Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11861/6455
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Prof. YEUNG Wing Kay, David | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-02-26T06:26:16Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-02-26T06:26:16Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2000 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2000, vol. 106, pp. 657-675. | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 0022-3239 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11861/6455 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper, we consider a class of differential games in which the game ends when a subset of its state variables reaches a certain target at the terminal time. A special feature of the game is that its horizon is not fixed at the outset, but is determined endogenously by the actions of the players; conditions characterizing a feedback Nash equilibrium (FNE) solution of the game are derived for the first time. Extensions and illustrations of the derivation of FNE solutions of the game are provided. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications | en_US |
dc.title | Feedback solution of a class of differential games with endogenous horizons | en_US |
dc.type | Peer Reviewed Journal Article | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1023/A:1004665614745 | - |
item.fulltext | No Fulltext | - |
crisitem.author.dept | Department of Economics and Finance | - |
Appears in Collections: | Economics and Finance - Publication |
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