired through the Freedom of Information Act and in private possession.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ 《四海》編委會 1951 己，「編輯者言」，*四海*，9 月 10 日，1 頁。

這樣的包裝除了能夠增加畫報在香港的銷路，俗稱「入屋」，也可以在海外華人的圈子裡宣傳香港，加強香港作為聯繫全球華人的「公關」功能。還有，利用中國傳統藝術作為包裝也可以達到凝聚海外的華人的目的。就《四海》的內容而言，大致可以歸納為三個類別：時事新聞、海外華人及消閒。每一期都以「世界一月」作為刊物的開端，以大量的圖片，以簡短的文字來綜合過去一個月的世界大事。緊隨其後是重大新聞的深入報導或主要議題的探討，同時依從了圖文並茂、多圖片少文字的原則。這兩部份構成了刊物的前半部份，篇幅平均是刊物的三份之一。從刊物的中間部份開始便是海外華人的生活報導和消閒性資訊。在報導海外華人的方面，華人女性在海外的成就幾乎是每一期的必要內容。消閒性質的內容多以中國傳統文化如京劇、書法等為主，其他的是短篇小說、海外電影的介紹等等。很明顯地，《四海》是用來凝聚四海之內的華人。

除了商業及成本的因素，這樣的包裝和設計包含了濃厚的政治意味。首先，內頁的黑白色印刷可以解讀為 1950 年代的世界正處於正義與邪惡的爭鬥之中。《四海》的創刊號寫道：「半個世界被掩埋於黑暗之中，紙是白的，墨是黑的，而印出來的東西卻常常黑白顛倒。」¹⁵(《四海》編委會 1951) 在 1952 年 10 月 1 日出版的第十二期，即是《四海》已發行了一週年，〈編輯者言〉重申「世界……被分裂為二，光明……【和】黑暗」。¹⁶(《四海》編委會 1952) 編者不諱言地說出《四海》的宗旨是要向讀者提供更多資訊，好讓他們「識清目標，自行決定，置身於目前這個世界應該怎樣。」而按編者言，「這個世界」正處於「民主與自由，獨裁與奴役兩大途徑」¹⁷(《四海》編委會 1951) 的「決擇交叉點」上。《四海》以黑白色印刷正正回應了世界正處於正與邪、是與非、光與暗等的兩極之間。

其次，刊物以畫報形式及利用大量圖片代替文字來報導世界各地新聞的手法，與美國新聞處不用自己的名義出版《四海》以免招惹反感的做法是同出一轍。這個做法一方面是因為圖片是被認為最有說服力的工具去報導世界的發展¹⁸(《四海》編委會 1952)；另一方面是要實踐讓讀者自行選擇真相、真理的辦報目的。這個做法同時亦是要宣揚自由、自決的美國核心價值。綜觀《四海》全部 53 期，只有四期載有〈編輯者言〉。

最後，以女性作為封面及報導的題材，其意義不單只是為了增加銷路，還有更深的意識形態味道。這一點可以從三方面說明。自傳統及日常的法，「自由」皆以陰性名詞 (feminine noun) 稱呼，例如英語中的“*She*”，即是「她」。在 19 世紀末，高唱「自由、平等、博愛」(Liberty, equality, fraternity) 的法國給美國送上了自由神像，它就是以女性來表現。其次，以女性的成就作為報導的焦點更能打動人心。基於中華傳統文化中「女卑」的觀念，女性華人能夠在海外有所成就及揚名更能表現及體驗刊物所提倡的自由信息。最後，表揚女性可以抗衡共產主義所歌頌的兩性平等。

宣傳手法及主要內容

《四海》是美國反共宣傳的工具可以從以下的兩個列表看到一二。它們是根據五年多以來《四海》的時事新聞報導而統計出來。表一是按着冷戰的兩個陣營及地區把相關的報導次數來分類；而表二是按照次數列舉出最為《四海》經常報導的十個亞洲國家和

¹⁵ 同上。

¹⁶ 《四海》編委會 1952 丁，「編輯者言」，《四海》，10 月 1 日，1 頁。

¹⁷ 《四海》編委會 1951 己，「編輯者言」，《四海》，9 月 10 日，1 頁。

¹⁸ 《四海》編委會 1952 丁，「編輯者言」，《四海》，10 月 1 日，1 頁。

地區。

表一：以冷戰陣營、主要地區作為報導對象的次數：

陣營/地區洲	次數	注
亞洲	424	
歐美陣營	278	美國佔 93 西德佔 29
蘇聯陣營	104	蘇聯佔 46 東德佔 23
非洲	45	
中東	34	
美洲 (不包括美國)	25	

表二：最為《四海》經常報導的十個亞洲國家和地區：

亞洲的國家/地區	次數
台灣	74
中國大陸	63
越南	44
日本	33
香港	31
北韓	25
馬來亞 (馬來西亞)	20
泰國 (暹羅)	20
印尼	19
南韓	19

由於《四海》是以華人為對象，所以有關亞洲的報導次數比其他地區多 (表一)。亞洲方面，台灣的報導次數在所有地區之中列居首位，其次是中國大陸，而兩者合共 137 次 (74 + 63) (表二)。以百份比計算，它們佔了約三分之一 (137/424) (表一)。顯而易見，中共政權和國民政府的意識形態之爭是《四海》的主要關注點。同樣的關注亦見於美蘇、東西德和南北韓，東西德的報導次數更比馬來西亞、印尼等多 (表一、表二)。這個選擇性的關注符合了刊物的編輯原則，即是人們正處於分裂的兩極世界之間。

對於「兩個世界」的側重同時也道出了《四海》的主要報導和宣傳手法。編者曾明言比較是《四海》的編輯作風。¹⁹(《四海》編委會 1952) 共產主義的世界常常被描述為充滿「謊言」、「奴性」，是人間「地獄」；而另一世界是自由、幸福的「天堂」。²⁰ 這個手法正是美國冷戰策略的核心。「圍堵政策之父」喬治·肯南 (George F. Kennan, 1904-2005) 提出最有效遏止共產主義擴張的方法就是維持美國的安定、繁榮、開放及活

¹⁹ 同上。

²⁰ 例子可見〈蘇聯的奴工〉，《四海》，1953 年 1 月 1 日，10-11 頁；〈俘虜天堂〉，《四海》，1953 年 12 月 10 日，8-9 頁；〈被迫參軍及逃往自由經過〉，《四海》，1954 年 5 月 10 日，20 頁；〈從地獄到天堂〉，《四海》，1955 年 10 月 10 日，1-3 頁。

力性，給共產主義的世界比下去。²¹(Hodge and Fareed, 1997) 就以創刊號為例，《四海》刊登了兩篇文章來證明美國的優越性。第一篇名為〈美蘇兩國工人購買力比較表〉，使用了圖表及相片直接地說出美國的工人比自喻為工人階級代表的蘇聯共產黨政府下的工人生活得更好。²²(《四海》編委會 1951) 緊接的是一篇科技發展的報導，內容介紹美國「電視時代」的來臨。報導中用了「理想成為事」和「從幻想到事實」作為副標題，來說出美國技術的優勢及社會的不斷進步。²³(《四海》編委會 1951)

作為畫報，相片是《四海》給共產主義世界比下去的最有力「武器」。以 1953 年 2 月 1 日的第 16 期和同年 6 月 1 日的第 20 期為例，兩者同樣地一併地報導東西德的生活和東德人從東柏林逃難至西德。它們的文字不多，但用了兩款截然不同的照片來表現兩個德國的不同。東德多面，所刊登的照片不是關於人民被勞役或「斷垣頹壁」的工廠面貌，就是東德軍人如何加強防衛以防止東德人逃走。相反，西德的圖片多是已翻新了或新建的現代化工業建築，用以證明西德的經濟已「復興」。這兩篇報導同時刊登了多張有關西德官民如何收容及接待來自東德的難民。²⁴(《四海》編委會 1953; 《四海》編委會 1953) 同樣的手法亦應用在中國大陸和台灣的報導上。1953 年的第 18 及 19 期分別報導了中國大陸和台灣的土地改革。單看這兩篇文章的標題是沒有大分別的：前者是〈「土改」所見〉，後者是〈土地改革在台灣〉。同樣的題材，相同的篇幅，但所呈現的影像卻大大的不同。〈「土改」所見〉內的照片全是「地主」被扣押、公審，甚至被槍決弄至陳屍田野的情景。台灣的則是農民和地主們融洽地合作的情況，及鄉間現代化及摩登化的景象。為了突顯台灣在土地改革上的成就，文章更附上一張命名為〈大陸土改悲劇〉的照片作對比。²⁵(《四海》編委會 1953; 《四海》編委會 1953)

以上的兩個比較例子又帶出了兩個《四海》最常用的宣傳武器及主題：難民和台灣。前者是世界共同關注的問題，不分地區和國籍；後者就反映了美國的對華政策。首先，難民逃離共產主義世界幾乎是每一期必然報導的主題，用意是打擊共產主義以彰顯自由世界的美好和吸引力。在 1951 年 11 月的第 3 期，就有關保加利亞回教徒被他們的社會主義政府「驅逐出境」的報導，編者寫道：「這樣殘忍的違反人道，唯有希特勒排斥猶太人的情形彷彿似之……他們失去了一切……但是終於獲得了身體和信仰的自由。」²⁶(《四海》編委會 1951) 緊接着文字的是差不多一整頁的照片，紀錄了他們前往土耳其的旅程。其中一張是關於他們接受紅十字會的招待，文字寫着：「接受其【難民】潤別已久之熱食，渠等心情原已奄奄待斃，至此方重獲一綫生命。」²⁷(《四海》編委會 1951) 更巧妙的安排是這篇報導隔離的一頁刊登了以〈蘇聯強迫勞動集中營〉和〈逃犯筆下的集中營〉為名的兩幅漫畫。²⁸(《四海》編委會 1951) 這正正說出與其活在獨裁和殘忍的社會主義政權下，出走到自由世界比留守家園更為重要。

在往後相關的難民報導，《四海》都用上了〈逃出鐵幕〉、〈竹幕邊緣〉和〈奔向自

²¹ Hodge, James F., Jr. and Fareed Zakaria, 1997. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *The American Encounter: the United States and the Making of the Modern World: Essays from 75 years of Foreign Affairs*. New York: Basic Books, pp.155-169.

²² 《四海》編委會 1951 戊，「美蘇兩國工人購買力比較表」，*四海*，9 月 10 日，13 頁。

²³ 《四海》編委會 1951 乙，「有聲有色的電視廣播」，*四海*，9 月 10 日，14-15 頁。

²⁴ 《四海》編委會 1953 己，「從東德到西德」，*四海*，2 月 1 日，2-3 頁；《四海》編委會 1953 戊，「東西德透視」，*四海*，6 月 1 日，6-7 頁。

²⁵ 《四海》編委會 1953 乙，「「土改」所見」，*四海*，4 月 1 日，2-3 頁；《四海》編委會 1953 甲，「土地改革在台灣」，*四海*，5 月 1 日，2-3 頁。

²⁶ 《四海》編委會 1951 丙，「保加利亞難民列車」，*四海*，11 月 10 日，8 頁。

²⁷ 同上。

²⁸ 《四海》編委會 1951 甲，*四海*，11 月 10 日，9 頁。

由〉的字句作為文章或圖片的標題。²⁹「幕」是冷戰時期所用的字眼來形容共產世界把自己關閉起來，不與外面的自由世界接觸。「鐵幕」(the Iron Curtain) 是指歐洲大陸上東西歐的分水線；而「竹幕」(the Bamboo Curtain) 是亞洲地區的中國大陸邊界，香港就是這「竹幕」的第一個「面向世界的窗口」(the window to the world)。1953 年 9 月刊登了一篇〈竹幕邊緣〉的文章，它是這樣寫道：

香港和深圳所代表的是兩個生活思想政治體制根本不同的世界，人們呼吸的也是兩種根本不同的空氣。大陸邊境，竹幕低垂，自由世界的人士要窺探一點大陸真情，難乎其難。³⁰(《四海》編委會 1951)

大抵是因為美國新聞處所提供的協助，《四海》曾多次刊登從中國大陸逃來香港的難民訪問稿、自白書等等。對象多是宗教人士，用意是要襯托出中國共產黨抑制信仰自由的政策，與西方的宗教自由態度是截然不同。³¹ 另一方面，《四海》亦表揚以美國為首的自由世界慷慨地收容及接濟難民。以香港為例，1955 年 3 月刊的封裡就以〈救濟難民〉為題刊登了數張照片，報導了美國經援協會 (the Cooperative for American Remittance to Everywhere, Inc., CARE) 為逃離中國大陸而滯留在香港的難民所送上的「食物包」(food parcel)。每幅照片都清楚看見印有 CARE 字樣的「食物包」與及受贈者滿心歡喜的笑容。³²(《四海》編委會 1955) 值得一提的是香港政府在 1960 年的年報亦高度讚揚 CARE 為這些難民解決了飢餓問題。³³(Hong Kong Government 1961) 同類有關美國如何關愛難民亦屢見報導。³⁴

至於美國的對華政策，《四海》可以說得上是美國政府的發言機關。除了自己單方面的圍堵措施，美國還積極地拉攏和聯合中國大陸以外的華人一起孤立中共政權。綜觀當下形勢，留守台灣的國民政府理想當然地成為海外華人的「召集人」。因此，對於《四海》來說，親台反中共才是政治正確的。除了前文所提到向台灣登記和報導台灣美好的一面，《四海》更不遺餘力地宣傳蔣介石政府的合法性。跟隨着美國的「不承認」政策 (the policy of non-recognition)，《四海》從不以「中國」稱呼中華人民共和國，只是用「中共政權」、「北京政府」、「中國大陸」等字眼。³⁵ 1955 年 5 月，在報導北京政府參加萬隆會議的文章內，《四海》更用上了美國傳媒常用的字眼，稱它為「紅色中國」(Red China)。³⁶(《四海》編委會 1955)

因為美國政府仍然堅持遷台的中華民國是唯一合法的中國，所以《四海》稱呼台灣為「祖國」，有時更用上「自由中國」的字眼。³⁷ 台灣是華人的「家」可以從那些所

²⁹ 例子見〈逃出鐵幕〉，《四海》，1951 年 12 月 25 日，封裡；〈逃出鐵幕的捷克人〉，《四海》，1952 年 3 月 25 日，14 頁；〈竹幕邊緣〉，《四海》，1951 年 11 月 10 日，封裡；〈竹幕來去〉，《四海》，1956 年 4 月，封裡。

³⁰ 《四海》編委會 1951 丙，「竹幕邊緣」，《四海》，11 月 10 日，封裡。

³¹ 例子可見〈從地獄到天堂的故事〉，《四海》，1955 年 10 月 10 日，18-19 頁；〈宗教在各國〉，《四海》，1955 年 5 月，6-7 頁。

³² 《四海》編委會 1955 丁，「救濟難民」，《四海》，3 月 10 日，封裡。

³³ Hong Kong Government, 1961. *Hong Kong Annual Report, 1960*. Hong Kong: The Government Printer, p.181.

³⁴ 例子可見〈鐵幕難民抵美〉，《四海》，1954 年 5 月 10 日，封裡。

³⁵ 例子可見〈中共治下的電影獄〉，《四海》，1951 年 9 月 10 日，14 頁；〈逃出中國大陸的鐵幕〉，1953 年 5 月 1 日，18 頁；〈共艦砲轟英巡艇〉，《四海》，1953 年 10 月 10 日，12 頁。

³⁶ 《四海》編委會 1955 戊，「萬隆會議」，《四海》，5 月 10 日，2 頁。

³⁷ 例子可見〈祖國的溫暖〉，《四海》，1952 年 8 月 1 日，15 頁；〈自由中國〉，《四海》，1953 年 5 月 1 日，4-5 頁；〈自由中國的海陸空軍〉，《四海》，1954 年 10 月 10 日，2-3 頁。

調「歸僑」的報導看到。1953年11月，在報導一宗台灣政府接收了從韓戰釋放出來的華人戰俘的新聞上，《四海》以〈反共義士歸來〉為文章的標題，並刊登了這批為數63人所合撰的書簡以證明遷台政府的合法性。根據報導，書簡的內容說：「我們回返自由祖國，我們的生命也交給了祖國，我們決與共匪奪鬥到底，雪耻復仇。」³⁸(《四海》編委會 1953) 另一個例子是1954年的第29期，它刊登了一批約1萬5千人從大陸逃往台灣的文章，題目是〈反共戰士浩蕩歸來〉。文章的第一句說：「中共反共戰士背棄共黨政權而回返自由中國的台灣，是自由國家……最大的政治勝利。」³⁹(《四海》編委會 1954) 兩篇報導都同樣用了「自由中國」來稱呼台灣，逃來台灣的是反共之士，他們是歸僑，並且終於返回祖國。問題是純粹以歷史地理的角度來看，台灣何曾是「國」？他們何曾居住過台灣？而「歸」、「回返」等些字如何用得上？

稱呼台灣為祖國的政治用心也見於《四海》自1952年起每年報導中華民國的雙十國慶的慶祝活動，目的是要加強海外華人的身份認同；相反，中華人民共和國十月一日的國慶日則隻字不提。⁴⁰(《四海》編委會 1952; 《四海》編委會 1953; 《四海》編委會 1954; 《四海》編委會 1955) 談到中華民國的成立，1955年12月的第50期便介紹了孫中山的孫女孫穗芳，文章題目為〈民航空中小姐孫穗芳〉。⁴¹(《四海》編委會 1952) 這個報導表面看來是要讚揚華人女性的成就，但它的撰寫對象卻令人聯想到背後的政治意味。除了孫穗芳，更令人猜疑的是文中所介紹的航空公司正是美國在太平洋戰爭時期送給中華民國的。當國民黨政府遷往台灣時，這間航空公司的產權曾引起中共政府和國民黨政府之間的司法訴訟，並導致英美兩國的介入。最後，這間航空公司隨國民黨政府遷往台灣。⁴²(Leary 1972) 無獨有偶，這間航空公司曾是《四海》的廣告商。⁴³(《四海》編委會 1952) 這裡同時亦指出香港也是《四海》拉攏的對象。除了報導香港華人往來兩地之外，《四海》更利用香港影星前往台灣的宣傳活動作為政治題材。1955年12月的出版刊登了一篇香港影星前往金門島的活動，它的目的是要答謝及慰問軍人在第一次台灣海峽危機中的防衛工作。這篇報導印刷在內頁的第一頁，標題是「影星勞軍」，並刊登了當時得令女明星緒如白光、林黛與士兵的合照。值得注意的是跟隨中文標題的英語標題：“Movie Patriots From Hong Kong Visiting Free China.”⁴⁴(《四海》編委會 1955) 意思是「香港的影壇愛國者探訪自由中國」。這個翻譯手法是值得商榷的。

就上述有關《四海》的宣傳手法及報導主題，不難理解香港政府對這份刊物的不滿。英美兩國的主要矛盾源於對華政策的不同。就外交承認問題上，英國率先在1950年1月初承認了中華人民共和國，並同時與遷往台灣的中華民國政府中斷邦交。這是為了保護英國在亞洲大陸上的殖民地利益，包括香港。無論是地理位置、政治取向或是意識形態，香港皆處身於一個尷尬的位置。面對着這個困局，英國殖民地政府採取政治中立的態度。相反，由於美國在亞洲的利益遠不及得上英國，故此冷戰思維成為它在制定對華政策的主要視角。正因如此，反中共親台灣成為美國新聞處出版宣傳刊物的方針。《四海》極度反中共的內容和高調親近台灣的姿態正抵觸了英國的香港政策。香港政府的政

³⁸ 《四海》編委會 1953 丙，「反共義士歸來」，*四海*，11月10日，2-3頁。

³⁹ 《四海》編委會 1954 甲，「反共戰士·浩蕩歸來」，*四海*，3月10日，2-3頁。

⁴⁰ 《四海》編委會 1952 丙，「從雙十·看台灣」，*四海*，11月1日，8-9頁；《四海》編委會 1953 十在台灣，「雙十在台灣」，*四海*，11月10日，4頁；《四海》編委會 1954 乙，「星光燦爛慶雙十」，*四海*，11月10日，10-11頁；《四海》編委會 1955 丙，「世界一月」，*四海*，11月15日，4-5頁。

⁴¹ 《四海》編委會 1952 乙，「民航空中小姐孫穗芳」，*四海*，12月，14-15頁。

⁴² Leary, William M., Jr., 1972. "Aircraft and Anti-Communists: CAT in Action, 1949-1952," *China Quarterly* 52 (October/November): pp.654-669.

⁴³ 《四海》編委會 1952 甲，*四海*，6月25日，19頁。

⁴⁴ 《四海》編委會 1955 己，「影星勞軍」，*四海*，12月，2-3頁。

治顧問曾於 1953 年春天數次與美國領事館商討美國新聞處的宣傳及出版活動，《四海》就是其中的爭論議題。

結語

自第 53 期在 1956 年 4 月出版後，《四海》便無聲地停刊。由於《四海》並不是美國新聞處的重點刊物，所以已公開的文獻並沒有太多相關的記錄。然而，從《四海》最後半年的出版設計和內容來推測，財政及銷路是停刊的主要原因。就內容來說，自第 49 期開始，消閒的部份增加了以男性為對象的文章，⁴⁵(《四海》編委會 1956) 打破以往只集中女性的做法。以設計來說，《四海》開放封底作為刊登廣告的用途，一改以往只是印刷不賺錢的東西，例如賀年圖、冷戰地圖、民間手工藝等等。⁴⁶(《四海》編委會 1955) 雖然如比，《四海》仍是一份有份量的反共刊物，它的成效不單只反映在香港政府對它的不滿，還反映在其銷路。自它面世以來，在兩年之間《四海》已發行至美洲及非洲，代理商約 50 個。美國新聞處在 1953 年的春天更錄得 3 萬本的發行數量。⁴⁷(Hummel 1953) 總括來說，《四海》是美國以香港作為反共宣傳戰基地其中一個最有效的例證。與此同時，香港在這方面的戰略價值亦於 1957 年國家安全委員政策文件第 5717 號 (NSC 5717) 得到美國政府首次的肯定。⁴⁸(Department of State 1957)

⁴⁵ 《四海》編委會 1956，‘男性的剖解’，*四海*，1-4 月，24-25 頁。

⁴⁶ 《四海》編委會 1955 甲，*四海*，10 月 10 日，19 頁。《四海》編委會 1955 乙，*四海*，11 月 15 日，25 頁。

⁴⁷ Hummel, Arthur W. Jr., 1953. Hummel to Aldington, 30 September. Acquired through the Freedom of Information Act. Private possession.

⁴⁸ Department of State, 1957. NSC 5717: U.S. Policy on Hong Kong, 17 July 1957. RG 273, box 44, f: NSC 5717. Maryland: National Archives and Records Administration II.

參考書目

趙稀方 2006, ‘五十年代的美元文化與香港小說’, *二十一世紀雙月刊*, 98 期, 12 月, 87-96 頁

- 《四海》編委會 1951 甲, *四海*, 11 月 10 日, 9 頁
《四海》編委會 1951 乙, ‘有聲有色的電視廣播’, *四海*, 9 月 10 日, 14-15 頁
《四海》編委會 1951 丙, ‘竹幕邊緣’, *四海*, 11 月 10 日, 封裡
《四海》編委會 1951 丁, ‘保加利亞難民列車’, *四海*, 11 月 10 日, 8 頁
《四海》編委會 1951 戊, ‘美蘇兩國工人購買力比較表’, *四海*, 9 月 10 日, 13 頁
《四海》編委會 1951 己, ‘編輯者言’, *四海*, 9 月 10 日, 1 頁
《四海》編委會 1952 甲, *四海*, 6 月 25 日, 19 頁
《四海》編委會 1952 乙, ‘民航空中小姐孫穗芳’, *四海*, 12 月, 14-15 頁
《四海》編委會 1952 丙, ‘從雙十・看台灣’, *四海*, 11 月 1 日, 8-9 頁
《四海》編委會 1952 丁, ‘編輯者言’, *四海*, 10 月 1 日, 1 頁
《四海》編委會 1953 甲, ‘土地改革在台灣’, *四海*, 5 月 1 日, 2-3 頁
《四海》編委會 1953 乙, ‘「土改」所見’, *四海*, 4 月 1 日, 2-3 頁
《四海》編委會 1953 丙, ‘反共義士歸來’, *四海*, 11 月 10 日, 2-3 頁
《四海》編委會 1953 丁, *四海*, 8 月 1 日, 1 頁
《四海》編委會 1953 戊, ‘東西德透視’, *四海*, 6 月 1 日, 6-7 頁
《四海》編委會 1953 己, ‘從東德到西德’, *四海*, 2 月 1 日, 2-3 頁
《四海》編委會 1953 庚, ‘雙十在台灣’, *四海*, 11 月 10 日, 4 頁
《四海》編委會 1954 甲, ‘反共戰士・浩蕩歸來’, *四海*, 3 月 10 日, 2-3 頁
《四海》編委會 1954 乙, ‘星光燦爛慶雙十’, *四海*, 11 月 10 日, 10-11 頁
《四海》編委會 1955 甲, *四海*, 10 月 10 日, 19 頁
《四海》編委會 1955 乙, *四海*, 11 月 15 日, 25 頁
《四海》編委會 1955 丙, ‘世界一月’, *四海*, 11 月 15 日, 4-5 頁
《四海》編委會 1955 丁, ‘救濟難民’, *四海*, 3 月 10 日, 封裡
《四海》編委會 1955 戊, ‘萬隆會議’, *四海*, 5 月 10 日, 2 頁
《四海》編委會 1955 己, ‘影星勞軍’, *四海*, 12 月, 2-3 頁
《四海》編委會 1956, ‘男性的剖解’, *四海*, 1-4 月, 24-25 頁

American Consul General (Hong Kong), 1953. Memorandum of Conversation, 7 April 1953, encl. American Consul General (Hong Kong), 25 April, acquired through the Freedom of Information Act and in private possession.

Defty, A., 2002. “Close and Continuous Liaison”: British Anti-Communist Propaganda and Cooperation with the United States, 1950-51. *Intelligence and National Security*, 17, Winter Issue, pp.100-130.

Department of Great Britain, 1949a. CRO (Nobel-Baker) to the Prime Minister, FO 371/75872, CRO, 12 May, London: Public Record Office.

Department of Great Britain, 1949b. Ministry of Defense to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, FO 371/75871, *Ministry of Defense*, 4 May, London: Public Record Office.

Department of State, 1949a. NSC 55/2: Views of the British Government Respecting Hong Kong, 17 October 1949. RG 237, *Records of the National Security Council: Policy*

- Papers, box 7, f: NSC 55. Maryland: National Archives and Records Administration II.*
- Department of State, 1949b. *United States Relations with China: With Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949*. Washington, D.C.: GPO.
- Department of State, 1957. NSC 5717: U.S. Policy on Hong Kong, 17 July 1957. *RG 273, box 44, f: NSC 5717. Maryland: National Archives and Records Administration II.*
- Department of State, 1977. Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, 30 December 1949 [NSC 48/2: The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia], *Foreign Relations of the United States*, vol. VII, *The Far East and Australasia*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, pt. 2, pp.1215-1220.
- Department of State, 1985a. Statement of Policy by the National Security Council, 6 November 1953 [NSC 146/2: United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Formosa and the National Government of China], *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, vol. XIV, *China and Japan*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, pp.294-299; 307-330.
- Department of State, 1985b. Basic U.S. Objectives Toward Communist China by the National Security Council, 6 November 1953 [NSC 146/2: United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Formosa and the National Government of China], *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, vol. XIV, *China and Japan*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, pp.294-299.
- Donovan, Robert J., 1996. *Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1949-1953*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, p. 86.
- Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, 1978. Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay), 17 May 1951: NSC 48/5, United States Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951*, vol. VI, *Asia and the Pacific*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, pt. 1, pp.33-36.
- Hambro, E., 1957. Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong. *Phylon*, 18, pp.69-81.
- Harrington, J., 1953. Consulate General to Department of State. *RG 84 Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Hong Kong, 1950-1955, box 1: f: 670*, 6 June, Maryland: National Archives and Records Administration II.
- Hodge, James F., Jr. and Fareed Zakaria, 1997. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *The American Encounter: the United States and the Making of the Modern World: Essays from 75 years of Foreign Affairs*. New York: Basic Books, pp.155-169.
- Hong Kong Government, 1954. *Hong Kong Annual Report, 1953*. Hong Kong: The Government Printer, p.162; and Arthur W. Hummel, Jr. to Aldington, 30 September 1953, acquired through the Freedom of Information Act and in private possession.
- Hong Kong Government, 1961. *Hong Kong Annual Report, 1960*. Hong Kong: The Government Printer, p.181.
- Hummel, Arthur W. Jr., 1953. Hummel to Aldington, 30 September. Acquired through the Freedom of Information Act. Private possession.
- Leary, William M., Jr., 1972. Aircraft and Anti-Communists: CAT in Action, 1949-1952. *China Quarterly*, 52 (October/November): pp.654-669.
- Mark, C.K., 2007. The "Problem of People": British Colonials, Cold War Powers, and the Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong, 1949-62. *Modern Asian Studies*, 41, pp.1145-1181.

香港成為國、共以外倡導「自由」聲音的地方——

以五十年代《自由陣綫》群體批評國民黨及反共言論為例

區志堅¹

香港樹仁大學

電郵：ckau@hksyu.edu

一、引言

近代知識的傳播，不可不注意報刊及雜誌，報章為每天出版，刊載時事，但每因篇幅未能發表長篇的觀點；而雜誌或為週刊，或為月刊，篇幅不厚，方便攜帶，或以較輕鬆筆觸書寫時事問題，較容易為群眾接受，更重要是記錄一個星期或一個月內，時人的評論，這些言論往往因篇幅太長，未能在報章上刊載，也因雜誌方便閱讀，又能在短時間及有限空間內，閱讀時人的評論，同時，雜誌為專題的刊物，若對某一課題有興趣者，自然會有固定的讀者群，故在電子網絡未廣泛發展的時代，雜誌成為另一種重要的知識傳播媒介；雜誌的範圍十分廣泛，如政論、時尚、時裝、娛樂、經濟等，其中以政論的雜誌尤值得注意。不少知識分子藉政論雜誌以批評時政，雜誌也有自己的政治取向，也因此而選擇去取文章的標準，雜誌漸漸聚合一群認同此雜誌宗旨的知識群體，也有自己的讀者群，這樣反過來推動雜誌的發展，雜誌成為作者、出版社及讀者溝通的橋樑。

尤可以注意者，雜誌在特殊的時間及空間內，扮演了知識交流的角色，特別處於一時控制知識傳播的國家，一些國外的出版為成為自由言論的空間。五、六十年代的香港政論雜誌提供了自由空間的角色，研究這些政論雜誌，以見作者在「反共」的大前提下，也批評國民政府的言論是怎樣的，不少居臺灣的知識分子，也在《自由陣綫》上發表言論，抗衡及批評中共，也見五十年代的香港在海峽兩岸的國民黨及共產黨政權以外，扮演了不滿中共及國府施政的知識分子，發表言論的地方，香港也成為中國大陸及台灣以外，海外華人的「第三勢力」集結之地，雖然這些民間言論未必可以影響施政，也可能在「反共」的概念下，評估國外及國內的形勢有偏頗，卻不失為一時一地言論的時代

¹ 本研究獲香港樹仁大學學術研究委員會撥款資助，編號：Ref. No. 10034A，特此致意。誠蒙陳正茂教授提供寶貴資料及意見，及感謝曾參加六十年代政論報刊出版的吳達明先生，謝炳堅先生接受訪問，也感謝韓子奇教授，林少陽教授提供意見。本文談及《自由陣綫》批判英美及蘇俄政策的言論，曾在宣讀：〈香港為中心的跨區域表述——五十年代《自由陣綫》批評國共及歐美政策的言論〉，2011年11月17-18日，香港浸會大學歷史系、香港樹仁大學歷史系合辦「中國與世界國際學術研討會」。是次本文在此基礎上，進一步探討《自由陣綫》群體批評國共施政的觀點。筆者就是項計劃發表相涉的論文，有：〈從《人生雜誌》看五十年代港台人士對「人生」的看法〉，亞洲學者協會主辦「亞洲學者國際學術研討會」，6-8/5/2011；馬來西亞拉曼大學文學院 2012，「民間與官方論述的異同：錢穆與戴季陶、陳伯達對中山思想的詮釋」，辛亥革命百年與海外華僑國際學術研討會論文集，拉曼大學出版社，馬來西亞；黃兆強 2011，「在非常環境非常心情下做了」——試析錢穆先生在香港興學的原因，錢穆研究暨當代人文思想國際學術研討會論文集，錢穆故居，台北，30-48頁。

特色。²(區志堅、侯勵英 2001;陳正茂 2008;菊池貴晴 1978;周淑真 1993;張君勱 2005;林博文 2010;林博文 1999;許行 1998;萬麗鵑 2001) 同時,《自由陣綫》自 1949 年 12 月刊行至 1959 年 6 月停刊,學者認為在香港「第三勢力」出版政論刊物中,立場最堅定,內容最明確,出版最長久的刊物,而此刊物以香港為蒐集及編輯文稿的地方,既受國民政府資助,又批評國民政府及共產黨,也並批評蘇俄及美國對外政策,出版社為在香港牛池灣成立自由出版社,故本文以《自由陣綫》為研究對象,以見《自由陣綫》刊載有關言論,及這群在香港知識分子以香港為中心,建構他們反共、評國民政府及批評歐美政策的言論;此外,今天有不少群眾,隨了自身經歷了中共統治下的生活情況外,故批評中共的施政;也有不少朋友未經歷這些情景,卻又發表反共及恐共的言論,此實與這些五、六十年代出版的政論雜誌建構的「恐共」圖像,也甚有關係。³(林果顯 2010;林果顯 2007;何宜絹 2007;余敏玲;Ysou 1963;Leffler 1992)

二、創刊的原因及宗旨

1949 年 10 月,中共政權宣佈中華人民共和國成立,不少堅持民主思想的知識分子,當然不欲居在新成立的中國,也不欲隨國民政府遷台,不少在美國及李宗仁的資助,於一個英國管治下的香港,組織出版社及發表反對國民黨及共產黨的言論,這就是其時人所稱「第三勢力」,當時的第三勢力以張發奎、張國燾、許崇智、伍憲子等人為首,並組織了「自由民主同盟」及「自由民主戰鬥同盟」的重要組織,也有青年黨的程思遠及羅夢冊等人的「民主中國座談會」,這些「第三勢力」一時之間,推動了香港政治團體的活動,又營造了香港曾扮演了一個政論活躍的地方,他們與五十年代香港的親中共的

² 要注意這些刊物是批評國民政府的施政,批評國府的缺失,未必一定是認為國民政府要離開政權的;參區志堅、侯勵英 2001,「香港浸會大學圖書館友聯資料介紹」,《近代中國史研究通訊》,31 期,92-101 頁;拙:〈從《人生雜誌》看五十年代港台人士對「人生」的看法〉(未刊稿),宣讀於亞洲學者協會,2011 年 5 月 16 至 18 日,宣讀論文;有關香港第三勢力的研究,見陳正茂 2008,「第三勢力運動」史料述評——以《自由陣綫》週刊為例,《中國青年黨研究論集》,秀威資訊科技股份有限公司,台北,13-40 頁;菊池貴晴 1978,《中國第三勢力史論》,汲古書院,東京;周淑真 1993,《中國青年黨在大陸和台灣》,中國人民大學出版社,北京。為中國第三勢力定名的,見張君勱 2005,《中國第三勢力》,稻鄉出版社,台北;林博文 2010,「

一九四九年的香港第三勢力」,《亞洲周刊》,24 卷,2 期,[線上],載

http://www.yzzk.com/cfm/Content_Archive.cfm?Channel=ae&Path=4472350941/02ae2.cfm 檢視日期:2011 年 4 月 14 日;林博文 1999,「五 0 年代香港「第三勢力」運動興亡始末」,《歷史的暗泡:近代中美關係秘辛》,遠流出版社,台北,107-119 頁;許行 1998,「香港政論雜誌回顧——五六十年代至七十年代政論刊物簡史」,《開放雜誌》,5 月號,44-50 頁;萬麗鵑 2001,[未刊稿],「一九五〇年代的中國第三勢力運動」,《國立政治大學歷史研究所博士論文》,台北。

³ 有關五六十年代,中國大陸境外,宣傳及建構「反共」及「恐共」的圖像,見林果顯 2010,「兩次台海危機的戰爭宣傳佈置」,《金門:內戰與冷戰:美、蘇、中檔案解密與研究》,九州出版社,北京,78-103 頁;林果顯 2007,[未刊稿],「臺灣反攻大陸論述的塑造與轉變(1949-1975)」,《政治大學歷史研究所博士論文》;何宜絹 2007,[未刊稿],「國民黨政府與反共抗俄教育之研究」,《國立中央大學歷史研究所碩士論文》,中壢;參余敏玲,[未刊稿],「偉大領袖」vs.「人民公敵」:從蔣介石形象塑造看國共宣傳戰 1945-1949;有關美國對國共兩黨的印象,見 Ysou, T. 1963. *America's Failure in China, 1941-50*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp.30-64. & Leffler, M.P. 1992. *A Preponderance of Power National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. pp.25-50.

左派勢力，展開論戰，又或批評其時國共兩黨的政策，這促使五十年代的香港政論報刊十分繁華的氣象，也使香港政論十分熱鬧。⁴(陳正茂 2008；陳正茂 2011 甲；陳正茂 2011 乙；陳正茂 2011 丙；陳運周 1950；陸恭蕙 2011；周奕 2002)

而《自由陣綫》週刊也在乘時而起，《自由陣綫》自 1949 年 12 月出版至 1959 年 6 月停刊，發行了 40 卷 6 期，據與此刊物相熟的友朋郭士談及出版的原因為：

遠在一九四九年李宗仁代總統時代，當時國民政府大勢已去，李宗仁在離國以前，紛紛對有關的政治人物和政治團體，大放交情，拚命拉攏，有的送錢，有的送官，有的送護照，自己則希望去美國取得美援後東山再起。青年黨也就透過總統府邱昌渭的關係（邱早年為青年黨黨員），分到了四萬銀元券，這一筆錢即由謝澄平經手，以團體名義領到，分了一部份給台灣青年黨總部，其餘的便在九龍牛池灣的一個村落，租了一塊地皮，修了一地房屋，作為香港青年黨人的落腳地，也就成為後來「自由出版社」的大本營所在。一方面由於錢的數目太少，粥少僧多，無法分配；一方面也由於青年黨人參政的時間較短，鬥爭意志尚未完全淘汰貪污，所以便將這一筆錢創辦了《自由陣綫》週刊。⁵(郭士 1963)

再依《自由陣綫》的封面標示：「沒有自由絕無生路；聯合起來才有力量」，可見 1949 年後，李宗仁在離開中國大陸之前，已希望邀請對有關的政治人物和政治團體，予以合作，而青年黨人士因藉總統府邱昌渭的關係，得到了四萬銀元券，便以團體名義，在九龍牛池灣的一個村落，租了地方，成立「自由出版社」及編刊《自由陣綫》，而此版社也以香港青年黨人為中心。

至於《自由陣綫》的創刊宗旨，在〈我們的傾向〉一文中，以為「現在儘管有人興高采烈，也許有人垂頭喪氣，但我們所不能忘懷的，却是國家的前途，人民的死活，人類的禍福。我們眼見我們的國家，已經陷入了一個可能喪失獨立自主的危機；我們的人民，已經有不能生存和被剝奪一切自由的危險，死神又已經伸出了他血腥還未洗淨的魔掌，正面對著全世界的人類，也是我們所不忍袖手的。……有心有力的人們，趕快團結起來，爭取中華民國獨立自主，維護人民的生存與自由，把中國推進一條民主改革的康莊大道，共同來實現一個繁榮康樂的現代國家，為人類和平的保障」，主要就是針對其時認為不自由的中國，「反對一黨專政」，⁶(《自由陣綫》編委會 1949)倡導復國，摧毀專制的統治，建立國家獨立、政治民主、經濟平等、生活自由的新中國，刊載文章者、

⁴ 參陳正茂 2008，「第三勢力運動」史料述評——以《自由陣綫》週刊為例，*中國青年黨研究論集*，13-16 頁；〈五 0 年代香港第三勢力的主要團體——「中國自由民主戰鬥同盟」始末〉(未刊稿)；參陳正茂 2011 甲，「五 0 年代香港第三勢力運動史料之介紹與略評」，*五 0 年代香港第三勢力運動史料蒐秘*，秀威資訊科技，台北，頁 1-16；陳正茂 2011 乙，「第三勢力運動史料述評：以《自由陣綫》週刊為例」，*五 0 年代香港第三勢力運動史料蒐秘*，秀威資訊科技，台北，17-44 頁；陳正茂 2011 丙，「五 0 年代香港第三勢力的主要團體」，*五 0 年代香港第三勢力運動史料蒐秘*，秀威資訊科技，台北，45-72 頁。陳運周 1950，「從香港看「第三勢力」」，*新聞天地週刊*，40 號，10 月 7 日，4 頁；參陸恭蕙 2011，*地下陣綫——中共在香港的歷史*，香港大學出版社，香港，91-100 頁；周奕 2002，*香港左派鬥爭史*，利文出版社，香港，31-39 頁。

⁵ 郭士 1963，「自由出版社」滄桑史，*醒獅月刊*，1 卷，1 期，8 頁。

⁶ 《自由陣綫》編委會 1949，「我們的傾向」，*自由陣綫*，1 卷，1 期，12 月 3 日，1 頁。

讀者及編者均是「自由的結合，他們不代表任何一個舊有黨派發言」之人士，依此刊物的宗旨，可見只有第三勢力，才是推動中國發展的力量。而在〈本刊的動向〉一文中，也述及：「檢討過去言論，第一卷提出『第三勢力』這一名辭，肯定中國第三勢力的存在，而展望其前途的發展，這一階段可以說是醞釀時期。第二卷，各方人士響應第三勢力運動，熱烈討論第三勢力的使命、任務乃至組織與領導等等問題，這一階段可以說是廣泛討論時期。今後，第三勢力運動必然進展到理論建立時期和組織時期」，⁷(《自由陣綫》編委會 1950 甲)可見《自由陣綫》就是「倡導第三勢力的革命運動，這種運動的基本目標，在於『政治民主』、『經濟民主』、『文化自由』，根據此三種目標，為樹立『理論的體系』，及訂定『政治的綱領』、『經濟的政策』之準繩，而作建設新中國的藍圖」，因為自由出版社各人的努力，成為時人評為「首先燃起自由反共的火炬，這不能不說是非常難能可貴的事情」。⁸(郭士 1963)

《自由陣綫》在 1950 年的 3 卷 3 期中刊有〈我們的基本信念〉一文，⁹(《自由陣綫》編委會 1950 乙)又再次強調：獨裁的極權的政治，是扼殺民主，消滅自由的「屠刀」。少數人獨佔的私有經濟制度或由少數人分配的集體經濟制度，都是社會生活不均不安的因素，統制文化思想的政策，「是抹煞創造，杜絕進步，拉人類面向黑暗的開倒車政策」，故「凡是愛好民主自由的人士不能忍受的。我們針對現實，提出民主政治，公平經濟，自由文化三個概念，歸結到建立民主中國，組織民主世界的目標」，而「民主政治，公平經濟，自由文化，三個基本原則，是每一個國家內部應有的合理安排，這樣的國家我們稱它為真正的民主國家」，可見籌辦《自由陣綫》的最終目的，就是希望建立一個民主國家，若以五、六十年代海峽兩岸國共兩黨建立政權的情況而言，建立民主國家的理想尤為可貴，因為 1949 年前，知識分子已見國民黨，控制言論，打壓知識分子批評國民黨違憲的言論，在 1950 年初，又不滿共產黨的專權，由是發出建立「民主國家與民主世界」的言論，更可切合其時代的要求。¹⁰(黃兆強 2011)

