Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11861/6418
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dc.contributor.authorProf. YEUNG Wing Kay, Daviden_US
dc.contributor.authorPetrosyan, Leon A.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2021-02-24T03:57:45Z-
dc.date.available2021-02-24T03:57:45Z-
dc.date.issued2013-
dc.identifier.citationDynamic Games and Applications, 2013, vol. 3, pp. 419-442.en_US
dc.identifier.issn2153-0785-
dc.identifier.issn2153-0793-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11861/6418-
dc.description.abstractThe provision of public goods constitutes a classic case of market failure which calls for cooperative optimization. However, cooperation cannot be sustainable unless there is guarantee that the agreed-upon optimality principle can be maintained throughout the planning duration. This paper derives subgame consistent cooperative solutions for public goods provision by asymmetric agents with transferable payoffs in a stochastic differential game framework. In particular, subgame consistency ensures that as the game proceeds agents are guided by the same optimality principle, and hence they do not possess incentives to deviate from the previously adopted optimal behavior. A “payoff distribution procedure” leading to subgame-consistent solutions is derived and illustrative examples are presented. This is the first time that subgame consistent cooperative provision of public goods with transferable payoffs is analyzed.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofDynamic Games and Applicationsen_US
dc.titleSubgame consistent cooperative provision of public goodsen_US
dc.typePeer Reviewed Journal Articleen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s13235-012-0062-7-
item.fulltextNo Fulltext-
crisitem.author.deptDepartment of Economics and Finance-
Appears in Collections:Economics and Finance - Publication
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