現時資料所見，《自由陣綫》的編輯先有謝澄平，後有盧衍明，並由張國燾、顧孟餘、張君勱、童貫賢、李微塵、伍憲子、任國榮、周天賢、黃如今及張發奎，其中三人組成常務委員會，分別是伍憲子、顧孟如及張發奎。¹¹(鄭義譯 2008)

至於編刊文章的內容範圍，以各期的〈本刊徵稿簡約〉所說：此為綜合性的刊物，凡學術論著，政治批判，通信報導，文藝小品，書報評介，譯述稿作，均可投稿，在第三卷〈合訂本目錄索引〉中更分類羅列第一至七期的題目，計有：短評、時論、專論、第三勢力有關論著、中共批判、人物介紹、天下縱橫談、通訊報導、鐵幕萬象、中共屠殺記者的暴行特輯、自由青年、翻譯、轉載、文藝、讀者投書、漫畫、圖表，收稿的地址為九龍鑽石山上元嶺石堪村四五六號，並由灣仔洛克道 57 號的香港啟明印刷公司承印。¹²(《自由陣綫》編委會 日期)

⁷ 《自由陣綫》編委會 1950 甲，「本刊的動向」，*自由陣綫*，3 卷，1 期，2 頁。

⁸ 郭士 1963，「自由出版社」滄桑史，*醒獅月刊*，8 頁。

⁹ 《自由陣綫》編委會 1950 乙，「我們的基本信念」，*自由陣綫*，3 卷，3 期，5 頁。

¹⁰ 有關 1945 年至 1949 年，中國國內知識分子批判國民黨違憲的言論，見黃兆強 2011，「在非常環境非常心情下做了——試析錢穆先生在香港興學的原因」，*錢穆研究暨當代人文思想國際學術研討會論文集*，錢穆故居，台北，30-36 頁；參拙，香港浸會大學歷史系，「錢穆對孫中山的評價」，*辛亥百年研討會論文集*，香港城市大學出版社，香港，將刊於 2012。

¹¹ 張發奎口述，夏蓮英訪談及紀錄，鄭義翻譯及校註 2008，*蔣介石與我——張發奎上將回憶錄*，文化藝術出版社，香港，489 頁。

¹² 《自由陣綫》編委會 日期，「本刊徵稿簡約」，*自由陣綫*，1 卷，1 期，缺頁。

及至 1950 年十月，自由出版社又出版：任重《「偽」員的苦難》、于平凡《中國民主運動史話》、張仁正《光復大陸戰略戰術》、何自求《無法好轉的中共財政經濟》、胡越（司馬長風）《辯證法的新發展》、李微塵《中國局勢的必然發展》、陳世民《迫害》、王祥雲《血債》、謝方《華北「革命文學」的一角》等，均為不少「反共」及提倡自由的文學作品及研究。

三、批評國共的政策

《自由陣綫》既以標榜編輯力倡「政治民主」、「經濟民主」、「文化自由」的宗旨，也反對任何專制政權及專制政體，不獨是五十年代，中國大陸的共產政權，也反對國民黨，由此可見部份第三勢力的言論，在反共的主要理念下，仍反對國民黨。

季子在〈現階段的中國問題〉一文中，指出 1950 年初，中共在軍事上可以說是獲得了壓到的勝利，國民黨雖還有希望，「種種打算，全部落空」，作者假設了中共統一台灣，仍希望中共按中國客觀環境改造，不可強行改革，不可抄自蘇俄，而在台灣的國民政府應進行徹底改革，要站在人民的利益前行政，「我們站在老百姓的立場，沒有理由反對任何人來充當一名領袖，我們也沒有權力拒絕任何人來領導我們，我們所必須要留意的，便是到底把我們領導往那裏去？假定能領導我們往生存進步的路上走，我們便承認你們為領袖也無所謂，說你們是『偉大』也可，『英明』也可，可是假如你們領導往死亡毀滅的路上走，那我們便有權否認你們的領導的義務！」政府要多給人們「獨立自由」，肯定人民的自由權利。¹³(季子 日期)

達明、盛超〈民主自由運動在發展中〉一文中，指出國民黨在戰後，不能使中國走向民主自由，知識份子受迫害，而中共的「一邊倒，與蘇聯並肩作戰，反帝反美」，卻「對於智識份子及各黨派中下級份子正施以訓練，要他們『搞通思想』，控制自由思想，故希望遷台的智識份子能「否定過去，不做恢復舊勢力的奴隸；他們懷疑當今，不做過附新朝廷的投機份子，他們夢想將來，不皆犧牲一切來創造自由中國與自由世界，有了如此的血潮，必然發生澎湃的自由民主運動」，無論在台灣的國民政府，或是中共建立的政權，也要建立一個民族獨立自由的國家，「反侵略反極權，維護祖國，保障民主的神聖戰爭」，在海峽兩岸的政府，也要為中國人建立一個「每個中國人的生命、財產、思想、言論、信仰、集會、結社的基本自由絕對不受任何國家內外的暴力之壓迫與剝削，獨裁專政是民主自由的敵對，不容許再存在於自由中國，過去中國人民基本自由已受無限傷害，今後要予以保障而加強」，在經濟方面，要防止資本主義的「毒害」，也要「防止共產主義的暴亂補償的社會主義途徑，使人民過著合理良好的經濟生活」，而兩岸政府固然要接受新的以改造舊的文化，但不能將中國的文化一筆抹殺，澈底打倒，「使中華民族成為異族的精神奴隸」。¹⁴(達明、盛超 日期)

50 年代，學者甚關心國民政府失掉大陸的原因。冷生〈國民黨失敗的基本因素〉一文，不獨指出國民黨失去大陸政權的原因，也批評國民黨「拋棄了知識分子，便失去了整個的民心，走上沒路」，文中指出北伐後的國民黨，雖曾與知識分子有過緊密結合，但為執政黨後，不少文人成為黨官，各省主席幾乎為軍人當政，知識分子「不為當局所注意」，又把知識分子「均為異端，看知識分子為眼中釘，懷疑文化人都是共產黨，枉

¹³ 季子 日期，〈現階段的中國問題〉，《自由陣綫》，1 卷，1 期，2-3 頁。

¹⁴ 達明、盛超 日期，〈民主自由運動在發展中〉，《自由陣綫》，1 卷，1 期，15-16 頁。

殺了若干青年，也把多少文化人逼上梁山」，戰後國民黨更與全國知識分子「絕緣」，權力分子與知識分子完全脫節，更甚者不少國民黨官員更「太太小姐可以抱著哈巴狗帶著馬桶逃難，可以利用機會與職權，套取外匯，走私營商，過著驕奢淫逸的生活，却不居社會中堅地位知識分子的死活」，而國民黨中宣傳部，只是發佈黨八股，「一個主義」的教條，「沒有真正打動民眾心弦的東西」，抗戰後國民黨官員更「以主子的姿態到各地去『劫收』，給淪陷區民眾以極壞的印象。復以通貨一再膨脹，國家財政崩潰，國民經濟破產」，政制上的改革，卻是「明眼人都看得這是『假民主』。在國代、立委的選舉中，國民黨包辦、把持、壟斷、分配，鬥得烏煙瘴氣。這些事實，更足以加速知識分子的離心運動」，國民黨的弊政更維繫於蔣介石，「國民黨的大權集於蔣氏一人；蔣氏一生戎馬倥傯，身經百戰，有點剛復自用的性格，是不容易接受別人的意見的」；反之，中共千方百計把知識分子「參加進去」，又埋頭苦幹編了許多小冊子，加強文化宣傳工作，故多受知識分子及社會下層群眾的歡迎。

冷氏又在〈民主政治的逆流〉一文中，¹⁵指出民主政治的基礎，是注意人民的要求，民主政治是國家建立的真諦，「在以人民的意志為意志」，可惜國民黨員學西洋民主政治，只是「偷偷摸摸的模仿德、義，走上法西斯蒂的路綫，於是民國誤為黨國，人民都是阿斗，在訓政時期的一黨專政之下，視相反的意見是反動，及抗戰以後到勝利復員時期，國民黨始終沒有實行民主政治的誠意，在偽裝的『民主』下，好話說盡，壞事做完，自身既不長進，又不肯接納別人的意見，終使中共坐大，而釀成巨禍」，及至遷台的國府也是「在一黨專政之下，一切均為異端，所有反對的意見都是反動，甚至使反對者無法存在，而竟變為反叛」；中共毛澤東的「新民主主義」，只是「民主其名獨裁其實的新極權主義。所謂人民民主專政，便是工人階級專政，而工人階級的組織，又必須透過共產黨，實際說來，就是共產黨專政。毛澤東曾謂『人民民主專政，就是人民民主獨裁』；質言之，也就是共產黨獨裁」，列寧主張以暴力鎮壓，實是以暴易暴，終會使「人民在自由被剝奪，求生無路，求死不得的情況下，勢必官逼民反，叛亂相循，永無寧日」。(冷氏 日期)

陳振軍又在〈台灣問題面面觀〉一文中，¹⁶指出遷臺後的蔣介石不理眾議，以一位「最不適宜做行政院長的人」閻錫山為行政院長，使「黨內外的知識分子，望而却步」，又以「在反共軍事負有嚴重責任的人，一年以來，他在台灣集黨政軍大權於一手，且隨時表現許多反民主的行動與言論，黨內黨外固已非常不滿，台灣人尤其疾首痛心」的陳誠為台灣主席，實不了解台灣黨內外人士的意願，如今國民黨要「革命與民主的作風出之」，以整飾軍事為第一要務，次者為安定民生，再次者為革新行政，也要嚴懲貪污「凡一過去一切犯有貪污嫌疑的人物，應該不顧情面，把他們驅逐離台，要使留在台灣的每一個人，都是真能苦幹的人」，若國民黨不改已有政策，「可以見得他們（中共）一定就能飛渡台灣海峽」，攻佔台灣，文章最後一再提出國民黨失去大陸的原因，除了政治及經濟的因素外，主要乃是黨國不重視知識分子，遠離群眾。(陳振軍 日期)

《自由陣綫》當然以反共為主要論述的內容。如慕容慧的〈抗議中共的餓殺人政策〉一文，批評中共的糧食政策及救災不力，使江南及兩湖等地「春夏間青黃不接的時期，饑餓而死的將達一萬萬人」，而中共養兵，減少了地方從事農耕的人力，迫使青年遠離鄉土的威迫或「清算」而逃避異鄉，不少農民因田地被軍隊分完，糧食徵完而致轉徙他方，中共的遷地政策，把甲地的人遷到乙地，乙地的人遷到丙地，終致人民流離失所；

¹⁵ 冷氏 日期，「民主政治的逆流」，*自由陣綫*，1卷，5期，4-5頁。

¹⁶ 陳振軍 日期，「台灣問題面面觀」，*自由陣綫*，1卷，13期，2-3頁。

加之，中共行「支前徵借」，徵借到連種子都搜刮乾淨，老百姓只是「穀粒俱盡，只有吃青草樹皮的分兒，在將來田地荒盡，青草樹皮吃完，除了活活餓死外，還有生路嗎？」中共把南方的糧食運往北方，北方的糧食送給蘇俄，換取一些機器「中共同胞的飢荒不是中共造成的嗎？」結果是老百姓民窮，只是「把軍隊和共產黨員養得胖胖的」。¹⁷(慕容慧 日期)

張元秋在〈中共出賣了新疆〉一文中，¹⁸說出中共於 1950 年，駐俄使者王稼祥與蘇俄維辛斯基簽了〈開發中國新疆重要資源協議〉，准許蘇俄可以在新疆「進行尋覓、探測、開採及提煉石油、煤氣和有色金屬」，張氏而言此代表了蘇俄可以合法地掠取新疆的資源，加之中共控制的中國大陸，已投入共產黨鐵幕，成為蘇俄的附庸，蘇俄使中共「澈底『附庸化』，『一邊倒』；為嚴防中共中（？）民族派勢力凡的醞釀與抬頭；必須迫使中共在經濟上與軍事上與其建立依存的關係，然後始能將中國國防整個納入蘇俄的國防體系之中，始能將中國人民全部編配成為蘇俄的集體化的農工生產軍，而奠定其東方戰綫所需要的軍需基礎」，新疆為歐亞大陸的中心，東至太平洋，西往大西洋，北至北冰洋，南往印度洋，既為軍事航空的重要基地，也是大陸戰爭的樞紐所在，又可以直達中國腹地，更可往印度，「一旦有事，則新德里及其他印度境內的中心地帶，都在其轟炸圈的範圍以內」，故此約「不僅能是中共賣國行為的公開招認，更說明了蘇俄對中共中國的更進一步的控制，而暗示中共今後向外發展的動向，反映出克姆林宮為準備侵略亞洲及發動三次大戰而預為的積極措施」。(張元秋 1950)

也有歐陽愷的〈農工商學兵在武漢〉一文，批評中共對農工商政策之不當。¹⁹因為在武漢徵糧是用累進法的，農民繳糧後，農民可否有足夠食物，中共是不理的，徵稅以外還有借，借多少更沒有標準，一徵再借，農民被「榨枯」，而工人為了強迫增加工，工作情緒惡劣，商人的貨物賣不出，又不准開門，又要買政府的「公債」，商人最終現款交不出，限期又短，終迫死不少武漢商人，軍人又只注意教導有關「防止反攻」的訊息，武漢大學教授又強迫進行減薪，「天啊！才吃得家人半飽的薪，又『自動』減薪」，教師的生活根本不足維持個人及家庭的生活。(歐陽愷 1950)

另外，也有島士在〈緊鑼密鼓的世界舞台〉一文中，²⁰指出戰後蘇俄日漸擴張，與中國的共產黨結合，使「人心的恐懼日益以深，然而這擁有廣大附庸國家的克寧姆宮主人，則利用戰時英美所給予的援助，從事於新武器的研製，從事於宣傳與煽動，從事於鐵幕的擴張，從事於經濟的建設，儼然以世界主人自居」，蘇聯與中國共產黨結合，使到「蘇聯的野心，鐵幕國家的狂妄，已非花言巧語所能掩飾，共產國際勢力愈伸張，蘇聯的野心也就愈明朗，民主政制與極權政制，本來是積不相容的，大家明合道蘇聯是一隻終於要吃人的猛虎，其所以姑息養奸，不因不外是看輕了這隻虎的力量」，故扶植東德人民政府，以進窺西歐，加強東南歐衛星國家的控制，指導中共打擊美國，寬待英國，希望取得英國的承認，以分散英美對遠東聯合一致的力量；另一方面，希望英美的「民主國家」陣形，能多在亞洲扶助「中國產生反共的新力量」，一再呼喚「香港守備軍力甚厚，在任何情形之下，英決不放棄香港」，除了中國以外，也要扶助其他亞洲國家的建立「反共」力量，若英美不協助建立反共力量，必然會使「（蘇聯）這隻虎已長牙添翼，咆哮狂妄，舞其魔掌，運其陰謀，染紅了半個世界，隨時隨地在予世界安全以威脅，

¹⁷ 慕容慧 日期，「抗議中共的餓殺人政策」，*自由陣綫*，1 卷，9 期，10-11 頁。

¹⁸ 張元秋 1950，「中共出賣了新疆」，*自由陣綫*，2 卷，1 期，5-8 頁。

¹⁹ 歐陽愷 1950，「農工商學兵在武漢」，*自由陣綫*，1 卷，1 期，10-12 頁。

²⁰ 島士 1950，「緊鑼密鼓的世界舞台」，*自由陣綫*，1 卷，1 期，17-18 頁。

龐大的中國，已由于過去的姑息寬容，優柔寡斷而遭了毒手，這不單是增加了蘇聯向世界挑戰的一筆大本錢，同時也增加了他敵對英美的自信，紙是包不住火的，兩種不相容的思想，兩個不相同的壁壘，終於是要決裂的」。(島士 1950)

1950 年的 3 卷 2 期，更載羅夢冊的〈主流社·中國民主自由社會主義學會為社員馬槐隆，楊文彬，會員黃以鏞，魏元珪，鄧世謀諸先生被迫害事件向北京台灣兩政權嚴重抗議書〉一文，²¹此文更見自由出版社批評國共兩黨的言論。文中指出 1950 年 7 月，主流社員及中國民主自由社會主義學會社員馬、楊等先生，在重慶被中共監禁；同時，黃、魏等人在台灣，又被國民黨逮捕，告了「背叛政府的第三黨組織」的罪名，判處十年徒刑，就是代表了「這是你們，一個號為新民主主義之人民政府，和另一個以自由中國為號召之國民政府，對中國人民，中國的國民，及對一個以非武裝的和平方式，循民主的常規，為中國民主自由而努力之民間的民主自由團體，所加之無掩蓋的反民主自由的迫害」，捕捉主流社等人物的行動，就是「你們自號為民主的，自由的政府，竟何以會如此的懼怕民主和自由，竟何以會對人民或國民之民主自由的力量如此下毒手，你們居所謂政府的地位，如果對我們的目標和路線全然不知，盲目的如此，這是你們的昏瞶糊塗；如果他們明白知之，而復如此，則你們是反民主，反自由之反動」，故希望北京、台灣政府應立即恢復社員的自由，保證以後不再發生類似事件，又希望政府能與「一些非武裝之人民的或國民的民主自由力量作和平的政治競賽，讓全國人民或國民作最後的抉擇」，更希望兩地政府不要與人民或國民為敵。(羅夢冊 1950)

四、批評代表「民主國家」的歐美政策之不善

1945 年後，歐洲出現了兩大陣形，一為共產國際的東歐集團國的鐵幕國家，一為以英美為首的「自由民主」國家，他們也多標榜自由民主概念，與被建構的「非自由」的共產國際互相對立，同時，五十年代，在亞洲方面，相繼爆發韓戰及越戰，共產黨在亞洲東南亞地區，如印尼等地多次引起動亂，共產黨在東南亞等地，往往被建構為「反自由」的代表。在這個歷史情景下，《自由陣綫》在「反共」的言論外，也刊載時人批評蘇俄及歐美諸國內政及對亞洲政策。

德謨在〈英鎊貶值的後果若何〉一文中，²²認為英國政府於五十年代初英鎊貶值，未必是恰當。作者認為貶值後英鎊對美匯率較低，英貨輸入美元區之數量雖增，仍不能多得美元，況日用糧食及工業所需原料，仍多取於海外，以外幣紛算則價貴，原料較貴，品製成本提高，日用品價貴，以致生活費增，故英貨售價必升，雖以抑低而償付幣值扯算，貨價也不能廉，難增進輸出的目的；而且，英國負債甚巨，因幣值降低而償付本息額大增，此於英國無益有損，更重要的指出「英當局貶值之舉，實由美國施其壓力，不得已而屈服；美國不論在政治上或經濟上稱霸世界，迫使英鎊貶值，毀壞其信用，解散其集團，則金元勢力，可獨占優越地位矣」；甚至對美國經濟發展而言，英鎊區內諸國，因感美元短絀之痛苦，亦於美國有損無益，他國美元缺乏，即對美購買力薄弱，銷路滯則輸出減，輸出減則失業人數增，故影響了美國經濟的發展。(德謨 1950)

²¹ 羅夢冊 1950，〈主流社·中國民主自由社會主義學會為社員馬槐隆，楊文彬，會員黃以鏞，魏元珪，鄧世謀諸先生被迫害事件向北京台灣兩政權嚴重抗議書〉，《自由陣綫》，3 卷，3 期，27 頁。

²² 德謨 1950，〈英鎊貶值的後果若何〉，《自由陣綫》，1 卷，1 期，14-15 頁。

程彬如在〈美國在中東的兩著冷棋〉一文中，²³認為五、六十年代，世界處在「冷戰」氛圍之中，一方面伊朗王訪美，一方面美國與土耳其聯盟，加強美國在中東的影響力，也使防止蘇俄在中東下「冷棋」，但美國加強對中東的影響力，實是加強對當地石油的控制，最終會引致「阿剌伯、土耳其、伊朗諸國人民起來反抗帝國主義者的剝削」，而美國與土耳其同盟，加強美國控制地中海的力量，正值英國在戰後，失去了對中東國家的控制，而蘇俄卻希望控制中東，「自一九四三年意國（意大利）失敗後，蘇聯的勢力伸展，幾奄有巴爾幹半島，黑海艦隊在大活躍，伊朗中東諸國在赤色恐怖中，土耳其又轉向英國了，可是今日的英國自顧不暇，於是代替英國而起的美國自然成了土國的援助者」，美國與土耳其的聯盟雖是抗張美國的影響力，但沒有美國在此地的擴張，也未能阻礙蘇俄的影響力。（程彬如 1950）

德謨在〈西歐復興與馬歇爾計劃〉一文中，²⁴指出戰後美國援助西歐國家，是不可避免的，西歐國家經濟雖為美國商富所控，但諸國不可不依賴美方的資助，而西歐於五十年代經濟發展仍未有改善的地方，因為：（一）大戰結束，生產尚未復興，美國也未能全面資助；（二）歐洲諸國雖以合作為名，但多畛域分歧，也因此引起不少紛爭。故作者也希望西歐應與美國及諸國之間通力合作，「更減低關稅，以便外貨輸入，投資落後地區以濬利源」。（德謨 1950）

華聲的〈在蘇俄半島體系爭奪戰中的越南〉一文，批評法國不善政。²⁵作者認為 1945 年 50 年，越南共產黨「承赤帝衣鉢」，在越北，越中以及越南各地，造成全越無分城市、農村的普遍不安，尤以 1950 年「由於中共在大陸得意，更增加了越盟的盛大氣燄，正規的戰鬥，不斷在越北山林地帶進行著」，農村經濟在越盟的破壞下「損失了百分之七十以上，良田千頃變成無奈的草萊，衣食無慮的農民，盡成流亡的災黎」，蘇俄更派一位受莫斯科訓練的少壯共黨理論家張政，擔任越盟副主席，加強國際情報局對越共的控制力，美國也自韓戰後，即宣佈加緊援越，以大量軍事力量參加對抗越共的戰爭，但西歐盟國之一的法國，卻「承認中共，俾得勸止毛澤東政府勿對越南直接干預，法國這種飲鴆止渴的行動，竟忘了中共太上政府對蘇俄的一貫陰謀，控制整個越南是半島體系爭奪戰中的一部份，絕對不是獻媚式的『承認』所可改變的，法人此舉，不是慌張失措，便是短視與荒唐」。（華聲 1950）

署名「作梅」的作者，譯自曾任美國駐法及蘇俄大使的 Bullit 撰寫的〈為什麼美國要阻止史大林征服亞洲〉一文。²⁶此文談及五十年代初美國杜魯門總統下令美國第七艦隊阻止任何武力攻擊台灣，又下令美國支援南韓後，已改變美國以往，曾使史大林「把四億五千萬中國人民增加在他的戰爭潛力之內，並威脅那由朝鮮日本起伸張到台灣、菲律賓、越南、馬來亞、暹羅、緬甸以至印度這一大半圓形的一片地方」之政策，若美國不改變昔日對亞洲政策，必增加了史大林主要的戰略據點，增加蘇俄控制亞洲樹膠、錫、白米等資源。加上，印度支那的共產黨在史大林的信徒胡志明領導下，已公開戰爭，蘇俄重新組織了胡志明和他的同黨，組成越南的一個合法政府，而英美則承認保大皇帝的政府，故在越南正和朝鮮一樣，美國和蘇俄各站在一方來打仗，若美國勝了這場戰爭，越南不會落在共產黨手中；另外，英國人雖在馬來亞，卻「對於共黨的游擊隊簡直沒法消滅」，馬來亞是世界產錫最大的地方，若落入共產黨手上，則不止英國受到經濟的打

²³ 程彬如 1950，「美國在中東的兩著冷棋」，*自由陣綫*，1 卷，1 期，4-6 頁。

²⁴ 德謨 1950，「西歐復興與馬歇爾計劃」，*自由陣綫*，1 卷，1 期，11-13 頁。

²⁵ 華聲 1950，「在蘇俄半島體系爭奪戰中的越南」，*自由陣綫*，3 卷，3 期，14-15 頁。

²⁶ Bullit，作梅譯 1950，「為什麼美國要阻止史大林征服亞洲」，*自由陣綫*，3 卷，3 期，18-19 頁。

擊，美國的天然樹膠，也因來自馬來亞，以樹膠為資源的生產也受影響，故建議不獨英美要加強資助亞洲國家抗共的戰爭，在當地的政府也要「得到人力的擁護，更重要的是人心」，「一種廣大和有效的心理作戰同時也要展開」，把胡志明手下那些愛國志士爭取過來，那些受過胡志明恐嚇不得幫助保大和法國的人，應重新組織起來。文中一再指出中共的武器在蘇俄軍官監督下，已加速運入越南，中國有一條鐵路正在蘇俄協助下建築，「如果越南之戰勝利要歸我們這方面的話，則應該在中共有機會大規模援助胡志明之前獲得戰果，否則沒有希望」，況且，共黨取得亞洲後，是不會滿足的，「史大林最後會征服全世界」，美國應採取有效行動阻止史大林的擴張，更藉批評美國對亞洲政策，以勸告美國政府：「從美國可恥的遠東政策中，我們可獲得一教訓，這教訓美國政府應牢牢記住，如果美國要在這個共產主義威脅下的世界生存，就不要忘記：『要統治就要有眼光』」，既批評了美國於 1949 年前先支持國民黨，後又未能大量資助國民黨軍事上以抗共黨的行為，又貶斥美國不少議員發表支持印支半島共黨及中共的言論。(作梅譯 1950)

五、總結

1949 年為中國現代史發展的重要時刻，中國共產黨在中國大陸建立政權，國民黨隨國民政府遷往臺灣，海峽兩岸隔江而治，兩地意識形態也有不同的發展，其間一些不滿中共的知識分子，既不留居中國大陸，但又不欲遷居台灣，自然會選擇居在香港，一些受到美國資助，以香港為反共的「前哨區」，批評中共政策又與中共展開文化論戰，他們也多出版雜誌及刊物，此時中共又資助在香港文化宣傳事業，形成五、六十年代香港報刊及文教事業甚為蓬勃，延伸了饒宗頤教授所言「1945 年至 1949 年的香港就是三國時的荊州」之說法，²⁷而香港也成為國共兩黨以外，第三勢力言論發表的重要地方，尤以六十年代中葉，臺灣的《自由中國》與《文星》受到官方壓力而停刊，²⁸(任育德 1999；薛化元 1996)香港出版的政論刊物，更成為國民政府的「異見人士」發表言論的重要地方，形成了六十年代香港政論雜誌較五十年代的發展，更為興盛，而造成此風，有賴五十年代，一群在香港出版政論刊物的編輯及作者之努力。²⁹(趙令揚、馬楚堅 2006；林慶彰 2005)學者一再呼喚「1950 年代以後的台灣與整個中國的思想歷史，目前仍是一片相當荒蕪的園地，而這五十年中海峽兩岸所經歷的思想變化非常複雜、深刻，應該得到

²⁷ 見區志堅 [未刊稿]，*饒宗頤教授訪問稿(2001 年)*。誠蒙香港城市大學中國文化中心主任鄭培凱教授答允運用「中國文化教育在香港研究計劃」內資料。

²⁸ 有關《自由中國》與《文星》停刊的原因很多，有其編輯委員會的內部因素等，其中國民政府的打壓，也是不能忽視的因素，見任育德 1999，*雷震與台灣民主憲政的發展*，國立政治大學歷史系，台北，275-288 頁；有關研究《自由中國》的成果，見薛化元 1996，*《自由中國》與民主憲政—1950 年代台灣思想史的一個考察*，稻鄉出版社，台北。

²⁹ 拙趙令揚、馬楚堅 2006，「中外文化交融下香港文化之新運：羅香林教授中外文化交流的觀點」，*羅香林教授逝世二十週年紀念論文集*，薈真文化事業出版社，香港，36-52 頁；林慶彰 2005，「香港成為國際漢學交往的橋樑—從乙堂問學書信看戰後羅香林與海外學人之交往」，*國際漢學論叢*，學生書局，台灣，2 期，251-290 頁。

特別的重視」，³⁰(王汎森 2011)期間香港在特殊的時空下，扮演兩岸文化及言論溝通及對話的角色。今後，若能多研究五、六十年代，國共以外的華人地區，新聞報刊及傳媒網絡建構的「反共」、「抗俄」、「共產國際」、「拯救被壓迫的群眾」、「打倒美國帝國主義」等論述，結合社會史、政治史與思想史互動的角度，進行分析，自可見國際華文報刊的言論，與海內外華人思想文化界的關係，又可加深在「冷戰前期」國際政治史及軍事史以外，思想文化互動的研究課題，更可以注意五、六十年代，在全球建構「自由民主國家」與「共產國際」的論述下，各地區主體性傳播媒體的回應又是怎樣。³¹(O'Connor 2010；沈志華、李濱、Douglas Stiffler 2010；沈志華、唐啟華 2010；白永瑞 2009；孫歌 2010)當然，進一步研究五十年代在香港出版，由「第三勢力」群體出版的刊物，與中共、國民黨在港刊載言論相較，也可見不獨是臺灣及東南亞國家的問題成為五十年代，美國及中共「言論相爭的熱點」，香港也成為美國、臺灣的國民政府與中共「言論相爭的前哨站」。³²(Tucker, Talk 2009；Manson 1996；張淑雅 2011)

³⁰ 見王汎森 2011，「中國近代思想文化史研究的若干思考」，*現代中國思想的核心觀念*(載許紀霖、宋宏編)，世紀出版集團，上海，730 頁。

³¹ 有關國際傳媒網絡的研究，見 O'Connor, P. 2010. *The English-Language Press Networks of East Asia, 1918-1945*. Folkstone: Global Oriental 一書，有關近年冷戰史的華人研究成果，見徐天新、沈志華 2011，*冷戰前期的大國關係*，世界知識出版社，北京，沈志華、李濱、Douglas Stiffler 2010，*冷戰與中蘇關係*，社會科學出版社，北京及沈志華、唐啟華 2010，*金門：內戰與冷戰*，九州出版社，北京，後二者為論文集。而有關東亞諸國面對全球化的主體性之研究，見白永瑞 2009，*思想東亞：韓半島視角的歷史與實踐*，台灣社會研究雜誌社，台北，39-60 頁；參孫歌 2010，「歷史中的亞洲論述與當下的思想課題」，*「把握進入歷史的瞬間」*，人間出版社，台北，49-150 頁。

³² 有關台灣、韓戰及東南亞國家成為英美為首「民主國家」與蘇俄、中共為首的「鐵幕國家」言論之「熱點」，見 Tucker, N.B., Talk, S. 2009. *United States-Taiwan Relationships and the Crisis with China*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp.1-8;參 Manson, J.W. 1996. *The Cold War, 1945-1991*. London: Routledge. & Gaddis, J. L. 2005. *The Cold War: A New History*. New York: Penguin Press;張淑雅 2011，*韓戰救臺灣？解讀美國對臺政策*，衛城出版社，新北市，17-32 頁。

參考書目

- 王汎森 2011, '中國近代思想文化史研究的若干思考', *現代中國思想的核心觀念*(載許紀霖、宋宏編), 世紀出版社, 上海, 730 頁
- 白永瑞 2009, *思想東亞：韓半島視角的歷史與實踐*, 台灣社會研究雜誌社, 台北, 39-60 頁
- 林果顯 2007, [未刊稿], '臺灣反攻大陸論述的塑造與轉變(1949-1975)', *政治大學歷史研究所博士論文*
- 林果顯 2010, '兩次台海危機的戰爭宣傳佈置', *金門：內戰與冷戰：美、蘇、中檔案解密與研究*, 九州出版社, 北京, 78-103 頁
- 林博文 1999, '五 0 年代香港「第三勢力」運動興亡始末', *歷史的暗泡：近代中美關係秘辛*遠流出版社, 台北, 107-119 頁
- 林博文 2010, '一九四九年的香港第三勢力', *亞洲周刊*, 24 卷, 2 期, 提取資料日期為 2011 年 4 月 14 日, 由
<http://www.yzzk.com/cfm/Content_Archive.cfm?Channel=ae&Path=4472350941/02ae2.cfm>
- 林慶彰 2005, '香港成為國際漢學交往的橋樑—從乙堂問學書信看戰後羅香林與海外學人之交往', *國際漢學論叢*, 學生書局, 台灣, 2 期, 251-290 頁
- 任育德 1999, *雷震與台灣民主憲政的發展*, 國立政治大學歷史系, 台北, 275-288 頁。
- 何宜絹 2007, [未刊稿], '國民黨政府與反共抗俄教育之研究', *國立中央大學歷史研究所碩士論文*, 中壢
- 余敏玲, [未刊稿], '「偉大領袖」vs.「人民公敵」：從蔣介石形象塑造看國共宣傳戰 1945-1949
- 冷氏 日期, '民主政治的逆流', *自由陣綫*, 1 卷, 5 期, 4-5 頁
- 沈志華、李濱、Douglas Stiffler 2010, *冷戰與中蘇關係*, 社會科學出版社, 北京
- 沈志華、唐啟華 2010, *金門：內戰與冷戰*, 九州出版社, 北京
- 拙, 香港浸會大學歷史系, '錢穆對孫中山的評價', *辛亥百年研討會論文集*, 香港城市大學出版社, 香港, 將刊於 2012
- 季子 日期, '現階段的中國問題', *自由陣綫*, 1 卷, 1 期, 2-3 頁
- 周奕 2002, *香港左派鬥爭史*, 利文出版社, 香港, 31-39 頁
- 周淑真 1993, *中國青年黨在大陸和台灣*, 中國人民大學出版社, 北京
- 馬來西亞拉曼大學文學院 2012, '民間與官方論述的異同：錢穆與戴季陶、陳伯達對中山思想的詮釋', *辛亥革命百年與海外華僑國際學術研討會論文集*, 拉曼大學出版社, 馬來西亞
- 島士 1950, '緊鑼密鼓的世界舞台', *自由陣綫*, 1 卷, 1 期, 17-18 頁
- 徐天新、沈志華 2011, *冷戰前期的大國關係*, 世界知識出版社, 北京
- 孫歌 2010, '歷史中的亞洲論述與當下的思想課題', '把握進入歷史的瞬間', 人間出版社, 台北, 49-150 頁
- 華聲 1950, '在蘇俄半島體系爭奪戰中的越南', *自由陣綫*, 3 卷, 3 期, 14-15 頁
- 陳振軍 日期, '台灣問題面面觀', *自由陣綫*, 1 卷, 13 期, 2-3 頁
- 陳正茂 2008, '「第三勢力運動」史料述評—以《自由陣綫》週刊為例', *中國青年黨研究論集*, 13-40 頁

- 陳正茂 2011 甲，‘五 0 年代香港第三勢力運動史料之介紹與略評’，*五 0 年代香港第三勢力運動史料蒐秘*，秀威資訊科技，台北，頁 1-16
- 陳正茂 2011 乙，‘第三勢力運動史料述評：以《自由陣綫》週刊為例’，*五 0 年代香港第三勢力運動史料蒐秘*，秀威資訊科技，台北，17-44 頁
- 陳正茂 2011 丙，‘五 0 年代香港第三勢力的主要團體’，*五 0 年代香港第三勢力運動史料蒐秘*，秀威資訊科技，台北，45-72 頁
- 陳運周 1950，‘從香港看「第三勢力」’，*新聞天地週刊*，40 號，10 月 7 日，4 頁
- 陸恭蕙 2011，*地下陣綫—中共在香港的歷史*，香港大學出版社，香港，91-100 頁
- 張元秋 1950，‘中共出賣了新疆’，*自由陣綫*，2 卷，1 期，5-8 頁
- 張君勱 2005，*中國第三勢力*，稻鄉出版社，台北
- 張發奎口述，夏蓮英訪談及紀錄，鄭義翻譯及校註 2008，*蔣介石與我—張發奎上將回憶錄*，文化藝術出版社，香港，489 頁
- 張淑雅 2011，*韓戰救臺灣？解讀美國對臺政策*，衛城出版社，新北市，17-32 頁
- 許行 1998，‘香港政論雜誌回顧—五六十年代至七十年代政論刊物簡史’，*開放雜誌*，5 月號，44-50 頁
- 郭士 1963，‘「自由出版社」滄桑史’，*醒獅月刊*，1 卷，1 期，8 頁
- 區志堅，[未刊稿]，*饒宗頤教授訪問稿(2001 年)*
- 區志堅、侯勵英 2001，‘香港浸會大學圖書館友聯資料介紹’，*近代中國史研究通訊*，31 期，92-101 頁
- 黃兆強 2011，‘「在非常環境非常心情下做了」—試析錢穆先生在香港興學的原因’，*錢穆研究暨當代人文思想國際學術研討會論文集*，錢穆故居，台北，30-48 頁
- 菊池貴晴 1978，*中國第三勢力史論*，汲古書院，東京
- 程彬如 1950，‘美國在中東的兩著冷棋’，*自由陣綫*，1 卷，1 期，4-6 頁
- 萬麗鵬 2001，[未刊稿]，‘一九五〇年代的中國第三勢力運動’，*國立政治大學歷史研究所博士論文*，台北
- 達明、盛超 日期，‘民主自由運動在發展中’，*自由陣綫*，1 卷，1 期，15-16 頁
- 趙令揚、馬楚堅 2006，‘中外文化交融下香港文化之新運：羅香林教授中外文化交流的觀點’，*羅香林教授逝世二十週年紀念論文集*，薈真文化事業出版社，香港，36-52 頁
- 慕容慧 日期，‘抗議中共的餓殺人政策’，*自由陣綫*，1 卷，9 期，10-11 頁
- 德謨 1950，‘英鎊貶值的後果若何’，*自由陣綫*，1 卷，1 期，14-15 頁
- 德謨 1950，‘西歐復興與馬歇爾計劃’，*自由陣綫*，1 卷，1 期，11-13 頁
- 歐陽愷 1950，‘農工商學兵在武漢’，*自由陣綫*，1 卷，1 期，10-12 頁
- 薛化元 1996，*《自由中國》與民主憲政—1950 年代台灣思想史的一個考察*，稻鄉出版社，台北
- 羅夢冊 1950，‘主流社·中國民主自由社會主義學會為社員馬槐隆，楊文彬，會員黃以鏞，魏元珪，鄧世謀諸先生被迫害事件向北京台灣兩政權嚴重抗議書’，*自由陣綫*，3 卷，3 期，27 頁
- 《自由陣綫》編委會 1949，‘我們的傾向’，*自由陣綫*，1 卷，1 期，12 月 3 日，1 頁
- 《自由陣綫》編委會 1950 甲，‘本刊的動向’，*自由陣綫*，3 卷，1 期，2 頁
- 《自由陣綫》編委會 1950 乙，‘我們的基本信念’，*自由陣綫*，3 卷，3 期，5 頁
- 《自由陣綫》編委會 日期，‘本刊徵稿簡約’，*自由陣綫*，1 卷，1 期，缺頁
- Bullit，作梅譯 1950，‘為什麼美國要阻止史大林征服亞洲’，*自由陣綫*，3 卷，3 期，18-19

- O'Connor, P. 2010. *The English-Language Press Networks of East Asia, 1918-1945*. Folkestone: Global Oriental.
- Leffler, M.P. 1992. *A Preponderance of Power National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. pp.25-50.
- Manson, J.W. 1996. *The Cold War, 1945-1991*. London: Routledge. & Gaddis, J. L. 2005. *The Cold War: A New History*. New York: Penguin Press.
- Tucker, N.B., Talk, S. 2009. *United States-Taiwan Relationships and the Crisis with China*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp.1-8.
- Ysuo, T. 1963. *America's Failure in China, 1941-50*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp.30-64.

從《自由陣線》到《自由鐘》： 檢視五六十年代流亡知識份子的命運

容啟聰

澳洲雪梨大學

電郵：kyun0761@uni.sydney.edu.au

一九四九年後，大量的中國知識份子從大陸出走，流亡在外，他們在香港及台灣出版了不少的期刊雜誌，而這些雜誌的內容變遷，大概也反映了當時的流亡人士對「救國」這一個理念的理解的轉變。這些雜誌，多數是為了尋求救國之法而出版的。對於這些流亡分子來說，「救國」具有兩個層面的意義。第一，在中共建政以後，在台灣的國民政府的處境相當危急，「救國」的第一重意義，就是要防止台灣落入中共之手。第二，「救國」是要在台灣建立民主政權，並把大陸從中共手上奪回來，使中國民主化。對於這兩個目標，流亡人士創辦了不同的雜誌，以宣揚他們的理念。本文旨在檢視這些雜誌內容的變遷，並從中探討在港流亡知識份子的命運。

首先，一些在香港的流亡人士，既要宣揚反共救國的信念，也不願與獨裁的國民黨合作，他們在香港創辦了《自由陣線》。這個雜誌由中國青年黨的左舜生於 1949 年 12 月所創辦，標榜一條獨立於國民黨以外的反共路線。在每期的封面，均印有「沒有自由絕無生路，聯合起來才有力量」，試圖結合所有反共反蔣的流亡人士去推動「第三勢力」：一個軍事反攻大陸的運動。這個雜誌的內容，多是對於「第三勢力」的介紹（魏沐塵 1950；張一之 1950），及中國和國際局勢的分析和評論（楊生 1949；陳振軍 1949；德謨 1949）。簡單來說，《自由陣線》所推動的是一個獨立的反共復國運動。

同時，流亡在香港的民主社會黨黨員，也把他們的官方雜誌《再生》搬到香港來，與《自由陣線》互相呼應。《再生》由民社黨的王厚生主編，除了對時局的分析和評論外（蔣勻田 1950；周祥光 1950），他們主要宣揚他們所堅信的民主社會主義的理念，釐清民主社會主義跟共產主義的分別（王希蘇 1949；陳寒波 1951），同時也談及他們會如何在反攻復國後建設民主社會和進行文化建設（龍存惠 1951；周畢田 1952；宗一 1956）。作為民社黨的官方刊物，《再生》也著力於報導流亡在外的民社黨領袖張君勱的消息（孫明燈 1949；廖崇誠 1950），也是張君勱所創辦的軍事組織「中國自由民主戰鬥同盟」的其中一個宣傳渠道（戰盟 1952）。「中國自由民主戰鬥同盟」，簡稱「戰盟」，由張君勱與前國民黨將軍張發奎於 1952 年所創立，為一軍事組織。「戰盟」受美國中央情報局所贊助，於日本沖繩設有訓練基地，並吸納流亡香港和海外的流亡青年加入，組織一支獨立於國民黨的軍隊，準備軍事反攻大陸（萬麗鵠 2001）。而《再生》亦漸與「戰盟」互相呼應，以宣傳軍事反攻大陸為宗旨（徐傳霖 1950；龍存惠 1952）。

此外，徐復觀與唐君毅等幾位新儒家學者創辦了《民主評論》。這雜誌所收錄的，主要是一些有關儒家思想的學術文章（唐君毅 1949；牟宗三 1949），也有一些政局的評論（張丕介 1950；金達凱 1952）。其中最值得關注的是在台灣居住的徐復觀所寫的評論文章。跟《自由陣線》和《再生》的文章不同，徐復觀把他的關注點放在台灣。他（1951；1956）尋求的是台灣的民主化，但他（1950；1952）也不很反對蔣介石。在四十年代的時候，徐復觀曾經是蔣介石的幕僚，因此他對蔣介石的感覺並不差（Lee 1998）。在五十年代，他（1954；1955）常希望蔣介石能聽他的意見，推動台灣的民主化，所以他對於蔣介石的批評並不如《自由陣線》和《再生》所刊載的尖銳。他亦一直於五十年代扮演著一個忠誠的批評者的角色。

可惜的是，到了五十年代中後期，上述的三個期刊的編者對「政治救國」的熱誠已經開始減退。一方面，張君勱所創辦的「戰盟」運作了幾年，並沒有成果，而組織內部也陷於人事糾紛，終於在 1954 年底解散 (萬麗鵬 2001)。隨著「戰盟」的解散，《再生》和《自由陣線》的激進言論亦開始緩和。及至五十年代後期，兩雜誌的言論亦漸流於政局評論，終於五十年代末停刊 (陳正茂 2008)。至於徐復觀 (1954；1955)，亦開始對蔣介石失望，對台灣民主化的前景並不樂觀。

既然自行組建組織反攻大陸的救國方法不可行，一部分在港的流亡人士開始把焦點放再台灣，部分上述人士，例如左舜生和張發奎，於 1958 年創辦了《聯合評論》，以求呼應台灣的《自由中國》雜誌，推動台灣民主化 (萬麗鵬 2001)。在這裡，我們可以見到一個策略上的退卻。他們明白到如果要救國的話，那麼一定要從台灣的民主化入手 (胡越 1958)。《聯合評論》的內容，主要報導台灣政局發展，批評台灣當局對民主自由的打壓 (李金曄 1960)，對蔣介石違憲第三次當選中華民國總統的做法更大表不滿 ((胡越 1959)。不過，到了五十年代後期，這些在港流亡人士的聲勢已大不如前。

1960 年 9 月，台灣的《自由中國》雜誌於被台灣當局查封 (薛化元 1996)，在港的流亡人士，除了公開聲援被捕的雷震等人外，所能做的事情實在不多 (陳正茂 1998)。此後，台灣自由主義人士要求民主的聲音大受打擊。在香港的流亡人士，彷彿失去了依靠。《聯合評論》與《民主評論》相繼在 1964 年和 1966 年停刊 (張忠棟 1989)，而很多在香港知識份子，也從事文化教育工作去了。例如，左舜生專心從事中國史研究，並在香港幾所專上書院講課 (陳正茂 1998)。徐復觀成為了重要的新儒家學者和教育家 (李維武 2001)。張君勱則在「戰盟」1954 年解散之後長居美國，專注於儒家研究，也為三藩市的中文報紙《世界日報》撰寫評論文章。他於 1965 年在加州創辦《自由鐘》雜誌，作為他所寫文章的出版園地，繼續宣揚儒家思想與自由民主 (鄭大華 1997)。

至此，在港流亡人士所辦的雜誌，及他們所寫的文章，重點皆從「政治救國」轉向「文化救國」，希望在香港這個英國殖民地，保存及宏揚中國文化。總而言之，流亡香港的知識份子，於五十年代初皆充滿「救國」熱誠，透過出版雜誌期刊，喚醒香港人及海外華僑反攻復國的重要，並鼓勵他們加入在港人士組建的軍事組織，以準備反攻。可惜這條路走不通。此後，在港人士的政治熱誠逐漸減退，終使「救國」的重點，由政治軍事層面轉向文化層面。也許，這就是流亡知識份子的命運。

參考書目

- 王希穌 1949, '社會主義之路：前進的資本主義與社會主義', *再生*, 256 號, 1 頁
- 牟宗三 1949, '儒家學術之發展及其使命', *民主評論*, 1 卷, 6 期, 2-6 頁
- 李金曄 1960, '反對黨與民主中國運動：為共同的理想作共同的努力', *聯合評論*, 98 期, 2 頁
- 李維武 2001, *徐復觀學術思想評傳*, 北京圖書館出版社, 北京
- 宗一 1956, '辯中國的民主和新方向', *再生*, 352 號, 6-20 頁
- 周祥光 1950, '論西藏問題', *再生*, 276 號, 9 頁
- 周畢田 1952, '建設新國家的基本認識', *再生*, 320 號, 14 頁
- 金達凱 1952, '全面擴展中的中共「思想改造」運動', *民主評論*, 3 卷, 4 期, 19-21 頁
- 胡越 1958, '把三個運動連結起來', *聯合評論*, 創刊號, 1 頁
- 胡越 1959, '蔣真要連任第三屆總統嗎?', *聯合評論*, 38 期, 1 頁
- 陳正茂 1998, *左舜生年譜*, 國史館, 台北
- 陳正茂 2008, *中國青年黨研究論集*, 秀威資訊科技股份有限公司, 台北
- 陳振軍 1949, '台灣問題面面觀', *自由陣線*, 1 卷, 3 期, 3-4 頁
- 陳寒波 1951, '略論民主社會主義', *再生*, 286 號, 11-12 頁
- 孫明燈 1949, '張君勱先生在印講學動態', *再生*, 257 號, 8-11 頁
- 徐傳霖 1950, '反共抗俄的途徑', *再生*, 272 號, 8-9 頁
- 徐復觀 1950, '第三勢力問題的剖析', *民主評論*, 1 卷, 18 期, 4-9 頁
- 徐復觀 1951, '儒家政治思想的構造及其轉進', *民主評論*, 3 卷, 1 期, 3-6 頁
- 徐復觀 1952, '如何解決反共陣營中的政治危機', *民主評論*, 3 卷, 2 期, 5-9 頁
- 徐復觀 1954, '論政治領導的藝術', *華僑日報*, 1954 年 3 月 31 日
- 徐復觀 1955, '錢大昕論梁武帝：保天下必自訥諫始', *自由人*, 447 期
- 徐復觀 1956, '為什麼要反對自由主義', *民主評論*, 7 卷, 21 期, 2-4 頁
- 唐君毅 1949, '人文世界之內容', *民主評論*, 1 卷, 2 期, 5-11 頁
- 惕生 1949, '中共政權的最大困難', *自由陣線*, 1 卷, 2 期, 7-8 頁
- 張一之 1950, '第三勢力的歷史使命', *自由陣線*, 2 卷, 2 期, 4 頁
- 張丕介 1950, '國民黨的改造問題', *民主評論*, 1 卷, 18 期, 2-3 頁
- 張忠棟 1989, '民主評論與自由中國', *歷史月刊*, 23 期, 126-131 頁
- 萬麗鵬 2001, '一九五〇年代的中國第三勢力運動', 國立政治大學博士論文
- 鄭大華 1997, *張君勱傳*, 中華書局, 北京
- 廖崇誠 1950, '張君勱先生在印講學動態(續)', *再生*, 262 號, 7-9 頁
- 蔣勻田 1950, '台灣在反共戰中的地位', *再生*, 270 號, 8-9 頁
- 德謨 1949, '西歐復興與馬歇爾計劃', *自由陣線*, 1 卷, 3 期, 11-12 頁
- 龍存惠 1951, '為維護中國文化而戰鬥', *再生*, 289 號, 6-8 頁
- 龍存惠 1952, '展開反共的民眾游擊運動', *再生*, 320 號, 3-5 頁
- 戰盟 1952, '中國自由民主戰鬥同盟宣言', *再生*, 327 號, 14-16 頁
- 薛化元 1996, *自由中國與民主憲政：1950 年代臺灣思想史的一個考察*, 稻鄉出版社, 台北
- 魏沐塵 1950, '第三勢力的基礎', *自由陣線*, 2 卷 1 期, 12-13 頁

Lee, S.-S., 1998, *Xu Fuguan and New Confucianism in Taiwan (1949–1969): A Cultural History of the Exile Generation*. Ph. D. Brown University.

陳寶琛與清季福建新政—以漳廈鐵路為例

黃嘉康

香港樹仁大學

電郵：kahong@hksyu.edu

引言

漳廈鐵路是晚清由閩籍官紳陳寶琛、張亨嘉等人力主籌辦的民營鐵路。對於福建區域研究而言，具有重要意義，它是晚清福建省內第一條民營鐵路，也是晚清新政時期國人籌辦民營鐵路的一個案例。至於學界對陳寶琛的認識亦多侷限於民國初年的遺老軼事，故此，本文欲以陳寶琛和漳廈鐵路的經營為主題，論述漳廈鐵路籌建的原因、經過及經營成效，藉此說明該鐵路在福建新政以至中國近代史上的地位。

第一節 漳廈鐵路籌建的背景

漳廈鐵路始建於 1905 年，由當時在京的光祿寺卿張亨嘉和閩籍官紳前內閣學士兼禮部侍郎陳寶琛發起籌辦，施工歷時四年多，1910 年 5 月，嵩嶼至江東橋東側路段竣工，全長 30.5 里(雙軌計 56 里，單軌 28 里加延長線)，為中國早期近代化鐵路工程之一。¹(曾鯤化 1973)

福建興辦民營鐵路的原因，與當地民族主義興起有關。福建作為中國東南沿岸大省，連接對岸台灣，為東南通商、海防的重要門戶。自 1870 年代起，即受法、日兩國侵擾(如 1874 年牡丹社事件、1884-85 年中法戰爭等)。1895 年，甲午戰敗後，日本即揭露其染指閩台地區之野心，除將台灣割讓為日本殖民地外，更將福建視為日方之勢力範圍，於 1900 年 2 月，日本外務省以「為貫徹軍略和商業上的目的，向清政府展開要求福建鐵路敷設權」的談判。同時，獲得清政府保證福建不割讓予他國，並規定區內所有路、礦(鐵路、礦產)開發，如予他國或用洋員技師者，必先徵得日方同意，方可進行。²(日本外務省 1900) 1900 年 5 月，日方再向清政府提出要求福建、江西、湖北、浙江的鐵路敷設權，但遭清廷拒絕。³ (日本外務省 1900)日本以福建為基地，繼而延伸其勢力向南中國之意圖亦由此可見。

日方為實現其礦、路經濟權益之計劃，制訂了「南清鐵路」專案。該路以福建為中心，貫通華南各省，包括福建、浙江、江西、廣東等地。為實現「南清鐵路」，外務省更擬定報告書，地圖等專案。⁴ (陳遵統 2009)其路線規劃，接近人凌鴻勳《中國鐵路志》記載，「南清鐵路」主要幹線包括(1)由廈門至福州，經延平入江西，經南昌而至九江；

¹ 曾鯤化 1973, *中國鐵路史(下冊)*，文海出版社，臺北，786-791 頁。

² 日本外務省 1900, '福建省鐵道ニ關シ請議ノ件'，*日本外交文書*，日本外務省，卷 33，232 號「南清鐵道關係一件」，2 月 1 日，261 頁。

³ 日本外務省 1900, '鐵道利權要求清側不承諾ニ付南方館員派遣ノ必要ナキ旨報告ノ件'，*日本外交文書*，日本外務省，卷 33「南清鐵道關係一件」，240 號，6 月 5 日，261 頁。

⁴ 據清末留日的福建學者陳遵統記述，曾看過日方有關在福建敷設鐵路的計劃專書。參陳遵統 2009, *福建編年史(下冊)*，福建人民出版社，福州，1550 頁。

(2)由杭州入江西至南昌；(3)由杭州經浙江、福建、廣東沿海地方，至廣州；(4)由杭州至福州(共四線)。⁵ (凌鴻勳 1963)由此可見，福建省的鐵路權實為「南清鐵路」的核心地帶，對日方的經濟擴張計劃極為重要。

至於其他列強方面，在得悉日本有意獨佔南中國以後，亦陸續向福建招手。是時，由於福建尚未敷設任何鐵路，列強皆欲搶先獨佔路權，乃先後接觸福建地方官紳，表示興辦鐵路之興趣，欲藉他們充當華資股份持有人來淡化外資壟斷的色彩。例如美國、法國和意大利等國皆先後和閩省官紳商討了福建與各省連接的鐵路計畫案。包括 1901 年意大利提出修建閩浙鐵路⁶ (宓汝成 1977)、1903-04 年美國提出修建閩贛鐵路等。⁷ (宓汝成 1903 年 12 月 31 日)

法國方面，雖早已向中方爭取了福建省的礦山經營和礦山內的敷設鐵路權，而法方欲更進一步，爭取福建省主要幹道的鐵路經營權。時法籍在華商人法蘭西斯·魏池乃與廈門地方商人翁松村、陳日翔等人洽商，以閩籍的商務部侍郎陳璧的名義出面，疏通慶親王奕劻、李蓮英等，爭取清廷支持，修建貫通廈門、漳州、潮汕的「閩潮鐵路」。⁸ (宓汝成 無日期)後來陳璧與法人密議消息內容被親日報章《閩報》披露，閩省輿論譁然，引起官紳相繼反對，事件因而告吹。⁹ (日本外務省 1905)與法國籌商失敗後，陳日翔轉而拜訪日本駐廈門領事上野專一欲招攬日資開發「閩潮鐵路」，日方因輿情沸騰未敢作決，閩潮鐵路的計劃最終未能成功。

面對列強的壓力下，閩省輿論沸騰，閩人皆鼓起自辦民族鐵路之意識。1904 年，陳寶琛代表福建到上海出席閩、浙、皖、贛四省自辦鐵路會議，交換自辦鐵路之意見和意向。¹⁰ 1905 年 8 月，黃乃裳於《福建日日新聞》撰文，發表〈論閩省紳商宜速定自辦鐵路權〉的社論，提醒閩人關注外力入侵，應速自辦鐵路以求自保。¹¹ (洪卜仁 2003)數日後，1905 年 8 月 5 日，時任光祿卿的張亨嘉(後來擔任京師大學堂首任監督)和閩省官紳共六十多人聯袂向清廷呈請成立「福建全省鐵路公司」，並公舉前內閣學士兼禮部侍郎陳寶琛總理鐵路籌建和籌募經費事宜。閩人自辦鐵路，由是開始。

第二節 陳寶琛的鐵路思想

閩省紳商公舉陳寶琛為「閩路公司」總理，與他在閩省的聲望及其熟悉鐵路事宜有重要關係。陳寶琛為同光時期著名的清流派官員，與張之洞有深厚交情，故被視為閩中最有力的地方官紳。加上陳氏早年於福建興辦新式教育，卓然有成，地方人士對他的建樹亦給予認同，故張亨嘉、郭曾炘等人於保舉時亦讚揚其「家世通顯，學粹品端，家居二十年，措辦商務、學務，具見成效」。加上陳寶琛在東南亞閩籍華僑中享負聲望，「均服其為人」，故張氏等認為陳寶琛為該司總理的不二人選。¹² (商部 1970)

⁵ 凌鴻勳 1963, *中國鐵路志*, 世界書局, 台北, 156-158 頁。

⁶ 宓汝成 1977, '內田致盛宣懷函, 1903 年 7 月', *近代中國鐵路史資料(中)*, 文海出版社, 臺北, 687-688 頁。當時更傳出有德國向中方要求在閩修建鐵路權, 今日方大為緊張, 立即向慶親王奕劻垂詢。

⁷ 宓汝成 1977, '美國合興公司代表柏許致日本駐華公使內田函, 1903 年 12 月 31 日', *近代中國鐵路史資料(中)*, 713 頁。

⁸ 宓汝成 1977, '閩潮鐵路', *近代中國鐵路史資料(中)*, 705-706 頁。

⁹ 日本外務省 1905, '福建鐵道ノ佛國經營ニ對スル反對運動並陳寶琛ニ同鐵道ノ經營一任ノ運動ニ關スル件', *日本外交文書*, 卷 38「南清鐵道關係一件」, 1073 號, 日本外務省, 1905 年 5 月 8 日, 頁 149。

¹⁰ 《大公報》, 1904 年 11 月 20 日。

¹¹ 洪卜仁 2003, '被遺忘的漳廈鐵路', *廈門晚報*, 6 月 29 日。

¹² 商部, 陳毅編 1970, '商部奏福建紳士籌築本省鐵路公舉大員總理摺', *軌政紀要(三)*, 420 頁。

早於 1880 年，陳寶琛便認識到修築鐵路對中國近代化的重要性，而為劉銘傳(時適值在京待命)代撰〈籌造鐵路以圖自強折〉，當中大體可瞭解陳氏對鐵路和洋務的認識。在奏摺中，陳寶琛明確主張中國的「自強之道...在於急造鐵路」，並列舉了修建鐵路的兩大優點：利於工商和軍事。在工商而言，「鐵路之利於漕務、賑務、商務、礦務、釐捐、行旅者，不可殫述」。對於軍事而言，「尤為急不可緩之圖」，鐵路之利在於將各省之軍隊「併成勁旅，十八省合為一氣」，從而增加國防力量。故此當時陳寶琛以鐵路為「裕國便民之道」。並建議清政府與外國籌商借款，聘洋人鐵路工匠自辦。¹³ (陳寶琛 2006) 當時李鴻章對此築路建議亦表示支持。¹⁴ (李鴻章 1977) 可惜其議後來因保守勢力反對而並未付諸實踐。此一建議於 1900 年代各省爭相自辦鐵路之時看來，固無新意，然陳氏早於 1880 年已有此思想，可見對鐵路問題具有深刻認識而獲閩紳信服。

第三節 漳廈鐵路的籌建經過

漳廈鐵路由閩路公司於 1905 年 8 月成立至漳廈鐵路段 1910 年 4 月正式通車，歷時 4 年 8 個月。現簡述如下：

招股章程

閩路公司經商部批准成立後，陳寶琛隨即與公司議董共同制訂了《商辦福建全省鐵路有限公司暫定章程》，其內容和特色如下：

- (一) 華資全資鐵路。章程總則規定，閩路公司「專招華股」，凡有外僑居住外地，查明屬實為華人者亦可認購股份。
- (二) 公司以敷設福建全省鐵路路線為目的。路線共分為上、下遊兩條主要幹道共四條支線，上遊主幹道包括：(1)福建至延平；(2)延平至建寧連接浙江省；(3)延平至邵武連接江西省。下遊主幹道包括(4)福州至興化，經泉州、漳州連接廣東省。基於福州與廈門為通商海岸，而客運貨量最多，故先從漳廈之間修建起點，由廈門對岸之嵩嶼，連接至漳州東石徑安海等地，¹⁵ (陳寶琛 1970)以達連接各省、便利貨運、經營路礦和為目的。¹⁶ (商部 1970)
- (三) 設局選址。「閩路公司」於省城福州設一總辦事處，並設分處於北京福建會館以作為在京閩籍官紳聯絡處、於上海開設安徽、浙江、江西四省聯合鐵路公所，籌組鐵連接省際鐵路事宜；於他省外埠設立經理代辦，以籌集股款，安排派發股票等事。¹⁷ (陳寶琛 1970)
- (四) 用人。公司暫不設股東會。日常事務由總局議董負責。凡認購二百股以上者可推舉為議董。工程師方面以聘請華人優先，如需延聘外國工程師則先與商

¹³ 陳寶琛，載氏著 2006，〈籌造鐵路以圖自強摺〉，《滄趣樓詩文集》，上海古籍出版社，上海，785-787 頁。

¹⁴ 其支持修築鐵路之建議，見李鴻章，宓汝成編 1977，〈李鴻章妥籌鐵路事宜摺〉，《近代中國鐵路史資料(上)》，89-93 頁。

¹⁵ 陳寶琛，陳毅編 1970，〈商辦福建全省鐵路有限公司暫定章程〉，《軌政紀要(三)》，404 頁。

¹⁶ 在奏報清廷的奏摺中，即有「該省路線，不特與江西、廣東、浙江等處壤地交接，商運必多裨益，且於該省礦產，亦可藉路線以謀自保，洵屬深有關聯」商部，陳毅編 1970，〈商部奏福建紳士籌築本省鐵路公舉大員總理摺〉，《軌政紀要(三)》，420-421 頁。

¹⁷ 陳寶琛，陳毅編 1970，〈商辦福建全省鐵路有限公司暫定章程〉，《軌政紀要(三)》，405 頁。

部議定。並與閩、浙、皖、贛四省於上海共同開設鐵路學堂，以為儲才之用，並保舉優質學生赴海外研習。¹⁸ (陳寶琛 1970)

(五) 股本。五元為一股，共招 120 萬股，共集資 600 萬元。每年訂息六厘，按期分派利息，另設特別股，限定六十萬元為限，除發給週年利息外亦給予特別利益。另參照安徽鐵路章程，攤派閩省各級官員及沿線商舖認購指定股份。¹⁹ (陳寶琛 1970)

(六) 辦工。鐵路路線以單軌為先，預備雙軌以備擴充。²⁰ (陳寶琛 1970)

勘路

在訂立章程後，閩路公司隨即展開勘路工作。1906 年 2 月，陳寶琛借用正太鐵路法籍技師二名為臨時工程師，開始勘察福州至漳州地形，以評估開設利潤較高的福漳線。²¹ (張允僑 2006)日本方面，得悉法人協助後，隨即以閩路公司未得日方同意，擅自招聘外國工程師勘路，違反 1900 年外國技師未得日方同意下，不得於福建修路協議(前述)，乃向閩浙總督及外務部表示抗議。後來清政府以政府並未覆准該協議和閩路公司為民營鐵路，該公司所聘何人聽任其辦理。²²(宓汝成 1977)其後，陳氏改聘陳怡堂為總工程師、王有谷為副總工程師，解決國籍問題，日方抗議因此作罷。²³(陳寶琛 1907 年 8-9 月)

招股

閩路公司起初成立預期之發展規模，係以貫通全省的鐵路為目標。而欲建立全省規模的大型鐵路公司，招募股本，籌募充足資金，便成為首要任務。當時招股目標為 120 萬股，共 600 萬元。招股工作自 1906 年初開始。閩路公司的股款主要來源分為兩方面，一、透過各省代辦經理處向各省紳商募款，然而反應不佳。二、向東南亞閩籍僑商募款。為保證爭取到足夠款項，陳寶琛於 1906 年 10 月親自到東南亞進行募款工作。他透過友人黃乃裳和邱菽園的安排下，分別到達息力(今新加坡)、檳榔嶼(檳城)、吉隆坡、緬甸等地。²⁴ (張允僑 2006)憑藉陳氏的個人名望與黃、邱二人的協助，華僑的集資較國內募款取得較大成果，計算國內認購股本者，閩路公司共籌得一百七十餘萬元，而其中鉅額股本認購者多半來自華僑。²⁵(陳寶琛 2006)但是，此數目跟原先招募目標 600 萬元仍相距甚遠，不足以支付全省建設的工程費和營運費用。故有後來先建漳廈線之決定。

¹⁸ 同上，頁 406。

¹⁹ 同上，頁 407-409。

²⁰ 同上，頁 409-410。

²¹ 張允僑，陳寶琛著 2006，「閩縣陳公寶琛年譜」，*滄趣樓詩文集*，738 頁。

²² 宓汝成 1977，*近代中國鐵路史資料(下)*，991-994 頁。

²³ 陳寶琛 1907，「福建全省鐵路路線說帖」，*東方雜誌*，4 卷，7 期，8-9 月，147 頁。

²⁴ 張允僑，陳寶琛著 2006，「閩縣陳公寶琛年譜」，*滄趣樓詩文集*，739-742 頁。

²⁵ 陳寶琛，載氏著 2006，「閩路續籌招股乞假兩個月回籍規畫摺」，*滄趣樓詩文集*，上海古籍出版社，上海，785-787 頁。

動工

1907年7月，陳寶琛自東南亞招股返抵廈門，由於經費不足關係，原先福建鐵路四線變成先築漳廈一條支線。陳氏決定先修築下遊漳廈鐵路一段共90里路程，在〈福建全省鐵路路線說帖〉一文中，陳氏交待先築漳廈段的原因為廈門「近於通商碼頭...進出口之貨多沿路，多富庶之村莊是近廈」，故從利益角度考慮，決定先開通漳廈區間由嵩江至江東橋的支線(嵩江路線)，待以後獲得盈利及籌募經費，再行敷設上遊幹線。²⁶(陳寶琛 1907年8-9月) 1909年2月，陳寶琛開復原職赴京，期間仍主持漳廈支線籌建事宜，直至完工為止。²⁷(陳寶琛 2006)宣統二年(1910年)，嵩江線正式通車，由於該路行走於漳州廈門之間，「漳廈鐵路」由是得名。

第四節 漳廈鐵路經營成效

漳廈鐵路自1910年起始開通，然而在經營不久即遇上種種經營難題，最後招致連年虧損，成效不彰。按曾鯤化《中國鐵路史》載，民國元年(1912)漳廈鐵路之總收入為26,333元，支出為55,825元，虧蝕29,492元。²⁸(曾鯤化 1973)其經營情況一直並未改善之原因，其問題癥結，可歸納為以下三點：

第一，經費不足。籌辦鐵路，在在需財，自閩路公司成立後，雖然陳寶琛著力向地方紳商和東南亞華僑集資，然當時之東南亞華僑縱然熱心家鄉公益和社會事業，終不能長期依賴。²⁹(陳絳 1997)最終鐵路經費只募集到173萬兩，這個數目相比同時期各省的商辦鐵路建設經費為少，³⁰(何漢威 1996)以致公司於1910年需向廣東銀行抵押車廠籌借額外50萬元，方能完成餘下的部份路段。在漳廈鐵路竣工不久，公司更因經費不足和營運虧蝕而陷入財困，需向地方政府要求注資補助。時任閩浙總督松壽乃開設鐵路隨糧捐，以運輸省內之每兩丁銀、每石米糧加收二百文為作修建鐵路和支付股息的資金，經省政府財政支援後，公司方能勉強維持。³¹(閩報 1909年8月3日)辛亥革命以後政權更迭，閩路公司頓失財政支持。遂引致後來因財困而遭政府接管之命運。

第二，鐵路路線缺陷。漳廈線籌建期間，由於陳氏北上任官關係，閩路公司管理不善，倉促完工，加上缺乏經費，最終修建鐵路的起點和終點未能直達兩城間的核心地區。例如廈門的嵩嶼站並未直達廈門島，只在對岸下車，貨物距離廈門港口還有海程3.5公里，至於所謂到達漳州的江東橋站則距離漳州中心地還有17.5公里路，乘坐火車的乘客和貨物還需接駁其他交通工具，甚為不便。當年福建《銀行週刊》的一篇文章便提到該

²⁶ 陳寶琛 1907，〈福建全省鐵路路線說帖〉，*東方雜誌*，4卷，7期，8-9月，145頁。

²⁷ 陳寶琛，載氏著 2006，〈閩路續籌招股乞假兩個月回籍規畫摺〉，*滄趣樓詩文集*，上海古籍出版社，上海，785頁。

²⁸ 曾鯤化 1973，*中國鐵路史(下冊)*，文海出版社，臺北，790頁。

²⁹ 陳寶琛在跟其弟陳寶璐於家書中談及募款一事時，明言不能對華僑的捐輸數額過於樂觀。參見陳寶琛 1907，陳寶琛致陳寶璐函，1月9日，原件，陳絳藏。轉引自陳絳 1997，〈陳寶琛的近代化思想與事業〉，*陳寶琛與中國近代社會*，陳寶琛教育基金籌委會，福州，175頁。

³⁰ 是時閩路公司所籌得股款，相較其他地區如廣東的1,958萬、潮汕的302萬、浙江的925萬為少，是同時期修建鐵路中股本較不足的省份。參見全漢昇、何漢威 1996，〈清末的商辦鐵路〉，*中國近代經濟史論叢*，稻鄉出版社，臺北，446頁。

³¹ 閩報 1909，〈松督奏請展辦鐵路隨糧捐〉，閩報，8月3日。

路：「必由船而車，復由車而船，需時既久，勞費繁多，反不如水路之利便。」³² (洪卜仁 2003)位置不便，以致利用者稀少，連年虧蝕。

第三，陳寶琛辭任閩路公司總理後，缺乏繼任人選。自閩路公司成立後，日常運作和籌備一直由陳寶琛本人親自辦理，包括籌募經費，聘請技師等等。1909年，陳氏因張之洞等人奏請開復原職赴京，陳遂辭任總理一職，交由繼任者辦理。然而，自陳去職後，繼任者一直未定，起先保舉廣東候補知府陳炳煌繼任，陳推辭不就，再保舉廈門商紳葉清池，葉亦推辭。最終以陳氏暫居總理職，而實際事宜交由鄭霽林打理。³³ (閩報 1909年8月17日) 1911年陳氏力辭下，終得清廷准許他辭去總理職位。但是漳廈鐵路自陳於1909年上京赴京以後，管理日漸廢弛，形同虛設，終致路政不脩。可見漳廈鐵路最終失敗的原因與後期經營不善有一定關係。

第五節 陳寶琛辭任後的漳廈鐵路

陳寶琛辭任閩路公司總理一職後，閩路公司只維持日常營運，缺乏改革，日常收入仍依賴省政府補助勉強維持。1913年9月，財政部下令停撥漳廈鐵路的補助費，在入不敷支的經營狀況下，公司陷入嚴重財政危機。最終於1914年，漳廈鐵路交由交通部接管，改為國有經營，設有「漳廈鐵路管理局」。公司改革後，政府和華僑曾一度計劃振興該路。1919年，交通部斥資60萬元興建嵩嶼碼頭以為便利鐵路貨運，但碼頭卻因資金不足而未有建成。至1926年，由中南銀行大股東黃奕柱的號召、陳培鋸和李清泉等人到京聯絡，組織南洋華僑救鄉會，以振興路礦為目的，以圖重建全省鐵路，計劃籌募二千萬元股本(路礦各集資一千萬元)，後來卻因北京政變以致北洋政府人事更迭，功敗垂成。³⁴ (陳遵統 2009) 1927年，國民革命軍入閩後，閩路公司移交福建省政府接管，亦只聽任其自負盈虧，並無任何振興之計劃。最終於1932年國共第一次內戰時期，該路器材及路軌遭軍隊變賣及破壞。³⁵ (陳文濤 2009)漳廈鐵路之歷史遂就此終結。

小結

從檢視漳廈鐵路的籌建歷史而言，陳寶琛等閩省紳商起初以民族主義因素發起籌辦鐵路，並有遠大理想，以建設全省之鐵路網為目標。可惜，閩路公司自陳寶琛離任赴京後，即管理廢弛，以致經營不善，從企業經營的角度而言，閩路公司從集資不足和經營路線的缺陷，成為其重要的致命傷。然而，從閩路公司成立和修建鐵路的動機而言，福建紳商自發籌建鐵路，以期路權不至落入法國和日本之手，就此角度而論，漳廈鐵路的確阻止了日方以福建為中心修建「南清鐵路」的企圖，完成其身為民族鐵路的歷史使命。

³² 洪卜仁 2003，「被遺忘的漳廈鐵路」，*廈門晚報*，6月29日。

³³ 閩報 1909，「託代路務」，*閩報*，8月17日。

³⁴ 陳遵統 2009，*福建編年史(下冊)*，福建人民出版社，福州，1558-1559頁。

³⁵ 陳文濤，徐天貽著 2009，「福建近代民生地理：志漳廈鐵路開築的經過」，*福建民國史稿*，福建人民出版社，福州，387-388頁。

參考書目

- 日本外務省 1900, '福建省鐵道ニ關シ請議ノ件', *日本外交文書*, 日本外務省, 卷 33, 232 號「南清鐵道關係一件」, 2 月 1 日, 261 頁
- 日本外務省 1900, '鐵道利權要求清側不承諾ニ付南方館員派遣ノ必要ナキ旨報告ノ件', *日本外交文書*, 日本外務省, 卷 33「南清鐵道關係一件」, 240 號, 6 月 5 日, 261 頁
- 日本外務省 1905, '福建鐵道ノ佛國經營ニ對スル反對運動竝陳寶琛ニ同鐵道ノ經營一任ノ運動ニ關スル件', *日本外交文書*, 卷 38「南清鐵道關係一件」, 1073 號, 日本外務省, 1905 年 5 月 8 日, 149 頁
- 全漢昇、何漢威 1996, '清末的商辦鐵路', *中國近代經濟史論叢*, 稻鄉出版社, 臺北, 446 頁
- 李鴻章, 宓汝成編 1977, '李鴻章妥籌鐵路事宜摺', *近代中國鐵路史資料(上)*, 89-93 頁
- 宓汝成 1977, '內田致盛宣懷函, 1903 年 7 月', *近代中國鐵路史資料(中)*, 文海出版社, 臺北, 687-688 頁
- 宓汝成 1977, '美國合興公司代表柏許致日本駐華公使內田函, 1903 年 12 月 31 日', *近代中國鐵路史資料(中)*, 713 頁
- 宓汝成 1977, '閩潮鐵路', *近代中國鐵路史資料(中)*, 705-706 頁
- 宓汝成 1977, *近代中國鐵路史資料(下)*, 991-994 頁
- 洪卜仁 2003, '被遺忘的漳廈鐵路', *廈門晚報*, 6 月 29 日
- 凌鴻勳 1963, *中國鐵路志*, 世界書局, 台北, 156-158 頁
- 商部, 陳毅編 1970, '商部奏福建紳士籌築本省鐵路公舉大員總理摺', *軌政紀要(三)*, 420-421 頁
- 張允僑, 陳寶琛著 2006, '閩縣陳公寶琛年譜', *滄趣樓詩文集*, 738-742 頁
- 陳文濤, 徐天胎著 2009, '福建近代民生地理: 志漳廈鐵路開築的經過', *福建民國史稿*, 福建人民出版社, 福州, 387-388 頁
- 陳絳 1997, '陳寶琛的近代化思想與事業', *陳寶琛與中國近代社會*, 陳寶琛教育基金籌委會, 福州, 175 頁
- 陳遵統 2009, *福建編年史(下冊)*, 福建人民出版社, 福州, 1550, 1558-1559 頁
- 陳寶琛 1907, '陳寶琛致陳寶璐函', 1 月 9 日, 原件, 陳絳藏
- 陳寶琛 1907, '福建全省鐵路路線說帖', *東方雜誌*, 4 卷, 7 期, 8-9 月, 145, 147 頁
- 陳寶琛, 陳毅編 1970, '商辦福建全省鐵路有限公司暫定章程', *軌政紀要(三)*, 404-405 頁
- 陳寶琛, 載氏著 2006, '閩路續籌招股乞假兩個月回籍規畫摺', *滄趣樓詩文集*, 上海古籍出版社, 上海, 785-787 頁
- 陳寶琛, 載氏著 2006, '籌造鐵路以圖自強摺', *滄趣樓詩文集*, 上海古籍出版社, 上海, 785-787 頁
- 曾鯤化 1973, *中國鐵路史(下冊)*, 文海出版社, 臺北, 786-791 頁
- 閩報 1909, '松督奏請展辦鐵路隨糧捐', *閩報*, 8 月 3 日
- 閩報 1909, '託代路務', *閩報*, 8 月 17 日

Women Missionaries in the Whirlpool of China's Anti-Foreignism, 1860-1900

Yan Shi
Baylor University
Email: Y_Shi@baylor.edu

Before the 19th century, China had minimal contact with any Western civilizations. As Christian missionaries spreading Christianity through the cities that were open to free trade in China, China slowly began its interaction with the West.

By 1900, thousands of missionaries worked in China, intending to convert the Chinese population to Christianity. They were, however, frustrated to find out that rather than a growing acceptance toward Christianity, a hostility towards foreigners was increasingly built up. This accumulating resentment eventually led to the outbreak of the 1900 Boxer Rising in China and the death of hundreds of missionaries and thousands of Chinese converts. A couple of reasons may result in the growth of Chinese anti-foreignism: Chinese backwardness by stressing typical traditions and customs, anti-imperialism, Christianity's incompatibility with Confucianism, and a sense of superiority of the missionaries. But here, I will primarily discuss how female missionaries' good intentions of emancipating Chinese women turned out to be unintended consequence. On one hand, the Christian missionaries, serving as an agent of social changes in China, had a positive influence on Chinese women's physical improvement and education. On the other hand, these female missionaries and converts themselves destroyed the unity and harmony of the traditional Chinese community, consequently aggravating the contradictions between the Chinese and the west.

Missionaries believed that they had received God's call to spread the Christian faith in China. Since Christianity was a major component of Western progress, they must share their faith with the "old and backward" China. This antipathy towards the Chinese has been remarked upon by Jonathan Chao: "They (missionaries) regarded many Chinese religious and social customs as cultural barriers to the Gospel, which needed to be removed. Accordingly, many missionaries saw themselves as willful destroyers of the traditional culture and as

builders of a new Christian civilization for china.”¹

According to the official record, the first Christian missionaries to China were the Jesuits, who arrived at the Ming Dynasty in the 16th century. Their activities, however, were strictly proscribed and they were forbidden to make converts among the Chinese people.² An influx of missionaries poured into China in the early 19th century, and due to Chinese restrictions on foreigners, most missionaries’ activities were limited to Macao and Canton. This situation changed following the Opium War (1839-1842), when five cities along China’s southeast coast were opened to foreign residence and trade.³

As China became more open to the West, the second half of the nineteenth century saw significant changes in foreign missionaries to China. First, foreign missionaries won the right to travel inland and establish Christian communities in the Chinese countryside. Second, an increasing number of female missionaries came to China. Missionaries operated on the presumption that converting women would lead to the Christianizing of entire families and, ultimately, the whole country; but men did not have any access to Chinese women. Hence, from the 1860s, male missionaries in China began to report that female missionaries were needed to assist with evangelistic work. Third, they came to China, not only as evangelizing missionaries, but also as bible translators, educationists, doctors, scholars and social reformers. These better-educated missionaries, especially female missionaries who were influenced by the development of feminism in the West, brought new perspectives to their task of evangelizing.

Their aim was to influence and change Chinese women’s religious beliefs, but their historic function, as it turned out, was to help transmit new ideas to Chinese women and to free women from feudal bondage. This idea, however, represented a fundamental misunderstanding of Chinese culture and the female role within it, and foreshadowed the later development of Chinese anti-foreignism.

Women in China were different from their counterpart in the West, because they held

¹ Jonathan Chao, *Guidelines toward a Christian understanding of China*, (Silver Spring, Md.: China Graduate School of Theology, 1977), 121.

² Charles Sumner Estes, *Christian Missions in China*, (Johns Hopkins university, 1895), 1.

³ Ibid.

little power within the traditional social and familial system. Confucianism promoted the concept that “women are as different from men as earth is from heaven... Women indeed are human beings, but they are of a lower state than men and can never attain to full equality with them.”⁴ This tradition, as the foundation of the social structure of China, became the basis of the role of women in China. For over thousands of years, Chinese women were subservient to men in society.

China is a nation which respects education profoundly, just as a Chinese maxim puts it, “Education is the highest pursuit a man can follow.” However, education for women in China was totally different from men. According to Confucius, a woman of no talent was a woman of virtue. Women, especially those of higher class, could receive education. But the aim of female education is perfect submission, not cultivation and development of the mind. As a result, Chinese women could enjoy few opportunities to improve themselves, which explains why the most immediate impression of the Christian missionaries was that the overwhelming number of the Chinese women could not read at all.⁵

Western Women in Eastern Lands was an influential historical work by Helen Montgomery, who was an American social reformer, a women’s and mission’s activist. In her book, she explains the growth of female missionary endeavors as simply one aspect of an entire century of revolt by Western women against the “cribbed, cabined, and confined sphere to which the natural prejudices of a man-monopolized world had assigned them.”⁶ Women in the United States and Europe were perceived as gaining equality through feminist reforms “based squarely on the principles of the Bible.” In Eastern lands, on the other hand, where “no clear gospel” existed for emancipation – or where existing gospels ran exactly counter to the desired message – millions of women and children, too, remained in “slavery” to men. In this situation Western women had a clear duty, as Montgomery summarized, to “put within the reach of their sisters in other lands this good tidings of great joy.”⁷ In China, they targeted their ideological underpinnings of female mission work on improving Chinese women’s

⁴ Margaret E Burton, *The Education of Women in China*, (New York: F.H. Revell, 1911), 19.

⁵ William Dean, *The China Mission: Embracing a history of the various missions of all denominations among the Chinese*, (New York: Sheldon, 1859), 22.

⁶ Helen Barrett Montgomery, *Western Women in Eastern Lands*, (New York: Garland, 1987), 3-4.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 73, 75.

education and abolishing the inhumane foot-binding tradition.

As mentioned above, the Christian work among the Chinese women proved impossible because the Chinese usually would not let their women participate in public activities. In an effort to make a new breakthrough, the Christian missions transferred their attention to education. Missionaries had tried to create schools right after they began their endeavors in China, but it was not until after the Opium War of 1840-1842 that there was a significant rise of the Christian schools. After the war, China was forced to open to the West. The unequal treaties guaranteed a special status of the Christian schools. Moreover, the growing contacts with the West also made it easy for some Chinese parents to send their children, both boys and girls, to the Christian schools.

Almost all the women missionaries were college graduates. Women missionaries brought their educational tradition from the West to China. In 1844, the first girls' school in China was established by an English missionary, Miss Mary Aldersey. The number of the girls' schools rose dramatically over time. In 1860, there were twelve Protestant women's schools. By 1877 there were thirty-eight such schools.⁸ Student enrollment steadily increased in all the Christian girls' schools. In 1860, there were 196 Chinese girls attending the Christian schools. In 1869, there were 556. The enrollment for subsequent years was: 1877, 1,307; 1896, 6,798; 1907, 9,929; 1910, 16,190; 1915, 45,168; and 1916, 50,173.⁹

These pioneer women met various obstacles and opposition in process of establishing these schools. They fought against the all-powerful custom which decreed that women should be regarded as brainless and be educated simply in manual labor. Sending girls to public schools was totally against the established Chinese social rules. Letting them go through the Western education was equal to a rebellion against the Chinese tradition. They also had to overcome the innumerable fears, suspicions and prejudices which the female missionaries as "a foreign barbarian" inspired. They must also persuade the Chinese that they meant only

⁸ Mary Anderson, *Protestant Mission Schools for Girls in South China 1887 to the Japanese Invasion* (Mobile, Ala.: Heiter-Starke Printing Co., 1943), 62, 303; Ida Belle Lewis, *The Education of Girls in China* (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1919), 24.

⁹ Valerie Griffiths, *The Ministry of Women in the China Inland Mission and the Overseas Missionary Fellowship, 1920-1990* (Th.M. Thesis, Regent College, Vancouver, 1995), 19; Jane Hunter, *The Gospel of Gentility*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 273.

good to their daughters, and that these daughters were capable of education and well worthy of it. All in all, it was a task which called for unlimited patience and perseverance.

From the beginning, the Christian girls' schools represented a new way of teaching in China. All the Christian schools used English as the teaching language for all the subjects other than the Chinese literature. Christian doctrine, worship, and fellowship were an important part of the daily routine. But in order to attract the Chinese girls into the Christian schools, the missionaries conceded to include Confucian classics and Chinese brush writing into the curriculum. The most distinguished focus of the Christian schools was their emphasis on the "Three R's" (reading, writing, and arithmetic) which was directly imported from the western educational system. Overall, the Christian schools started something entirely new for not only Chinese girls but also Chinese education.¹⁰

The Christian girls' schools promoted an educational as well as a social revolution. Female missionaries presented models completely at odds with the experience of Chinese women. They were educated, moved about freely in public, earned independent salaries, and had careers. They presented new religious ideas and offered an alternate understanding of gender that, to some, brought comfort, and to others, opportunity.¹¹ Hence, they encouraged Chinese female students to use education to find their own paths. Education was not meant to please future husbands. Instead, it was for the purpose to prepare women for their independent participation in society.

By 1876, there were more than 2000 female students studying in at least 121 missionary schools for girls.¹² In 1902 there were more than 4000 female students studying in missionary establishment. Chinese girls were becoming literate in both Chinese and English. They learned much knowledge that was new in China and came to know the Western world. Some of them were even converted to Christianity. The missionary education also led the Chinese women to examine critically many of the Chinese traditions concerning women. At home, they began to demand equal treatment to what their husbands or brothers had received. Some

¹⁰ Gael Graham, *Gender, Culture, and Christianity* (New York: P. Lang, 1995), 14.

¹¹ Jonathan D Spence, *The Search for Modern China* (New York: Norton, 1990), 7-12, 102-6, 204-10.

¹² Fan Hong, *Footbinding, feminism, and Freedom: The Liberation of Women's Bodies in Modern China* (New York: Routledge, 1997), 54.

Chinese girls even hoped to make it possible for Chinese young women to have professional careers. For the first time, Chinese women's thoughts on right were initiated. Missionary education, in some sense, constituted the first step up Chinese women's emancipator ladder.

Missionaries were not only concerned with channeling Christianity through education. They also realized that Chinese women faced many other burdens as a consequence of their gender. In the eyes of female missionaries, the custom of foot-binding was the strongest element of Chinese culture that they needed to overcome. Tiny-footed girls usually looked as if they were in pain, for instead of jumping about happily they needed help in walking, as if they were wounded. Therefore, foot-binding was an evil that crippled about half the population, prevented women from supporting themselves and from caring adequately for their children, and confined women and their thoughts to the narrowest sphere. At the same time of providing Chinese women with education, female missionaries led a social reform to abolish the binding of women's feet.

Since the twelfth century, young Chinese girls were forced to bind their feet in order to cripple the bones inside to prevent them from growing. These "three-inch feet" were called "lotus feet," which constituted the prerequisite for good marriages. Foot-breaking might be a more accurate description of the procedure. The initial breaking of the foot was sufficiently brutal, but the physiological consequence was life-long. As one recent scholar puts it: "the intense physical sufferings brought about by the process of breaking and binding the feet in early childhood produced a passivity, stoicism and fatalism that effectively 'bound' not only the feet but also the mind and the emotions."¹³ It is precisely this control over the mind and emotions that supporters of the practice sought.

Missionaries were the first to see the problem and to draw Chinese attention to the irrational ways that men treated women. They began to oppose the unchallenged custom and call for an end to this terribly inhuman practice. They combined women's education and the abolition of women's foot-binding together. For them, this was the only way to achieve Chinese women's emancipation, physically, morally and intellectually.

Female missionaries founded anti-footbinding societies. The first-known western

¹³ Fan Hong, *Footbinding, Feminism, and Freedom*, 289.

anti-footbinding society was organized in 1874 in Xiamen.¹⁴ This society spawned similar, though less formal, efforts in many large Chinese cities. The movement to banish footbinding was bolstered in April 1895 when a group of female missionaries formed the Natural Foot Society.¹⁵ Objections to footbinding usually fell into the above categories: concerns for women's health; harm to economic and educational opportunities; and appeals to natural, Confucian, or even Taoist principles.

Anti-footbinding societies used various techniques to advance their objectives. Pamphlets and posters against footbinding were printed in the Chinese language and sent to a number of large cities. Public meetings were held in provincial capitals and large cities. Memoranda and letters were sent to provincial governors. Missionaries received mostly favorable responses. Many Chinese intellectuals also voiced their opposition to foot-binding.¹⁶ Anti-footbinding meetings offered rare opportunities for the foreign community and the Chinese population to mix and discuss issues. Female missionaries also brought their propaganda of abolishing footbinding to the highest social level. The Natural foot society drew up a memorandum to which "nearly all foreign ladies in the Far East added their names." The memorandum is believed to have eventually reached the Forbidden City, and it is said that after sustained pressure from foreign women of various nationalities, the Empress Cixi finally issued the Anti-footbinding Edict of 1902. Even though this edict was rescinded a short time later, it provided an essentially feminist energy for Chinese women.

Scholars have found that the interaction between female missionaries and the Chinese women was complex, challenging the indigenous culture while providing some practical benefits such as education and anti-footbinding.¹⁷ Overall, the project of missionaries is troubling and even embarrassing, because the aggression that is inherent in the desire to alter belief and change culture conflicts with the fundamental concept of a "changeless China."¹⁸

¹⁴ *Chinese Recorder* October 1895, 497.

¹⁵ *Chinese Recorder* May 1895, 237.

¹⁶ Jane Hunter, *The Gospel of Gentility*, 14.

¹⁷ Leslie A. Fleming, *Women's Work for Women: Missionaries and Social Change in Asia* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989); M.S. Frost, "Unbinding Ties: Female Missionaries and Chinese Women in the Late Qing," *Methodist History* 41, no. 1 (2002): 329-41.

¹⁸ Carol C. Chin, "beneficent Imperialists: American Women Missionaries in China at Turn of the Twentieth Century," *Diplomatic History* 27, no. 3 (2003): 327-52.

Confucius was the most important philosopher who most effectively determined the key-note of Chinese people's thoughts and life. His ideology "Confucianism" becomes the foundation of the concept of a "changeless China."¹⁹ Just as Benjamin Schwartz puts it, "China was dominated for centuries by a completely unproblematic, unchanging something called Confucianism."²⁰ Thus the face of the master was definitely and deliberately turned to the past, and the face of China has always been in the same way turned in the same direction ever since. The Chinese prefer to drift with the current rather than to attempt to steer in waters hitherto unknown. And it is also this concept that has tended to make real progress in China difficult, if not impossible.

Ideas that seem to be in conflict with traditional ideology could be tolerated only if they did not prove a threat to the state by attaining independent social, cultural, or political power. Since Confucianism undergirded governmental authority, ideas that seemed to challenge or threaten it were labeled heterodox.²¹ Historian Paul Cohen writes that "on the resumption of Western missionary efforts in late sixteenth century, Christianity, with its foreign origin, its fundamental non-adherence to Confucianism..., the miraculous content of some of its doctrines, and its suspected motives of political subversion, became a natural candidate for the heterodox label."²² And once this label was applied, it stuck. Beginning in the mid-1600s and continuing into the mid-1900s, Chinese writers produced a large number of works questioning Christian doctrines and attacking its practice. As a result, most Chinese viewed Christianity negatively and found it threatening.

Even after the religion was legalized, Cohen observes, "It was hard to root out overnight the psychological associations that had been built up over a period of many decades... In one respect, indeed, the religion of the Westerner became even less tolerable after 1860 than before. For, as we have seen, it was the combination of heterodoxy and power that Chinese dreaded most, and in the post-1860 era the social and political power of Christianity in China

¹⁹ Victor Purcell, *The Boxer Uprising: A Background Study* (Cambridge [Eng.] University Press, 1963), 57.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Martin A Cohen, *Christian missions* (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), 545, 561

²² Ibid., 561

grew to unprecedented proportion.”²³ And as this heterodoxy became connected with and protected by foreign military forces, the hostility toward it only grew.

Women were seen as a property of men, rather than an individual human being. Hence, based upon the Confucian definition of women’s domesticity, traditional Chinese society very much devalued the meaning of women in a society. Just as Ban Zhao, the first female Chinese historian, puts it,

A husband has the right to remarry whereas a woman does not because the husband is the god. To the god we must remain loyal and to the husband a woman must remain faithful for the god will punish whoever disobeys or betrays him.²⁴

The Christian missionaries in China, however, made a revolution by creating schools for Chinese girls, smashing spiritual and physical shackles on women, and encouraging women to look for their life path. Chinese women were no longer invisible, they no longer accepted the ideas that it was their job to obey and to serve men, and they rejected arguments that their aptitudes were inferior to those of men. For a patriarchal society like China, these changes on women were unprecedented. The formerly obedient girls fell under the spell of the heterodox missionaries, which further intensified the Chinese hostility toward the foreign missionaries. Hence, the conservative people cried out for China to rid itself of all foreign influence. The notorious Boxer Rising was seen as the peak of this hostility, with a persecution of 239 missionaries in 1900. The figure of thirty thousand Protestants who perished is somewhat uncertain, but includes one hundred and thirty-four or one hundred and thirty-five adults and fifty-two children. Two thousand Chinese converts died.²⁵

Female missionaries, whether positively or negatively, made an impact on Chinese culture. Through the missionary schools, and other social agencies, female missionaries became sources of alternate, more “modern” models of development. They exposed the

²³ Ibid., 563

²⁴ Wong Yin Lee, “Women’s Education in Traditional and Modern China,” *Women’s History Review* 4(1995): 247.

²⁵ K.S Latourette, *A History of Christian Missions in China*, (New York, 1929), p.512.

Chinese, particularly the Chinese women, to a wide range of Western cultural values that often conflicted with indigenous values such as Confucianism.

However, as Cohen sums up the blame for the missionaries well, “partly by the mere fact of his presence in the Chinese interior and partly by the manner in which he made his presence felt there- clearly played a major role in encouraging the growth of Chinese anti-foreignism after 1860.”²⁶ Therefore in summation it can be concluded that the missionaries were in a large part responsible for the anti-foreignism and its growth that ultimately led to the Boxer Rising. Their good intentions turned out to - unintended consequences, some of which were quite severe.

²⁶ Paul Cohen, *China and Christianity: the missionary movement and the growth of Chinese antifeignism, 1860-1870* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), 270.

REFERENCES

- Anderson, M., 1943. *Protestant Mission Schools for Girls in South China 1887 to the Japanese Invasion*. Mobile, Ala.: Heiter-Starke Printing Co.
- Burton, M.E., 1911. *The Education of Women in China*. New York: F.H. Revell.
- Chao, J., 1977. *Guidelines toward a Christian understanding of China*. Silver Spring, Md.: China Graduate School of Theology.
- Chin, C.C., 2003. Beneficent Imperialists: American Women Missionaries in China at Turn of the Twentieth Century. *Diplomatic History*. 27(3).
Chinese Recorder. October 1895.
Chinese Recorder. May 1895.
- Cohen, M.A., 1982. *Christian missions*. New York: Paulist Press.
- Cohen, P., 1963. *China and Christianity: the missionary movement and the growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Dean, W., 1859. *The China Mission: Embracing a history of the various missions of all denominations among the Chinese*. New York: Sheldon.
- Estes, C., 1895. *Christian Missions in China*. Johns Hopkins University.
- Fleming, L.A., 1989. *Women's Work for Women: Missionaries and Social Change in Asia*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
- Frost, M.S., 2002. Unbinding Ties: Female Missionaries and Chinese Women in the Late Qing. *Methodist History*, 41(1).
- Graham, G., 1995. *Gender, Culture, and Christianity*. New York: P. Lang.
- Griffiths, V., 1995. *The Ministry of Women in the China Inland Mission and the Overseas Missionary Fellowship, 1920-1990*. Th.M. Thesis, Regent College, Vancouver.
- Hong, F., 1997. *Footbinding, feminism, and Freedom: The Liberation of Women's Bodies in Modern China*. New York: Routledge.
- Hunter, J., 1984. *The Gospel of Gentility*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Latourette, K.S., 1929. *A History of Christian Missions in China*. New York.
- Lee, W.Y., 1995. Women's Education in Traditional and Modern China. *Women's History Review*, 4.
- Lewis, I.B., 1919. *The Education of Girls in China*. New York: Teachers College, Columbia University.
- Montgomery, H.B., 1987. *Western Women in Eastern Lands*. New York: Garland.
- Purcell, V., 1963. *The Boxer Uprising: A Background Study*. Cambridge: University Press.

Spence, J.D., 1990. *The Search for Modern China*. New York: Norton.

Social Meanings of Architecture in Pre-modern China:

Hall (*tang*) and Pavilion (*ting*)

Jing Xie

University of New South Wales

Email: jingxie10@gmail.com

The reflections upon self and society to a great extent constituted the intellectual development of human beings. Particularly in the west, self-awareness and its progression from inchoate to mature is a prominent theme throughout history. As a material device, architecture played a pivotal role in Western culture for concealing and manifesting selfhood (see Tuan, 1982).

The developments of individualism in pre-modern Chinese society, as most scholars acknowledged, are evident by abundant literary forms, such as text and painting. However, it also exhibits a different vein, compared to the western societies, as there was lack of clear articulation and boundary for the notion of individualism.¹

Indeed, the social and cultural difference predominately shapes the building forms, by which people's attitude and practice toward their selfhood and social wholeness are manifested. Traditional Chinese architecture is markedly different from its European counterpart which displays the different social institutions by building types (Xu, 2009), nor does it like western architecture offering a clear demarcation between the internal and external world, thereby acting as a "life container." If the relationship of self and the world is largely evidenced in the spatial and mental distances among individuals, then the question arises as to how the Chinese, particularly those literati who embarked self cultivation far ahead of the rest population, drew the boundary between self and society via physical devices ?

Although pre-modern Chinese architecture seemingly demonstrated generic characteristics, there is still notable difference in terms of social meanings and practices of

¹ For details see Yi-Fu Tuan, *Segmented Worlds and Self, Group Life and Individual Consciousness* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), pp.150-151; for the literary construction of selfhood see John Hay (ed.), *Boundaries in China* (Reaktion books, 1994); William Theodore de Bary (ed.), *Self and Society in Ming Thought* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1970).

different buildings. Admittedly, Imperial China was well known for the absence of architect as a profession. All buildings were erected by the craftsmen to a conventional standard. Literary descriptions of architectural types were prolific (see Li, 2000, pp.648-840). But, only four were discernable in terms of their physical forms, regardless of sub-regional and temporal variations, as Xu Yinong (2000, p.171) points out: main halls (*dian*, *tang*, and *ting*); halls of two or more stories (*lou* and *ge*); pavilions (*ting*); and galleries or free-standing corridors (*lang*). These four forms, however, were built under the same principle of construction and indistinguishably used in houses, monasteries, schools, and government compounds. In Xu's opinion, single building could only assume its spatial function and meaning by acting as a part to the whole specific institutional compound (*Ibid*).

In this paper, I would like to further point out that, there is explicit difference between two building types in constructing and consolidating the bipolar categories of individual and social, through their distinctive physical settings, meanings inscribed by their names, and associated daily livings—they are, hall (*tang*) and pavilion (*ting*), particularly from the Song dynasty onwards.

HALL (*tang*)

A hall in Chinese dictionary has a bunch of meanings: a formal building in a house, or for specific public use; a government courtroom; kinship to the grandsire in a family. All these meanings seem to suggest a certain degree of legitimacy. In general, the main hall of a house was a sanctioned place by law and tradition for conducting formal rituals and businesses of the family. Not only the size of the hall, but also the complexity of its structure (e.g., bracket system), were ratified by law according to its owner's socio-political status. For example, *Li Ji* (Book of Rites) compiled in Xi Han dynasty (202BC-9AD) stated that height symbolized nobility. Therefore, the height of the hall base/platform would be nine *chi* (2 meters, 1 *chi*= 0.231meter) for the emperor, seven *chi* (1.6 meter) for the lord, five *chi* (1.2 metre) for the official, three *chi* (0.7 meter) for the scholar (Zheng & Kong, 1999, p.730).

The sumptuary law in the Tang dynasty rigidly indicated that nobles below the royal

family members, could not adopt the construction treatment of *zao jing* and *chong gong* in their main halls. (*Zao jing* is a specially constructed ceiling, built with decorations, carvings and painted with colours. Such treatment was only to apply to the great hall of emperors and gods. *Chong gong* is a structural treatment with two layers of arch.) Officials of the third rank and above, could not have a hall of more than five bays in width and nine bays in depth (a bay is a column-interval). Officials of the fifth rank and above could not have a hall of more than five bays in width and seven bays in depth. Officials of the sixth, seventh ranks and below, could not have a hall of more than three bays in width and five bays in depth. Commoners were further limited in what they could build, being restricted to a hall no larger than three bays in width and four bays in depth, and a gate no more than one bay in width and two bays in depth (Wang, 1955, c.31, p.575).

Compared to the Tang dynasty, the Song dynasty experienced an increase in ornamentation in housing, particularly among officials' households. Accordingly, the law on housing control became a little looser. The Song officials could use a particular kind of ornament which was previously reserved for royal members and nobles in Tang times. Similarly, the commoners were allowed to build a bigger hall than before. The superior architectural features of *zao jing* and *chong gong*, formerly applied only in the great hall of royal palace and that of the most important noble's mansion, now could be used in all officials' houses. Nonetheless, in a symbolic manner, it manifested a power transformation to the centralized government, which extracted power from great nobles and shared it with officials elected through the national examination system (Tuotuo, 1977, c.154, p.3600).

Although the regulation in the Song dynasty became comparatively looser, still, a hall was the physical emblem of the house-owner's social status. In convention, the main hall had to be built in a rigid symmetry and on a north-south axis. And it often faced a courtyard, which in return heightened its architectural significance.[fig.1] Invariably, a hall has to be built in a rectangular plan, while it can be expanded in a modular system. A hall was the social display place where family or personal prestige and pride were physically presented, particularly among the gentry and court officials.² [fig.2, 3]

² Typical plans and sections of a hall in the Song period can be acquired from *Ying Zao Fa Shi*, the first written

Zhang Zai (张载, 1020-1078), a Northern Song scholar and philosopher, as well as one of the founding fathers of the Neo-Confucianism, stated the proper social functions of a hall:

The main hall in a household is like a temple, it is also like the great hall where the emperor formulating legislations. People should not live in the hall, as it is for worshipping the gods and ancestors, for holding auspicious events and funerals, for initiation rites and weddings (Zhang, 1985, p.295).

In his book *Shu Yi*, Sima Guang (司马光, 1019-1086), a pre-eminent scholar and historian from the Northern Song dynasty, in a meticulous manner described all the traditional housing etiquettes, which were performed through a formal architecture device—courtyard house. The main hall was, above all, the predominate structure of a house, where “nuisance” behaviours were forbidden (Sima, 1868). There was also a major internal division of a house, and the critical boundary occurred in the main hall, behind which was the back house—the private domain, and beyond the main hall was the front house—the public domain (*Ibid*). [fig.4]

Although human behaviour was largely codified in text, the main hall was deployed as a prime structure for referencing— who, where and when to act or not to act. Therefore it could constantly impose instrumental power on inhabitants—to conform them to the society. In every sense, the main hall was a product of hierarchical social and domestic system, and it symbolized the Confucian moral structure.

A hall could also detached from a courtyard house and functioned independently. The

official book on architecture and construction preserved to date in Chinese history, though the intention of compiling this book was to control construction cost and the waste of building materials. Li Jie 李诫, (Song), *Ying Zao Fa Shi* 营造法式, (Shang Wu Ying Shu Guan, 1954); for English scholarship on *Ying Zao Fa Shi* see, Else Glahn, “Unfolding the Chinese Building Standards: Research on the Yingzao fashi,” in *Chinese Traditional Architecture*, et al. Nancy Shatzman Steinhardt (New York City: China Institute in America, China House Gallery, c1984), pp.47-58; Chen Wei, “On Drawings in Yingzao Fashi,” in *Architecture Studies 01* (China Architecture Industry Press, 2011), pp.251-278; Li Shiqiao, “Reconstituting Chinese Building Tradition: The Yingzao fashi in the Early Twentieth Century,” in *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians*, vol. 62, no. 4 (Dec., 2003), pp. 470-489.

book *Record of Relics in Bianjing* (the Northern Song capital, now Kaifeng), compiled by a Ming scholar Li Lian (李濂), listed a number of halls in the capital city, and all of them seemed have assumed certain functions from a social (or Confucian) aspect. Zi Shan Tang (Hall of Inquiring Goodness) for example, was built in 1015 as a study place for the young princes. Consider the virtue of learning was to be good and benevolent for the imperial members, the name of the hall was therefore granted as “Zi Shan” (Inquiring Goodness) in 1016, which clearly exhibited Confucian ideology (Li, 1999, p.119). Similarly, San Huai Tang (Hall of Three Chinese scholar-trees) allegorically recorded a story of how the righteous Confucianist Wang You achieving his (or precisely his family) prosperousness. Su Shi (苏轼, 1037-1101), a renowned Song scholar-official, wrote the essay *San Huai Tang Ming* (The Motto of Hall of Three Chinese scholar-trees) as a memento for Wang’s righteousness—an essential Confucian virtue of a scholar-official (*Ibid*, pp.120-121; Tuotuo, 1977, p.9242).

In *Tai Ping Yu Lan*, a kind of encyclopaedia book with materials taken from various sources and arranged according to subjects, compiled in the Northern Song dynasty, there is a long list of the meanings and usages of halls recorded from different precedent historical periods and social contexts. The functions and social meanings of a hall, such as for court business, for teaching and learning, for displaying filiality and royalty, for banquet and worshipping, all these seemed have conformed to the political, social and moral disciplines of Confucianism (Li, 2000, pp.671-674).

PAVILION (*ting*)

Pavilion, on the other hand, was detached from Confucian doctrine. It has never been stipulated in the formal layout of traditional courtyard house; rather, it was always integrated into a garden or natural landscape.³

The transformation of social meaning of pavilion was indispensably bound to the

³ The genesis of a pavilion was for defence purpose in the Warring States *Period* (475-221 BC) and later on for local administration in the Han dynasty (202 BC – 220 AD). During the period of disunion (220-589AD), a particular time of turmoil in Chinese history, as the whole country was divided by different regions ruled by different warlords, the social role of a pavilion as administration unit disappeared. However, the folk custom that setting up pavilions along the traffic routes as resting spots was widespread onwards. At the same time, pavilion emerged in many garden developments.

garden development in Chinese history. The Chinese classic garden development originated from the 11th to 12th centuries B.C. During 770 B.C. to 211 B.C., gardens were exclusively reserved for the Imperial family. Later on, from 220 B.C. to 589 B.C., many Buddhist and Taoist temples started to build gardens attached to their premises, and this phenomenon became widely spread. It was after the Five Dynasties (907-979), particularly from the Song dynasty onwards, that private gardens emerged and became common among wealthy families, and the movement reached its climax in the Ming and Qing dynasties (Wei, 1992, pp.1-3).

The private garden that emerged from the Song dynasty was normally integrated with a dwelling. The literary record of private gardens in poetry and painting, judged by both the activities of their creation and the contents ensued, was nevertheless a form of individual expression. The Song dynasty, as Yi-Fu Tuan (1982, pp.146-147) points out, witnessed “an unprecedented blossoming of individual interests and tastes in art and culture among members of the gentry, the scholar-officials.”

A pavilion is an essential element of garden making in Chinese tradition. Unlike other natural yet tamed elements such as stones, trees and waters, a pavilion is most artificially made and reciprocally manifests the personal purpose of its creation. Apart from providing a locus for appreciating the landscape, the erection of a pavilion denotes certain expression of individualism.

Cang Lang Pavilion for example, the most recounted building in Chinese literature, offers a thunder manifesto of how the Chinese literati construct self and social ideologies through both architecture and literature. The story of Cang Lang Pavilion is inseparably connected with its original creator and author— Su Shunqin (苏舜钦, 1008-1048), a famous poet of the Northern Song dynasty (960-1127 AD), as well as a radical advocator for political reform. He had served in a number of official posts including the dynasty's highest court before his dismissal, a result of an accusation of embezzlement by his political opposition. Shortly afterwards, Su travelled to the southern region in 1045, accompanied by his wife, searching for a secluded place for soothing his mind and body. Eventually Su found and purchased a dream land (an approximate area of 1.4 hectares, with water on its three sides). On the northern site, he built a pavilion named “Cang Lang” (Su, 1961, p.183).

Su Shunqin not only named the pavilion as “Cang Lang”, but also called himself as the

“old man of Cang Lang”. Besides his poem— *Notes of Cang Lang Pavilion*, Su produced more than four poems specifically regarding Cang Lang Pavilion. All of them focused on describing his daily life in and around the Pavilion and his associated sentiments and feelings (for details see Su, 1961).

Once the Pavilion was completed, its name and meaning seemed have been transformed onto the entire garden. In most of Su’s writings, a detailed account of the Pavilion itself was absent. Rather, the discourse was centred on the landscape surrounding the Pavilion and the author’s pleasure of living there, as well as Su’s aversion to his political opposition.

There was a trend emerging during the Song dynasty that poetry and painting were employed to discreetly express the literati’s political dissent. Alfreda Murck (2000, p.262) points out that the mutual political views shared among the literati were instilled into various literature forms, thereby exchanged and appreciated by those who also defined themselves as a circle. Ouyang Xiu (欧阳修, 1007-1073), a prominent litterateur and historian of the Northern Song dynasty, as well as a close friend of Su’s, was invited by Su to write a poem on exactly the same topic: *Cang Lang Pavilion*. In fact, as Ouyang Xiu stated in his poem, he was unable to visit the place, therefore his writing was solely based on his reading of Su’s poem (Ouyang, 1992, p.3607-3608). In other words, Ouyang Xiu had reconstructed the landscape through his in-depth understanding of Su’s architectural concepts and Su’s personality. Mei Yaochen (梅尧臣, 1002-1060), another important Song scholar-official, also responded to Su’s invitation and wrote the poem *On the Topic of Cang Lang Pavilion* (Fan, 1999, p.189). Apart from expressing the commiseration in their poems, Ouyang and Mei both conveyed their envy for Su’s solitary life – free from political business. The Pavilion seemed have become a symbolic vessel facilitating communication between the scholars. And through echoes and supports from the others, one’s individual value therefore was reinforced.

The existing building of Cang Lang Pavilion is quite small and conventional. It consists of four stone columns holding a cantilevered tiled roof—a traditional but very common and simple structure one can encounter almost everywhere in China.[fig.5] With its architectural openness and structural lightness, a pavilion was often well integrated into its surrounding landscape. It is this lightness that offers an ideal characteristic for escape—frees oneself from

social burdens. Commenting on modern escapist places (e.g., mega-shopping malls, fancy resorts, theme parks, or even picture-perfect suburbs), Yi-Fu Tuan (1998, p.5) discerns that all of them, like a pavilion, lack a fundamental feature, that is, weight.

As an escapist place, a pavilion was not only built as a shelter for comforting tired body and mind, but also for people to appreciate the nature and leisure. It is through leisure activity that idiosyncrasy of the individuals could often be fully revealed and developed. In a similar fashion, Ouyang Xiu, after his demotion in 1046, named himself as the “Zui Weng” (old drunkard) and wrote *Record of Zui Weng Pavilion* for his pavilion endowed by a monk friend. The pavilion, as the essay portrayed, was surrounded by scenic mountains and elevated above a creek.[fig.6] Ouyang frequently entertained himself and his guests with drinks and games there. The most famous lines of his essay as follows:

The real intention of an old drunkard is not for wine, but lies in-between mountains and waters. The joy from mountains and waters was perceived by the heart while cheered by the wine (Ouyang, 1922, c.39).

Whether getting intoxicated by wine or by natural landscape, it was nevertheless an attempt to withdraw from social reality. Both Su Shunqin and Ouyang Xiu called themselves as “old man” (weng) at their age of 39, which in fact only deemed a middle age among the Song scholar population according to statistical report.⁴ Particularly for Ouyang Xiu, it was certainly not a premature senility in his physical or biological condition, but was a mental retreat—to ironically claim his state of retirement.

Due to the imperial court system, scholar-official’s political career would inevitably encounter a number of risks ranging from demotion to exile and even to execution by holding critical opinion against the emperor’s favour. Therefore, most scholars’ lifestyles, under the intertwined influences of Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism, oscillated between two extremes: political engagement and the reclusiveness of a solitary person. The architecture of

⁴ A research surveyed 82 scholars in the Song dynasty, and the average age is 65.6. Available from: <http://shufa.pku.edu.cn/view.asp?Class=13&id=1986>. Date accessed: 02 Feb., 2012.

pavilion invitingly brings a person to an imitate connectedness with the nature. In addition, the claim for selfhood, accompanied by literary writings, to paraphrase Stephen Owen's words, is a social action against sovereignty—to claim a private sphere from omnipresent monarchy (Owen, 1996, pp.88-89).

Spatially and mentally disengaging with the society is a common practice of cultivating selfhood among the literati, particularly when they were under political crisis or under influences from Taoism. Pavilions and associated literature thus cemented the pursuit of individualism in both activity and mentality.

Zhang Tianji (张天骥, 1041-?), an erudite scholar, as well as a hermit in the Northern Song dynasty, who had no interest to serve as a court official and led an Taoist life in Yunlong Mountain (in Xuzhou, Jiangsu Province). He lived with his pets, two cranes, and built a pavilion (in 1078) as the place for appreciating natural landscape and for playing with the cranes. Su Shi, the renowned scholar-official as mentioned earlier, and a close friend of Zhang's, frequently visited the pavilion when Su was demoted to the Prefect of Xuzhou. Reflecting upon his frustration of political career, intertwined with the beautiful natural scenery and the joyful hermit lifestyle of Zhang, Su wrote the essay *Fang He Ting Ji* (Record of pavilion for releasing crane), which brought the fame for the pavilion and Yunlong mountain afterwards. [fig.7]

It was from this essay that the pavilion obtained its name—“Fang He Ting” (Pavilion for releasing crane). “Crane” literally referred to the pets, but also figuratively indicated the affinity between hermit and crane—as crane in Chinese culture represents dignity, and it often symbolically associated with immortality, Taoism and moral righteousness. The pavilion according to Su's essay was built on the top of the mountain where Zhang encountered a exotic scene one day when he was ascending. It is a perfect location where the magnificent nature can be fully revealed (Su, 1986, p.360).

In contrast to social life, particularly to political life, which was full of unconceivable and unpredictable forces, nature displays itself in a regular pattern (e.g., four seasonal shifts) and in a circular succession—in a word—certainty. To a scholar-official, who was unfamiliar with peasants' toil life ruled by the relentless nature, this natural realm seems to be an ideal

escapist place, which is completely filled with simplicity, ease, and harmony, far receded from the mundane world. Only a wise hermit, like flying cranes, could possibly indulge his solitude there. Su often drunk with Zhang in the pavilion and enjoyed himself. He also claimed that the joy of a hermit life was even beyond the exchange for the position of an emperor.

Within a garden house, a hall and a pavilion could also be consciously distinguished by their names, and of course, by their conventional physical forms.⁵ The bestowed meanings (in text) on a hall often indicated social engagement, while that of a pavilion often exhibited individual pleasure. For example, an old house of Su Shi on Bai He (white crane) mountain in Huizhou for example, contained several buildings: a hall named “virtue brings neighbours;” one pavilion named “pavilion for rejoicing the river;” another pavilion was erected in the middle of a small vegetation garden named “leisureliness” (Archaeology of Historic Sites in the Prefecture of Huizhou, 1934, c.1330).

The simplicity of a pavilion contains myths. A pavilion has to be constructed in a succinct and open form so that it can be seamlessly integrated into natural landscape—too much physical decoration or concealment will impair its conformity to the nature, but too less artificiality will also belie its human trace. From both functional and physical viewpoints, a pavilion to some extent is useless: it can neither offer a true escape from harsh weather, nor does it suggest any habitation other than for a transient rest. Certainly, a pavilion alone would not be built as a dwelling form for people to settle down. In other words, a pavilion is not a necessity but a luxury, it was always owned by those who had their houses built first and had a pavilion as the extra. A pavilion was often located in the least accessible area to the public: either in the backyard of a house, or situated in a reclusive natural environment. In short, pavilion is purposively erected for self indulgence, for escaping from the moral burden of the society, and for asserting individual propositions.

⁵ There was a prevailed custom from the Northern Song dynasty onward that once the buildings were completed by the builders, the scholars would designate a proper name for each building. The name would be written on a plaque and hung on the building, denoting specific meanings.

REFLEXIVE BOUNDARY

This Song custom (among the literati) that consciously constructing self via architecture and assisted by literature casted strong influences on the succeeding dynasties in pre-modern China, though with some variations in different periods. Hall and pavilion therefore represent two opposite social dispositions: conformity and dissent.

The literature records of pavilions seemed have far outnumbered that of halls. Eulogizing halls in literature was, by contrast, few. Conformity to society, as a Confucian discipline embodied in halls, was consistently and forcefully conducted by various social mechanisms. However, by virtue of its orthodox nature, it was omnipresent and whereby often became an unconscious part of social existence, which was also, paradoxically, easy to fall into oblivion.

Pavilion, on the contrary, as a form of individual expression, exhibits a “subtle art of dissent” —to borrow Alfreda Murck’s phrase, as it proposes retreatment and encourages scholars to articulate their political aversion through architectural and literary forms (Murck, 2000). Indeed, art, as Robin Evans (1997, p.266) points out, “has so often been portrayed as being against the world, because it is obliged to affirm by being untypical or unreal.” There were abundant literature records, as well as a series of renovations and rebuildings for these pavilions, carried out by the later generations, particularly in the Ming and the Qing dynasties. A personal character embodied in a pavilion, especially when it fights against the formidable social norms, was so vivid to be remembered and thereby became inspirational and admirable.

Avowedly, many modern scholars stated that pre-modern Chinese individualism lacked institutional support. In fact, traditional Chinese scholars seldom asserted their critical views against the society or the political system, nor did they totally separate themselves from the whole society (e.g., a hermit still had friends and frequently received visits). Rather, they withdrew themselves to a private realm only when they fell out of favour (Tuan, 1982, pp.150-151). Three essential elements: social, nature and human constituted the Chinese view of cosmos and the very foundation of their social philosophy. The position of human being, therefore, inevitably swung between two extremes: sociality and nature.

Hall and pavilion, one was a highly sanctioned place being desired and treated as magnificent as possible, the other was a humble shelter often loosely erected in a simplistic manner, denoted their inclinations toward two different realms: social and nature. Both of them are inseparable in constructing the Chinese scholars as a social individual. Similarly, discoursing on individualism in modern times, Georg Simmel (1971, p.324) claims that individual achievements, as which make him unique and indispensable though, at the same time make him so much the more dependent on the complementary activity of others. In other words, man can only complete himself by the possession of both individuality and sociality. It is by the physical form of a hall that personal achievement in the society is well acknowledged and displayed. While it is the lightness and seclusion of a pavilion and its associated thunder echoes in literature that the value of an individual person is asserted.

REFERENCES

- Archaeology of Historic Sites in the Prefecture of Huizhou [惠州府古迹考], 1934. In: *Gu Jin Tu Shu Ji Cheng* [古今图书集成], Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 165, ch. 1330.
- Evans, R., 1997. *Translations from Drawing to Building and Other Essays*, The MIT Press.
- Fan, C.D. [范成大] [Song], 1999. *Wu Jun Zhi* [吴郡志]. Jiangsu Ancient literature Press.
- Li, F. [李昉] [Song], et al., 2000. *Tai Ping Yu Lan* [太平御览], vol.2. Hebei Education Press.
- Li, L. [李濂] [Ming], 1999. *Record of Relics in Bianjing* [汴京遗迹志]. Zhong Hua Shu Ju.
- Murck, A., 2000. *Poetry and Painting in Song China: the Subtle Art of Dissent*, Harvard University Asia Center.
- Ouyang, X. [欧阳修][Song], 1922. *Ouyang Wen Zhong Gong Ji* [欧阳文忠公集]. Shanghai Shang Wu Ying Shu Guang.
- _____, 1992. Cang Lang Pavilion. In: *Quan Song Shi* [全宋诗], vol.6. Beijing University Press. Ch.284.
- Owen, S., 1996. *The End of The Chinese 'Middle Ages': Essays in Mid-Tang Literary Culture*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
- Sima, G. [司马光] [Song], 1868. *Shu Yi* [书仪]. Jiangsu Shu Ju.
- Simmel, G., 1971. *On Individuality and Social Forms.*, ed. & intro. Donald N. Levine, The University of Chicago Press.
- Su, S.Q. [苏舜钦] [Song], 1961. *Su Shun Qin Ji* [苏舜钦集]. Zhong Hua Shu Ju.
- Tuan, Y.-F., 1982. *Segmented Worlds and Self, Group Life and Individual Consciousness*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Tuan, Y.-F., 1998. *Escapism*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins university Press.
- Tuotuo [脱脱] [Yuan], et al., 1977. *Song Shi* [宋史]. Zhong Hua Shu Ju.
- Wang, P. [王溥] [Song], 1955. *Tang Hui Yao* [唐会要]. Zhong Hua Shu Ju.
- Wei, J.Z. [魏嘉瓚], ed., 1992. *Record of Suzhou Gardens in History* [苏州历代园林录], Beijing: Yanshan Press.
- Xu, Y.N., 2000. *The Chinese City in Space and Time*. University of Hawai'i Press.
- Xu, Y., 2009. Legacy from the Past, Impetus for the Future: Notes on Architectural Adaptive Reuse. *World Architecture*, 230, pp.115-121.
- Zhang, Z. [张载] [Song], 1985. *Zhang Zai Ji* [张载集], Zhong Hua Shu Ju.

Zheng, X. [郑玄] [Han] and Kong, Y.D. [孔颖达] [Tang], 1999. *Li Ji* [礼记正译]. Beijing University Press.

晚明滑稽仿作新視野——王思任《弈律》初探

胡梓穎

香港公開大學

電郵：gwu@ouhk.edu.hk

中國古典滑稽仿作概述

「滑稽仿作」(Parody)一詞，在希臘文學中早已出現。亞里斯多德 (前 384-前 322) 在其《詩學》(*Poetics*)中亦對此文體有所提及，指的是作者把著名作品的文字略作改動而令作品產生滑稽的效果。(Aristotle 1995) 然而，在中國文學的範疇裡，至今還沒有給「滑稽仿作」定下統一的名稱，只籠統地把這類作品入於諧謔文學之列。此處必先說明本文何以放棄一般慣用的專門名詞如「擬仿」、「戲仿」等，而以「滑稽仿作」取代之。司馬貞(656-720)《史記索隱》對「滑稽」一詞曾有如下說明：

滑(音骨)，亂也；稽(音雞)，同也。言便(辯)捷之人，言非若是，言是若非，謂能亂同異也。(司馬貞 1987)

可見「滑稽」一詞原指善於雄辯者能透過言語亂同異、顛倒是非。「擬仿」、「戲仿」等名稱，只能說明作品具「摹擬」和「遊戲」的性質，卻未能突顯該類作品「亂同異」、「顛倒是非」的特質。故本文嘗試把《弈律》歸類為「滑稽仿作」，藉以突顯該類作品「亂同異」、「顛倒是非」之特性。

縱然歷代文人未有對「滑稽仿作」作分類，但中國「滑稽仿作」的出現卻可追溯到漢魏六朝，如劉宋袁淑(408-453)的〈雞九錫文〉、〈常山王九命文〉等篇，都反映出「滑稽仿作」的發展在六朝時期已臻成熟。韓愈(768-824)〈毛穎傳〉的出現，在唐代已引起文人圈子很大的迴響；而毀譽雙方的爭論點主要在於此文是否「有益於世」。據南宋王柏(1197-1274)所述：「托物作史，以文為戲，自韓昌黎傳《毛穎》始。當時貪常嗜瑣者，咕咕然動其喙笑以為怪。」(王栢 1970) 歷來不少論者認為韓愈之舉有違儒家傳統，如《舊唐書·韓愈傳》中就批評韓愈〈毛穎傳〉是「譏戲不近人情」、「文章之甚紕謬者」。(劉昫等 1987) 惟其好友柳宗元(773-819)對他的作品卻甚為欣賞，並替其辯護，認為諧謔並不違聖人之道，甚至撰寫了〈蝨蟻傳〉。柳宗元在〈讀韓愈所著〈毛穎傳〉後題〉一文中引《詩經·淇奥》及《史記·滑稽列傳》之例，認為二者皆是「有益於世者」。他又進一步指出，韓愈的〈毛穎傳〉是「發其鬱積，而學者得之勵」，抒發情感之餘也同樣是有益於世。(柳宗元 1972) 雖然柳宗元支持韓愈撰〈毛穎傳〉，但從其討論中亦可見他很重視諧謔文學的社會功能。其爭論點只周旋於韓愈之文是否「有益於世」，但對「文以載道」、「文以明道」的觀點始終沒有半點動搖。由此可見，雖然當時各家曾就《毛穎傳》之撰寫產生激烈的辯論；但無論反對和支持韓愈者，都一致認為諧謔文學必須「有益於世」。換言之，他們的諧謔文學觀念與《詩經》、司馬遷(前 145-前 90)和劉勰(465?-520?)的觀念並無二致。雖然有關爭論持續不斷，但仍無礙晚唐以後滑稽仿作的蓬勃發展。宋代蘇軾(1037-1101)的〈江瑤柱傳〉、明代董穀(1516年舉人)的〈十五子傳〉、高明(1306-1359)〈烏寶傳〉、吳偉業(1609-1672)〈葉公傳〉等，或多或少繼承了〈毛穎傳〉「以文為戲」

的路向。另唐代張說(667-730)曾仿《神農本草經》撰寫〈錢本草〉，繼而唐代僧人慧日(680-748)又再將之改編為〈禪門本草〉，後來明代袁宏道(1568-1610)又再一次將之寫成〈禪門本草補〉。《神農本草經》作為「滑稽仿作」的被模仿對象，見證了「滑稽仿作」由唐代至明代的繼承與發展；而這一系列的繼承與發展，亦可說是中國古典文學史上一部活生生的「滑稽仿作」史。至於明代王思任仿《大明律》而撰的《奕律》，在中國「滑稽仿作」類作品中同樣具有不容忽視的地位。

王思任(1575-1646)，字季重，號遂東，又號「謔庵」，一生以諧謔為能事。他不但經常強調自己生性喜歡調笑、戲謔，自稱「舌如風，笑一肚」(王思任 1995)，還以不同的文體創作了大量諧謔作品如《奕律》、《悔謔》、《遊喚》、〈奔女判〉、〈坑廁賦〉等。由於其生性諧謔，經常戲謔甚至諷刺時人，他的仕途亦因而不很平坦。王思任晚年曾撰寫〈悔謔〉四十二則，記錄其生平事蹟，藉以悔改其戲謔的性格；然而，終其一生都無法改變過來。

王思任在世時，《奕律》已被多次刊印，今存版本包括：明天啟六年(1626)快堂刻本、明崇禎竹嶼刻本、明末虞山毛氏汲古閣本，另該文又被收錄於明清暉閣刻《王季重九種》及故宮博物院藏明刊本《王季重雜著》。王思任身後，其子王鼎起又把《奕律》收錄於清順治十五年(1658)刊刻的《謔庵文飯小品》中。另《明史·藝文傳》著錄《王思任集》三十卷，而張岱《石匱書·藝文志》著錄《清暉閣集》二十卷，惜兩者均無存本，無法證實有否收錄該文。從王思任《奕律》在晚明時期多次被刊印，可知此作品在當時已引起了讀者的注意。張岱(1985)在〈王季重先生像贊〉論王思任其人也提及「以文為飯，以奕為律」，點出了他的兩本重要著作《文飯小品》和《奕律》；錢謙益(1983)在〈王僉事思任〉中又言其「好以詼諧為文，仿《大明律》制《奕律》，吾以為必傳。」張、錢二人不約而同地在王思任的傳中提及《奕律》，可見此文在王思任的作品中佔有舉足輕重的地位，惟今人鮮有論及此作。

王思任晚年欲把其作品編成六十卷的《文飯》，無奈因國變而罷。及其身後，其子鼎起欲完成父親遺願，可惜因財政問題，只得把《文飯小品》編選成五卷並刊刻。這個刻本將所收錄的作品按文體分為三十九個類別；其中《悔謔》和《奕律》都被獨立分類，編者直接以作品的名稱代替文體類別，沒有將它們分類。今本《文飯小品》的文體分類，屬王思任原來的分類，抑是其子重新的分類，已無法稽考；但這已充分證明，中國古典文學雖然沒有為這些仿作定下文體名稱，但《文飯》的編者已意識到這些作品是屬於另類體裁的作品，不應被列入其它文體之下。

明、清兩代文人對於王思任的諧謔作品不無批評，部份認為他的諧謔太辛辣刻薄，如朱彝尊(1629-1709)就指王思任「滑稽太甚，有傷大雅」。(朱彝尊 1998) 另《四庫全書總目提要》編者對王氏的評價也頗負面。然而，這些評價是否持平公允，仍有待相權。原因是這些不同的評價涉及了多方面因素，例如當時文人的政治觀出現分歧、諧謔觀步伐不一致等。在政治原因方面，自滿清入關後，王思任飽嘗亡國之痛，隱居深山，最後絕食以殉節。故清室將王思任的作品列為禁書，清人對王思任的作品評價也比較負面。至於諧謔文學觀方面，晚明文人大致有兩種看法。部份文人仍然沿襲司馬遷《史記·滑稽列傳》「談言微中，可以解紛」、劉勰《文心雕龍·諧謔》「空戲滑音，德音大壞」，以及唐宋以來「文以載道」的傳統觀念，以「雅正」為作品的基本要求；另一部份文人則受到中晚明陽明心學的影響，認為諧謔文學應以抒發「真情」為基本。文人諧謔觀念上的分歧，導致他們對王思任有不同的看法。當然，以上都是比較籠統的看法，實際情形也並不如此壁壘分明。例如張岱(1985)對王思任的諧謔作品甚為欣賞，但也指出王氏作品的特色既能表現真我，又能「談言微中」；又例如錢謙益(1983)以為王氏之文「入魔入

盜」，但又指王思任的作品是「吾以為必傳」。「入魔入盜」和「談言微中」是兩種很極端的評價，如從這一層面看，是張褒錢抑。但從另一角度看，張氏將王氏諧謔作品歸類為傳統「談言微中」的作品，與柳宗元支持韓愈《毛穎傳》是異曲同工；而錢氏卻從文學角度指出王氏作品具獨特性，必能流傳後世，批評中帶有遠見，可見錢氏瞭解文學發展的路向，更具先見之明。當然，不同時代自有不同的文學觀念。本文並不旨在探討王思任的諧謔作品是否合於雅正的原則，只是試圖以王思任的滑稽仿作《弈律》為例，廓清晚明士人諧謔文學的新視野。

《弈律》與《大明律》的「律」觀比較

《弈律》，顧名思義就是弈棋之律，乃仿《大明律》的體例而寫成。作為晚明文人，王思任喜愛圍棋這種雅戲自是可以想見，《弈律》的撰寫就是最好的證明。按《明史·刑法志》所載，明太祖朱元璋(1328-1398)早於元代至正二十五年(西元 1365 年)佔領武昌以後，便開始著手議訂律令。兩年後，朱元璋自稱吳王，命左丞相李善長(1314 - 1390)編修律令，並於同年底完成有關編修工作。明洪武六年(西元 1373 年)，朱元璋再命刑部尚書劉惟謙重修律令，並於翌年成書。其後再經歷三次修改增訂，《大明律》終於洪武三十年(西元 1397 年)正式頒佈，成為明代各級司法部門斷獄量刑的依據。在《大明律》的修訂過程中，明太祖曾下命律令需以最淺白簡潔的文字來撰寫，以免出現文字上的漏洞而導致貪贓枉法的情況發生。(張廷玉等 1974, 2280-4 頁)然而在〈弈律小引〉中，王思任卻強調律令應當詳盡地撰寫，以免有所遺漏：

張眾膽者握秦鏡，逃百魅者圖禹鐘，吾是以甯詳毋略也。(王思任 1995)

秦鏡，指的是秦始皇的方鏡，相傳此鏡能照見人心的善惡。(劉欽 1979) 禹鐘，即指夏禹以九牧之金鑄鼎，傳說此鼎上鑄萬物，使民知何物為善，何物為惡。(左丘明著、杜預注 1977) 王思任指出秦始皇以方鏡照人心，臣民懼而未敢作惡；夏禹以鼎上所鑄萬物教育人民，使臣民知善惡而免入歧途。故王氏所訂《弈律》之條例亦以詳盡為旨，以防弈者犯錯。明顯地，王思任訂律的宗旨亦與明太祖不盡相同。

在進一步討論《弈律》以前，此處先闡述王思任對於「律」的看法，從而了解《弈律》的主題思想。王思任曾為其友李清(字映碧，1602-1683)所撰的《折獄新語》(下稱《折獄》)作序。此書共分十卷，記錄了李清任官其間曾斷之公案。王氏之序開首即以《折獄》與湯顯祖(字義仍，號海若、若士，1550-1616)的傳奇作比較：

湯若士之傳奇，非場上之劇業，乃案頭之道書也。李映碧之折獄，非赭衣之繫令，乃紗帽之新語也。(李清 1995)

王氏首先指出湯顯祖戲曲作品之搬演並不單是為觀眾提供娛樂，還是啟示讀者為人之道；同樣地，李清的《折獄》亦非單純的記錄李氏所斷之案，同時亦記錄了當日官場上的「新語」。

「新語」一詞，最早見於漢代陸賈《新語》一書。據《隋書·經籍志》所載，《世說新語》本名《世說》。魯迅 (2001)曾指出，唐人始將此書命名為《世說新書》，而宋代晏殊刪拼的版本則命名為《世說新語》。可見該書大概於唐、宋之間才被命名為《世說

新語》。《世說》在有明一代曾多次被重新刊印，並有不少文人為之點評。明代以「世說體」撰寫的作品亦如雨後春筍。(Qian 2001) 另王思任曾多次在其作品中引用《世說》的事典、語典。(劉偉生 2008)由於《世說新語》在晚明相當流行，而王思任對《世說新語》也很關注，但卻從未有提及過陸賈《新語》一書，故有理由相信他所指的「新語」是源於劉義慶(403-444)《世說新語》，意指記錄新奇的人與事。王氏所言的「紗帽之新語」，不單呼應了《折獄》之命名、突顯此書主題，更可視為書題之注腳。王氏進一步把兩者作比較：

湯若士說鬼說夢，化工之筆，鬼夢俱變為人。李映碧說奸說盜，化工之筆，奸盜皆露其性。然而湯若士之筆貴刻，刻□啼歎處多其□，往往罵人搥人，而主於入人；李映碧之筆常寬，寬□□處多其□，往往擣人救人，而主于生人。(李清 1995)

王思任以在晚明風靡一時的《牡丹亭》和《折獄》作比較，除了能加深讀者對此書的印象，更可見王氏對此書評價不低。在《牡丹亭》中，湯顯祖試圖透過戲曲揭露並分析時人的思想與內在情感，從而抨擊程朱理學抑制人們真性情的一面；而在《折獄》中，李清記錄奸人盜賊之惡行，然而斥責背後，還是處處給予犯人改過自新的機會。從王思任的論述，可見王氏認為法律的意義不單在於公平對待每一個人、為人們排難解紛，更重要的是給予犯人重新改過的機會。

《弈律》中的刑罰標準

《弈律》條目計四十二條。作者從《大明律》中選取了律例四十二條為仿作對象，其中不少條目都沿用《大明律》中的原標題，只有部份標題因應內容而略作修改(見表1)。修改大致可分為兩類，即：(一)減字類，如條目四十「虛出通關」，原題為「虛出通關朱砂」；(二)取意類，指標題只取原文意思，但沒有承襲，如條目十八「誑騙」，原題為「詐欺官私取材」。標題之修改自然是以配合《弈律》的內容為原則。

表1 《弈律》與《大明律》條目對比

《弈律》條目	《大明律》條目
1. 斷罪依新頒律	卷第一・名列律・斷罪依新頒律
2. 殺人	卷第十九・人命・謀殺人
3. 擄掠	卷第十四・軍政・縱軍擄掠
4. 白晝搶奪	卷第十八・賊盜・白晝搶奪
5. 事發在逃	卷第一・名列律・事發在逃
6. 公取竊取皆為盜	卷第十八・賊盜・公取竊取皆為盜
7. 威力制縛人	卷第二十・鬪毆・威力制縛人
8. 奏對不以實	卷第三・公式・事應奏不奏
9. 詐為瑞應	卷第二十四・詐偽・詐為瑞應
10. 那移出納	卷第七・倉庫・那移出納
11. 教唆詞訟	卷第二十二・訴訟・教唆詞訟
12. 詐教誘人犯法	卷第二十四・詐偽・詐教誘人犯法

13. 庸醫殺傷人	卷第十九・人命・庸醫殺傷人
14. 術士妄言禍福	卷第十二・儀制・術士妄言禍福
15. 漏泄軍情大事	卷第三・公式・漏泄軍情大事
16. 同行知有謀害	卷第十九・人命・同行知有謀害
17. 宮內忿爭	卷第二十・鬪毆・宮內忿爭
18. 立子違法	卷第四・戶律・立嫡子違法
19. 囑託公事	卷第二十六・雜犯・囑託公事
20. 罵人	卷第二十・罵詈・罵人
21. 搬做雜劇	卷第二十六・雜犯・搬做雜劇
22. 守支留難	卷第七・倉庫・守支留難
23. 冒支	卷第七・倉庫・冒支官糧
24. 得遺失物	卷第八・錢債・得遺失物
25. 收留迷失子	卷第四・戶律・收留迷失子女
26. 公事失錯	卷第一・名列律・公事失錯
27. 檢踏災傷	卷第五・田宅・檢踏災傷田糧
28. 事畢不放回	卷第二十八・斷獄・原告人事畢不放回
29. 謀反	卷第十八・賊盜・謀反大逆
30. 私和	卷第二十六・雜犯・私和公事
31. 禁止迎送	卷第十二・儀制・禁止迎送
32. 上言大臣德政	卷第二・吏律・上言大臣德政
33. 誑騙	卷第十八・賊盜・詐欺官私取材
34. 侵佔街道	卷第三十・河防・侵佔街道
35. 冒破物料	卷第二十九・工律・冒破物料
36. 造作不如法	卷第二十九・工律・造作不如法
37. 辯明冤枉	卷第二十八・斷獄・辯明冤枉
38. 起解金銀足色	卷第七・倉庫・起解金銀足色
39. 市司評物價	卷第十・市廛・市司評物價
40. 虛出通關	卷第七・倉庫・虛出通關朱砂
41. 貢舉非其人	卷第二・吏律・貢舉非其人
42. 化外人有犯	卷第一・名列律・化外人有犯

《奔律》沿襲《大明律》之體例，卷首即開宗名義說明干犯其中條例的刑罰。《大明律》卷首即列出「五刑」，五類刑罰由輕至重，分別為「笞」、「杖」、「徒」、「流」、「死」。笞刑，自笞一十至五十，為笞刑五。杖刑，自杖六十至一百，為杖刑五。徒刑，自杖六十徒一年起，每等加杖十，刑期半年，至杖一百徒三年，為徒五等。流刑，分為三等，即二千里、二千五百里、三千里，而皆加杖一百。死刑，分為兩類，曰斬，曰絞。在《奔律》中，王思任刪掉了流刑和死刑，把刑罰簡化為「約法三章」，其刑如下：

笞：每一十，贖銀五厘。罪止笞五十。

杖：每一十，贖銀一分。六十起，罪止杖一百。

徒：徒作愚徒之徒，每一年贖銀三錢。不贖，侍坐一年。罪止徒三年。至總徒不准贖，終身侍坐。不許對奔。(王思任 1995)

下棋本是遊戲，如判犯規的對弈者以重刑，似乎過於嚴苛；而從《折獄》序文亦可知，王思任認為法律的意義在於給犯人改過自新的機會；流刑及死刑基本上是放棄了犯人，並沒有給予犯人改過自新的機會，故《弈律》裡不設流刑及死刑自是可以理解。作為儒者，王思任訂律的原則體現了儒家「以人為本」、重「寬恕」的人文精神。因此，《弈律》中最高刑罰只是總徒，即徒刑四年，犯者終身侍坐觀戰，不能親自對弈。可見王思任訂律的目的只是不讓對棋士犯規而已。

在《弈律》中，只有兩條目達到最高的判刑，即總徒四年；而兩條目均與棋士之品行有關。其一是條目五「事發在逃」：

凡局已分勝負，因而挾憤逃去不終者，杖一百，總徒四年。(王思任 1995)

不服輸挾憤而逃，非棋士應有態度，故該判以重刑。作者繼而在條目下之纂注闡明判重刑之原因：

擄掠猶聽人之擲掄，在逃則不復施己之面目，況雲挾憤，是剛而昧恥者，吾非斯人之徒與而誰與？(王思任 1995)

圍棋本是雅戲，棋士自當有棋士的品格與風度。犯下俘虜人口、搶劫財物的罪人至少還要留著被人嘲笑，但逃走的人卻不打算再在人前出現，而且還要脅憤離開，不知何謂廉恥，失卻了棋士應有的風度，是故作者對此等對弈者甚為不齒，判以重刑。另一達至最高判刑的條目則是第二十九條「謀反」：

凡曾經投師輸拜，而忽然拒敵不肯饒服者，以謀反論，但列子杖一百，總徒四年。止系平交昔弱今強者，彼此增減勿論。(王思任 1995)

棋士除了要有風度，還得懂得尊師重道。正如作者在此條目下「纂注」所言：

律意止重「師」字，如曾經學弈輸拜，則雖青出於藍亦當然思其本。如輒敢對壘驕抗，不須與弈，但列勢子，即當杖一百，總徒四年，所以懲倍惡而正終身也。若平交，則彼此互饒，增減勿論矣。(王思任 1995)

王思任指出『律意止重「師」字』，體現了儒家「尊師重道」的精神。即使徒兒青出於藍亦當飲水思源；若對老師拙拙相逼，實為忘本，非為徒兒之道，故當以嚴懲。以上兩條皆與棋士的品行有關，王思任判以重刑為戒，可見他認為對棋士的行為表現比棋局的勝負以及棋士的棋藝更加重要。由於作者重視棋士之品德，因此一切蓄意的舉動，如欺詐或有預謀之舉都予以較重的刑罰。

《弈律》除了按罪行的嚴重性而作出不同程度的判罰，對於犯者是否蓄意犯規亦很注意。蓄意的犯規一般都被判以較重刑罰，而無心之失者則往往獲輕判。這種判罰的模式貫徹了王思任「以律生人救人」的訂律精神。如條目三「擄掠」：

凡見己大敗，輒敢擄掠圖賴人者，杖一百，徒三年，仍坐贓一百二十貫。其激變混局有所規範者，杖八十，徒二年。偶失者不坐。(王思任 1995)

作者在此條「纂注」再次說明：「然無心偶錯，則不必坐。」(王思任 1995) 在《弈律》中，擄掠是很嚴重的罪行，但非蓄意的擄掠還可獲得輕判。以上的判罰貫徹了王思任的司法精神——讓犯人有改過自新的機會。在第二十六條「公事失錯」中，作者也給予類似的判刑：

凡因公事偶錯，即自覺舉，許紀過罰二子改正。(王思任 1995)

寬恕無意犯規的棋士不單是出於同情心，而且顯示出王思任洞悉到司法制度的精神和社會功用。懲罰犯錯的人並不困難，但寬恕犯人卻顯得更正面、更有建設性。此外，犯人的責任感亦相當重要。雖然王思任往往寬恕偶然或非蓄意犯規的棋士，但他還是認為犯人需要對自己的行為負責，讓他們吸取教訓，從錯誤中學習。故判以一定懲罰還是有需要的。對於完全罔顧對弈規範的人，作者在第四十二條「化外人有犯」則有如下判處：

凡弈律頒行天下，系我同志者各當遵守，如化外人聽其有犯，不用此律。(王思任 1995)

王思任把罔顧對弈規則的人視為「夷狄」。他在此條「纂注」中指出：

化外人，乃負固不服而必犯此律者，是夷狄也，于夷狄直縱之縻之而已，何足校焉。(王思任 1995)

王思任認為法律的精神在於給予犯人改過自身的機會。因此，罔顧法律的人既不能教化，作者只能採取放棄態度。由此可見，《弈律》雖是遊戲文字，但戲謔背後還是隱藏著王思任對法律精神的構想與實踐；而他的法律精神也同時滲透了濃厚的儒家思想。

《弈律》條目及其「纂注」

下棋本乃遊戲。王思任卻選擇以嚴肅的律令撰寫《弈律》，形成輕鬆與嚴肅的反差。《弈律》各條目皆模仿《大明律》之體式撰寫而成，但條例本身無論在標題以至用辭都會有導致讀者誤解改寫文字的可能，因此王思任在各條例以下另加「纂注」作解釋，闡明有關判刑的原因和原則，藉以引領讀者閱讀有關文字，並表達作者的意見。如其四〈白晝搶奪〉條：

凡白晝搶奪人棋，杖九十，徒二年半。強悔者，杖七十。哀悔者，笞五十，聽悔一次，仍紀過罰一子。(王思任 1995)

其「纂注」云：

言「白晝」，則燈下在其中。搶奪者，謂人持子未下，或下子未定，而遽從手中奪之，以起其子也。情雖強而實則弱，故徒懲之。強悔，杖七十，惡其強也。若哀悔者，尚有輸服之意，笞之，而聽悔一次，所以示憐，又必紀過罰子，以責其改。所以示法律，可謂寬嚴並濟矣。(王思任 1995)

這裡作者闡明如何和為何定下不同程度的刑罰。作者不厭其煩的詳細解釋，究其原因受到律例的寫作形式限制，而不能在正文中表達作者本身的意見。在按語加上作者自己的意見，既能讓讀者清楚了解原文，同時亦能保持作為「律令」體裁風格上的完整性。如「所以示法律，可謂寬嚴並濟」句，與條文沒有直接的關係，但卻點出了整部《弈律》的創作主旨。這種於正文下附加纂注的書寫模式，突破了前代「滑稽仿作」的寫作規範。

雖然部份纂注作者只簡單地說「此條明顯」，(王思任 1995) 但大部份的纂注都對各條目有相當詳盡的分析。從整部作品來看，條例的作用是製造遊戲和法律之間的張力，從而製造諧謔滑稽的效果；至於各條目下的按語則是作者表達其思想的部份。故《弈律》的按語某程度上比正文的律令更為重要。例如條目七〈威力制縛人〉的內文相當簡潔：

凡挾威力拆揪人棋而制縛之者，杖一百。罷局不敘恐嚇人者，笞四十。(王思任 1995)

然而，此條的按語卻比條文更詳盡：

此與威逼不同。威謂威勢，力謂氣力。挾者如挾貴、挾尊、挾長、挾潑、挾慣、挾嬌之類，拆則不止悔人之棋，揪則不待人弈之定，制者拘也，縛者捆也，是必欲以強取勝而拘捆之，使不得動也。律惡強，故杖一百。雖勝不敘，恐嚇人如口稱決殺之類，亦亂人觀聽者，並笞之。(王思任 1995)

為何作者要花如此多的篇幅來論述這一條簡短的律令？究其原委，本條例縱然與《大明律》原文名目相同，但二者的內容卻是風馬牛不相及。由於讀者被設定為熟讀《大明律》的士人，因此作者在借用《大明律》條目時，認為有必要將他所表達的意思詳加說明，以免讀者誤解其意。這亦解釋了為何作者要花如此多的篇幅來闡明其寫作各條目的用意。「纂注」的撰寫充分透露了作者有意引導讀者閱讀其文的意圖。

由於《弈律》的體式是仿《大明律》而撰，故其中不少條目都受到文字或語氣上的規範，令讀者難以明白箇中諧謔之處；故各條目以下的「纂注」往往都幫助讀者進一步了解條目的內容，起著舉足輕重的作用。如條目十三「庸醫殺傷人」：

凡庸醫見人棋子有病，初無故害之情，不按方術強為針刺，因而致死者，杖六十，終身不許行術。(王思任 1995)

「庸醫」和「方術」都是與治病有關的詞彙，似乎跟對弈沒有多大的關係。為了更進一步讓讀者明白其內容，作者在「纂注」中加以補充：

庸醫，乃低棋之別名。方術，即弈譜之正法。雖有救人之心，而甚有殺人著之著，杖以六十，而禁其終身弈棋，當自謂不冤也。(王思任 1995)

從此例可見，《弈律》的體裁和語氣因受制於《大明律》，不少諧謔的內容都難以被讀者理解。因此，作者必須在「纂注」中詳加解釋，說明「庸醫」是指代不擅下棋的弈者，從而讓讀者明白其中諧趣之處。

《弈律》正文字字莊嚴，實不足為笑；然作者將此作品名為《弈律》，弈棋的消閒

性質與律例的嚴肅精神頓時形成了強烈反差，亦因為這種反差而讓讀者感到滑稽可笑。值得注意的是，戲謔文字除了有賴於讀者在閱讀時的聯想，同時亦關係到讀者對法律原文的認知。那就是說，王思任這篇作品的讀者絕非普羅大眾，而是與王思任背景相似、已達到一定教育程度的士人和官吏。正如美國學者 Karin Myhre (2001) 所指出的，「幽默」一詞其實很難下定義，因為各人自有不同的文化背景、性格和經驗，而這些背景因素與讀者認為什麼才是可笑有著很密切的關係。因此，「諧謔」除了基於作品本身的客觀因素，讀者的品味和評價也是不可或缺的部份。另據 Pierre Bourdieu (1992) 的解釋，來自不同背景的人各有不同的習慣和文化，而這此往往都表現在人們的生活模式上。然而，習慣和文化選擇除了與教育程度和經濟能力有關，也跟其父親的職業、年齡等有著密切的關係。不同的生活習慣和文化選擇，同時亦反映了不同價值觀和審美觀。作為文學作品的《弈律》，其諧謔性亦隱含著士人的文化價值觀和審美觀，因此，要了解作品的諧謔之處，很大程度上是基於讀者的教育程度和成長背景所陶養出的品味。

〈弈律小引〉和〈弈律自跋〉的啟示

弈棋本是盛行於明晚的雅戲，王思任卻將之視為充滿欺騙、罪惡、暴露人性弱點的活動，極具反諷意味。從表 1 所列條目可見，對弈者在下棋時確實有不少不當的行為。《欽定四庫全書總目提要》有評此文云：

夫奕以消閒遣興，而限以苛例，使拘使萬狀，動輒得咎，斯亦不韻之極矣，無論其所定當否也。(永瑤，紀鈞等 1987)

評論者以為王思任所作《弈律》以嚴苛的法律條文套用於博弈是很掃興的做法。然王思任在〈宮內忿爭〉條的纂注卻指出：「弈本雅戲，而忿爭則惡道矣。」(王思任 1995) 如此高尚優雅的玩意都存在著那麼多的惡行，可見《弈律》之讓人掃興，非始於王思任，而是始於犯規的棋士們。作者在〈弈律跋〉中指出：

詩云：「奏假無言，時靡有爭。」凡爭之多，皆起於言之多也。王積薪夜止孤山宿，聞婦姑弈棋，了無丁丁聲。而勝負判決才三語耳。是夜出此書以示之，當茫然不知作何解矣。(王思任 1995)

有關「王積薪夜上孤山宿」事，見於唐代薛用弱(1985)的《集異記》卷一「王積薪」條。事敘棋士王積薪旅居蜀道，借宿於深山孤老之家，是夜無寐，偶聞屋中婆媳二人之聲。屋中並無燈火，只婆媳以話語對弈。雖無棋盤亦無棋子，但二人均欲以精湛棋藝取勝，並沒有因無紀錄而作弊。高明者不知有賴，不必有乍，故孤山婆媳口頭對弈，無憑無據，仍可自律。故王思任認為將《弈律》出示孤山婆媳，二人當茫然不知何解。言下之意，律者乃繩不自律之人，如人可自律，則無需作律。王思任之「不韻」，實建基於棋士們之「不韻」。

《弈律》在有明一代已被多次刊印。初刊時已附有〈弈律跋〉以說明其創作動機。及至第三次刊印的時候，王思任再親自作〈弈律小引〉申明其寫作動機：

律之作也，以繩強也，而予之作律，以繩弱也。曷為乎餘之作律不繩強而

繩弱也？曰：性道弱而智力出，智力弱而爭賴出。凡天下之強有力能為爭賴者，皆其中弱耳。(王思任 1995)

在王思任看來，有才有識之士擁有實力，可以憑自己的能力來生存，無須損他人而利己；唯有庸碌之輩，既無能力生存，只能靠打擊、陷害別人的方式來從中取利取勝，以維持生存空間。因此，他強調《弈律》以把弱者繩之於法為旨。作為《弈律》的引言，此處當然是指向下棋本身，但亦可能有意同時涉指晚明社會中的「弱者」。作者續言道：

或曰今天下強者少而弱者多，惡其害己，則將不利於吾子。嗟乎！刑書一鑄，孰殺子產？吾待之矣，而是子產亦何便容易得殺也！(王思任 1995)

戰國時代的仁者子產是一位很有政治才能的領導者。當時諸侯間篡弑之事頻仍，甚至也有打算殺害子產者，惟各諸侯敬子產之賢德，殺害之事亦因而作罷。(司馬遷 2000) 王思任引用這典故，旨在說明以武力殺害別人以示其實力，但子產根本不需要作任何行動，別人都敬重其人、加許其才；因此，子產的才智與實力實在眾諸侯之上，而以武力顯示自身實力的人，看似強者，實質卻是弱者。王思任嘗試透過諧謔的手法來表達他對晚明社會的看法，以下棋作為論說的媒介，既能啟發讀者的思考，又不刺人心，不失「謔而不虐」的雅正原則。

《弈律》只是遊戲文字，當然沒有必要在現實生活中執行；但以〈奕律跋〉、〈奕律小引〉二文及各條目之「纂注」並觀之，可窺見王思任相當重視讀者如何解讀其作品、了解其思想，絕非單純的遊戲之作。小說、戲曲之點評在有明一代相當盛行（王璦玲 2009），而王思任亦經常參與其事，比較重要的包括點評《世說新語》和《牡丹亭》，另又曾撰寫〈世說新語序〉、〈批點玉茗堂牡丹亭詞序〉、〈王實甫西廂序〉、〈十認錯春燈謎序〉等，可見他頗熱衷於小說、戲曲之點評活動。以序文交代寫作動機，在中國古典文學裡相當普遍；而詮釋作品內容的注疏和批點文字同樣俯拾皆是。小說、戲曲的批點在明清兩代尤其蓬勃。印刷術的發達和商業的繁榮推動了小說、戲曲和笑話集的出版，而文人批點在此間亦成為這些書籍的賣點。文人參與點評，既是出於興趣，同時亦有商業考慮。作品序文及點評模式亦為部份作者提供了自我解說的空間。然在傳統士人文學如詩、詞、散文裡，以自序說明寫作原由相當普遍，但自我點評或注釋卻很罕見。在《弈律》中，王思任以「纂注」來詮釋作品內容，並引導讀者理解他的作品。然而，這些「纂注」卻與一般注疏和批點文字不同——王思任並不是在文字完成後才讓讀者參與點評，亦不是在文字完成後自我評點，而是通過「纂注」的形式，一邊創作、一邊自我解說。換言之，各條目的「纂注」其實是作品的有機部份。作者以這種形式開闢出正文以外與讀者溝通的空間，主動「參與」了讀者的閱讀過程，「陪伴」讀者細閱每一條目以避免誤解，有時甚至藉此表達個人的觀點以引發討論。「纂注」的撰寫，並不是序文模式的交代背景，也不是從讀者角度分析之點評；王思任是有意在作者和讀者的對話中取得主導地位，以建立「作者」的權威性解讀。這種自我解釋的文字在小說、戲曲等流行文學中屢見不鮮，但在傳統的士人文學中卻不甚普遍。

《弈律》中的人物刻劃

《弈律》的體式雖然為律令，但其中卻包含了有關對弈者和旁觀棋局者的細緻描摹

刻劃，顯示了作者在日常生活中對棋士們的觀察，與〈毛穎傳〉那種傳記式的人物刻劃有別，為中國古典滑稽仿作的藝術技巧注入了新元素。

明代小說戲曲的發展相當蓬勃。雖然王思任終其一生都沒有創作過小說戲曲作品，但就經常參與小說戲曲之點評。其中在〈世說新語序〉和〈批點玉茗堂牡丹亭詞敘〉中，王氏都討論有關人物描寫的問題。他認為描摹人物以傳神為尚，上乘的作品應能把人物的神情、意態生動地活現讀者眼前，而且不同的人物亦應具有鮮明的形象個性，可見他對描摹人物的藝術技巧是相當關注。王思任曾在其撰寫的〈世說新語序〉中討論到人物描寫的問題。王思任認為描摹人物以傳神為尚，上乘的作品應能把人物的神情、意態生動地活現讀者眼前，而且不同的人物亦應具有鮮明的形象個性。(王思任 1966)。至於在〈玉茗堂還魂記序〉中，王思任指出湯顯祖《牡丹亭》的成就在於感人；而其所以感人者，在於能夠掌握並生動地描摹劇中人物的情態、神髓，「無不從筋節竅髓，以探其七情生動之微」。(王思任著，王鼎起編 1995)。可見王思任對人物刻劃相當關注。人物描繪是作者通過模仿人物原型的語言、動作、外貌等方面，把人物重現於觀賞者眼前。亞里斯多德在《詩學》中曾指出，如觀賞者從未見過作品之原型，就難以對該件藝術品產生共鳴。(Aristotle 1995) 礙於律令的文體規範，王思任當然難以像《世說新語》裡描摹多種不同年齡、身份的人物形象，更不能在短短的條文裡塑造出如杜麗娘般複雜的人物形象；《弈律》所描繪的，不是個別的或特有的人物形象，而是呈現了普遍存在於對弈者和觀弈者的行為反應和狀態。換言之，王思任是透過日常生活的觀察，描繪出晚明棋士和觀弈者的在棋局進行時的行為態度；而要讓讀者產生共鳴，他所描繪的人物必須是讀者常見、具普遍性的人物形象。《弈律》中一系列的描繪，不單反映了晚明文人圈子的生活百態，還是制訂《弈律》條例的依據。例如在其九「詐為瑞應」中，作者就對棋士的行為表現作出以下描寫：

凡詐為瑞應，詐稱死亡，詐喜詐悲，詐驚詐乞，暗邀人心者，各答五十。(王思任 1995)

其下附有「纂注」：

瑞與遂同。詐為遂應。原不欲應之，而故為應狀，以誤其著也。詐稱死亡，原未必即殺，而故云已殺，以懈其著也。詐喜者未勝而自賀，詐悲者未失而預愁，詐驚者有陡然一悟之意，詐乞者有無故索憐之情。是數者心甚苦勞，態俱鄙猥，然詐偽與強竊有間，故僅答以五十。(王思任 1995)

此處作者以「瑞」、「遂」二字的諧音來引起諧謔效果。欲取得上風的棋士，使用心計故弄玄虛，還沒有勝出就裝著胸有成竹、沾沾自喜的樣子，還沒有敗陣就愁雲慘霧的樣子，又或裝出可憐相，藉以影響對手的情緒，令對方作出錯誤判斷，趁其不備而取勝。作者在纂注中加以批評，以為這些行為卑鄙猥褻，需予以懲罰。雖然文字並沒有描寫固定的人物，但對於雙方棋士的心理描寫既真實又細緻。律令的書寫形式不能讓他發表意見，他就在「纂注」部份加以發揮，抒發己見，闡明有關判刑之原因，甚至對犯規的棋士加以批評。

《弈律》的「法律效力」不單針對棋士，對旁觀者同樣有約束力。如其十四「術士妄言禍福」條云：

凡旁觀原無確見。而恣口得失，代人驚喜者，笞五十。(王思任 1995)

戰況激烈的棋局，往往牽動著棋士和觀眾的情緒。「軍情緊急」之際，觀眾在旁議論、流露驚喜表情，實乃常事。惟這些舉動卻有可能反過來影響到正在對弈的棋士，故一律被禁止。類似情形如其二十一「搬做雜劇」條就列明會對觀戰時「腐吟優唱、手舞足蹈、觀聽狂惑者」(王思任 1995)，都會予以笞刑。除了議論和手舞足蹈，觀眾在旁通風報信、提點棋士也是常見之事，如其十五「漏泄軍情大事」條就列明：

凡旁觀將機密重情及緊關事務漏泄，而又代為代點者，杖一百。顯相告語者，杖九十。隱者，杖八十。以手足聲氣者，杖七十。色目者，杖六十。(王思任 1995)

在這短小的篇幅裡，作者細緻地將通風報信者慣用的幾種手法都羅列出來，包括明顯的話語提點、隱晦的作弊、以手足動作暗示或製造聲音以通報，以及眼神的交流，把觀眾的行為表現生動地刻劃出來，達到了讓人物「一一呵活眼前」的效果。由此可見，雖然王思任終其一生都沒有參與小說戲曲的創作，但作為晚明著名的小說戲曲點評家，他對人物刻劃的掌握已臻爐火純青的境界。

結論

作律始於法家。王思任的《弈律》卻揉合了法家和儒家的精神。《弈律》條文既重視嚴謹公平的原則，又處處體現了「以人為本」、「寬恕」、「尊師重道」等儒家精神。王思任〈折獄新語序〉中「以律救人」、「以律生人」的精神，正是《弈律》精神的最佳注腳。王思任一生嬉笑不能自禁，常為儒者所垢病；但作為遊戲文字的《弈律》，卻體現了聖人之道，可說是王思任對批評聲音的最佳回應。

作為活躍於晚明的小說、戲曲點評家，王思任在《弈律》中亦發揮了其點評家本色。「滑稽仿作」本身就具有「假異同」、「顛倒是非」的遊戲特質，而仿《大明律》來撰寫的《弈律》也確是幾可亂真；但王思任卻不囿於原文嚴肅、刻板的文字風格，反而透過對棋士們諧趣生動的描寫，側面勾勒出一幅活生生的明代棋士百態圖。如此細膩的人物刻劃工夫，亦反映出這位小說、戲曲點評家非常善於揣摩人物心理，這或多或少都與當日小說、戲曲的蓬勃發展有關。

王思任選擇以《大明律》為模仿對象，且以文言書寫，即設定了作品的讀者群為社會上層的文人士大夫。他在《弈律》各條目加入「纂注」，主動地「參與」讀者的閱讀過程，把作者的被動狀態扭轉為主動狀態。在再版時加入的〈弈律跋〉，更進一步反映王思任很重視與讀者的互動關係。這一種自覺性，未見於前代的滑稽仿作，大概是晚明出版業蓬勃發展下的副產品，帶有相當濃厚的晚明色彩。在嬉戲調笑的背後，可以窺見晚明文人的新視野——在出版業蓬勃的晚明，即使是以文言書寫的士人文學也要面對商業化問題。重視與讀者的互動關係，說明了讀者群的擴大或會增加誤解或曲解作品的可能性。王思任不厭其煩地為《弈律》撰寫纂注，除了突顯他作為晚明點評家的本色，同時也透露出他對「作者」權威性解讀的重視，比孔尚任(1648-1718)撰文解讀《桃花扇》早了大半個世紀。可以說，《弈律》的纂注不單肩負了指引讀者閱讀的任務，同時也為這一部「滑稽仿作」深深地蓋上了「晚明文學」的印鑒。

參考書目

- 王思任 1989, 文飯小品, 嶽麓書社, 長沙
- _____ 1977, 王季重雜著, 偉文圖書出版社, 臺北
- _____ 1966, 王季重先生文集, 收入乾坤正氣集, 第34冊, 第504至507卷, 環球書局, 臺北
- _____ 1995, 弈律, 收入四庫全書存目叢書, 子部, 卷76, 莊嚴文化事業有限公司, 臺北
- 王思任著, 王鼎起編 1995, 謔庵文飯小品, 收入續修四庫全書, 卷1368, 上海古籍出版社, 上海
- 王栢 1970, 魯齋王文憲公文集, 學生書局, 臺北
- 王夢歐 1998, 禮記今注今譯, 臺灣商務印書館, 臺北
- 王璦玲, 胡曉真 2009, 經典轉化與明清敘事文學, 聯經出版事業股份有限公司, 臺北
- 司馬貞 1987, 史記索隱, 收入欽定四庫全書, 第246冊, 上海古籍出版社, 上海
- 司馬遷 2000, 史記, 浙江古籍出版社, 杭州
- 左丘明著, 杜預注 1977, 春秋左傳集解, 上海人民出版社, 上海
- 永瑤, 紀鈞等 1987, 欽定四庫全書總目, 上海古籍出版社, 上海
- 朱彝尊 1998, 靜志居詩話, 人民文學出版社, 北京
- 李清 1995, 折獄新語, 收入續修四庫全書, 子部, 法家類, 卷972, 上海古籍出版社, 上海
- 柳宗元 1972, 柳河東集, 中華書局, 香港
- 張廷玉等 1974, 明史, 中華書局, 北京
- 張岱 1995, 石匱書, 收入續修四庫全書, 史部, 別史類, 卷318-320, 上海古籍出版社, 上海
- 張岱 1985, 琅嬛文集, 嶽麓書社, 長沙
- 劉昫等 1987, 舊唐書, 卷一百六十, 收入欽定四庫全書, 史部, 第271冊, 上海古籍出版社, 上海
- 劉偉生 2008, ‘王思任小品中的晉人風韻’, 廣西社會科學, 4期, 總154期, 151-155頁
- 劉惟謙等 1995, 大明律, 上海古籍出版社, 上海
- 劉歆 1979, 西京雜記, 臺灣商務印書館, 臺北
- 劉勰著, 范文瀾注 1995, 文心雕龍注, 商務印書館, 香港
- 魯迅 2001, 中國小說史略, 上海古籍出版社, 上海
- 錢謙益 1983, 列朝詩集小傳, 上海古籍出版社, 上海
- 魏征, 令狐德棻 1973, 隋書, 中華書局, 北京
- Aristotle, 1995. *Poetics* (Ed. & Trans. Stephen Halliwell). Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass
- Bourdieu, P., 1992. *Distinction: A Social Critique of Judgement of Taste*, Routledge, London
- Myhre, K., 2001. Wit and Humor. In: V. Mair, ed.. *The Columbia History of Chinese Literature*. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 132-148.
- Qian, N.X., 2001. *Spirit and Self in Medieval China: The Shih-shuo hsin-yü and Its Legacy*, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.

「奇書文體」的影響：論陳忱《水滸後傳》的敘事結構

林成川

香港中文大學

電郵：linchengchuan@gmail.com

一、前言

陳忱《水滸後傳》是一部接續百回本《水滸傳》而成的小說，主要敘述散落四處的梁山泊諸人及其後代重新聚義，協助李俊暹羅國稱王的故事。陳忱，字遐心，號雁宕山樵（或雁宕山人），又號默容居士，浙江湖州府烏程縣南潯鎮人。生於明萬曆四十二年（1615）。生平所著《雁宕詩集》、《雁宕雜著》、《續二十一史彈詞》、《癡世界》（曲本）等均佚，今存者惟《水滸後傳》及周慶雲《潯溪詩徵》（1857）所收遺詩一百零六首。到目前為止，專門研究陳忱《水滸後傳》的學位論文或專著有如下幾種：

1. Ellen Widmer (魏愛蓮), *The margins of utopia: Shui-hu hou-chuan and the literature of Ming loyalism*, Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1987.

2. 趙淑美, 〈《水滸後傳》研究〉(東海大學中文研究所碩士論文, 1989年)

3. 駱水玉: 〈四部具有烏托邦視境的清代小說——《水滸後傳》、《希夷夢》、《紅樓夢》、《鏡花緣》研究〉(國立臺灣大學中文研究所博士論文, 1999年)。

4. 張俊峰: 〈陳忱《水滸後傳》研究〉(香港中文大學哲學碩士論文, 2004年)。

另外，對《水滸傳》清代三部續書（《水滸後傳》、《後水滸傳》、《蕩寇志》）作整體研究的論著亦為數不少。以上論著對《水滸後傳》的作者生平、主題思想、歷史文化背景、所受前傳的影響、相對於前傳的價值優劣等方面都作了細緻豐富的研究，然而普遍缺乏對《水滸後傳》形式結構方面的考察。本文將主要借鑒浦安迪教授《中國敘事學》、《明代小說四大奇書》、周建渝教授《多重視野中的〈三國志通俗演義〉》在中國古典小說敘事結構方面的研究，對《水滸後傳》的敘事結構試作一番探索，重點考察其結構對於小說意義所起到的作用。

《水滸後傳》現存最早的刻本為康熙甲辰本（1664），分別藏於大英博物館及日本早稻田大學圖書館。柳存仁（1967）《倫敦所見中國小說書目提要》一書對大英博物館藏本有如下介紹：

1. 書扉上欄橫書「元人遺本」四字，右欄題「雁宕山樵評」，中欄題「水滸後傳」，左欄有一段說明：「宋遺民不知何許人，大約與施（耐庵）、羅（貫中）同時，特姓名弗傳，致其書亦湮沒不彰耳。……」末署「康熙甲辰仲秋鐫」。

2. 古宋遺民〈原序〉置於卷首，次錄〈《水滸後傳》序〉，末署「萬曆戊申秋杪雁宕山樵撰」。

3. 正文凡八卷四十回。有「論略」六十七條，末署「樵餘偶識」，有回末總評及正文評點。（柳存仁 1967）評者與作者為同一人。

「雁宕山樵」即作者陳忱，「萬曆戊申（1608）秋杪」、「古宋遺民」係假託。此書另外還有日本天理大學圖書館節山文庫藏本、三多齋本、紹裕堂新刻本以及蔡元放評改本。（黃海星 2009）目前通行於世的《水滸後傳》，乃乾隆三十五年（1770）蔡元放評

改本，研究者亦大多以之為論述基礎。¹蔡元放評改本將陳忱原訂的八卷四十回改為十卷四十回，又刪去古宋遺民與雁宕山樵的原序及「論略」、評點，全書回目²及正文亦與陳忱原刊本略有出入。（趙淑美 1989；Ellen Widmer 1987）本文論述主要依據日本早稻田大學圖書館藏原刊本，同時參照臺灣大學圖書館藏蔡元放評改本³。引述時若遇評改本與原刊本存在出入之處，文中另作說明。

二、《水滸後傳》與《水滸傳》的對應敘事

《水滸後傳》的故事接續的是《水滸傳》第九十九回（百回本）或第一百一十九回（一百二十回本）⁴。由《水滸後傳》中凡六次「征大遼」、「伏方臘」並舉⁵，又有多處單獨提及征遼或平方臘事，唯獨沒有提及一百二十回本《水滸傳》增加的征「田虎」、「王慶」兩寇，可以確證《水滸後傳》是接續百回本《水滸傳》而成。明確了後傳所對應的前驅⁶，對我們接下來的分析至關重要，因為這直接關係到小說作者有意識地在敘事結構上接續並模仿了前傳的文體。

作為一部接續《水滸傳》而成的小說，《水滸後傳》所處的文本語境相當特殊。一方面它理應具備新批評家所看重的作為「有機整體」的「文本自足性」；另一方面，從「文本互涉」的角度看，作為嚴格意義上的「續書」，《水滸後傳》又與前傳有著千絲萬縷的聯繫。若斷然無視二者之間的血脈關聯，將使後傳的意義遭受不少損失。因此，在討論《水滸後傳》文本內部的敘事結構之前，有必要先將它與前傳聯繫起來作一番考察。

（一）《大宋宣和遺事》（1954）錄有梁山三十六將，《水滸傳》一百回寫了一百零八個天罡地煞，到後傳除了武松已成廢人，在杭州六和塔下養老不算，其餘還有三十二人。陳忱又增加了四名年輕後代：宋安平、呼延鈺、徐晟、花逢春，以及八名與梁山稍有瓜葛的舊人：聞煥章、樂廷玉、扈成、王進、費保、高青、倪雲、狄成，湊足四十四人，在比例上剛好與前傳對應。這種人數上的對應關係暗示了後傳與前傳的關聯，也從一開始就提醒讀者，後傳有意在人數與章回上模仿前傳的整體佈局。德國哲學家 Cassirer（恩斯特·凱西爾 1992）指出：「除了空間與時間，數是決定神話世界結構的第三個重大形式主題。」借鑒他對「數」在神話世界結構中所起作用的研究，我們可以探求「數」

¹ Ellen Widmer 與趙淑美都有關於原刻本與蔡元放評改本的比較研究，黃海星的論述依據的是日本早稻田大學圖書館藏本，洛水玉則主要引用上海古籍出版社 1990 年據華東師範大學藏原刊刊本影印的《水滸後傳》。

² 回目之區別參見本文附錄之「《水滸後傳》各回情節提要」。

³ 臺灣大學圖書館藏有乾隆三十五年（1770）大字圈點刊本，正文凡十卷四十回。封面題「秣陵蔡元放批評」，「重訂水滸後傳」；第一回回前題「古宋遺民雁宕山樵編輯，金陵憨客野雲主人評定」，正文前置蔡元放〈評刻《水滸後傳》敘〉及「讀法」；參見陳忱 1975，*水滸後傳*，天一出版社，臺北，據臺灣大學圖書館藏乾隆三十五年大字圈點刊本影印）。

⁴ 「且說李俊三人竟來尋見費保四個，不負前約。七人都在榆柳莊上商議定了，盡將家私打造船隻，從太倉港乘駕出海，自投化外國去了。後來為暹羅國之主。童威、費保等都做了化外官職，自取其樂，另霸海濱。這是李俊的後話。」見施耐庵、羅貫中 1988，*水滸傳：李卓吾評本*，上海古籍出版社，上海，第 1458 頁。

⁵ 分別見《水滸後傳》第一、九、二十七、三十七回。本文所引《水滸後傳》均為原刊本，蔡元放評語引自評改本，下同。

⁶ 明代的百回本《水滸傳》有多種刊本，如郭武定版《水滸傳》、天都外臣序本《水滸傳》、《容與堂刻李卓吾先生批評忠義水滸傳》，難以斷定《水滸後傳》所接續的到底是哪一種百回本，本文所引用的主要是上海古籍出版社《水滸傳：李卓吾評本》，以 1973 年上海人民出版社影印北京圖書館藏杭州容與堂本為底本校點。

在小說「續書」與「本傳」的結構關係中起到的形式方面的作用。對《水滸後傳》與《水滸傳》進行對照，我們可以發現，數字比例上的對應關係隨處可見，這種比例關係使兩部小說在結構上形成緊密聯繫，也促使讀者將後傳放置在前後兩傳合為一體的文本語境之下加以考察。

（二）前傳第二十二回，宋江因為殺了閻婆惜而被捕；後傳也在相同的位置第九回敘述李俊被捕。我們很容易懷疑二十二回之於一百回，與九回之於四十回的位置一致僅僅是個巧合，可是當我們讀到前傳第三十三回，宋江再次被捕與後傳第九回李俊被捕的情形如此相似，我們大概也會認為陳忱如此安排真的別有深意存焉。前傳第三十三回，宋江于元宵節去清風鎮上看燈，花榮因職役在身，不能同往，只叫了二三人陪同宋江。宋江看得高興，「呵呵大笑」，被劉高妻子認出，隨即被捕。針對這段情節，署名「李卓吾」的評者評論說：「花知寨太莽，宋公明亦欠細密。臨去時著幾人護送，也好討個信息，緣何如此托大。」（施耐庵，羅貫中 1988）幾乎相同的情節出現於《水滸後傳》的第九回。李俊等人剛觸犯了太湖一霸丁自燮，丁與常州太守商議元宵節放燈引李俊上鉤。看燈之前，高青告誡不該去丁自燮的地盤，以免疏虞，李俊想到宋江到東京看燈，李逵鬧了元宵，也得平安無事，梁中書北京放燈，眾好漢偏去救出盧員外，於是放心前去。李俊記得的只有那兩次驚天動地的壯舉，惟獨不知宋江恰好也曾在元宵節被捕，而被捕的主要原因正是「托大」。李俊等人賞完鼇山花燈，飲酒至二更，遲遲不肯動身，終於被捕。同樣在元宵節，同樣是因為大意，李俊被捕就與宋江被捕形成了對應關係。再加上另一次發生在前傳第二十二回的宋江被捕，與後傳第九回李俊被捕在各自書中的位置一致，這就使後傳的李俊與前傳宋江的形象合而為一，那麼接下來第十回出現宋江托夢、交待李俊後半生事業的情節就顯得順理成章了。⁷

（三）前傳第三十九回，刺配充軍的宋江乘著酒興，在潯陽樓上題了一首《西江月》：「自幼曾攻經史，長成亦有權謀。恰如猛虎臥荒丘，潛伏爪牙忍受。不幸刺文雙頰，那堪配在江州。他年若得報冤仇，血染潯陽江口。」又題了一首更加放肆的給他帶來巨大麻煩的「反詩」：「心在山東身在吳，飄蓬江海謾嗟籲。他時若遂凌雲志，敢笑黃巢不丈夫。」而在後傳同樣的位置，第十六回，我們看到了落魄逃難的蔣敬在潯陽樓上重提舊事：

漸漸酒上心來，忽然想起宋公明當初在這樓上醉後題了反詩，險些喪了性命，幸得眾兄弟救上山寨。隔了許多歲月，經了許多變更，風景依然，良朋何在？不覺淒慘起來，想著宋公明吟的那《西江月》至今還記得，步他原韻，也題一首，寫今日落魄淒涼光景。喚酒保借過筆硯，磨得墨濃，蘸得筆飽。他本是落第舉子，不待思索，寫在粉壁上道：「萬事由來天定，空多神算奇謀。當年管鮑遇山丘，一晌豪華消受。浪跡天涯歸去，青衫重到江州。千金散去不為仇，恐惹英雄笑口。」

後傳第十五回剛敘述了一個小高潮：宋徽宗聽信李良嗣的計策，聯金滅遼，為逞一時之快，卻埋下了無窮後患。在宏大敘事之後，作者又安排行動神速的戴宗遇上蔣敬。第十六回有許多線索都令人回想起前傳的故事，例如蔣敬江上被劫，差點喪命，與前傳

⁷ 前傳宋江元宵節看燈與後傳李俊元宵節看燈兩件事的對應，當然也可以有不同的解讀。如蔡元放就指出，前傳宋江夜看小鼇山與火攻翠雲樓都寫了燈節景致，後傳的李俊常州看燈與最後一回的觀燈大宴，同樣寫了燈節景致，「卻都無一筆相似」，他認為，這是作者「自顯筆力，以為快樂也」。（蔡昇：《水滸後傳讀法》，見陳忱 1975，水滸後傳，天一出版社，臺北）

第六十五回張順過揚子江遇盜的情形幾乎如出一轍，而兩個盜賊因分贓不均，自相殘殺，也是兩傳一致⁸；蔣敬被洗劫一空，身邊只剩一個金環，又令人想起前傳第五十五回，呼延灼被徐甯破了連環馬，兵敗逃難，只好「解下束腰金帶」來賣了做盤纏⁹；穆春與蔣敬同去尋盜賊張德、陸祥報仇，撞見張德之妻，穆春拔出解手刀，「把刀在婦人面上撇了兩撇」¹⁰，與前傳第二十六回武松提刀威嚇潘金蓮的動作完全一樣。¹¹作者不厭其煩地描述了如此之多與前傳相似的細節，足以引起讀者對其敘述技巧的強烈關注。這也表明除了「洩憤」的目的之外¹²，作者從來不曾忽視作品的美學意味。

（四）前傳第五十二至五十四回，柴進之叔柴皇城被高唐州知府高廉的妻弟殷天錫氣死，殷天錫又挑釁柴進，意圖霸佔花園，卻被李逵打死。李逵逃回梁山泊，柴進被高廉屈打成招，發下牢裏監收。梁山泊眾人為救柴進，攻打高唐州。戴宗請來公孫勝，破了高廉妖法。高廉全家被斬，柴皇城一家老小獲救。柴進又得當牢節級蘭仁之助，躲在枯井，終為李逵所救。後傳也在相同的中間位置，第二十一至二十二回，敘述了類似的事件。金兵渡過黃河，天下大亂，宋朝宰相李邦彥力主和議，大肆搜刮財物獻給金國。滄州太守高源，是高廉的兄弟，借機把措處不足金銀的柴進連同家眷全都監禁了。飲馬川眾人從戴宗口中得知此事，起兵攻打滄州。高廉吸取高唐教訓，打算先下手，又冒出一個智勇雙全的兩院節級吉孚施計救了柴進，安放在唐牛兒家中，直到李應等人攻破滄州，把高源家口殺得罄盡。柴進及其家眷終獲相救。

兩件事都發生於全書的中間位置，主人公都是柴進，情節大同小異，使人讀到後傳的中段，仿佛又重新置身於前傳的時空。這顯然得益於陳忱營造出來的幻覺，他打算在這部小說的中點，將與前傳的「相犯」¹³發揮到極致。而這種「相犯」是否真能成功達到中國傳統批評家所看重的「犯而不犯」的境界，某種程度上將決定這部「續書」小說的價值。首先不妨引用蔡元放的看法：

前傳高廉要在獄中謀死柴進，為獄卒蘭仁所救，此處高源也是要在獄中謀死柴進，又為節級吉孚所救，非寫柴進偏與獄卒有緣，亦非寫滄州獄卒偏愛柴進，都要與本官相拘，只是作者故意弄奇，使兩傳相犯，而又極不相似，使讀者眼在此處，心照前文。文章家亦有取其相近以為用者，此類是也。（陳忱 1975）

他提醒讀者，讀後傳的時候，要「眼在此處，心照前文」，這自然不錯。前傳固然為後傳提供了必不可少的語境，而在最高明的續書作者手中，這種覆蓋式的「文本互涉」

⁸ 至於被劫之後的復仇行動，則是「前傳殺張旺，妙在迂回，此快在直截。」見陳忱著：《水滸後傳》，早稻田大學圖書館藏康熙三年本，第十六回，夾批。

⁹ 後傳第二十回，呼延灼父子三人逃過金兵，進了一家酒店，又提到了這一條金帶。

¹⁰ 原文並不作「撇」，字形左「扌」右「閉」，讀作 bī。

¹¹ 「（武松）提起刀來，望那婦人臉上便劈兩劈。」見施耐庵，羅貫中 1988，*水滸傳：李卓吾評本*，上海古籍出版社，上海，第 382 頁。《金聖歎批評本水滸傳》此字亦是左「扌」右「閉」。

¹² 這是陳忱的「夫子自道」：「《後傳》為洩憤之書。」見陳忱，*水滸後傳論略*，早稻田大學圖書館藏康熙三年本。

¹³ 「相犯」是中國古代小說評點中的一個術語，如金聖嘆在《讀第五才子書法》中指出《水滸傳》的兩種敘事技巧：「正犯法」與「略犯法」，前者指作者在小說中故意選擇相似的話題來描寫，卻仍有本領寫得不重複，後者可以說是前者的變體，指作者對相似話題的描寫雖然不重複，但仍然具有某種相似性。金聖嘆之後的小說評點家，如毛宗崗與張竹坡，都提出過關於「相犯」以及「犯而不犯」（雖然情節或形象相似，但仍能寫得不重複）的敘事技巧。在浦安迪看來，這種技巧相當於現代的文學批評概念「形象迭用」，明顯關乎小說結構方面的特點。見浦安迪 1996，*中國敘事學*，北京大學出版社，北京，第 94 頁。

在某些最精彩的時刻甚至會變成互涵式的「相互發明」。也就是說，我們不但要借助前傳來理解後傳，有時候還要反向為之，要「眼在此處，心照後文」。後傳第二十一回就有這樣一個關鍵之處，足以令後傳為前傳生色添光。金聖歎對《水滸傳》「武松打虎」一段的精彩評點早已成為中國小說批評史上的經典，在第二十三回（金批本第二十二回）那些與正文相得益彰的評點中，金聖歎一再指出武松唯一的防身武器「哨棒」的重要性。他逐一點數「哨棒」在本回出現的次數，告訴我們在武松雙手輪起哨棒劈下來之前，「哨棒」一共出現了十五次，武松持執哨棒的姿勢換了九種，然而到了關鍵時刻它卻折斷了：「半日勤寫哨棒，只道仗他打虎，到此忽然開除，令人瞠目噤口，不復敢讀下去。」（施耐庵 2005）這正是金聖歎在《讀第五才子書法》中指出的極為高明的「草蛇灰線法」：「驟看之，有如無物，及至細尋，其中便有一條線索，拽之通體俱動。」¹⁴帶著這樣的「讀法」，我們再試著考察《水滸傳》第五十二回與後傳第二十一回的關係。在前傳第五十二回，太祖皇帝御賜的「丹書鐵券」對柴進的意義就相當於第二十三回景陽岡上武松的「哨棒」，是他賴以護身的「法寶」：「為是家間祖上有陳橋讓位之功，先朝曾勅賜丹書鐵券，但有做下不是的人停藏在家，無人敢搜。」（施耐庵，羅貫中 1988）如前所述，第五十二回柴進之叔柴皇城與高唐州太守高廉的妻弟殷天錫發生爭端，柴進前去救助，卻沒有把「丹書鐵券」帶在身邊。在他們的對話中，「丹書鐵券」出現了十一次：

我家是金枝玉葉，有先朝丹書鐵券在門，諸人不許欺侮。（柴皇城）

小侄自使人回滄州家裏去取丹書鐵券來，和他理會。（柴進）

他雖是倚勢欺人，我家放著有護持聖旨。（柴進）

你可看骨肉之面，親齎書往京師攔駕告狀，與我報仇。（柴皇城）

誓書在我家裏，不曾帶得，星夜教人去取，須用將往東京告狀。（柴進）

我家也是龍子龍孫，放著先朝丹書鐵券，誰敢不敬？（柴進）

便有誓書鐵券，我也不怕！（殷天錫）

我自有誓書鐵券護身。（柴進）

小人是柴世宗嫡派子孫，家門有先朝太祖誓書鐵券，見在滄州居住。（柴進）

放著先朝太祖誓書，如何便下刑法打我？（柴進）

誓書有在那裏？（高廉）（施耐庵，羅貫中 1988）

除了殷天錫那「無知者無畏」的嘴硬口吻，其餘幾處都可以看出「丹書鐵券」確實能起到「護家門」的作用，至少令侵犯者需要事先確認柴進沒有把「丹書鐵券」帶在身邊才敢撕破臉面。正因為柴進一開始就將「丹書鐵券」遺留在了滄州，他才有口難辯，毫無防身之術，以致身陷囹圄。這「丹書鐵券」連用十一次，積蓄了足夠的能量，惟獨缺乏一個契機，缺乏像武松輪起哨棒那樣的「盡力一劈」，使它充分釋放，充分展現作者的敘事技巧。而當我們讀到後傳第二十一回，讀到似曾相識的情節與形象時，發現促使這一條潛伏在前傳裏的「草蛇灰線」終於「通體俱動」的契機，竟然只是淡淡的一句話：

¹⁴ 金聖歎，讀第五才子書法，見施耐庵 2006，金聖歎批評本水滸傳，嶽麓書社，長沙，第 2 頁。王靖宇認為金聖嘆所謂的「草蛇灰線法」與現代批評中所流行的詞語「復調意象」（recurrent image）有部分相似，即作者通過在其作品中反復而又不露痕跡地使用某一關鍵的意象或象徵，成功地達到某種和諧效果。見王靖宇 2004，金聖嘆的生平及其文學批評，上海古籍出版社，上海，第 65 頁。

這樣亂世，太祖皇帝的誓書那裏還講得起！¹⁵

這句話完全消解了前傳裏充當了護身符的帶有神秘色彩的「丹書鐵券」的功能，這一條「草蛇灰線」剛被牽出，隨即灰飛煙滅，盡成虛妄。此時柴進身在滄州，「丹書鐵券」自然隨身攜帶，可惜時代已經完全不同，前傳裏的那種搖搖欲墜但仍然勉強維持的秩序到了後傳已經宣告土崩瓦解。戴宗口中說出的這句話充滿悲憤與無奈，並不僅僅是因為太祖皇帝的誓書成了空口白條，而是因為維繫人心的信用體系已經崩潰，中原之大，再也沒有正人君子的容身之所了。在後傳第三十回，登雲山與飲馬川會合一處，眾人商議何去何從，連一向寬厚的安道全都對中原喪失了信心：「我等若去（暹羅國），豈不成一個大業？強如在中國東奔西走，受盡醜陋的氣！」從這一角度看，後傳第二十一回設置柴進再度入獄的情節實在意味深長。它並非簡單地模仿前傳相同位置的相同情節，而是通過與前傳的「相犯」引導讀者的眼光從前傳返回後傳，進而利用二十一回這一關鍵的回目，與第一回開篇長詩的末句「千秋萬世恨無極，白髮孤燈續舊編」以及最後一回末尾的「無端又續英雄譜，醉墨淋漓不自禁」遙相呼應，從根本上暗示了中國諸人已經無路可退、只能奔赴海外續寫「英雄譜」的悲壯處境。

無論是在後傳與前傳的「文本互涉」層面，還是在後傳文本的內部整體結構層面，後傳第二十一回都扮演了至關重要的角色，從中似乎還可以略為探尋作者陳忱創作續書時面對前傳文本的心態。關鍵的材料來自《水滸後傳》原刻本第二十一回的「回末總評」：

極奇、極險、極快文字，如馳快馬，峻阪收韁，如張飽帆，江心回舵。讀者至更無可轉身處，幾幾乎有死之心，無生之氣。何況身履其地者！宋遺民自評：通篇精神，周匝章是，不減前傳，真叫苦自知之言。¹⁶

既然我們已經知道「宋遺民」其實就是小說的真實作者，那麼上述文字出現的「宋遺民自評」應該令人感到意外，作者竟然忍不住在某一回的回末現身，明確提醒讀者注意他創作此書的甘苦和他的強烈自信。第二十一回顯然是作者花了極大力氣要與前傳一較短長的，而事實上他也的確通過對這一關鍵回目的精心佈置，將全書打造成一個既與前傳相關，又在內部自成一體的渾圓的整體。而上述評語散發出來的異常強烈的語氣，也意味著作者不讓前輩「專美」的「影響的焦慮」¹⁷在此達到了最濃烈的程度。

三、《水滸後傳》的內部敘事結構

（一）《水滸後傳》十回單元的主結構

關於明代小說四大奇書（《三國演義》、《水滸傳》、《西遊記》、《金瓶梅》）的敘事結

¹⁵ 此句蔡元放改作：「亂世橫行，太祖皇帝的誓書也不作準了。」

¹⁶ 陳忱，《水滸後傳》，早稻田大學圖書館藏康熙三年本，第二十一回，回末總評。

¹⁷ 「影響的焦慮」（the anxiety of influence）是美國文學批評家哈羅德·布魯姆（Harold Bloom）提出來的一個文學批評概念，他認為在西方詩歌史上，「強者」詩人面對前輩詩人懷有一種「俄狄浦斯情結」，前輩詩人的巨大影響使後來者倍感焦慮，他們有強烈的否定父輩的慾望，並且他們只有突破前輩詩人對他們進取情感的抑制，才能開拓出自己的發展空間。參見 Harold Bloom, *The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry* (Edition: 2), New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

構，浦安迪教授指出，中國古典小說的定型長度是一百回，並不是一個偶然的巧合，在四大奇書成文的時代，它已成為文人小說形式的標準特徵，「百」的數位暗示著各種潛在對稱和數位圖形意義，正好符合中國藝術美學追求二元平衡的傾向。更為重要的是，明清文人小說家們又把慣用的「百回」的總輪廓劃分為十個十回，形成一種特殊的節奏律動。《水滸傳》、《西遊記》和《金瓶梅》的早期版本，大致都分成十卷，每卷十回。我們一旦看破奇書文體由「十」乘「十」的敘述節奏組成——即小說敘述的連續統一性被有節奏地劃分為十個「十回」的單元——全書的整體結構模型就了然在目了。（浦安迪 1996）以百回本《水滸傳》為例，這種十進位的章法清楚地見於第二至十一回（介紹史進、魯達、林冲等一連串人物；直至最初介紹梁山營寨）、第二十二至三十一回（武松的英雄業績）、第六十一至七十回（盧俊義入夥、盧活捉史文恭和爭取寨主地位的比武）以及第七十二至八十一回（與帝國當權者接觸以致終受招安）。這種模式也在一百二十回的「全傳」本的最後幾個部分出現：伐遼（第八十三至八十九回）、平田虎（第九十一至一百回）、平王慶（第一百零一至一百一十回）、征方臘（第一百一十一回至一百一十九回）都運用了這種章法。（浦安迪 2006）其餘部分雖然不能如此順利地劃分為明顯的十回結構，但從內容方面考慮，這一圖式似乎仍隱約可見。例如第十二回至二十一回寫的是宋江上山前梁山泊的早期歷史；第三十二回至四十一回或四十二回描述宋江被逼為盜前的坎坷經歷以及他被推為梁山一夥實際魁首的經過；第五十一回至六十回則是描寫這夥強人隊伍的發展壯大，終於成為朝廷的一大威脅。（浦安迪 2006）

以上論述有助於考察《水滸後傳》的結構特點。陳忱的原刻本分成八卷，每卷五回，細讀之後可以發現這與奇書文體的結構事實上並無太大矛盾。對《水滸傳》來說，「現存的繁本百回《水滸傳》雖然沒有一部是分成十回一卷的，但各種分成二十卷、每卷五回的本子，都可以變相地合併成「十回」的結構，足見《水滸傳》一書，大體上也與《金瓶梅》和《西遊記》大同小異，基本上是以十回為單元的節奏組成的。」（浦安迪 1996）相對於百回本《水滸傳》而言，《水滸後傳》篇幅短小，使得陳忱可以更方便地安排「十回」一個單元的敘事結構。第一回至第十回，主要講述了後傳中心人物李俊出海之前，前傳倖存下來的梁山舊將在三個地方重新聚義。第一回由阮小七在靠近梁山泊的故鄉石碣村殺死尋事的張幹辦開始引入正題，好漢聚首的情形仿佛前傳梁山聚義故事的重演：散落四方的梁山舊人被逼無奈，重上「梁山」，只是此時的「梁山」已失去了昔日叱吒風雲、震驚朝野的氣勢，餘威所被，只剩登雲山和飲馬川這兩處梁山泊的微型翻版而已。後傳的中心人物李俊在第九回出場，他和童氏兄弟、費保、倪雲、高青、狄成諸人在太湖抵抗惡霸豪吏的舉動也相當於一種小型聚義。前十回基本上形成了山東登雲山、河北飲馬川和太湖這三個聚義圈，而以第十回李俊夢見宋江贈詩指點，決定赴海外另創基業為一個小結。第十一回至十九回，交待宋金開戰前三支力量的各自發展。先是李俊奪得金鰲島，進逼暹羅，最終因和親而暫息干戈。第十三回李俊救起從高麗返國途遇風浪翻船落水的安道全，使暹羅與中國通上消息，敘事焦點轉回中國，李俊一方暫時按下不表。接下來的幾回主要敘述梁山舊人及家眷逐漸向登雲山聚攏。直到第十九回宋金矛盾激化，正式交戰。第二十回至三十回，講述金兵入侵，中原淪陷，梁山英雄再無容身之地，決意奔赴海外。這十回基本上以飲馬川諸人與金兵交戰為主線，旁敘其餘各地的舊人新人，以第三十回的兩寨會合、奪船出海作收結。第三十一回至四十回是最清晰完整的一個十回結構，講述眾人協助李俊暹羅稱王，又在牡蠣灘救駕，功德圓滿。

（二）《水滸後傳》「十回」主結構中的次結構

奇書文體的次結構，存在於每一個十回的單元之內。每十回單元的中間，即第五回的前後往往是另一個關鍵，經常孕育著一個飽含喜怒哀樂的情緒高峰，夾在首尾兩次相對平靜的低潮中間。（浦安迪 1996）奇書文體還有一種「三、四回次結構法」，如《水滸傳》第三至第七回的敘述重點以魯達為主；第七至第十一回寫林沖；第四十四至第四十六回寫揚雄。又如，第四十六至第四十九回寫「三打祝家莊」，第六十至第六十二回是「智賺盧俊義」。（浦安迪 1996）《水滸後傳》也仿效了奇書文體的這種次結構。第一個十回單元的中間第五回敘述經過一場大戰，飲馬川眾人逐走了佔據龍角岡佑聖觀的畢豐，招聚人馬，重排座次。而「排座次」這一極富象徵意味的儀式在最後一個十回單元的中間再次上演，第三十五回李俊稱王，排定座次，其在全書中的意義相當於前傳第七十一回的梁山英雄排座次。後傳第二個十回單元的中間部分第十五回是一次小高潮，宋金聯合出兵，攻滅遼國。這一回之後直到第二十回，才再次發生國與國之間的大規模戰爭。嚴格意義上說，第二十四回並不是第三個十回單元的中間位置，但這一回的獨特之處在於它是第三個十回單元裏面僅有的沒有正面描寫戰爭場面的一回。在第三個十回單元裏，第二十四回的敘述筆調相對而言最「冷」（蔡元放所謂「火裏生蓮法」）（陳忱 1975）。燕青拜訪被擄至金營的宋徽宗，獻上青子黃柑，以謝皇帝當年的赦罪之恩。皇帝身邊無人探視的清冷與四野的蕭條，跟它前後回目裏著意描繪的熱烈與慘烈形成鮮明的對比。

跟前傳相似，後傳也善於在十回單元裏截取三、四回，形成一種次結構。如第四至五回是杜興傳，第七至十回是樂和傳，第十六至十八回是穆春傳，第二十三至二十七回是燕青傳，這幾個人物的形象都比前傳增色不少。陳忱在《水滸後傳論略》中又點明了《水滸後傳》的一種敘事次結構：「有一人一傳者，有一人附見數傳者，有數人並見一傳者，映帶有情，轉折不測，深得太史公筆法。頭緒如亂麻，終於不紊，迴圈無端，五花八陣，縱橫錯見，真奇書也！」¹⁸「數人並見一傳」大概指的是「四公子傳」，即梁山舊人的四個後代：花逢春、宋安平、徐晟、呼延鈺，可見於第十一至十二回（花逢春）、十九至二十回（徐晟、呼延鈺）、二十八至二十九回（徐晟、呼延鈺、宋安平）以及大聚會之後的回目。「一人附見數傳者」，比如楊林，就同時出現在杜興傳、燕青傳與徐晟、呼延鈺傳中。

（三）《水滸後傳》整體結構上的平行敘述

關於中國古代長篇小說的平行式敘述結構，本節主要參考周建渝教授的〈《三國演義》的平行式敘述結構〉一文，現總結其主要觀點如下：

所謂「平行」，指的是兩個或三個事物在相似或相反性質的基礎上，構成的某種平行（parallel）現象，以及平行雙方之間產生的相互對應關係。在傳統的中國文學作品中，它表現為兩個或三個部分在句法結構或語義等方面構成的平行狀態，包括類比與對立兩種關係，並均以其相互間的平行敘述為前提或基礎。同時，也正是這種類比的平行或對立的平行，使平行的兩者被聯繫起來，並相互對應（相互呼應與相互說明）。平行的美學觀念在中國古典小說中得到出色的運用，其主要表現為人物與人物、事件與事件之間的平行敘述及其相互對應關係，並由此對應式敘述，使小說無論在敘述結構或是隱含寓

¹⁸ 陳忱，《水滸後傳論略》，早稻田大學圖書館藏康熙三年本。

意方面，均能達到圓滿的整合。另外，小說的敘述似乎是在更大規模的結構上，演繹著平行與對應這一美學觀念。（周建渝 2009）

《水滸傳》第九十九回交待了混江龍李俊征方臘回來後，詐病辭去，最終成為「暹羅國之主」。作為後傳的中心人物，李俊直到第九回才正式露面。這一回主要講述李俊出海前在太湖隱居打漁的故事。一日正當仲冬時節，李俊同諸位兄弟登上縹緲峰飲酒賞雪，忽然西北上一個霹靂，一塊大火從空中飛墜山下，眾人下山一看：

只見燒塌了丈餘雪地，有一塊石板，長一尺，闊五寸，如白玉一般。童威拾起，眾人看時，卻有字跡。……（李俊）念道：「替天行道，久存忠義。金鼇背上，別有天地。」眾人聽罷，都解不出。李俊道：「這分明是上天顯異。頭一句說‘替天行道’，原是忠義堂前杏黃旗上四個大字，合著我們舊日的事。且拿回去供在家裏，日後定有應驗。」

讀到這一段，我們很自然地聯想起前傳第一回與第七十一回出現的兩番石碣，金聖歎便認為《水滸傳》「一部大書以石碣始，以石碣終」（施耐庵 2006），又據此將《水滸傳》腰斬為七十回本。姑且不論他如此處置的正當性¹⁹，這至少可以表明他相當重視「石碣」在《水滸傳》的敘事結構上所起到的重要作用。後傳的縹緲峰石板與前傳的兩番石碣暗暗相映，雖然蔡元放堅持認為二者「用各不同，文章亦異」：「忠義堂之石碣是宋江建醮祈來，縹緲峰之石板是上天自然降下」，「忠義堂之石碣，是作一番收煞，縹緲峰之石板，卻作全部提頭」。（陳忱 1975）我們在前傳中已經看到了「石碣」與梁山泊諸人的命運相連²⁰，而後傳的「天降石板」也很明顯是一道「祥符」，暗示李俊獲得了天命的授權，將要走上成大事的道路。緊接第九回的瑞兆，作者又在第十回安排剛脫離困境的李俊做了一個夢，夢中一個黃巾力士前來相邀：

李俊走出門，力士扶上一條大黑蟒，……竟到梁山泊忠義堂前歇下。……看見宋公明裸頭蟒服，坐在中間。左邊是吳學究，右邊花知寨，都降階相迎。施禮罷，宋公明說道：「兄弟，我在天宮，甚是安樂。因念舊居，常與眾弟兄在此相會。我被奸臣所鴆，不得全終，你前程遠大，不比我福薄，後半段事業要你主持。你須要替天行道，存心忠義，一如我所為，方得皇天保佑。我有四句詩，後來應驗，你牢記著。」念道：「金鼇背上起蛟龍，徼外山川氣象雄。罡煞算來存一半，盡朝玉闕享皇封。」李俊聽了詩句，不解其意，正要詳問，只見黑旋風李逵手托雙斧，奔上堂來，大叫道：「李俊！你好欺負人，怎來會哥哥不來看我！」把手一推，驚覺醒來，卻是南柯一夢。

李俊與眾人思量夢中之事，想起「金鼇背上」四字，與石板字句相同，而樂和認為宋江所說的「徼外山川氣象雄」，必然暗示他們應去海外別尋事業。李俊又提起虬髯公扶餘國稱王之事，決意出海。而隔了二十回之後，在第三十一回，又發生了與第九、十回相對應的事件。暹羅國主馬賽真招了花逢春為駙馬，又得李俊在金鼇島犄角聲援，故

¹⁹ 王靖宇曾在《金聖歎的生平及其文學批評》一書中從美學與道德兩方面探討了金聖歎改動原作的正當性。參見王靖宇 2004，*金聖歎的生平及其文學批評*，上海古籍出版社，上海，第 47-55 頁。

²⁰ 《水滸傳》第一回，洪太尉看到石碣（碑）上鑿著「遇洪而開」四個字，便堅持要求道士掘開石碣，終於導致魔王出世，一百零八個天罡地煞重回人間。第七十一回，宋江令公孫勝建羅天大醮，祈求上蒼，後來天門打開，降下一塊火鑽入地下，眾人掘出一個石碣，上書天罡地煞一百零八人，分定次序。

以為可以高枕無憂。一日清明節近，馬賽真帶領眾人到萬壽山拜祭，忽然一團火飛上九霄，又落到馬賽真肩上，將袞龍袍燒了一個大窟窿。後來又到丹霞山賞玩，遇見一位道士。一番問答之後，道士勸告馬賽真隨他出家，馬賽真說要等十年之後，傳位世子，才能出家。道士說只怕目下就有大禍，又取出一面漆黑無光的石鏡，在掌上磨了一磨，放出光來，抬了與馬賽真看：

只見裏面山河廣闊，宮殿巍峨，一個人沖天巾、袞龍袍，臥在地下。國主見了，不勝駭異。他人看時，原是一塊黑石，並不見一些光景。²¹

道士又以四句偈語相贈：「澤水為災，長年不永。他日重來，唯有荒塚。」後來偈語果然應驗，共濤謀逆，害死馬賽真後篡位，等到這位道士徐神翁歸來時，馬賽真早已身歸「荒塚」。遇見道士後的次日，白石島又報來一道申文：

海邊有一異獸，如豺狼相似，頭生獨角，遍體赤毛，行走如飛，掠人而食，獵戶收捕他不得。一日雲雷大作，天上飛下一條黑蟒，金鱗閃爍有光，與這異獸相鬥，被黑蟒蟠住，張開血盆的口咬殺了，黑蟒騰空而去。那異獸死在沙灘上。居民恨他吃人，各拿利刃，割下肉來，其白如玉，煮熟來味甚甘美。

火燒龍袍、石鏡映災、黑蟒咬殺異獸，接連發生的怪事令馬賽真愈加不安，他猜測暹羅可能會被海嘯淹沒，而「長年不永」則會應驗在自己身上，他感到自己天命已盡了。將這一回與第九、十回李俊受「天降石板」、宋江托夢的事件對照起來閱讀，我們會發現兩件事剛好能構成明顯的對應關係。首先，正如蔡元放所指出的，「異獸」暗指協助共濤叛亂的妖僧薩頭陀，「黑蟒」暗指剿滅共、薩叛黨的李俊。²²而黑蟒咬殺異獸之後「騰空而去」，則暗示李俊登上王位，這與第十回夢中黃巾力士稱呼李俊為「李大王」，並將他扶上一條大黑蟒「騰空而去」的情形相仿。另外，前傳中的石碣事實上扮演了一個意義重大的角色，即推動了小說循環敘事結構的生成（《紅樓夢》中的「石頭」也起到了同樣的作用）（Wang Jing 1992）。而在寓意層面，前傳七十一回建醮儀式的成功舉行，以及上天通過降下「石碣」所作出的回應，充當了一種小說技巧，目的在於解決轉世的煞星竟能轉化為品德高尚的英雄形象這一悖論。（Wang 1992）我們可以發現，後傳的石頭也擁有類似的功能。²³第九回由一塊大火燒成的石板「如白玉一般」，石板上的文字預示李俊之興，而第三十一回道士袖中取出的石鏡「漆黑無光」，擦拭之後，映出馬賽真禍事不遠，而在他人眼中看來，這「原是一塊黑石，並不見一些光景。」一則祥瑞，一則凶兆，恰成對照。李俊與馬賽真在人生重大關頭表現出來的處世態度也頗堪玩味。第九回李俊初登場時，早已看淡名利，感慨宋江、盧俊義遭受「鳥盡弓藏、兔死狗烹」之禍，因而只欲閒散度日，與兄弟們「圖些快活」。第十回提及虬髯公海外稱王之事，李俊也說「這個我也不敢望」。可以說李俊出海，原是迫於無奈，「石板」更非有心追求，

²¹ 蔡元放評改本刪去了「石鏡」一段，說明蔡並未意識到第三十一回「石鏡」（黑石）與第九回「石板」的對應關係，他也因此認為「縹緲峰石板」與「忠義堂石碣」的作用不一樣。

²² 第三十一回夾批：「異獸者，薩頭陀也，黑蟒者，李俊也。」第十回夾批：「是黑蟒，不是金龍，便是外國番王之兆。」見陳忱 1975，*水滸後傳*，天一出版社，臺北。

²³ 作者安排李俊獲得「天降石板」，為後來李俊稱王這一實質上接近于「奪國篡位」的行為提供了道德上的合法性。事實上李俊受石板與宋江托夢都具有承受天命的意味，張健先生指出，「為了折服人心（讀者），故以宋江托夢為其護符」。（張健：〈讀《水滸後傳》——中國的「烏托邦」〉，收入林以亮，夏志清等著，痙弦、廖玉蕙主編 1975，*中國古典小說論集*，幼獅文化公司期刊部，臺北，第 246 頁。）

而是無意得來，這一點既異於前傳七十一回之宋江，也與後傳三十一回之馬賽真相反。前面已經說到，三十一回的馬賽真志得意滿，高枕無憂，正處於人生的巔峰，向徐神翁問道也是為了獲得「長生不老的真訣」、「點石為金的妙法」。雖然他看見石鏡中自己的死狀後「不勝駭異」，但也終究未能領會徐神翁的點化，反而在第三十二回貿然服下薩頭陀進獻的「長生妙藥」，毒發身亡。兩個事件分別處於第一個十回的末尾與最後一個十回的開端，在結構上形成對稱，有力地強化了及時功成身退、不可貪戀富貴的寓意。

除了上文所述，《水滸後傳》還有幾個地方點出相似的寓意，而其回數的設計，也可以視為作者的精心安排。前傳的關鍵人物之一公孫勝直到第六回才在後傳首次露面，其時他正同朱武一道隱居二仙山，享受嘯傲煙霞、嘲風弄月的自在日子。跟李俊一樣，公孫勝也慶倖自己「見機得早，跳出火坑」，又感慨宋江的「滿腔忠義，化作一場春夢」，他「敲著漁鼓板」唱道：

心上莫栽荊棘，口中謾設雌黃。逍遙大地盡清涼，丹汞鼎爐自養。
世事千戈棋局，人情蕉鹿滄桑。浮雲富貴亦尋常，且把恩仇齊放。

而在第四十回，「雅好文墨」的暹羅國主李俊為了給梁山泊大塊肉大碗酒的粗豪漢子增添一些文學氣息，於元宵節令眾人賦詩，此時公孫勝又「敲著漁鼓簡板」，唱了與第六回極為相似的一首「道情」：

回首風塵自遠，息機萬慮俱忘。功名富貴霎時忙，走馬燈邊一樣。
美酒三杯沉醉，白雲一枕清涼。蓬萊閬苑可翱翔，早渡洪波弱浪。

從第六回被迫離開二仙山，無處容身，直到第四十回入住丹霞宮，公孫勝在後傳裏四處奔波，終生只為尋覓一處與世無爭的僻靜之所。而在第六回與第四十回之間的第二十三回，作者特意插敘了姚平仲得道成仙的故事。金兵渡過黃河，汴京危困，姚平仲為了建立震世之功，單獨進兵，不料事泄中計，導致二萬精兵全軍覆沒，只剩得一人一騎，失魂落魄，欲抽刀自刎，突然悟道：

「人生富貴功名如水上浮漚，縱使成得功來，也不免兔死狗烹，鳥盡弓藏，所以范蠡作五湖之游，張良訪赤松之跡。父母妻子，亦不過愛欲纏牽，與自己有何關係？不如尋仙訪道，作世外之游，是英雄退步的本色。」把念頭放下，頓覺遍體清涼。

後來姚平仲到了青城山，遇見一個道人，「敲著漁鼓簡」唱道：

咄，咄，咄，茫茫大地如墨黑。休，休，休，世人盡到烏江頭。忍，忍，忍，
弄盡聰明反作蠢。來，來，來，戰場白骨生青苔。

道人原來是大漢鍾離權，看到姚平仲為了功名，害了二萬人的性命，罪業不小，幸而姚平仲「見機得早」，事蹟與自己同類，特來帶他修成仙道。這個事件可以說是一個單獨的情節，在結構上自成一體，但當我們仔細推敲這一回與第六回、第四十回的聯繫，讀到反復出現的「見機得早」、「英雄退步」、「功名富貴如浮雲」、「清涼」，就會發現作者如此刻意安排的匠心。第二十三回既呼應了第六回公孫勝脫網忘機的逍遙生活（甚至

也暗暗嘲諷了公孫勝未能徹底「退步」，難作世外之遊），也指涉了最後一回功成名就、宴樂賦詩的諸位君臣。第四十回，柴進點了一本《水滸記》，搬演前傳故事，柴進道：「虧他情節件件做到，回想起來，真是一夢！」而蔡元放則將「戲中戲」改為《邯鄲記》，也仍然保留了原作「人生如夢」的寓意：「人生榮枯得失，雖變態萬端，而究竟不過是一出戲文、一場春夢，不足深較，將本傳數十回大書，盡付虛空了結也。」（陳忱 1975）通過第六回、二十三回、四十回相互呼應的關係，我們再次看到了小說平行敘事結構在傳達作品寓意上所起到的作用。

《水滸後傳》一開始就預設了大團圓結局，這使得它的整體結構不能採用跟《三國演義》、《水滸傳》、《金瓶梅》相似的那種興衰循環模式，反倒是跟《西遊記》的「追尋性框架故事」（浦安迪 1996）有著不少相似之處。第十回李俊出海，既順應了宋江托夢的「天啟」，也是出於中原無處容身的現實困境。第三十回飲馬川與登雲山眾人會合，發現朝廷已經「無路可退」，與其留在中原受氣，不如到海外重整乾坤，重新搬演了第十回的出海經歷。第六、二十三、四十回的形象迭用，呈現出只有「及時跳出火坑」才能「遍體清涼」的寓意。第九回與第三十一回的對應則暗示了功名富貴只可無心得、不可有心求。第二十一回作為全書的中點，實際上卻暗示了中原世界已經乾坤倒轉、秩序崩潰。所有這些結構上的特徵，都指向了後傳英雄放棄了中原事業，轉向對海外「烏托邦」的追尋。

附錄

《水滸後傳》各回情節提要

第一回，阮統制梁山感舊，張幹辦湖泊尋災²⁴。

本傳先從前傳煞尾敍起，並點明所以作後傳的原因。阮小七罷官回到故鄉石碣村，到梁山泊祭拜，遇上先前結怨的張幹辦尋事。阮小七殺掉張幹辦之後，扶老母逃命，路上母親失蹤。

第二回，毛孔目橫吞海貨，顧大嫂直斬豪家。

阮小七遇上被毛豸橫吞海貨的扈成，又遇上重操舊業的顧大嫂、孫新，得知老母已為重新起事的鄒潤請上登雲山，便同去殺掉毛豸一家，取回貨物。又引出升任登州都統制的欒廷玉。

第三回，病尉遲閑住遭殃，欒廷玉失機入夥²⁵。

孫立因毛豸一事，被登州太守監禁。扈成用計瞞過欒廷玉，助登雲山眾人攻破登州城，既解登雲山之圍，又說服欒廷玉入夥。登雲山重排座次，規模壯大。

第四回，鬼臉兒寄書罹禍，趙玉娥炫色招奸²⁶。

杜興路過登雲山，不願入夥，孫立托其帶信到東京給樂和。因梁山泊舊將又在登雲山起事，朝廷對梁山泊舊人收管甘結，樂和已聞訊離開，杜興因而被捕入獄，刺配彰德府。又遇上楊林，其時楊林和裴宣因登雲山之事，被地方官逼迫尋事，只得仍上飲馬川。彰德府管營之妾趙玉娥與馮舍人勾搭，誣陷杜興，杜興遂被管營派去看守草料場。

第五回，老管營蹇遭橫死，撲天雕冤被拘囚²⁷。

管營被殺，楊林、裴宣殺了趙玉娥、馮舍人。事發後，濟州知府誘捕李應，杜興、楊林以及路上遇到的蔡慶，救出李應，又殺掉前來報仇的馮舍人之父馮彪。飲馬川眾人逐走佔據龍角岡佑聖觀的畢豐，招聚人馬，重排座次。

第六回，飲馬川李應重興，虎峪寨魔王鬥法²⁸。

蔡慶不願入夥，遇上樊瑞與郭京鬥法。蔡慶被認出，與樊瑞逃走。李良嗣到東京向童貫獻計聯金攻遼，又建議剿滅梁山餘黨。郭京誤認樊瑞為公孫勝，帶兵圍住紫虛宮，逼走公孫勝、朱武。

第七回，李良嗣條陳賜姓，鐵叫子避難更名²⁹。

公孫勝與朱武留在飲馬川山后住下。郭京領兵攻打飲馬川失敗。李良嗣聯金滅遼的計策被皇帝採納，令落難的郭京投奔建康王宣慰。途中郭京驅鬼不成反受辱，又遇樂和，同去建康。

第八回，萬柳莊玉貌招殃，寶帶橋節婦遇盜³⁰。

郭京與王宣慰遇見花榮與秦明的遺孀及花榮之子花逢春，欲占為己有。樂和設計救出諸

²⁴ 此回目原刊本作「阮統制感舊梁山泊，張別駕激變石碣村」。

²⁵ 此回目原刊本作「病尉遲閑住受餘殃，欒廷玉失機同入夥」。

²⁶ 此回目原刊本作「鬼臉兒寄書罹重禍，趙玉娥錯配遇多情」。

²⁷ 此回目原刊本作「老管營少妾殺命，撲天雕舊僕株連」。

²⁸ 此回目原刊本作「飲馬川群英興舊業，虎峪寨鬥法辱黃冠」。

²⁹ 此回目原刊本作「李良嗣條陳因賜姓，鐵叫子避難暫更名」。

³⁰ 此回目原刊本作「燕子磯玉貌惹奇殃，寶帶橋金蘭逢舊友」。

人。

第九回，混江龍賞雪受祥符，巴山蛇截湖征重稅。

樂和救出諸人後，遇見童威劫船。轉敘李俊與童威、童猛、費保、倪雲、高青、狄成諸人在太湖消夏灣隱居，天上掉下一塊石板，暗示李俊將來事業。李俊諸人因觸犯丁自燮，於元宵節不慎被捕入獄。

第十回，墨吏賠錢受辱，豪紳斂賄傾家³¹。

樂和設計救出李俊，丁自燮與呂太守「賠了夫人又折兵」。李俊夢見宋江贈詩指點，決定赴海外另創基業。

第十一回，駕長風群雄開霸業，射鯨魚一箭顯家傳。

李俊眾人奪得船隻，又招來三百兵士，同往暹羅。花逢春射中鯨魚。李俊先據清水澳，又奪得金龜島。

第十二回，金龜島開基殄暴，暹羅城被困和親³²。

共濤領兵欲逐李俊不成，反被李俊圍住暹羅城。蕭妃提議和親，李俊接納，玉芝公主與花逢春成婚。

第十三回，救水厄天涯逢舊友，換良方相府藥佳人。³³

李俊派五百兵隨同花恭人留在駙馬府中。安道全自高麗國歸來，在清水澳遇上風浪翻船，與李俊相遇，樂和托其帶信給孫立。盧師越藥死蔡京之妾，以陷害安道全。蔡京令追捕安道全，在其寓所拘捕蕭讓、金大堅。

第十四回，安太醫遭讒避跡，聞參謀高隱留賓³⁴。安道全逃出東京，偶遇聞煥章。蕭讓、金大堅被刺配沙門島，經過登雲山下獲救。聞煥章赴東京接回蕭、金家眷。安道全尋訪戴宗。

第十五回，大征戰耶律奔潰，小割裂企弓獻詩³⁵。

戴宗受命赴軍中效命。宋金聯合滅遼。戴宗赴建康遇上蔣敬。

第十六回，潯陽樓感舊題詞，柳塘灣除凶報怨³⁶。

蔣敬路遇盜賊，險被害命。在潯陽樓題詞，遇見穆春，同去報仇，奪回財物。

第十七回，穆春喋血雙峰廟，扈成計敗三路兵³⁷。

穆春在雙峰廟殺死「雙峰三虎」，與蔣敬投奔登雲山。扈成設計，令蔣敬假扮黃信誘敵。

第十八回，黃統制遭枉歸山，焦面鬼謀妻落井³⁸。

登雲山諸人用計攻破官軍，連累黃信被捕，後救出黃信。穆春赴安樂村殺死謀害聞煥章的焦面鬼，將聞煥章、蕭讓、金大堅家眷接至登雲山。

第十九回，納平州王黼招兵，逐強徒徐晟奪甲³⁹。

宋金交戰，宋欽宗繼位，改年號為靖康元年。呼延灼遇徐甯之子徐晟，收為義子。呼延鈺、徐晟教場出彩，隨父出征。聞煥章接呼延灼、徐甯家眷往登雲山。

第二十回，賣楊劉汪豹累呼延，失保定朱全投飲馬⁴⁰。

汪豹投敵，金兵渡過黃河。呼延灼父子三人往保定遇朱全，同上飲馬川。曇化從金朝請

³¹ 此回目原刊本作「墨吏貪贓賠錢縱獄，豪紳聚斂加利償民」。

³² 此回目原刊本作「金龜島興兵圖遠略，暹羅城危困乞和親」。

³³ 此回目原刊本作「翻海舶天涯遇知己，換良方相府藥佳人」。

³⁴ 此回目原刊本作「安太醫遭讒先避跡，聞參謀高隱款名賢」。

³⁵ 此回目原刊本作「大征戰耶律淳奔潰，小割裂左企弓獻詩」。

³⁶ 此回目原刊本作「潯陽江悶和酒樓詩，柳塘灣快除雪舟恨」。

³⁷ 此回目原刊本作「穆春血濺雙峰廟，扈成計敗三路兵」。

³⁸ 此回目原刊本作「鎮三山遭冤入登雲，焦面鬼謀妻落枯井」。

³⁹ 此回目原刊本作「啟兵端輕納平州城，逞神力奪轉唐猊甲」。

⁴⁰ 此回目原刊本作「呼延灼父子透重圍，美髯公良朋解險厄」。

兵來攻飲馬川。

第二十一回，李應火燒萬慶寺，柴進仇陷滄州牢⁴¹。

李應諸人設計擊敗曇化，戴宗來訪，告知柴進被陷。李應攻打滄州府，柴進為吉孚與唐牛兒所救。

第二十二回，破滄州義友重逢，困汴京奸臣遠竄⁴²。

滄州府被攻破，戴宗、楊林赴東京，偶遇燕青。朝廷主戰、主和兩派爭議不決。欽宗下令將蔡京父子、高俅、童貫、王黼、楊戩、梁師成等人發配遠惡軍州。李綱派王鐵杖刺殺六賊，王、楊、梁三人被刺，蔡京父子、高俅、童貫從小路避過。

第二十三回，喪三軍將材離火宅，演六甲兒戲陷神京⁴³。

欽宗在戰和之間搖擺不定。姚平仲貿然出兵，全軍覆沒，一時頓悟，到青城山遇見鍾離權，作世外之遊。欽宗聽信郭京邪術，東京被破，北宋滅國。康王趙構于建康登基，是為高宗。

第二十四回，獻青子草野全忠，贖難人石交仗義⁴⁴。

燕青、楊林到金營探訪宋徽宗，獻上青子與黃柑。回來路上遇見淪為難民的盧二安人母女兩人，燕青四處籌措銀兩解救。

第二十五回，折王進小乙逞雄談，救關勝大名施巧計⁴⁵。

燕青、楊林遇見王進，燕青雄談折服王進，又見到凌振。燕青至大名府贖回盧二安人母女，又拾得木夾，救出關勝。

第二十六回，逢天巧荒殿延英，發地雷寺基殲賊⁴⁶。

燕青諸人遇見兵敗的王進、凌振，隨後又遇呼延灼等人，與飲馬川諸人會合。劉狍、畢豐等人領兵來攻飲馬川，燕青設計，公孫勝作法，于萬慶寺天雷地雷同發，大獲全勝。

第二十七回，渡黃河叛臣顯戮，贈鳩酒奸黨凶終⁴⁷。

李應等人用燕青計，擊敗金兵，殺了汪豹。又路遇被押解的蔡京等人，擺筵席盡情消遣，贈鳩酒毒死四人。

第二十八回，橫冲營良馬歸故主，鄆城店小盜識新英⁴⁸。

呼延灼父子三人被金兵冲散，呼延鈺、徐晟混入金營，遇見宋安平，又得兩匹寶馬，逃離金營。路上又遇鄆哥，祭拜梁山泊靖忠廟。又救出呂小姐。

第二十九回，還道村兵擒郭道士，紫髯伯義護美髯公⁴⁹。

呼延鈺、徐晟等人抓獲郭京，朱仝被錢歪嘴告發入獄，遇見皇甫端、宋清夫婦。眾人商議解救。

第三十回，聚登雲兩寨朝宗，同泛海群雄辟地⁵⁰。

燕青設計救出朱仝等人，將曾世雄、郭京梟首。飲馬川諸人與登雲山諸人會合，眾人攻破登州，奪海鯁船出海。路經日本薩摩州，取綢布賞與倭丁，方得脫身。

第三十一回，國主遊春逢羽客，共濤謀逆遇番僧⁵¹。

⁴¹ 此回目原刊本作「撲天雕火燒萬慶寺，小旋風冤困滄州牢」。

⁴² 此回目原刊本作「破滄州豪傑重逢，困汴京奸雄遠竄」。

⁴³ 此回目原刊本作「跨青驃英雄尋退步，演六甲兒戲陷神京」。

⁴⁴ 此回目原刊本作「換青衣二帝慘蒙塵，獻黃柑孤臣完大義」。

⁴⁵ 此回目原刊本作「野狐鋪正言折王進，大名府巧計救關勝」。

⁴⁶ 此回目原刊本作「小相逢古殿話新愁，大征戰松坡獲全勝」。

⁴⁷ 此回目原刊本作「渡黃河叛臣因授首，進鳩酒狹路巧相逢」。

⁴⁸ 此回目原刊本作「橫冲營良馬識故主，靖忠廟養卒奉英靈」。

⁴⁹ 此回目原刊本作「還道村法斬郭道士，紫髯伯術護美髯公」。

⁵⁰ 此回目原刊本作「陰陽設計鐵扇離殃，南北兩寨金鼃聚義」。

⁵¹ 此回目原刊本作「馬國主遊春逢羽客，共丞相訪道遇番僧」。

暹羅國王馬賽真遇見道士，見不祥之兆。共濤遇妖僧薩頭陀，圖謀篡位。

第三十二回，慶生辰龍舟觀競渡，篡寶位綺席進霞丹。

李俊于端陽節慶壽賽龍舟。共濤、薩頭陀用妖術詛咒李俊、馬賽真、花逢春，馬賽真得病又愈，李俊、花逢春安然無恙，世子無疾而夭。共濤、薩頭陀遂設宴，以丸藥毒死馬賽真。共濤篡位，然一股赤氣罩住宮門，共濤不得進入。李俊興兵殺奔暹羅城。

第三十三回，頭陀役鬼燒海舶，李俊誓志守孤城⁵²。

李俊圍住暹羅城，中了薩頭陀反客為主之計，于明珠峽口遇伏，幸有雷雨相助，殺回金鼃島固守，雙方相持不下。童威諸人圍攻暹羅城，商議裏應外合。中原諸人于清水澳會著狄成，前往金鼃島解圍。

第三十四回，大復仇二凶授首，議嗣統眾傑歸心⁵³。

中原諸人與李俊會合，大獲全勝。複領兵攻破暹羅城，救出蕭妃等人。薩頭陀被擒，與共濤伏誅。眾人擁立李俊為國主。

第三十五回，日本國興兵構釁，青霓島煽亂殲師⁵⁴。

李俊稱王，排定座次，分派職事。革鵬往日本借兵一萬，煽動青霓、白石、釣魚三島一同攻打暹羅。公孫勝作法，全殲日本兵。

第三十六回，振國威勝算平三島，建奇功異物貢遐方。

借戰勝日本兵餘威，李俊出師征討，三島平定。

第三十七回，金鼃島仙客題詩，牡蠣灘忠臣救駕⁵⁵。

李俊巡曆諸島，遇徐神翁題詩。宋高宗被金兵追至牡蠣灘，李俊救駕，應驗題詩。眾人痛打趙良嗣、王朝恩，了卻舊怨。

第三十八回，武行者僧房敘舊，宿太尉海國封王⁵⁶。

柴進等人護送高宗返朝，借機遊覽臨安。到六和塔與武松敘舊，又于西湖遇見李師師。宿太尉到暹羅宣讀詔書，冊立李俊為國王，眾人皆封顯官。

第三十九回，丹霞宮三真修靜業，金鑾殿四美結良姻⁵⁷。

李俊與柴進、燕青、樂和商議應行諸事，曉示眾官辦理。公孫勝、朱武、樊瑞於丹霞山中修行。李俊娶聞煥章之女為妃，燕青、徐晟、呼延鈺、宋安平等人亦各得佳人。

第四十回，薦故觀燈同宴樂，賦詩演戲大團圓⁵⁸。

除公孫勝等修行之人及少數幾人，其餘各人都與暹羅國民通婚。高麗國王前來與李俊交拜，結為兄弟。公孫勝建羅天大醮，全國朝拜。宋江、馬賽真等顯靈，眾人歡喜皈依。高麗王拜公孫勝為師。眾人賦詩大團圓。

⁵² 此回目原刊本作「薩頭陀役鬼燒海舶，混江龍誓志守孤城」。

⁵³ 此回目原刊本作「大復仇二凶同授首，權統攝傑士盡歸心」。

⁵⁴ 此回目原刊本作「日本國借兵生釁，青霓島煽亂興師」。

⁵⁵ 此回目原刊本作「徐神翁詩驗金鼃島，宋高宗駕困牡蠣灘」。

⁵⁶ 此回目原刊本作「武行者敘舊六和塔，宿太尉敕封暹羅王」。

⁵⁷ 此回目原刊本作「丹霞宮三真修靜業，金鑾殿四美結良緣」。

⁵⁸ 此回目原刊本作「大聚會弟兄同宴樂，好結果君臣共賦詩」。

參考書目

- 陳曦鍾，侯忠義，魯玉川輯校 1981，*水滸傳會評本*，北京大學出版社，北京
- 朱一玄，劉毓忱編 2002，*水滸傳資料彙編*，南開大學出版社，天津
- 林以亮，夏志清等著，痲弦、廖玉蕙主編 1975，*中國古典小說論集*，幼獅文化公司期刊部，臺北
- 魯迅 2010，*中國小說史略*，中華書局，北京
- 馬蹄疾編 1980，*水滸資料彙編*，中華書局，北京，
- 徐岱 2010，*小說敘事學*，商務印書館，北京
- 王靖宇著，淡蓓芳譯 2004，*金聖嘆的生平及其文學批評*，上海古籍出版社，上海
- 夏志清著，胡益民等譯 2008，*中國古典小說*，江蘇文藝出版社，南京
- [美]浦安迪 1996，*中國敘事學*，北京大學出版社，北京，
- [美]浦安迪著，沈亨壽譯 2006，*明代小說四大奇書*，生活·讀書·新知三聯書店，北京
- 李忠昌 1992，*古代小說續書漫話*，遼寧教育出版社，沈陽
- [德]恩斯特·凱西爾 1992，*神話思維*，中國社會科學出版社，北京
- 陳忱 1975，*水滸後傳*，天一出版社，臺北，
- 施耐庵著，金聖嘆批評 2005，*金聖嘆批評本水滸傳*，嶽麓書社，長沙
- 施耐庵，羅貫中 1988，*水滸傳：李卓吾評本*，上海古籍出版社，上海
- 1954，*新刊大宋宣和遺事*，上海古典文學出版社，上海
- 王旭川 2004，*中國小說續書研究*，學林出版社，上海
- 沈伯俊編 1994，*水滸研究論文集*，中華書局，北京
- 周建渝 1998，*才子佳人小說研究*，文史哲出版社，臺北
- 周建渝 2002，*傳統文學的現代批評*，中國社會科學出版社，北京
- 周建渝 2009，*多重視野中的《三國志通俗演義》*，中國社會科學出版社，北京
- 柳存仁 1967，*倫敦所見中國小說書錄*，龍門書店，香港
- 段春旭 2009，*中國古代長篇小說續書研究*，三聯書店，上海
- 胡士瑩 1980，*話本小說概論*，中華書局，北京
- 孫楷第 1982，*中國通俗小說書目*，人民文學出版社，北京，
- 高玉海 2004，*明清小說續書研究*，中國社會科學出版社北京，
- 張恨水 2008，*水滸人物論贊*，江蘇文藝出版社，南京
- 黃海星 2009，*水滸傳續書研究*，香港大學哲學博士論文，香港
- 趙淑美 1989，*《水滸後傳》研究*，東海大學中文研究所碩士論文，台中
- 駱水玉 2001，*水滸後傳——舊明遺民陳忱的海外乾坤*，*漢學研究*，19 卷，1 期，6 月，219-248 頁
- Widmer, E., 1987. *The margins of utopia: Shui-hu hou-chuan and the literature of Ming loyalism*, Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University.
- Wang, J., 1992. *The Story of stone: intertextuality, ancient Chinese stone lore, and the stone symbolism in Dream of the red chamber, Water margin, and The journey to the west*. Publisher Durham, N.C.; London: Duke University Press.
- Bloom, H., 1997. *The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry*, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press.

〈官定後戲贈〉與杜甫的離職詩

黃自鴻¹

香港公開大學

電郵：chwong@ouhk.edu.hk

一

不作河西尉，淒涼為折腰。
老夫怕趨走，率府且逍遙。
耽酒須微祿，狂歌託聖朝。
故山歸興盡，回首向風颺。

杜甫的〈官定後戲贈〉可謂認識唐代官制的「基礎讀本」(杜甫、仇兆鰲 1979)。在杜甫的影響下，縣尉成為唐代最「惡名昭彰」的官職之一，同時本詩也被認為是唐代士人鬱鬱不得志的真實寫照。在這首詩中，子美感嘆自己不願四處奔波為五斗米折腰，拒絕擔任河西縣尉，後接受右衛率府兵曹參軍一職。作者顯然不滿率府兵曹的工作性質及微薄俸祿，一腔致君堯舜的熱誠遭到打擊，只能耽於杯中之物，放浪狂歌。

這是一首理解杜甫仕宦生涯的重要作品。經過多方努力，杜甫成功獲得宰相試文章的機會，於天寶十四載授河西縣尉。就如〈官定後戲贈〉中所說，渴望已久的出仕機會似乎來臨，到最後卻只換來一身不平之氣。王嗣奭(1983)《杜臆》中解說甚詳：

若論得錢，則為尉頗不淒涼，其云「淒涼」者，為折腰且怕趨走，不如率府兵曹且得逍遙，「逍遙」與「淒涼」反。率府之祿甚微，頗堪為耽酒之需，而且得狂歌以自託於聖朝，謂朝廷不以狂歌為罪也。正見逍遙處。初本欲歸，今得微祿，歸興遂盡，甘回首以向風颺耳。曰「向風颺」，知率府亦非所欲，為貧而仕，不得已也。不平之意，具在言外。「贈」字有誤，當是「戲題」。

現代學者如洪業(Hung 1969)、馮至(2007)、蕭滌非(1980)詮釋本詩，認為杜甫不願任河西縣尉，原因是不欲逢迎長官，鞭撻百姓。杜甫寄贈高適的〈送高三十五書記十五韻〉中，就云「脫身簿尉中，始與捶楚辭」(杜甫、仇兆鰲 1979)；高適就任封丘縣尉，憤憤不平之下寫了和上述作品相似的〈封丘縣〉，同樣借用陶潛不願為五斗米仕宦的典故，反映了唐代縣尉形象欠佳的一面：

我本漁樵孟諸野，一生自是悠悠者。乍可狂歌草澤中，寧堪作吏風塵下。只言小邑無所為，公門百事皆有期，拜迎官長心欲碎，鞭撻黎庶令人悲。歸來向家問妻子，舉家盡笑今如此。生事應須南畝田，世情付與東流水。夢想舊山安在哉，為銜君命且遲迴。乃知梅福徒為爾，轉憶陶潛歸去來。(劉開揚 1981)

¹本文蒙英國牛津大學曾昭楹女士、香港公開大學鄭煒先生惠賜寶貴意見，謹致謝忱。

〈官定後戲贈〉頗能表現唐代下層官吏的心態，也讓以後許多讀者，感慨詩聖仕途的崎嶇。朱東潤(2006)認為河西路遠，尉官也不是容易應付的工作，〈送高三十五書記十五韻〉中所說「脫身簿尉中，始與箠楚辭」，朱氏解釋為「不擔任這項工作，就不至於受到捶楚」。葉嘉瑩(2008)的杜甫專著指出，這首作品能夠說明杜甫真誠的個性，他不滿於縣尉、兵曹參軍的低微職位，不願為此而折腰，於是就用文字自嘲。

然而，在唐代歷史研究的範疇中，「縣尉」的形象可能與杜詩讀者的理解有異。礪波護(1992)、賴瑞和(2004)曾撰文解釋唐代縣尉的制度及職掌，事實上，唐代的高級官員都曾擔任縣尉，文學家對「縣尉」負面形象的解釋或許無法符合歷史事實。據考證，唐代士人先從有地方經驗的縣尉開始是士人釋褐的自然途徑，赤、畿縣尉則是再任或累遷的職位，除非是出身非常良好的士人，才有機會以赤、畿縣尉作初任官。唐縣大致可分為赤、畿、望、緊、上、中、中下、下各等，當上赤、畿縣尉自是美事，不過能成為望、緊、上各級縣尉，也可擁有不錯的仕途前景。兩位學者亦考察縣尉的職務，發現赤縣尉各有六個縣尉，各掌功、倉、戶、兵、法及士六部，而從畿到上縣則各有兩個縣尉，分掌功、戶、倉和兵、法、士等事務，因此，捕盜賊只是縣尉的其中一種工作而已。²杜甫於天寶初年應進士未第，天寶十三年因上賦三篇獲玄宗賞識，通過宰相試文的關卡，日後在晚年的〈壯遊〉裡，就用了甚為自得的筆調記述這段經歷，以及不去就任的原因：「曳裾置醴地，奏賦入明光。天子廢食召，群公會軒裳。脫身無所愛，痛飲信行藏。」(杜甫、仇兆鰲 1979)有關「不拜河西尉」一點，相隔多年的〈壯遊〉與〈官定後戲贈〉敘述基本一致，作者都以為源於自己的「狂」，而沒有說明這是因為(被?)捶楚之故。

按兩《唐書》記載，河西縣位於同州(今陝西)。武德三年從郃陽縣分河西縣，乾元三年改河西縣為夏陽縣。郃陽屬望縣(劉昫等 1975)。賴瑞和(2004)指出，在唐代以制舉或獻著述入縣尉的情況不少，前者約有十多例(書中舉五例)，後者約有四例。合書中所舉的九例看，士人釋褐的縣尉任命地點，《新唐書·地理志》皆作望縣或以下，包括：襄陽(望)、汜水(望)、長社(望)、閬中(緊)、山陰(緊)、富陽(緊)、臨濮(緊)、新政(中)、樂城(中)(歐陽修、宋祁 1975)；再翻閱《舊唐書》，經由制舉獲得的初任官大致以縣尉和參軍為主，以下列出四例(劉昫等 1975)：

崔仁師，定州安喜人。武德初，應制舉，授管州錄事參軍。

[陸]象先，本名景初。少有器量，應制舉，拜揚州參軍。

劉幽求，冀州武強人也。聖曆年，應制舉，拜閬中尉，刺史不禮焉，乃棄官而歸。

[田]仁會，武德初應制舉，授左衛兵曹，累遷左武侯中郎將。

〈官定後戲贈〉中的杜甫，明言右衛率府兵曹參軍根本不是自己希望得到的官職，純粹是無可奈何的權宜之計，然而從唐代官制的角度分析，授與杜甫的兩職實頗符合唐代的任官慣例。按陳貽焮(1982-1988)的看法，杜甫在〈進鵬賦表〉中對皇帝暗示自己的目標是著作佐郎之類的官職，要價實在太高。現在授與從九品的縣尉，自然讓杜甫大失所望，即便其後得到從八品下的閑曹，都不是杜甫期望的，這應該是最符合作者性格的詮釋。事實上，舊注如楊倫(1998)等人，都沒有引述〈送高三十五書記十五韻〉或高適詩解釋本作，只認為〈官定後戲贈〉有著陶

² 洪業譯縣尉為“police commissioner”，賴瑞和則指“county administrator”為最符合縣尉工作性質的譯名。

淵明解印的色彩，更稱述「不作河西尉」兩句「傲岸」，不失為杜詩中較出色的作品。

進一步言，讀者可以借助這首作品發掘杜甫性格中的各個方面。正如評論家指出的，杜甫最可貴的特點在於「真」，表現在詩歌裡頭則是一種極為矛盾的觀點和性格，在這個問題上曹慕樊(2009)有非常恰當的理解。例如，杜甫一方面為人和易，卻又嚴峻；一方面拒絕別人的贈與，卻又向人求取資助；一方面性喜幽獨，卻又期望為唐室效力；一方面心慕儒家，卻又多番借陶淵明等魏晉間人抒發自己的出世欲望；一方面既自信作品獨樹一幟，卻又認為文章事業何等寂寞(杜甫、仇兆鰲 1979)。對〈官定後戲贈〉的不同解釋，正可說明杜甫的「離職詩」是了解作者生平的關鍵。

二

擔任右衛率府兵曹參軍的前後，杜甫撰有〈去矣行〉、〈戲簡鄭廣文兼呈蘇司業〉等作，對於上級官員的不屑，在這些詩作中表露無遺：

君不見韝上鷹，一飽則飛掣。焉能作堂上燕，銜泥附炎熱。野人曠蕩無覲顏，豈可久在王侯間。未試囊中餐玉法，明朝且入藍田山。(杜甫、仇兆鰲 1979)
廣文到官舍，繫馬堂階下。醉則騎馬歸，頗遭官長罵。才名三十年，坐客寒無氈。賴有蘇司業，時時乞酒錢。(杜甫、仇兆鰲 1979)

古注云：「天寶十四載，甫在率府，數上賦頌，不蒙采錄，欲辭職去，作去矣行。」(彭定求 1960)就像早年〈贈李白〉中期拾瑤草的杜甫，〈去矣行〉中充分表露了「野人」不願留在京城，不願趨炎附勢的心情，甚至說自己不受禮法拘束，毫無愧色，從不低聲下氣獻媚於王侯之間，詩的最後引用服食玉屑的典故抒發遁走的意向。後一首〈戲簡鄭廣文〉寫鄭虔騎馬醉歸的酒後狂態為官長斥責，用字幽默，頗有讚美之情。就像〈飲中八仙歌〉的筆調，鄭虔形象甚有賀知章、李白二人的色彩，也突顯出杜甫認為蔑視官長是狂傲自適的主要特點。杜甫著實恥於擔任低級的職位，除了隨侍皇帝左右的拾遺外，杜甫亦嘗任率府兵曹及華州司功參軍，就任不久就離開工作崗位，賴瑞和(2004)認為州府參軍在唐人眼中應該不屬優差，在仕途前景上不如較低級別的官職。以後者為例，〈早秋苦熱堆案相仍〉很能說明杜甫任職華州司功參軍時的不滿。相當有趣的是，一首廣為古典注家所不喜的「劣等詩」，在現代杜甫研究中，卻極有重構詩聖生平、代表杜甫詩作風格的價值，甚至是西方世界理解杜甫的主要來源之一(黃自鴻 2008)。洪業就以同情的筆調為杜甫辯解：「當然有許多簿書。教育官員的工作是多方面的，他須看管學校、廟宇、考試、典禮、陳設等等。他須協助地方長官草擬碑文和信件，須記錄州內所有官員的功過、任官年期、休假。雖然有三個助理和六個文員協助，以上的文書工作須耗費極多的注意力。」(Hung 1969)離職前，杜甫亦撰有〈立秋後題〉說明自己的意向：

日月不相饒，節序昨夜隔。玄蟬無停號，秋燕已如客。平生獨往願，惆悵年半百。罷官亦由人，何事拘形役。(杜甫、仇兆鰲 1979)

王勛成(2004)駁斥了關輔饑荒、政治絕望和房琯集團失勢三個看法，認為杜甫罷官純粹是官少人多的緩衝之計。閻琦(2003)根據杜甫當時的生活狀況和詩作，特別是〈立秋後題〉中的「罷官」一語，說明杜甫並非主動「棄官」，而是遭到「罷官」。〈立秋後題〉以後，杜甫終其一生沒有再提及離職華州司功參軍一事，似有隱情。閻琦翻檢杜詩，指出杜甫一直關注時局和眷戀官宦生涯，不像是對政治失望；就任華州司功參軍之時荒怠政事、私出州境、曠久不歸，罷官是非常合理的結果。乾元二年，杜甫去職華州司功參軍後，於秦州寫下〈遣興五首〉，其中第三、第五首分別詠陶潛和孟浩然。在杜甫筆下，陶潛似未能達道，在其集中屢屢顯示生活長饑枯槁的不滿，可見他領悟人生的道理還是較晚的；孟浩然布衣終身，杜甫有感他的命運與己相若，於是詠以自憐(杜甫、仇兆鰲 1979，阮氏明紅 2004)。然而在另一方面，杜甫也於廣德二年拒絕就任京兆功曹；六月雖然得到嚴武幫助，出任麾下節度參謀、檢校工部員外郎，可是不久後亦以辭職作結(杜甫、仇兆鰲 1979)。也許閻琦的看法仍有待進一步證實，該文倒是提出了一個值得治杜學者探討的問題：我們依據哪些杜詩，採用什麼閱讀視野塑造杜甫「完人」的形象？

嚴武幕府時代的杜甫，在任官初期就已流露不欲久留，期望辭官退隱的意願，例如〈到村〉裡面，杜甫感慨自己白頭幕僚，按楊倫(1998)的說法，作者「此時既不願久留，又不便辭去，不知何適而可，頗費躊躇」：

老去參戎幕，歸來散馬蹄。稻粱須就列，榛草即相迷。蓄積思江漢，疏頑惑町畦。暫酬知己分，還入故林棲。(杜甫、仇兆鰲 1979)

除此以外，〈獨坐〉、〈正月三日歸溪上有作簡院內諸公〉也都重申白首趨幕的尷尬與不耐：

悲秋迴白首，倚杖背孤城。江斂洲渚出，天虛風物清。滄溟恨衰謝，朱紱負平生。仰羨黃昏鳥，投林羽翮輕。(杜甫、仇兆鰲 1979)

野外堂依竹，籬邊水向城。蟻浮仍臘味，鷗泛已春聲。藥許隣人斷，書從稚子擎。白頭趨幕府，深覺負平生。(杜甫、仇兆鰲 1979)

「白首+下級官員+清景→退隱」是以上詩作的基本脈絡。仇注云〈正月三日〉「老趨幕府，不得遂其立朝素志，故云深負」，說法稍嫌坦護，邊連寶(2005)的解說則較通達：「嚴之待公雖厚，然公素性，孤介而疏懶，不耐世俗禮法，故有詩云：束縛酬知己。又有云：小吏最相輕。則趨幕府之為負平生，公實深覺其然。不妨明示院內諸公，即嚴公見之，亦復何害？而顧注乃曲為迴護，何也？」廣德二年秋寄贈嚴武的〈遣悶奉呈嚴公二十韻〉，更詳細的敘述意興闌珊的心情：

白水魚竿客，清秋鶴髮翁。胡為來幕下，祇合在舟中。黃卷真如律，青袍也自公。老妻憂坐痺，幼女問頭風。平地專欹倒，分曹失異同。禮甘衰力就，義忝上官通。疇昔論詩早，光輝仗鉞雄。寬容存性拙，剪拂念途窮。露裛思藤架，煙霏想桂叢。信然龜觸網，直作鳥窺籠。西嶺紆村北，南江繞舍東。竹皮寒舊翠，椒實雨新紅。浪簸船應坼，杯乾甕即空。藩籬生野徑，斤斧任

樵童。束縛酬知己，蹉跎效小忠。周防期稍稍，太簡遂忽忽。曉入朱扉啟，昏歸畫角終。不成尋別業，未敢息微躬。烏鵲愁銀漢，駑駘怕錦幪。會希全物色，時放倚梧桐。(杜甫、仇兆鰲 1979)

這首作品展現出一個白髮老人的形象：性拙老者身患坐痺、頭風，根本不能承擔繁重公務，倒是因為與嚴武交情深厚，勉力盡忠。詩中不忘感謝嚴武雪中送炭的恩情，只是自己不喜歡拘束的生活，性格草率，唯有請辭。黃生認為杜甫「及居幕中，未免以禮數相拘，又為同輩所譖，此公所以不堪其束縛」(黃生、徐定祥 1994)，大約源於〈莫相疑行〉等詩作。若將上面〈官定後戲贈〉、〈去矣行〉、〈早秋苦熱〉、〈立秋後題〉、〈遣悶奉呈嚴公〉等「離職詩」綜合論述，杜甫雖然對時局異常關心，卻又因為各種各樣的理由放棄官職；辭官後生活困頓，不斷尋求親友幫助，詩作中既暴露極其不堪的形象，卻又充滿狂傲的特質，無法與上級和同僚相處。

從知人論世的角度來看，「離職詩」應該是理解作家仕途以至人生的重要材料。如果說，杜甫是以儒家知識分子為基本塑像，要考訂時代背景和他的官宦生涯，上面諸作自是重組杜甫生平的重心。然而，這些主要為了宣泄個人不滿的作品，卻被解讀為愛護人民、皇帝昏庸、時局昏暗、英俊下僚的反映。杜甫世稱「詩史」，要準確了解作者的內心，還須文學與歷史研究互相闡發。

參考書目

- 王勛成 2004，‘杜甫罷官說’，*蘭州大學學報(社會科學版)*，32卷，2期，3月，23-26頁
- 王嗣奭 1983，*杜臆*，上海古籍出版社，上海
- 朱東潤 2006，*杜甫敘論*，人民文學出版社，北京
- 杜甫著，仇兆鰲注 1979，*杜詩詳注*，中華書局，北京
- 阮氏明紅 2004，‘杜甫與陶淵明’，*首都師範大學學報(社會科學版)*，4期，61-64頁
- 曹慕樊 2009，*杜詩雜說全編*，生活·讀書·新知三聯書店，北京
- 陳貽炊 1982-1988，*杜甫評傳*，上海古籍出版社，上海
- 彭定求主編 1960，*全唐詩*，中華書局，北京
- 馮至 2007，*杜甫傳*，百花文藝出版社，天津
- 黃生撰，徐定祥點校 1994，*杜詩說*，黃山書社，安徽
- 黃自鴻 2008，‘《早秋苦熱堆案相仍》的重讀’，*杜甫研究學刊*，2期，6月，66-71頁
- 楊倫 1998，*杜詩鏡銓*，上海古籍出版社，上海
- 葉嘉瑩 2008，*葉嘉瑩說杜甫詩*，中華書局，北京
- 聞一多 2004，*唐詩雜論*，中華書局，北京
- 劉昫等 1975，*舊唐書*，中華書局，北京
- 劉開揚 1981，*高適詩集編年箋註*，中華書局，北京
- 歐陽修、宋祁 1975，*新唐書*，中華書局，北京
- 蕭滌非 1980，*杜甫研究*，齊魯書社，濟南
- 賴瑞和 2004，*唐代基層文官*，聯經，台北
- 閻琦 2003，‘杜甫華州罷官西行秦州考論’，*西北大學學報(哲學社會科學版)*，33卷，2期，5月，88-93頁
- 邊連寶 2005，*杜律啟蒙*，韓成武、賀嚴、孫微、綦維點校，齊魯書社，濟南
- 礪波護 1992，‘唐代的縣尉’，黃正建譯，*日本學者研究中國史論著選譯*，卷4，劉俊文主編，中華書局，北京，560-573頁
- Hung, W., 1969. *Du Fu: China's Greatest Poet*. New York: Russell and Russell.

分析《酒徒》中的五個代碼

杜子臻¹

香港公開大學

電郵：geoffreydo@yahoo.com.hk

引言

劉以鬯(1918-)的《酒徒》由 1962 年 10 月 18 日開始在《星島晚報》副刊上連載，直到 1963 年 10 月出版成書，是一部「娛樂自己」的小說，可見他的寫作目的是為了否定某些自己的作品(劉以鬯 2005)。香港有眾多關於《酒徒》的評論，獲益出版有限公司更選取部分評論出版了《酒徒評論選集》，可見《酒徒》對香港文學影響甚深，而大部分評論的研究內容都集中於《酒徒》的意識流(Stream of consciousness)運用、小說主人公與劉以鬯的關係。本文則集中研究小說的內部，嘗試以羅蘭·巴特(Roland Barthes, 1915-1980)《S/Z》中的五個代碼(codes)來分析《酒徒》，以發掘小說在故事敘述、人物行動、主題結構、二元對立、引用知識等方面的特色，以局部重現小說在組成過程時的多元性。

羅蘭·巴特(2004)認為文本是由五種代碼互相重疊組合而成，而代碼的作用是表現文本的「構成動作」，回到作品的構思過程，回復文本曾有的多元性及可逆性。代碼的能令「引人閱讀之文」(readerly)回到「引人寫作之文」(writerly)，即由商品或成品回到「生產中」的文。巴特認為必須把文本(引人閱讀之文)分割，方能使文本盡量回到其生產的過程，故巴特把《薩拉辛》(Sarrasine)分割成五百六十一個閱讀單位(lexias)，每個閱讀單位只包含二至三個代碼，但巴特不會建構代碼間的關係，希望保持代碼獨立，以呈現文章的「多元複合性」。巴特亦會在閱讀單位間加入「題外話」(digression)用以解釋或進一步整理代碼與文本的關係。最後，巴特以二元對立的代碼組織成象徵區(symbolic grouping)，藉著象徵區表明主題的三種入口，但巴特又不希望具體地建立象徵區，巴特以抽象的方式表現了的主題，因此巴特對《薩拉辛》的解讀亦可引起多重的解讀，有別於以往趨向單一解讀的結論或結構(羅蘭·巴特 2004; Barthes, Roland 2000)。

雖然巴特表示「五個代碼」、「題外話」、「象徵區」均能表現文的多元性。但縱觀《S/Z》，「閱讀單位」及「題外話」只有輔助的功能。²閱讀單位的目的尋找代碼，並非隨意之極，它乃受制於「系統」。就如《薩拉辛》中的最初幾個意義代碼是「女性素質」、「財富」、「冷」、「國際性」，後來成為了象徵區的組成要素，可見閱讀單位的分割是為了方便找尋二元對立的代碼。再者，「題外話」的功能有幾個，分別是解釋五個代碼的原理。替代碼下定義、建構代碼間的關係、建立象徵區等。象徵區才是最能表現文本多元的部分，它表示了文本有多重入口，某程度上，「五個代碼閱讀法」的目的是建立象徵區，

¹ 杜子臻(1988-)，男，香港公開大學中文系兼職助教，現修讀嶺南大學中文碩士。電郵地址為〈geoffreydo@yahoo.com.hk〉。

² 「閱讀單位」及「題外話」只有輔助的功能，這也可能與《S/Z》成書過程有關，《S/Z》是由巴特兩年的演講資料整合而成，自然受「演講」方式所限制。巴特指閱讀單位是依照他停下抬頭思考的地方而劃分。另一方面，可能是巴特借「結構」去展現「多元性」，涉及太多結構主義的特性，如五個代碼和象徵區均是結構，代碼的二元對立。巴特不想別人誤會他是尋找文本的結構，故把「五個代碼」運行方法都放在「題外話」中希望藉此能減少誤解。參巴特，289 頁。

但這不是巴特所希望的，巴特希望借助「結構」，去尋找文本的「多元性」而不是建立象徵區。故找尋象徵區的入口才是五個代碼的目的。

歷來有不少學者把《S/Z》的方法應用於文學評論中，最初是鄭樹森(1948-)的〈白先勇「遊園驚夢」的結構和語碼〉，他認為閱讀單位令分析不能始終一貫，故把〈遊園驚夢〉中的五個代碼組織並逐一分析，並不依照巴特不組織代碼關係的原意，而且分析中沒有應用閱讀單位、題外話、象徵區等概念於小說分析中(周英雄、鄭樹森 1980)。後來古添洪(1945-)著有〈讀「孔雀東南飛」——巴爾特語碼讀文學法的應用〉，文中把詩歌分割成七十六個閱讀單位，並附以十二個題外話作闡釋，完全應用了《S/Z》的閱讀策略，重視重現詩歌的多元性，故對象徵區未有進一步的闡發(古添洪 1984)。而李泓泊的〈讀《長恨歌》——羅蘭·巴特五種文學符碼的方法運用〉，對代碼的中文譯名作了詳細的疏理，並把〈長恨歌〉分割成四十四個閱讀單位，附以十二個題外話作分析，並採用了象徵區的概念，點明了主題中超越與結合的對立(李泓泊 2003)。而黎活仁(1950-)的〈小說的空間化：柏陽研究〉則把〈沉船〉的五個代碼列出，未有進一步把小說中各種代碼的關係組織起來(黎活仁 2008)。可見前人把《S/Z》引用於詩歌分析時，會把《S/Z》的概念全套引用，而分析小說時，僅分析當中的五個代碼。

羅伯特·肖爾斯(Robert Scholes, 1929-)指出巴特的《S/Z》一改文學評論中慣常擴充詩意、壓縮小說內涵的作法，使文章的內涵得以充份闡發(羅伯特·肖爾斯 1988)。雖然《S/Z》的操作方法是一個很全面的閱讀策略，然全面應用於小說分析中必會導致篇幅過多，故本文會逐一分析《酒徒》的五個代碼，並找出代碼間的關連，以表現小說的結構，最後建立象徵區，希望以此提供解讀的門徑，以表現意義的多元性。而為了達到細讀的效果，本文集中分析小說的文學、愛情及酒等三部分。

《酒徒》的詮釋代碼 (hermeneutic code)

詮釋代碼是「真相的聲音」，具有提出疑問、拖延解答及解答謎的功能，以挑起讀者閱讀的興趣。詮釋代碼可分為十個階段，而十個階段可分為建構問題(question)、拖延(delays)和解答(answer)三部分。建構問題部分是「主題化」、「提出」及「謎的正式表述」；拖延部分包括「解答的承諾」、「圈套」、「含混」、「部分解答」、「中止解答」及「剎住」；解答部分就以「破解」為主。巴特認為詮釋代碼必須設置拖延，具備障礙(obstacles)、中斷(stoppages)及歧途(deviations)等功能(羅蘭·巴特 2004; Barthes, Roland 2000)。若把同一序列的詮釋代碼組合一起就會成為「謎」，而《酒徒》中，和主題較密切的謎主要是文學、愛情及酒等三方面，現按文中出現的先後列出主要的謎。

有關文學的謎主要是「『我』會否以嚴肅文學工作為正職？」「主題化」階段在於「我」的職業和興趣矛盾。「我」以寫武俠小說為生，同時具有很高的文學水平，不滿四毫小說在香港流行。而武俠小說和其他四毫小說皆是商品，藝術性及文學性也很低。「提出」階段在於「我」對文學重拾信心。「我」被麥荷門的文學熱誠所感動，並打算續寫多年前的小說〈花橋〉及擔任《前衛文學》的編輯，使讀者對「我」會否從事文學工作感興趣，因此是第一個謎的正式提出。「解答的承諾」在於「我」參與《前衛文學》的策劃。「我」為週刊命名，並承諾翻譯外國小說及撰寫發刊詞，表現了辦週刊的決心，而且讀者可從小說結尾知道辦週刊的結果，故這裏是作者對第一個謎「解答的承諾」。「圈套」在於「我」決定放棄文學並寫黃色小說。「我」表示對文學已不再有興趣，更想把所有文學書籍賣掉，亦不願意再辦週刊。因「我」被莫雨欺騙後，大受打擊，才說出這些自

暴自棄的話。事後，「我」亦有嘗試幫助麥荷門辨《前衛文學》，故這裏是一個「圈套」，讓讀者誤以為「我」會放棄嚴肅文學。「含混」在於「我」勸麥荷門別再辨《前衛文學》。「我」當然不想麥荷門母親的五千元白白浪費，另一方面，「我」更想看到《前衛文學》的出版，所以這裏是真相和圈套共存，可稱為含混。「部分解答」在於「我」表示憎惡四毫小說。可看出「我」由此至終也是對文學抱有熱誠，而寫黃色小說是為了生活，而並非放棄文學。而「我」拒絕為《前衛文學》提供資料，也是一個圈套，往後「我」有多番協助麥荷門。「中止解答」在於「我」和麥荷門的關係惡化。由於以往是麥荷門令「我」和文學工作扯上關係，現在兩人關係惡化，使「我」和文學暫時分開了，因此是「中止解答」。「破解」在於「我」和麥荷門的關係破裂。以往對文學充滿熱誠的麥荷門不再主動請教於「我」。「我」因麥荷門而再接觸文學工作，現在卻因麥荷門而再次和文學工作分離，亦即不會再從事文學工作。此為第一個謎的破解。此謎包含的拖延部分甚多，如「『我』放棄文學」、「『我』寫黃色小說」等情節，可見文學是《酒徒》中的主線劇情，共分八個階段表述，並多番拖延解答，以「圈套」和「含混」來混亂讀者，以保持謎的魅力。

愛情方面的謎主要是「『我』過去的感情狀況」及「『我』的感情會否開花結果」。「主題化」在於「我」想起感情事而情緒低落。「生鏽的感情又逢落雨天，思想在煙圈裡捉迷藏」（劉以鬯 2005），這裏使讀者產生疑問：「『我』的感情為何生鏽？」「部分解答」在於「我」想起被張麗麗求愛拒絕。但張麗麗不一定是「感情生鏽」的唯一原因，故只屬「部分解答」。文中往後沒有再交待此問題，為讀者留下思考的空間，讓讀者可以藉着其他情節，猜想「我」過去的感情生活。可見此謎的作用在於交待「我」曾感情失敗，對愛情死心，並以此提高讀者對往後愛情情節的興趣。此謎引伸了兩個謎，分別是「『我』和司馬莉會否一起」及「『我』和楊露會否一起」，而這兩個問題將會在象徵代碼（symbolic code）部分再作探討。

最後較重要的謎是「『我』能否戒酒」。「主題化」在於「我」想著要戒酒。文中「我」對文學每有衝勁時就會想戒酒。這表示了戒酒和從事嚴肅文學工作有密切的關係，「酒」和文學只能二選其一。「圈套」在於「我」向雷老太太承諾會戒酒。由於雷老太太救了「我」一命，又給了「我」二千元，視「我」如親生子。「我」為了報恩，所以被迫戒酒，而非有決心戒酒。「部分解答」在於「我」飲了酒。我並沒有遵守承諾，更酒後罵了雷老太太。「破解」在於雷老太太自殺，而我繼續飲酒。可見雷老太太的死並未能促使「我」戒酒，「我」是不能戒酒。此謎的「主題化」出現次數甚多，淡淡提出問題，卻遲遲不解答，讓讀者以為謎不會出現。在小說的最後部分才出現「圈套」，打破讀者期待，並以雷老太太的死作結，可見「我」不戒酒的決心。

《酒徒》的詮釋代碼互有關連，如從事嚴肅文學工作和飲酒有衝突，兩者交錯出現，但決不重疊，以表現「我」遊走於面對理想和逃避理想之間。酒和愛情的謎在《酒徒》中起了輔助作用，而讀者最終關心的是「我」能否從事嚴肅文學工作，故文學的拖延部分甚多，表述階段較多，使《酒徒》的情節更為曲折。透過詮釋代碼的分析，可得知三個謎的最終發展都像是回到了故事的原點，「我」仍然以寫稿為生，愛情方面依然是生鏽，依然「想」著戒酒。

《酒徒》的行動代碼（proairetic code）

行動代碼是「經驗的聲音」，指文本中人物做過的動作。巴特認為行動代碼可組成諸多序列，而序列的唯一邏輯是已做過(already-done)和已讀過(already-read) (羅蘭·巴特 2004; Barthes, Roland 2000)。巴特順時序列舉行動代碼，以勾劃故事的大約面貌。本文嘗試把相似的行動代碼組織，以找出行動代碼在《酒徒》中的功能。文中主要的行動代碼可體現在文學、愛情和酒三方面。與文學有關的行動代碼包括「寫稿」及「請教」。文中經常出現「寫稿」這個行動代碼。寫稿專指寫武俠小說或黃色小說，為了生計，「我」不得不寫稿，相反，文學屬於理想和興趣，「我」在文中從未寫過嚴肅文學作品，只是構思小說，但構思並非行動。故寫稿這個行動代碼產生了「主動」和「被動」這組象徵代碼。「我」主動創作武俠小說、黃色小說，這是為了生計，對文學採取被動態度，是受生活條件所限。再者，「寫稿」具詮釋功能，能交待「『我』會否以嚴肅文學工作為正職？」的結果。因為「寫稿」表現了「我」對文學採取被動態度，而出現的頻繁，表示了「我」對文學的態度並無轉變，亦即「我」不會以文學工作為正職。「請教」這行動代碼最能代表麥荷門的個性。麥荷門經常向「我」請教關於文學的知識，對文學採取「主動」的態度。其功用在於顯示「我」和麥荷門對文學的相反態度。此外，亦顯出「我」的文學水平很高。

「購買廉價愛情」亦是「我」常見的行動，故事開首，因「我」心情低落，去了酒吧找女人。第一次出現是莫雨拖稿費，包租婆給他生活費，使他自尊受損，促使他第一次去舞廳，亦因此認識並「愛」上舞女楊露。當楊露沒空見「我」，「我」就再次找女人，結果身上的錢全被女子偷了。及後楊露嫁人，使「我」大受打擊，差點和徐娘未成年的女兒發生關係。最後「我」因文學及愛情失意，衝開了心理障礙，打算找徐娘未成年的女兒，可惜她們已搬家，「我」因此萬念俱灰，飲下滴露。由「找女人」到「輕生」，可見「我」失意時，會藉「找女人」來縱慾，麻醉自己。但是「我」卻想不到會愛上楊露，使自己的感情再受傷害。「找女人」是為了滿足自己及不用受到感情挫折，但楊露使「找女人」的本質扭曲了，令「我」無法去逃避感情傷害，因而輕生。「飲酒」和「找女人」均是陋習，是相似的行動代碼。「找女人」不成就要輕生，可見「我」的陋習是不可戒的。故，「找女人」亦有助解答「『我』能否戒酒」這個謎。

與酒有關的行動代碼包括「飲酒」及「承諾戒酒」。「飲酒」每次出現的時候也不同，或寫稿後飲酒，或找女人時飲酒，或思考文學問題後飲酒，十分隨意。作用在於證明「我」未能戒酒，可幫助解答「『我』能否戒酒」的謎。文中的「我」經常想戒酒，但「想」並非實際行動，故不能視之為行動代碼。相反，是雷老太太救了「我」後，「我」才承諾戒酒。但「承諾戒酒」在故事只出現了一次，表現了「我」是被迫戒酒，其作用是配合「『我』能否戒酒」的謎，組成「圈套」，推動「『我』會否以嚴肅文學工作為正職？」情節的發展。

《酒徒》的行動代碼能把謎的解答拖延，具「圈套」、「含混」、「部分解答」等功能，而行動代碼也是跟隨角色，如代表「我」的行動代碼是「寫稿」、「找女人」及「飲酒」，準確反映了角色的性格。行動代碼也是吸引讀者的關鍵，若果「我」是不飲酒、不找女人的不得志文人，肯定會使故事失色不少。

《酒徒》中的義素代碼 (semantic code)

義素代碼是「個人的聲音」，巴特主張把義素指明，「聽任其不穩定性，離散性，使得它們成為塵屑的微粒，意義的明滅不定的微粒(羅蘭·巴特 2004;Barthes, Roland 2000)。」此這是為了保持文的「多元複合性」。義素代碼具有一種詮釋價值。義素的每個製作過程，都是真相(詮釋代碼)的製作過程。所指是真相的途徑，是真相的未完成(羅蘭·巴特 2004;Barthes, Roland 2000)。《酒徒》中較最要的義素是財富、女性特質及心態。

財富的義素代碼包含了「貧窮」和「富裕」這組二元對立的代碼。「貧窮」的義素代碼主要顯示在「我」的身上，最初呈現於「我」中馬票的夢裏，「我」富有後立刻「將鋼筆丟掉」，鋼筆的所指是寫稿，表明了「我」寫稿是為了金錢，及後「我」「將全場舞女都叫來坐台」，以金錢購買廉價的愛情，最後「我」更將鈔票擲在張麗麗的臉上，可見他認為有金錢就有愛情，求愛不會被拒絕(指舞女)。「我」對金錢抱有強烈慾望，為了生計才寫稿及對人忍讓，處於貧窮的狀況。所以「我」在故事中經常問別人借錢，一次也沒有還。「富裕」的義素代碼主要表現在麥荷門的身上，麥荷門是編「港聞二」，薪金自然比寫武俠小說的「我」高，加上他約「我」去「鑽石」去喝酒，可見他生活過得去，不用為錢而煩惱。「鑽石」的所指為財富，從「我」盛讚「鑽石」的鹵味，以及故事後期「我」借了兩百元才能和楊露去「鑽石」進餐，可見「鑽石」與富裕的生活有關。「富裕」這義素代碼，為麥荷門日後能創立《前衛文學》寫下伏線。

女性特質的義素代碼包含了「具備西方女性特質」及「具備中國女性特質」等兩個代碼。「具備西方女性特質」主要呈現在司馬莉身上：

每一次見到她的眼睛，立刻就想起安徒生的童話。但是她已經學會抽煙了，而且姿勢極好〔……〕她有五個男朋友。我吃了一驚。可是更使我吃驚的是：她說她可能會在最短期間結婚〔……〕可是絕對沒有想到她早已在閱讀《查泰萊夫人之情人》與金賽博士的報告了〔……〕她在我心理上完全沒有準備的時候解開衣鈕。(她醉了?我想。)我越是害怕；她的笑容越嫵媚。我不相信她是羅麗姐型的女孩子；也不希望她會變成羅麗姐。但是，她竟婀娜娜娜地走去關上房門，然後像蛇一般躺在我的床上(劉以鬯 2005)。

「我」對她的描述均是使用西方的指涉代碼 (reference code)，如「安徒生的童話」、《查泰萊夫人之情人》(*Lady Chatterley's Lover*)、《金賽博士的報告》(*The Kinsey Reports*)、羅麗姐型等，可見義素代碼是「具西方女性特質」。再者，她思想開放，有五個男朋友，又主動誘惑「我」，在性方面較為開放。而「具中國女性特質」主要呈現在楊露身上：

楊露的父親在賭台輸去五百塊錢，付不出，當場寫了一張借據給別人，一直無法還清這筆債，只好聽從包租婆的勸告，逼楊露下海做舞女〔……〕楊露賺了不少錢，但是完全沒有積蓄。她的父親比過去賭得更凶，天九、麻將、跑馬、十三張、沙蟹……沒有一樣不賭。楊露收入最好的時候，她的父親到澳門去了(劉以鬯 2005)。

可見楊露是為了養家而當舞女，而且並沒有怪責父親，可見她甚重家庭並且考順，因此具備中國女性特質，和不具備中國女性特質的司馬莉相反。

心態的義素代碼包含了「樂觀」和「悲觀」這組二元對立的代碼。從麥荷門對《前衛文學》的看法，可發現「樂觀」的義素代碼，他並不介意《前衛文學》的銷量，反而為了週刊出版而高興，可見他對文學充滿熱誠及為人樂觀。「樂觀」的義素代碼為麥荷門往後對文學的熱誠減退寫下伏筆。從「我」創作的《海明威在香港》，發現「悲觀」的義素代碼。故事中的海明威在香港賣文為生，寫了很多巨著，卻沒有出版社肯出版。可見「我」對香港的文學風氣已死心。

《酒徒》中的義素代碼會指向謎的真相，但義素代碼必須借助詮釋代碼才可把謎破解，因為義素代碼的所指較含蓄，如楊露具中國女性特質，讀者未必能一開始就掌握其義素代碼，必須積聚一定數量的所指才能歸納出來。再者，義素代碼亦是組成《酒徒》中象徵代碼的重要元素。

《酒徒》中的象徵代碼

象徵代碼是「象徵的聲音」，由一組二元對立的代碼組成(羅蘭·巴特 2004;Barthes, Roland 2000)。其他四種代碼若有二元對立的代碼，均可成為象徵代碼，構成大「結構」。現分析文中二元對立的代碼，以找出文本的深層結構(羅蘭·巴特 2004;Barthes, Roland 2000)。有關以文學為生的問題有「良知」和「沒良知」的對立，麥荷門和「我」均對文學都抱有熱誠，不願創作害人的文學，相反莫雨騙了有二十多年交情的朋友稿費，「我」的朋友以寫四毫小說為榮，李悟蟬以黃色小說賺錢，他們皆沒有藝術的良知，和「我」及麥荷門呈對立的狀態。而對待文學態度：「悲觀」和「樂觀」，使「我」和麥荷門呈對立關係。「我」是悲觀的，對理想失去希望，麥荷門是樂觀的，敢於尋求理想；在行為上，「我」曾為了生計去寫武俠小說及色情小說。相反，麥荷門則堅持從事嚴肅文學，並創辦了《前衛文學》。另一方面，他們兩人尚有相同之處，他們都對文學都抱有熱誠，以前的「我」對文學的熱誠好比今天的麥荷門。再者，他們皆有良知，對四毫小說反感，認為那些是有毒的東西。由此可見，麥荷門某程度是「我」的延續，當《前衛文學》的銷量不佳的同時，麥荷門對文學開始感到灰心，不再向「我」請教文學，可見麥荷門轉趨悲觀，亦可見麥荷門是象徵以前的「我」。

「具中國女性特質/具西化女性特質」使司馬莉和楊露在行為上呈對立狀況。司馬莉只有十七歲，但思想開放，懂得抽煙和喝酒，在「我」的眼中是一個自暴自棄的女孩，而楊露雖是舞女，但「下海」原因是父親欠下賭債，無力償還，加上她的弟弟亦急需錢來上學，所以「我」很同情她。她們的心理亦呈對立關係，楊露的思想並未如司馬莉那般西化，她為了不讓家人傷心，故晚上不回家。她又不介意弟弟對她的憎恨，默默地負上家庭的責任，所以楊露具重家庭的中國女性特質。再者，楊露的職業是舞女，經常陪人客喝酒，但她初遇「我」時，並未有不尋常的身體接觸，相反，司馬莉試圖脫衣誘惑「我」。可見楊露的思想較司馬莉保守。故「我」主動追求楊露，而拒絕了司馬莉的誘惑，這也是出於楊露有「重家庭」和「被迫為娼」的特質。可是到故事後期，楊露決定結婚，使「我」感到灰心，但灰心的原因並非完全出於失戀，而是楊露的本質改變了。楊露結婚即意味着她不再支付家庭的生活費用，她更宣稱不想再理會家人。楊露變為不重家庭，和司馬莉實無太大的差異，故「我」對楊露大為失望，並罵了她一頓。

文中其他兩位與「我」有曖昧關係的女性，則不屬於「具中國女性特質」及「具西方女性特質」這組對立關係，而是和楊露及司馬莉呈對立的關係。因為包租婆和張麗麗並非「我」喜歡的對象，而是利用的對象。「我」和張麗麗、包租婆之間的是互相利用。

「包租婆」提供酒給「我」，以換取「我」陪她一晚。而張麗麗則為「我」提供生活費，而「我」則替她辦事。當「我」找不到楊露時，心情低落，最後飲了滴露，而包租婆為了「我」而飲滴露，但「我」並沒有再找包租婆。故「我」對楊露及司馬莉產生了愛情，而「我」和包租婆、張麗麗的關係是互相利用，雙方呈對立關係。

「繼續飲酒」和「不再飲酒」這組象徵代碼，使「我」和「雷老太太」成為對立的關係。飲酒和找女人均為陋習，而「我」是藉著這兩個陋習來逃避現實，一旦戒了，就會有嚴重的後果。當楊露嫁了後，「我」找徐娘又不成功，使「我」的感情傷害及負面情緒無法壓抑，而飲滴露輕生。可見「酒」和「女人」也不可以戒絕。而雷老太太則鏗而不捨勸「我」，戒酒，本身對「我」並無影響力。但當雷老太太救了「我」，又給二千元「我」，對「我」有恩。因此，「我」覺得有負雷老太太，決定戒酒，與雷老太太同在「戒酒」的陣線。可惜「我」不飲酒就終日不安，故又飲酒，與雷老太太對立，更酒後罵雷太太，雷老太太便因此自殺而死。

《酒徒》的指涉代碼

指涉代碼是「科學的聲音」，是文章引及的諸多知識或智慧(羅蘭·巴特 2004;Barthes, Roland 2000)。指涉代碼是指格言、文學及名人的意見等前人的知識。巴特主張點明文所引及的知識類型而已，不去構造或重新構造其所列舉之文化(羅蘭·巴特 2004;Barthes, Roland 2000)。可是為了有效地建構象徵區，本文會把指涉代碼集中整理。文中佔最多的是文學類指涉代碼，可分為文學作品及作家兩類。單在「我」和麥荷門的一次對話中，提及的現代文學已很多，如《阿Q正傳》、《春蠶》、《秋收》、《殘冬》、《將軍》、《駱駝祥子》、《四世同堂》、《蕭蕭》、《黑夜》、《丈夫》等，若將《酒徒》中全部的文字指涉代碼整理，可以組成一本現代文學簡史。文學的指涉代碼為「我」提供了依據，使我的文學知識得以具體呈現，讓讀者從我的文學偏好，掌握「我」的個性。這些指涉及代碼均是文章引用他人的資料，但讀者在閱讀文章時並不會注意，亦因為這些真實的資料，讓虛構的「我」更為真實，表現出熟悉現代文學且有獨到的文學見解，可以說「指涉代碼」是「我」的構成元素之一。

「我」創作了「海明威在香港」，當中海明威(Ernest Miller Hemingway, 1899-1961)及其作品，如《老人與海》(*The old man and the sea*)、《鐘為誰敲》(*For Whom the Bell Tolls*)，均是「指涉代碼」。作用在於更具體、準確地描繪香港的文學風氣。單憑「我」的遭遇來表現香港的文學風氣是不夠說服力，由於「我」是虛構的，讀者對「我」尚未清楚了解，故不能以「我」來帶出訊息。相反，海明威是著名而傑出的作家，文中以他帶出一個問題：「若果海明威在香港以賣文為生，他也會餓死」，使故事極具震撼力，也能使讀者清楚明白文章的訊息。文中多處提及曹雪芹(1724?-1763)，又提及其著作《紅樓夢》。用處是表明「我」自比曹雪芹，希望能寫出不朽名作，具體地呈現了「我」的志向，從而顯示了「我」對文字的熱愛。在另一方面，亦具有詮釋代碼的功能，曹雪芹和「我」能否戒酒有密切關係，因為「我」稱曹雪芹是酒徒，「我」以曹雪芹自比，亦即想成為曹雪芹，要寫好小說及作酒徒。

《酒徒》的文學指涉代碼，成功塑造了有血有肉的酒徒，及寫實的香港，使故事容易引起讀者的共鳴。若讀者對文學作品一無所知，亦不懂得海明威、曹雪芹，《酒徒》就會回復成虛構的小說，文中的人物會毫無生氣，故事也會變得虛構，故事的情節亦會大打折扣。此外，由於指涉代碼涉及的範圍太廣，讀者對它們的理解均有差異，使《酒

徒》有多重解讀。

《酒徒》的三處入口

本文經由指涉代碼及象徵代碼組成的象徵區，發現《酒徒》有三處入口，分別是對立、文化及文學。以對立來看《酒徒》，故事中的二元對立，只能從好變為壞，並不能由壞變好，而得到改善。變壞的要素，如楊露到後期也不顧家庭；我由寫武俠小說，進展到寫黃色小說；沒有良知的人越能賺錢，有良知的人越窮。而得不到改善的有：麥荷門嘗試把「我」由悲觀轉為樂觀，而因此對文學的熱誠減退，慢慢步入悲觀；雷老太太更想把「我」由飲酒帶去戒酒，結果能力不足，招惹了死亡的下場。可見文中的二元對立只可由好的一方轉為壞的一方。以文化角度來看《酒徒》，社會逐漸被西方影響，如文中的司馬莉思想開放，又如莫雨等人為求利益不擇手段，男女間出現了不認真的愛情，顯然是受了西方的思想影響，使人與人之間互不信任。社會間盛行利己風氣，文中的麥荷門和楊露亦因此失去了樂觀的心態，漸漸成為利己者。從文學角度來看《酒徒》，反映文學墮落的情況。有藝術價值的文學不被欣賞，反而盛行通俗小說如武俠小說、黃色小說。可見文學價值的本質改變了，由為藝術創作轉為為迎合讀者口味而創作，扼殺了作家的創作自由。而創作文藝小說並不能糊口，令到專注從事文藝工作愈益減少，令到文藝創作受到影響。從以上三個角度得出《酒徒》的主題：「代碼、文化、文學都無止境地向壞的方向發展，並不能得到改善。」

參考書目

- 陳炳良 1991, *香港文學探賞*, 三聯書店有限公司, 香港
- 福建人民出版社編 1983, *台灣香港文學論文選*, 福建人民出版社, 福州
- 高辛勇 1987, *形名學與敘事理論：結構主義的小說分析法*, 聯經出版事業公司, 台北
- 古添洪 1984, *記號詩學*, 東大圖書公司, 台北
- 古遠清 1997, *香港當代文學批評史*, 湖北教育出版社, 漢口
- 獲益編輯部編 1995, *《酒徒》評論選集*, 獲益出版有限公司, 香港
- 計紅芳 2007, *香港南來作家的身份建構*, 中國社會科學出版社, 北京
- 李泓泊 2003‘讀《長恨歌》——羅蘭·巴特五種文學符碼的方法運用’, *文學前瞻*, 4 期, 34-56 頁
- 黎活仁 2008, *重複、人物、時間與空間的敘事*, 大安出版社, 台北
- 梁秉鈞、譚國根、黃勁輝、黃淑嫻編 2010, *劉以鬯與香港現代主義*, 香港公開大學出版社, 香港
- 柳蘇 1993, *香港文壇剪影*, 新知三聯書店, 北京
- 劉以鬯 2005, *酒徒*, 獲益出版事業有限公司, 香港
- 羅伯特·肖爾斯(Scholes, Robert) 1988, *結構主義與文學(Structuralism in Literature)*, 孫秋秋、高雁魁、王焱譯, 春風文藝出版社, 瀋陽
- 羅蘭·巴特(Barthes, Roland) 2004, *S/Z*, 屠友祥譯, 桂冠圖書股份有限公司, 台北
- 邱運華 2005, *文學批評方法與案例*, 北京大學出版社, 北京
- 史蒂文·科恩(Cohan, Steven)、琳達·夏爾斯(M.Shires, Linda) 1997, *講故事：對敘事虛構作品的理論分析(Telling Stories: A Theoretical Analysis of Narrative Fiction)*, 張方譯, 駱駝出版社, 台北
- 泰利·伊高頓(Eagleton, Terry) 1993, *文學理論導讀(Literary Theory: An Introduction)*, 吳新發譯, 書林出版有限公司, 台北
- 托多洛夫(Todorov, Tzvetan) 2002, *批評的批評——教育小說(Literature and its theorists: a personal view of twentieth-century criticism)*, 王東亮、王晨陽譯, 三聯書店, 北京
- 黃修己 2004, *20 世紀中國文學史*, 中山大學出版社, 廣州
- 鄭樹森 1982, *文學理論與比較文學*, 時報文化出版事業有限公司, 台北
- 周英雄、鄭樹森合編 1980, *結構主義的理論與實踐*, 黎明文化事業公司, 台北
- Barthes, Roland., 2000. *S/Z*. Translated from french by Richard Miller. Hill and Wang: New York.

論「仁」的英文翻譯

On the English Renditions of the Confucian Concept ren 仁

張宇傑

香港大學

電郵：hkucyk@hku.hk

甲、前言

子貢曰：「貧而無諂，富而無驕，何如？」子曰：「可也。未若貧而樂，富而好禮者也。」（《論語·學而》，載宋朱熹《四書章句集註》1983，頁52）¹禮極為孔子重視。孔子重禮，但更重仁，故孔子說：「人而不仁，如禮何？人而不仁，如樂何？」（《論語·八佾》，頁61）仁是儒家的中心思想。

多位學者都曾統計過「仁」在《論語》裏出現的次數（見 Chan 1955，頁296；楊伯峻 1980，頁16；Leung 2004，頁221）。大家的結果雖然不一致，但都肯定孔子在《論語》裏談仁最多。筆者也根據景印阮刻本的十三經注疏統計過「仁」與「禮」在《論語》出現的次數，「仁」出現凡109次、「禮」則75次，結果與楊說和梁說相符（魏何晏集注、宋邢昺疏、清阮元校勘 1957）。近儒蘇文擢概括孔子之道時也說，「要而言之，仁學而已」（蘇文擢 1971，頁6）。仁雖然是孔子所最重者，卻並非孔子發明。孔子祇是把「仁」發揚光大而已。方穎嫻（1967）與陳榮捷（Chan 1955）都有專文探討「仁」內涵的演變，此處不贅。

仁在英文裏的譯法有十多種。陳榮捷探討「仁」的演變時曾列出「仁」的各種英譯，計十六種：benevolence、love、altruism、kindness、charity、compassion、magnanimity、perfect virtue、goodness、true manhood、manhood at its best、human-heartedness、humaneness、humanity、hominity、man-to-manness（Chan 1955，頁295）。這十六種譯法，Raymond Dawson 亦有提及（1981，頁37）。「仁」的英譯至今已不祇十六種。就筆者所見，還有 authoritative conduct（Ames 1999）、fellow-feeling（Robinson 2011）、consummate conduct（Ames 2011）。譯法雖然多樣，「仁」的內涵卻非上列任何一種所能該。歸根究底，「仁」的涵義實在太豐富了。Raymond Dawson 嘗談及英譯「仁」的困難：

The problem of translating Chinese ethical terms is very great. Whatever English words are used are bound to have their own special associations which are alien to Chinese attitudes. For *jen* nobody has found an entirely satisfactory solution（1981，頁37）。

「仁」英譯之難最能見於韋達的這句翻譯：

¹本文《大學》、《中庸》、《論語》、《孟子》引文均錄自朱熹《四書章句集註》。為免煩雜，下文祇標四書引文之篇名與頁數。

The essential teachings of Confucius may be summed up on the one cardinal virtue of benevolence, or humanity, or loving kindness, which is the primal manifestation of man's spiritual nature or Higher Self (蘇文擢 1971, 頁 10 [英文部分]).

由此可見，benevolence、humanity、loving kindness 三者都不能盡得「仁」的內涵。本文旨在指出，既然在英文裏找不到對等的詞來翻譯「仁」，不如另鑄新詞，以漢語拼音 *ren* 來指稱「仁」。本文分兩部分：本文先探析「仁」的內涵，再分析「仁」現有的英文翻譯。時間所限，逐一分析所有譯法，大抵不能，因此祇會探討兩個最常見的譯法 benevolence 和 humanity，以及較新穎的譯法 fellow-feeling，以見「仁」之不能譯。

乙、「仁」的內涵

仁有廣狹二義。狹義的仁大抵是仁愛、愛人，較易掌握。揚雄《法言》云：「君子於仁也柔，於義也剛。」(汪榮寶《法言義疏》1933，君子卷第十二，頁 1) 韓愈〈原道〉云：「博愛之謂仁。行而宜之之謂義。」(《韓昌黎集》1964，卷 11，頁 60) 又〈原性〉云：「其所以為性者五：曰仁、曰禮、曰信、曰義、曰智。」(頁 64)。這些都是仁之狹義。

仁之廣義則較複雜，因為所有德目都可歸於廣義的仁，是一切德目之所本。宋文天祥〈自贊〉云：「孔曰成仁，孟云取義。惟其義盡，所以仁至。」(《文文山全集》1965，頁 251。)足見仁是全德，涵蓋其他德目。簡單地說，仁是人之為人的本質。《中庸》云：「天命之謂性，率性之謂道，修道之謂教」(《四書章句集註》，頁 17)。這個「性」就是人的道德自覺，人之所以異於禽獸者；而行仁便能體現人的道德自覺。因此《中庸》云：「脩身以道，脩道以仁。仁者人也，親親為大。」(頁 28；又參方穎嫻 1967，頁 25)《中庸》又云：「成己仁也。」(頁 34)《孟子·盡心下》云：「仁也者，人也。合而言之，道也。」(頁 367)《論語·述而》之「志於道，據於德，依於仁」者，亦此之謂也(頁 94)。

孔子雖然屢次提到「仁」，卻從沒有明言仁的內涵。楊伯峻認為孔子對曾子說的一貫之道「忠恕」就是仁(1980，頁 16)：

子曰：「參乎！吾道一以貫之。」曾子曰：「唯。」子出。門人問曰：「何謂也？」
曾子曰：「夫子之道，忠恕而已矣。」(《論語·里仁》，頁 72)

楊伯峻解釋說：「『吾道』就是孔子自己的整個思想體系，而貫穿這個思想體系的，必然是它的核心。分別講是『忠恕』，概括講是『仁』。」(1980，頁 16)其說極是。勞思光也認為「仁」析言之便是「忠恕」(1965，頁 28)。學者討論「仁」的涵義時，也每每提到《論語·顏淵》這一章：

子曰：「克己復禮為仁。一日克己復禮，天下歸仁焉。為仁由己，而由人乎哉？」
(頁 131)

筆者認為，《論語》這兩章正可視為「仁」的定義。「忠恕」為仁是從人的態度上說，而「克己復禮」則從行仁之方上說。

忠者曰何？孔子沒有解釋過。《說文·心部》云：「忠，敬也。」（漢許慎撰，宋徐鉉校定 1963，頁 217）清段玉裁《說文解字注》云：「忠，敬也。敬者，肅也。未有盡心而不敬者。此與慎訓謹同義。盡心曰忠。」（1981，頁 502）唐孔穎達《禮記·中庸》疏云：「忠者內盡於心。」（《禮記正義》1957，卷 52，頁 2111）朱熹說：「盡己之謂忠，推己之謂恕。」（《四書章句集註》1983，頁 8）漢董仲舒《春秋繁露·天道無二》云：「心止於一中者，謂之忠。」（四部叢刊初篇本 1965，卷 12，頁 67）《淮南子·繆稱訓》云：「中君子之意，忠也。」（四部叢刊初篇本 1965，卷 10，頁 69）清梁玉繩釋云：「此即……中心為忠之意。」（何寧《淮南子集釋》1998，頁 719）《大學》云：「欲脩其身者，先正其心。欲正其心者，先誠其意。」（頁 3）誠意正心然後脩身正是「忠」的意思。

《大學》對「誠意」有進一步的闡釋：

所謂誠其意者，毋自欺也。如惡惡臭，如好好色，此之謂自謙，故君子必慎其獨也！小人閒居為不善，無所不至，見君子而后厭然，揜其不善而著其善。人之視己，如見其肺肝然，則何益矣。此謂誠於中，形於外，故君子必慎其獨也。（頁 7）

誠意毋自欺便能正心：

所謂脩身在正其心者，身有所忿懣，則不得其正；有所恐懼，則不得其正；有所好樂，則不得其正；有所憂患，則不得其正。（頁 8）

朱子解釋說：「蓋是四者，皆心之用，而人所不能無者。然一有之而不能察，則欲動情勝，而其用之所行，或不能不失其正。」（《四書章句集註》1983，頁 8）。由此可見，正心就是上文董仲舒所說的「心止於一中謂之忠」。人能夠誠意正心然後脩身，便能忠於人的「性」，忠於人所天賦的道德自覺。

《大學》對誠意提出了具體的方法，就是「慎獨」。上文提過，朱子解釋「正心」時也說，人一有所忿懣恐懼、好樂憂患而不能察覺，便會「欲動情勝」，心便不能正了。因此要時時警惕。這種對自己的戒慎就是孔子答顏淵問仁時所說的「克己」。

然而，慎獨脩己不足以稱仁。除了「忠」外，還需要「恕」。「恕」就是將心比心。孔穎達《禮記·中庸》疏云：「恕者，外不欺物。恕，付也，付度其義於人也。」（《禮記正義》1957，卷 52，頁 2111）子貢問曰：「有一言而可以終身行之者乎？」子曰：「其恕乎！己所不欲，勿施於人。」（《論語·衛靈公》，頁 166）《中庸》云：「施諸己而不願，亦勿施於人。」（頁 23）《大學》裏的「絜矩之道」其實就是恕：

所惡於上，毋以使下；所惡於下，毋以事上；所惡於前，毋以先後；所惡於後，毋以從前；所惡於右，毋以交於左；所惡於左，毋以交於右。（頁 10）

這些都是從消極的一面而言。正面地說，恕就是《論語·雍也》所說的「己欲立而立人，己欲達而達人」（頁 92）。總言之，「恕」就是朱子所謂的「推己」，孔子所謂的「愛人」（《論語·顏淵》，頁 139），要將心比心，推己及人。

為人設想固然重要，但是要把「恕」付諸實行，纔能安人安百姓。禮正是實踐恕道的方法。先儒常常訓禮為履便是這個緣故。因此，孔子答顏淵說，除了「克己」外，還

要「復禮」，把立人達人之心實踐出來，纔稱得上「仁」。恕實踐到不同人身上，便成了不同的德目，例如用到父母身上是孝，兄長身上則為弟。

「克己」加上「復禮」便是仁。禮數要看對象，因人而異，最重要是合宜。這點務須注意。合宜就是義。先儒常以宜訓義。上文引《中庸》提到，「仁者人也，親親為大」。又《中庸》云：「親親之殺，尊賢之等，禮所生也。」(頁 28) 因此對待父母，關心要最多，相對的禮數也最隆重。關係疏離一點，關心也自然少一點，禮數也當然簡單一點。故有子說：「君子務本，本立而道生。孝弟也者，其為仁之本與。」(《論語·學而》，頁 48) 儒家思想認為親疏有別，除了因為要維持人倫外，更重要者是人生於天地之間，便要行天地之道。天下萬事萬物都有尊有卑，有始有終。故《大學》云：「物有本末，事有終始。知所先後，則近道矣。」(頁 3) 《禮記·樂記》云：「天尊地卑，君臣定矣。卑高已陳，貴賤位矣。動靜有常，小大殊矣。方以類聚，物以羣分，則性命不同矣。在天成象，在地成形。如此，則禮者，天地之別也。」(清孫希旦《禮記集解》1989，頁 993) 總言之，「禮者，天地之序也。」(《禮記集解》1989，頁 990)

最後談談「仁」之健與其道德之重要性。「仁」有一種特質，就是健行不息(牟宗三 1974，頁 36)。《易·乾·象》曰：「天行健，君子以自強不息。」(《周易》〔四部叢刊初篇本〕1965，頁 1) 子曰：「天何言哉？四時行焉，百物生焉，天何言哉？」(《論語·陽貨》，頁 180) 君子要像四時運行一樣，生生不息，時時刻刻都行仁，須臾不離。因此孔子說：「君子無終食之間違仁，造次必於是，顛沛必於是。」(《論語·里仁》，頁 70)

從「仁」之健可見其道德之重要性。仁既是個人的心意，也是道德的責任，必須堅守。故子曰：「民之於仁也，甚於水火。」(《論語·衛靈公》，頁 168) 子曰：「當仁不讓於師。」(《衛靈公》，頁 168) 有時為了成就仁，犧牲性命也在所不辭。子曰：「志士仁人，無求生以害仁，有殺身以成仁。」(《衛靈公》，頁 163)

丙、「仁」的英譯

「仁」的英文翻譯以 benevolence 和 humanity 最常見。下文將討論這兩個翻譯的得失。此外，下文也會討論 fellow-feeling 這個較新的翻譯。多年來討論這些翻譯的文獻不少。囿於時間，不能在此詳細分析各學者的意見。梁國超(Leung 2004)已經總結了各種的評價，此處不贅。下文主要根據上文「仁」內涵的討論來剖析翻譯的得失。

子、Benevolence 譯「仁」

Benevolence 是「仁」最常見的英譯之一。Oxford English Dictionary (OED) 這樣解釋 benevolence：

Disposition to do good, desire to promote the happiness of others, kindness, generosity, charitable feeling (as a general state or disposition towards mankind at large). (1989)

從這個定義可見，benevolence 確有「恕」的涵意。OED 所說的「desire to promote the happiness of others」亦與立人達人之意相距不遠。然而，benevolence 卻完全忽略了「仁」

對克己脩身的要求。美國漢學家安樂哲(Roger Ames)說，benevolence 這個翻譯突出了仁之一端，卻忽略了仁所包括的其他德目 (2011, 頁 177)，所言甚是。Raymond Dawson 說，benevolence 雖然與仁意思相近，在英文裏用起來也不見突兀，卻始終不夠嚴謹 (1981, 頁 38)。此外，benevolence 也容易令讀者聯想到這個字在英文裏的本義，曲解了「仁」的涵意 (Dawson 1981, 頁 38)。

這些聯想是甚麼？他沒有解釋。梁國超指出，benevolence 是一個宗教的詞，意思是要幫助貧困和有需要的人(Leung 2004, 頁 58)。誠然，看看以下例句，便會發現 benevolence 似乎略帶施捨、憐憫的色彩：

A benevolent uncle paid for her to have music lessons. (*Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English* 2009)

當然，「仁」也有憐憫的意思，有「不忍人之心」，但對別人的關心也要適當。上文說過，仁之實踐要視乎對象，所謂「親親之殺」是也。然而，就上列的例句所見，即使對人過分關心，超過了本分，似乎也可稱之為 benevolence。仁決非如此。

此外，恕心是可以用於不同關係的，在父母是孝，在上司則恭。可是，benevolence 這個帶憐憫色彩的字用於父母、上司卻未免突兀，因為父母子女、上司下屬等關係都是雙向的。以父母與子女的關係為例，子女當然要孝順父母，而父母也要疼愛子女，並非如 benevolence 一詞的性質一般，純屬單向的施捨而已。

丑、Humanity 譯「仁」

Humanity 是「仁」另一個常見的英譯。OED 這樣解釋 humanity：

The character or quality of being humane; behaviour or disposition towards others such as befits a human being...Disposition to treat human beings and animals with consideration and compassion, and to relieve their distresses; kindness, benevolence; humaneness. (1989)

Humanity 相應的形容詞是 humane。茲記 OED 的解釋如下：

Characterized by such behaviour or disposition towards others as befits a man.

a. Gentle or kindly in demeanour or action; civil, courteous, friendly, obliging. Obs. (passing gradually into b.)

b. Marked by sympathy with and consideration for the needs and distresses of others; feeling or showing compassion and tenderness towards human beings and the lower animals; kind, benevolent. (In early use not clearly distinguishable from a.) (OED 1989)

Humanity 蘊涵了「恕」的意思，存關懷別人之意。這個詞的意思與 benevolent 接近，都是對他人的同情。辭典闡釋 humane 時更或用上 benevolent 一字 (Pearsall & Trumble 2002 ; Soanes & Stevenson 2006)。兩者比較，humanity 顯然比 benevolence 更貼切，因為 humanity 除了關心別人的意思外，也令人想到人天生便有不忍人之心。

不過，humanity 作為「仁」的翻譯，也有缺點。首先，humanity 跟 benevolence 一樣，都略帶同情之義，並不適用於所有關係上。用到父母、朋友等關係上畢竟彀扭。上文討論 benevolence 時已解釋過，此處不贅。再者，「仁」要克己脩身之意，在 humanity 裏同樣付之闕如。這個翻譯雖然點出了人天賦的善心，但與「仁」的差別也頗大。誠然，人人皆生而有「仁」。子曰：「仁遠乎哉？我欲仁，斯仁至矣。」(《論語·述而》，頁 100)。然而，要學懂克己纔能脩身。人必定有善性惡性二端，故必須脩身方能行忠恕之道。揚子《法言》云：「人之性也，善惡混。修其善則為善人，修其惡則為惡人。」(汪榮寶《法言義疏》1933，修身卷第三，頁 1)上文引《中庸》說，「脩道之謂教」。《禮記·學記》云：「君子如欲化民成俗，其必由學乎！玉不琢不成器，人不學不知道。」(清孫希旦《禮記集解》1989，頁 956-957)

因此，「仁」雖然是「天爵」(見《孟子·告子上》，頁 336)，大家都有，但「仁」是道德上非常高的境界，僅次於「神」與「聖」，絕不輕易做到，連孔子也不敢自居。子曰：「若聖與仁，則吾豈敢？抑為之不厭，誨人不倦，則可謂云爾已矣。」(《論語·述而》，頁 101) 孔子有弟子三千，而「身通六藝者七十有二人」(漢司馬遷，《史記》1959，卷 47，孔子世家第十七，頁 1938)。然而，祇有顏回能「三月不違仁，其餘則日月至焉而已矣。」(《論語·雍也》，頁 86)

寅、Fellow-feeling 譯「仁」

Douglas Robinson 去年在香港浸會大學的一個翻譯講座講演時，提出以 fellow-feeling 來翻譯「仁」(Robinson 2011)。在他看來，benevolence 和 humanity 都不能盡得「仁」的涵意。他認為 fellow-feeling 當是「仁」最貼切的翻譯。Oxford English Dictionary 這樣解釋 fellow-feeling：

Participation in the feelings of others; sympathy (OED 1989)

誠然，fellow-feeling 是個挺妥貼的翻譯，因為 fellow-feeling 正是以己度人之恕心。較諸 benevolence 和 humanity，fellow-feeling 顯然更勝一籌，因為 fellow-feeling 一詞突出了仁「將心比心」的「恕」。此外，這種 fellow-feeling 可用於任何關係上，並非僅僅單向的施贈，用於父母、兄弟上均可。可惜，fellow-feeling 同樣祇是廣義「仁」的一端而已。正心誠意然後脩身的意思經翻譯後便蕩然無存了。

其實，benevolence、humanity 與 fellow-feeling 三字除了不能傳遞「仁」要克己脩身的涵意外，更不能翻譯仁之健及其重要性。上文乙部已解釋過，君子造次顛沛都不違仁，甚至要捨身成仁。然而，這三個翻譯都欠缺了「仁」在道德上的重要性，不像「仁」一樣要時時刻刻堅守。

丁、結語

「仁」歷年的英譯不少。從上文對 *benevolence*、*humanity*、及 *fellow-feeling* 三個英譯的評析可見，它們都能夠把「仁」具對別人的關懷的一端譯出。Robinson 提出的新譯法 *fellow-feeling* 更能夠把「恕」將心比心的特質表現出來。然而，「仁」要慎獨脩身的一端具付之闕如。不過，三個英譯即使包含為人設想之意，卻始終無法傳達「仁」在道德上的重要性。

其實，「前言」所列出的各種譯法，沒有一個足以包羅「仁」所有的內涵。筆者以為，學者大抵會繼續嘗試，把仁譯成英文。不過，仁的涵義如此豐富，新的英譯相信也無法盡得「仁」的內涵。再者，即使有新的英譯，應用時譯者還是要花一番功夫，解釋「仁」的內涵。因此，不如乾脆用漢語拼音把「仁」譯成 *ren*。假以時日，*ren* 便能普及起來，像 *dim-sum*、*kung-fu* 等字一樣，起初是拼音而已，漸漸便演變成真正的英文詞語。現在 *Dim-sum*、*kung-fu* 二字具見於 *Oxford English Dictionary*，而二零零八年美國迪士尼更製作了一齣電影叫 *Kungfu Panda*。學界有了統一的詞來指稱「仁」，對於儒學在西方的推廣與研究，相信有不少幫助。

參考文獻

- 文天祥 1965, *文文山全集*, 世界書局, 臺北
- 方穎嫻 1967, ‘原仁論 — 自詩書至孔子時代觀念之演變’, *大陸雜誌*, 第 52 卷, 第 3 期, 頁 22-34
- 司馬遷 1959, *史記*, 中華書局, 北京
- 朱熹 1983, *四書章句集註*, 中華書局, 北京
- 牟宗三 1974, *中國哲學的特質*, 臺灣學生書局, 臺北
- 何寧 1998, *淮南子集釋*, 中華書局, 北京
- 汪榮寶 1933, *法言義疏*, 出版社、出版地缺
- 周易*〔四部叢刊初篇本〕1965, 臺灣商務印書館, 臺北
- 段玉裁 1981, *說文解字注* [經韻樓臧版], 上海古籍出版社, 上海
- 孫希旦 1989, *禮記集解*, 中華書局, 北京
- 淮南子*〔四部叢刊初篇本〕1965, 臺灣商務印書館, 臺北
- 許慎撰, 徐鉉等校定 1963, *說文解字*, 中華書局, 北京
- 何晏集注、宋邢昺疏、清阮元校勘 1957, *景印阮刻論語注疏二十卷：附校勘記* [粹芬閣藏版], 啟明書局, 臺北
- 勞思光 1966, *中國文化要義*, 香港中文大學崇基學院, 香港
- 楊伯峻 1980, *論語譯注*, 中華書局, 北京
- 董仲舒 1965, *春秋繁露*〔四部叢刊初篇本〕, 臺灣商務印書館, 臺北
- 鄭玄注, 孔穎達疏 1957, *禮記正義*, 中華書局, 北京
- 韓愈 1964, *韓昌黎集*, 商務印書館(香港)有限公司, 香港
- 蘇文擢 1971, *三教約言 Highlights of the Three Religions of China*, 圓玄學院, 香港
- Ames, R. and Rosemont Jr., H. (trans.), 1999. *The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation*. New York : Ballantine Books.
- Ames, R., 2011. *Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary*. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press.
- Chan W.T., 1955. The Evolution of the Confucian Concept Jên. *Philosophy East and West*, 4(4), pp.295-319.
- Dawson, R., 1981. *Confucius*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Leung, K.C.A., 2004. *Translating Confucian Thought: The Case of the Analects*. MPhil. The University of Hong Kong.
- Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English* 2009. Harlow, Pearson Longman.
- Pearsall, J. and Trumble, B., 2002. *Oxford English Reference Dictionary*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Robinson, D., 2011. A Seminar Entitled ‘English Translations of rén 仁 in Mencius,’ at Hong Kong Baptist University, 24th February 2011.
- Simpson, J.A. and Weiner, E.S.C., 1989. *The Oxford English Dictionary*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Soanes, C. and Stevenson, A., 2006. *Concise Oxford English Dictionary*. 11th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.